From 3d08cd331c1adcf0d917392f7e527b3f00511748 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 06:52:22 +0200 Subject: Merging upstream version 6.8. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7 | 248 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 248 insertions(+) create mode 100644 man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7 (limited to 'man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7') diff --git a/man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7 b/man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..392aa08 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man7/cgroup_namespaces.7 @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2016 by Michael Kerrisk +.\" +.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft +.\" +.\" +.TH cgroup_namespaces 7 2024-05-02 "Linux man-pages (unreleased)" +.SH NAME +cgroup_namespaces \- overview of Linux cgroup namespaces +.SH DESCRIPTION +For an overview of namespaces, see +.BR namespaces (7). +.P +Cgroup namespaces virtualize the view of a process's cgroups (see +.BR cgroups (7)) +as seen via +.IR /proc/ pid /cgroup +and +.IR /proc/ pid /mountinfo . +.P +Each cgroup namespace has its own set of cgroup root directories. +These root directories are the base points for the relative +locations displayed in the corresponding records in the +.IR /proc/ pid /cgroup +file. +When a process creates a new cgroup namespace using +.BR clone (2) +or +.BR unshare (2) +with the +.B CLONE_NEWCGROUP +flag, its current +cgroups directories become the cgroup root directories +of the new namespace. +(This applies both for the cgroups version 1 hierarchies +and the cgroups version 2 unified hierarchy.) +.P +When reading the cgroup memberships of a "target" process from +.IR /proc/ pid /cgroup , +the pathname shown in the third field of each record will be +relative to the reading process's root directory +for the corresponding cgroup hierarchy. +If the cgroup directory of the target process lies outside +the root directory of the reading process's cgroup namespace, +then the pathname will show +.I ../ +entries for each ancestor level in the cgroup hierarchy. +.P +The following shell session demonstrates the effect of creating +a new cgroup namespace. +.P +First, (as superuser) in a shell in the initial cgroup namespace, +we create a child cgroup in the +.I freezer +hierarchy, and place a process in that cgroup that we will +use as part of the demonstration below: +.P +.in +4n +.EX +# \fBmkdir \-p /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/sub2\fP +# \fBsleep 10000 &\fP # Create a process that lives for a while +[1] 20124 +# \fBecho 20124 > /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/sub2/cgroup.procs\fP +.EE +.in +.P +We then create another child cgroup in the +.I freezer +hierarchy and put the shell into that cgroup: +.P +.in +4n +.EX +# \fBmkdir \-p /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/sub\fP +# \fBecho $$\fP # Show PID of this shell +30655 +# \fBecho 30655 > /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer/sub/cgroup.procs\fP +# \fBcat /proc/self/cgroup | grep freezer\fP +7:freezer:/sub +.EE +.in +.P +Next, we use +.BR unshare (1) +to create a process running a new shell in new cgroup and mount namespaces: +.P +.in +4n +.EX +# \fBPS1="sh2# " unshare \-Cm bash\fP +.EE +.in +.P +From the new shell started by +.BR unshare (1), +we then inspect the +.IR /proc/ pid /cgroup +files of, respectively, the new shell, +a process that is in the initial cgroup namespace +.RI ( init , +with PID 1), and the process in the sibling cgroup +.RI ( sub2 ): +.P +.in +4n +.EX +sh2# \fBcat /proc/self/cgroup | grep freezer\fP +7:freezer:/ +sh2# \fBcat /proc/1/cgroup | grep freezer\fP +7:freezer:/.. +sh2# \fBcat /proc/20124/cgroup | grep freezer\fP +7:freezer:/../sub2 +.EE +.in +.P +From the output of the first command, +we see that the freezer cgroup membership of the new shell +(which is in the same cgroup as the initial shell) +is shown defined relative to the freezer cgroup root directory +that was established when the new cgroup namespace was created. +(In absolute terms, +the new shell is in the +.I /sub +freezer cgroup, +and the root directory of the freezer cgroup hierarchy +in the new cgroup namespace is also +.IR /sub . +Thus, the new shell's cgroup membership is displayed as \[aq]/\[aq].) +.P +However, when we look in +.I /proc/self/mountinfo +we see the following anomaly: +.P +.in +4n +.EX +sh2# \fBcat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep freezer\fP +155 145 0:32 /.. /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer ... +.EE +.in +.P +The fourth field of this line +.RI ( /.. ) +should show the +directory in the cgroup filesystem which forms the root of this mount. +Since by the definition of cgroup namespaces, the process's current +freezer cgroup directory became its root freezer cgroup directory, +we should see \[aq]/\[aq] in this field. +The problem here is that we are seeing a mount entry for the cgroup +filesystem corresponding to the initial cgroup namespace +(whose cgroup filesystem is indeed rooted at the parent directory of +.IR sub ). +To fix this problem, we must remount the freezer cgroup filesystem +from the new shell (i.e., perform the mount from a process that is in the +new cgroup namespace), after which we see the expected results: +.P +.in +4n +.EX +sh2# \fBmount \-\-make\-rslave /\fP # Don\[aq]t propagate mount events + # to other namespaces +sh2# \fBumount /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer\fP +sh2# \fBmount \-t cgroup \-o freezer freezer /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer\fP +sh2# \fBcat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep freezer\fP +155 145 0:32 / /sys/fs/cgroup/freezer rw,relatime ... +.EE +.in +.\" +.SH STANDARDS +Linux. +.SH NOTES +Use of cgroup namespaces requires a kernel that is configured with the +.B CONFIG_CGROUPS +option. +.P +The virtualization provided by cgroup namespaces serves a number of purposes: +.IP \[bu] 3 +It prevents information leaks whereby cgroup directory paths outside of +a container would otherwise be visible to processes in the container. +Such leakages could, for example, +reveal information about the container framework +to containerized applications. +.IP \[bu] +It eases tasks such as container migration. +The virtualization provided by cgroup namespaces +allows containers to be isolated from knowledge of +the pathnames of ancestor cgroups. +Without such isolation, the full cgroup pathnames (displayed in +.IR /proc/self/cgroups ) +would need to be replicated on the target system when migrating a container; +those pathnames would also need to be unique, +so that they don't conflict with other pathnames on the target system. +.IP \[bu] +It allows better confinement of containerized processes, +because it is possible to mount the container's cgroup filesystems such that +the container processes can't gain access to ancestor cgroup directories. +Consider, for example, the following scenario: +.RS +.IP \[bu] 3 +We have a cgroup directory, +.IR /cg/1 , +that is owned by user ID 9000. +.IP \[bu] +We have a process, +.IR X , +also owned by user ID 9000, +that is namespaced under the cgroup +.I /cg/1/2 +(i.e., +.I X +was placed in a new cgroup namespace via +.BR clone (2) +or +.BR unshare (2) +with the +.B CLONE_NEWCGROUP +flag). +.RE +.IP +In the absence of cgroup namespacing, because the cgroup directory +.I /cg/1 +is owned (and writable) by UID 9000 and process +.I X +is also owned by user ID 9000, process +.I X +would be able to modify the contents of cgroups files +(i.e., change cgroup settings) not only in +.I /cg/1/2 +but also in the ancestor cgroup directory +.IR /cg/1 . +Namespacing process +.I X +under the cgroup directory +.IR /cg/1/2 , +in combination with suitable mount operations +for the cgroup filesystem (as shown above), +prevents it modifying files in +.IR /cg/1 , +since it cannot even see the contents of that directory +(or of further removed cgroup ancestor directories). +Combined with correct enforcement of hierarchical limits, +this prevents process +.I X +from escaping the limits imposed by ancestor cgroups. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR unshare (1), +.BR clone (2), +.BR setns (2), +.BR unshare (2), +.BR proc (5), +.BR cgroups (7), +.BR credentials (7), +.BR namespaces (7), +.BR user_namespaces (7) -- cgit v1.2.3