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|
.\" Copyright (c) 2021 by Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
.\"
.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft
.\"
.TH mount_setattr 2 2024-05-02 "Linux man-pages (unreleased)"
.SH NAME
mount_setattr \- change properties of a mount or mount tree
.SH LIBRARY
Standard C library
.RI ( libc ", " \-lc )
.SH SYNOPSIS
.nf
.BR "#include <linux/fcntl.h>" " /* Definition of " AT_* " constants */"
.BR "#include <linux/mount.h>" " /* Definition of " MOUNT_ATTR_* " constants */"
.BR "#include <sys/syscall.h>" " /* Definition of " SYS_* " constants */"
.B #include <unistd.h>
.P
.BI "int syscall(SYS_mount_setattr, int " dirfd ", const char *" pathname ,
.BI " unsigned int " flags ", struct mount_attr *" attr \
", size_t " size );
.fi
.P
.IR Note :
glibc provides no wrapper for
.BR mount_setattr (),
necessitating the use of
.BR syscall (2).
.SH DESCRIPTION
The
.BR mount_setattr ()
system call changes the mount properties of a mount or an entire mount tree.
If
.I pathname
is a relative pathname,
then it is interpreted relative to
the directory referred to by the file descriptor
.IR dirfd .
If
.I dirfd
is the special value
.BR AT_FDCWD ,
then
.I pathname
is interpreted relative to
the current working directory of the calling process.
If
.I pathname
is the empty string and
.B AT_EMPTY_PATH
is specified in
.IR flags ,
then the mount properties of the mount identified by
.I dirfd
are changed.
(See
.BR openat (2)
for an explanation of why the
.I dirfd
argument is useful.)
.P
The
.BR mount_setattr ()
system call uses an extensible structure
.RI ( "struct mount_attr" )
to allow for future extensions.
Any non-flag extensions to
.BR mount_setattr ()
will be implemented as new fields appended to the this structure,
with a zero value in a new field resulting in the kernel behaving
as though that extension field was not present.
Therefore,
the caller
.I must
zero-fill this structure on initialization.
See the "Extensibility" subsection under
.B NOTES
for more details.
.P
The
.I size
argument should usually be specified as
.IR "sizeof(struct mount_attr)" .
However, if the caller is using a kernel that supports an extended
.IR "struct mount_attr" ,
but the caller does not intend to make use of these features,
it is possible to pass the size of an earlier
version of the structure together with the extended structure.
This allows the kernel to not copy later parts of the structure
that aren't used anyway.
With each extension that changes the size of
.IR "struct mount_attr" ,
the kernel will expose a definition of the form
.BI MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER number\c
\&.
For example, the macro for the size of the initial version of
.I struct mount_attr
is
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_SIZE_VER0 .
.P
The
.I flags
argument can be used to alter the pathname resolution behavior.
The supported values are:
.TP
.B AT_EMPTY_PATH
If
.I pathname
is the empty string,
change the mount properties on
.I dirfd
itself.
.TP
.B AT_RECURSIVE
Change the mount properties of the entire mount tree.
.TP
.B AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
Don't follow trailing symbolic links.
.TP
.B AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT
Don't trigger automounts.
.P
The
.I attr
argument of
.BR mount_setattr ()
is a structure of the following form:
.P
.in +4n
.EX
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set; /* Mount properties to set */
__u64 attr_clr; /* Mount properties to clear */
__u64 propagation; /* Mount propagation type */
__u64 userns_fd; /* User namespace file descriptor */
};
.EE
.in
.P
The
.I attr_set
and
.I attr_clr
members are used to specify the mount properties that
are supposed to be set or cleared for a mount or mount tree.
Flags set in
.I attr_set
enable a property on a mount or mount tree,
and flags set in
.I attr_clr
remove a property from a mount or mount tree.
.P
When changing mount properties,
the kernel will first clear the flags specified
in the
.I attr_clr
field,
and then set the flags specified in the
.I attr_set
field.
For example, these settings:
.P
.in +4n
.EX
struct mount_attr attr = {
.attr_clr = MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC | MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV,
.attr_set = MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY | MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID,
};
.EE
.in
.P
are equivalent to the following steps:
.P
.in +4n
.EX
unsigned int current_mnt_flags = mnt\->mnt_flags;
\&
/*
* Clear all flags set in .attr_clr,
* clearing MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC and MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV.
*/
current_mnt_flags &= \(tiattr\->attr_clr;
\&
/*
* Now set all flags set in .attr_set,
* applying MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY and MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID.
*/
current_mnt_flags |= attr\->attr_set;
\&
mnt\->mnt_flags = current_mnt_flags;
.EE
.in
.P
As a result of this change, the mount or mount tree (a) is read-only;
(b) blocks the execution of set-user-ID and set-group-ID programs;
(c) allows execution of programs; and (d) allows access to devices.
.P
Multiple changes with the same set of flags requested
in
.I attr_clr
and
.I attr_set
are guaranteed to be idempotent after the changes have been applied.
.P
The following mount attributes can be specified in the
.I attr_set
or
.I attr_clr
fields:
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
makes the mount read-only.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
removes the read-only setting if set on the mount.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
causes the mount not to honor the set-user-ID and set-group-ID mode bits and
file capabilities when executing programs.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
clears the set-user-ID, set-group-ID,
and file capability restriction if set on this mount.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
prevents access to devices on this mount.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
removes the restriction that prevented accessing devices on this mount.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
prevents executing programs on this mount.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
removes the restriction that prevented executing programs on this mount.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NOSYMFOLLOW
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
prevents following symbolic links on this mount.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
removes the restriction that prevented following symbolic links on this mount.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NODIRATIME
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
prevents updating access time for directories on this mount.
If set in
.IR attr_clr ,
removes the restriction that prevented updating access time for directories.
Note that
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NODIRATIME
can be combined with other access-time settings
and is implied by the noatime setting.
All other access-time settings are mutually exclusive.
.TP
.BR MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME " - changing access-time settings"
The access-time values listed below are an enumeration that
includes the value zero, expressed in the bits defined by the mask
.BR MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME .
Even though these bits are an enumeration
(in contrast to the other mount flags such as
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC ),
they are nonetheless passed in
.I attr_set
and
.I attr_clr
for consistency with
.BR fsmount (2),
which introduced this behavior.
.IP
Note that,
since the access-time values are an enumeration rather than bit values,
a caller wanting to transition to a different access-time setting
cannot simply specify the access-time setting in
.IR attr_set ,
but must also include
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
in the
.I attr_clr
field.
The kernel will verify that
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
isn't partially set in
.I attr_clr
(i.e., either all bits in the
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
bit field are either set or clear), and that
.I attr_set
doesn't have any access-time bits set if
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
isn't set in
.IR attr_clr .
.RS
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_RELATIME
When a file is accessed via this mount,
update the file's last access time (atime)
only if the current value of atime is less than or equal to
the file's last modification time (mtime) or last status change time (ctime).
.IP
To enable this access-time setting on a mount or mount tree,
.B MOUNT_ATTR_RELATIME
must be set in
.I attr_set
and
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
must be set in the
.I attr_clr
field.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME
Do not update access times for (all types of) files on this mount.
.IP
To enable this access-time setting on a mount or mount tree,
.B MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME
must be set in
.I attr_set
and
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
must be set in the
.I attr_clr
field.
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_STRICTATIME
Always update the last access time (atime)
when files are accessed on this mount.
.IP
To enable this access-time setting on a mount or mount tree,
.B MOUNT_ATTR_STRICTATIME
must be set in
.I attr_set
and
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
must be set in the
.I attr_clr
field.
.RE
.TP
.B MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
If set in
.IR attr_set ,
creates an ID-mapped mount.
The ID mapping is taken from the user namespace specified in
.I userns_fd
and attached to the mount.
.IP
Since it is not supported to
change the ID mapping of a mount after it has been ID mapped,
it is invalid to specify
.B MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
in
.IR attr_clr .
.IP
For further details, see the subsection "ID-mapped mounts" under NOTES.
.P
The
.I propagation
field is used to specify the propagation type of the mount or mount tree.
This field either has the value zero,
meaning leave the propagation type unchanged, or it has one of
the following values:
.TP
.B MS_PRIVATE
Turn all mounts into private mounts.
.TP
.B MS_SHARED
Turn all mounts into shared mounts.
.TP
.B MS_SLAVE
Turn all mounts into dependent mounts.
.TP
.B MS_UNBINDABLE
Turn all mounts into unbindable mounts.
.P
For further details on the above propagation types, see
.BR mount_namespaces (7).
.SH RETURN VALUE
On success,
.BR mount_setattr ()
returns zero.
On error,
\-1 is returned and
.I errno
is set to indicate the cause of the error.
.SH ERRORS
.TP
.B EBADF
.I pathname
is relative but
.I dirfd
is neither
.B AT_FDCWD
nor a valid file descriptor.
.TP
.B EBADF
.I userns_fd
is not a valid file descriptor.
.TP
.B EBUSY
The caller tried to change the mount to
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY ,
but the mount still holds files open for writing.
.TP
.B EBUSY
The caller tried to create an ID-mapped mount raising
.B MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
and specifying
.I userns_fd
but the mount still holds files open for writing.
.TP
.B EINVAL
The pathname specified via the
.I dirfd
and
.I pathname
arguments to
.BR mount_setattr ()
isn't a mount point.
.TP
.B EINVAL
An unsupported value was set in
.IR flags .
.TP
.B EINVAL
An unsupported value was specified in the
.I attr_set
field of
.IR mount_attr .
.TP
.B EINVAL
An unsupported value was specified in the
.I attr_clr
field of
.IR mount_attr .
.TP
.B EINVAL
An unsupported value was specified in the
.I propagation
field of
.IR mount_attr .
.TP
.B EINVAL
More than one of
.BR MS_SHARED ,
.BR MS_SLAVE ,
.BR MS_PRIVATE ,
or
.B MS_UNBINDABLE
was set in the
.I propagation
field of
.IR mount_attr .
.TP
.B EINVAL
An access-time setting was specified in the
.I attr_set
field without
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
being set in the
.I attr_clr
field.
.TP
.B EINVAL
.B MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
was specified in
.IR attr_clr .
.TP
.B EINVAL
A file descriptor value was specified in
.I userns_fd
which exceeds
.BR INT_MAX .
.TP
.B EINVAL
A valid file descriptor value was specified in
.IR userns_fd ,
but the file descriptor did not refer to a user namespace.
.TP
.B EINVAL
The underlying filesystem does not support ID-mapped mounts.
.TP
.B EINVAL
The mount that is to be ID mapped is not a detached mount;
that is, the mount has not previously been visible in a mount namespace.
.TP
.B EINVAL
A partial access-time setting was specified in
.I attr_clr
instead of
.B MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME
being set.
.TP
.B EINVAL
The mount is located outside the caller's mount namespace.
.TP
.B EINVAL
The underlying filesystem has been mounted in a mount namespace that is
owned by a noninitial user namespace
.TP
.B ENOENT
A pathname was empty or had a nonexistent component.
.TP
.B ENOMEM
When changing mount propagation to
.BR MS_SHARED ,
a new peer group ID needs to be allocated for all mounts without a peer group
ID set.
This allocation failed because there was not
enough memory to allocate the relevant internal structures.
.TP
.B ENOSPC
When changing mount propagation to
.BR MS_SHARED ,
a new peer group ID needs to be allocated for all mounts without a peer group
ID set.
This allocation failed because
the kernel has run out of IDs.
.\" Christian Brauner: i.e. someone has somehow managed to
.\" allocate so many peer groups and managed to keep the kernel running
.\" (???) that the ida has ran out of ids
.\" Note that technically further error codes are possible that are
.\" specific to the ID allocation implementation used.
.TP
.B EPERM
One of the mounts had at least one of
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME ,
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV ,
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NODIRATIME ,
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC ,
.BR MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID ,
or
.B MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY
set and the flag is locked.
Mount attributes become locked on a mount if:
.RS
.IP \[bu] 3
A new mount or mount tree is created causing mount propagation across user
namespaces
(i.e., propagation to a mount namespace owned by a different user namespace).
The kernel will lock the aforementioned flags to prevent these sensitive
properties from being altered.
.IP \[bu]
A new mount and user namespace pair is created.
This happens for example when specifying
.B CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS
in
.BR unshare (2),
.BR clone (2),
or
.BR clone3 (2).
The aforementioned flags become locked in the new mount namespace
to prevent sensitive mount properties from being altered.
Since the newly created mount namespace will be owned by the
newly created user namespace,
a calling process that is privileged in the new
user namespace would\[em]in the absence of such locking\[em]be
able to alter sensitive mount properties (e.g., to remount a mount
that was marked read-only as read-write in the new mount namespace).
.RE
.TP
.B EPERM
A valid file descriptor value was specified in
.IR userns_fd ,
but the file descriptor refers to the initial user namespace.
.TP
.B EPERM
An attempt was made to add an ID mapping to a mount that is already ID mapped.
.TP
.B EPERM
The caller does not have
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in the initial user namespace.
.SH STANDARDS
Linux.
.SH HISTORY
Linux 5.12.
.\" commit 7d6beb71da3cc033649d641e1e608713b8220290
.\" commit 2a1867219c7b27f928e2545782b86daaf9ad50bd
.\" commit 9caccd41541a6f7d6279928d9f971f6642c361af
.SH NOTES
.SS ID-mapped mounts
Creating an ID-mapped mount makes it possible to
change the ownership of all files located under a mount.
Thus, ID-mapped mounts make it possible to
change ownership in a temporary and localized way.
It is a localized change because the ownership changes are
visible only via a specific mount.
All other users and locations where the filesystem is exposed are unaffected.
It is a temporary change because
the ownership changes are tied to the lifetime of the mount.
.P
Whenever callers interact with the filesystem through an ID-mapped mount,
the ID mapping of the mount will be applied to
user and group IDs associated with filesystem objects.
This encompasses the user and group IDs associated with inodes
and also the following
.BR xattr (7)
keys:
.IP \[bu] 3
.IR security.capability ,
whenever filesystem capabilities
are stored or returned in the
.B VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
format,
which stores a root user ID alongside the capabilities
(see
.BR capabilities (7)).
.IP \[bu]
.I system.posix_acl_access
and
.IR system.posix_acl_default ,
whenever user IDs or group IDs are stored in
.B ACL_USER
or
.B ACL_GROUP
entries.
.P
The following conditions must be met in order to create an ID-mapped mount:
.IP \[bu] 3
The caller must have the
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability in the user namespace the filesystem was mounted in.
.\" commit bd303368b776eead1c29e6cdda82bde7128b82a7
.\" Christian Brauner
.\" Note, currently no filesystems mountable in non-initial user namespaces
.\" support ID-mapped mounts.
.IP \[bu]
The underlying filesystem must support ID-mapped mounts.
Currently, the following filesystems support ID-mapped mounts:
.\" fs_flags = FS_ALLOW_IDMAP in kernel sources
.RS
.IP \[bu] 3
.PD 0
.BR xfs (5)
(since Linux 5.12)
.IP \[bu]
.BR ext4 (5)
(since Linux 5.12)
.IP \[bu]
.B FAT
(since Linux 5.12)
.IP \[bu]
.BR btrfs (5)
(since Linux 5.15)
.\" commit 5b9b26f5d0b88b74001dcfe4ab8a8f2f4e744112
.IP \[bu]
.B ntfs3
(since Linux 5.15)
.\" commit 82cae269cfa953032fbb8980a7d554d60fb00b17
.IP \[bu]
.B f2fs
(since Linux 5.18)
.\" commit 984fc4e76d63345499f01c0c198a4b44860cf027
.IP \[bu]
.B erofs
(since Linux 5.19)
.\" commit 6c459b78d4793afbba6d864c466cc5cd2932459d
.IP \[bu]
.B overlayfs
(ID-mapped lower and upper layers supported since Linux 5.19)
.IP \[bu]
.B squashfs
(since Linux 6.2)
.IP \[bu]
.B tmpfs
(since Linux 6.3)
.IP \[bu]
.B cephfs
(since Linux 6.7)
.IP \[bu]
.B hugetlbfs
(since Linux 6.9)
.PD
.RE
.IP \[bu]
The mount must not already be ID-mapped.
This also implies that the ID mapping of a mount cannot be altered.
.IP \[bu]
The mount must not have any writers.
.\" commit 1bbcd277a53e08d619ffeec56c5c9287f2bf42f
.IP \[bu]
The mount must be a detached mount;
that is,
it must have been created by calling
.BR open_tree (2)
with the
.B OPEN_TREE_CLONE
flag and it must not already have been visible in a mount namespace.
(To put things another way:
the mount must not have been attached to the filesystem hierarchy
with a system call such as
.BR move_mount (2).)
.P
ID mappings can be created for user IDs, group IDs, and project IDs.
An ID mapping is essentially a mapping of a range of user or group IDs into
another or the same range of user or group IDs.
ID mappings are written to map files as three numbers
separated by white space.
The first two numbers specify the starting user or group ID
in each of the two user namespaces.
The third number specifies the range of the ID mapping.
For example,
a mapping for user IDs such as "1000\ 1001\ 1" would indicate that
user ID 1000 in the caller's user namespace is mapped to
user ID 1001 in its ancestor user namespace.
Since the map range is 1,
only user ID 1000 is mapped.
.P
It is possible to specify up to 340 ID mappings for each ID mapping type.
If any user IDs or group IDs are not mapped,
all files owned by that unmapped user or group ID will appear as
being owned by the overflow user ID or overflow group ID respectively.
.P
Further details on setting up ID mappings can be found in
.BR user_namespaces (7).
.P
In the common case, the user namespace passed in
.I userns_fd
(together with
.B MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
in
.IR attr_set )
to create an ID-mapped mount will be the user namespace of a container.
In other scenarios it will be a dedicated user namespace associated with
a user's login session as is the case for portable home directories in
.BR systemd-homed.service (8)).
It is also perfectly fine to create a dedicated user namespace
for the sake of ID mapping a mount.
.P
ID-mapped mounts can be useful in the following
and a variety of other scenarios:
.IP \[bu] 3
Sharing files or filesystems
between multiple users or multiple machines,
especially in complex scenarios.
For example,
ID-mapped mounts are used to implement portable home directories in
.BR systemd-homed.service (8),
where they allow users to move their home directory
to an external storage device
and use it on multiple computers
where they are assigned different user IDs and group IDs.
This effectively makes it possible to
assign random user IDs and group IDs at login time.
.IP \[bu]
Sharing files or filesystems
from the host with unprivileged containers.
This allows a user to avoid having to change ownership permanently through
.BR chown (2).
.IP \[bu]
ID mapping a container's root filesystem.
Users don't need to change ownership permanently through
.BR chown (2).
Especially for large root filesystems, using
.BR chown (2)
can be prohibitively expensive.
.IP \[bu]
Sharing files or filesystems
between containers with non-overlapping ID mappings.
.IP \[bu]
Implementing discretionary access (DAC) permission checking
for filesystems lacking a concept of ownership.
.IP \[bu]
Efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount basis.
In contrast to
.BR chown (2),
changing ownership of large sets of files is instantaneous with
ID-mapped mounts.
This is especially useful when ownership of
an entire root filesystem of a virtual machine or container
is to be changed as mentioned above.
With ID-mapped mounts,
a single
.BR mount_setattr ()
system call will be sufficient to change the ownership of all files.
.IP \[bu]
Taking the current ownership into account.
ID mappings specify precisely
what a user or group ID is supposed to be mapped to.
This contrasts with the
.BR chown (2)
system call which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account.
It simply changes the ownership to the specified user ID and group ID.
.IP \[bu]
Locally and temporarily restricted ownership changes.
ID-mapped mounts make it possible to change ownership locally,
restricting the ownership changes to specific mounts,
and temporarily as the ownership changes only apply as long as the mount exists.
By contrast,
changing ownership via the
.BR chown (2)
system call changes the ownership globally and permanently.
.\"
.SS Extensibility
In order to allow for future extensibility,
.BR mount_setattr ()
requires the user-space application to specify the size of the
.I mount_attr
structure that it is passing.
By providing this information, it is possible for
.BR mount_setattr ()
to provide both forwards- and backwards-compatibility, with
.I size
acting as an implicit version number.
(Because new extension fields will always
be appended, the structure size will always increase.)
This extensibility design is very similar to other system calls such as
.BR perf_setattr (2),
.BR perf_event_open (2),
.BR clone3 (2)
and
.BR openat2 (2).
.P
Let
.I usize
be the size of the structure as specified by the user-space application,
and let
.I ksize
be the size of the structure which the kernel supports,
then there are three cases to consider:
.IP \[bu] 3
If
.I ksize
equals
.IR usize ,
then there is no version mismatch and
.I attr
can be used verbatim.
.IP \[bu]
If
.I ksize
is larger than
.IR usize ,
then there are some extension fields that the kernel supports
which the user-space application is unaware of.
Because a zero value in any added extension field signifies a no-op,
the kernel treats all of the extension fields
not provided by the user-space application
as having zero values.
This provides backwards-compatibility.
.IP \[bu]
If
.I ksize
is smaller than
.IR usize ,
then there are some extension fields which the user-space application is aware
of but which the kernel does not support.
Because any extension field must have its zero values signify a no-op,
the kernel can safely ignore the unsupported extension fields
if they are all zero.
If any unsupported extension fields are non-zero,
then \-1 is returned and
.I errno
is set to
.BR E2BIG .
This provides forwards-compatibility.
.P
Because the definition of
.I struct mount_attr
may change in the future
(with new fields being added when system headers are updated),
user-space applications should zero-fill
.I struct mount_attr
to ensure that recompiling the program with new headers will not result in
spurious errors at run time.
The simplest way is to use a designated initializer:
.P
.in +4n
.EX
struct mount_attr attr = {
.attr_set = MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY,
.attr_clr = MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV
};
.EE
.in
.P
Alternatively, the structure can be zero-filled using
.BR memset (3)
or similar functions:
.P
.in +4n
.EX
struct mount_attr attr;
memset(&attr, 0, sizeof(attr));
attr.attr_set = MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY;
attr.attr_clr = MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV;
.EE
.in
.P
A user-space application that wishes to determine which extensions the running
kernel supports can do so by conducting a binary search on
.I size
with a structure which has every byte nonzero
(to find the largest value which doesn't produce an error of
.BR E2BIG ).
.SH EXAMPLES
.\" SRC BEGIN (mount_setattr.c)
.EX
/*
* This program allows the caller to create a new detached mount
* and set various properties on it.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <err.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
\&
static inline int
mount_setattr(int dirfd, const char *pathname, unsigned int flags,
struct mount_attr *attr, size_t size)
{
return syscall(SYS_mount_setattr, dirfd, pathname, flags,
attr, size);
}
\&
static inline int
open_tree(int dirfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags)
{
return syscall(SYS_open_tree, dirfd, filename, flags);
}
\&
static inline int
move_mount(int from_dirfd, const char *from_pathname,
int to_dirfd, const char *to_pathname, unsigned int flags)
{
return syscall(SYS_move_mount, from_dirfd, from_pathname,
to_dirfd, to_pathname, flags);
}
\&
static const struct option longopts[] = {
{"map\-mount", required_argument, NULL, \[aq]a\[aq]},
{"recursive", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]b\[aq]},
{"read\-only", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]c\[aq]},
{"block\-setid", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]d\[aq]},
{"block\-devices", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]e\[aq]},
{"block\-exec", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]f\[aq]},
{"no\-access\-time", no_argument, NULL, \[aq]g\[aq]},
{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0 },
};
\&
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd_userns = \-1;
int fd_tree;
int index = 0;
int ret;
bool recursive = false;
const char *source;
const char *target;
struct mount_attr *attr = &(struct mount_attr){};
\&
while ((ret = getopt_long_only(argc, argv, "",
longopts, &index)) != \-1) {
switch (ret) {
case \[aq]a\[aq]:
fd_userns = open(optarg, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd_userns == \-1)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "open(%s)", optarg);
break;
case \[aq]b\[aq]:
recursive = true;
break;
case \[aq]c\[aq]:
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY;
break;
case \[aq]d\[aq]:
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_NOSUID;
break;
case \[aq]e\[aq]:
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_NODEV;
break;
case \[aq]f\[aq]:
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC;
break;
case \[aq]g\[aq]:
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_NOATIME;
attr\->attr_clr |= MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME;
break;
default:
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Invalid argument specified");
}
}
\&
if ((argc \- optind) < 2)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Missing source or target mount point");
\&
source = argv[optind];
target = argv[optind + 1];
\&
/* In the following, \-1 as the \[aq]dirfd\[aq] argument ensures that
open_tree() fails if \[aq]source\[aq] is not an absolute pathname. */
.\" Christian Brauner
.\" When writing programs I like to never use relative paths with AT_FDCWD
.\" because. Because making assumptions about the current working directory
.\" of the calling process is just too easy to get wrong; especially when
.\" pivot_root() or chroot() are in play.
.\" My absolut preference (joke intended) is to open a well-known starting
.\" point with an absolute path to get a dirfd and then scope all future
.\" operations beneath that dirfd. This already works with old-style
.\" openat() and _very_ cautious programming but openat2() and its
.\" resolve-flag space have made this **chef's kiss**.
.\" If I can't operate based on a well-known dirfd I use absolute paths
.\" with a -EBADF dirfd passed to *at() functions.
\&
fd_tree = open_tree(\-1, source,
OPEN_TREE_CLONE | OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC |
AT_EMPTY_PATH | (recursive ? AT_RECURSIVE : 0));
if (fd_tree == \-1)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "open(%s)", source);
\&
if (fd_userns >= 0) {
attr\->attr_set |= MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP;
attr\->userns_fd = fd_userns;
}
\&
ret = mount_setattr(fd_tree, "",
AT_EMPTY_PATH | (recursive ? AT_RECURSIVE : 0),
attr, sizeof(struct mount_attr));
if (ret == \-1)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "mount_setattr");
\&
close(fd_userns);
\&
/* In the following, \-1 as the \[aq]to_dirfd\[aq] argument ensures that
open_tree() fails if \[aq]target\[aq] is not an absolute pathname. */
\&
ret = move_mount(fd_tree, "", \-1, target,
MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH);
if (ret == \-1)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, "move_mount() to %s", target);
\&
close(fd_tree);
\&
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
.EE
.\" SRC END
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR newgidmap (1),
.BR newuidmap (1),
.BR clone (2),
.BR mount (2),
.BR unshare (2),
.BR proc (5),
.BR capabilities (7),
.BR mount_namespaces (7),
.BR user_namespaces (7),
.BR xattr (7)
|