/* * * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND #include "stubs.h" #endif #include "prerror.h" #include "secerr.h" #include "prtypes.h" #include "prinit.h" #include "blapi.h" #include "nssilock.h" #include "secitem.h" #include "blapit.h" #include "mpi.h" #include "secmpi.h" #include "pqg.h" /* * FIPS 186-2 requires result from random output to be reduced mod q when * generating random numbers for DSA. * * Input: w, 2*qLen bytes * q, qLen bytes * Output: xj, qLen bytes */ static SECStatus fips186Change_ReduceModQForDSA(const PRUint8 *w, const PRUint8 *q, unsigned int qLen, PRUint8 *xj) { mp_int W, Q, Xj; mp_err err; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* Initialize MPI integers. */ MP_DIGITS(&W) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&Q) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&Xj) = 0; CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&W)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Q)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&Xj)); /* * Convert input arguments into MPI integers. */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&W, w, 2 * qLen)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Q, q, qLen)); /* * Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1, Step 3.3 * * xj = (w0 || w1) mod q */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&W, &Q, &Xj)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Xj, xj, qLen)); cleanup: mp_clear(&W); mp_clear(&Q); mp_clear(&Xj); if (err) { MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err); rv = SECFailure; } return rv; } /* * FIPS 186-2 requires result from random output to be reduced mod q when * generating random numbers for DSA. */ SECStatus FIPS186Change_ReduceModQForDSA(const unsigned char *w, const unsigned char *q, unsigned char *xj) { return fips186Change_ReduceModQForDSA(w, q, DSA1_SUBPRIME_LEN, xj); } /* * The core of Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1. * * We no longer support FIPS 186-2 RNG. This function was exported * for power-up self tests and FIPS tests. Keep this stub, which fails, * to prevent crashes, but also to signal to test code that FIPS 186-2 * RNG is no longer supported. */ SECStatus FIPS186Change_GenerateX(PRUint8 *XKEY, const PRUint8 *XSEEDj, PRUint8 *x_j) { PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); return SECFailure; } /* * Specialized RNG for DSA * * As per Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1, in step 3.3 the value * Xj should be reduced mod q, a 160-bit prime number. Since this parameter * is only meaningful in the context of DSA, the above RNG functions * were implemented without it. They are re-implemented below for use * with DSA. */ /* ** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator ** object. In DSA mode, so there is a q. */ static SECStatus dsa_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(const SECItem *qItem, PRUint8 *dest, unsigned int *destLen, unsigned int maxDestLen) { SECStatus rv; SECItem w; const PRUint8 *q = qItem->data; unsigned int qLen = qItem->len; if (*q == 0) { ++q; --qLen; } if (maxDestLen < qLen) { /* This condition can occur when DSA_SignDigest is passed a group with a subprime that is larger than DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } w.data = NULL; /* otherwise SECITEM_AllocItem asserts */ if (!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &w, 2 * qLen)) { return SECFailure; } *destLen = qLen; rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(w.data, w.len); if (rv == SECSuccess) { rv = fips186Change_ReduceModQForDSA(w.data, q, qLen, dest); } SECITEM_FreeItem(&w, PR_FALSE); return rv; } static void translate_mpi_error(mp_err err) { MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err); } static SECStatus dsa_NewKeyExtended(const PQGParams *params, const SECItem *seed, DSAPrivateKey **privKey) { mp_int p, g; mp_int x, y; mp_err err; PLArenaPool *arena; DSAPrivateKey *key; /* Check args. */ if (!params || !privKey || !seed || !seed->data) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } /* Initialize an arena for the DSA key. */ arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (!arena) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); return SECFailure; } key = (DSAPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(DSAPrivateKey)); if (!key) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); return SECFailure; } key->params.arena = arena; /* Initialize MPI integers. */ MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&x) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0; CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y)); /* Copy over the PQG params */ CHECK_MPI_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.prime, ¶ms->prime)); CHECK_MPI_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.subPrime, ¶ms->subPrime)); CHECK_MPI_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->params.base, ¶ms->base)); /* Convert stored p, g, and received x into MPI integers. */ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(params->prime, &p); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(params->base, &g); OCTETS_TO_MPINT(seed->data, &x, seed->len); /* Store x in private key */ SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, seed->len); PORT_Memcpy(key->privateValue.data, seed->data, seed->len); /* Compute public key y = g**x mod p */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &x, &p, &y)); /* Store y in public key */ MPINT_TO_SECITEM(&y, &key->publicValue, arena); *privKey = key; key = NULL; cleanup: mp_clear(&p); mp_clear(&g); mp_clear(&x); mp_clear(&y); if (key) { PORT_FreeArena(key->params.arena, PR_TRUE); } if (err) { translate_mpi_error(err); return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } SECStatus DSA_NewRandom(PLArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *q, SECItem *seed) { int retries = 10; unsigned int i; PRBool good; if (q == NULL || q->data == NULL || q->len == 0 || (q->data[0] == 0 && q->len == 1)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } if (!SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, seed, q->len)) { return SECFailure; } do { /* Generate seed bytes for x according to FIPS 186-1 appendix 3 */ if (dsa_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(q, seed->data, &seed->len, seed->len)) { goto loser; } /* Disallow values of 0 and 1 for x. */ good = PR_FALSE; for (i = 0; i < seed->len - 1; i++) { if (seed->data[i] != 0) { good = PR_TRUE; break; } } if (!good && seed->data[i] > 1) { good = PR_TRUE; } } while (!good && --retries > 0); if (!good) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); loser: if (arena != NULL) { SECITEM_ZfreeItem(seed, PR_FALSE); } return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } /* ** Generate and return a new DSA public and private key pair, ** both of which are encoded into a single DSAPrivateKey struct. ** "params" is a pointer to the PQG parameters for the domain ** Uses a random seed. */ SECStatus DSA_NewKey(const PQGParams *params, DSAPrivateKey **privKey) { SECItem seed; SECStatus rv; rv = PQG_Check(params); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return rv; } seed.data = NULL; rv = DSA_NewRandom(NULL, ¶ms->subPrime, &seed); if (rv == SECSuccess) { if (seed.len != PQG_GetLength(¶ms->subPrime)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); rv = SECFailure; } else { rv = dsa_NewKeyExtended(params, &seed, privKey); } } SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&seed, PR_FALSE); return rv; } /* For FIPS compliance testing. Seed must be exactly the size of subPrime */ SECStatus DSA_NewKeyFromSeed(const PQGParams *params, const unsigned char *seed, DSAPrivateKey **privKey) { SECItem seedItem; seedItem.data = (unsigned char *)seed; seedItem.len = PQG_GetLength(¶ms->subPrime); return dsa_NewKeyExtended(params, &seedItem, privKey); } static SECStatus dsa_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *kbytes) { mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */ mp_int x, k; /* private key & pseudo-random integer */ mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is signature) */ mp_int t; /* holding tmp values */ mp_int ar; /* holding blinding values */ mp_digit fuzz; /* blinding multiplier for q */ mp_err err = MP_OKAY; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset; SECItem localDigest; unsigned char localDigestData[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN]; SECItem t2 = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; /* FIPS-compliance dictates that digest is a SHA hash. */ /* Check args. */ if (!key || !signature || !digest) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } dsa_subprime_len = PQG_GetLength(&key->params.subPrime); dsa_signature_len = dsa_subprime_len * 2; if ((signature->len < dsa_signature_len) || (digest->len > HASH_LENGTH_MAX) || (digest->len < SHA1_LENGTH)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } /* DSA accepts digests not equal to dsa_subprime_len, if the * digests are greater, then they are truncated to the size of * dsa_subprime_len, using the left most bits. If they are less * then they are padded on the left.*/ PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, dsa_subprime_len); offset = (digest->len < dsa_subprime_len) ? (dsa_subprime_len - digest->len) : 0; PORT_Memcpy(localDigestData + offset, digest->data, dsa_subprime_len - offset); localDigest.data = localDigestData; localDigest.len = dsa_subprime_len; /* Initialize MPI integers. */ MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&x) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&t) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&ar) = 0; CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&x)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&k)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&t)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&ar)); /* ** Convert stored PQG and private key into MPI integers. */ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.prime, &p); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->privateValue, &x); OCTETS_TO_MPINT(kbytes, &k, dsa_subprime_len); /* k blinding create a single value that has the high bit set in * the mp_digit*/ if (RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&fuzz, sizeof(mp_digit)) != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup; } fuzz |= 1ULL << ((sizeof(mp_digit) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)); /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 1 ** ** r = (g**k mod p) mod q */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul_d(&q, fuzz, &t)); /* t = q*fuzz */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&k, &t, &t)); /* t = k+q*fuzz */ /* length of t is now fixed, bits in k have been blinded */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &t, &p, &r)); /* r = g**t mod p */ /* r is now g**(k+q*fuzz) == g**k mod p */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&r, &q, &r)); /* r = r mod q */ /* make sure fuzz is cleared off the stack and not optimized away */ *(volatile mp_digit *)&fuzz = 0; /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 5, Step 2 ** ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + x*r)) mod q */ if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup; } SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &t); /* t <-$ Zq */ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE); if (DSA_NewRandom(NULL, &key->params.subPrime, &t2) != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup; } SECITEM_TO_MPINT(t2, &ar); /* ar <-$ Zq */ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&t2, PR_FALSE); /* Using mp_invmod on k directly would leak bits from k. */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&k, &ar, &k)); /* k = k * ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */ /* k is now k*t*ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&k, &q, &k)); /* k = k**-1 mod q */ /* k is now (k*t*ar)**-1 */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&k, &t, &q, &k)); /* k = k * t mod q */ /* k is now (k*ar)**-1 */ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */ /* To avoid leaking secret bits here the addition is blinded. */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mul(&x, &ar, &x)); /* x = x * ar */ /* x is now x*ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&x, &r, &q, &x)); /* x = x * r mod q */ /* x is now x*r*ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &ar, &q, &t)); /* t = s * ar mod q */ /* t is now hash(M)*ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_add(&t, &x, &s)); /* s = t + x */ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &q, &s)); /* s = s * k mod q */ /* s is now (HASH(M)+x*r)*ar*(k*ar)**-1 = (k**-1)*(HASH(M)+x*r) */ /* ** verify r != 0 and s != 0 ** mentioned as optional in FIPS 186-1. */ if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); rv = SECFailure; goto cleanup; } /* ** Step 4 ** ** Signature is tuple (r, s) */ err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&r, signature->data, dsa_subprime_len); if (err < 0) goto cleanup; err = mp_to_fixlen_octets(&s, signature->data + dsa_subprime_len, dsa_subprime_len); if (err < 0) goto cleanup; err = MP_OKAY; signature->len = dsa_signature_len; cleanup: PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN); mp_clear(&p); mp_clear(&q); mp_clear(&g); mp_clear(&x); mp_clear(&k); mp_clear(&r); mp_clear(&s); mp_clear(&t); mp_clear(&ar); if (err) { translate_mpi_error(err); rv = SECFailure; } return rv; } /* signature is caller-supplied buffer of at least 40 bytes. ** On input, signature->len == size of buffer to hold signature. ** digest->len == size of digest. ** On output, signature->len == size of signature in buffer. ** Uses a random seed. */ SECStatus DSA_SignDigest(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest) { SECStatus rv; int retries = 10; unsigned char kSeed[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN]; unsigned int kSeedLen = 0; unsigned int i; unsigned int dsa_subprime_len = PQG_GetLength(&key->params.subPrime); PRBool good; PORT_SetError(0); do { rv = dsa_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(&key->params.subPrime, kSeed, &kSeedLen, sizeof kSeed); if (rv != SECSuccess) break; if (kSeedLen != dsa_subprime_len) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); rv = SECFailure; break; } /* Disallow a value of 0 for k. */ good = PR_FALSE; for (i = 0; i < kSeedLen; i++) { if (kSeed[i] != 0) { good = PR_TRUE; break; } } if (!good) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM); rv = SECFailure; continue; } rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, kSeed); } while (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM && --retries > 0); PORT_Memset(kSeed, 0, sizeof kSeed); return rv; } /* For FIPS compliance testing. Seed must be exactly 20 bytes. */ SECStatus DSA_SignDigestWithSeed(DSAPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *seed) { SECStatus rv; rv = dsa_SignDigest(key, signature, digest, seed); return rv; } /* signature is caller-supplied buffer of at least 20 bytes. ** On input, signature->len == size of buffer to hold signature. ** digest->len == size of digest. */ SECStatus DSA_VerifyDigest(DSAPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest) { /* FIPS-compliance dictates that digest is a SHA hash. */ mp_int p, q, g; /* PQG parameters */ mp_int r_, s_; /* tuple (r', s') is received signature) */ mp_int u1, u2, v, w; /* intermediate values used in verification */ mp_int y; /* public key */ mp_err err; unsigned int dsa_subprime_len, dsa_signature_len, offset; SECItem localDigest; unsigned char localDigestData[DSA_MAX_SUBPRIME_LEN]; SECStatus verified = SECFailure; /* Check args. */ if (!key || !signature || !digest) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } dsa_subprime_len = PQG_GetLength(&key->params.subPrime); dsa_signature_len = dsa_subprime_len * 2; if ((signature->len != dsa_signature_len) || (digest->len > HASH_LENGTH_MAX) || (digest->len < SHA1_LENGTH)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); return SECFailure; } /* DSA accepts digests not equal to dsa_subprime_len, if the * digests are greater, than they are truncated to the size of * dsa_subprime_len, using the left most bits. If they are less * then they are padded on the left.*/ PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, dsa_subprime_len); offset = (digest->len < dsa_subprime_len) ? (dsa_subprime_len - digest->len) : 0; PORT_Memcpy(localDigestData + offset, digest->data, dsa_subprime_len - offset); localDigest.data = localDigestData; localDigest.len = dsa_subprime_len; /* Initialize MPI integers. */ MP_DIGITS(&p) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&q) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&g) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&y) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&r_) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&s_) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&u1) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&u2) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&v) = 0; MP_DIGITS(&w) = 0; CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&p)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&q)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&g)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&y)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&r_)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&s_)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&u1)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&u2)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&v)); CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_init(&w)); /* ** Convert stored PQG and public key into MPI integers. */ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.prime, &p); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.subPrime, &q); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->params.base, &g); SECITEM_TO_MPINT(key->publicValue, &y); /* ** Convert received signature (r', s') into MPI integers. */ OCTETS_TO_MPINT(signature->data, &r_, dsa_subprime_len); OCTETS_TO_MPINT(signature->data + dsa_subprime_len, &s_, dsa_subprime_len); /* ** Verify that 0 < r' < q and 0 < s' < q */ if (mp_cmp_z(&r_) <= 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s_) <= 0 || mp_cmp(&r_, &q) >= 0 || mp_cmp(&s_, &q) >= 0) { /* err is zero here. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto cleanup; /* will return verified == SECFailure */ } /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 6, Step 1 ** ** w = (s')**-1 mod q */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_invmod(&s_, &q, &w)); /* w = (s')**-1 mod q */ /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 6, Step 2 ** ** u1 = ((Hash(M')) * w) mod q */ SECITEM_TO_MPINT(localDigest, &u1); /* u1 = HASH(M') */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&u1, &w, &q, &u1)); /* u1 = u1 * w mod q */ /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 6, Step 3 ** ** u2 = ((r') * w) mod q */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&r_, &w, &q, &u2)); /* ** FIPS 186-1, Section 6, Step 4 ** ** v = ((g**u1 * y**u2) mod p) mod q */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&g, &u1, &p, &g)); /* g = g**u1 mod p */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_exptmod(&y, &u2, &p, &y)); /* y = y**u2 mod p */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mulmod(&g, &y, &p, &v)); /* v = g * y mod p */ CHECK_MPI_OK(mp_mod(&v, &q, &v)); /* v = v mod q */ /* ** Verification: v == r' */ if (mp_cmp(&v, &r_)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); verified = SECFailure; /* Signature failed to verify. */ } else { verified = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */ } cleanup: PORT_Memset(localDigestData, 0, sizeof localDigestData); mp_clear(&p); mp_clear(&q); mp_clear(&g); mp_clear(&y); mp_clear(&r_); mp_clear(&s_); mp_clear(&u1); mp_clear(&u2); mp_clear(&v); mp_clear(&w); if (err) { translate_mpi_error(err); } return verified; }