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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-15 17:54:12 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-15 17:54:12 +0000
commitb527294153be3b79563c82c66102adc0004736c0 (patch)
tree9b423a224848441885190b5ea7cf0feb23510c9d /servers/slapd/passwd.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadopenldap-b527294153be3b79563c82c66102adc0004736c0.tar.xz
openldap-b527294153be3b79563c82c66102adc0004736c0.zip
Adding upstream version 2.6.7+dfsg.upstream/2.6.7+dfsg
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--servers/slapd/passwd.c659
1 files changed, 659 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/servers/slapd/passwd.c b/servers/slapd/passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6b1ddb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/servers/slapd/passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,659 @@
+/* passwd.c - password extended operation routines */
+/* $OpenLDAP$ */
+/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2022 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
+ * Public License.
+ *
+ * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
+ * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
+ * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
+ */
+
+#include "portable.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <ac/socket.h>
+#include <ac/string.h>
+#include <ac/unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_CRYPT
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+#define __USE_GNU
+#endif /* HAVE_CRYPT_R */
+#include <ac/crypt.h>
+#endif /* SLAPD_CRYPT */
+
+#include "slap.h"
+
+#include <lber_pvt.h>
+#include <lutil.h>
+#include <lutil_sha1.h>
+
+const struct berval slap_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD = BER_BVC(LDAP_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD);
+
+static const char *defhash[] = {
+#ifdef LUTIL_SHA1_BYTES
+ "{SSHA}",
+#else
+ "{SMD5}",
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+int passwd_extop(
+ Operation *op,
+ SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ struct berval id = {0, NULL}, hash, *rsp = NULL;
+ req_pwdexop_s *qpw = &op->oq_pwdexop;
+ req_extended_s qext = op->oq_extended;
+ Modifications *ml;
+ slap_callback cb = { NULL, slap_null_cb, NULL, NULL };
+ int i, nhash;
+ char **hashes, idNul;
+ int rc;
+ BackendDB *op_be;
+ int freenewpw = 0;
+ struct berval dn = BER_BVNULL, ndn = BER_BVNULL;
+
+ assert( ber_bvcmp( &slap_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD, &op->ore_reqoid ) == 0 );
+
+ if( op->o_dn.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS, "%s PASSMOD\n",
+ op->o_log_prefix );
+ rs->sr_text = "only authenticated users may change passwords";
+ return LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ qpw->rs_old.bv_len = 0;
+ qpw->rs_old.bv_val = NULL;
+ qpw->rs_new.bv_len = 0;
+ qpw->rs_new.bv_val = NULL;
+ qpw->rs_mods = NULL;
+ qpw->rs_modtail = NULL;
+
+ rs->sr_err = slap_passwd_parse( op->ore_reqdata, &id,
+ &qpw->rs_old, &qpw->rs_new, &rs->sr_text );
+
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &id )) {
+ idNul = id.bv_val[id.bv_len];
+ id.bv_val[id.bv_len] = '\0';
+ }
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS && !BER_BVISEMPTY( &id ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS, "%s PASSMOD id=\"%s\"%s%s\n",
+ op->o_log_prefix, id.bv_val,
+ qpw->rs_old.bv_val ? " old" : "",
+ qpw->rs_new.bv_val ? " new" : "" );
+ } else {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS, "%s PASSMOD%s%s\n",
+ op->o_log_prefix,
+ qpw->rs_old.bv_val ? " old" : "",
+ qpw->rs_new.bv_val ? " new" : "" );
+ }
+
+ if ( rs->sr_err != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &id ))
+ id.bv_val[id.bv_len] = idNul;
+ return rs->sr_err;
+ }
+
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &id ) ) {
+ rs->sr_err = dnPrettyNormal( NULL, &id, &dn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ id.bv_val[id.bv_len] = idNul;
+ if ( rs->sr_err != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "Invalid DN";
+ rc = rs->sr_err;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+ op->o_req_dn = dn;
+ op->o_req_ndn = ndn;
+ op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 1 );
+
+ } else {
+ ber_dupbv_x( &dn, &op->o_dn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ ber_dupbv_x( &ndn, &op->o_ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ op->o_req_dn = dn;
+ op->o_req_ndn = ndn;
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
+ op->o_bd = op->o_conn->c_authz_backend;
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex );
+ }
+
+ if( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
+ if ( qpw->rs_old.bv_val != NULL ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "unwilling to verify old password";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYRUS_SASL
+ rc = slap_sasl_setpass( op, rs );
+#else
+ rs->sr_text = "no authz backend";
+ rc = LDAP_OTHER;
+#endif
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ if ( op->o_req_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "no password is associated with the Root DSE";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ /* If we've got a glued backend, check the real backend */
+ op_be = op->o_bd;
+ if ( SLAP_GLUE_INSTANCE( op->o_bd )) {
+ op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 0 );
+ }
+
+ if (backend_check_restrictions( op, rs,
+ (struct berval *)&slap_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD ) != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+ rc = rs->sr_err;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ /* check for referrals */
+ if ( backend_check_referrals( op, rs ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ rc = rs->sr_err;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ /* This does not apply to multi-provider case */
+ if(!( !SLAP_SINGLE_SHADOW( op->o_bd ) || be_isupdate( op ))) {
+ /* we SHOULD return a referral in this case */
+ BerVarray defref = op->o_bd->be_update_refs
+ ? op->o_bd->be_update_refs : default_referral;
+
+ if( defref != NULL ) {
+ rs->sr_ref = referral_rewrite( op->o_bd->be_update_refs,
+ NULL, NULL, LDAP_SCOPE_DEFAULT );
+ if(rs->sr_ref) {
+ rs->sr_flags |= REP_REF_MUSTBEFREED;
+ } else {
+ rs->sr_ref = defref;
+ }
+ rc = LDAP_REFERRAL;
+ goto error_return;
+
+ }
+
+ rs->sr_text = "shadow context; no update referral";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ /* generate a new password if none was provided */
+ if ( qpw->rs_new.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ slap_passwd_generate( &qpw->rs_new );
+ if ( qpw->rs_new.bv_len ) {
+ rsp = slap_passwd_return( &qpw->rs_new );
+ freenewpw = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if ( qpw->rs_new.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "password generation failed";
+ rc = LDAP_OTHER;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ if ( op->o_txnSpec ) {
+ rc = txn_preop( op, rs );
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ op->o_bd = op_be;
+
+ /* Give the backend a chance to handle this itself */
+ if ( op->o_bd->be_extended ) {
+ rs->sr_err = op->o_bd->be_extended( op, rs );
+ if ( rs->sr_err != LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM &&
+ rs->sr_err != SLAP_CB_CONTINUE )
+ {
+ rc = rs->sr_err;
+ if ( rsp ) {
+ rs->sr_rspdata = rsp;
+ rsp = NULL;
+ }
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The backend didn't handle it, so try it here */
+ if( op->o_bd && !op->o_bd->be_modify ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "operation not supported for current user";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+ if ( qpw->rs_old.bv_val != NULL ) {
+ Entry *e = NULL;
+
+ rc = be_entry_get_rw( op, &op->o_req_ndn, NULL,
+ slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword, 0, &e );
+ if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && e ) {
+ Attribute *a = attr_find( e->e_attrs,
+ slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword );
+ if ( a )
+ rc = slap_passwd_check( op, e, a, &qpw->rs_old, &rs->sr_text );
+ else
+ rc = 1;
+ be_entry_release_r( op, e );
+ if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS )
+ goto old_good;
+ }
+ rs->sr_text = "unwilling to verify old password";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto error_return;
+ }
+
+old_good:
+ ml = ch_malloc( sizeof(Modifications) );
+ if ( !qpw->rs_modtail ) qpw->rs_modtail = &ml->sml_next;
+
+ if ( default_passwd_hash ) {
+ for ( nhash = 0; default_passwd_hash[nhash]; nhash++ );
+ hashes = default_passwd_hash;
+ } else {
+ nhash = 1;
+ hashes = (char **)defhash;
+ }
+ ml->sml_numvals = nhash;
+ ml->sml_values = ch_malloc( (nhash+1)*sizeof(struct berval) );
+ for ( i=0; hashes[i]; i++ ) {
+ slap_passwd_hash_type( &qpw->rs_new, &hash, hashes[i], &rs->sr_text );
+ if ( hash.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ if ( !rs->sr_text ) {
+ rs->sr_text = "password hash failed";
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ ml->sml_values[i] = hash;
+ }
+ ml->sml_values[i].bv_val = NULL;
+ ml->sml_nvalues = NULL;
+ ml->sml_desc = slap_schema.si_ad_userPassword;
+ ml->sml_type = ml->sml_desc->ad_cname;
+ ml->sml_op = LDAP_MOD_REPLACE;
+ ml->sml_flags = 0;
+ ml->sml_next = qpw->rs_mods;
+ qpw->rs_mods = ml;
+
+ if ( hashes[i] ) {
+ rs->sr_err = LDAP_OTHER;
+
+ } else {
+ slap_callback **sc;
+
+ cb.sc_next = op->o_callback;
+
+ op->o_tag = LDAP_REQ_MODIFY;
+ op->o_callback = &cb;
+ op->orm_modlist = qpw->rs_mods;
+ op->orm_no_opattrs = 0;
+
+ cb.sc_private = qpw; /* let Modify know this was pwdMod,
+ * if it cares... */
+
+ rs->sr_err = op->o_bd->be_modify( op, rs );
+
+ /* be_modify() might have shuffled modifications */
+ qpw->rs_mods = op->orm_modlist;
+
+ if ( rs->sr_err == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ rs->sr_rspdata = rsp;
+
+ } else if ( rsp ) {
+ ber_bvfree( rsp );
+ rsp = NULL;
+ }
+ op->o_tag = LDAP_REQ_EXTENDED;
+ for ( sc = &op->o_callback; *sc; sc = &(*sc)->sc_next ) {
+ if ( *sc == &cb ) {
+ *sc = cb.sc_next;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = rs->sr_err;
+ op->oq_extended = qext;
+
+error_return:;
+ if ( qpw->rs_mods ) {
+ slap_mods_free( qpw->rs_mods, 1 );
+ }
+ if ( freenewpw ) {
+ free( qpw->rs_new.bv_val );
+ }
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &dn ) ) {
+ op->o_tmpfree( dn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ BER_BVZERO( &op->o_req_dn );
+ }
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ndn ) ) {
+ op->o_tmpfree( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ BER_BVZERO( &op->o_req_ndn );
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* NOTE: The DN in *id is NOT NUL-terminated here. dnNormalize will
+ * reject it in this condition, the caller must NUL-terminate it.
+ * FIXME: should dnNormalize still be complaining about that?
+ */
+int slap_passwd_parse( struct berval *reqdata,
+ struct berval *id,
+ struct berval *oldpass,
+ struct berval *newpass,
+ const char **text )
+{
+ int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ ber_tag_t tag;
+ ber_len_t len = -1;
+ BerElementBuffer berbuf;
+ BerElement *ber = (BerElement *)&berbuf;
+
+ if( reqdata == NULL ) {
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if( reqdata->bv_len == 0 ) {
+ *text = "empty request data field";
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* ber_init2 uses reqdata directly, doesn't allocate new buffers */
+ ber_init2( ber, reqdata, 0 );
+
+ tag = ber_skip_tag( ber, &len );
+
+ if( tag != LBER_SEQUENCE ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "slap_passwd_parse: decoding error\n" );
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_peek_tag( ber, &len );
+ if( tag == LDAP_TAG_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD_ID ) {
+ if( id == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: ID not allowed.\n" );
+
+ *text = "user must change own password";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_get_stringbv( ber, id, LBER_BV_NOTERM );
+
+ if( tag == LBER_ERROR ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: ID parse failed.\n" );
+
+ goto decoding_error;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_peek_tag( ber, &len );
+ }
+
+ if( tag == LDAP_TAG_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD_OLD ) {
+ if( oldpass == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: OLD not allowed.\n" );
+
+ *text = "use bind to verify old password";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_get_stringbv( ber, oldpass, LBER_BV_NOTERM );
+
+ if( tag == LBER_ERROR ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: OLD parse failed.\n" );
+
+ goto decoding_error;
+ }
+
+ if( oldpass->bv_len == 0 ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: OLD empty.\n" );
+
+ *text = "old password value is empty";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_peek_tag( ber, &len );
+ }
+
+ if( tag == LDAP_TAG_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD_NEW ) {
+ if( newpass == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: NEW not allowed.\n" );
+
+ *text = "user specified passwords disallowed";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_get_stringbv( ber, newpass, LBER_BV_NOTERM );
+
+ if( tag == LBER_ERROR ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: NEW parse failed.\n" );
+
+ goto decoding_error;
+ }
+
+ if( newpass->bv_len == 0 ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_parse: NEW empty.\n" );
+
+ *text = "new password value is empty";
+ rc = LDAP_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tag = ber_peek_tag( ber, &len );
+ }
+
+ if( len != 0 ) {
+decoding_error:
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "slap_passwd_parse: decoding error, len=%ld\n",
+ (long) len );
+
+ *text = "data decoding error";
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+done:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct berval * slap_passwd_return(
+ struct berval *cred )
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct berval *bv = NULL;
+ BerElementBuffer berbuf;
+ /* opaque structure, size unknown but smaller than berbuf */
+ BerElement *ber = (BerElement *)&berbuf;
+
+ assert( cred != NULL );
+
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_return: %ld\n",
+ (long) cred->bv_len );
+
+ ber_init_w_nullc( ber, LBER_USE_DER );
+
+ rc = ber_printf( ber, "{tON}",
+ LDAP_TAG_EXOP_MODIFY_PASSWD_GEN, cred );
+
+ if( rc >= 0 ) {
+ (void) ber_flatten( ber, &bv );
+ }
+
+ ber_free_buf( ber );
+
+ return bv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * if "e" is provided, access to each value of the password is checked first
+ */
+int
+slap_passwd_check(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ Attribute *a,
+ struct berval *cred,
+ const char **text )
+{
+ int result = 1;
+ struct berval *bv;
+ AccessControlState acl_state = ACL_STATE_INIT;
+ char credNul = cred->bv_val[cred->bv_len];
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD
+ void *old_authctx = NULL;
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_pool_setkey( op->o_threadctx, (void *)slap_sasl_bind,
+ op->o_conn->c_sasl_authctx, 0, &old_authctx, NULL );
+#endif
+
+ if ( credNul ) cred->bv_val[cred->bv_len] = 0;
+
+ for ( bv = a->a_vals; bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ ) {
+ /* if e is provided, check access */
+ if ( e && access_allowed( op, e, a->a_desc, bv,
+ ACL_AUTH, &acl_state ) == 0 )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ( !lutil_passwd( bv, cred, NULL, text ) ) {
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( credNul ) cred->bv_val[cred->bv_len] = credNul;
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_SPASSWD
+ ldap_pvt_thread_pool_setkey( op->o_threadctx, (void *)slap_sasl_bind,
+ old_authctx, 0, NULL, NULL );
+#endif
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+void
+slap_passwd_generate( struct berval *pass )
+{
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_passwd_generate\n" );
+ BER_BVZERO( pass );
+
+ /*
+ * generate passwords of only 8 characters as some getpass(3)
+ * implementations truncate at 8 characters.
+ */
+ lutil_passwd_generate( pass, 8 );
+}
+
+void
+slap_passwd_hash_type(
+ struct berval * cred,
+ struct berval * new,
+ char *hash,
+ const char **text )
+{
+ new->bv_len = 0;
+ new->bv_val = NULL;
+
+ assert( hash != NULL );
+
+ lutil_passwd_hash( cred , hash, new, text );
+}
+void
+slap_passwd_hash(
+ struct berval * cred,
+ struct berval * new,
+ const char **text )
+{
+ char *hash = NULL;
+ if ( default_passwd_hash ) {
+ hash = default_passwd_hash[0];
+ }
+ if ( !hash ) {
+ hash = (char *)defhash[0];
+ }
+
+ slap_passwd_hash_type( cred, new, hash, text );
+}
+
+#ifdef SLAPD_CRYPT
+static ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_t passwd_mutex;
+static lutil_cryptfunc slapd_crypt;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+static int slapd_crypt( const char *key, const char *salt, char **hash )
+{
+ char *cr;
+ int rc;
+ struct crypt_data data;
+
+ data.initialized = 0;
+ cr = crypt_r( key, salt, &data );
+ if ( cr == NULL || cr[0] == '\0' ) {
+ /* salt must have been invalid */
+ rc = LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
+ } else {
+ if ( hash ) {
+ *hash = ber_strdup( cr );
+ rc = LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
+ } else {
+ rc = strcmp( salt, cr ) ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+#else
+static int slapd_crypt( const char *key, const char *salt, char **hash )
+{
+ char *cr;
+ int rc;
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_lock( &passwd_mutex );
+
+ cr = crypt( key, salt );
+ if ( cr == NULL || cr[0] == '\0' ) {
+ /* salt must have been invalid */
+ rc = LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR;
+ } else {
+ if ( hash ) {
+ *hash = ber_strdup( cr );
+ rc = LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
+
+ } else {
+ rc = strcmp( salt, cr ) ? LUTIL_PASSWD_ERR : LUTIL_PASSWD_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &passwd_mutex );
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_CRYPT_R */
+
+#endif /* SLAPD_CRYPT */
+
+void slap_passwd_init()
+{
+#ifdef SLAPD_CRYPT
+ ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_init( &passwd_mutex );
+ lutil_cryptptr = slapd_crypt;
+#endif
+}
+