Adding upstream version 2.6.7+dfsg.upstream/2.6.7+dfsg

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2194 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..181f40f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2194 @@
+/* $OpenLDAP$ */
+/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright 1998-2022 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2000 Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
+ * Public License.
+ *
+ * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
+ * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
+ * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
+ */
+
+#include "portable.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+#include <limits.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <ac/stdlib.h>
+#include <ac/string.h>
+#include <ac/ctype.h>
+
+#include "slap.h"
+
+#include "lutil.h"
+#include "slap-config.h"
+
+#define SASLREGEX_REPLACE 10
+
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT	((ber_int_t) 0x0010)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX	((ber_int_t) 0x0020)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN	((ber_int_t) 0x0030)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE	((ber_int_t) 0x0040)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL	((ber_int_t) 0x0050)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP	((ber_int_t) 0x0060)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS	((ber_int_t) 0x0070)
+
+/*
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
+ *
+ * syntax: dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val>
+ *
+ * dn.exact:	the value must pass normalization and is used 
+ *		in exact DN match.
+ * dn.regex:	the value is treated as a regular expression 
+ *		in matching DN values in authz{To|From}
+ *		attributes.
+ * dn:		for backwards compatibility reasons, the value 
+ *		is treated as a regular expression, and thus 
+ *		it is not normalized nor validated; it is used
+ *		in exact or regex comparisons based on the 
+ *		context.
+ *
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
+ *
+ * syntax: u[.mech[/realm]]:<val>
+ * 
+ * where mech is a SIMPLE, AUTHZ, or a SASL mechanism name
+ * and realm is mechanism specific realm (separate to those
+ * which are representable as part of the principal).
+ */
+
+typedef struct sasl_regexp {
+  char *sr_match;						/* regexp match pattern */
+  char *sr_replace;					/* regexp replace pattern */
+} SaslRegexp_t;
+
+static int nSaslRegexp = 0;
+static SaslRegexp_t *SaslRegexp = NULL;
+
+#include "rewrite.h"
+struct rewrite_info	*sasl_rwinfo = NULL;
+#define AUTHID_CONTEXT	"authid"
+static BerVarray	authz_rewrites = NULL;
+
+/* What SASL proxy authorization policies are allowed? */
+#define	SASL_AUTHZ_NONE	0x00
+#define	SASL_AUTHZ_FROM	0x01
+#define	SASL_AUTHZ_TO	0x02
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_AND	0x10
+
+static const char *policy_txt[] = {
+	"none", "from", "to", "any"
+};
+
+static int authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
+
+static int
+slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule,
+	struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc );
+
+int slap_sasl_setpolicy( const char *arg )
+{
+	int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+	if ( strcasecmp( arg, "none" ) == 0 ) {
+		authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
+	} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "from" ) == 0 ) {
+		authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM;
+	} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "to" ) == 0 ) {
+		authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
+	} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 || strcasecmp( arg, "any" ) == 0 ) {
+		authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
+	} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "all" ) == 0 ) {
+		authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND;
+	} else {
+		rc = LDAP_OTHER;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+const char * slap_sasl_getpolicy()
+{
+	if ( authz_policy == (SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND) )
+		return "all";
+	else
+		return policy_txt[authz_policy];
+}
+
+int slap_parse_user( struct berval *id, struct berval *user,
+		struct berval *realm, struct berval *mech )
+{
+	char	u;
+	
+	assert( id != NULL );
+	assert( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) );
+	assert( user != NULL );
+	assert( realm != NULL );
+	assert( mech != NULL );
+
+	u = id->bv_val[ 0 ];
+	
+	if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) {
+		/* called with something other than u: */
+		return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* uauthzid form:
+	 *		u[.mech[/realm]]:user
+	 */
+	
+	user->bv_val = ber_bvchr( id, ':' );
+	if ( BER_BVISNULL( user ) ) {
+		return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	user->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+	user->bv_val++;
+	user->bv_len = id->bv_len - ( user->bv_val - id->bv_val );
+
+	if ( id->bv_val[1] == '.' ) {
+		id->bv_val[1] = '\0';
+		mech->bv_val = id->bv_val + 2;
+		mech->bv_len = user->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
+
+		realm->bv_val = ber_bvchr( mech, '/' );
+
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( realm ) ) {
+			realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+			realm->bv_val++;
+			mech->bv_len = realm->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
+			realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1;
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		BER_BVZERO( mech );
+		BER_BVZERO( realm );
+	}
+
+	if ( id->bv_val[ 1 ] != '\0' ) {
+		return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	if ( !BER_BVISNULL( mech ) ) {
+		if ( mech->bv_val != id->bv_val + 2 )
+			return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+
+		AC_MEMCPY( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 );
+		mech->bv_val -= 2;
+	}
+
+	if ( !BER_BVISNULL( realm ) ) {
+		if ( realm->bv_val < id->bv_val + 2 )
+			return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+
+		AC_MEMCPY( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 );
+		realm->bv_val -= 2;
+	}
+
+	/* leave "u:" before user */
+	user->bv_val -= 2;
+	user->bv_len += 2;
+	user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u;
+	user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':';
+
+	return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int
+authzValidate(
+	Syntax *syntax,
+	struct berval *in )
+{
+	struct berval	bv;
+	int		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+	LDAPURLDesc	*ludp = NULL;
+	int		scope = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * 1) <DN>
+	 * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>}
+	 * 3) dn.regex:<pattern>
+	 * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID>
+	 * 5) group[/<groupClass>[/<memberAttr>]]:<DN>
+	 * 6) <URL>
+	 */
+
+	assert( in != NULL );
+	assert( !BER_BVISNULL( in ) );
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+		"authzValidate: parsing %s\n", in->bv_val );
+
+	/*
+	 * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>}
+	 * 3) dn.regex:<pattern>
+	 *
+	 * <DN> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	if ( !strncasecmp( in->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) {
+		bv.bv_val = in->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" );
+
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) {
+			bv.bv_val++;
+
+			if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
+
+			} else {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+
+		} else {
+			if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+			scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			bv.bv_val++;
+		}
+
+		bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " );
+		/* jump here in case no type specification was present
+		 * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */
+is_dn:		bv.bv_len = in->bv_len - ( bv.bv_val - in->bv_val );
+
+		/* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */
+		if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) {
+			/* LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS */
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
+		switch ( scope ) {
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+			return dnValidate( NULL, &bv );
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID>
+	 */
+	} else if ( ( in->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || in->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' )
+			&& ( in->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' 
+				|| in->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' 
+				|| in->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) )
+	{
+		char		buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
+		struct berval	id,
+				user = BER_BVNULL,
+				realm = BER_BVNULL,
+				mech = BER_BVNULL;
+
+		if ( sizeof( buf ) <= in->bv_len ) {
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		id.bv_len = in->bv_len;
+		id.bv_val = buf;
+		strncpy( buf, in->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+		rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * 5) group[/groupClass[/memberAttr]]:<DN>
+	 *
+	 * <groupClass> defaults to "groupOfNames"
+	 * <memberAttr> defaults to "member"
+	 * 
+	 * <DN> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	} else if ( strncasecmp( in->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 )
+	{
+		struct berval	group_dn = BER_BVNULL,
+				group_oc = BER_BVNULL,
+				member_at = BER_BVNULL;
+
+		bv.bv_val = in->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" );
+		bv.bv_len = in->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" );
+		group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' );
+		if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) {
+			/* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */
+			bv.bv_val = in->bv_val;
+			scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			goto is_dn;
+		}
+		
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: we assume that "member" and "groupOfNames"
+		 * are present in schema...
+		 */
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) {
+			group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ];
+			group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+
+			member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' );
+			if ( member_at.bv_val ) {
+				AttributeDescription	*ad = NULL;
+				const char		*text = NULL;
+
+				group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+				member_at.bv_val++;
+				member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val;
+				rc = slap_bv2ad( &member_at, &ad, &text );
+				if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+					return rc;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if ( oc_bvfind( &group_oc ) == NULL ) {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+		}
+
+		group_dn.bv_val++;
+		group_dn.bv_len = in->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - in->bv_val );
+
+		rc = dnValidate( NULL, &group_dn );
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter>
+	 * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree}
+	 *
+	 * <scope> defaults to "base"
+	 * <base> must pass DN normalization
+	 * <filter> must pass str2filter()
+	 */
+	rc = ldap_url_parse( in->bv_val, &ludp );
+	switch ( rc ) {
+	case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS:
+		/* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary,
+		 * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which
+		 * gives the idea SSL is being used.  Maybe we could
+		 * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use
+		 * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with
+		 * little parsing.
+		 */
+		if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) {
+			/*
+			 * must be ldap:///
+			 */
+			rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME:
+		/*
+		 * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ...
+		 *
+		 * NOTE: must pass DN normalization
+		 */
+		ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+		bv.bv_val = in->bv_val;
+		scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+		goto is_dn;
+
+	default:
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host )
+		|| ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts )
+	{
+		/* host part must be empty */
+		/* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the filter */
+	if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
+		Filter	*f = str2filter( ludp->lud_filter );
+		if ( f == NULL ) {
+			rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		filter_free( f );
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the searchbase */
+	if ( ludp->lud_dn != NULL ) {
+		ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &bv );
+		rc = dnValidate( NULL, &bv );
+	} else {
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+	}
+
+done:
+	ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+	return( rc );
+}
+
+static int
+authzPrettyNormal(
+	struct berval	*val,
+	struct berval	*normalized,
+	void		*ctx,
+	int		normalize )
+{
+	struct berval	bv;
+	int		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+	LDAPURLDesc	*ludp = NULL;
+	char		*lud_dn = NULL,
+			*lud_filter = NULL;
+	int		scope = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * 1) <DN>
+	 * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>}
+	 * 3) dn.regex:<pattern>
+	 * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID>
+	 * 5) group[/<groupClass>[/<memberAttr>]]:<DN>
+	 * 6) <URL>
+	 */
+
+	assert( val != NULL );
+	assert( !BER_BVISNULL( val ) );
+	BER_BVZERO( normalized );
+
+	/*
+	 * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>}
+	 * 3) dn.regex:<pattern>
+	 *
+	 * <DN> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	if ( !strncasecmp( val->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) {
+		struct berval	out = BER_BVNULL,
+				prefix = BER_BVNULL;
+		char		*ptr;
+
+		bv.bv_val = val->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" );
+
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) {
+			bv.bv_val++;
+
+			if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" );
+				scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
+
+			} else {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+
+		} else {
+			if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+			scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			bv.bv_val++;
+		}
+
+		bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " );
+		/* jump here in case no type specification was present
+		 * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */
+is_dn:		bv.bv_len = val->bv_len - ( bv.bv_val - val->bv_val );
+
+		/* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */
+		if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) {
+			ber_str2bv_x( "dn:*", STRLENOF( "dn:*" ), 1, normalized, ctx );
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
+		switch ( scope ) {
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+			if ( normalize ) {
+				rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &out, ctx );
+			} else {
+				rc = dnPretty( NULL, &bv, &out, ctx );
+			}
+			if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+			normalized->bv_len = STRLENOF( "dn.regex:" ) + bv.bv_len;
+			normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx );
+			ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, "dn.regex:" );
+			ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len );
+			ptr[ 0 ] = '\0';
+			return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+		default:
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		/* prepare prefix */
+		switch ( scope ) {
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+			BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn:" );
+			break;
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+			BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.children:" );
+			break;
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+			BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.subtree:" );
+			break;
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+			BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.onelevel:" );
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			assert( 0 );
+			break;
+		}
+
+		normalized->bv_len = prefix.bv_len + out.bv_len;
+		normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx );
+		
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, prefix.bv_val );
+		ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, out.bv_val, out.bv_len );
+		ptr[ 0 ] = '\0';
+		ber_memfree_x( out.bv_val, ctx );
+
+		return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
+	 * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID>
+	 */
+	} else if ( ( val->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || val->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' )
+			&& ( val->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' 
+				|| val->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' 
+				|| val->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) )
+	{
+		char		buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
+		struct berval	id,
+				user = BER_BVNULL,
+				realm = BER_BVNULL,
+				mech = BER_BVNULL;
+
+		if ( sizeof( buf ) <= val->bv_len ) {
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		id.bv_len = val->bv_len;
+		id.bv_val = buf;
+		strncpy( buf, val->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+		rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		ber_dupbv_x( normalized, val, ctx );
+
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * 5) group[/groupClass[/memberAttr]]:<DN>
+	 *
+	 * <groupClass> defaults to "groupOfNames"
+	 * <memberAttr> defaults to "member"
+	 * 
+	 * <DN> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	} else if ( strncasecmp( val->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 )
+	{
+		struct berval	group_dn = BER_BVNULL,
+				group_oc = BER_BVNULL,
+				member_at = BER_BVNULL,
+				out = BER_BVNULL;
+		char		*ptr;
+
+		bv.bv_val = val->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" );
+		bv.bv_len = val->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" );
+		group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' );
+		if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) {
+			/* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */
+			bv.bv_val = val->bv_val;
+			scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			goto is_dn;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * FIXME: we assume that "member" and "groupOfNames"
+		 * are present in schema...
+		 */
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) {
+			ObjectClass		*oc = NULL;
+
+			group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ];
+			group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+
+			member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' );
+			if ( member_at.bv_val ) {
+				AttributeDescription	*ad = NULL;
+				const char		*text = NULL;
+
+				group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+				member_at.bv_val++;
+				member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val;
+				rc = slap_bv2ad( &member_at, &ad, &text );
+				if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+					return rc;
+				}
+
+				member_at = ad->ad_cname;
+
+			}
+
+			oc = oc_bvfind( &group_oc );
+			if ( oc == NULL ) {
+				return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			}
+
+			group_oc = oc->soc_cname;
+		}
+
+		group_dn.bv_val++;
+		group_dn.bv_len = val->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - val->bv_val );
+
+		if ( normalize ) {
+			rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &group_dn, &out, ctx );
+		} else {
+			rc = dnPretty( NULL, &group_dn, &out, ctx );
+		}
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		normalized->bv_len = STRLENOF( "group" ":" ) + out.bv_len;
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &group_oc ) ) {
+			normalized->bv_len += STRLENOF( "/" ) + group_oc.bv_len;
+			if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &member_at ) ) {
+				normalized->bv_len += STRLENOF( "/" ) + member_at.bv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+		normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx );
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, "group" );
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &group_oc ) ) {
+			ptr[ 0 ] = '/';
+			ptr++;
+			ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, group_oc.bv_val, group_oc.bv_len );
+			if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &member_at ) ) {
+				ptr[ 0 ] = '/';
+				ptr++;
+				ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, member_at.bv_val, member_at.bv_len );
+			}
+		}
+		ptr[ 0 ] = ':';
+		ptr++;
+		ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, out.bv_val, out.bv_len );
+		ptr[ 0 ] = '\0';
+		ber_memfree_x( out.bv_val, ctx );
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter>
+	 * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree}
+	 *
+	 * <scope> defaults to "base"
+	 * <base> must pass DN normalization
+	 * <filter> must pass str2filter()
+	 */
+	rc = ldap_url_parse( val->bv_val, &ludp );
+	switch ( rc ) {
+	case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS:
+		/* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary,
+		 * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which
+		 * gives the idea SSL is being used.  Maybe we could
+		 * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use
+		 * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with
+		 * little parsing.
+		 */
+		if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) {
+			/*
+			 * must be ldap:///
+			 */
+			rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		AC_MEMCPY( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap", STRLENOF( "ldap" ) );
+		break;
+
+	case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME:
+		/*
+		 * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ...
+		 *
+		 * NOTE: must pass DN normalization
+		 */
+		ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+		bv.bv_val = val->bv_val;
+		scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+		goto is_dn;
+
+	default:
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host )
+		|| ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts )
+	{
+		/* host part must be empty */
+		/* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the filter */
+	if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
+		struct berval	filterstr;
+		Filter		*f;
+
+		lud_filter = ludp->lud_filter;
+
+		f = str2filter( lud_filter );
+		if ( f == NULL ) {
+			rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		filter2bv( f, &filterstr );
+		filter_free( f );
+		if ( BER_BVISNULL( &filterstr ) ) {
+			rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		ludp->lud_filter = filterstr.bv_val;
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the searchbase */
+	if ( ludp->lud_dn ) {
+		struct berval	out = BER_BVNULL;
+
+		lud_dn = ludp->lud_dn;
+
+		ber_str2bv( lud_dn, 0, 0, &bv );
+		if ( normalize ) {
+			rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &out, ctx );
+		} else {
+			rc = dnPretty( NULL, &bv, &out, ctx );
+		}
+
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		ludp->lud_dn = out.bv_val;
+	} else {
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	ludp->lud_port = 0;
+	normalized->bv_val = ldap_url_desc2str( ludp );
+	if ( normalized->bv_val ) {
+		normalized->bv_len = strlen( normalized->bv_val );
+
+	} else {
+		rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+	}
+
+done:
+	if ( lud_filter ) {
+		if ( ludp->lud_filter != lud_filter ) {
+			ber_memfree( ludp->lud_filter );
+		}
+		ludp->lud_filter = lud_filter;
+	}
+
+	if ( lud_dn ) {
+		if ( ludp->lud_dn != lud_dn ) {
+			slap_sl_free( ludp->lud_dn, ctx );
+		}
+		ludp->lud_dn = lud_dn;
+	}
+
+	ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+
+	return( rc );
+}
+
+int
+authzNormalize(
+	slap_mask_t	usage,
+	Syntax		*syntax,
+	MatchingRule	*mr,
+	struct berval	*val,
+	struct berval	*normalized,
+	void		*ctx )
+{
+	int		rc;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, ">>> authzNormalize: <%s>\n",
+		val->bv_val );
+
+	rc = authzPrettyNormal( val, normalized, ctx, 1 );
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<<< authzNormalize: <%s> (%d)\n",
+		normalized->bv_val, rc );
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int
+authzPretty(
+	Syntax *syntax,
+	struct berval *val,
+	struct berval *out,
+	void *ctx)
+{
+	int		rc;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, ">>> authzPretty: <%s>\n",
+		val->bv_val );
+
+	rc = authzPrettyNormal( val, out, ctx, 0 );
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<<< authzPretty: <%s> (%d)\n",
+		out->bv_val ? out->bv_val : "(null)" , rc );
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
+slap_parseURI(
+	Operation	*op,
+	struct berval	*uri,
+	struct berval	*base,
+	struct berval	*nbase,
+	int		*scope,
+	Filter		**filter,
+	struct berval	*fstr,
+	int		normalize )
+{
+	struct berval	bv;
+	int		rc;
+	LDAPURLDesc	*ludp;
+
+	struct berval	idx;
+
+	assert( uri != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( uri ) );
+	BER_BVZERO( base );
+	BER_BVZERO( nbase );
+	BER_BVZERO( fstr );
+	*scope = -1;
+	*filter = NULL;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+		"slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val );
+
+	rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+
+	idx = *uri;
+	if ( idx.bv_val[ 0 ] == '{' ) {
+		char	*ptr;
+
+		ptr = ber_bvchr( &idx, '}' ) + 1;
+
+		assert( ptr != (void *)1 );
+
+		idx.bv_len -= ptr - idx.bv_val;
+		idx.bv_val = ptr;
+		uri = &idx;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * dn[.<dnstyle>]:<dnpattern>
+	 * <dnstyle> ::= {exact|regex|children|subtree|onelevel}
+	 *
+	 * <dnstyle> defaults to "exact"
+	 * if <dnstyle> is not "regex", <dnpattern> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	if ( !strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) {
+		bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" );
+
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) {
+			bv.bv_val++;
+
+			if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" );
+				*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" );
+				*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" );
+				*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" );
+				*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+
+			} else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) {
+				bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" );
+				*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
+
+			} else {
+				return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			}
+
+		} else {
+			if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) {
+				return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			}
+			*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			bv.bv_val++;
+		}
+
+		bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " );
+		/* jump here in case no type specification was present
+		 * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */
+is_dn:		bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - (bv.bv_val - uri->bv_val);
+
+		/* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */
+		if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) {
+			*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS;
+		}
+
+		switch ( *scope ) {
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+			if ( normalize ) {
+				rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+				if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+					*scope = -1;
+				}
+			} else {
+				ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+				rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+			ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+		case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS:
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			*scope = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * u:<uid>
+	 */
+	} else if ( ( uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' )
+			&& ( uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' 
+				|| uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' 
+				|| uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) )
+	{
+		Connection	c = *op->o_conn;
+		char		buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
+		struct berval	id,
+				user = BER_BVNULL,
+				realm = BER_BVNULL,
+				mech = BER_BVNULL;
+
+		if ( sizeof( buf ) <= uri->bv_len ) {
+			return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		id.bv_len = uri->bv_len;
+		id.bv_val = buf;
+		strncpy( buf, uri->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+		rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
+		if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			return rc;
+		}
+
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &mech ) ) {
+			c.c_sasl_bind_mech = mech;
+		} else {
+			BER_BVSTR( &c.c_sasl_bind_mech, "AUTHZ" );
+		}
+		
+		rc = slap_sasl_getdn( &c, op, &user,
+				realm.bv_val, nbase, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID );
+
+		if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+		}
+
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * group[/<groupoc>[/<groupat>]]:<groupdn>
+	 *
+	 * groupoc defaults to "groupOfNames"
+	 * groupat defaults to "member"
+	 * 
+	 * <groupdn> must pass DN normalization
+	 */
+	} else if ( strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 )
+	{
+		struct berval	group_dn = BER_BVNULL,
+				group_oc = BER_BVNULL,
+				member_at = BER_BVNULL;
+		char		*tmp;
+
+		bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" );
+		bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" );
+		group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' );
+		if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) {
+			/* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */
+			bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val;
+			*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+			goto is_dn;
+		}
+		
+		if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) {
+			group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ];
+			group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+
+			member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' );
+			if ( member_at.bv_val ) {
+				group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val;
+				member_at.bv_val++;
+				member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val;
+
+			} else {
+				BER_BVSTR( &member_at, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR );
+			}
+
+		} else {
+			BER_BVSTR( &group_oc, SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS );
+			BER_BVSTR( &member_at, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR );
+		}
+		group_dn.bv_val++;
+		group_dn.bv_len = uri->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - uri->bv_val );
+
+		if ( normalize ) {
+			rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &group_dn, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+			if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+				*scope = -1;
+				return rc;
+			}
+		} else {
+			ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &group_dn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		}
+		*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP;
+
+		/* FIXME: caller needs to add value of member attribute
+		 * and close brackets twice */
+		fstr->bv_len = STRLENOF( "(&(objectClass=)(=" /* )) */ )
+			+ group_oc.bv_len + member_at.bv_len;
+		fstr->bv_val = ch_malloc( fstr->bv_len + 1 );
+
+		tmp = lutil_strncopy( fstr->bv_val, "(&(objectClass=" /* )) */ ,
+				STRLENOF( "(&(objectClass=" /* )) */ ) );
+		tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, group_oc.bv_val, group_oc.bv_len );
+		tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, /* ( */ ")(" /* ) */ ,
+				STRLENOF( /* ( */ ")(" /* ) */ ) );
+		tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, member_at.bv_val, member_at.bv_len );
+		tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, "=", STRLENOF( "=" ) );
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter>
+	 * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree}
+	 *
+	 * <scope> defaults to "base"
+	 * <base> must pass DN normalization
+	 * <filter> must pass str2filter()
+	 */
+	rc = ldap_url_parse( uri->bv_val, &ludp );
+	switch ( rc ) {
+	case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS:
+		/* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary,
+		 * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which
+		 * gives the idea SSL is being used.  Maybe we could
+		 * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use
+		 * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with
+		 * little parsing.
+		 */
+		if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) {
+			/*
+			 * must be ldap:///
+			 */
+			rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME:
+		/*
+		 * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ...
+		 *
+		 * NOTE: must pass DN normalization
+		 */
+		ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+		bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val;
+		*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+		goto is_dn;
+
+	default:
+		rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host )
+		|| ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts )
+	{
+		/* host part must be empty */
+		/* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */
+		rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the scope */
+	*scope = ludp->lud_scope;
+
+	/* Grab the filter */
+	if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
+		*filter = str2filter_x( op, ludp->lud_filter );
+		if ( *filter == NULL ) {
+			rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, fstr );
+	}
+
+	/* Grab the searchbase */
+	ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, base );
+	if ( normalize ) {
+		rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, base, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+	} else {
+		ber_dupbv_x( nbase, base, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+		rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+done:
+	if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		if( *filter ) {
+			filter_free_x( op, *filter, 1 );
+			*filter = NULL;
+		}
+		BER_BVZERO( base );
+		BER_BVZERO( fstr );
+	} else {
+		/* Don't free these, return them to caller */
+		ludp->lud_filter = NULL;
+		ludp->lud_dn = NULL;
+	}
+
+	ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
+	return( rc );
+}
+
+static int slap_sasl_rewrite_config_argv(
+		const char	*fname,
+		int		lineno,
+		int		argc,
+		char		**argv
+)
+{
+	int	rc;
+	char	*argv0 = NULL;
+
+	if ( strncasecmp( argv[0], "authid-", STRLENOF( "authid-" ) ) == 0 ) {
+		/* strip "authid-" prefix for parsing */
+		argv0 = argv[0];
+		argv[0] = &argv0[ STRLENOF( "authid-" ) ];
+	}
+
+	/* init at first call */
+	if ( sasl_rwinfo == NULL ) {
+		sasl_rwinfo = rewrite_info_init( REWRITE_MODE_USE_DEFAULT );
+	}
+
+	rc = rewrite_parse( sasl_rwinfo, fname, lineno, argc, argv );
+
+	if ( argv0 )
+		argv[0] = argv0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int slap_sasl_rewrite_config_bv(
+		const char	*fname,
+		int		lineno,
+		struct berval	bv
+)
+{
+	int rc;
+	ConfigArgs ca = { 0 };
+
+	ca.line = bv.bv_val;
+	ca.argc = 0;
+	config_fp_parse_line( &ca );
+
+	rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_argv( fname, lineno, ca.argc, ca.argv );
+
+	ch_free( ca.tline );
+	ch_free( ca.argv );
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+slap_sasl_rewrite_bva_add(
+		BerVarray	*bva,
+		int		idx,
+		int		argc,
+		char		**argv
+)
+{
+	char		*line, *s;
+	struct berval	bv;
+
+	if ( argc > 1 ) {
+		/* quote all args but the first */
+		line = ldap_charray2str( argv, "\" \"" );
+		ber_str2bv( line, 0, 0, &bv );
+		s = ber_bvchr( &bv, '"' );
+		assert( s != NULL );
+
+		/* move the trailing quote of argv[0] to the end */
+		AC_MEMCPY( s, s + 1, bv.bv_len - ( s - bv.bv_val ) );
+		bv.bv_val[ bv.bv_len - 1 ] = '"';
+	} else {
+		ber_str2bv( argv[ 0 ], 0, 1, &bv );
+	}
+
+	if ( idx == -1 ) {
+		ber_bvarray_add( bva, &bv );
+	} else {
+		(*bva)[ idx ] = bv;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy( void )
+{
+	if ( sasl_rwinfo ) {
+		rewrite_info_delete( &sasl_rwinfo );
+		sasl_rwinfo = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int slap_sasl_rewrite_config(
+		const char	*fname,
+		int		lineno,
+		int		argc,
+		char		**argv,
+		int		valx
+)
+{
+	int	rc, i, last;
+	char	*line;
+	struct berval bv;
+	struct rewrite_info *rw = sasl_rwinfo;
+
+	for ( last = 0; authz_rewrites && !BER_BVISNULL( &authz_rewrites[ last ] ); last++ )
+		/* count'em */ ;
+
+	if ( valx == -1 || valx >= last ) {
+		valx = -1;
+		rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_argv( fname, lineno, argc, argv );
+		if ( rc == 0 ) {
+			slap_sasl_rewrite_bva_add( &authz_rewrites, valx, argc, argv );
+		}
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	sasl_rwinfo = NULL;
+
+	for ( i = 0; i < valx; i++ )
+	{
+		rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_bv( fname, lineno, authz_rewrites[ i ] );
+		assert( rc == 0 );
+	}
+
+	rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_argv( fname, lineno, argc, argv );
+	if ( rc != 0 ) {
+		slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+		sasl_rwinfo = rw;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	for ( i = valx; authz_rewrites && !BER_BVISNULL( &authz_rewrites[ i ] ); i++ )
+	{
+		rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_bv( fname, lineno, authz_rewrites[ i ] );
+		assert( rc == 0 );
+	}
+
+	authz_rewrites = ch_realloc( authz_rewrites,
+			( last + 2 )*sizeof( struct berval ) );
+	BER_BVZERO( &authz_rewrites[ last + 1 ] );
+
+	for ( i = last - 1; i >= valx; i-- )
+	{
+		authz_rewrites[ i + 1 ] = authz_rewrites[ i ];
+	}
+
+	slap_sasl_rewrite_bva_add( &authz_rewrites, valx, argc, argv );
+
+	if ( rw )
+		rewrite_info_delete( &rw );
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int slap_sasl_rewrite_delete( int valx ) {
+	int rc, i;
+
+	if ( valx == -1 ) {
+		slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+		if ( authz_rewrites ) {
+			ber_bvarray_free( authz_rewrites );
+			authz_rewrites = NULL;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &authz_rewrites[ i ] ); i++ )
+		/* count'em */ ;
+
+	if ( valx >= i ) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	i = valx;
+	ber_memfree( authz_rewrites[ i ].bv_val );
+	for ( ; !BER_BVISNULL( &authz_rewrites[ i + 1 ] ); i++ )
+	{
+		authz_rewrites[ i ] = authz_rewrites[ i + 1 ];
+	}
+	BER_BVZERO( &authz_rewrites[ i ] );
+
+	slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+
+	for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &authz_rewrites[ i ] ); i++ )
+	{
+		rc = slap_sasl_rewrite_config_bv( "slapd", 0, authz_rewrites[ i ] );
+		assert( rc == 0 );
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int slap_sasl_rewrite_unparse( BerVarray *bva ) {
+	if ( authz_rewrites ) {
+		return slap_bv_x_ordered_unparse( authz_rewrites, bva );
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config(
+		struct rewrite_info	**rwinfo,
+		const char		*fname,
+		int			lineno,
+		const char		*match,
+		const char		*replace,
+		const char		*context )
+{
+	int	rc;
+	char	*argvRule[] = { "rewriteRule", NULL, NULL, ":@", NULL };
+	struct rewrite_info *rw = *rwinfo;
+
+	/* init at first call */
+	if ( rw == NULL ) {
+		char *argvEngine[] = { "rewriteEngine", "on", NULL };
+		char *argvContext[] = { "rewriteContext", NULL, NULL };
+
+		/* initialize rewrite engine */
+		rw = rewrite_info_init( REWRITE_MODE_USE_DEFAULT );
+
+		/* switch on rewrite engine */
+		rc = rewrite_parse( rw, fname, lineno, 2, argvEngine );
+		if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* create generic authid context */
+		argvContext[1] = AUTHID_CONTEXT;
+		rc = rewrite_parse( rw, fname, lineno, 2, argvContext );
+		if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	argvRule[1] = (char *)match;
+	argvRule[2] = (char *)replace;
+	rc = rewrite_parse( rw, fname, lineno, 4, argvRule );
+out:
+	if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
+		*rwinfo = rw;
+	} else {
+		rewrite_info_delete( &rw );
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int slap_sasl_regexp_config( const char *match, const char *replace, int valx )
+{
+	int i, rc;
+	SaslRegexp_t sr;
+	struct rewrite_info *rw = NULL;
+
+	if ( valx < 0 || valx > nSaslRegexp )
+		valx = nSaslRegexp;
+
+	for ( i = 0; i < valx; i++) {
+		rc = slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( &rw, "sasl-regexp", 0,
+				SaslRegexp[i].sr_match,
+				SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace,
+				AUTHID_CONTEXT);
+		assert( rc == 0 );
+	}
+
+	rc = slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( &rw, "sasl-regexp", 0,
+			match, replace, AUTHID_CONTEXT );
+
+	if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		SaslRegexp = (SaslRegexp_t *) ch_realloc( (char *) SaslRegexp,
+				(nSaslRegexp + 1) * sizeof(SaslRegexp_t) );
+
+		for ( i = nSaslRegexp; i > valx; i-- ) {
+			SaslRegexp[i] = SaslRegexp[i - 1];
+		}
+
+		SaslRegexp[i] = sr;
+		SaslRegexp[i].sr_match = ch_strdup( match );
+		SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace = ch_strdup( replace );
+
+		nSaslRegexp++;
+
+		for ( i = valx + 1; i < nSaslRegexp; i++ ) {
+			rc = slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( &rw, "sasl-regexp", 0,
+					SaslRegexp[i].sr_match,
+					SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace,
+					AUTHID_CONTEXT);
+			assert( rc == 0 );
+		}
+
+		slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+		sasl_rwinfo = rw;
+	} else if ( rw ) {
+		rewrite_info_delete( &rw );
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void
+slap_sasl_regexp_destroy_one( int n )
+{
+	ch_free( SaslRegexp[ n ].sr_match );
+	ch_free( SaslRegexp[ n ].sr_replace );
+}
+
+void
+slap_sasl_regexp_destroy( void )
+{
+	if ( SaslRegexp ) {
+		int	n;
+
+		for ( n = 0; n < nSaslRegexp; n++ ) {
+			slap_sasl_regexp_destroy_one( n );
+		}
+
+		ch_free( SaslRegexp );
+		SaslRegexp = NULL;
+		nSaslRegexp = 0;
+	}
+
+	slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+}
+
+int slap_sasl_regexp_delete( int valx )
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if ( valx >= nSaslRegexp ) {
+		rc = 1;
+	} else if ( valx < 0 || nSaslRegexp == 1 ) {
+		slap_sasl_regexp_destroy();
+	} else {
+		int i;
+
+		slap_sasl_regexp_destroy_one( valx );
+		nSaslRegexp--;
+
+		for ( i = valx; i < nSaslRegexp; i++ ) {
+			SaslRegexp[ i ] = SaslRegexp[ i + 1 ];
+		}
+
+		slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy();
+		for ( i = 0; i < nSaslRegexp; i++ ) {
+			rc = slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( &sasl_rwinfo, "sasl-regexp", 0,
+					SaslRegexp[ i ].sr_match,
+					SaslRegexp[ i ].sr_replace,
+					AUTHID_CONTEXT );
+			assert( rc == 0 );
+		}
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void slap_sasl_regexp_unparse( BerVarray *out )
+{
+	int i;
+	BerVarray bva = NULL;
+	char ibuf[32], *ptr;
+	struct berval idx;
+
+	if ( !nSaslRegexp ) return;
+
+	idx.bv_val = ibuf;
+	bva = ch_malloc( (nSaslRegexp+1) * sizeof(struct berval) );
+	BER_BVZERO(bva+nSaslRegexp);
+	for ( i=0; i<nSaslRegexp; i++ ) {
+		idx.bv_len = sprintf( idx.bv_val, "{%d}", i);
+		bva[i].bv_len = idx.bv_len + strlen( SaslRegexp[i].sr_match ) +
+			strlen( SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace ) + 5;
+		bva[i].bv_val = ch_malloc( bva[i].bv_len+1 );
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( bva[i].bv_val, ibuf );
+		*ptr++ = '"';
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, SaslRegexp[i].sr_match );
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, "\" \"" );
+		ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace );
+		*ptr++ = '"';
+		*ptr = '\0';
+	}
+	*out = bva;
+}
+
+/* Take the passed in SASL name and attempt to convert it into an
+   LDAP URI to find the matching LDAP entry, using the pattern matching
+   strings given in the saslregexp config file directive(s) */
+
+static int slap_authz_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out,
+		int flags, void *ctx )
+{
+	const char	*context = AUTHID_CONTEXT;
+
+	if ( sasl_rwinfo == NULL || BER_BVISNULL( in ) ) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* FIXME: if aware of authc/authz mapping, 
+	 * we could use different contexts ... */
+	switch ( rewrite_session( sasl_rwinfo, context, in->bv_val, NULL, 
+				&out->bv_val ) )
+	{
+	case REWRITE_REGEXEC_OK:
+		if ( !BER_BVISNULL( out ) ) {
+			char *val = out->bv_val;
+			ber_str2bv_x( val, 0, 1, out, ctx );
+			if ( val != in->bv_val ) {
+				free( val );
+			}
+		} else {
+			ber_dupbv_x( out, in, ctx );
+		}
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS,
+			"[rw] %s: \"%s\" -> \"%s\"\n",
+			context, in->bv_val, out->bv_val );		
+		return 1;
+
+	case REWRITE_REGEXEC_UNWILLING:
+	case REWRITE_REGEXEC_ERR:
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+}
+
+/* This callback actually does some work...*/
+static int sasl_sc_sasl2dn( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	struct berval *ndn = op->o_callback->sc_private;
+
+	if ( rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH ) return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+
+	/* We only want to be called once */
+	if ( !BER_BVISNULL( ndn ) ) {
+		op->o_tmpfree( ndn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+		BER_BVZERO( ndn );
+
+		Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+			"%s: slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n",
+			op->o_log_prefix );
+		return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; /* short-circuit the search */
+	}
+
+	ber_dupbv_x( ndn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+	return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+typedef struct smatch_info {
+	struct berval *dn;
+	int match;
+} smatch_info;
+
+static int sasl_sc_smatch( Operation *o, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+	smatch_info *sm = o->o_callback->sc_private;
+
+	if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0;
+
+	if (dn_match(sm->dn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname)) {
+		sm->match = 1;
+		return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE;	/* short-circuit the search */
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+slap_sasl_matches( Operation *op, BerVarray rules,
+		struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc )
+{
+	int	rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+
+	if ( rules != NULL ) {
+		int	i;
+
+		for( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rules[i] ); i++ ) {
+			rc = slap_sasl_match( op, &rules[i], assertDN, authc );
+			if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) break;
+		}
+	}
+	
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Map a SASL regexp rule to a DN. If the rule is just a DN or a scope=base
+ * URI, just strcmp the rule (or its searchbase) to the *assertDN. Otherwise,
+ * the rule must be used as an internal search for entries. If that search
+ * returns the *assertDN entry, the match is successful.
+ *
+ * The assertDN should not have the dn: prefix
+ */
+
+static int
+slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule,
+	struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc )
+{
+	int rc; 
+	regex_t reg;
+	smatch_info sm;
+	slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_smatch, NULL, NULL };
+	Operation op = {0};
+	SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
+	struct berval base = BER_BVNULL;
+
+	sm.dn = assertDN;
+	sm.match = 0;
+	cb.sc_private = &sm;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "===>slap_sasl_match: comparing DN %s to rule %s\n",
+		assertDN->bv_len ? assertDN->bv_val : "(null)", rule->bv_val );
+
+	/* NOTE: don't normalize rule if authz syntax is enabled */
+	rc = slap_parseURI( opx, rule, &base, &op.o_req_ndn,
+		&op.ors_scope, &op.ors_filter, &op.ors_filterstr, 0 );
+
+	if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto CONCLUDED;
+
+	switch ( op.ors_scope ) {
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+exact_match:
+		if ( dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, assertDN ) ) {
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+		}
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+	{
+		int	d = assertDN->bv_len - op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
+
+		rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+
+		if ( d == 0 && op.ors_scope == LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ) {
+			goto exact_match;
+
+		} else if ( d > 0 ) {
+			struct berval bv;
+
+			/* leave room for at least one char of attributeType,
+			 * one for '=' and one for ',' */
+			if ( d < (int) STRLENOF( "x=,") ) {
+				goto CONCLUDED;
+			}
+
+			bv.bv_len = op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
+			bv.bv_val = assertDN->bv_val + d;
+
+			if ( bv.bv_val[ -1 ] == ',' && dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, &bv ) ) {
+				switch ( op.ors_scope ) {
+				case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+				case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+					rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+					break;
+
+				case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+				{
+					struct berval	pdn;
+
+					dnParent( assertDN, &pdn );
+					/* the common portion of the DN
+					 * already matches, so only check
+					 * if parent DN of assertedDN 
+					 * is all the pattern */
+					if ( pdn.bv_len == op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) {
+						rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+					}
+					break;
+				}
+				default:
+					/* at present, impossible */
+					assert( 0 );
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+	}
+
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+		rc = regcomp(&reg, op.o_req_ndn.bv_val,
+			REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB);
+		if ( rc == 0 ) {
+			rc = regexec(&reg, assertDN->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0);
+			regfree( &reg );
+		}
+		if ( rc == 0 ) {
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+		}
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP: {
+		char	*tmp;
+
+		/* Now filterstr looks like "(&(objectClass=<group_oc>)(<member_at>="
+		 * we need to append the <assertDN> so that the <group_dn> is searched
+		 * with scope "base", and the filter ensures that <assertDN> is
+		 * member of the group */
+		tmp = ch_realloc( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val, op.ors_filterstr.bv_len +
+			assertDN->bv_len + STRLENOF( /*"(("*/ "))" ) + 1 );
+		if ( tmp == NULL ) {
+			rc = LDAP_NO_MEMORY;
+			goto CONCLUDED;
+		}
+		op.ors_filterstr.bv_val = tmp;
+		
+		tmp = lutil_strcopy( &tmp[op.ors_filterstr.bv_len], assertDN->bv_val );
+		tmp = lutil_strcopy( tmp, /*"(("*/ "))" );
+
+		/* pass opx because str2filter_x may (and does) use o_tmpmfuncs */
+		op.ors_filter = str2filter_x( opx, op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
+		if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) {
+			rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			goto CONCLUDED;
+		}
+		op.ors_scope = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE;
+
+		/* hijack match DN: use that of the group instead of the assertDN;
+		 * assertDN is now in the filter */
+		sm.dn = &op.o_req_ndn;
+
+		/* do the search */
+		break;
+		}
+
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS:
+		if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( assertDN ) ) {
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+		}
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Must run an internal search. */
+	if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) {
+		rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR;
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+	}
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "slap_sasl_match: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
+	   op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.ors_scope );
+
+	op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 1 );
+	if(( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL)) {
+		rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+		goto CONCLUDED;
+	}
+
+	op.o_hdr = opx->o_hdr;
+	op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
+	op.o_ndn = *authc;
+	op.o_callback = &cb;
+	slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr );
+	op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
+	op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
+	/* use req_ndn as req_dn instead of non-pretty base of uri */
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &base ) ) {
+		ch_free( base.bv_val );
+		/* just in case... */
+		BER_BVZERO( &base );
+	}
+	ber_dupbv_x( &op.o_req_dn, &op.o_req_ndn, op.o_tmpmemctx );
+	op.ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER;
+	op.ors_slimit = 1;
+	op.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
+	op.ors_attrs = slap_anlist_no_attrs;
+	op.ors_attrsonly = 1;
+
+	op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
+
+	if (sm.match) {
+		rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+	} else {
+		rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+	}
+
+CONCLUDED:
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_dn ) ) slap_sl_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_ndn ) ) slap_sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
+	if( op.ors_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.ors_filter, 1 );
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.ors_filterstr ) ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "<===slap_sasl_match: comparison returned %d\n", rc );
+
+	return( rc );
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function answers the question, "Can this ID authorize to that ID?",
+ * based on authorization rules. The rules are stored in the *searchDN, in the
+ * attribute named by *attr. If any of those rules map to the *assertDN, the
+ * authorization is approved.
+ *
+ * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
+ */
+static int
+slap_sasl_check_authz( Operation *op,
+	struct berval *searchDN,
+	struct berval *assertDN,
+	AttributeDescription *ad,
+	struct berval *authc )
+{
+	int		rc,
+			do_not_cache = op->o_do_not_cache;
+	BerVarray	vals = NULL;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "==>slap_sasl_check_authz: does %s match %s rule in %s?\n",
+	   assertDN->bv_val, ad->ad_cname.bv_val, searchDN->bv_val);
+
+	/* ITS#4760: don't cache group access */
+	op->o_do_not_cache = 1;
+	rc = backend_attribute( op, NULL, searchDN, ad, &vals, ACL_AUTH );
+	op->o_do_not_cache = do_not_cache;
+	if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
+
+	/* Check if the *assertDN matches any *vals */
+	rc = slap_sasl_matches( op, vals, assertDN, authc );
+
+COMPLETE:
+	if( vals ) ber_bvarray_free_x( vals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "<==slap_sasl_check_authz: %s check returning %d\n",
+		ad->ad_cname.bv_val, rc );
+
+	return( rc );
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a SASL name (e.g. "UID=name,cn=REALM,cn=MECH,cn=AUTH")
+ * return the LDAP DN to which it matches. The SASL regexp rules in the config
+ * file turn the SASL name into an LDAP URI. If the URI is just a DN (or a
+ * search with scope=base), just return the URI (or its searchbase). Otherwise
+ * an internal search must be done, and if that search returns exactly one
+ * entry, return the DN of that one entry.
+ */
+void
+slap_sasl2dn(
+	Operation	*opx,
+	struct berval	*saslname,
+	struct berval	*sasldn,
+	int		flags )
+{
+	int rc;
+	slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_sasl2dn, NULL, NULL };
+	Operation op = {0};
+	SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
+	struct berval regout = BER_BVNULL;
+	struct berval base = BER_BVNULL;
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==>slap_sasl2dn: "
+		"converting SASL name %s to a DN\n",
+		saslname->bv_val );
+
+	BER_BVZERO( sasldn );
+	cb.sc_private = sasldn;
+
+	/* Convert the SASL name into a minimal URI */
+	if( !slap_authz_regexp( saslname, &regout, flags, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) {
+		goto FINISHED;
+	}
+
+	/* NOTE: always normalize regout because it results
+	 * from string submatch expansion */
+	rc = slap_parseURI( opx, &regout, &base, &op.o_req_ndn,
+		&op.ors_scope, &op.ors_filter, &op.ors_filterstr, 1 );
+	if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &regout ) ) slap_sl_free( regout.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
+	if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+		goto FINISHED;
+	}
+
+	/* Must do an internal search */
+	op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 1 );
+
+	switch ( op.ors_scope ) {
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+		*sasldn = op.o_req_ndn;
+		BER_BVZERO( &op.o_req_ndn );
+		/* intentionally continue to next case */
+
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP:
+	case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS:
+		/* correctly parsed, but illegal */
+		goto FINISHED;
+
+	case LDAP_SCOPE_BASE:
+	case LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+	case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+	case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE:
+		/* do a search */
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		/* catch unhandled cases (there shouldn't be) */
+		assert( 0 );
+	}
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+		"slap_sasl2dn: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
+		op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.ors_scope );
+
+	if ( ( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL) ) {
+		goto FINISHED;
+	}
+
+	/* Must run an internal search. */
+	if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) {
+		rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR;
+		goto FINISHED;
+	}
+
+	op.o_hdr = opx->o_hdr;
+	op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
+	op.o_ndn = opx->o_conn->c_ndn;
+	op.o_callback = &cb;
+	slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr );
+	op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
+	op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
+	op.ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER;
+	op.ors_slimit = 1;
+	op.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
+	op.ors_attrs = slap_anlist_no_attrs;
+	op.ors_attrsonly = 1;
+	/* use req_ndn as req_dn instead of non-pretty base of uri */
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &base ) ) {
+		ch_free( base.bv_val );
+		/* just in case... */
+		BER_BVZERO( &base );
+	}
+	ber_dupbv_x( &op.o_req_dn, &op.o_req_ndn, op.o_tmpmemctx );
+
+	op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
+	
+FINISHED:
+	if( opx == opx->o_conn->c_sasl_bindop && !BER_BVISEMPTY( sasldn ) ) {
+		opx->o_conn->c_authz_backend = op.o_bd;
+	}
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_dn ) ) {
+		slap_sl_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
+	}
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_ndn ) ) {
+		slap_sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
+	}
+	if( op.ors_filter ) {
+		filter_free_x( opx, op.ors_filter, 1 );
+	}
+	if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.ors_filterstr ) ) {
+		ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
+	}
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<==slap_sasl2dn: Converted SASL name to %s\n",
+		!BER_BVISEMPTY( sasldn ) ? sasldn->bv_val : "<nothing>" );
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+/* Check if a bind can SASL authorize to another identity.
+ * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
+ */
+
+int slap_sasl_authorized( Operation *op,
+	struct berval *authcDN, struct berval *authzDN )
+{
+	int rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+
+	/* User binding as anonymous */
+	if ( !authzDN || !authzDN->bv_len || !authzDN->bv_val ) {
+		rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		goto DONE;
+	}
+
+	/* User is anonymous */
+	if ( !authcDN || !authcDN->bv_len || !authcDN->bv_val ) {
+		goto DONE;
+	}
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+	   "==>slap_sasl_authorized: can %s become %s?\n",
+		authcDN->bv_len ? authcDN->bv_val : "(null)",
+		authzDN->bv_len ? authzDN->bv_val : "(null)" );
+
+	/* If person is authorizing to self, succeed */
+	if ( dn_match( authcDN, authzDN ) ) {
+		rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+		goto DONE;
+	}
+
+	/* Allow the manager to authorize as any DN in its own DBs. */
+	{
+		Backend *zbe = select_backend( authzDN, 1 );
+		if ( zbe && be_isroot_dn( zbe, authcDN )) {
+			rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+			goto DONE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check source rules */
+	if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_TO ) {
+		rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authcDN, authzDN,
+			slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzTo, authcDN );
+		if(( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) ^ (( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_AND) != 0)) {
+			if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS )
+				rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+			goto DONE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check destination rules */
+	if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_FROM ) {
+		rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authzDN, authcDN,
+			slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzFrom, authcDN );
+		if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+			goto DONE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+
+DONE:
+
+	Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+		"<== slap_sasl_authorized: return %d\n", rc );
+
+	return( rc );
+}