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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 19:49:46 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 19:49:46 +0000
commit0b6b94e6b6152f15cf4c2247c5974f539aae28cd (patch)
treea7698198a1f527ede17a929af46e456e03d50600 /auth2-gss.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadopenssh-0b6b94e6b6152f15cf4c2247c5974f539aae28cd.tar.xz
openssh-0b6b94e6b6152f15cf4c2247c5974f539aae28cd.zip
Adding upstream version 1:9.6p1.upstream/1%9.6p1
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'auth2-gss.c')
-rw-r--r--auth2-gss.c343
1 files changed, 343 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.34 2023/03/31 04:22:27 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+#define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS 2048
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ int r, present;
+ u_int mechs;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *doid = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+ if (mechs == 0) {
+ logit_f("mechanism negotiation is not supported");
+ return (0);
+ } else if (mechs > SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS) {
+ logit_f("too many mechanisms requested %u > %u", mechs,
+ SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ do {
+ mechs--;
+
+ free(doid);
+
+ present = 0;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse oid");
+
+ if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+ doid[1] == len - 2) {
+ goid.elements = doid + 2;
+ goid.length = len - 2;
+ ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
+ } else {
+ logit_f("badly formed OID received");
+ }
+ } while (mechs > 0 && !present);
+
+ if (!present) {
+ free(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+ free(doid);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+ if (ctxt != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ free(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
+
+ /* Return the OID that we received */
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+ free(doid);
+
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+ recv_tok.value = p;
+ recv_tok.length = len;
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &flags));
+
+ free(p);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
+ }
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
+ }
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+ &input_gssapi_mic);
+ else
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
+ SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+ &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+ }
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status;
+ int r;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ recv_tok.value = p;
+ recv_tok.length = len;
+
+ /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, NULL));
+
+ free(recv_tok.value);
+
+ /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+
+ /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
+ * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
+ * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
+ */
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ int r, authenticated;
+ const char *displayname;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
+ * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
+ */
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+
+ if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ int r, authenticated = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ const char *displayname;
+ u_char *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+ fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+ gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ mic.value = p;
+ mic.length = len;
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
+
+ if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+ gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ free(mic.value);
+
+ if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ NULL,
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ &options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */