diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | auth.c | 108 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 101 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.160 2023/03/05 05:34:09 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.161 2024/05/17 00:30:23 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern struct include_list includes; -extern int use_privsep; extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; @@ -272,7 +271,7 @@ auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial, const char *authmsg; char *extra = NULL; - if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) + if (!mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; /* Raise logging level */ @@ -472,14 +471,14 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user) struct connection_info *ci; u_int i; - ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); + ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns); ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci); log_change_level(options.log_level); log_verbose_reset(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++) log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]); - process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + server_process_permitopen(ssh); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); @@ -638,97 +637,6 @@ fakepw(void) } /* - * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not - * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is - * called. - * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some - * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses. - */ - -static char * -remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) -{ - struct sockaddr_storage from; - socklen_t fromlen; - struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; - char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; - const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - - /* Get IP address of client. */ - fromlen = sizeof(from); - memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); - if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), - (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) { - debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); - if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) - fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); - - debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); - /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ - if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), - NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { - /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - /* - * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, - * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: - * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ - hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { - logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", - name, ntop); - freeaddrinfo(ai); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - - /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ - lowercase(name); - - /* - * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given - * address actually is an address of this host. This is - * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can - * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from - * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be - * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of - * the domain). - */ - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { - logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " - "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ - for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, - sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && - (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) - break; - } - freeaddrinfo(aitop); - /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ - if (ai == NULL) { - /* Address not found for the host name. */ - logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " - "map back to the address.", ntop, name); - return xstrdup(ntop); - } - return xstrdup(name); -} - -/* * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this * several times. @@ -741,12 +649,10 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) if (!use_dns) return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); - else if (dnsname != NULL) - return dnsname; - else { - dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); + if (dnsname != NULL) return dnsname; - } + dnsname = ssh_remote_hostname(ssh); + return dnsname; } /* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */ |