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-rw-r--r--session.c2732
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diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
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+++ b/session.c
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+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.336 2023/08/10 23:05:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ * All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+#include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
+ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
+ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
+ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
+ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
+
+/* func */
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
+void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
+void session_proctitle(Session *);
+int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
+int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void do_motd(void);
+int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+
+static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern int startup_pipe;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
+
+/* original command from peer. */
+const char *original_command = NULL;
+
+/* data */
+static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
+static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
+static Session *sessions = NULL;
+
+#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
+#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+static int is_child = 0;
+static int in_chroot = 0;
+
+/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+static void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ unlink(auth_sock_name);
+ rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
+{
+ Channel *nc;
+ int sock = -1;
+
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+ error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
+
+ /* Create private directory for socket */
+ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: "
+ "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ restore_uid();
+ free(auth_sock_dir);
+ auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+ goto authsock_err;
+ }
+
+ xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
+ auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
+
+ /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
+ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+
+ /* Restore the privileged uid. */
+ restore_uid();
+
+ /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
+ if (sock < 0)
+ goto authsock_err;
+
+ /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+ nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth-listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "auth socket", 1);
+ nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
+ return 1;
+
+ authsock_err:
+ free(auth_sock_name);
+ if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+ restore_uid();
+ free(auth_sock_dir);
+ }
+ if (sock != -1)
+ close(sock);
+ auth_sock_name = NULL;
+ auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+display_loginmsg(void)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0)
+ return;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+ printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
+ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+}
+
+static void
+prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
+{
+ int fd = -1, success = 0;
+
+ if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+ auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
+ if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
+ error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
+ sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
+ error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (close(fd) != 0) {
+ error_f("close: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ success = 1;
+ out:
+ if (!success) {
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ free(auth_info_file);
+ auth_info_file = NULL;
+ }
+ restore_uid();
+}
+
+static void
+set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+ char *tmp, *cp, *host;
+ int port;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
+ channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+ for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+ tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
+ /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+ if ((host = hpdelim2(&cp, NULL)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+ fatal_f("internal error: permitopen port");
+ channel_add_permission(ssh,
+ FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port);
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) {
+ channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+ for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
+ tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]);
+ /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+ if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
+ host = cleanhostname(host);
+ if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+ fatal_f("internal error: permitlisten port");
+ channel_add_permission(ssh,
+ FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port);
+ free(tmp);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void
+do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+
+ auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
+
+ /* setup the channel layer */
+ /* XXX - streamlocal? */
+ set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
+
+ if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+ options.disable_forwarding) {
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+ } else {
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+ else
+ channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0)
+ channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+ else
+ channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+ }
+ auth_debug_send(ssh);
+
+ prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
+
+ do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
+
+ do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
+}
+
+/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
+static int
+xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+ if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
+ s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
+ s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors and such.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+ /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
+ if (pipe(pin) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe in: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(pout) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe out: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pipe(perr) == -1) {
+ error_f("pipe err: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#else
+ int inout[2], err[2];
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+ /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) {
+ error_f("socketpair #1: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) {
+ error_f("socketpair #2: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(inout[1]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ session_proctitle(s);
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pin[1]);
+ close(pout[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ close(perr[0]);
+ close(perr[1]);
+#else
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(inout[1]);
+ close(err[0]);
+ close(err[1]);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ is_child = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+ * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+ */
+ if (setsid() == -1)
+ error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
+ * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+ */
+ close(pin[1]);
+ if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ close(pin[0]);
+
+ /* Redirect stdout. */
+ close(pout[0]);
+ if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ close(pout[1]);
+
+ /* Redirect stderr. */
+ close(perr[0]);
+ if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1)
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+ close(perr[1]);
+#else
+ /*
+ * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
+ * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+ * seem to depend on it.
+ */
+ close(inout[1]);
+ close(err[1]);
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */
+ perror("dup2 stdin");
+ if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
+ perror("dup2 stdout");
+ close(inout[0]);
+ if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */
+ perror("dup2 stderr");
+ close(err[0]);
+#endif
+
+ /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+ do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+ s->pid = pid;
+ /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
+ * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+ * multiple copies of the login messages.
+ */
+ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
+ close(pin[0]);
+ close(pout[1]);
+ close(perr[1]);
+
+ session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
+#else
+ /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
+ close(inout[0]);
+ close(err[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
+ * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+ */
+ session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+ s->is_subsystem, 0);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
+ * lastlog, and other such operations.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
+ ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+
+ /*
+ * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+ * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
+ * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
+ * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
+ * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
+ */
+ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+ error_f("dup #1: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+ error_f("dup #2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ close(fdout);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Fork the child. */
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1:
+ error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ close(fdout);
+ close(ptymaster);
+ close(ttyfd);
+ close(ptyfd);
+ return -1;
+ case 0:
+ is_child = 1;
+
+ close(fdout);
+ close(ptymaster);
+
+ /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ptyfd);
+
+ /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
+ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
+
+ /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+ error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1)
+ error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1)
+ error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ do_login(ssh, s, command);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
+ * the command.
+ */
+ do_child(ssh, s, command);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+ s->pid = pid;
+
+ /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
+ /* Enter interactive session. */
+ s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
+ options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+ session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+int
+do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ int ret;
+ const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ char session_type[1024];
+
+ if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = options.adm_forced_command;
+ forced = "(config)";
+ } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
+ original_command = command;
+ command = auth_opts->force_command;
+ forced = "(key-option)";
+ }
+ s->forced = 0;
+ if (forced != NULL) {
+ s->forced = 1;
+ if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
+ s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
+ SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem)
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+ "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem) {
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+ "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+ } else if (command == NULL) {
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+ } else {
+ /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
+ }
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ tty = s->tty;
+ if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+ tty += 5;
+ }
+
+ verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ session_type,
+ tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+ tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
+ s->pw->pw_name,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ s->self);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (command != NULL)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+ else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+ if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+ PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+ else
+ ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
+
+ original_command = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
+ * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+ * multiple copies of the login messages.
+ */
+ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+ pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
+ options.use_dns),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * If password change is needed, do it now.
+ * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
+ */
+ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ display_loginmsg();
+ do_pam_chauthtok();
+ s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
+ /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ return;
+
+ display_loginmsg();
+
+ do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+ "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+ f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+ if (f) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stdout);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+ if (command != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#else
+ if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
+ * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
+ * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
+ * If allowlist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
+ * only variable names that match it will be accepted.
+ */
+static void
+read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+ const char *filename, const char *allowlist)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char *line = NULL, *cp, *value;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_int lineno = 0;
+
+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
+ if (!f)
+ return;
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ if (++lineno > 1000)
+ fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
+ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+ ;
+ if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+ continue;
+
+ cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+ value = strchr(cp, '=');
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
+ filename);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
+ * the value string.
+ */
+ *value = '\0';
+ value++;
+ if (allowlist != NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(cp, allowlist, 0) != 1)
+ continue;
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
+ }
+ free(line);
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+/*
+ * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
+ */
+static char *
+child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = strlen(name);
+ for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
+ if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
+ return(env[i] + len + 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read /etc/default/login.
+ * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
+ */
+static void
+read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
+ u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
+ u_long mask;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
+ * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
+ * interested in.
+ */
+ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login",
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+
+ if (tmpenv == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (uid == 0)
+ var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
+ else
+ var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
+ if (var != NULL)
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
+
+ if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
+ if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
+ umask((mode_t)mask);
+
+ for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
+ free(tmpenv[i]);
+ free(tmpenv);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+static void
+copy_environment_denylist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+ const char *denylist)
+{
+ char *var_name, *var_val;
+ int i;
+
+ if (source == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
+ if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
+ free(var_name);
+ continue;
+ }
+ *var_val++ = '\0';
+
+ if (denylist == NULL ||
+ match_pattern_list(var_name, denylist, 0) != 1) {
+ debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+ }
+
+ free(var_name);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+static void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+ copy_environment_denylist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char **
+do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ size_t n;
+ u_int i, envsize;
+ char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
+ char *path = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /* Initialize the environment. */
+ envsize = 100;
+ env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
+ env[0] = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
+ * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
+ */
+ {
+ char **p;
+
+ p = fetch_windows_environment();
+ copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+ free_windows_environment(p);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+ * the child's environment as they see fit
+ */
+ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
+ /* Set basic environment. */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
+
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef _AIX
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+ else
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+ /*
+ * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+ * important components pointing to the system directories,
+ * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+ * remains intact here.
+ */
+# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+ read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+ path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
+ s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+ }
+# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+ if (!options.use_pam) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+ _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
+
+ if (getenv("TZ"))
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+ if (s->term)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
+ if (s->display)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
+
+ /*
+ * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+ * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+ * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+ */
+ {
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+ }
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+ {
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment",
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+ s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ auth_sock_name);
+
+
+ /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
+ if (options.permit_user_env) {
+ for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
+ ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
+ cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
+ if (cp != NULL) {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment allowlist */
+ if (options.permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL ||
+ match_pattern_list(ocp,
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist, 0) == 1)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize,
+ ocp, cp + 1);
+ }
+ free(ocp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+ if (options.permit_user_env) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%s/environment",
+ pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+ read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf,
+ options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+ }
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /*
+ * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+ * been set by PAM.
+ */
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ char **p;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak
+ * back into the session environment.
+ */
+#define PAM_ENV_DENYLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*"
+ p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+ copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+ PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
+ free_pam_environment(p);
+
+ p = fetch_pam_environment();
+ copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+ PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
+ free_pam_environment(p);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+ /* Environment specified by admin */
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+ cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
+ if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+ /* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+ fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+ }
+ *value++ = '\0';
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
+ free(cp);
+ }
+
+ /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ ssh_local_port(ssh));
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+ free(laddr);
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
+
+ if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
+ if (auth_info_file != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
+ if (original_command)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+ original_command);
+
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ /* dump the environment */
+ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+ for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+ fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
+ }
+ return env;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
+ * first in this order).
+ */
+static void
+do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char *cmd = NULL, *user_rc = NULL;
+ int do_xauth;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ do_xauth =
+ s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+ xasprintf(&user_rc, "%s/%s", s->pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+
+ /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
+ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
+ auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
+ stat(user_rc, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL,
+ user_rc) == -1)
+ fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ user_rc);
+ } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+ if (debug_flag)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ if (do_xauth)
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+ } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
+ /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+ if (debug_flag) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+ options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
+ s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+ }
+ if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location) == -1)
+ fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+ f = popen(cmd, "w");
+ if (f) {
+ fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+ s->auth_display);
+ fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+ s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+ s->auth_data);
+ pclose(f);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+ cmd);
+ }
+ }
+ free(cmd);
+ free(user_rc);
+}
+
+static void
+do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
+ struct stat sb;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ return;
+ nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
+#else
+ if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ return;
+ nl = def_nl;
+#endif
+ if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1)
+ return;
+
+ /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
+ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
+ if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+ fputs(buf, stderr);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ exit(254);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+ * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+ */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ char component[PATH_MAX];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!path_absolute(path))
+ fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+ if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+ fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+ /*
+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+ */
+ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+ if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+ else {
+ cp++;
+ memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+ component[cp - path] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ debug3_f("checking '%s'", component);
+
+ if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+ fatal_f("stat(\"%s\"): %s",
+ component, strerror(errno));
+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+ fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+ "directory %s\"%s\"",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+ cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+ }
+
+ if (chdir(path) == -1)
+ fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+ "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (chroot(path) == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal_f("chdir(/) after chroot: %s", strerror(errno));
+ verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
+}
+
+/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+void
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
+
+ platform_setusercontext(pw);
+
+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+ (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+#else
+ if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+ error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("setgid");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* Initialize the group list. */
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+ perror("initgroups");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ endgrent();
+#endif
+
+ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+
+ if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+ pw->pw_uid);
+ snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+ (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+ chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+ "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+ safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+ free(tmp);
+ free(chroot_path);
+ /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
+ free(options.chroot_directory);
+ options.chroot_directory = NULL;
+ in_chroot = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
+ perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
+ * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
+ */
+ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
+#else
+# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+ /*
+ * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
+ * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
+ * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
+ * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
+ * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
+ * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
+ */
+ if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
+ fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
+# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
+ } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+ strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+ fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+ }
+
+ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+ fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+}
+
+static void
+do_pwchange(Session *s)
+{
+ fflush(NULL);
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ setexeccon(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+ execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+ (char *)NULL);
+#else
+ execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+ perror("passwd");
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
+ }
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ extern int auth_sock;
+
+ if (auth_sock != -1) {
+ close(auth_sock);
+ auth_sock = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) ==
+ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh))
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ else {
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh));
+ }
+ /*
+ * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
+ * open in the parent.
+ */
+ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
+ channel_close_all(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
+ * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
+ */
+ endpwent();
+
+ /* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+ * descriptors open.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+ * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+ * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+ */
+#define ARGV_MAX 10
+void
+do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+ extern char **environ;
+ char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512];
+ const char *shell, *shell0;
+ struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data();
+ ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+
+ /* Force a password change */
+ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
+ child_close_fds(ssh);
+ do_pwchange(s);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
+ * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+ session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ do_motd();
+#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ do_nologin(pw);
+ do_setusercontext(pw);
+ /*
+ * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+ * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+ * login then display them too.
+ */
+ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+ display_loginmsg();
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+ debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
+ display_loginmsg();
+ exit(254);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
+ * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+ */
+ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+ * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+ */
+ env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+ * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+ * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
+ * closed before building the environment, as we call
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
+ */
+ child_close_fds(ssh);
+
+ /*
+ * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
+ * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
+ */
+ environ = env;
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+ /*
+ * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
+ * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
+ * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
+ * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
+ * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
+ */
+
+ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
+ (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+ char cell[64];
+
+ debug("Getting AFS token");
+
+ k_setpag();
+
+ if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+ krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
+
+ krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+ s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
+ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
+ /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+ r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
+#endif
+ if (r || !in_chroot) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
+ "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (r)
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+ do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+
+ /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
+ if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+ error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session",
+ remote_id);
+ printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
+ fflush(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
+ extern int optind, optreset;
+ int i;
+ char *p, *args;
+
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
+ args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+ for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
+ if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
+ argv[i++] = p;
+ argv[i] = NULL;
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ __progname = argv[0];
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+#endif
+ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+ }
+
+ fflush(NULL);
+
+ /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
+ shell0++;
+ else
+ shell0 = shell;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
+ * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+ * this is a login shell.
+ */
+ if (!command) {
+ char argv0[256];
+
+ /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
+ argv0[0] = '-';
+
+ if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
+ >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Execute the shell. */
+ argv[0] = argv0;
+ argv[1] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+
+ /* Executing the shell failed. */
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
+ * option to execute the command.
+ */
+ argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
+ argv[1] = "-c";
+ argv[2] = (char *) command;
+ argv[3] = NULL;
+ execve(shell, argv, env);
+ perror(shell);
+ exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+session_unused(int id)
+{
+ debug3_f("session id %d unused", id);
+ if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
+ id >= sessions_nalloc) {
+ fatal_f("insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
+ id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
+ }
+ memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
+ sessions[id].self = id;
+ sessions[id].used = 0;
+ sessions[id].chanid = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+ sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ sessions_first_unused = id;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_new(void)
+{
+ Session *s, *tmp;
+
+ if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
+ if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
+ return NULL;
+ debug2_f("allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
+ sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
+ tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
+ sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
+ error_f("cannot allocate %d sessions",
+ sessions_nalloc + 1);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sessions = tmp;
+ session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
+ }
+
+ if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
+ sessions_first_unused < 0) {
+ fatal_f("insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
+ sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
+ sessions_nalloc);
+ }
+
+ s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
+ if (s->used)
+ fatal_f("session %d already used", sessions_first_unused);
+ sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
+ s->used = 1;
+ s->next_unused = -1;
+ debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
+
+ return s;
+}
+
+static void
+session_dump(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+ debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d "
+ "channel %d pid %ld",
+ s->used,
+ s->next_unused,
+ s->self,
+ s->chanid,
+ (long)s->pid);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+{
+ Session *s = session_new();
+ debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error("no more sessions");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+ s->chanid = chanid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_by_tty(char *tty)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+ debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
+ debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
+ i, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+ if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+ continue;
+ for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+ if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+ "channel %d", s->self, id);
+ return s;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+ int i;
+ debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
+ return s;
+ }
+ error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
+ session_dump();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
+ debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
+ free(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+ debug("Allocating pty.");
+ if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
+ sizeof(s->tty)))) {
+ free(s->term);
+ s->term = NULL;
+ s->ptyfd = -1;
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+ error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+
+ /* Set window size from the packet. */
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+
+ session_proctitle(s);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ int r, success = 0;
+ char *prog, *cmd, *type;
+ u_int i;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
+ s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+ cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+ if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+ debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
+ } else {
+ if (stat(prog, &st) == -1)
+ debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
+ prog, strerror(errno));
+ s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+ debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+ }
+ xasprintf(&type, "session:subsystem:%s",
+ options.subsystem_name[i]);
+ channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, type);
+ free(type);
+ success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!success)
+ logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
+ "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ int r, success;
+ u_char single_connection = 0;
+
+ if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+ error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+ "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ s->single_connection = single_connection;
+
+ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
+ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
+ else {
+ success = 0;
+ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
+ }
+ if (!success) {
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ }
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:shell");
+
+ return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ u_int success;
+ int r;
+ char *command = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:command");
+
+ success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
+ free(command);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ char *name, *val;
+ u_int i;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+ /* Don't set too many environment variables */
+ if (s->num_env > 128) {
+ debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
+ if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
+ debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
+ s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
+ s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
+ s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
+ s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
+ s->num_env++;
+ return (1);
+ }
+ }
+ debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
+
+ fail:
+ free(name);
+ free(val);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names.
+ * Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as
+ * local extension.
+ */
+static int
+name2sig(char *name)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x
+ SSH_SIG(HUP);
+ SSH_SIG(INT);
+ SSH_SIG(KILL);
+ SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+ SSH_SIG(TERM);
+ SSH_SIG(USR1);
+ SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef SSH_SIG
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+ if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0)
+ return SIGINFO;
+#endif
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ char *signame = NULL;
+ int r, sig, success = 0;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "parse");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) {
+ error_f("unsupported signal \"%s\"", signame);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (s->pid <= 0) {
+ error_f("no pid for session %d", s->self);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) {
+ error_f("refusing to send signal %s to %s session",
+ signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
+ error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ debug_f("signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", signame, (long)s->pid, sig);
+ temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
+ r = killpg(s->pid, sig);
+ restore_uid();
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_f("killpg(%ld, %d): %s", (long)s->pid,
+ sig, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ success = 1;
+ out:
+ free(signame);
+ return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+ !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+ debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (called) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ called = 1;
+ return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
+ }
+}
+
+int
+session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
+{
+ int success = 0;
+ Session *s;
+
+ if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
+ logit_f("no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ debug_f("session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
+
+ /*
+ * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+ * or a subsystem is executed
+ */
+ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
+ success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
+ success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
+ success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
+ success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
+ success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
+ success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
+ success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
+ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) {
+ success = session_signal_req(ssh, s);
+ }
+
+ return success;
+}
+
+void
+session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+ int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
+{
+ /*
+ * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
+ * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
+ */
+ if (s->chanid == -1)
+ fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
+ channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
+ fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+ 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+void
+session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ error_f("no session");
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+ return;
+
+ debug_f("session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+ /* Record that the user has logged out. */
+ if (s->pid != 0)
+ record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+ /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+ if (getuid() == 0)
+ pty_release(s->tty);
+
+ /*
+ * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
+ * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+ * while we're still cleaning up.
+ */
+ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
+ error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+ s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* unlink pty from session */
+ s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
+}
+
+static char *
+sig2name(int sig)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
+ SSH_SIG(ABRT);
+ SSH_SIG(ALRM);
+ SSH_SIG(FPE);
+ SSH_SIG(HUP);
+ SSH_SIG(ILL);
+ SSH_SIG(INT);
+ SSH_SIG(KILL);
+ SSH_SIG(PIPE);
+ SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+ SSH_SIG(SEGV);
+ SSH_SIG(TERM);
+ SSH_SIG(USR1);
+ SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef SSH_SIG
+ return "SIG@openssh.com";
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+
+ if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
+ debug_f("x11 channel %d missing", id);
+ } else {
+ /* Detach X11 listener */
+ debug_f("detach x11 channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ u_int i;
+
+ debug3_f("channel %d", id);
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
+ if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("no x11 channel %d", id);
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ debug_f("session %d: closing channel %d",
+ s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ /*
+ * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+ * close all of its siblings.
+ */
+ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+ session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ }
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+ s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+ free(s->display);
+ s->display = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ s->auth_proto = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ s->auth_data = NULL;
+ free(s->auth_display);
+ s->auth_display = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
+{
+ Channel *c;
+ int r;
+ char *note = NULL;
+
+ if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid);
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
+ xasprintf(&note, "exit %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+ channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
+#ifndef WCOREDUMP
+# define WCOREDUMP(x) (0)
+#endif
+ if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
+ xasprintf(&note, "signal %d%s", WTERMSIG(status),
+ WCOREDUMP(status) ? " core dumped" : "");
+ } else {
+ /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.",
+ status);
+ }
+
+ debug_f("session %d channel %d pid %ld %s", s->self, s->chanid,
+ (long)s->pid, note == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : note);
+ free(note);
+
+ /* disconnect channel */
+ debug_f("release channel %d", s->chanid);
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
+ * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
+ * by session_close_by_channel when the child sessions close their fds.
+ */
+ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
+ * interested in data we write.
+ * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+ * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+ */
+ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+ chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+}
+
+void
+session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ u_int i;
+
+ verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ s->pw->pw_name,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ s->self);
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ free(s->term);
+ free(s->display);
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+ free(s->auth_display);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->subsys);
+ if (s->env != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+ free(s->env[i].name);
+ free(s->env[i].val);
+ }
+ free(s->env);
+ }
+ session_proctitle(s);
+ session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug_f("no session for pid %ld", (long)pid);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (s->chanid != -1)
+ session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ s->pid = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is called when a channel dies before
+ * the session 'child' itself dies
+ */
+void
+session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+ Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ debug_f("no session for id %d", id);
+ return;
+ }
+ debug_f("channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid);
+ if (s->pid != 0) {
+ debug_f("channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", id, s->ttyfd);
+ /*
+ * delay detach of session (unless this is a forced close),
+ * but release pty, since the fd's to the child are already
+ * closed
+ */
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
+ if (!force)
+ return;
+ }
+ /* detach by removing callback */
+ channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
+
+ /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+ s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->chanid = -1;
+ session_close(ssh, s);
+}
+
+void
+session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used) {
+ if (closefunc != NULL)
+ closefunc(s);
+ else
+ session_close(ssh, s);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static char *
+session_tty_list(void)
+{
+ static char buf[1024];
+ int i;
+ char *cp;
+
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+ Session *s = &sessions[i];
+ if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+
+ if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
+ cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
+ cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
+ } else
+ cp = s->tty + 5;
+
+ if (buf[0] != '\0')
+ strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+ strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
+ }
+ }
+ if (buf[0] == '\0')
+ strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+void
+session_proctitle(Session *s)
+{
+ if (s->pw == NULL)
+ error("no user for session %d", s->self);
+ else
+ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
+}
+
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+ char display[512], auth_display[512];
+ char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ u_int i;
+
+ if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+ debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
+ (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (s->display != NULL) {
+ debug("X11 display already set.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+ options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+ &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+ debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
+ session_close_single_x11, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
+ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
+ fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ /*
+ * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
+ * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
+ * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
+ */
+ if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+ snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+ s->display = xstrdup(display);
+ s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
+ } else {
+#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+ struct hostent *he;
+ struct in_addr my_addr;
+
+ he = gethostbyname(hostname);
+ if (he == NULL) {
+ error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+ ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+#else
+ snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
+ s->display_number, s->screen);
+#endif
+ s->display = xstrdup(display);
+ s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ static int called = 0;
+
+ debug("do_cleanup");
+
+ /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
+ if (is_child)
+ return;
+
+ /* avoid double cleanup */
+ if (called)
+ return;
+ called = 1;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+ sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+ if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
+ authctxt->krb5_ctx)
+ krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
+#endif
+
+ /* remove agent socket */
+ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+
+ /* remove userauth info */
+ if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
+ temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+ unlink(auth_info_file);
+ restore_uid();
+ free(auth_info_file);
+ auth_info_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
+ * or if running in monitor.
+ */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
+}
+
+/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+
+const char *
+session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
+{
+ const char *remote = "";
+
+ if (utmp_size > 0)
+ remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+ if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
+ remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ return remote;
+}
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-10 07:48:21 +0000