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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/global/resolve_local.c | 192 |
1 files changed, 192 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/global/resolve_local.c b/src/global/resolve_local.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6ef848 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/global/resolve_local.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/*++ +/* NAME +/* resolve_local 3 +/* SUMMARY +/* determine if domain resolves to local mail system +/* SYNOPSIS +/* #include <resolve_local.h> +/* +/* void resolve_local_init() +/* +/* int resolve_local(domain) +/* const char *domain; +/* DESCRIPTION +/* resolve_local() determines if the named domain resolves to the +/* local mail system, either by case-insensitive exact match +/* against the domains, files or tables listed in $mydestination, +/* or by a match of an [address-literal] against of the network +/* addresses listed in $inet_interfaces or in $proxy_interfaces. +/* The result is > 0 if the domain matches the list of local +/* domains and IP addresses, 0 when it does not match, and < 0 +/* in case of error. +/* +/* resolve_local_init() performs initialization. If this routine is +/* not called explicitly ahead of time, it will be called on the fly. +/* BUGS +/* Calling resolve_local_init() on the fly is an incomplete solution. +/* It is bound to fail with applications that enter a chroot jail. +/* SEE ALSO +/* own_inet_addr(3), find out my own network interfaces +/* match_list(3), generic pattern matching engine +/* match_ops(3), generic pattern matching operators +/* LICENSE +/* .ad +/* .fi +/* The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software. +/* AUTHOR(S) +/* Wietse Venema +/* IBM T.J. Watson Research +/* P.O. Box 704 +/* Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA +/*--*/ + +/* System library. */ + +#include <sys_defs.h> + +/* Utility library. */ + +#include <msg.h> +#include <mymalloc.h> +#include <string_list.h> +#include <myaddrinfo.h> +#include <valid_mailhost_addr.h> + +/* Global library. */ + +#include <mail_params.h> +#include <own_inet_addr.h> +#include <resolve_local.h> + +/* Application-specific */ + +static STRING_LIST *resolve_local_list; + +/* resolve_local_init - initialize lookup table */ + +void resolve_local_init(void) +{ + /* Allow on-the-fly update to make testing easier. */ + if (resolve_local_list) + string_list_free(resolve_local_list); + resolve_local_list = string_list_init(VAR_MYDEST, MATCH_FLAG_RETURN, + var_mydest); +} + +/* resolve_local - match domain against list of local destinations */ + +int resolve_local(const char *addr) +{ + char *saved_addr = mystrdup(addr); + char *dest; + const char *bare_dest; + struct addrinfo *res0 = 0; + ssize_t len; + + /* + * The optimizer will eliminate tests that always fail. + */ +#define RETURN(x) \ + do { \ + myfree(saved_addr); \ + if (res0) \ + freeaddrinfo(res0); \ + return(x); \ + } while (0) + + if (resolve_local_list == 0) + resolve_local_init(); + + /* + * Strip one trailing dot but not dot-dot. + * + * XXX This should not be distributed all over the code. Problem is, + * addresses can enter the system via multiple paths: networks, local + * forward/alias/include files, even as the result of address rewriting. + */ + len = strlen(saved_addr); + if (len == 0) + RETURN(0); + if (saved_addr[len - 1] == '.') + saved_addr[--len] = 0; + if (len == 0 || saved_addr[len - 1] == '.') + RETURN(0); + + /* + * Compare the destination against the list of destinations that we + * consider local. + */ + if (string_list_match(resolve_local_list, saved_addr)) + RETURN(1); + if (resolve_local_list->error != 0) + RETURN(resolve_local_list->error); + + /* + * Compare the destination against the list of interface addresses that + * we are supposed to listen on. + * + * The destination may be an IPv6 address literal that was buried somewhere + * inside a deeply recursively nested address. This information comes + * from an untrusted source, and Wietse is not confident that everyone's + * getaddrinfo() etc. implementation is sufficiently robust. The syntax + * is complex enough with null field compression and with IPv4-in-IPv6 + * addresses that errors are likely. + * + * The solution below is ad-hoc. We neutralize the string as soon as we + * realize that its contents could be harmful. We neutralize the string + * here, instead of neutralizing it in every resolve_local() caller. + * That's because resolve_local knows how the address is going to be + * parsed and converted into binary form. + * + * There are several more structural solutions to this. + * + * - One solution is to disallow address literals. This is not as bad as it + * seems: I have never seen actual legitimate use of address literals. + * + * - Another solution is to label each string with a trustworthiness label + * and to expect that all Postfix infrastructure will exercise additional + * caution when given a string with untrusted content. This is not likely + * to happen. + * + * FIX 200501 IPv6 patch did not require "IPv6:" prefix in numerical + * addresses. + */ + dest = saved_addr; + if (*dest == '[' && dest[len - 1] == ']') { + dest++; + dest[len -= 2] = 0; + if ((bare_dest = valid_mailhost_addr(dest, DO_GRIPE)) != 0 + && hostaddr_to_sockaddr(bare_dest, (char *) 0, 0, &res0) == 0) { + if (own_inet_addr(res0->ai_addr) || proxy_inet_addr(res0->ai_addr)) + RETURN(1); + } + } + + /* + * Must be remote, or a syntax error. + */ + RETURN(0); +} + +#ifdef TEST + +#include <vstream.h> +#include <mail_conf.h> + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int rc; + + if (argc != 3) + msg_fatal("usage: %s mydestination domain", argv[0]); + mail_conf_read(); + myfree(var_mydest); + var_mydest = mystrdup(argv[1]); + vstream_printf("mydestination=%s destination=%s %s\n", argv[1], argv[2], + (rc = resolve_local(argv[2])) > 0 ? "YES" : + rc == 0 ? "NO" : "ERROR"); + vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT); + return (0); +} + +#endif |