diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/tls/tls_dane.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/src/tls/tls_dane.c b/src/tls/tls_dane.c index a2b9b80..ac7f05f 100644 --- a/src/tls/tls_dane.c +++ b/src/tls/tls_dane.c @@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ /* void tls_dane_free(dane) /* TLS_DANE *dane; /* -/* void tls_dane_add_fpt_digests(dane, digest, delim, smtp_mode) +/* void tls_dane_add_fpt_digests(dane, pkey_only, digest, delim, smtp_mode) /* TLS_DANE *dane; +/* int pkey_only; /* const char *digest; /* const char *delim; /* int smtp_mode; @@ -130,6 +131,9 @@ /* SSL context to be configured with the chosen digest algorithms. /* .IP fpt_alg /* The OpenSSL EVP digest algorithm handle for the fingerprint digest. +/* .IP pkey_only +/* When true, generate "fingerprint" TLSA records for just the public +/* keys. Otherwise, for both certificates and public keys. /* .IP tlsa /* TLSA record linked list head, initially NULL. /* .IP usage @@ -415,8 +419,9 @@ static void dane_free(void *dane, void *unused_context) /* tls_dane_add_fpt_digests - map fingerprint list to DANE TLSA RRset */ -void tls_dane_add_fpt_digests(TLS_DANE *dane, const char *digest, - const char *delim, int smtp_mode) +void tls_dane_add_fpt_digests(TLS_DANE *dane, int pkey_only, + const char *digest, const char *delim, + int smtp_mode) { ARGV *values = argv_split(digest, delim); ssize_t i; @@ -455,31 +460,41 @@ void tls_dane_add_fpt_digests(TLS_DANE *dane, const char *digest, continue; } +#define USTR_LEN(raw) (unsigned char *) STR(raw), VSTRING_LEN(raw) + /* * At the "fingerprint" security level certificate digests and public - * key digests are interchangeable. Each leaf certificate is matched - * via either the public key digest or full certificate digest. The - * DER encoding of a certificate is not a valid public key, and - * conversely, the DER encoding of a public key is not a valid - * certificate. An attacker would need a 2nd-preimage that is + * key digests are by default interchangeable. Each leaf certificate + * is matched via either the public key digest or full certificate + * digest. The DER encoding of a certificate is not a valid public + * key, and conversely, the DER encoding of a public key is not a + * valid certificate. An attacker would need a 2nd-preimage that is * feasible across types (given cert digest == some pkey digest) and * yet presumably difficult within a type (e.g. given cert digest == * some other cert digest). No such attacks are known at this time, * and it is expected that if any are found they would work within as * well as across the cert/pkey data types. + * + * That said, when `pkey_only` is true, we match only public keys. * * The private-use matching type "255" is mapped to the configured * fingerprint digest, which may (harmlessly) coincide with one of * the standard DANE digest algorithms. The private code point is * however unconditionally enabled. */ + if (!pkey_only) { + dane->tlsa = tlsa_prepend(dane->tlsa, 3, 0, 255, USTR_LEN(raw)); + if (log_mask & (TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_DANE)) + tlsa_info("fingerprint", "digest as private-use TLSA record", + 3, 0, 255, USTR_LEN(raw)); + } + + /* The public key match is unconditional */ + dane->tlsa = tlsa_prepend(dane->tlsa, 3, 1, 255, USTR_LEN(raw)); if (log_mask & (TLS_LOG_VERBOSE | TLS_LOG_DANE)) tlsa_info("fingerprint", "digest as private-use TLSA record", - 3, 0, 255, (unsigned char *) STR(raw), VSTRING_LEN(raw)); - dane->tlsa = tlsa_prepend(dane->tlsa, 3, 0, 255, - (unsigned char *) STR(raw), VSTRING_LEN(raw)); - dane->tlsa = tlsa_prepend(dane->tlsa, 3, 1, 255, - (unsigned char *) STR(raw), VSTRING_LEN(raw)); + 3, 1, 255, USTR_LEN(raw)); + vstring_free(raw); } argv_free(values); @@ -798,12 +813,21 @@ int tls_dane_enable(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) SSL *ssl = TLScontext->con; int usable = 0; int ret; + int rpk_compat = 1; for (tp = dane->tlsa; tp != 0; tp = tp->next) { ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, tp->usage, tp->selector, tp->mtype, tp->data, tp->length); if (ret > 0) { ++usable; + /* + * Disable use of RFC7250 raw public keys if any TLSA record + * depends on X.509 certificates. Only DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) records + * can get by with just a public key. + */ + if (tp->usage != DNS_TLSA_USAGE_DOMAIN_ISSUED_CERTIFICATE + || tp->selector != DNS_TLSA_SELECTOR_SUBJECTPUBLICKEYINFO) + rpk_compat = 0; continue; } if (ret == 0) { @@ -818,6 +842,9 @@ int tls_dane_enable(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) tls_print_errors(); return (-1); } + if (rpk_compat) + tls_enable_server_rpk(NULL, ssl); + return (usable); } @@ -964,8 +991,9 @@ void tls_dane_log(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) { static VSTRING *top; static VSTRING *bot; + X509 *mcert = 0; EVP_PKEY *mspki = 0; - int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(TLScontext->con, NULL, &mspki); + int depth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(TLScontext->con, &mcert, &mspki); uint8_t u, s, m; unsigned const char *data; size_t dlen; @@ -994,22 +1022,27 @@ void tls_dane_log(TLS_SESS_STATE *TLScontext) hex_encode(top, (char *) data, dlen); } - switch (TLScontext->level) { - case TLS_LEV_FPRINT: + if (TLScontext->level == TLS_LEV_FPRINT) { msg_info("%s: Matched fingerprint: %s%s%s", TLScontext->namaddr, STR(top), dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? "..." : "", dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? STR(bot) : ""); return; - - default: - msg_info("%s: Matched DANE %s at depth %d: %u %u %u %s%s%s", - TLScontext->namaddr, mspki ? - "TA public key verified certificate" : depth ? - "TA certificate" : "EE certificate", depth, u, s, m, + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_PREREQ(3,2) + if (SSL_get0_peer_rpk(TLScontext->con) != NULL) { + msg_info("%s: Matched DANE raw public key: %u %u %u %s%s%s", + TLScontext->namaddr, u, s, m, STR(top), dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? "..." : "", dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? STR(bot) : ""); return; } +#endif + msg_info("%s: Matched DANE %s at depth %d: %u %u %u %s%s%s", + TLScontext->namaddr, mspki ? + "TA public key verified certificate" : depth ? + "TA certificate" : "EE certificate", depth, u, s, m, + STR(top), dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? "..." : "", + dlen > MAX_DUMP_BYTES ? STR(bot) : ""); } #ifdef TEST |