Adding upstream version 16.2.upstream/16.2

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 235 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pubdec.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pubdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0a5738
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pubdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * pgp-pubdec.c
+ *	  Decrypt public-key encrypted session key.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *	  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *	  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *	  documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pubdec.c
+ */
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "px.h"
+
+/*
+ * padded msg = 02 || PS || 00 || M
+ * PS - pad bytes
+ * M - msg
+ */
+static uint8 *
+check_eme_pkcs1_v15(uint8 *data, int len)
+{
+	uint8	   *data_end = data + len;
+	uint8	   *p = data;
+	int			rnd = 0;
+
+	if (len < 1 + 8 + 1)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (*p++ != 2)
+		return NULL;
+
+	while (p < data_end && *p)
+	{
+		p++;
+		rnd++;
+	}
+
+	if (p == data_end)
+		return NULL;
+	if (*p != 0)
+		return NULL;
+	if (rnd < 8)
+		return NULL;
+	return p + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secret message: 1 byte algo, sesskey, 2 byte cksum
+ * ignore algo in cksum
+ */
+static int
+control_cksum(uint8 *msg, int msglen)
+{
+	int			i;
+	unsigned	my_cksum,
+				got_cksum;
+
+	if (msglen < 3)
+		return PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+
+	my_cksum = 0;
+	for (i = 1; i < msglen - 2; i++)
+		my_cksum += msg[i];
+	my_cksum &= 0xFFFF;
+	got_cksum = ((unsigned) (msg[msglen - 2]) << 8) + msg[msglen - 1];
+	if (my_cksum != got_cksum)
+	{
+		px_debug("pubenc cksum failed");
+		return PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+decrypt_elgamal(PGP_PubKey *pk, PullFilter *pkt, PGP_MPI **m_p)
+{
+	int			res;
+	PGP_MPI    *c1 = NULL;
+	PGP_MPI    *c2 = NULL;
+
+	if (pk->algo != PGP_PUB_ELG_ENCRYPT)
+		return PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+
+	/* read elgamal encrypted data */
+	res = pgp_mpi_read(pkt, &c1);
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto out;
+	res = pgp_mpi_read(pkt, &c2);
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* decrypt */
+	res = pgp_elgamal_decrypt(pk, c1, c2, m_p);
+
+out:
+	pgp_mpi_free(c1);
+	pgp_mpi_free(c2);
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int
+decrypt_rsa(PGP_PubKey *pk, PullFilter *pkt, PGP_MPI **m_p)
+{
+	int			res;
+	PGP_MPI    *c;
+
+	if (pk->algo != PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT
+		&& pk->algo != PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT_SIGN)
+		return PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+
+	/* read rsa encrypted data */
+	res = pgp_mpi_read(pkt, &c);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	/* decrypt */
+	res = pgp_rsa_decrypt(pk, c, m_p);
+
+	pgp_mpi_free(c);
+	return res;
+}
+
+/* key id is missing - user is expected to try all keys */
+static const uint8
+			any_key[] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+int
+pgp_parse_pubenc_sesskey(PGP_Context *ctx, PullFilter *pkt)
+{
+	int			ver;
+	int			algo;
+	int			res;
+	uint8		key_id[8];
+	PGP_PubKey *pk;
+	uint8	   *msg;
+	int			msglen;
+	PGP_MPI    *m;
+
+	pk = ctx->pub_key;
+	if (pk == NULL)
+	{
+		px_debug("no pubkey?");
+		return PXE_BUG;
+	}
+
+	GETBYTE(pkt, ver);
+	if (ver != 3)
+	{
+		px_debug("unknown pubenc_sesskey pkt ver=%d", ver);
+		return PXE_PGP_CORRUPT_DATA;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * check if keyid's match - user-friendly msg
+	 */
+	res = pullf_read_fixed(pkt, 8, key_id);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+	if (memcmp(key_id, any_key, 8) != 0
+		&& memcmp(key_id, pk->key_id, 8) != 0)
+	{
+		px_debug("key_id's does not match");
+		return PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Decrypt
+	 */
+	GETBYTE(pkt, algo);
+	switch (algo)
+	{
+		case PGP_PUB_ELG_ENCRYPT:
+			res = decrypt_elgamal(pk, pkt, &m);
+			break;
+		case PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT:
+		case PGP_PUB_RSA_ENCRYPT_SIGN:
+			res = decrypt_rsa(pk, pkt, &m);
+			break;
+		default:
+			res = PXE_PGP_UNKNOWN_PUBALGO;
+	}
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	/*
+	 * extract message
+	 */
+	msg = check_eme_pkcs1_v15(m->data, m->bytes);
+	if (msg == NULL)
+	{
+		px_debug("check_eme_pkcs1_v15 failed");
+		res = PXE_PGP_WRONG_KEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	msglen = m->bytes - (msg - m->data);
+
+	res = control_cksum(msg, msglen);
+	if (res < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * got sesskey
+	 */
+	ctx->cipher_algo = *msg;
+	ctx->sess_key_len = msglen - 3;
+	memcpy(ctx->sess_key, msg + 1, ctx->sess_key_len);
+
+out:
+	pgp_mpi_free(m);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+	return pgp_expect_packet_end(pkt);
+}