From 293913568e6a7a86fd1479e1cff8e2ecb58d6568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sat, 13 Apr 2024 15:44:03 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 16.2. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html (limited to 'doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html') diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html b/doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6729089 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/src/sgml/html/plperl-trusted.html @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ + +45.5. Trusted and Untrusted PL/Perl

45.5. Trusted and Untrusted PL/Perl #

+ Normally, PL/Perl is installed as a trusted programming + language named plperl. In this setup, certain Perl + operations are disabled to preserve security. In general, the + operations that are restricted are those that interact with the + environment. This includes file handle operations, + require, and use (for + external modules). There is no way to access internals of the + database server process or to gain OS-level access with the + permissions of the server process, + as a C function can do. Thus, any unprivileged database user can + be permitted to use this language. +

+ Here is an example of a function that will not work because file + system operations are not allowed for security reasons: +

+CREATE FUNCTION badfunc() RETURNS integer AS $$
+    my $tmpfile = "/tmp/badfile";
+    open my $fh, '>', $tmpfile
+        or elog(ERROR, qq{could not open the file "$tmpfile": $!});
+    print $fh "Testing writing to a file\n";
+    close $fh or elog(ERROR, qq{could not close the file "$tmpfile": $!});
+    return 1;
+$$ LANGUAGE plperl;
+

+ The creation of this function will fail as its use of a forbidden + operation will be caught by the validator. +

+ Sometimes it is desirable to write Perl functions that are not + restricted. For example, one might want a Perl function that sends + mail. To handle these cases, PL/Perl can also be installed as an + untrusted language (usually called + PL/PerlU). + In this case the full Perl language is available. When installing the + language, the language name plperlu will select + the untrusted PL/Perl variant. +

+ The writer of a PL/PerlU function must take care that the function + cannot be used to do anything unwanted, since it will be able to do + anything that could be done by a user logged in as the database + administrator. Note that the database system allows only database + superusers to create functions in untrusted languages. +

+ If the above function was created by a superuser using the language + plperlu, execution would succeed. +

+ In the same way, anonymous code blocks written in Perl can use + restricted operations if the language is specified as + plperlu rather than plperl, but the caller + must be a superuser. +

Note

+ While PL/Perl functions run in a separate Perl + interpreter for each SQL role, all PL/PerlU functions + executed in a given session run in a single Perl interpreter (which is + not any of the ones used for PL/Perl functions). + This allows PL/PerlU functions to share data freely, + but no communication can occur between PL/Perl and + PL/PerlU functions. +

Note

+ Perl cannot support multiple interpreters within one process unless + it was built with the appropriate flags, namely either + usemultiplicity or useithreads. + (usemultiplicity is preferred unless you actually need + to use threads. For more details, see the + perlembed man page.) + If PL/Perl is used with a copy of Perl that was not built + this way, then it is only possible to have one Perl interpreter per + session, and so any one session can only execute either + PL/PerlU functions, or PL/Perl functions + that are all called by the same SQL role. +

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