summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/src/lib/crypto/ecdh.cpp
blob: d4411c39f0912836a0d92732843005cccfc95b9c (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
/*-
 * Copyright (c) 2017-2022 Ribose Inc.
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS
 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <string.h>
#include <botan/ffi.h>
#include "hash_botan.hpp"
#include "ecdh.h"
#include "ecdh_utils.h"
#include "symmetric.h"
#include "types.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "mem.h"
#include "bn.h"

// Produces kek of size kek_len which corresponds to length of wrapping key
static bool
compute_kek(uint8_t *              kek,
            size_t                 kek_len,
            const uint8_t *        other_info,
            size_t                 other_info_size,
            const ec_curve_desc_t *curve_desc,
            const pgp_mpi_t *      ec_pubkey,
            const botan_privkey_t  ec_prvkey,
            const pgp_hash_alg_t   hash_alg)
{
    const uint8_t *p = ec_pubkey->mpi;
    uint8_t        p_len = ec_pubkey->len;

    if (curve_desc->rnp_curve_id == PGP_CURVE_25519) {
        if ((p_len != 33) || (p[0] != 0x40)) {
            return false;
        }
        p++;
        p_len--;
    }

    rnp::secure_array<uint8_t, MAX_CURVE_BYTELEN * 2 + 1> s;

    botan_pk_op_ka_t op_key_agreement = NULL;
    bool             ret = false;
    char             kdf_name[32] = {0};
    size_t           s_len = s.size();

    if (botan_pk_op_key_agreement_create(&op_key_agreement, ec_prvkey, "Raw", 0) ||
        botan_pk_op_key_agreement(op_key_agreement, s.data(), &s_len, p, p_len, NULL, 0)) {
        goto end;
    }

    snprintf(
      kdf_name, sizeof(kdf_name), "SP800-56A(%s)", rnp::Hash_Botan::name_backend(hash_alg));
    ret = !botan_kdf(
      kdf_name, kek, kek_len, s.data(), s_len, NULL, 0, other_info, other_info_size);
end:
    return ret && !botan_pk_op_key_agreement_destroy(op_key_agreement);
}

static bool
ecdh_load_public_key(botan_pubkey_t *pubkey, const pgp_ec_key_t *key)
{
    bool res = false;

    const ec_curve_desc_t *curve = get_curve_desc(key->curve);
    if (!curve) {
        RNP_LOG("unknown curve");
        return false;
    }

    if (curve->rnp_curve_id == PGP_CURVE_25519) {
        if ((key->p.len != 33) || (key->p.mpi[0] != 0x40)) {
            return false;
        }
        rnp::secure_array<uint8_t, 32> pkey;
        memcpy(pkey.data(), key->p.mpi + 1, 32);
        return !botan_pubkey_load_x25519(pubkey, pkey.data());
    }

    if (!mpi_bytes(&key->p) || (key->p.mpi[0] != 0x04)) {
        RNP_LOG("Failed to load public key");
        return false;
    }

    botan_mp_t   px = NULL;
    botan_mp_t   py = NULL;
    const size_t curve_order = BITS_TO_BYTES(curve->bitlen);

    if (botan_mp_init(&px) || botan_mp_init(&py) ||
        botan_mp_from_bin(px, &key->p.mpi[1], curve_order) ||
        botan_mp_from_bin(py, &key->p.mpi[1 + curve_order], curve_order)) {
        goto end;
    }

    if (!(res = !botan_pubkey_load_ecdh(pubkey, px, py, curve->botan_name))) {
        RNP_LOG("failed to load ecdh public key");
    }
end:
    botan_mp_destroy(px);
    botan_mp_destroy(py);
    return res;
}

static bool
ecdh_load_secret_key(botan_privkey_t *seckey, const pgp_ec_key_t *key)
{
    const ec_curve_desc_t *curve = get_curve_desc(key->curve);

    if (!curve) {
        return false;
    }

    if (curve->rnp_curve_id == PGP_CURVE_25519) {
        if (key->x.len != 32) {
            RNP_LOG("wrong x25519 key");
            return false;
        }
        /* need to reverse byte order since in mpi we have big-endian */
        rnp::secure_array<uint8_t, 32> prkey;
        for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
            prkey[i] = key->x.mpi[31 - i];
        }
        return !botan_privkey_load_x25519(seckey, prkey.data());
    }

    bignum_t *x = NULL;
    if (!(x = mpi2bn(&key->x))) {
        return false;
    }
    bool res = !botan_privkey_load_ecdh(seckey, BN_HANDLE_PTR(x), curve->botan_name);
    bn_free(x);
    return res;
}

rnp_result_t
ecdh_validate_key(rnp::RNG *rng, const pgp_ec_key_t *key, bool secret)
{
    botan_pubkey_t  bpkey = NULL;
    botan_privkey_t bskey = NULL;
    rnp_result_t    ret = RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;

    const ec_curve_desc_t *curve_desc = get_curve_desc(key->curve);
    if (!curve_desc) {
        return RNP_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
    }

    if (!ecdh_load_public_key(&bpkey, key) ||
        botan_pubkey_check_key(bpkey, rng->handle(), 0)) {
        goto done;
    }
    if (!secret) {
        ret = RNP_SUCCESS;
        goto done;
    }

    if (!ecdh_load_secret_key(&bskey, key) ||
        botan_privkey_check_key(bskey, rng->handle(), 0)) {
        goto done;
    }
    ret = RNP_SUCCESS;
done:
    botan_privkey_destroy(bskey);
    botan_pubkey_destroy(bpkey);
    return ret;
}

rnp_result_t
ecdh_encrypt_pkcs5(rnp::RNG *               rng,
                   pgp_ecdh_encrypted_t *   out,
                   const uint8_t *const     in,
                   size_t                   in_len,
                   const pgp_ec_key_t *     key,
                   const pgp_fingerprint_t &fingerprint)
{
    botan_privkey_t eph_prv_key = NULL;
    rnp_result_t    ret = RNP_ERROR_GENERIC;
    uint8_t         other_info[MAX_SP800_56A_OTHER_INFO];
    uint8_t         kek[32] = {0}; // Size of SHA-256 or smaller
    // 'm' is padded to the 8-byte granularity
    uint8_t      m[MAX_SESSION_KEY_SIZE];
    const size_t m_padded_len = ((in_len / 8) + 1) * 8;

    if (!key || !out || !in || (in_len > sizeof(m))) {
        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
    }
#if !defined(ENABLE_SM2)
    if (key->curve == PGP_CURVE_SM2_P_256) {
        RNP_LOG("SM2 curve support is disabled.");
        return RNP_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
    }
#endif
    const ec_curve_desc_t *curve_desc = get_curve_desc(key->curve);
    if (!curve_desc) {
        RNP_LOG("unsupported curve");
        return RNP_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
    }

    // +8 because of AES-wrap adds 8 bytes
    if (ECDH_WRAPPED_KEY_SIZE < (m_padded_len + 8)) {
        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
    }

    // See 13.5 of RFC 4880 for definition of other_info_size
    const size_t other_info_size = curve_desc->OIDhex_len + 46;
    const size_t kek_len = pgp_key_size(key->key_wrap_alg);
    size_t       tmp_len = kdf_other_info_serialize(
      other_info, curve_desc, fingerprint, key->kdf_hash_alg, key->key_wrap_alg);

    if (tmp_len != other_info_size) {
        RNP_LOG("Serialization of other info failed");
        return RNP_ERROR_GENERIC;
    }

    if (!strcmp(curve_desc->botan_name, "curve25519")) {
        if (botan_privkey_create(&eph_prv_key, "Curve25519", "", rng->handle())) {
            goto end;
        }
    } else {
        if (botan_privkey_create(
              &eph_prv_key, "ECDH", curve_desc->botan_name, rng->handle())) {
            goto end;
        }
    }

    if (!compute_kek(kek,
                     kek_len,
                     other_info,
                     other_info_size,
                     curve_desc,
                     &key->p,
                     eph_prv_key,
                     key->kdf_hash_alg)) {
        RNP_LOG("KEK computation failed");
        goto end;
    }

    memcpy(m, in, in_len);
    if (!pad_pkcs7(m, m_padded_len, in_len)) {
        // Should never happen
        goto end;
    }

    out->mlen = sizeof(out->m);
    if (botan_key_wrap3394(m, m_padded_len, kek, kek_len, out->m, &out->mlen)) {
        goto end;
    }

    /* we need to prepend 0x40 for the x25519 */
    if (key->curve == PGP_CURVE_25519) {
        out->p.len = sizeof(out->p.mpi) - 1;
        if (botan_pk_op_key_agreement_export_public(
              eph_prv_key, out->p.mpi + 1, &out->p.len)) {
            goto end;
        }
        out->p.mpi[0] = 0x40;
        out->p.len++;
    } else {
        out->p.len = sizeof(out->p.mpi);
        if (botan_pk_op_key_agreement_export_public(eph_prv_key, out->p.mpi, &out->p.len)) {
            goto end;
        }
    }

    // All OK
    ret = RNP_SUCCESS;
end:
    botan_privkey_destroy(eph_prv_key);
    return ret;
}

rnp_result_t
ecdh_decrypt_pkcs5(uint8_t *                   out,
                   size_t *                    out_len,
                   const pgp_ecdh_encrypted_t *in,
                   const pgp_ec_key_t *        key,
                   const pgp_fingerprint_t &   fingerprint)
{
    if (!out_len || !in || !key || !mpi_bytes(&key->x)) {
        return RNP_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
    }

    const ec_curve_desc_t *curve_desc = get_curve_desc(key->curve);
    if (!curve_desc) {
        RNP_LOG("unknown curve");
        return RNP_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
    }

    const pgp_symm_alg_t wrap_alg = key->key_wrap_alg;
    const pgp_hash_alg_t kdf_hash = key->kdf_hash_alg;
    /* Ensure that AES is used for wrapping */
    if ((wrap_alg != PGP_SA_AES_128) && (wrap_alg != PGP_SA_AES_192) &&
        (wrap_alg != PGP_SA_AES_256)) {
        RNP_LOG("non-aes wrap algorithm");
        return RNP_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
    }

    // See 13.5 of RFC 4880 for definition of other_info_size
    uint8_t      other_info[MAX_SP800_56A_OTHER_INFO];
    const size_t other_info_size = curve_desc->OIDhex_len + 46;
    const size_t tmp_len =
      kdf_other_info_serialize(other_info, curve_desc, fingerprint, kdf_hash, wrap_alg);

    if (other_info_size != tmp_len) {
        RNP_LOG("Serialization of other info failed");
        return RNP_ERROR_GENERIC;
    }

    botan_privkey_t prv_key = NULL;
    if (!ecdh_load_secret_key(&prv_key, key)) {
        RNP_LOG("failed to load ecdh secret key");
        return RNP_ERROR_GENERIC;
    }

    // Size of SHA-256 or smaller
    rnp::secure_array<uint8_t, MAX_SYMM_KEY_SIZE>    kek;
    rnp::secure_array<uint8_t, MAX_SESSION_KEY_SIZE> deckey;

    size_t       deckey_len = deckey.size();
    size_t       offset = 0;
    rnp_result_t ret = RNP_ERROR_GENERIC;

    /* Security: Always return same error code in case compute_kek,
     *           botan_key_unwrap3394 or unpad_pkcs7 fails
     */
    size_t kek_len = pgp_key_size(wrap_alg);
    if (!compute_kek(kek.data(),
                     kek_len,
                     other_info,
                     other_info_size,
                     curve_desc,
                     &in->p,
                     prv_key,
                     kdf_hash)) {
        goto end;
    }

    if (botan_key_unwrap3394(
          in->m, in->mlen, kek.data(), kek_len, deckey.data(), &deckey_len)) {
        goto end;
    }

    if (!unpad_pkcs7(deckey.data(), deckey_len, &offset)) {
        goto end;
    }

    if (*out_len < offset) {
        ret = RNP_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER;
        goto end;
    }

    *out_len = offset;
    memcpy(out, deckey.data(), *out_len);
    ret = RNP_SUCCESS;
end:
    botan_privkey_destroy(prv_key);
    return ret;
}