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-rw-r--r--authenticate.c376
1 files changed, 376 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/authenticate.c b/authenticate.c
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+++ b/authenticate.c
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+/*
+ * Support rsync daemon authentication.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2000 Andrew Tridgell
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2022 Wayne Davison
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ * with this program; if not, visit the http://fsf.org website.
+ */
+
+#include "rsync.h"
+#include "itypes.h"
+#include "ifuncs.h"
+
+extern int read_only;
+extern char *password_file;
+extern struct name_num_obj valid_auth_checksums;
+
+/***************************************************************************
+encode a buffer using base64 - simple and slow algorithm. null terminates
+the result.
+ ***************************************************************************/
+void base64_encode(const char *buf, int len, char *out, int pad)
+{
+ char *b64 = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+ int bit_offset, byte_offset, idx, i;
+ const uchar *d = (const uchar *)buf;
+ int bytes = (len*8 + 5)/6;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
+ byte_offset = (i*6)/8;
+ bit_offset = (i*6)%8;
+ if (bit_offset < 3) {
+ idx = (d[byte_offset] >> (2-bit_offset)) & 0x3F;
+ } else {
+ idx = (d[byte_offset] << (bit_offset-2)) & 0x3F;
+ if (byte_offset+1 < len) {
+ idx |= (d[byte_offset+1] >> (8-(bit_offset-2)));
+ }
+ }
+ out[i] = b64[idx];
+ }
+
+ while (pad && (i % 4))
+ out[i++] = '=';
+
+ out[i] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* Generate a challenge buffer and return it base64-encoded. */
+static void gen_challenge(const char *addr, char *challenge)
+{
+ char input[32];
+ char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ int len;
+
+ memset(input, 0, sizeof input);
+
+ strlcpy(input, addr, 17);
+ sys_gettimeofday(&tv);
+ SIVAL(input, 16, tv.tv_sec);
+ SIVAL(input, 20, tv.tv_usec);
+ SIVAL(input, 24, getpid());
+
+ len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
+ sum_update(input, sizeof input);
+ sum_end(digest);
+
+ base64_encode(digest, len, challenge, 0);
+}
+
+/* Generate an MD4 hash created from the combination of the password
+ * and the challenge string and return it base64-encoded. */
+static void generate_hash(const char *in, const char *challenge, char *out)
+{
+ char buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+ int len;
+
+ len = sum_init(valid_auth_checksums.negotiated_nni, 0);
+ sum_update(in, strlen(in));
+ sum_update(challenge, strlen(challenge));
+ sum_end(buf);
+
+ base64_encode(buf, len, out, 0);
+}
+
+/* Return the secret for a user from the secret file, null terminated.
+ * Maximum length is len (not counting the null). */
+static const char *check_secret(int module, const char *user, const char *group,
+ const char *challenge, const char *pass)
+{
+ char line[1024];
+ char pass2[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
+ const char *fname = lp_secrets_file(module);
+ STRUCT_STAT st;
+ int ok = 1;
+ int user_len = strlen(user);
+ int group_len = group ? strlen(group) : 0;
+ char *err;
+ FILE *fh;
+
+ if (!fname || !*fname || (fh = fopen(fname, "r")) == NULL)
+ return "no secrets file";
+
+ if (do_fstat(fileno(fh), &st) == -1) {
+ rsyserr(FLOG, errno, "fstat(%s)", fname);
+ ok = 0;
+ } else if (lp_strict_modes(module)) {
+ if ((st.st_mode & 06) != 0) {
+ rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must not be other-accessible (see strict modes option)\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ } else if (MY_UID() == ROOT_UID && st.st_uid != ROOT_UID) {
+ rprintf(FLOG, "secrets file must be owned by root when running as root (see strict modes)\n");
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ok) {
+ fclose(fh);
+ return "ignoring secrets file";
+ }
+
+ if (*user == '#') {
+ /* Reject attempt to match a comment. */
+ fclose(fh);
+ return "invalid username";
+ }
+
+ /* Try to find a line that starts with the user (or @group) name and a ':'. */
+ err = "secret not found";
+ while ((user || group) && fgets(line, sizeof line, fh) != NULL) {
+ const char **ptr, *s = strtok(line, "\n\r");
+ int len;
+ if (!s)
+ continue;
+ if (*s == '@') {
+ ptr = &group;
+ len = group_len;
+ s++;
+ } else {
+ ptr = &user;
+ len = user_len;
+ }
+ if (!*ptr || strncmp(s, *ptr, len) != 0 || s[len] != ':')
+ continue;
+ generate_hash(s+len+1, challenge, pass2);
+ if (strcmp(pass, pass2) == 0) {
+ err = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ err = "password mismatch";
+ *ptr = NULL; /* Don't look for name again. */
+ }
+
+ fclose(fh);
+
+ force_memzero(line, sizeof line);
+ force_memzero(pass2, sizeof pass2);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static const char *getpassf(const char *filename)
+{
+ STRUCT_STAT st;
+ char buffer[512], *p;
+ int n;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
+ n = fgets(buffer, sizeof buffer, stdin) == NULL ? -1 : (int)strlen(buffer);
+ } else {
+ int fd;
+
+ if ((fd = open(filename,O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+ rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "could not open password file %s", filename);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+ }
+
+ if (do_stat(filename, &st) == -1) {
+ rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "stat(%s)", filename);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+ }
+ if ((st.st_mode & 06) != 0) {
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: password file must not be other-accessible\n");
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+ }
+ if (MY_UID() == ROOT_UID && st.st_uid != ROOT_UID) {
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: password file must be owned by root when running as root\n");
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+ }
+
+ n = read(fd, buffer, sizeof buffer - 1);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (n > 0) {
+ buffer[n] = '\0';
+ if ((p = strtok(buffer, "\n\r")) != NULL)
+ return strdup(p);
+ }
+
+ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: failed to read a password from %s\n", filename);
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_SYNTAX);
+}
+
+/* Possibly negotiate authentication with the client. Use "leader" to
+ * start off the auth if necessary.
+ *
+ * Return NULL if authentication failed. Return "" if anonymous access.
+ * Otherwise return username.
+ */
+char *auth_server(int f_in, int f_out, int module, const char *host,
+ const char *addr, const char *leader)
+{
+ char *users = lp_auth_users(module);
+ char challenge[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
+ char line[BIGPATHBUFLEN];
+ const char **auth_uid_groups = NULL;
+ int auth_uid_groups_cnt = -1;
+ const char *err = NULL;
+ int group_match = -1;
+ char *tok, *pass;
+ char opt_ch = '\0';
+
+ /* if no auth list then allow anyone in! */
+ if (!users || !*users)
+ return "";
+
+ negotiate_daemon_auth(f_out, 0);
+ gen_challenge(addr, challenge);
+
+ io_printf(f_out, "%s%s\n", leader, challenge);
+
+ if (!read_line_old(f_in, line, sizeof line, 0)
+ || (pass = strchr(line, ' ')) == NULL) {
+ rprintf(FLOG, "auth failed on module %s from %s (%s): "
+ "invalid challenge response\n",
+ lp_name(module), host, addr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *pass++ = '\0';
+
+ users = strdup(users);
+
+ for (tok = strtok(users, " ,\t"); tok; tok = strtok(NULL, " ,\t")) {
+ char *opts;
+ /* See if the user appended :deny, :ro, or :rw. */
+ if ((opts = strchr(tok, ':')) != NULL) {
+ *opts++ = '\0';
+ opt_ch = isUpper(opts) ? toLower(opts) : *opts;
+ if (opt_ch == 'r') { /* handle ro and rw */
+ opt_ch = isUpper(opts+1) ? toLower(opts+1) : opts[1];
+ if (opt_ch == 'o')
+ opt_ch = 'r';
+ else if (opt_ch != 'w')
+ opt_ch = '\0';
+ } else if (opt_ch != 'd') /* if it's not deny, ignore it */
+ opt_ch = '\0';
+ } else
+ opt_ch = '\0';
+ if (*tok != '@') {
+ /* Match the username */
+ if (wildmatch(tok, line))
+ break;
+ } else {
+#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+ int j;
+ /* See if authorizing user is a real user, and if so, see
+ * if it is in a group that matches tok+1 wildmat. */
+ if (auth_uid_groups_cnt < 0) {
+ item_list gid_list = EMPTY_ITEM_LIST;
+ uid_t auth_uid;
+ if (!user_to_uid(line, &auth_uid, False)
+ || getallgroups(auth_uid, &gid_list) != NULL)
+ auth_uid_groups_cnt = 0;
+ else {
+ gid_t *gid_array = gid_list.items;
+ auth_uid_groups_cnt = gid_list.count;
+ auth_uid_groups = new_array(const char *, auth_uid_groups_cnt);
+ for (j = 0; j < auth_uid_groups_cnt; j++)
+ auth_uid_groups[j] = gid_to_group(gid_array[j]);
+ }
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < auth_uid_groups_cnt; j++) {
+ if (auth_uid_groups[j] && wildmatch(tok+1, auth_uid_groups[j])) {
+ group_match = j;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (group_match >= 0)
+ break;
+#else
+ rprintf(FLOG, "your computer doesn't support getgrouplist(), so no @group authorization is possible.\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+ free(users);
+
+ if (!tok)
+ err = "no matching rule";
+ else if (opt_ch == 'd')
+ err = "denied by rule";
+ else {
+ const char *group = group_match >= 0 ? auth_uid_groups[group_match] : NULL;
+ err = check_secret(module, line, group, challenge, pass);
+ }
+
+ force_memzero(challenge, sizeof challenge);
+ force_memzero(pass, strlen(pass));
+
+ if (auth_uid_groups) {
+ int j;
+ for (j = 0; j < auth_uid_groups_cnt; j++) {
+ if (auth_uid_groups[j])
+ free((char*)auth_uid_groups[j]);
+ }
+ free(auth_uid_groups);
+ }
+
+ if (err) {
+ rprintf(FLOG, "auth failed on module %s from %s (%s) for %s: %s\n",
+ lp_name(module), host, addr, line, err);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (opt_ch == 'r')
+ read_only = 1;
+ else if (opt_ch == 'w')
+ read_only = 0;
+
+ return strdup(line);
+}
+
+void auth_client(int fd, const char *user, const char *challenge)
+{
+ const char *pass;
+ char pass2[MAX_DIGEST_LEN*2];
+
+ if (!user || !*user)
+ user = "nobody";
+ negotiate_daemon_auth(-1, 1);
+
+ if (!(pass = getpassf(password_file))
+ && !(pass = getenv("RSYNC_PASSWORD"))) {
+ /* XXX: cyeoh says that getpass is deprecated, because
+ * it may return a truncated password on some systems,
+ * and it is not in the LSB.
+ *
+ * Andrew Klein says that getpassphrase() is present
+ * on Solaris and reads up to 256 characters.
+ *
+ * OpenBSD has a readpassphrase() that might be more suitable.
+ */
+ pass = getpass("Password: ");
+ }
+
+ if (!pass)
+ pass = "";
+
+ generate_hash(pass, challenge, pass2);
+ io_printf(fd, "%s %s\n", user, pass2);
+}