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+# Security Policy
+
+## No guarantees
+
+Support is provided on a best-effort bases only.
+No binding guarantees can be provided.
+
+## Security premises
+
+Rand provides the trait `rand_core::CryptoRng` aka `rand::CryptoRng` as a marker
+trait. Generators implementating `RngCore` *and* `CryptoRng`, and given the
+additional constraints that:
+
+-   Instances of seedable RNGs (those implementing `SeedableRng`) are
+    constructed with cryptographically secure seed values
+-   The state (memory) of the RNG and its seed value are not be exposed
+
+are expected to provide the following:
+
+-   An attacker can gain no advantage over chance (50% for each bit) in
+    predicting the RNG output, even with full knowledge of all prior outputs.
+
+For some RNGs, notably `OsRng`, `ThreadRng` and those wrapped by `ReseedingRng`,
+we provide limited mitigations against side-channel attacks:
+
+-   After a process fork on Unix, there is an upper-bound on the number of bits
+    output by the RNG before the processes diverge, after which outputs from
+    each process's RNG are uncorrelated
+-   After the state (memory) of an RNG is leaked, there is an upper-bound on the
+    number of bits of output by the RNG before prediction of output by an
+    observer again becomes computationally-infeasible
+
+Additionally, derivations from such an RNG (including the `Rng` trait,
+implementations of the `Distribution` trait, and `seq` algorithms) should not
+introduce signficant bias other than that expected from the operation in
+question (e.g. bias from a weighted distribution).
+
+## Supported Versions
+
+We will attempt to uphold these premises in the following crate versions,
+provided that only the latest patch version is used, and with potential
+exceptions for theoretical issues without a known exploit:
+
+| Crate | Versions | Exceptions |
+| ----- | -------- | ---------- |
+| `rand` | 0.7 |  |
+| `rand` | 0.5, 0.6 | Jitter |
+| `rand` | 0.4 | Jitter, ISAAC |
+| `rand_core` | 0.2 - 0.5 | |
+| `rand_chacha` | 0.1 - 0.2 | |
+| `rand_hc` | 0.1 - 0.2 | |
+
+Explanation of exceptions:
+
+-   Jitter: `JitterRng` is used as an entropy source when the primary source
+    fails; this source may not be secure against side-channel attacks, see #699.
+-   ISAAC: the [ISAAC](https://burtleburtle.net/bob/rand/isaacafa.html) RNG used
+    to implement `thread_rng` is difficult to analyse and thus cannot provide
+    strong assertions of security.
+
+## Known issues
+
+In `rand` version 0.3 (0.3.18 and later), if `OsRng` fails, `thread_rng` is
+seeded from the system time in an insecure manner.
+
+## Reporting a Vulnerability
+
+To report a vulnerability, [open a new issue](https://github.com/rust-random/rand/issues/new).
+Once the issue is resolved, the vulnerability should be [reported to RustSec](https://github.com/RustSec/advisory-db/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md).