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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 17:20:00 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-19 17:20:00 +0000
commit8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44 (patch)
tree4099e8021376c7d8c05bdf8503093d80e9c7bad0 /third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadsamba-8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44.tar.xz
samba-8daa83a594a2e98f39d764422bfbdbc62c9efd44.zip
Adding upstream version 2:4.20.0+dfsg.upstream/2%4.20.0+dfsg
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c')
-rw-r--r--third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c363
1 files changed, 363 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c b/third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c
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+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "kdc_locl.h"
+
+static int
+name_type_ok(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ krb5_const_principal principal)
+{
+ int nt = krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal);
+
+ if (!krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, principal))
+ return 1;
+ if (nt == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST || nt == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN)
+ return 1;
+ if (config->strict_nametypes == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct timeval _kdc_now;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+synthesize_hdb_close(krb5_context context, struct HDB *db)
+{
+ (void) context;
+ (void) db;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Synthesize an HDB entry suitable for PKINIT and GSS preauth.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+synthesize_client(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ krb5_const_principal princ,
+ HDB **db,
+ hdb_entry **h)
+{
+ static HDB null_db;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ hdb_entry *e;
+
+ /* Hope this works! */
+ null_db.hdb_destroy = synthesize_hdb_close;
+ null_db.hdb_close = synthesize_hdb_close;
+ if (db)
+ *db = &null_db;
+
+ ret = (e = calloc(1, sizeof(*e))) ? 0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ e->flags.client = 1;
+ e->flags.immutable = 1;
+ e->flags.virtual = 1;
+ e->flags.synthetic = 1;
+ e->flags.do_not_store = 1;
+ e->kvno = 1;
+ e->keys.len = 0;
+ e->keys.val = NULL;
+ e->created_by.time = time(NULL);
+ e->modified_by = NULL;
+ e->valid_start = NULL;
+ e->valid_end = NULL;
+ e->pw_end = NULL;
+ e->etypes = NULL;
+ e->generation = NULL;
+ e->extensions = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = (e->max_renew = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_renew))) ?
+ 0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = (e->max_life = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_life))) ?
+ 0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->principal);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->created_by.principal);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We can't check OCSP in the TGS path, so we can't let tickets for
+ * synthetic principals live very long.
+ */
+ *(e->max_renew) = config->synthetic_clients_max_renew;
+ *(e->max_life) = config->synthetic_clients_max_life;
+ *h = e;
+ } else if (e) {
+ hdb_free_entry(context, &null_db, e);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+KDC_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KDC_LIB_CALL
+_kdc_db_fetch(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ krb5_const_principal principal,
+ unsigned flags,
+ krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr,
+ HDB **db,
+ hdb_entry **h)
+{
+ hdb_entry *ent = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ int i;
+ unsigned kvno = 0;
+ krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
+ krb5_const_principal princ;
+
+ *h = NULL;
+ if (db)
+ *db = NULL;
+
+ if (!name_type_ok(context, config, principal))
+ return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+
+ flags |= HDB_F_DECRYPT;
+ if (kvno_ptr != NULL && *kvno_ptr != 0) {
+ kvno = *kvno_ptr;
+ flags |= HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED;
+ } else {
+ flags |= HDB_F_ALL_KVNOS;
+ }
+
+ ent = calloc(1, sizeof (*ent));
+ if (ent == NULL)
+ return krb5_enomem(context);
+
+ if (principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
+ if (principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
+ ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ "malformed request: "
+ "enterprise name with %d name components",
+ principal->name.name_string.len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal->name.name_string.val[0],
+ &enterprise_principal);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < config->num_db; i++) {
+ HDB *curdb = config->db[i];
+
+ if (db)
+ *db = curdb;
+
+ ret = curdb->hdb_open(context, curdb, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (ret) {
+ const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+ kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to open database: %s", msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ princ = principal;
+ if (!(curdb->hdb_capability_flags & HDB_CAP_F_HANDLE_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) && enterprise_principal)
+ princ = enterprise_principal;
+
+ ret = hdb_fetch_kvno(context, curdb, princ, flags, 0, 0, kvno, ent);
+ curdb->hdb_close(context, curdb);
+
+ if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
+ continue; /* Check the other databases */
+
+ /*
+ * This is really important, because errors like
+ * HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE (used to indicate to Samba that
+ * the RODC on which this code is running does not have
+ * the key we need, and so a proxy to the KDC is required)
+ * have specific meaning, and need to be propogated up.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (ret) {
+ case HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM:
+ case 0:
+ /*
+ * the ent->entry.principal just contains hints for the client
+ * to retry. This is important for enterprise principal routing
+ * between trusts.
+ */
+ *h = ent;
+ ent = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case HDB_ERR_NOENTRY:
+ if (db)
+ *db = NULL;
+ if ((flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK) &&
+ config->synthetic_clients) {
+ ret = synthesize_client(context, config, principal, db, h);
+ if (ret) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "could not synthesize "
+ "HDB client principal entry");
+ ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+ krb5_prepend_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
+ }
+ } else {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ if (db)
+ *db = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+out:
+ krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
+ free(ent);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+KDC_LIB_FUNCTION void KDC_LIB_CALL
+_kdc_free_ent(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent)
+{
+ hdb_free_entry (context, db, ent);
+ free (ent);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the order list of preferred encryption types and sort the
+ * available keys and return the most preferred key.
+ */
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_get_preferred_key(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+ hdb_entry *h,
+ const char *name,
+ krb5_enctype *enctype,
+ Key **key)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (config->use_strongest_server_key) {
+ const krb5_enctype *p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
+
+ for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
+ if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
+ !_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, p[i]))
+ continue;
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL, p[i], key);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (enctype != NULL)
+ *enctype = p[i];
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *key = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->keys.len; i++) {
+ if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0 &&
+ !_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype))
+ continue;
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL,
+ h->keys.val[i].key.keytype, key);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (enctype != NULL)
+ *enctype = (*key)->key.keytype;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP,
+ "No valid kerberos key found for %s", name);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_verify_checksum(krb5_context context,
+ krb5_crypto crypto,
+ krb5_key_usage usage,
+ const krb5_data *data,
+ Checksum *cksum)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, usage,
+ data->data, data->length,
+ cksum);
+ if (ret == KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP)
+ ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns TRUE if a PAC should be included in ticket authorization data.
+ *
+ * Per [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.3, PACs are always included for TGTs; for service
+ * tickets, policy is governed by whether the client explicitly requested
+ * a PAC be omitted when requesting a TGT, or if the no-auth-data-reqd
+ * flag is set on the service principal entry.
+ *
+ * However, when issuing a cross-realm TGT to an AD realm our PAC might not
+ * interoperate correctly. Therefore we honor the no-auth-data-reqd HDB entry
+ * flag on cross-realm TGTs.
+ */
+
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_include_pac_p(astgs_request_t r)
+{
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Notify the HDB backend and KDC plugin of the audited event.
+ */
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_audit_request(astgs_request_t r)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ struct HDB *hdb;
+
+ ret = _kdc_plugin_audit(r);
+ if (ret == 0 &&
+ (hdb = r->clientdb ? r->clientdb : r->config->db[0]) &&
+ hdb->hdb_audit)
+ ret = hdb->hdb_audit(r->context, hdb, r->client, (hdb_request_t)r);
+
+ return ret;
+}