Adding upstream version 2:4.20.0+dfsg.upstream/2%4.20.0+dfsg

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 363 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c b/third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00bbe0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/heimdal/kdc/misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 - 2001 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "kdc_locl.h"
+
+static int
+name_type_ok(krb5_context context,
+             krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+             krb5_const_principal principal)
+{
+    int nt = krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal);
+
+    if (!krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, principal))
+        return 1;
+    if (nt == KRB5_NT_SRV_INST || nt == KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN)
+        return 1;
+    if (config->strict_nametypes == 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+struct timeval _kdc_now;
+
+static krb5_error_code
+synthesize_hdb_close(krb5_context context, struct HDB *db)
+{
+    (void) context;
+    (void) db;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Synthesize an HDB entry suitable for PKINIT and GSS preauth.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+synthesize_client(krb5_context context,
+                  krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+                  krb5_const_principal princ,
+                  HDB **db,
+                  hdb_entry **h)
+{
+    static HDB null_db;
+    krb5_error_code ret;
+    hdb_entry *e;
+
+    /* Hope this works! */
+    null_db.hdb_destroy = synthesize_hdb_close;
+    null_db.hdb_close = synthesize_hdb_close;
+    if (db)
+        *db = &null_db;
+
+    ret = (e = calloc(1, sizeof(*e))) ? 0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        e->flags.client = 1;
+        e->flags.immutable = 1;
+        e->flags.virtual = 1;
+        e->flags.synthetic = 1;
+        e->flags.do_not_store = 1;
+        e->kvno = 1;
+        e->keys.len = 0;
+        e->keys.val = NULL;
+        e->created_by.time = time(NULL);
+        e->modified_by = NULL;
+        e->valid_start = NULL;
+        e->valid_end = NULL;
+        e->pw_end = NULL;
+        e->etypes = NULL;
+        e->generation = NULL;
+        e->extensions = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ret == 0)
+        ret = (e->max_renew = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_renew))) ?
+            0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+    if (ret == 0)
+        ret = (e->max_life = calloc(1, sizeof(*e->max_life))) ?
+            0 : krb5_enomem(context);
+    if (ret == 0)
+        ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->principal);
+    if (ret == 0)
+        ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, princ, &e->created_by.principal);
+    if (ret == 0) {
+        /*
+         * We can't check OCSP in the TGS path, so we can't let tickets for
+         * synthetic principals live very long.
+         */
+        *(e->max_renew) = config->synthetic_clients_max_renew;
+        *(e->max_life) = config->synthetic_clients_max_life;
+        *h = e;
+    } else if (e) {
+        hdb_free_entry(context, &null_db, e);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+KDC_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KDC_LIB_CALL
+_kdc_db_fetch(krb5_context context,
+	      krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+	      krb5_const_principal principal,
+	      unsigned flags,
+	      krb5uint32 *kvno_ptr,
+	      HDB **db,
+	      hdb_entry **h)
+{
+    hdb_entry *ent = NULL;
+    krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+    int i;
+    unsigned kvno = 0;
+    krb5_principal enterprise_principal = NULL;
+    krb5_const_principal princ;
+
+    *h = NULL;
+    if (db)
+        *db = NULL;
+
+    if (!name_type_ok(context, config, principal))
+        return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+
+    flags |= HDB_F_DECRYPT;
+    if (kvno_ptr != NULL && *kvno_ptr != 0) {
+	kvno = *kvno_ptr;
+	flags |= HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED;
+    } else {
+	flags |= HDB_F_ALL_KVNOS;
+    }
+
+    ent = calloc(1, sizeof (*ent));
+    if (ent == NULL)
+        return krb5_enomem(context);
+
+    if (principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
+        if (principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
+            ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
+            krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+                                   "malformed request: "
+                                   "enterprise name with %d name components",
+                                   principal->name.name_string.len);
+            goto out;
+        }
+        ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal->name.name_string.val[0],
+                              &enterprise_principal);
+        if (ret)
+            goto out;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < config->num_db; i++) {
+	HDB *curdb = config->db[i];
+
+        if (db)
+            *db = curdb;
+
+	ret = curdb->hdb_open(context, curdb, O_RDONLY, 0);
+	if (ret) {
+	    const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
+	    kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to open database: %s", msg);
+	    krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+        princ = principal;
+        if (!(curdb->hdb_capability_flags & HDB_CAP_F_HANDLE_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) && enterprise_principal)
+            princ = enterprise_principal;
+
+        ret = hdb_fetch_kvno(context, curdb, princ, flags, 0, 0, kvno, ent);
+	curdb->hdb_close(context, curdb);
+
+        if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
+            continue; /* Check the other databases */
+
+        /*
+         * This is really important, because errors like
+         * HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE (used to indicate to Samba that
+         * the RODC on which this code is running does not have
+         * the key we need, and so a proxy to the KDC is required)
+         * have specific meaning, and need to be propogated up.
+         */
+        break;
+    }
+
+    switch (ret) {
+    case HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM:
+    case 0:
+        /*
+         * the ent->entry.principal just contains hints for the client
+         * to retry. This is important for enterprise principal routing
+         * between trusts.
+         */
+        *h = ent;
+        ent = NULL;
+        break;
+
+    case HDB_ERR_NOENTRY:
+        if (db)
+            *db = NULL;
+        if ((flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) && (flags & HDB_F_SYNTHETIC_OK) &&
+            config->synthetic_clients) {
+            ret = synthesize_client(context, config, principal, db, h);
+            if (ret) {
+                krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "could not synthesize "
+                                       "HDB client principal entry");
+                ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
+                krb5_prepend_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
+            }
+        } else {
+            krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "no such entry found in hdb");
+        }
+        break;
+
+    default:
+        if (db)
+            *db = NULL;
+        break;
+    }
+
+out:
+    krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_principal);
+    free(ent);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+KDC_LIB_FUNCTION void KDC_LIB_CALL
+_kdc_free_ent(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent)
+{
+    hdb_free_entry (context, db, ent);
+    free (ent);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the order list of preferred encryption types and sort the
+ * available keys and return the most preferred key.
+ */
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_get_preferred_key(krb5_context context,
+		       krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
+		       hdb_entry *h,
+		       const char *name,
+		       krb5_enctype *enctype,
+		       Key **key)
+{
+    krb5_error_code ret;
+    int i;
+
+    if (config->use_strongest_server_key) {
+	const krb5_enctype *p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
+
+	for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
+	    if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
+		!_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, p[i]))
+		continue;
+	    ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL, p[i], key);
+	    if (ret != 0)
+		continue;
+	    if (enctype != NULL)
+		*enctype = p[i];
+	    return 0;
+	}
+    } else {
+	*key = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < h->keys.len; i++) {
+	    if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype) != 0 &&
+		!_kdc_is_weak_exception(h->principal, h->keys.val[i].key.keytype))
+		continue;
+	    ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, h, NULL,
+				  h->keys.val[i].key.keytype, key);
+	    if (ret != 0)
+		continue;
+	    if (enctype != NULL)
+		*enctype = (*key)->key.keytype;
+	    return 0;
+	}
+    }
+
+    krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP,
+			   "No valid kerberos key found for %s", name);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_verify_checksum(krb5_context context,
+		     krb5_crypto crypto,
+		     krb5_key_usage usage,
+		     const krb5_data *data,
+		     Checksum *cksum)
+{
+    krb5_error_code ret;
+
+    ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, usage,
+			       data->data, data->length,
+			       cksum);
+    if (ret == KRB5_PROG_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP)
+	ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP;
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns TRUE if a PAC should be included in ticket authorization data.
+ *
+ * Per [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.3, PACs are always included for TGTs; for service
+ * tickets, policy is governed by whether the client explicitly requested
+ * a PAC be omitted when requesting a TGT, or if the no-auth-data-reqd
+ * flag is set on the service principal entry.
+ *
+ * However, when issuing a cross-realm TGT to an AD realm our PAC might not
+ * interoperate correctly.  Therefore we honor the no-auth-data-reqd HDB entry
+ * flag on cross-realm TGTs.
+ */
+
+krb5_boolean
+_kdc_include_pac_p(astgs_request_t r)
+{
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Notify the HDB backend and KDC plugin of the audited event.
+ */
+
+krb5_error_code
+_kdc_audit_request(astgs_request_t r)
+{
+    krb5_error_code ret;
+    struct HDB *hdb;
+
+    ret = _kdc_plugin_audit(r);
+    if (ret == 0 &&
+	(hdb = r->clientdb ? r->clientdb : r->config->db[0]) &&
+	hdb->hdb_audit)
+	ret = hdb->hdb_audit(r->context, hdb, r->client, (hdb_request_t)r);
+
+    return ret;
+}