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-rw-r--r--third_party/heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa-ltm.c637
1 files changed, 637 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/third_party/heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa-ltm.c b/third_party/heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa-ltm.c
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/third_party/heimdal/lib/hcrypto/rsa-ltm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,637 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 - 2007, 2010 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <roken.h>
+#include <krb5-types.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <rsa.h>
+
+#include "tommath.h"
+
+#define CHECK(f) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY && ((ret = f)) != MP_OKAY) { goto out; } } while (0)
+#define FIRST(e) do { ret = (e); } while (0)
+#define FIRST_ALLOC(e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__; ret = ((e)) ? MP_OKAY : MP_MEM; } while (0)
+#define THEN_MP(e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = (e); } while (0)
+#define THEN_IF_MP(cond, e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY && (cond)) ret = (e); } while (0)
+#define THEN_IF_VOID(cond, e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY && (cond)) e; } while (0)
+#define THEN_VOID(e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY) e; } while (0)
+#define THEN_ALLOC(e) \
+ do { where = __LINE__ + 1; if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = ((e)) ? MP_OKAY : MP_MEM; } while (0)
+
+static mp_err
+random_num(mp_int *num, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ mp_err ret = MP_MEM;
+
+ len = (len + 7) / 8; /* bits to bytes */
+ if ((p = malloc(len)) && RAND_bytes(p, len) != 1)
+ ret = MP_ERR;
+ if (p)
+ ret = mp_from_ubin(num, p, len);
+ free(p);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static mp_err
+BN2mpz(mp_int *s, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ mp_err ret = MP_MEM;
+ void *p;
+
+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
+ p = malloc(len);
+ if (p) {
+ BN_bn2bin(bn, p);
+ ret = mp_from_ubin(s, p, len);
+ }
+ free(p);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static mp_err
+setup_blind(mp_int *n, mp_int *b, mp_int *bi)
+{
+ mp_err ret;
+
+ ret = random_num(b, mp_count_bits(n));
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_mod(b, n, b);
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_invmod(b, n, bi);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static mp_err
+blind(mp_int *in, mp_int *b, mp_int *e, mp_int *n)
+{
+ mp_err ret;
+ mp_int t1;
+
+ ret = mp_init(&t1);
+ /* in' = (in * b^e) mod n */
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_exptmod(b, e, n, &t1);
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_mul(&t1, in, in);
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_mod(in, n, in);
+ mp_clear(&t1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static mp_err
+unblind(mp_int *out, mp_int *bi, mp_int *n)
+{
+ mp_err ret;
+
+ /* out' = (out * 1/b) mod n */
+ ret = mp_mul(out, bi, out);
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) ret = mp_mod(out, n, out);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static mp_err
+ltm_rsa_private_calculate(mp_int * in, mp_int * p, mp_int * q,
+ mp_int * dmp1, mp_int * dmq1, mp_int * iqmp,
+ mp_int * out)
+{
+ mp_err ret;
+ mp_int vp, vq, u;
+ int where HEIMDAL_UNUSED_ATTRIBUTE = 0;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&vp, &vq, &u, NULL));
+
+ /* vq = c ^ (d mod (q - 1)) mod q */
+ /* vp = c ^ (d mod (p - 1)) mod p */
+ THEN_MP(mp_mod(in, p, &u));
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&u, dmp1, p, &vp));
+ THEN_MP(mp_mod(in, q, &u));
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&u, dmq1, q, &vq));
+
+ /* C2 = 1/q mod p (iqmp) */
+ /* u = (vp - vq)C2 mod p. */
+ THEN_MP(mp_sub(&vp, &vq, &u));
+ THEN_IF_MP(mp_isneg(&u), mp_add(&u, p, &u));
+ THEN_MP(mp_mul(&u, iqmp, &u));
+ THEN_MP(mp_mod(&u, p, &u));
+
+ /* c ^ d mod n = vq + u q */
+ THEN_MP(mp_mul(&u, q, &u));
+ THEN_MP(mp_add(&u, &vq, out));
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&vp, &vq, &u, NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from,
+ unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = NULL, *p0 = NULL;
+ size_t size, ssize = 0, padlen;
+ mp_int enc, dec, n, e;
+ mp_err ret;
+ int where = __LINE__;
+
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&n, &e, &enc, &dec, NULL));
+
+ size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ THEN_IF_MP((size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE ||
+ size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE < flen),
+ MP_ERR);
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e));
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_cmp_d(&e, 3) == MP_LT), MP_ERR);
+ THEN_ALLOC((p = p0 = malloc(size - 1)));
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ padlen = size - flen - 3;
+ *p++ = 2;
+ }
+ THEN_IF_MP((RAND_bytes(p, padlen) != 1), MP_ERR);
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ while (padlen) {
+ if (*p == 0)
+ *p = 1;
+ padlen--;
+ p++;
+ }
+ *p++ = 0;
+ memcpy(p, from, flen);
+ p += flen;
+ assert((p - p0) == size - 1);
+ }
+
+ THEN_MP(mp_from_ubin(&dec, p0, size - 1));
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&dec, &e, &n, &enc));
+ THEN_VOID(ssize = mp_ubin_size(&enc));
+ THEN_VOID(assert(size >= ssize));
+ THEN_MP(mp_to_ubin(&enc, to, SIZE_MAX, NULL));
+ THEN_VOID(size = ssize);
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&dec, &e, &n, NULL);
+ mp_clear(&enc);
+ free(p0);
+ return ret == MP_OKAY ? size : -where;
+}
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from,
+ unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ mp_err ret;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ mp_int s, us, n, e;
+ int where = __LINE__;
+
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (flen > RSA_size(rsa))
+ return -2;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&e, &n, &s, &us, NULL));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e));
+ THEN_MP((mp_cmp_d(&e, 3) == MP_LT) ? MP_ERR : MP_OKAY);
+ THEN_MP(mp_from_ubin(&s, rk_UNCONST(from), (size_t)flen));
+ THEN_MP((mp_cmp(&s, &n) >= 0) ? MP_ERR : MP_OKAY);
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&s, &e, &n, &us));
+
+ THEN_VOID(p = to);
+ THEN_VOID(size = mp_ubin_size(&us));
+ THEN_VOID(assert(size <= RSA_size(rsa)));
+ THEN_MP(mp_to_ubin(&us, p, SIZE_MAX, NULL));
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&e, &n, &s, NULL);
+ mp_clear(&us);
+
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY || size == 0)
+ return -where;
+
+ /* head zero was skipped by mp_to_unsigned_bin */
+ if (*p == 0)
+ return -where;
+ if (*p != 1)
+ return -(where + 1);
+ size--; p++;
+ while (size && *p == 0xff) {
+ size--; p++;
+ }
+ if (size == 0 || *p != 0)
+ return -(where + 2);
+ size--; p++;
+ memmove(to, p, size);
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from,
+ unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+ unsigned char *ptr = NULL, *ptr0 = NULL;
+ mp_err ret;
+ mp_int in, out, n, e;
+ mp_int bi, b;
+ size_t size;
+ int blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
+ int do_unblind = 0;
+ int where = __LINE__;
+
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&e, &n, &in, &out, &b, &bi, NULL));
+
+ size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (size < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE || size - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE < flen)
+ return -2;
+
+ THEN_ALLOC((ptr0 = ptr = malloc(size)));
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ *ptr++ = 0;
+ *ptr++ = 1;
+ memset(ptr, 0xff, size - flen - 3);
+ ptr += size - flen - 3;
+ *ptr++ = 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, from, flen);
+ ptr += flen;
+ assert((ptr - ptr0) == size);
+ }
+
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e));
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_cmp_d(&e, 3) == MP_LT), MP_ERR);
+ THEN_MP(mp_from_ubin(&in, ptr0, size));
+ free(ptr0);
+
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_isneg(&in) || mp_cmp(&in, &n) >= 0), MP_ERR);
+
+ if (blinding) {
+ THEN_MP(setup_blind(&n, &b, &bi));
+ THEN_MP(blind(&in, &b, &e, &n));
+ do_unblind = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY && rsa->p && rsa->q && rsa->dmp1 && rsa->dmq1 &&
+ rsa->iqmp) {
+ mp_int p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, NULL));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&p, rsa->p));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&q, rsa->q));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp));
+ THEN_MP(ltm_rsa_private_calculate(&in, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp,
+ &out));
+ mp_clear_multi(&p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, NULL);
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY) goto out;
+ } else if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ mp_int d;
+
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&d, rsa->d));
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&in, &d, &n, &out));
+ mp_clear(&d);
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY) goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (do_unblind)
+ THEN_MP(unblind(&out, &bi, &n));
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY && size > 0) {
+ size_t ssize;
+
+ ssize = mp_ubin_size(&out);
+ assert(size >= ssize);
+ THEN_MP(mp_to_ubin(&out, to, SIZE_MAX, NULL));
+ size = ssize;
+ }
+
+ out:
+ mp_clear_multi(&e, &n, &in, &out, &b, &bi, NULL);
+ return ret == MP_OKAY ? size : -where;
+}
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char* from,
+ unsigned char* to, RSA* rsa, int padding)
+{
+ unsigned char *ptr;
+ size_t size;
+ mp_err ret;
+ mp_int in, out, n, e, b, bi;
+ int blinding = (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING) == 0;
+ int do_unblind = 0;
+ int where = __LINE__;
+
+ if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+
+ size = RSA_size(rsa);
+ if (flen > size)
+ return -2;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&in, &n, &e, &out, &b, &bi, NULL));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&n, rsa->n));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&e, rsa->e));
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_cmp_d(&e, 3) == MP_LT), MP_ERR);
+ THEN_MP(mp_from_ubin(&in, rk_UNCONST(from), flen));
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_isneg(&in) || mp_cmp(&in, &n) >= 0), MP_ERR);
+
+ if (blinding) {
+ THEN_MP(setup_blind(&n, &b, &bi));
+ THEN_MP(blind(&in, &b, &e, &n));
+ do_unblind = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY && rsa->p && rsa->q && rsa->dmp1 && rsa->dmq1 &&
+ rsa->iqmp) {
+ mp_int p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp;
+
+ THEN_MP(mp_init_multi(&p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, NULL));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&p, rsa->p));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&q, rsa->q));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&iqmp, rsa->iqmp));
+ THEN_MP(ltm_rsa_private_calculate(&in, &p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, &out));
+ mp_clear_multi(&p, &q, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp, NULL);
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY) goto out;
+ } else if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ mp_int d;
+
+ THEN_IF_MP((mp_isneg(&in) || mp_cmp(&in, &n) >= 0), MP_ERR);
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&d, rsa->d));
+ THEN_MP(mp_exptmod(&in, &d, &n, &out));
+ mp_clear(&d);
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY) goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (do_unblind)
+ THEN_MP(unblind(&out, &bi, &n));
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ size_t ssize;
+
+ ptr = to;
+ ssize = mp_ubin_size(&out);
+ assert(size >= ssize);
+ ret = mp_to_ubin(&out, ptr, SIZE_MAX, NULL);
+ if (ret != MP_OKAY) goto out;
+ size = ssize;
+
+ /* head zero was skipped by mp_int_to_unsigned */
+ if (*ptr != 2) {
+ where = __LINE__;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ size--; ptr++;
+ while (size && *ptr != 0) {
+ size--; ptr++;
+ }
+ if (size == 0) {
+ where = __LINE__;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ size--; ptr++;
+ memmove(to, ptr, size);
+ }
+
+ out:
+ mp_clear_multi(&e, &n, &in, &out, &b, &bi, NULL);
+ return (ret == MP_OKAY) ? size : -where;
+}
+
+static BIGNUM *
+mpz2BN(mp_int *s)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ BIGNUM *bn;
+ mp_err ret;
+ void *p;
+
+ size = mp_ubin_size(s);
+ if (size == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ p = malloc(size);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = mp_to_ubin(s, p, SIZE_MAX, NULL);
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY)
+ bn = BN_bin2bn(p, size, NULL);
+ free(p);
+ return (ret == MP_OKAY) ? bn : NULL;
+}
+
+enum gen_pq_type { GEN_P, GEN_Q };
+
+static int
+gen_p(int bits, enum gen_pq_type pq_type, uint8_t nibble_pair, mp_int *p, mp_int *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ mp_bool res;
+ mp_err ret = MP_MEM;
+ mp_int t1, t2;
+ size_t len = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ int trials = mp_prime_rabin_miller_trials(bits);
+ int counter = 0;
+ int where HEIMDAL_UNUSED_ATTRIBUTE = 0;
+
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&t1, &t2, NULL));
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY && (buf = malloc(len))) do {
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, counter++);
+ /* random bytes */
+ ret = (RAND_bytes(buf, len) == 1) ? MP_OKAY : MP_ERR;
+
+ /* make it odd */
+ buf[len - 1] |= 1;
+
+ /* ensure the high nibble of the product is at least 128 */
+ if (pq_type == GEN_P)
+ buf[0] = (nibble_pair & 0xf0) | (buf[0] & 0x0f);
+ else
+ buf[0] = ((nibble_pair & 0x0f) << 4) | (buf[0] & 0x0f);
+
+ /* load number */
+ THEN_MP(mp_from_ubin(p, buf, len));
+
+ /* test primality; repeat if not */
+ THEN_MP(mp_prime_is_prime(p, trials, &res));
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY && res == MP_NO) continue;
+
+ /* check gcd(p - 1, e) == 1 */
+ THEN_MP(mp_sub_d(p, 1, &t1));
+ THEN_MP(mp_gcd(&t1, e, &t2));
+ } while (ret == MP_OKAY && mp_cmp_d(&t2, 1) != MP_EQ);
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&t1, &t2, NULL);
+ free(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static uint8_t pq_high_nibble_pairs[] = {
+0x9f, 0xad, 0xae, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0xcb, 0xcc, 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf,
+0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xea, 0xeb, 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf9,
+0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff
+};
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_generate_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
+{
+ mp_int el, p, q, n, d, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp, t1, t2, t3;
+ mp_err ret;
+ uint8_t high_nibbles = 0;
+ int bitsp;
+ int where = __LINE__;
+
+ if (bits < 789)
+ return -1;
+
+ bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
+
+ FIRST(mp_init_multi(&el, &p, &q, &n, &d,
+ &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp,
+ &t1, &t2, &t3, NULL));
+ THEN_MP(BN2mpz(&el, e));
+
+ /*
+ * randomly pick a pair of high nibbles for p and q to ensure the product's
+ * high nibble is at least 128
+ */
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY)
+ ret = (RAND_bytes(&high_nibbles, 1) == 1) ? MP_OKAY : MP_ERR;
+ high_nibbles %= sizeof(pq_high_nibble_pairs);
+ high_nibbles = pq_high_nibble_pairs[high_nibbles];
+
+ /* generate p and q so that p != q and bits(pq) ~ bits */
+ THEN_MP(gen_p(bitsp, GEN_P, high_nibbles, &p, &el, cb));
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0);
+ THEN_MP(gen_p(bitsp, GEN_Q, high_nibbles, &q, &el, cb));
+
+ /* make p > q */
+ if (mp_cmp(&p, &q) < 0) {
+ mp_int c;
+ c = p;
+ p = q;
+ q = c;
+ }
+
+ BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1);
+
+ /* calculate n, n = p * q */
+ THEN_MP(mp_mul(&p, &q, &n));
+
+ /* calculate d, d = 1/e mod (p - 1)(q - 1) */
+ THEN_MP(mp_sub_d(&p, 1, &t1));
+ THEN_MP(mp_sub_d(&q, 1, &t2));
+ THEN_MP(mp_mul(&t1, &t2, &t3));
+ THEN_MP(mp_invmod(&el, &t3, &d));
+
+ /* calculate dmp1 dmp1 = d mod (p-1) */
+ THEN_MP(mp_mod(&d, &t1, &dmp1));
+ /* calculate dmq1 dmq1 = d mod (q-1) */
+ THEN_MP(mp_mod(&d, &t2, &dmq1));
+ /* calculate iqmp iqmp = 1/q mod p */
+ THEN_MP(mp_invmod(&q, &p, &iqmp));
+
+ /* fill in RSA key */
+
+ if (ret == MP_OKAY) {
+ rsa->e = mpz2BN(&el);
+ rsa->p = mpz2BN(&p);
+ rsa->q = mpz2BN(&q);
+ rsa->n = mpz2BN(&n);
+ rsa->d = mpz2BN(&d);
+ rsa->dmp1 = mpz2BN(&dmp1);
+ rsa->dmq1 = mpz2BN(&dmq1);
+ rsa->iqmp = mpz2BN(&iqmp);
+ }
+
+ mp_clear_multi(&el, &p, &q, &n, &d,
+ &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp,
+ &t1, &t2, &t3, NULL);
+ return (ret == MP_OKAY) ? 1 : -where;
+}
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_init(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ltm_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const RSA_METHOD hc_rsa_ltm_method = {
+ "hcrypto ltm RSA",
+ ltm_rsa_public_encrypt,
+ ltm_rsa_public_decrypt,
+ ltm_rsa_private_encrypt,
+ ltm_rsa_private_decrypt,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ ltm_rsa_init,
+ ltm_rsa_finish,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ ltm_rsa_generate_key
+};
+
+const RSA_METHOD *
+RSA_ltm_method(void)
+{
+ return &hc_rsa_ltm_method;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-06-20 15:22:00 +0000