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|
/*
Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
PAC Glue between Samba and the KDC
Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
#include "sdb.h"
#include "sdb_hdb.h"
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/auth.h"
#include <krb5_locl.h>
#include "lib/replace/system/filesys.h"
#undef DBGC_CLASS
#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_KERBEROS
static bool samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(astgs_request_t r)
{
const KDC_REQ *req = kdc_request_get_req(r);
const PA_DATA *pa_for_user = NULL;
if (req->msg_type != krb_tgs_req) {
return false;
}
if (req->padata != NULL) {
int idx = 0;
pa_for_user = krb5_find_padata(req->padata->val,
req->padata->len,
KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER,
&idx);
}
if (pa_for_user != NULL) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Given the right private pointer from hdb_samba4,
* get a PAC from the attached ldb messages.
*
* For PKINIT we also get pk_reply_key and can add PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO.
*/
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_get_pac(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server,
const krb5_keyblock *pk_reply_key,
uint64_t pac_attributes,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
DATA_BLOB *logon_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *cred_ndr = NULL;
DATA_BLOB **cred_ndr_ptr = NULL;
DATA_BLOB _cred_blob = data_blob_null;
DATA_BLOB *cred_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *upn_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *pac_attrs_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *requester_sid_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB client_claims_blob = {};
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(client->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
const struct samba_kdc_entry *server_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(server->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
bool is_krbtgt = krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context, server->principal);
enum auth_group_inclusion group_inclusion;
bool is_s4u2self = samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(r);
enum samba_asserted_identity asserted_identity =
(is_s4u2self) ?
SAMBA_ASSERTED_IDENTITY_SERVICE :
SAMBA_ASSERTED_IDENTITY_AUTHENTICATION_AUTHORITY;
struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL;
NTSTATUS reply_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
const struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc_const = NULL;
struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc_shallow_copy = NULL;
struct auth_claims auth_claims = {};
/* Only include resource groups in a service ticket. */
if (is_krbtgt) {
group_inclusion = AUTH_EXCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS;
} else if (server_entry->supported_enctypes & KERB_ENCTYPE_RESOURCE_SID_COMPRESSION_DISABLED) {
group_inclusion = AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS;
} else {
group_inclusion = AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS_COMPRESSED;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(client->context, 0, "samba_wdc_get_pac context");
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (pk_reply_key != NULL) {
cred_ndr_ptr = &cred_ndr;
}
ret = samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(mem_ctx,
server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
skdc_entry,
skdc_entry->msg,
&user_info_dc_const);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Make a shallow copy of the user_info_dc structure. */
nt_status = authsam_shallow_copy_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
user_info_dc_const,
&user_info_dc_shallow_copy);
user_info_dc_const = NULL;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to allocate user_info_dc SIDs: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
nt_status = samba_kdc_add_asserted_identity(asserted_identity,
user_info_dc_shallow_copy);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to add asserted identity: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
nt_status = samba_kdc_add_claims_valid(user_info_dc_shallow_copy);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DBG_ERR("Failed to add Claims Valid: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status));
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
ret = samba_kdc_get_claims_data_from_db(server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
skdc_entry,
&auth_claims.user_claims);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
nt_status = claims_data_encoded_claims_set(mem_ctx,
auth_claims.user_claims,
&client_claims_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
/*
* For an S4U2Self request, the authentication policy is not enforced.
*/
if (!is_s4u2self && authn_policy_restrictions_present(server_entry->server_policy)) {
const hdb_entry *device = kdc_request_get_armor_client(r);
const struct auth_user_info_dc *device_info = NULL;
if (device != NULL) {
const hdb_entry *device_krbtgt = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry *device_skdc_entry = NULL;
const struct samba_kdc_entry *device_krbtgt_skdc_entry = NULL;
const krb5_const_pac device_pac = kdc_request_get_armor_pac(r);
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac device_pac_entry = {};
device_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(device->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
device_krbtgt = kdc_request_get_armor_server(r);
if (device_krbtgt != NULL) {
device_krbtgt_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(device_krbtgt->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
}
device_pac_entry = samba_kdc_entry_pac(device_pac,
device_skdc_entry,
samba_kdc_entry_is_trust(device_krbtgt_skdc_entry));
ret = samba_kdc_get_user_info_dc(mem_ctx,
context,
server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
device_pac_entry,
&device_info,
NULL /* resource_groups_out */);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = samba_kdc_get_claims_data(mem_ctx,
context,
server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
device_pac_entry,
&auth_claims.device_claims);
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
ret = samba_kdc_allowed_to_authenticate_to(mem_ctx,
server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
server_entry->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx,
skdc_entry,
user_info_dc_shallow_copy,
device_info,
auth_claims,
server_entry,
&server_audit_info,
&reply_status);
if (server_audit_info != NULL) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_steal_server_audit_info(r, server_audit_info);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(reply_status)) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus(r, reply_status, ret);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
if (ret) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
}
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_logon_info_blob(mem_ctx,
user_info_dc_shallow_copy,
group_inclusion,
&logon_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
if (cred_ndr_ptr != NULL) {
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_cred_ndr_blob(mem_ctx,
skdc_entry,
cred_ndr_ptr);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
}
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_upn_info_blob(mem_ctx,
user_info_dc_shallow_copy,
&upn_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
if (is_krbtgt) {
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_pac_attrs_blob(mem_ctx,
pac_attributes,
&pac_attrs_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
nt_status = samba_kdc_get_requester_sid_blob(mem_ctx,
user_info_dc_shallow_copy,
&requester_sid_blob);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status);
}
}
if (pk_reply_key != NULL && cred_ndr != NULL) {
ret = samba_kdc_encrypt_pac_credentials(context,
pk_reply_key,
cred_ndr,
mem_ctx,
&_cred_blob);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
cred_blob = &_cred_blob;
}
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
if (ret != 0) {
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
ret = samba_make_krb5_pac(context, logon_blob, cred_blob,
upn_blob, pac_attrs_blob,
requester_sid_blob, NULL,
&client_claims_blob, NULL, NULL,
*pac);
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_verify_pac2(astgs_request_t r,
const hdb_entry *delegated_proxy,
const hdb_entry *client,
const hdb_entry *krbtgt,
const krb5_pac pac,
krb5_cksumtype ctype)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
struct samba_kdc_entry *client_skdc_entry = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac client_pac_entry = {};
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
bool is_s4u2self = samba_wdc_is_s4u2self_req(r);
bool is_in_db = false;
bool is_trusted = false;
uint32_t flags = 0;
if (pac == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_wdc_verify_pac2 context");
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (client != NULL) {
client_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(client->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
}
/*
* If the krbtgt was generated by an RODC, and we are not that
* RODC, then we need to regenerate the PAC - we can't trust
* it, and confirm that the RODC was permitted to print this ticket
*
* Because of the samba_kdc_validate_pac_blob() step we can be
* sure that the record in 'client' matches the SID in the
* original PAC.
*/
ret = samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(krbtgt_skdc_entry, &is_in_db, &is_trusted);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
krb5_pac_set_trusted(pac, is_trusted);
client_pac_entry = samba_kdc_entry_pac(pac,
client_skdc_entry,
samba_kdc_entry_is_trust(krbtgt_skdc_entry));
if (is_s4u2self) {
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION;
}
if (delegated_proxy != NULL) {
krb5_enctype etype;
Key *key = NULL;
if (!is_in_db) {
/*
* The RODC-issued PAC was signed by a KDC entry that we
* don't have a key for. The server signature is not
* trustworthy, since it could have been created by the
* server we got the ticket from. We must not proceed as
* otherwise the ticket signature is unchecked.
*/
ret = HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
goto out;
}
/* Fetch the correct key depending on the checksum type. */
if (ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
} else {
ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
ctype,
&etype);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
}
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, krbtgt, NULL, etype, &key);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
/* Check the KDC, whole-PAC and ticket signatures. */
ret = krb5_pac_verify(context,
pac,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
&key->key);
if (ret != 0) {
DBG_WARNING("PAC KDC signature failed to verify\n");
goto out;
}
flags |= SAMBA_KDC_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION;
}
ret = samba_kdc_verify_pac(mem_ctx,
context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
flags,
client_pac_entry,
krbtgt_skdc_entry);
if (ret != 0) {
goto out;
}
out:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Re-sign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac(void *priv, astgs_request_t r,
krb5_const_principal _client_principal,
hdb_entry *delegated_proxy,
krb5_const_pac delegated_proxy_pac,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *server,
hdb_entry *krbtgt,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
struct samba_kdc_entry *delegated_proxy_skdc_entry = NULL;
krb5_const_principal delegated_proxy_principal = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac delegated_proxy_pac_entry = {};
struct samba_kdc_entry *client_skdc_entry = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac client_pac_entry = {};
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac device = {};
const struct samba_kdc_entry *server_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(server->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
const struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = NULL;
krb5_pac new_pac = NULL;
struct authn_audit_info *server_audit_info = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS reply_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint32_t flags = 0;
if (pac == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
mem_ctx = talloc_named(NULL, 0, "samba_wdc_reget_pac context");
if (mem_ctx == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
if (delegated_proxy != NULL) {
delegated_proxy_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(delegated_proxy->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
delegated_proxy_principal = delegated_proxy->principal;
}
delegated_proxy_pac_entry = samba_kdc_entry_pac(delegated_proxy_pac,
delegated_proxy_skdc_entry,
/* The S4U2Proxy
* evidence ticket could
* not have been signed
* or issued by a krbtgt
* trust account. */
false /* is_from_trust */);
if (client != NULL) {
client_skdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(client->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
}
device = samba_kdc_get_device_pac(r);
ret = krb5_pac_init(context, &new_pac);
if (ret != 0) {
new_pac = NULL;
goto out;
}
client_pac_entry = samba_kdc_entry_pac(*pac,
client_skdc_entry,
samba_kdc_entry_is_trust(krbtgt_skdc_entry));
ret = samba_kdc_update_pac(mem_ctx,
context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx,
flags,
client_pac_entry,
server->principal,
server_skdc_entry,
delegated_proxy_principal,
delegated_proxy_pac_entry,
device,
new_pac,
&server_audit_info,
&reply_status);
if (server_audit_info != NULL) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_steal_server_audit_info(r, server_audit_info);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(reply_status)) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus(r, reply_status, ret);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
if (ret != 0) {
krb5_pac_free(context, new_pac);
if (ret == ENOATTR) {
krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
*pac = NULL;
ret = 0;
}
goto out;
}
/* Replace the pac */
krb5_pac_free(context, *pac);
*pac = new_pac;
out:
talloc_free(mem_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Verify a PAC's SID and signatures */
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_verify_pac(void *priv, astgs_request_t r,
krb5_const_principal _client_principal,
hdb_entry *delegated_proxy,
hdb_entry *client,
hdb_entry *_server,
hdb_entry *krbtgt,
EncTicketPart *ticket,
krb5_pac pac)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
krb5_kdc_configuration *config = kdc_request_get_config((kdc_request_t)r);
struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->context,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_cksumtype ctype = CKSUMTYPE_NONE;
hdb_entry signing_krbtgt_hdb;
if (delegated_proxy) {
uint16_t pac_kdc_signature_rodc_id;
const unsigned int local_tgs_rodc_id = krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
const uint16_t header_ticket_rodc_id = krbtgt->kvno >> 16;
/*
* We're using delegated_proxy for the moment to indicate cases
* where the ticket was encrypted with the server key, and not a
* krbtgt key. This cannot be trusted, so we need to find a
* krbtgt key that signs the PAC in order to trust the ticket.
*
* The krbtgt passed in to this function refers to the krbtgt
* used to decrypt the ticket of the server requesting
* S4U2Proxy.
*
* When we implement service ticket renewal, we need to check
* the PAC, and this will need to be updated.
*/
ret = krb5_pac_get_kdc_checksum_info(context,
pac,
&ctype,
&pac_kdc_signature_rodc_id);
if (ret != 0) {
DBG_WARNING("Failed to get PAC checksum info\n");
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to check the KDC and ticket signatures, fetching the
* correct key based on the enctype.
*/
if (local_tgs_rodc_id != 0) {
/*
* If we are an RODC, and we are not the KDC that signed
* the evidence ticket, then we need to proxy the
* request.
*/
if (local_tgs_rodc_id != pac_kdc_signature_rodc_id) {
return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
}
} else {
/*
* If we are a DC, the ticket may have been signed by a
* different KDC than the one that issued the header
* ticket.
*/
if (pac_kdc_signature_rodc_id != header_ticket_rodc_id) {
struct sdb_entry signing_krbtgt_sdb;
/*
* Fetch our key from the database. To support
* key rollover, we're going to need to try
* multiple keys by trial and error. For now,
* krbtgt keys aren't assumed to change.
*/
ret = samba_kdc_fetch(context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx,
krbtgt->principal,
SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | SDB_F_RODC_NUMBER_SPECIFIED | SDB_F_CANON,
((uint32_t)pac_kdc_signature_rodc_id) << 16,
&signing_krbtgt_sdb);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = sdb_entry_to_hdb_entry(context,
&signing_krbtgt_sdb,
&signing_krbtgt_hdb);
sdb_entry_free(&signing_krbtgt_sdb);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/*
* Replace the krbtgt entry with our own entry
* for further processing.
*/
krbtgt = &signing_krbtgt_hdb;
}
}
} else if (!krbtgt_skdc_entry->is_trust) {
/*
* We expect to have received a TGT, so check that we haven't
* been given a kpasswd ticket instead. We don't need to do this
* check for an incoming trust, as they use a different secret
* and can't be confused with a normal TGT.
*/
struct timeval now = krb5_kdc_get_time();
/*
* Check if the ticket is in the last two minutes of its
* life.
*/
KerberosTime lifetime = rk_time_sub(ticket->endtime, now.tv_sec);
if (lifetime <= CHANGEPW_LIFETIME) {
/*
* This ticket has at most two minutes left to live. It
* may be a kpasswd ticket rather than a TGT, so don't
* accept it.
*/
kdc_audit_addreason((kdc_request_t)r,
"Ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED;
}
}
ret = samba_wdc_verify_pac2(r,
delegated_proxy,
client,
krbtgt,
pac,
ctype);
if (krbtgt == &signing_krbtgt_hdb) {
hdb_free_entry(context, config->db[0], &signing_krbtgt_hdb);
}
return ret;
}
static char *get_netbios_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, HostAddresses *addrs)
{
char *nb_name = NULL;
size_t len;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; addrs && i < addrs->len; i++) {
if (addrs->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
continue;
}
len = MIN(addrs->val[i].address.length, 15);
nb_name = talloc_strndup(mem_ctx,
addrs->val[i].address.data, len);
if (nb_name) {
break;
}
}
if ((nb_name == NULL) || (nb_name[0] == '\0')) {
return NULL;
}
/* Strip space padding */
for (len = strlen(nb_name) - 1;
(len > 0) && (nb_name[len] == ' ');
--len) {
nb_name[len] = '\0';
}
return nb_name;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_check_client_access(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
krb5_context context = kdc_request_get_context((kdc_request_t)r);
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = NULL;
const hdb_entry *client = NULL;
struct samba_kdc_entry *kdc_entry;
struct samba_kdc_entry_pac device = {};
struct authn_audit_info *client_audit_info = NULL;
bool password_change;
char *workstation;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
NTSTATUS check_device_status = NT_STATUS_OK;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
client = kdc_request_get_client(r);
tmp_ctx = talloc_named(client->context, 0, "samba_wdc_check_client_access");
if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
kdc_entry = talloc_get_type_abort(client->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
device = samba_kdc_get_device_pac(r);
ret = samba_kdc_check_device(tmp_ctx,
context,
kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
kdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx,
device,
kdc_entry->client_policy,
&client_audit_info,
&check_device_status);
if (client_audit_info != NULL) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_steal_client_audit_info(r, client_audit_info);
if (ret2) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
kdc_entry->reject_status = check_device_status;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(check_device_status)) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
/*
* Add the NTSTATUS to the request so we can return it in the
* ‘e-data’ field later.
*/
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus(r, check_device_status, ret);
if (ret2) {
ret = ret2;
}
}
if (ret) {
/*
* As we didn’t get far enough to check the server policy, only
* the client policy will be referenced in the authentication
* log message.
*/
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
workstation = get_netbios_name(tmp_ctx,
kdc_request_get_req(r)->req_body.addresses);
password_change = (kdc_request_get_server(r) && kdc_request_get_server(r)->flags.change_pw);
nt_status = samba_kdc_check_client_access(kdc_entry,
kdc_request_get_cname((kdc_request_t)r),
workstation,
password_change);
kdc_entry->reject_status = nt_status;
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
krb5_error_code ret2;
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ENOMEM;
}
ret = samba_kdc_map_policy_err(nt_status);
/*
* Add the NTSTATUS to the request so we can return it in the
* ‘e-data’ field later.
*/
ret2 = hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus(r, nt_status, ret);
if (ret2) {
ret = ret2;
}
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* Now do the standard Heimdal check */
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
}
/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
* The caller is responsible for freeing it */
static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_build_supported_etypes(uint32_t supported_etypes,
krb5_data *e_data)
{
e_data->data = malloc(4);
if (e_data->data == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
e_data->length = 4;
PUSH_LE_U32(e_data->data, 0, supported_etypes);
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_finalize_reply(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *server_kdc_entry;
uint32_t supported_enctypes;
server_kdc_entry = talloc_get_type(kdc_request_get_server(r)->context, struct samba_kdc_entry);
/*
* If the canonicalize flag is set, add PA-SUPPORTED-ENCTYPES padata
* type to indicate what encryption types the server supports.
*/
supported_enctypes = server_kdc_entry->supported_enctypes;
if (kdc_request_get_req(r)->req_body.kdc_options.canonicalize && supported_enctypes != 0) {
krb5_error_code ret;
PA_DATA md;
ret = samba_kdc_build_supported_etypes(supported_enctypes, &md.padata_value);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
md.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES;
ret = kdc_request_add_encrypted_padata(r, &md);
if (ret != 0) {
/*
* So we do not leak the allocated
* memory on md in the error case
*/
krb5_data_free(&md.padata_value);
}
}
return 0;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_plugin_init(krb5_context context, void **ptr)
{
*ptr = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void samba_wdc_plugin_fini(void *ptr)
{
return;
}
static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_referral_policy(void *priv,
astgs_request_t r)
{
return kdc_request_get_error_code((kdc_request_t)r);
}
struct krb5plugin_kdc_ftable kdc_plugin_table = {
.minor_version = KRB5_PLUGIN_KDC_VERSION_11,
.init = samba_wdc_plugin_init,
.fini = samba_wdc_plugin_fini,
.pac_verify = samba_wdc_verify_pac,
.pac_update = samba_wdc_reget_pac,
.client_access = samba_wdc_check_client_access,
.finalize_reply = samba_wdc_finalize_reply,
.pac_generate = samba_wdc_get_pac,
.referral_policy = samba_wdc_referral_policy,
};
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