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---
ms.assetid: 2a5d5271-6ac6-4c1b-b4ef-9b568932a55a
title: Active Directory domain-wide schema updates
description: Domain-wide schema updates performed by adprep /domainprep when promoting a Domain Controller
author: iainfoulds
ms.author: daveba
manager: daveba
ms.date: 10/29/2018
ms.topic: article
---
# Domain-wide schema updates

>Applies to: Windows Server 2022, Windows Server 2019, Windows Server

You can review the following set of changes to help understand and prepare for the schema updates that are performed by adprep /domainprep in Windows Server.

Beginning in Windows Server 2012, Adprep commands run automatically as needed during AD DS installation. They can also be run separately in advance of AD DS installation. For more information, see [Running Adprep.exe](/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd464018(v=ws.10)).

For more information about how to interpret the access control entry (ACE) strings, see [ACE strings](/windows/win32/secauthz/ace-strings). For more information about how to interpret the security ID (SID) strings, see [SID strings](/windows/win32/secauthz/sid-strings).

## Windows Server (Semi-Annual Channel): Domain-wide updates

After the operations that are performed by **domainprep** in Windows Server 2016 (operation 89) complete, the **revision** attribute for the CN=ActiveDirectoryUpdate,CN=DomainUpdates,CN=System,DC=ForestRootDomain object is set to **16**.

|Operations number and GUID|Description|Permissions|
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
|**Operation 89**: {A0C238BA-9E30-4EE6-80A6-43F731E9A5CD}|Delete the ACE granting Full Control to Enterprise Key Admins and add an ACE granting Enterprise Key Admins Full Control over just the msdsKeyCredentialLink attribute.|Delete (A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;Enterprise Key Admins) <br /> <br />Add (OA;CI;RPWP;5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063;;Enterprise Key Admins)|

## Windows Server 2016: Domain-wide updates

After the operations that are performed by **domainprep** in Windows Server 2016 (operations 82-88) complete, the **revision** attribute for the CN=ActiveDirectoryUpdate,CN=DomainUpdates,CN=System,DC=ForestRootDomain object is set to **15**.

|Operations number and GUID|Description|Attributes|Permissions|
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
|**Operation 82**: {83C53DA7-427E-47A4-A07A-A324598B88F7}|Create CN=Keys container at root of domain|- objectClass: container<br />- description: Default container for key credential objects<br />- ShowInAdvancedViewOnly: TRUE|(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;EA)<br />(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;DA)<br />(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;SY)<br />(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;DD)<br />(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;ED)|
|**Operation 83**: {C81FC9CC-0130-4FD1-B272-634D74818133}|Add Full Control allow aces to CN=Keys container for "domain\Key Admins" and "rootdomain\Enterprise Key Admins".|N/A|(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;Key Admins)<br />(A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;Enterprise Key Admins)|
|**Operation 84**: {E5F9E791-D96D-4FC9-93C9-D53E1DC439BA}|Modify otherWellKnownObjects attribute to point to the CN=Keys container.|- otherWellKnownObjects: B:32:683A24E2E8164BD3AF86AC3C2CF3F981:CN=Keys,%ws|N/A|
|**Operation 85**: {e6d5fd00-385d-4e65-b02d-9da3493ed850}|Modify the domain NC to permit "domain\Key Admins" and "rootdomain\Enterprise Key Admins" to modify the msds-KeyCredentialLink attribute. |N/A|(OA;CI;RPWP;5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063;;Key Admins)<br />(OA;CI;RPWP;5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063;;Enterprise Key Admins in root domain, but in non-root domains resulted in a bogus domain-relative ACE with a non-resolvable -527 SID)|
|**Operation 86**: {3a6b3fbf-3168-4312-a10d-dd5b3393952d}|Grant the DS-Validated-Write-Computer CAR to creator owner and self|N/A|(OA;CIIO;SW;9b026da6-0d3c-465c-8bee-5199d7165cba;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;PS)<br />(OA;CIIO;SW;9b026da6-0d3c-465c-8bee-5199d7165cba;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;CO)|
|**Operation 87**: {7F950403-0AB3-47F9-9730-5D7B0269F9BD}|Delete the ACE granting Full Control to the incorrect domain-relative Enterprise Key Admins group, and add an ACE granting Full Control to Enterprise Key Admins group. |N/A|Delete (A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;Enterprise Key Admins)<br /> <br />Add (A;CI;RPWPCRLCLOCCDCRCWDWOSDDTSW;;;Enterprise Key Admins)|
|**Operation 88**: {434bb40d-dbc9-4fe7-81d4-d57229f7b080}|Add "msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts" on the domain NC object and set default value to FALSE|N/A|N/A|

The Enterprise Key Admins and Key Admins groups are only created after a Windows Server 2016 Domain Controller is promoted and takes over the PDC Emulator FSMO role.

## Windows Server 2012 R2: Domain-wide updates

Although no operations are performed by **domainprep** in Windows Server 2012 R2, after the command completes, the **revision** attribute for the CN=ActiveDirectoryUpdate,CN=DomainUpdates,CN=System,DC=ForestRootDomain object is set to **10**.

## Windows Server 2012: Domain-wide updates

After the operations that are performed by **domainprep** in Windows Server 2012 (operations 78, 79, 80, and 81) complete, the **revision** attribute for the CN=ActiveDirectoryUpdate,CN=DomainUpdates,CN=System,DC=ForestRootDomain object is set to **9**.

|Operations number and GUID|Description|Attributes|Permissions|
|------------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
|**Operation 78**: {c3c927a6-cc1d-47c0-966b-be8f9b63d991}|Create a new object CN=TPM Devices in the Domain partition.|Object class: msTPM-InformationObjectsContainer|N/A|
|**Operation 79**: {54afcfb9-637a-4251-9f47-4d50e7021211}|Created an access control entry for the TPM service.|N/A|(OA;CIIO;WP;ea1b7b93-5e48-46d5-bc6c-4df4fda78a35;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;PS)|
|**Operation 80**: {f4728883-84dd-483c-9897-274f2ebcf11e}|Grant "Clone DC" extended right to **Cloneable Domain Controllers** group|N/A|(OA;;CR;3e0f7e18-2c7a-4c10-ba82-4d926db99a3e;;*domain SID*-522)|
|**Operation 81**: {ff4f9d27-7157-4cb0-80a9-5d6f2b14c8ff}|Grant ms-DS-Allowed-To-Act-On-Behalf-Of-Other-Identity to Principal Self on all objects.|N/A|(OA;CIOI;RPWP;3f78c3e5-f79a-46bd-a0b8-9d18116ddc79;;PS)|