Adding upstream version 1:4.13+dfsg1.upstream/1%4.13+dfsg1

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 211 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/pwauth.c b/lib/pwauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62de472
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/pwauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1992 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#ifndef USE_PAM
+#ident "$Id$"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "pwauth.h"
+#include "getdef.h"
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef __linux__		/* standard password prompt by default */
+static const char *PROMPT = gettext_noop ("Password: ");
+#else
+static const char *PROMPT = gettext_noop ("%s's Password: ");
+#endif
+
+bool wipe_clear_pass = true;
+/*@null@*/char *clear_pass = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * pw_auth - perform getpass/crypt authentication
+ *
+ *	pw_auth gets the user's cleartext password and encrypts it
+ *	using the salt in the encrypted password. The results are
+ *	compared.
+ */
+
+int pw_auth (const char *cipher,
+             const char *user,
+             int reason,
+             /*@null@*/const char *input)
+{
+	char prompt[1024];
+	char *clear = NULL;
+	const char *cp;
+	const char *encrypted;
+	int retval;
+
+#ifdef	SKEY
+	bool use_skey = false;
+	char challenge_info[40];
+	struct skey skey;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * There are programs for adding and deleting authentication data.
+	 */
+
+	if ((PW_ADD == reason) || (PW_DELETE == reason)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * There are even programs for changing the user name ...
+	 */
+
+	if ((PW_CHANGE == reason) && (NULL != input)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * WARNING:
+	 *
+	 * When we change a password and we are root, we don't prompt.
+	 * This is so root can change any password without having to
+	 * know it.  This is a policy decision that might have to be
+	 * revisited.
+	 */
+
+	if ((PW_CHANGE == reason) && (getuid () == 0)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * WARNING:
+	 *
+	 * When we are logging in a user with no ciphertext password,
+	 * we don't prompt for the password or anything.  In reality
+	 * the user could just hit <ENTER>, so it doesn't really
+	 * matter.
+	 */
+
+	if ((NULL == cipher) || ('\0' == *cipher)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#ifdef	SKEY
+	/*
+	 * If the user has an S/KEY entry show them the pertinent info
+	 * and then we can try validating the created ciphertext and the SKEY.
+	 * If there is no SKEY information we default to not using SKEY.
+	 */
+
+# ifdef SKEY_BSD_STYLE
+	/*
+	 * Some BSD updates to the S/KEY API adds a fourth parameter; the
+	 * sizeof of the challenge info buffer.
+	 */
+#  define skeychallenge(s,u,c) skeychallenge(s,u,c,sizeof(c))
+# endif
+
+	if (skeychallenge (&skey, user, challenge_info) == 0) {
+		use_skey = true;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Prompt for the password as required.  FTPD and REXECD both
+	 * get the cleartext password for us.
+	 */
+
+	if ((PW_FTP != reason) && (PW_REXEC != reason) && (NULL == input)) {
+		cp = getdef_str ("LOGIN_STRING");
+		if (NULL == cp) {
+			cp = _(PROMPT);
+		}
+#ifdef	SKEY
+		if (use_skey) {
+			printf ("[%s]\n", challenge_info);
+		}
+#endif
+
+		snprintf (prompt, sizeof prompt, cp, user);
+		clear = getpass (prompt);
+		if (NULL == clear) {
+			static char c[1];
+
+			c[0] = '\0';
+			clear = c;
+		}
+		input = clear;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Convert the cleartext password into a ciphertext string.
+	 * If the two match, the return value will be zero, which is
+	 * SUCCESS. Otherwise we see if SKEY is being used and check
+	 * the results there as well.
+	 */
+
+	encrypted = pw_encrypt (input, cipher);
+	if (NULL != encrypted) {
+		retval = strcmp (encrypted, cipher);
+	} else {
+		retval = -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef  SKEY
+	/*
+	 * If (1) The password fails to match, and
+	 * (2) The password is empty and
+	 * (3) We are using OPIE or S/Key, then
+	 * ...Re-prompt, with echo on.
+	 * -- AR 8/22/1999
+	 */
+	if ((0 != retval) && ('\0' == input[0]) && use_skey) {
+		clear = getpass (prompt);
+		if (NULL == clear) {
+			static char c[1];
+
+			c[0] = '\0';
+			clear = c;
+		}
+		input = clear;
+	}
+
+	if ((0 != retval) && use_skey) {
+		int passcheck = -1;
+
+		if (skeyverify (&skey, input) == 0) {
+			passcheck = skey.n;
+		}
+		if (passcheck > 0) {
+			retval = 0;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Things like RADIUS authentication may need the password -
+	 * if the external variable wipe_clear_pass is zero, we will
+	 * not wipe it (the caller should wipe clear_pass when it is
+	 * no longer needed).  --marekm
+	 */
+
+	clear_pass = clear;
+	if (wipe_clear_pass && (NULL != clear) && ('\0' != *clear)) {
+		strzero (clear);
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+#else				/* !USE_PAM */
+extern int errno;		/* warning: ANSI C forbids an empty source file */
+#endif				/* !USE_PAM */