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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
commit | 025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead (patch) | |
tree | fa6986b4690f991613ffb97cea1f6942427baf5d /plugins/sudoers/check.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | sudo-05ae7ad340f23eb918a40c175f781eff7823df3f.tar.xz sudo-05ae7ad340f23eb918a40c175f781eff7823df3f.zip |
Adding upstream version 1.9.15p5.upstream/1.9.15p5upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/sudoers/check.c')
-rw-r--r-- | plugins/sudoers/check.c | 325 |
1 files changed, 325 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/check.c b/plugins/sudoers/check.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4356dd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/plugins/sudoers/check.c @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC + * + * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2005, 2007-2018 + * Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. + */ + +/* + * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it. + * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <sys/types.h> /* for ssize_t */ +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <pwd.h> +#include <grp.h> + +#include <sudoers.h> +#include <timestamp.h> + +/* + * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as. + * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common + * case, this matches ctx->user.pw or ctx->runas.pw. + */ +static struct passwd * +get_authpw(struct sudoers_context *ctx, unsigned int mode) +{ + struct passwd *pw = NULL; + debug_decl(get_authpw, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH); + + if (ISSET(mode, (MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) { + /* In list mode we always prompt for the user's password. */ + sudo_pw_addref(ctx->user.pw); + pw = ctx->user.pw; + } else { + if (def_rootpw) { + if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(ROOT_UID)) == NULL) { + log_warningx(ctx, SLOG_SEND_MAIL, N_("unknown uid %u"), + ROOT_UID); + } + } else if (def_runaspw) { + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) { + log_warningx(ctx, SLOG_SEND_MAIL, + N_("unknown user %s"), def_runas_default); + } + } else if (def_targetpw) { + if (ctx->runas.pw->pw_name == NULL) { + /* This should never be NULL as we fake up the passwd struct */ + log_warningx(ctx, SLOG_RAW_MSG, N_("unknown uid %u"), + (unsigned int) ctx->runas.pw->pw_uid); + } else { + sudo_pw_addref(ctx->runas.pw); + pw = ctx->runas.pw; + } + } else { + sudo_pw_addref(ctx->user.pw); + pw = ctx->user.pw; + } + } + + debug_return_ptr(pw); +} + +/* + * Returns AUTH_SUCCESS if the user successfully authenticates, + * AUTH_FAILURE if not or AUTH_ERROR on error. + */ +int +check_user(struct sudoers_context *ctx, unsigned int validated, + unsigned int mode) +{ + struct getpass_closure closure = { 0 }; + struct sudo_conv_callback callback; + int status = TS_ERROR; + int ret = AUTH_ERROR; + bool exempt = false; + char *prompt; + debug_decl(check_user, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH); + + /* + * In intercept mode, only check the user if configured to do so. + * We already have a session so no need to init the auth subsystem. + */ + if (ISSET(ctx->mode, MODE_POLICY_INTERCEPTED)) { + if (!def_intercept_authenticate) { + debug_return_int(AUTH_SUCCESS); + } + } + + /* + * Init authentication system regardless of whether we need a password. + * Required for proper PAM session support. + */ + if ((closure.auth_pw = get_authpw(ctx, mode)) == NULL) + debug_return_int(AUTH_ERROR); + if (sudo_auth_init(ctx, closure.auth_pw, mode) != AUTH_SUCCESS) { + sudo_pw_delref(closure.auth_pw); + debug_return_int(AUTH_ERROR); + } + closure.ctx = ctx; + + /* + * Don't prompt for the root passwd or if the user is exempt. + * If the user is not changing uid/gid, no need for a password. + */ + if (!def_authenticate || user_is_exempt(ctx)) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "%s: %s", __func__, + !def_authenticate ? "authentication disabled" : + "user exempt from authentication"); + exempt = true; + ret = AUTH_SUCCESS; + goto done; + } + if (ctx->user.uid == 0 || (ctx->user.uid == ctx->runas.pw->pw_uid && + (ctx->runas.gr == NULL || + user_in_group(ctx->user.pw, ctx->runas.gr->gr_name)))) { +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (ctx->runas.role == NULL && ctx->runas.type == NULL) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR + if (ctx->runas.apparmor_profile == NULL) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_SET + if (ctx->runas.privs == NULL && ctx->runas.limitprivs == NULL) +#endif + { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, + "%s: user running command as self", __func__); + ret = AUTH_SUCCESS; + goto done; + } + } + + /* Construct callback for getpass function. */ + memset(&callback, 0, sizeof(callback)); + callback.version = SUDO_CONV_CALLBACK_VERSION; + callback.closure = &closure; + + /* Open, lock and read time stamp file if we are using it. */ + if (!ISSET(mode, MODE_IGNORE_TICKET)) { + /* Open time stamp file and check its status. */ + closure.cookie = timestamp_open(ctx); + if (closure.cookie != NULL) { + if (timestamp_lock(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw)) { + status = timestamp_status(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw); + } + } + } + + switch (status) { + case TS_FATAL: + /* Fatal error (usually setuid failure), unsafe to proceed. */ + goto done; + + case TS_CURRENT: + /* Time stamp file is valid and current. */ + if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER)) { + ret = AUTH_SUCCESS; + break; + } + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, + "%s: check user flag overrides time stamp", __func__); + FALLTHROUGH; + + default: + if (ISSET(mode, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE) && !def_noninteractive_auth) { + validated |= FLAG_NO_USER_INPUT; + log_auth_failure(ctx, validated, 0); + goto done; + } + + /* Expand any escapes in the prompt. */ + prompt = expand_prompt(ctx, + ctx->user.prompt ? ctx->user.prompt : def_passprompt, + closure.auth_pw->pw_name); + if (prompt == NULL) + goto done; + + ret = verify_user(ctx, closure.auth_pw, prompt, validated, &callback); + if (ret == AUTH_SUCCESS && closure.lectured) + (void)set_lectured(ctx); /* lecture error not fatal */ + free(prompt); + break; + } + +done: + if (ret == AUTH_SUCCESS) { + /* The approval function may disallow a user post-authentication. */ + ret = sudo_auth_approval(ctx, closure.auth_pw, validated, exempt); + + /* + * Only update time stamp if user validated and was approved. + * Failure to update the time stamp is not a fatal error. + */ + if (ret == AUTH_SUCCESS && ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS)) { + if (ISSET(mode, MODE_UPDATE_TICKET) && status != TS_ERROR) + (void)timestamp_update(closure.cookie, closure.auth_pw); + } + } + timestamp_close(closure.cookie); + sudo_auth_cleanup(ctx, closure.auth_pw, !ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_SUCCESS)); + sudo_pw_delref(closure.auth_pw); + + debug_return_int(ret); +} + +/* + * Display sudo lecture (standard or custom). + * Returns true if the user was lectured, else false. + */ +void +display_lecture(struct sudo_conv_callback *callback) +{ + struct getpass_closure *closure; + struct sudo_conv_message msg[2]; + struct sudo_conv_reply repl[2]; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + struct stat sb; + ssize_t nread; + int fd, msgcount = 1; + debug_decl(lecture, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH); + + if (callback == NULL || (closure = callback->closure) == NULL) + debug_return; + + if (closure->lectured) + debug_return; + + if (def_lecture == never || + (def_lecture == once && already_lectured(closure->ctx))) + debug_return; + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + memset(&repl, 0, sizeof(repl)); + + if (def_lecture_file) { + fd = open(def_lecture_file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK); + if (fd != -1 && fstat(fd, &sb) == 0) { + if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + (void) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK); + while ((nread = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) > 0) { + buf[nread] = '\0'; + msg[0].msg_type = SUDO_CONV_ERROR_MSG|SUDO_CONV_PREFER_TTY; + msg[0].msg = buf; + sudo_conv(1, msg, repl, NULL); + } + if (nread == 0) { + close(fd); + goto done; + } + log_warning(closure->ctx, SLOG_RAW_MSG, + N_("error reading lecture file %s"), def_lecture_file); + } else { + log_warningx(closure->ctx, SLOG_RAW_MSG, + N_("ignoring lecture file %s: not a regular file"), + def_lecture_file); + } + } else { + log_warning(closure->ctx, SLOG_RAW_MSG|SLOG_NO_STDERR, + N_("unable to open %s"), def_lecture_file); + } + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + } + + /* Default sudo lecture. */ + msg[0].msg_type = SUDO_CONV_ERROR_MSG|SUDO_CONV_PREFER_TTY; + msg[0].msg = _("\n" + "We trust you have received the usual lecture from the local System\n" + "Administrator. It usually boils down to these three things:\n\n" + " #1) Respect the privacy of others.\n" + " #2) Think before you type.\n" + " #3) With great power comes great responsibility.\n\n"); + if (!def_pwfeedback) { + msg[1].msg_type = SUDO_CONV_ERROR_MSG|SUDO_CONV_PREFER_TTY; + msg[1].msg = _("For security reasons, the password you type will not be visible.\n\n"); + msgcount++; + } + sudo_conv(msgcount, msg, repl, NULL); + +done: + closure->lectured = true; + debug_return; +} + +/* + * Checks if the user is exempt from supplying a password. + */ +bool +user_is_exempt(const struct sudoers_context *ctx) +{ + bool ret = false; + debug_decl(user_is_exempt, SUDOERS_DEBUG_AUTH); + + if (def_exempt_group) { + if (user_in_group(ctx->user.pw, def_exempt_group)) + ret = true; + } + debug_return_bool(ret); +} |