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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-15 13:14:46 +0000 |
commit | 025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead (patch) | |
tree | fa6986b4690f991613ffb97cea1f6942427baf5d /src/sudo_noexec.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | sudo-025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead.tar.xz sudo-025c439e829e0db9ac511cd9c1b8d5fd53475ead.zip |
Adding upstream version 1.9.15p5.upstream/1.9.15p5upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/sudo_noexec.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/sudo_noexec.c | 251 |
1 files changed, 251 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/sudo_noexec.c b/src/sudo_noexec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ba74d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/sudo_noexec.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* + * SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC + * + * Copyright (c) 2004-2005, 2010-2018 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it. + * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com + */ + +#include <config.h> + +#include <sys/types.h> + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) && HAVE_DECL_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER +# include <sys/prctl.h> +# include <asm/unistd.h> +# include <linux/filter.h> +# include <linux/seccomp.h> +#endif + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#ifdef HAVE_SPAWN_H +#include <spawn.h> +#endif +#include <string.h> +#ifdef HAVE_WORDEXP_H +#include <wordexp.h> +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SHL_LOAD) +# include <dl.h> +#elif defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) +# include <dlfcn.h> +#endif + +#include <sudo_compat.h> +#include <pathnames.h> + +#ifdef HAVE___INTERPOSE +/* + * Mac OS X 10.4 and above has support for library symbol interposition. + * There is a good explanation of this in the Mac OS X Internals book. + */ +typedef struct interpose_s { + void *new_func; + void *orig_func; +} interpose_t; + +# define FN_NAME(fn) fake_ ## fn +# define INTERPOSE(fn) \ + __attribute__((__used__)) static const interpose_t interpose_ ## fn \ + __attribute__((__section__("__DATA,__interpose"))) = \ + { (void *)fake_ ## fn, (void *)fn }; +#else +# define FN_NAME(fn) fn +# define INTERPOSE(fn) +#endif + +/* + * Replacements for the exec(3) family of syscalls. It is not enough to + * just replace execve(2) since many C libraries do not call the public + * execve(2) interface. Note that it is still possible to access the real + * syscalls via the syscall(2) interface, but that is rarely done. + */ + +#define EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +{ \ + errno = EACCES; \ + return -1; \ +} + +#define EXEC_REPL1(fn, t1) \ +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1); \ +int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1) \ +EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +INTERPOSE(fn) + +#define EXEC_REPL2(fn, t1, t2) \ +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2); \ +int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2) \ +EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +INTERPOSE(fn) + +#define EXEC_REPL3(fn, t1, t2, t3) \ +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3); \ +int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3) \ +EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +INTERPOSE(fn) + +#define EXEC_REPL6(fn, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6) \ +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3, t4 a4, t5 a5, t6 a6); \ +int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, t3 a3, t4 a4, t5 a5, t6 a6) \ +EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +INTERPOSE(fn) + +#define EXEC_REPL_VA(fn, t1, t2) \ +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, ...); \ +int FN_NAME(fn)(t1 a1, t2 a2, ...) \ +EXEC_REPL_BODY \ +INTERPOSE(fn) + +/* + * Standard exec(3) family of functions. + */ +EXEC_REPL_VA(execl, const char *, const char *) +EXEC_REPL_VA(execle, const char *, const char *) +EXEC_REPL_VA(execlp, const char *, const char *) +EXEC_REPL2(execv, const char *, char * const *) +EXEC_REPL2(execvp, const char *, char * const *) +EXEC_REPL3(execve, const char *, char * const *, char * const *) + +/* + * Non-standard exec(3) functions and corresponding private versions. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_EXECVP +EXEC_REPL3(execvP, const char *, const char *, char * const *) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_EXECVPE +EXEC_REPL3(execvpe, const char *, char * const *, char * const *) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_EXECT +EXEC_REPL3(exect, const char *, char * const *, char * const *) +#endif + +/* + * Not all systems support fexecve(2), posix_spawn(2) and posix_spawnp(2). + */ +#ifdef HAVE_FEXECVE +EXEC_REPL3(fexecve, int , char * const *, char * const *) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_POSIX_SPAWN +EXEC_REPL6(posix_spawn, pid_t *, const char *, const posix_spawn_file_actions_t *, const posix_spawnattr_t *, char * const *, char * const *) +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_POSIX_SPAWNP +EXEC_REPL6(posix_spawnp, pid_t *, const char *, const posix_spawn_file_actions_t *, const posix_spawnattr_t *, char * const *, char * const *) +#endif + +/* + * system(3) and popen(3). + * We can't use a wrapper for popen since it returns FILE *, not int. + */ +EXEC_REPL1(system, const char *) + +sudo_dso_public FILE *FN_NAME(popen)(const char *c, const char *t); +FILE *FN_NAME(popen)(const char *c, const char *t) +{ + errno = EACCES; + return NULL; +} +INTERPOSE(popen) + +#if defined(HAVE_WORDEXP) && (defined(RTLD_NEXT) || defined(HAVE_SHL_LOAD) || defined(HAVE___INTERPOSE)) +/* + * We can't use a wrapper for wordexp(3) since we still want to call + * the real wordexp(3) but with WRDE_NOCMD added to the flags argument. + */ +typedef int (*sudo_fn_wordexp_t)(const char *, wordexp_t *, int); + +sudo_dso_public int FN_NAME(wordexp)(const char *words, wordexp_t *we, int flags); +int FN_NAME(wordexp)(const char *words, wordexp_t *we, int flags) +{ +#if defined(HAVE___INTERPOSE) + return wordexp(words, we, flags | WRDE_NOCMD); +#else +# if defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) + void *fn = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "wordexp"); +# elif defined(HAVE_SHL_LOAD) + const char *name, *myname = _PATH_SUDO_NOEXEC; + struct shl_descriptor *desc; + void *fn = NULL; + int idx = 0; + + /* Search for wordexp() but skip this shared object. */ + myname = sudo_basename(myname); + while (shl_get(idx++, &desc) == 0) { + name = sudo_basename(desc->filename); + if (strcmp(name, myname) == 0) + continue; + if (shl_findsym(&desc->handle, "wordexp", TYPE_PROCEDURE, &fn) == 0) + break; + } +# else + void *fn = NULL; +# endif + if (fn == NULL) { + errno = EACCES; + return -1; + } + return ((sudo_fn_wordexp_t)fn)(words, we, flags | WRDE_NOCMD); +#endif /* HAVE___INTERPOSE */ +} +INTERPOSE(wordexp) +#endif /* HAVE_WORDEXP && (RTLD_NEXT || HAVE_SHL_LOAD || HAVE___INTERPOSE) */ + +/* + * On Linux we can use a seccomp() filter to disable exec. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) && HAVE_DECL_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + +/* Older systems may not support execveat(2). */ +#ifndef __NR_execveat +# define __NR_execveat -1 +#endif + +static void noexec_ctor(void) __attribute__((constructor)); + +static void +noexec_ctor(void) +{ + struct sock_filter exec_filter[] = { + /* Load syscall number into the accumulator */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + /* Jump to deny for execve/execveat */ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_execve, 2, 0), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, __NR_execveat, 1, 0), + /* Allow non-matching syscalls */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + /* Deny execve/execveat syscall */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | (EACCES & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)) + }; + const struct sock_fprog exec_fprog = { + nitems(exec_filter), + exec_filter + }; + + /* + * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER will fail unless the process has + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN or the no_new_privs bit is set. + */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == 0) + (void)prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &exec_fprog); +} +#endif /* HAVE_DECL_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER */ |