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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:49:52 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-10 20:49:52 +0000 |
commit | 55944e5e40b1be2afc4855d8d2baf4b73d1876b5 (patch) | |
tree | 33f869f55a1b149e9b7c2b7e201867ca5dd52992 /src/core/execute.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | systemd-55944e5e40b1be2afc4855d8d2baf4b73d1876b5.tar.xz systemd-55944e5e40b1be2afc4855d8d2baf4b73d1876b5.zip |
Adding upstream version 255.4.upstream/255.4
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/execute.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/execute.c | 2742 |
1 files changed, 2742 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8dbdfcf --- /dev/null +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -0,0 +1,2742 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <poll.h> +#include <sys/file.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/personality.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <sys/shm.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/un.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <utmpx.h> + +#include <linux/fs.h> /* Must be included after <sys/mount.h> */ + +#include "sd-messages.h" + +#include "af-list.h" +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "async.h" +#include "cap-list.h" +#include "capability-util.h" +#include "cgroup-setup.h" +#include "constants.h" +#include "cpu-set-util.h" +#include "dev-setup.h" +#include "env-file.h" +#include "env-util.h" +#include "errno-list.h" +#include "escape.h" +#include "exec-credential.h" +#include "execute.h" +#include "execute-serialize.h" +#include "exit-status.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "format-util.h" +#include "glob-util.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "ioprio-util.h" +#include "lock-util.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "macro.h" +#include "manager.h" +#include "manager-dump.h" +#include "memory-util.h" +#include "missing_fs.h" +#include "missing_prctl.h" +#include "mkdir-label.h" +#include "namespace.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "process-util.h" +#include "rlimit-util.h" +#include "rm-rf.h" +#include "seccomp-util.h" +#include "securebits-util.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "serialize.h" +#include "sort-util.h" +#include "special.h" +#include "stat-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "syslog-util.h" +#include "terminal-util.h" +#include "tmpfile-util.h" +#include "umask-util.h" +#include "unit-serialize.h" +#include "user-util.h" +#include "utmp-wtmp.h" + +static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { + return IN_SET(i, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, + EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL); +} + +static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { + return IN_SET(o, + EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); +} + +const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + if (context->stdio_as_fds) + return NULL; + + if (context->tty_path) + return context->tty_path; + + return "/dev/console"; +} + +static void exec_context_determine_tty_size( + const ExecContext *context, + const char *tty_path, + unsigned *ret_rows, + unsigned *ret_cols) { + + unsigned rows, cols; + + assert(context); + assert(ret_rows); + assert(ret_cols); + + if (!tty_path) + tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(context); + + rows = context->tty_rows; + cols = context->tty_cols; + + if (tty_path && (rows == UINT_MAX || cols == UINT_MAX)) + (void) proc_cmdline_tty_size( + tty_path, + rows == UINT_MAX ? &rows : NULL, + cols == UINT_MAX ? &cols : NULL); + + *ret_rows = rows; + *ret_cols = cols; +} + +int exec_context_apply_tty_size( + const ExecContext *context, + int tty_fd, + const char *tty_path) { + + unsigned rows, cols; + + exec_context_determine_tty_size(context, tty_path, &rows, &cols); + + return terminal_set_size_fd(tty_fd, tty_path, rows, cols); + } + +void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { + _cleanup_close_ int _fd = -EBADF, lock_fd = -EBADF; + int fd; + + assert(context); + + const char *path = exec_context_tty_path(context); + + if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0 && isatty(p->stdin_fd)) + fd = p->stdin_fd; + else if (path && (context->tty_path || is_terminal_input(context->std_input) || + is_terminal_output(context->std_output) || is_terminal_output(context->std_error))) { + fd = _fd = open_terminal(path, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NONBLOCK); + if (fd < 0) + return (void) log_debug_errno(fd, "Failed to open terminal '%s', ignoring: %m", path); + } else + return; /* nothing to do */ + + /* Take a synchronization lock for the duration of the setup that we do here. + * systemd-vconsole-setup.service also takes the lock to avoid being interrupted. We open a new fd + * that will be closed automatically, and operate on it for convenience. */ + lock_fd = lock_dev_console(); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(lock_fd)) + log_debug_errno(lock_fd, "No privileges to lock /dev/console, proceeding without: %m"); + else if (lock_fd < 0) + return (void) log_debug_errno(lock_fd, "Failed to lock /dev/console: %m"); + + if (context->tty_vhangup) + (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(fd); + + if (context->tty_reset) + (void) reset_terminal_fd(fd, /* switch_to_text= */ true); + + (void) exec_context_apply_tty_size(context, fd, path); + + if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path) + (void) vt_disallocate(path); +} + +bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + return context->private_network || context->network_namespace_path; +} + +static bool exec_needs_ephemeral(const ExecContext *context) { + return (context->root_image || context->root_directory) && context->root_ephemeral; +} + +bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + return context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path; +} + +bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + const ExecRuntime *runtime) { + + assert(context); + + if (context->root_image) + return true; + + if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || + !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths)) + return true; + + if (context->n_bind_mounts > 0) + return true; + + if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) + return true; + + if (context->n_mount_images > 0) + return true; + + if (context->n_extension_images > 0) + return true; + + if (!strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) + return true; + + if (!IN_SET(context->mount_propagation_flag, 0, MS_SHARED)) + return true; + + if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared && (runtime->shared->tmp_dir || runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir)) + return true; + + if (context->private_devices || + context->private_mounts > 0 || + (context->private_mounts < 0 && exec_needs_network_namespace(context)) || + context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || + context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || + context->protect_kernel_tunables || + context->protect_kernel_modules || + context->protect_kernel_logs || + context->protect_control_groups || + context->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || + context->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL || + exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context)) + return true; + + if (context->root_directory) { + if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context)) + return true; + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + if (params && !params->prefix[t]) + continue; + + if (context->directories[t].n_items > 0) + return true; + } + } + + if (context->dynamic_user && + (context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE].n_items > 0 || + context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE].n_items > 0 || + context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].n_items > 0)) + return true; + + if (context->log_namespace) + return true; + + return false; +} + +bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { + assert(context); + + if (!context->dynamic_user) + return false; + + if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) + return false; + + if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME && context->runtime_directory_preserve_mode == EXEC_PRESERVE_NO) + return false; + + return true; +} + +int exec_params_get_cgroup_path( + const ExecParameters *params, + const CGroupContext *c, + char **ret) { + + const char *subgroup = NULL; + char *p; + + assert(params); + assert(ret); + + if (!params->cgroup_path) + return -EINVAL; + + /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated + * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control + * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one, + * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process, + * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=, + * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre= + * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP + * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */ + + if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) && (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP) || c->delegate_subgroup)) { + if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_IS_CONTROL)) + subgroup = ".control"; + else + subgroup = c->delegate_subgroup; + } + + if (subgroup) + p = path_join(params->cgroup_path, subgroup); + else + p = strdup(params->cgroup_path); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ret = p; + return !!subgroup; +} + +bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa; +} + +static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable, char **argv) { + assert(unit); + assert(msg); + assert(executable); + + if (!DEBUG_LOGGING) + return; + + _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); + + log_unit_struct(unit, LOG_DEBUG, + "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, + LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), + LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); +} + +static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); + +int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, + ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, + pid_t *ret) { + + char serialization_fd_number[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1]; + _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL, *log_level = NULL, *executor_path = NULL; + _cleanup_fdset_free_ FDSet *fdset = NULL; + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *f = NULL; + pid_t pid; + int r; + + assert(unit); + assert(unit->manager); + assert(unit->manager->executor_fd >= 0); + assert(command); + assert(context); + assert(ret); + assert(params); + assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0)); + assert(!params->files_env); /* We fill this field, ensure it comes NULL-initialized to us */ + + LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_UNIT(unit); + + r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, ¶ms->files_env); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); + + /* We won't know the real executable path until we create the mount namespace in the child, but we + want to log from the parent, so we use the possibly inaccurate path here. */ + log_command_line(unit, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); + + if (params->cgroup_path) { + r = exec_params_get_cgroup_path(params, cgroup_context, &subcgroup_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m"); + if (r > 0) { + /* If there's a subcgroup, then let's create it here now (the main cgroup was already + * realized by the unit logic) */ + + r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to create subcgroup '%s': %m", subcgroup_path); + } + } + + /* In order to avoid copy-on-write traps and OOM-kills when pid1's memory.current is above the + * child's memory.max, serialize all the state needed to start the unit, and pass it to the + * systemd-executor binary. clone() with CLONE_VM + CLONE_VFORK will pause the parent until the exec + * and ensure all memory is shared. The child immediately execs the new binary so the delay should + * be minimal. Once glibc provides a clone3 wrapper we can switch to that, and clone directly in the + * target cgroup. */ + + r = open_serialization_file("sd-executor-state", &f); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open serialization stream: %m"); + + fdset = fdset_new(); + if (!fdset) + return log_oom(); + + r = exec_serialize_invocation(f, fdset, context, command, params, runtime, cgroup_context); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to serialize parameters: %m"); + + if (fseeko(f, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to reseek on serialization stream: %m"); + + r = fd_cloexec(fileno(f), false); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set O_CLOEXEC on serialization fd: %m"); + + r = fdset_cloexec(fdset, false); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set O_CLOEXEC on serialized fds: %m"); + + r = log_level_to_string_alloc(log_get_max_level(), &log_level); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to convert log level to string: %m"); + + r = fd_get_path(unit->manager->executor_fd, &executor_path); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to get executor path from fd: %m"); + + xsprintf(serialization_fd_number, "%i", fileno(f)); + + /* The executor binary is pinned, to avoid compatibility problems during upgrades. */ + r = posix_spawn_wrapper( + FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(unit->manager->executor_fd), + STRV_MAKE(executor_path, + "--deserialize", serialization_fd_number, + "--log-level", log_level, + "--log-target", log_target_to_string(manager_get_executor_log_target(unit->manager))), + environ, + &pid); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to spawn executor: %m"); + + log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); + + /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever + * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the + * process will be killed too). */ + if (subcgroup_path) + (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path, pid); + + exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); + + *ret = pid; + return 0; +} + +void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* When initializing a bool member to 'true', make sure to serialize in execute-serialize.c using + * serialize_bool() instead of serialize_bool_elide(). */ + + *c = (ExecContext) { + .umask = 0022, + .ioprio = IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO, + .cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER, + .syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO, + .syslog_level_prefix = true, + .ignore_sigpipe = true, + .timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY, + .personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID, + .timeout_clean_usec = USEC_INFINITY, + .capability_bounding_set = CAP_MASK_UNSET, + .restrict_namespaces = NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL, + .log_level_max = -1, +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + .syscall_errno = SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL, +#endif + .tty_rows = UINT_MAX, + .tty_cols = UINT_MAX, + .private_mounts = -1, + .memory_ksm = -1, + .set_login_environment = -1, + }; + + FOREACH_ARRAY(d, c->directories, _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX) + d->mode = 0755; + + numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); + + assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL); +} + +void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + c->environment = strv_free(c->environment); + c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files); + c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment); + c->unset_environment = strv_free(c->unset_environment); + + rlimit_free_all(c->rlimit); + + for (size_t l = 0; l < 3; l++) { + c->stdio_fdname[l] = mfree(c->stdio_fdname[l]); + c->stdio_file[l] = mfree(c->stdio_file[l]); + } + + c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory); + c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory); + c->root_image = mfree(c->root_image); + c->root_image_options = mount_options_free_all(c->root_image_options); + c->root_hash = mfree(c->root_hash); + c->root_hash_size = 0; + c->root_hash_path = mfree(c->root_hash_path); + c->root_hash_sig = mfree(c->root_hash_sig); + c->root_hash_sig_size = 0; + c->root_hash_sig_path = mfree(c->root_hash_sig_path); + c->root_verity = mfree(c->root_verity); + c->extension_images = mount_image_free_many(c->extension_images, &c->n_extension_images); + c->extension_directories = strv_free(c->extension_directories); + c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path); + c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier); + c->user = mfree(c->user); + c->group = mfree(c->group); + + c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups); + + c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name); + + c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths); + c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths); + c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths); + c->exec_paths = strv_free(c->exec_paths); + c->no_exec_paths = strv_free(c->no_exec_paths); + c->exec_search_path = strv_free(c->exec_search_path); + + bind_mount_free_many(c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts); + c->bind_mounts = NULL; + c->n_bind_mounts = 0; + temporary_filesystem_free_many(c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems); + c->temporary_filesystems = NULL; + c->n_temporary_filesystems = 0; + c->mount_images = mount_image_free_many(c->mount_images, &c->n_mount_images); + + cpu_set_reset(&c->cpu_set); + numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); + + c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id); + c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context); + c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile); + c->smack_process_label = mfree(c->smack_process_label); + + c->restrict_filesystems = set_free_free(c->restrict_filesystems); + + c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); + c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs); + c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(d, c->directories, _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX) + exec_directory_done(d); + + c->log_level_max = -1; + + exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c); + c->log_filter_allowed_patterns = set_free_free(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns); + c->log_filter_denied_patterns = set_free_free(c->log_filter_denied_patterns); + + c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec = 0; + c->log_ratelimit_burst = 0; + + c->stdin_data = mfree(c->stdin_data); + c->stdin_data_size = 0; + + c->network_namespace_path = mfree(c->network_namespace_path); + c->ipc_namespace_path = mfree(c->ipc_namespace_path); + + c->log_namespace = mfree(c->log_namespace); + + c->load_credentials = hashmap_free(c->load_credentials); + c->set_credentials = hashmap_free(c->set_credentials); + c->import_credentials = set_free_free(c->import_credentials); + + c->root_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->root_image_policy); + c->mount_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->mount_image_policy); + c->extension_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->extension_image_policy); +} + +int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { + assert(c); + + if (!runtime_prefix) + return 0; + + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].n_items) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) + p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", i->path); + else + p = path_join(runtime_prefix, i->path); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the + * service next. */ + (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT); + + STRV_FOREACH(symlink, i->symlinks) { + _cleanup_free_ char *symlink_abs = NULL; + + if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) + symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", *symlink); + else + symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, *symlink); + if (!symlink_abs) + return -ENOMEM; + + (void) unlink(symlink_abs); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int exec_context_destroy_mount_ns_dir(Unit *u) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + + if (!u || !MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)) + return 0; + + p = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* This is only filled transiently (see mount_in_namespace()), should be empty or even non-existent*/ + if (rmdir(p) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) + log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Unable to remove propagation dir '%s', ignoring: %m", p); + + return 0; +} + +void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { + assert(c); + + c->path = mfree(c->path); + c->argv = strv_free(c->argv); +} + +void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c, n) + exec_command_done(i); +} + +ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { + ExecCommand *i; + + while ((i = LIST_POP(command, c))) { + exec_command_done(i); + free(i); + } + + return NULL; +} + +void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c, n) + *i = exec_command_free_list(*i); +} + +void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c, n) + exec_status_reset(&i->exec_status); +} + +void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c, n) + LIST_FOREACH(command, z, *i) + exec_status_reset(&z->exec_status); +} + +typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { + const Unit *unit; + const char *path; +} InvalidEnvInfo; + +static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { + InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; + + log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); +} + +const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) { + assert(c); + + switch (fd_index) { + + case STDIN_FILENO: + if (c->std_input != EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + return NULL; + + return c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] ?: "stdin"; + + case STDOUT_FILENO: + if (c->std_output != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + return NULL; + + return c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] ?: "stdout"; + + case STDERR_FILENO: + if (c->std_error != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + return NULL; + + return c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] ?: "stderr"; + + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **v = NULL; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(ret); + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) { + _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {}; + bool ignore = false; + char *fn = *i; + + if (fn[0] == '-') { + ignore = true; + fn++; + } + + if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) { + if (ignore) + continue; + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */ + r = safe_glob(fn, 0, &pglob); + if (r < 0) { + if (ignore) + continue; + return r; + } + + /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */ + assert(pglob.gl_pathc > 0); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(path, pglob.gl_pathv, pglob.gl_pathc) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **p = NULL; + + r = load_env_file(NULL, *path, &p); + if (r < 0) { + if (ignore) + continue; + return r; + } + + /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ + if (p) { + InvalidEnvInfo info = { + .unit = unit, + .path = *path, + }; + + p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); + } + + if (!v) + v = TAKE_PTR(p); + else { + char **m = strv_env_merge(v, p); + if (!m) + return -ENOMEM; + + strv_free_and_replace(v, m); + } + } + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(v); + + return 0; +} + +static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { + _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL; + + if (!tty) + return true; + + tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); + + /* trivial identity? */ + if (streq(tty, "console")) + return true; + + if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved) < 0) + return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */ + + /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ + return path_equal(resolved, tty) || (streq(resolved, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); +} + +static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext *ec) { + assert(ec); + + return ec->tty_reset || + ec->tty_vhangup || + ec->tty_vt_disallocate || + is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) || + is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) || + is_terminal_output(ec->std_error); +} + +bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext *ec) { + + return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec) && + tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec)); +} + +static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) { + assert(f); + + STRV_FOREACH(g, l) + fprintf(f, " %s", *g); +} + +static void strv_dump(FILE* f, const char *prefix, const char *name, char **strv) { + assert(f); + assert(prefix); + assert(name); + + if (!strv_isempty(strv)) { + fprintf(f, "%s%s:", prefix, name); + strv_fprintf(f, strv); + fputs("\n", f); + } +} + +void exec_params_dump(const ExecParameters *p, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { + assert(p); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sRuntimeScope: %s\n" + "%sExecFlags: %u\n" + "%sSELinuxContextNetwork: %s\n" + "%sCgroupSupportedMask: %u\n" + "%sCgroupPath: %s\n" + "%sCrededentialsDirectory: %s\n" + "%sEncryptedCredentialsDirectory: %s\n" + "%sConfirmSpawn: %s\n" + "%sShallConfirmSpawn: %s\n" + "%sWatchdogUSec: " USEC_FMT "\n" + "%sNotifySocket: %s\n" + "%sFallbackSmackProcessLabel: %s\n", + prefix, runtime_scope_to_string(p->runtime_scope), + prefix, p->flags, + prefix, yes_no(p->selinux_context_net), + prefix, p->cgroup_supported, + prefix, p->cgroup_path, + prefix, strempty(p->received_credentials_directory), + prefix, strempty(p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory), + prefix, strempty(p->confirm_spawn), + prefix, yes_no(p->shall_confirm_spawn), + prefix, p->watchdog_usec, + prefix, strempty(p->notify_socket), + prefix, strempty(p->fallback_smack_process_label)); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "FdNames", p->fd_names); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "Environment", p->environment); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "Prefix", p->prefix); + + LIST_FOREACH(open_files, file, p->open_files) + fprintf(f, "%sOpenFile: %s %s", prefix, file->path, open_file_flags_to_string(file->flags)); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "FilesEnv", p->files_env); +} + +void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sUMask: %04o\n" + "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n" + "%sRootDirectory: %s\n" + "%sRootEphemeral: %s\n" + "%sNonBlocking: %s\n" + "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" + "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" + "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n" + "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n" + "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n" + "%sProtectClock: %s\n" + "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n" + "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" + "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n" + "%sProtectHome: %s\n" + "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" + "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n" + "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n" + "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n" + "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n" + "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n" + "%sKeyringMode: %s\n" + "%sProtectHostname: %s\n" + "%sProtectProc: %s\n" + "%sProcSubset: %s\n", + prefix, c->umask, + prefix, empty_to_root(c->working_directory), + prefix, empty_to_root(c->root_directory), + prefix, yes_no(c->root_ephemeral), + prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_logs), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_clock), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_users), + prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), + prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), + prefix, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c)), + prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe), + prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute), + prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime), + prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_suid_sgid), + prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode), + prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname), + prefix, protect_proc_to_string(c->protect_proc), + prefix, proc_subset_to_string(c->proc_subset)); + + if (c->set_login_environment >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sSetLoginEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->set_login_environment > 0)); + + if (c->root_image) + fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image); + + if (c->root_image_options) { + fprintf(f, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix); + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->root_image_options) + if (!isempty(o->options)) + fprintf(f, " %s:%s", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + o->options); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } + + if (c->root_hash) { + _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; + encoded = hexmem(c->root_hash, c->root_hash_size); + if (encoded) + fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, encoded); + } + + if (c->root_hash_path) + fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_path); + + if (c->root_hash_sig) { + _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; + ssize_t len; + len = base64mem(c->root_hash_sig, c->root_hash_sig_size, &encoded); + if (len) + fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix, encoded); + } + + if (c->root_hash_sig_path) + fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_sig_path); + + if (c->root_verity) + fprintf(f, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix, c->root_verity); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) + fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) + fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment) + fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->unset_environment) + fprintf(f, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode)); + + for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { + fprintf(f, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].mode); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { + fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path); + + STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) + fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s:%s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_symlink_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path, *d); + } + } + + fprintf(f, "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n", prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->timeout_clean_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); + + if (c->memory_ksm >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sMemoryKSM: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->memory_ksm > 0)); + + if (c->nice_set) + fprintf(f, "%sNice: %i\n", prefix, c->nice); + + if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) + fprintf(f, "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n", prefix, c->oom_score_adjust); + + if (c->coredump_filter_set) + fprintf(f, "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64"\n", prefix, c->coredump_filter); + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) + if (c->rlimit[i]) { + fprintf(f, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n", + prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); + fprintf(f, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n", + prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur); + } + + if (c->ioprio_set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; + + r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(ioprio_prio_class(c->ioprio), &class_str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix, class_str); + + fprintf(f, "%sIOPriority: %d\n", prefix, ioprio_prio_data(c->ioprio)); + } + + if (c->cpu_sched_set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; + + r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix, policy_str); + + fprintf(f, + "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" + "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n", + prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, + prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); + } + + if (c->cpu_set.set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *affinity = NULL; + + affinity = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpu_set); + fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix, affinity); + } + + if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))) { + _cleanup_free_ char *nodes = NULL; + + nodes = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->numa_policy.nodes); + fprintf(f, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))); + fprintf(f, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix, strnull(nodes)); + } + + if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); + + fprintf(f, + "%sStandardInput: %s\n" + "%sStandardOutput: %s\n" + "%sStandardError: %s\n", + prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input), + prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output), + prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); + + if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]); + if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO]); + if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); + + if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); + if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); + if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); + if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); + if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); + if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); + if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) + fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); + + if (c->tty_path) + fprintf(f, + "%sTTYPath: %s\n" + "%sTTYReset: %s\n" + "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n" + "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n" + "%sTTYRows: %u\n" + "%sTTYColumns: %u\n", + prefix, c->tty_path, + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset), + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup), + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate), + prefix, c->tty_rows, + prefix, c->tty_cols); + + if (IN_SET(c->std_output, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) || + IN_SET(c->std_error, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, + EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, + EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE)) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL; + + r = log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix, fac_str); + + r = log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix, lvl_str); + } + + if (c->log_level_max >= 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; + + (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c->log_level_max, &t); + + fprintf(f, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix, strna(t)); + } + + if (c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec > 0) + fprintf(f, + "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n", + prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); + + if (c->log_ratelimit_burst > 0) + fprintf(f, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix, c->log_ratelimit_burst); + + if (!set_isempty(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) || !set_isempty(c->log_filter_denied_patterns)) { + fprintf(f, "%sLogFilterPatterns:", prefix); + + char *pattern; + SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) + fprintf(f, " %s", pattern); + SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_denied_patterns) + fprintf(f, " ~%s", pattern); + fputc('\n', f); + } + + FOREACH_ARRAY(field, c->log_extra_fields, c->n_log_extra_fields) { + fprintf(f, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix); + fwrite(field->iov_base, 1, field->iov_len, f); + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->log_namespace) + fprintf(f, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix, c->log_namespace); + + if (c->secure_bits) { + _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; + + r = secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c->secure_bits, &str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix, str); + } + + if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_MASK_UNSET) { + _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; + + r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_bounding_set, &str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix, str); + } + + if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; + + r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_ambient_set, &str); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, str); + } + + if (c->user) + fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user); + if (c->group) + fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group); + + fprintf(f, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->dynamic_user)); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "SupplementaryGroups", c->supplementary_groups); + + if (c->pam_name) + fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name); + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadWritePaths", c->read_write_paths); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadOnlyPaths", c->read_only_paths); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "InaccessiblePaths", c->inaccessible_paths); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecPaths", c->exec_paths); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "NoExecPaths", c->no_exec_paths); + strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecSearchPath", c->exec_search_path); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(mount, c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts) + fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix, + mount->read_only ? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths", + mount->ignore_enoent ? "-": "", + mount->source, + mount->destination, + mount->recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind"); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(tmpfs, c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems) + fprintf(f, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix, + tmpfs->path, + isempty(tmpfs->options) ? "" : ":", + strempty(tmpfs->options)); + + if (c->utmp_id) + fprintf(f, + "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n", + prefix, c->utmp_id); + + if (c->selinux_context) + fprintf(f, + "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); + + if (c->apparmor_profile) + fprintf(f, + "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); + + if (c->smack_process_label) + fprintf(f, + "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", c->smack_process_label); + + if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) + fprintf(f, + "%sPersonality: %s\n", + prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); + + fprintf(f, + "%sLockPersonality: %s\n", + prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality)); + + if (c->syscall_filter) { + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallFilter: ", + prefix); + + if (!c->syscall_allow_list) + fputc('~', f); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + void *id, *val; + bool first = true; + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; + const char *errno_name = NULL; + int num = PTR_TO_INT(val); + + if (first) + first = false; + else + fputc(' ', f); + + name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); + fputs(strna(name), f); + + if (num >= 0) { + errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num); + if (errno_name) + fprintf(f, ":%s", errno_name); + else + fprintf(f, ":%d", num); + } + } +#endif + + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->syscall_archs) { + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", + prefix); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + void *id; + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); +#endif + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; + + r = namespace_flags_to_string(c->restrict_namespaces, &s); + if (r >= 0) + fprintf(f, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n", + prefix, strna(s)); + } + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF + if (exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) { + char *fs; + SET_FOREACH(fs, c->restrict_filesystems) + fprintf(f, "%sRestrictFileSystems: %s\n", prefix, fs); + } +#endif + + if (c->network_namespace_path) + fprintf(f, + "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n", + prefix, c->network_namespace_path); + + if (c->syscall_errno > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + const char *errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c->syscall_errno); + if (errno_name) + fputs(errno_name, f); + else + fprintf(f, "%d", c->syscall_errno); +#endif + fputc('\n', f); + } + + FOREACH_ARRAY(mount, c->mount_images, c->n_mount_images) { + fprintf(f, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s", prefix, + mount->ignore_enoent ? "-": "", + mount->source, + mount->destination); + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, mount->mount_options) + fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + strempty(o->options)); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } + + FOREACH_ARRAY(mount, c->extension_images, c->n_extension_images) { + fprintf(f, "%sExtensionImages: %s%s", prefix, + mount->ignore_enoent ? "-": "", + mount->source); + LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, mount->mount_options) + fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", + partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), + strempty(o->options)); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } + + strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExtensionDirectories", c->extension_directories); +} + +bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under + * an unchanged UID or as root. */ + + if (!c->user) + return true; + + if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) + return true; + + return false; +} + +int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext *c) { + int p; + + assert(c); + + if (c->ioprio_set) + return c->ioprio; + + p = ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0); + if (p < 0) + return IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO; + + return ioprio_normalize(p); +} + +bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* Explicit setting wins */ + if (c->mount_apivfs_set) + return c->mount_apivfs; + + /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */ + if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c)) + return true; + + return false; +} + +void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(field, c->log_extra_fields, c->n_log_extra_fields) + free(field->iov_base); + + c->log_extra_fields = mfree(c->log_extra_fields); + c->n_log_extra_fields = 0; +} + +void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; + const char *path; + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(c); + + /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */ + exec_context_tty_reset(c, /* parameters= */ NULL); + + /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path + * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed + * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */ + if (!exec_context_may_touch_tty(c)) + return; + + path = exec_context_tty_path(c); + if (!path) + return; + + fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC); /* Pin the inode */ + if (fd < 0) + return (void) log_full_errno(errno == ENOENT ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, + "Failed to open TTY inode of '%s' to adjust ownership/access mode, ignoring: %m", + path); + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return (void) log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to stat TTY '%s', ignoring: %m", path); + + /* Let's add a superficial check that we only do this for stuff that looks like a TTY. We only check + * if things are a character device, since a proper check either means we'd have to open the TTY and + * use isatty(), but we'd rather not do that since opening TTYs comes with all kinds of side-effects + * and is slow. Or we'd have to hardcode dev_t major information, which we'd rather avoid. Why bother + * with this at all? → https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/19213 */ + if (!S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) + return log_warning("Configured TTY '%s' is not actually a character device, ignoring.", path); + + r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, 0, TTY_GID); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s to " UID_FMT ":" GID_FMT ", ignoring: %m", path, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) TTY_GID); +} + +int exec_context_get_clean_directories( + ExecContext *c, + char **prefix, + ExecCleanMask mask, + char ***ret) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(prefix); + assert(ret); + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { + if (!FLAGS_SET(mask, 1U << t)) + continue; + + if (!prefix[t]) + continue; + + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, c->directories[t].items, c->directories[t].n_items) { + char *j; + + j = path_join(prefix[t], i->path); + if (!j) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume(&l, j); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */ + if (t != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { + j = path_join(prefix[t], "private", i->path); + if (!j) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume(&l, j); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + STRV_FOREACH(symlink, i->symlinks) { + j = path_join(prefix[t], *symlink); + if (!j) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_consume(&l, j); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(l); + return 0; +} + +int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext *c, ExecCleanMask *ret) { + ExecCleanMask mask = 0; + + assert(c); + assert(ret); + + for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) + if (c->directories[t].n_items > 0) + mask |= 1U << t; + + *ret = mask; + return 0; +} + +int exec_context_get_oom_score_adjust(const ExecContext *c) { + int n = 0, r; + + assert(c); + + if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) + return c->oom_score_adjust; + + r = get_oom_score_adjust(&n); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read /proc/self/oom_score_adj, ignoring: %m"); + + return n; +} + +uint64_t exec_context_get_coredump_filter(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; + uint64_t n = COREDUMP_FILTER_MASK_DEFAULT; + int r; + + assert(c); + + if (c->coredump_filter_set) + return c->coredump_filter; + + r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/coredump_filter", &t); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read /proc/self/coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); + else { + r = safe_atoux64(t, &n); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse \"%s\" from /proc/self/coredump_filter, ignoring: %m", t); + } + + return n; +} + +int exec_context_get_nice(const ExecContext *c) { + int n; + + assert(c); + + if (c->nice_set) + return c->nice; + + errno = 0; + n = getpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0); + if (errno > 0) { + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to get process nice value, ignoring: %m"); + n = 0; + } + + return n; +} + +int exec_context_get_cpu_sched_policy(const ExecContext *c) { + int n; + + assert(c); + + if (c->cpu_sched_set) + return c->cpu_sched_policy; + + n = sched_getscheduler(0); + if (n < 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to get scheduler policy, ignoring: %m"); + + return n < 0 ? SCHED_OTHER : n; +} + +int exec_context_get_cpu_sched_priority(const ExecContext *c) { + struct sched_param p = {}; + int r; + + assert(c); + + if (c->cpu_sched_set) + return c->cpu_sched_priority; + + r = sched_getparam(0, &p); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to get scheduler priority, ignoring: %m"); + + return r >= 0 ? p.sched_priority : 0; +} + +uint64_t exec_context_get_timer_slack_nsec(const ExecContext *c) { + int r; + + assert(c); + + if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + return c->timer_slack_nsec; + + r = prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK); + if (r < 0) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to get timer slack, ignoring: %m"); + + return (uint64_t) MAX(r, 0); +} + +char** exec_context_get_syscall_filter(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + + assert(c); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + void *id, *val; + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; + const char *e = NULL; + char *s; + int num = PTR_TO_INT(val); + + if (c->syscall_allow_list && num >= 0) + /* syscall with num >= 0 in allow-list is denied. */ + continue; + + name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); + if (!name) + continue; + + if (num >= 0) { + e = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num); + if (e) { + s = strjoin(name, ":", e); + if (!s) + return NULL; + } else { + if (asprintf(&s, "%s:%d", name, num) < 0) + return NULL; + } + } else + s = TAKE_PTR(name); + + if (strv_consume(&l, s) < 0) + return NULL; + } + + strv_sort(l); +#endif + + return l ? TAKE_PTR(l) : strv_new(NULL); +} + +char** exec_context_get_syscall_archs(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + + assert(c); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + void *id; + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs) { + const char *name; + + name = seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1); + if (!name) + continue; + + if (strv_extend(&l, name) < 0) + return NULL; + } + + strv_sort(l); +#endif + + return l ? TAKE_PTR(l) : strv_new(NULL); +} + +char** exec_context_get_syscall_log(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + + assert(c); + +#if HAVE_SECCOMP + void *id, *val; + HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_log) { + char *name = NULL; + + name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); + if (!name) + continue; + + if (strv_consume(&l, name) < 0) + return NULL; + } + + strv_sort(l); +#endif + + return l ? TAKE_PTR(l) : strv_new(NULL); +} + +char** exec_context_get_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + void *af; + + assert(c); + + SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families) { + const char *name; + + name = af_to_name(PTR_TO_INT(af)); + if (!name) + continue; + + if (strv_extend(&l, name) < 0) + return NULL; + } + + strv_sort(l); + + return l ? TAKE_PTR(l) : strv_new(NULL); +} + +char** exec_context_get_restrict_filesystems(const ExecContext *c) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + + assert(c); + +#if HAVE_LIBBPF + l = set_get_strv(c->restrict_filesystems); + if (!l) + return NULL; + + strv_sort(l); +#endif + + return l ? TAKE_PTR(l) : strv_new(NULL); +} + +void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { + assert(s); + + *s = (ExecStatus) { + .pid = pid, + }; + + dual_timestamp_now(&s->start_timestamp); +} + +void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) { + assert(s); + + if (s->pid != pid) + *s = (ExecStatus) { + .pid = pid, + }; + + dual_timestamp_now(&s->exit_timestamp); + + s->code = code; + s->status = status; + + if (context && context->utmp_id) + (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status); +} + +void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus *s) { + assert(s); + + *s = (ExecStatus) {}; +} + +void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + assert(s); + assert(f); + + if (s->pid <= 0) + return; + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", + prefix, s->pid); + + if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp)) + fprintf(f, + "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n", + prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->start_timestamp.realtime)); + + if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp)) + fprintf(f, + "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n" + "%sExit Code: %s\n" + "%sExit Status: %i\n", + prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->exit_timestamp.realtime), + prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code), + prefix, s->status); +} + +static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; + const char *prefix2; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t"); + + cmd = quote_command_line(c->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); + + fprintf(f, + "%sCommand Line: %s\n", + prefix, strnull(cmd)); + + exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); +} + +void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + LIST_FOREACH(command, i, c) + exec_command_dump(i, f, prefix); +} + +void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) { + ExecCommand *end; + + assert(l); + assert(e); + + if (*l) { + /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */ + end = LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l); + LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e); + } else + *l = e; +} + +int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { + va_list ap; + char **l, *p; + + assert(c); + assert(path); + + va_start(ap, path); + l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + p = strdup(path); + if (!p) { + strv_free(l); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + free_and_replace(c->path, p); + + return strv_free_and_replace(c->argv, l); +} + +int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + va_list ap; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(path); + + va_start(ap, path); + l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + +static char *destroy_tree(char *path) { + if (!path) + return NULL; + + if (!path_equal(path, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) { + log_debug("Spawning process to nuke '%s'", path); + + (void) asynchronous_rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_SUBVOLUME|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + } + + return mfree(path); +} + +void exec_shared_runtime_done(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return; + + if (rt->manager) + (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt->id); + + rt->id = mfree(rt->id); + rt->tmp_dir = mfree(rt->tmp_dir); + rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir); + safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); + safe_close_pair(rt->ipcns_storage_socket); +} + +static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { + exec_shared_runtime_done(rt); + + return mfree(rt); +} + +DEFINE_TRIVIAL_UNREF_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime, exec_shared_runtime, exec_shared_runtime_free); +DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime*, exec_shared_runtime_free); + +ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_destroy(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return NULL; + + assert(rt->n_ref > 0); + rt->n_ref--; + + if (rt->n_ref > 0) + return NULL; + + rt->tmp_dir = destroy_tree(rt->tmp_dir); + rt->var_tmp_dir = destroy_tree(rt->var_tmp_dir); + + return exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); +} + +static int exec_shared_runtime_allocate(ExecSharedRuntime **ret, const char *id) { + _cleanup_free_ char *id_copy = NULL; + ExecSharedRuntime *n; + + assert(ret); + + id_copy = strdup(id); + if (!id_copy) + return -ENOMEM; + + n = new(ExecSharedRuntime, 1); + if (!n) + return -ENOMEM; + + *n = (ExecSharedRuntime) { + .id = TAKE_PTR(id_copy), + .netns_storage_socket = EBADF_PAIR, + .ipcns_storage_socket = EBADF_PAIR, + }; + + *ret = n; + return 0; +} + +static int exec_shared_runtime_add( + Manager *m, + const char *id, + char **tmp_dir, + char **var_tmp_dir, + int netns_storage_socket[2], + int ipcns_storage_socket[2], + ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { + + _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt = NULL; + int r; + + assert(m); + assert(id); + + /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, {net,ipc}ns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */ + + r = exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt, id); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = hashmap_ensure_put(&m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops, rt->id, rt); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + assert(!!rt->tmp_dir == !!rt->var_tmp_dir); /* We require both to be set together */ + rt->tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir); + rt->var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir); + + if (netns_storage_socket) { + rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[0]); + rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[1]); + } + + if (ipcns_storage_socket) { + rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[0]); + rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[1]); + } + + rt->manager = m; + + if (ret) + *ret = rt; + /* do not remove created ExecSharedRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */ + TAKE_PTR(rt); + return 0; +} + +static int exec_shared_runtime_make( + Manager *m, + const ExecContext *c, + const char *id, + ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { + + _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; + _cleanup_close_pair_ int netns_storage_socket[2] = EBADF_PAIR, ipcns_storage_socket[2] = EBADF_PAIR; + int r; + + assert(m); + assert(c); + assert(id); + + /* It is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ + if (!exec_needs_network_namespace(c) && !exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c) && !c->private_tmp) { + *ret = NULL; + return 0; + } + + if (c->private_tmp && + !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/tmp") && + (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var/tmp") || + prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var")))) { + r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + if (exec_needs_network_namespace(c)) { + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, netns_storage_socket) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c)) { + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ipcns_storage_socket) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket, ipcns_storage_socket, ret); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; +} + +int exec_shared_runtime_acquire(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, bool create, ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { + ExecSharedRuntime *rt; + int r; + + assert(m); + assert(id); + assert(ret); + + rt = hashmap_get(m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, id); + if (rt) + /* We already have an ExecSharedRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */ + goto ref; + + if (!create) { + *ret = NULL; + return 0; + } + + /* If not found, then create a new object. */ + r = exec_shared_runtime_make(m, c, id, &rt); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ + *ret = NULL; + return 0; + } + +ref: + /* increment reference counter. */ + rt->n_ref++; + *ret = rt; + return 1; +} + +int exec_shared_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + ExecSharedRuntime *rt; + + assert(m); + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { + fprintf(f, "exec-runtime=%s", rt->id); + + if (rt->tmp_dir) + fprintf(f, " tmp-dir=%s", rt->tmp_dir); + + if (rt->var_tmp_dir) + fprintf(f, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt->var_tmp_dir); + + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + fprintf(f, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy); + } + + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + fprintf(f, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy); + } + + if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-0=%i", copy); + } + + if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-1=%i", copy); + } + + fputc('\n', f); + } + + return 0; +} + +int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { + _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt_create = NULL; + ExecSharedRuntime *rt = NULL; + int r; + + /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text. + * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=. + * Even if the ExecSharedRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge + * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */ + + assert(u); + assert(key); + assert(value); + + /* Manager manages ExecSharedRuntime objects by the unit id. + * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */ + if (isempty(u->id)) { + log_unit_debug(u, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter."); + return 0; + } + + if (u->manager) { + if (hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, u->id); + } + if (!rt) { + if (exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt_create, u->id) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + rt = rt_create; + } + + if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) { + if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->tmp_dir, value) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) { + if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->var_tmp_dir, value) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) { + + safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); + rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = deserialize_fd(fds, value); + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] < 0) + return 0; + + } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { + + safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); + rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = deserialize_fd(fds, value); + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] < 0) + return 0; + } else + return 0; + + /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecSharedRuntime objects. */ + if (rt_create && u->manager) { + r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create); + if (r < 0) { + log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m"); + return 0; + } + + rt_create->manager = u->manager; + + /* Avoid cleanup */ + TAKE_PTR(rt_create); + } + + return 1; +} + +int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { + _cleanup_free_ char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; + char *id = NULL; + int r, netns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}, ipcns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}; + const char *p, *v = ASSERT_PTR(value); + size_t n; + + assert(m); + assert(fds); + + n = strcspn(v, " "); + id = strndupa_safe(v, n); + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + + v = startswith(p, "tmp-dir="); + if (v) { + n = strcspn(v, " "); + tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); + if (!tmp_dir) + return log_oom(); + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + } + + v = startswith(p, "var-tmp-dir="); + if (v) { + n = strcspn(v, " "); + var_tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); + if (!var_tmp_dir) + return log_oom(); + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + } + + v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-0="); + if (v) { + char *buf; + + n = strcspn(v, " "); + buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); + + netns_fdpair[0] = deserialize_fd(fds, buf); + if (netns_fdpair[0] < 0) + return netns_fdpair[0]; + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + } + + v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-1="); + if (v) { + char *buf; + + n = strcspn(v, " "); + buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); + + netns_fdpair[1] = deserialize_fd(fds, buf); + if (netns_fdpair[1] < 0) + return netns_fdpair[1]; + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + } + + v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-0="); + if (v) { + char *buf; + + n = strcspn(v, " "); + buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); + + ipcns_fdpair[0] = deserialize_fd(fds, buf); + if (ipcns_fdpair[0] < 0) + return ipcns_fdpair[0]; + if (v[n] != ' ') + goto finalize; + p = v + n + 1; + } + + v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-1="); + if (v) { + char *buf; + + n = strcspn(v, " "); + buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); + + ipcns_fdpair[1] = deserialize_fd(fds, buf); + if (ipcns_fdpair[1] < 0) + return ipcns_fdpair[1]; + } + +finalize: + r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_fdpair, ipcns_fdpair, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m"); + return 0; +} + +void exec_shared_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m) { + ExecSharedRuntime *rt; + + assert(m); + + /* Free unreferenced ExecSharedRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */ + + HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { + if (rt->n_ref > 0) + continue; + + (void) exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); + } +} + +int exec_runtime_make( + const Unit *unit, + const ExecContext *context, + ExecSharedRuntime *shared, + DynamicCreds *creds, + ExecRuntime **ret) { + _cleanup_close_pair_ int ephemeral_storage_socket[2] = EBADF_PAIR; + _cleanup_free_ char *ephemeral = NULL; + _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt = NULL; + int r; + + assert(unit); + assert(context); + assert(ret); + + if (!shared && !creds && !exec_needs_ephemeral(context)) { + *ret = NULL; + return 0; + } + + if (exec_needs_ephemeral(context)) { + r = mkdir_p("/var/lib/systemd/ephemeral-trees", 0755); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = tempfn_random_child("/var/lib/systemd/ephemeral-trees", unit->id, &ephemeral); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ephemeral_storage_socket) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + rt = new(ExecRuntime, 1); + if (!rt) + return -ENOMEM; + + *rt = (ExecRuntime) { + .shared = shared, + .dynamic_creds = creds, + .ephemeral_copy = TAKE_PTR(ephemeral), + .ephemeral_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(ephemeral_storage_socket[0]), + .ephemeral_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(ephemeral_storage_socket[1]), + }; + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(rt); + return 1; +} + +ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return NULL; + + exec_shared_runtime_unref(rt->shared); + dynamic_creds_unref(rt->dynamic_creds); + + rt->ephemeral_copy = destroy_tree(rt->ephemeral_copy); + + safe_close_pair(rt->ephemeral_storage_socket); + return mfree(rt); +} + +ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return NULL; + + rt->shared = exec_shared_runtime_destroy(rt->shared); + rt->dynamic_creds = dynamic_creds_destroy(rt->dynamic_creds); + return exec_runtime_free(rt); +} + +void exec_runtime_clear(ExecRuntime *rt) { + if (!rt) + return; + + safe_close_pair(rt->ephemeral_storage_socket); + rt->ephemeral_copy = mfree(rt->ephemeral_copy); +} + +void exec_params_shallow_clear(ExecParameters *p) { + if (!p) + return; + + /* This is called on the PID1 side, as many of the struct's FDs are only borrowed, and actually + * owned by the manager or other objects, and reused across multiple units. */ + + p->environment = strv_free(p->environment); + p->fd_names = strv_free(p->fd_names); + p->files_env = strv_free(p->files_env); + p->fds = mfree(p->fds); + p->exec_fd = safe_close(p->exec_fd); + p->user_lookup_fd = -EBADF; + p->bpf_outer_map_fd = -EBADF; + p->unit_id = mfree(p->unit_id); + p->invocation_id = SD_ID128_NULL; + p->invocation_id_string[0] = '\0'; + p->confirm_spawn = mfree(p->confirm_spawn); +} + +void exec_params_deep_clear(ExecParameters *p) { + if (!p) + return; + + /* This is called on the sd-executor side, where everything received is owned by the process and has + * to be fully cleaned up to make sanitizers and analyzers happy, as opposed as the shallow clean + * function above. */ + + close_many_unset(p->fds, p->n_socket_fds + p->n_storage_fds); + + p->cgroup_path = mfree(p->cgroup_path); + + if (p->prefix) { + free_many_charp(p->prefix, _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); + p->prefix = mfree(p->prefix); + } + + p->received_credentials_directory = mfree(p->received_credentials_directory); + p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory = mfree(p->received_encrypted_credentials_directory); + + if (p->idle_pipe) { + close_many_and_free(p->idle_pipe, 4); + p->idle_pipe = NULL; + } + + p->stdin_fd = safe_close(p->stdin_fd); + p->stdout_fd = safe_close(p->stdout_fd); + p->stderr_fd = safe_close(p->stderr_fd); + + p->notify_socket = mfree(p->notify_socket); + + open_file_free_many(&p->open_files); + + p->fallback_smack_process_label = mfree(p->fallback_smack_process_label); + + exec_params_shallow_clear(p); +} + +void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { + if (!d) + return; + + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, d->items, d->n_items) { + free(i->path); + strv_free(i->symlinks); + } + + d->items = mfree(d->items); + d->n_items = 0; + d->mode = 0755; +} + +static ExecDirectoryItem *exec_directory_find(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path) { + assert(d); + assert(path); + + FOREACH_ARRAY(i, d->items, d->n_items) + if (path_equal(i->path, path)) + return i; + + return NULL; +} + +int exec_directory_add(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path, const char *symlink) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **s = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; + ExecDirectoryItem *existing; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(path); + + existing = exec_directory_find(d, path); + if (existing) { + r = strv_extend(&existing->symlinks, symlink); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; /* existing item is updated */ + } + + p = strdup(path); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (symlink) { + s = strv_new(symlink); + if (!s) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(d->items, d->n_items + 1)) + return -ENOMEM; + + d->items[d->n_items++] = (ExecDirectoryItem) { + .path = TAKE_PTR(p), + .symlinks = TAKE_PTR(s), + }; + + return 1; /* new item is added */ +} + +static int exec_directory_item_compare_func(const ExecDirectoryItem *a, const ExecDirectoryItem *b) { + assert(a); + assert(b); + + return path_compare(a->path, b->path); +} + +void exec_directory_sort(ExecDirectory *d) { + assert(d); + + /* Sort the exec directories to make always parent directories processed at first in + * setup_exec_directory(), e.g., even if StateDirectory=foo/bar foo, we need to create foo at first, + * then foo/bar. Also, set .only_create flag if one of the parent directories is contained in the + * list. See also comments in setup_exec_directory() and issue #24783. */ + + if (d->n_items <= 1) + return; + + typesafe_qsort(d->items, d->n_items, exec_directory_item_compare_func); + + for (size_t i = 1; i < d->n_items; i++) + for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) + if (path_startswith(d->items[i].path, d->items[j].path)) { + d->items[i].only_create = true; + break; + } +} + +ExecCleanMask exec_clean_mask_from_string(const char *s) { + ExecDirectoryType t; + + assert(s); + + if (streq(s, "all")) + return EXEC_CLEAN_ALL; + if (streq(s, "fdstore")) + return EXEC_CLEAN_FDSTORE; + + t = exec_resource_type_from_string(s); + if (t < 0) + return (ExecCleanMask) t; + + return 1U << t; +} + +static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = { + [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail", + [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", + [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", + [EXEC_INPUT_DATA] = "data", + [EXEC_INPUT_FILE] = "file", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput); + +static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = { + [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE] = "file", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND] = "append", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE] = "truncate", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput); + +static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init", + [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login", + [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode); + +static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO] = "no", + [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES] = "yes", + [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART] = "restart", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES); + +/* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */ +static const char* const exec_directory_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectory", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectory", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectory", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectory", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectory", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type, ExecDirectoryType); + +/* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the symlink setting it is configured with in the unit */ +static const char* const exec_directory_type_symlink_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectorySymlink", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectorySymlink", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectorySymlink", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectorySymlink", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectorySymlink", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_symlink, ExecDirectoryType); + +static const char* const exec_directory_type_mode_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectoryMode", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectoryMode", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectoryMode", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectoryMode", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectoryMode", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_mode, ExecDirectoryType); + +/* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This + * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit + * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */ +static const char* const exec_resource_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "runtime", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "state", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "cache", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "logs", + [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "configuration", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType); + +static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit", + [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private", + [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED] = "shared", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode); |