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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-12 03:50:42 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-06-12 03:50:42 +0000 |
commit | 78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e (patch) | |
tree | f515d16b6efd858a9aeb5b0ef5d6f90bf288283d /src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c | |
parent | Adding debian version 255.5-1. (diff) | |
download | systemd-78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e.tar.xz systemd-78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e.zip |
Merging upstream version 256.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c | 314 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 314 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c deleted file mode 100644 index e7a38d4..0000000 --- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,314 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ - -#include "alloc-util.h" -#include "ask-password-api.h" -#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h" -#include "env-util.h" -#include "fileio.h" -#include "hexdecoct.h" -#include "json.h" -#include "parse-util.h" -#include "random-util.h" -#include "sha256.h" -#include "tpm2-util.h" - -static int get_pin(usec_t until, AskPasswordFlags ask_password_flags, bool headless, char **ret_pin_str) { - _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL; - _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pin = NULL; - int r; - - assert(ret_pin_str); - - r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &pin_str); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m"); - if (!r) { - if (headless) - return log_error_errno( - SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), - "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. " - "Use the '$PIN' environment variable."); - - pin = strv_free_erase(pin); - r = ask_password_auto( - "Please enter TPM2 PIN:", - "drive-harddisk", - NULL, - "tpm2-pin", - "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin", - until, - ask_password_flags, - &pin); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to ask for user pin: %m"); - assert(strv_length(pin) == 1); - - pin_str = strdup(pin[0]); - if (!pin_str) - return log_oom(); - } - - *ret_pin_str = TAKE_PTR(pin_str); - - return r; -} - -int acquire_tpm2_key( - const char *volume_name, - const char *device, - uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, - uint16_t pcr_bank, - const void *pubkey, - size_t pubkey_size, - uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, - const char *signature_path, - const char *pcrlock_path, - uint16_t primary_alg, - const char *key_file, - size_t key_file_size, - uint64_t key_file_offset, - const void *key_data, - size_t key_data_size, - const void *policy_hash, - size_t policy_hash_size, - const void *salt, - size_t salt_size, - const void *srk_buf, - size_t srk_buf_size, - TPM2Flags flags, - usec_t until, - bool headless, - AskPasswordFlags ask_password_flags, - void **ret_decrypted_key, - size_t *ret_decrypted_key_size) { - - _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *signature_json = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ void *loaded_blob = NULL; - _cleanup_free_ char *auto_device = NULL; - size_t blob_size; - const void *blob; - int r; - - assert(salt || salt_size == 0); - - if (!device) { - r = tpm2_find_device_auto(&auto_device); - if (r == -ENODEV) - return -EAGAIN; /* Tell the caller to wait for a TPM2 device to show up */ - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Could not find TPM2 device: %m"); - - device = auto_device; - } - - if (key_data) { - blob = key_data; - blob_size = key_data_size; - } else { - _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; - - /* If we read the salt via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */ - if (asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup-tpm2/%s", random_u64(), volume_name) < 0) - return log_oom(); - - r = read_full_file_full( - AT_FDCWD, key_file, - key_file_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : key_file_offset, - key_file_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : key_file_size, - READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, - bindname, - (char**) &loaded_blob, &blob_size); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - blob = loaded_blob; - } - - if (pubkey_pcr_mask != 0) { - r = tpm2_load_pcr_signature(signature_path, &signature_json); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load pcr signature: %m"); - } - - _cleanup_(tpm2_pcrlock_policy_done) Tpm2PCRLockPolicy pcrlock_policy = {}; - - if (FLAGS_SET(flags, TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK)) { - r = tpm2_pcrlock_policy_load(pcrlock_path, &pcrlock_policy); - if (r < 0) - return r; - } - - _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL; - r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(device, &tpm2_context); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if (!(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)) { - r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context, - hash_pcr_mask, - pcr_bank, - pubkey, pubkey_size, - pubkey_pcr_mask, - signature_json, - /* pin= */ NULL, - FLAGS_SET(flags, TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK) ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL, - primary_alg, - blob, - blob_size, - policy_hash, - policy_hash_size, - srk_buf, - srk_buf_size, - ret_decrypted_key, - ret_decrypted_key_size); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unseal secret using TPM2: %m"); - - return r; - } - - for (int i = 5;; i--) { - _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL, *b64_salted_pin = NULL; - - if (i <= 0) - return -EACCES; - - r = get_pin(until, ask_password_flags, headless, &pin_str); - if (r < 0) - return r; - - if (salt_size > 0) { - uint8_t salted_pin[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {}; - CLEANUP_ERASE(salted_pin); - - r = tpm2_util_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256(pin_str, strlen(pin_str), salt, salt_size, salted_pin); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to perform PBKDF2: %m"); - - r = base64mem(salted_pin, sizeof(salted_pin), &b64_salted_pin); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to base64 encode salted pin: %m"); - } else - /* no salting needed, backwards compat with non-salted pins */ - b64_salted_pin = TAKE_PTR(pin_str); - - r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context, - hash_pcr_mask, - pcr_bank, - pubkey, pubkey_size, - pubkey_pcr_mask, - signature_json, - b64_salted_pin, - pcrlock_path ? &pcrlock_policy : NULL, - primary_alg, - blob, - blob_size, - policy_hash, - policy_hash_size, - srk_buf, - srk_buf_size, - ret_decrypted_key, - ret_decrypted_key_size); - if (r < 0) { - log_error_errno(r, "Failed to unseal secret using TPM2: %m"); - - /* We get this error in case there is an authentication policy mismatch. This should - * not happen, but this avoids confusing behavior, just in case. */ - if (!IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -ENOLCK)) - continue; - } - - return r; - } -} - -int find_tpm2_auto_data( - struct crypt_device *cd, - uint32_t search_pcr_mask, - int start_token, - uint32_t *ret_hash_pcr_mask, - uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, - void **ret_pubkey, - size_t *ret_pubkey_size, - uint32_t *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask, - uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, - void **ret_blob, - size_t *ret_blob_size, - void **ret_policy_hash, - size_t *ret_policy_hash_size, - void **ret_salt, - size_t *ret_salt_size, - void **ret_srk_buf, - size_t *ret_srk_buf_size, - TPM2Flags *ret_flags, - int *ret_keyslot, - int *ret_token) { - - int r, token; - - assert(cd); - - for (token = start_token; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) { - _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL, *pubkey = NULL, *salt = NULL, *srk_buf = NULL; - _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL; - size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size, pubkey_size, salt_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0; - uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask; - uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg; - TPM2Flags flags; - int keyslot; - - r = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, "systemd-tpm2", &v); - if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -EINVAL, -EMEDIUMTYPE)) - continue; - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read JSON token data off disk: %m"); - - r = tpm2_parse_luks2_json( - v, - &keyslot, - &hash_pcr_mask, - &pcr_bank, - &pubkey, &pubkey_size, - &pubkey_pcr_mask, - &primary_alg, - &blob, &blob_size, - &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size, - &salt, &salt_size, - &srk_buf, &srk_buf_size, - &flags); - if (r == -EUCLEAN) /* Gracefully handle issues in JSON fields not owned by us */ - continue; - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse TPM2 JSON data: %m"); - - if (search_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX || - search_pcr_mask == hash_pcr_mask) { - - if (start_token <= 0) - log_info("Automatically discovered security TPM2 token unlocks volume."); - - *ret_hash_pcr_mask = hash_pcr_mask; - *ret_pcr_bank = pcr_bank; - *ret_pubkey = TAKE_PTR(pubkey); - *ret_pubkey_size = pubkey_size; - *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask = pubkey_pcr_mask; - *ret_primary_alg = primary_alg; - *ret_blob = TAKE_PTR(blob); - *ret_blob_size = blob_size; - *ret_policy_hash = TAKE_PTR(policy_hash); - *ret_policy_hash_size = policy_hash_size; - *ret_salt = TAKE_PTR(salt); - *ret_salt_size = salt_size; - *ret_keyslot = keyslot; - *ret_token = token; - *ret_srk_buf = TAKE_PTR(srk_buf); - *ret_srk_buf_size = srk_buf_size; - *ret_flags = flags; - return 0; - } - - /* PCR mask doesn't match what is configured, ignore this entry, let's see next */ - } - - return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO), "No valid TPM2 token data found."); -} |