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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-06-12 03:50:42 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-06-12 03:50:42 +0000
commit78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e (patch)
treef515d16b6efd858a9aeb5b0ef5d6f90bf288283d /src/shared/creds-util.h
parentAdding debian version 255.5-1. (diff)
downloadsystemd-78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e.tar.xz
systemd-78e9bb837c258ac0ec7712b3d612cc2f407e731e.zip
Merging upstream version 256.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/shared/creds-util.h')
-rw-r--r--src/shared/creds-util.h32
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.h b/src/shared/creds-util.h
index 5e39a6a..b80755b 100644
--- a/src/shared/creds-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/creds-util.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ bool credential_glob_valid(const char *s);
int get_credentials_dir(const char **ret);
int get_encrypted_credentials_dir(const char **ret);
+int open_credentials_dir(void);
+
/* Where creds have been passed to the system */
#define SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY "/run/credentials/@system"
#define ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY "/run/credentials/@encrypted"
@@ -51,21 +53,31 @@ typedef enum CredentialSecretFlags {
CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS = 1 << 2,
} CredentialSecretFlags;
-int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size);
+int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, struct iovec *ret);
int get_credential_user_password(const char *username, char **ret_password, bool *ret_is_hashed);
+typedef enum CredentialFlags {
+ CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL = 1 << 0, /* allow decryption of NULL key, even if TPM is around */
+ CREDENTIAL_ANY_SCOPE = 1 << 1, /* allow decryption of both system and user credentials */
+} CredentialFlags;
+
/* The four modes we support: keyed only by on-disk key, only by TPM2 HMAC key, and by the combination of
* both, as well as one with a fixed zero length key if TPM2 is missing (the latter of course provides no
* authenticity or confidentiality, but is still useful for integrity protection, and makes things simpler
* for us to handle). */
#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST SD_ID128_MAKE(5a,1c,6a,86,df,9d,40,96,b1,d5,a6,5e,08,62,f1,9a)
+#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED SD_ID128_MAKE(55,b9,ed,1d,38,59,4d,43,a8,31,9d,2e,bb,33,2a,c6)
#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC SD_ID128_MAKE(0c,7c,c0,7b,11,76,45,91,9c,4b,0b,ea,08,bc,20,fe)
#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK SD_ID128_MAKE(fa,f7,eb,93,41,e3,41,2c,a1,a4,36,f9,5a,29,36,2f)
#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC SD_ID128_MAKE(93,a8,94,09,48,74,44,90,90,ca,f2,fc,93,ca,b5,53)
+#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED \
+ SD_ID128_MAKE(ef,4a,c1,36,79,a9,48,0e,a7,db,68,89,7f,9f,16,5d)
#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK \
SD_ID128_MAKE(af,49,50,a8,49,13,4e,b1,a7,38,46,30,4f,f3,0c,05)
-#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT SD_ID128_MAKE(05,84,69,da,f6,f5,43,24,80,05,49,da,0f,8e,a2,fb)
+#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED \
+ SD_ID128_MAKE(ad,bc,4c,a3,ef,b6,42,01,ba,88,1b,6f,2e,40,95,ea)
+#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL SD_ID128_MAKE(05,84,69,da,f6,f5,43,24,80,05,49,da,0f,8e,a2,fb)
/* Two special IDs to pick a general automatic mode (i.e. tpm2+host if TPM2 exists, only host otherwise) or
* an initrd-specific automatic mode (i.e. tpm2 if firmware can do it, otherwise fixed zero-length key, and
@@ -74,6 +86,18 @@ int get_credential_user_password(const char *username, char **ret_password, bool
* with an underscore. */
#define _CRED_AUTO SD_ID128_MAKE(a2,19,cb,07,85,b2,4c,04,b1,6d,18,ca,b9,d2,ee,01)
#define _CRED_AUTO_INITRD SD_ID128_MAKE(02,dc,8e,de,3a,02,43,ab,a9,ec,54,9c,05,e6,a0,71)
+#define _CRED_AUTO_SCOPED SD_ID128_MAKE(23,88,96,85,6f,74,48,8a,9c,78,6f,6a,b0,e7,3b,6a)
+
+int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret);
+int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const char *tpm2_signature_path, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret);
+
+int ipc_encrypt_credential(const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret);
+int ipc_decrypt_credential(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, uid_t uid, const struct iovec *input, CredentialFlags flags, struct iovec *ret);
+
+typedef struct PickUpCredential {
+ const char *credential_prefix;
+ const char *target_dir;
+ const char *filename_suffix;
+} PickUpCredential;
-int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size);
-int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const char *tpm2_signature_path, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size);
+int pick_up_credentials(const PickUpCredential *table, size_t n_table_entry);