Adding upstream version 255.4.upstream/255.4

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 478 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55d7481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+#pragma once
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "bitfield.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "json.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "openssl-util.h"
+#include "ordered-set.h"
+#include "sha256.h"
+#include "tpm2-pcr.h"
+
+typedef enum TPM2Flags {
+        TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN     = 1 << 0,
+        TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK = 1 << 1,
+} TPM2Flags;
+
+/* As per https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf a
+ * TPM2 on a Client PC must have at least 24 PCRs. This hardcodes our expectation of 24. */
+#define TPM2_PCRS_MAX 24U
+#define TPM2_PCRS_MASK ((UINT32_C(1) << TPM2_PCRS_MAX) - 1)
+
+/* The SRK handle is defined in the Provisioning Guidance document (see above) in the table "Reserved Handles
+ * for TPM Provisioning Fundamental Elements". The SRK is useful because it is "shared", meaning it has no
+ * authValue nor authPolicy set, and thus may be used by anyone on the system to generate derived keys or
+ * seal secrets. This is useful if the TPM has an auth (password) set for the 'owner hierarchy', which would
+ * prevent users from generating primary transient keys, unless they knew the owner hierarchy auth. See
+ * the Provisioning Guidance document for more details. */
+#define TPM2_SRK_HANDLE UINT32_C(0x81000001)
+
+/* The TPM specification limits sealed data to MAX_SYM_DATA. Unfortunately, tpm2-tss incorrectly
+ * defines this value as 256; the TPM specification Part 2 ("Structures") section
+ * "TPMU_SENSITIVE_CREATE" states "For interoperability, MAX_SYM_DATA should be 128." */
+#define TPM2_MAX_SEALED_DATA UINT16_C(128)
+
+static inline bool TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(unsigned pcr) {
+        return pcr < TPM2_PCRS_MAX;
+}
+static inline bool TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(uint32_t pcr_mask) {
+        return pcr_mask <= TPM2_PCRS_MASK;
+}
+
+#define FOREACH_PCR_IN_MASK(pcr, mask) BIT_FOREACH(pcr, mask)
+
+#define TPM2_N_HASH_ALGORITHMS 4U
+
+#if HAVE_TPM2
+
+#include <tss2/tss2_esys.h>
+#include <tss2/tss2_mu.h>
+#include <tss2/tss2_rc.h>
+
+int dlopen_tpm2(void);
+
+typedef struct {
+        unsigned n_ref;
+
+        void *tcti_dl;
+        TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *tcti_context;
+        ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context;
+
+        /* Some selected cached capabilities of the TPM */
+        TPMS_ALG_PROPERTY *capability_algorithms;
+        size_t n_capability_algorithms;
+        TPMA_CC *capability_commands;
+        size_t n_capability_commands;
+        TPM2_ECC_CURVE *capability_ecc_curves;
+        size_t n_capability_ecc_curves;
+        TPML_PCR_SELECTION capability_pcrs;
+} Tpm2Context;
+
+int tpm2_context_new(const char *device, Tpm2Context **ret_context);
+Tpm2Context *tpm2_context_ref(Tpm2Context *context);
+Tpm2Context *tpm2_context_unref(Tpm2Context *context);
+DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(Tpm2Context*, tpm2_context_unref);
+
+typedef struct {
+        Tpm2Context *tpm2_context;
+        ESYS_TR esys_handle;
+
+        bool flush;
+} Tpm2Handle;
+
+#define _tpm2_handle(c, h) { .tpm2_context = (c), .esys_handle = (h), }
+static const Tpm2Handle TPM2_HANDLE_NONE = _tpm2_handle(NULL, ESYS_TR_NONE);
+
+void Esys_Freep(void *p);
+
+int tpm2_handle_new(Tpm2Context *context, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+Tpm2Handle *tpm2_handle_free(Tpm2Handle *handle);
+DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(Tpm2Handle*, tpm2_handle_free);
+
+typedef struct {
+        unsigned index;
+        TPMI_ALG_HASH hash;
+        TPM2B_DIGEST value;
+} Tpm2PCRValue;
+
+#define TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(i, h, v)                                    \
+        (Tpm2PCRValue) {                                                \
+                .index = (i),                                           \
+                .hash = (h),                                            \
+                .value = ((TPM2B_DIGEST) v),                            \
+        }
+
+bool tpm2_pcr_value_valid(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value);
+bool tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+bool tpm2_pcr_values_has_all_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_pcr_value_from_string(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue *ret_pcr_value);
+char *tpm2_pcr_value_to_string(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value);
+
+bool tpm2_pcr_values_valid(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+void tpm2_sort_pcr_values(Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_pcr_values_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_pcr_values_to_mask(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t *ret_mask);
+int tpm2_pcr_values_from_string(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values);
+char *tpm2_pcr_values_to_string(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_pcr_values_hash_count(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, size_t *ret_count);
+int tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_pcr_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *ret_selection, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_values, size_t *ret_n_values);
+
+int tpm2_make_encryption_session(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *primary, const Tpm2Handle *bind_key, Tpm2Handle **ret_session);
+
+int tpm2_create_primary(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *template, const TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+int tpm2_create(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPMT_PUBLIC *template, const TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE **ret_private);
+int tpm2_create_loaded(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPMT_PUBLIC *template, const TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE **ret_private, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+int tpm2_load(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *private, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+int tpm2_marshal_public(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret, size_t *ret_size);
+int tpm2_marshal_nv_public(const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *nv_public, void **ret, size_t *ret_size);
+int tpm2_unmarshal_nv_public(const void *data, size_t size, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *ret_nv_public);
+int tpm2_marshal_blob(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *private, const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *seed, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size);
+int tpm2_unmarshal_blob(const void *blob, size_t blob_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE *ret_private, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *ret_seed);
+
+bool tpm2_supports_alg(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_ALG_ID alg);
+bool tpm2_supports_command(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_CC command);
+bool tpm2_supports_ecc_curve(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_ECC_CURVE ecc_curve);
+
+bool tpm2_test_parms(Tpm2Context *c, TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg, const TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *parms);
+
+int tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH **ret_banks);
+int tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, char ***ret);
+int tpm2_get_best_pcr_bank(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH *ret);
+
+const char *tpm2_userspace_log_path(void);
+const char *tpm2_firmware_log_path(void);
+
+typedef enum Tpm2UserspaceEventType {
+        TPM2_EVENT_PHASE,
+        TPM2_EVENT_FILESYSTEM,
+        TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY,
+        TPM2_EVENT_MACHINE_ID,
+        _TPM2_USERSPACE_EVENT_TYPE_MAX,
+        _TPM2_USERSPACE_EVENT_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL,
+} Tpm2UserspaceEventType;
+
+const char* tpm2_userspace_event_type_to_string(Tpm2UserspaceEventType type) _const_;
+Tpm2UserspaceEventType tpm2_userspace_event_type_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
+
+int tpm2_extend_bytes(Tpm2Context *c, char **banks, unsigned pcr_index, const void *data, size_t data_size, const void *secret, size_t secret_size, Tpm2UserspaceEventType event, const char *description);
+
+uint32_t tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_to_mask(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *ret);
+bool tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_has_mask(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_add_mask(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_sub_mask(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_add(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_sub(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b);
+void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_move(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b);
+char *tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_to_string(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s);
+size_t tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_weight(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s);
+#define tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_is_empty(s) (tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_weight(s) == 0)
+
+uint32_t tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_to_mask(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *ret);
+bool tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_has_mask(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add_mask(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub_mask(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add_tpms_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub_tpms_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *b);
+void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *b);
+char *tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_to_string(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l);
+size_t tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_weight(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l);
+#define tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_is_empty(l) (tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_weight(l) == 0)
+
+int tpm2_digest_many(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const struct iovec data[], size_t count, bool extend);
+static inline int tpm2_digest_buffer(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const void *data, size_t len, bool extend) {
+        return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, &IOVEC_MAKE((void*) data, len), 1, extend);
+}
+int tpm2_digest_many_digests(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const TPM2B_DIGEST data[], size_t count, bool extend);
+static inline int tpm2_digest_rehash(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest) {
+        return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, NULL, 0, true);
+}
+static inline int tpm2_digest_init(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest) {
+        return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, NULL, 0, false);
+}
+
+void tpm2_log_debug_tpml_pcr_selection(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const char *msg);
+void tpm2_log_debug_pcr_value(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value, const char *msg);
+void tpm2_log_debug_buffer(const void *buffer, size_t size, const char *msg);
+void tpm2_log_debug_digest(const TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const char *msg);
+void tpm2_log_debug_name(const TPM2B_NAME *name, const char *msg);
+
+typedef struct Tpm2PCRPredictionResult {
+        TPM2B_DIGEST hash[TPM2_N_HASH_ALGORITHMS]; /* a hash for each potential algorithm */
+} Tpm2PCRPredictionResult;
+
+TPM2B_DIGEST *tpm2_pcr_prediction_result_get_hash(Tpm2PCRPredictionResult *result, uint16_t alg);
+
+/* A structure encapsulating a full set of PCR predictions with alternatives. This can be converted into a
+ * series of PolicyOR + PolicyPCR items for the TPM. */
+typedef struct Tpm2PCRPrediction {
+        uint32_t pcrs;                      /* A mask of pcrs included */
+        OrderedSet* results[TPM2_PCRS_MAX]; /* set of Tpm2PCRPredictionResult objects, one for each PCR */
+} Tpm2PCRPrediction;
+
+void tpm2_pcr_prediction_done(Tpm2PCRPrediction *p);
+
+extern const struct hash_ops tpm2_pcr_prediction_result_hash_ops;
+
+bool tpm2_pcr_prediction_equal(Tpm2PCRPrediction *a, Tpm2PCRPrediction *b, uint16_t algorithm);
+
+int tpm2_pcr_prediction_to_json(const Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, JsonVariant **ret);
+int tpm2_pcr_prediction_from_json(Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, JsonVariant *aj);
+
+/* As structure encapsulating all metadata stored for a pcrlock policy on disk */
+typedef struct Tpm2PCRLockPolicy {
+        /* The below is the fixed metadata encoding information about the NV index we store the
+         * PolicyAuthorizeNV policy in, as well as a pinned SRK, and the encrypted PIN to use for writing to
+         * the NV Index. */
+        uint16_t algorithm;
+        uint32_t nv_index;
+        struct iovec nv_handle;
+        struct iovec nv_public;
+        struct iovec srk_handle;
+        struct iovec pin_public;
+        struct iovec pin_private;
+
+        /* The below contains the current prediction whose resulting policy is stored in the NV
+         * index. Once in JSON and once in parsed form. When the policy is updated the fields below are
+         * changed, the fields above remain fixed. */
+        JsonVariant *prediction_json;
+        Tpm2PCRPrediction prediction;
+} Tpm2PCRLockPolicy;
+
+void tpm2_pcrlock_policy_done(Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *data);
+int tpm2_pcrlock_search_file(const char *path, FILE **ret_file, char **ret_path);
+int tpm2_pcrlock_policy_load(const char *path, Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *ret_policy);
+
+int tpm2_index_to_handle(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_HANDLE index, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+int tpm2_index_from_handle(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, TPM2_HANDLE *ret_index);
+
+int tpm2_pcr_read(Tpm2Context *c, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_selection, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_pcr_read_missing_values(Tpm2Context *c, Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values);
+
+int tpm2_get_pin_auth(TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, const char *pin, TPM2B_AUTH *ret_auth);
+int tpm2_set_auth(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, const char *pin);
+int tpm2_set_auth_binary(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, const TPM2B_AUTH *auth);
+
+int tpm2_make_policy_session(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *primary, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, Tpm2Handle **ret_session);
+
+int tpm2_policy_auth_value(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest);
+int tpm2_policy_authorize_nv(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest);
+int tpm2_policy_pcr(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_selection, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest);
+int tpm2_policy_or(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_DIGEST *branches, size_t n_branches, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest);
+int tpm2_policy_super_pcr(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm);
+
+int tpm2_calculate_pubkey_name(const TPMT_PUBLIC *public, TPM2B_NAME *ret_name);
+int tpm2_calculate_nv_index_name(const TPMS_NV_PUBLIC *nvpublic, TPM2B_NAME *ret_name);
+
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_auth_value(TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_authorize(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy_ref, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_authorize_nv(const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *public, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_pcr(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_or(const TPM2B_DIGEST *branches, size_t n_branches, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_policy_super_pcr(Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, TPM2B_DIGEST *pcr_policy);
+int tpm2_calculate_serialize(TPM2_HANDLE handle, const TPM2B_NAME *name, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret_serialized, size_t *ret_serialized_size);
+int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, bool use_pin, const Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *policy, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_seal(TPM2_HANDLE parent_handle, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *parent_public, const TPMA_OBJECT *attributes, const void *secret, size_t secret_size, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_serialized_parent, size_t *ret_serialized_parent_size);
+
+int tpm2_get_srk_template(TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg, TPMT_PUBLIC *ret_template);
+int tpm2_get_best_srk_template(Tpm2Context *c, TPMT_PUBLIC *ret_template);
+
+int tpm2_get_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+int tpm2_get_or_create_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+
+int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
+int tpm2_unseal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, JsonVariant *signature, const char *pin, const Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *pcrlock_policy, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
+
+#if HAVE_OPENSSL
+int tpm2_tpm2b_public_to_openssl_pkey(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, EVP_PKEY **ret);
+int tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_openssl_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret);
+#endif
+
+int tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(const void *pem, size_t pem_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret);
+int tpm2_tpm2b_public_to_fingerprint(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret_fingerprint, size_t *ret_fingerprint_size);
+
+int tpm2_define_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2_HANDLE requested_nv_index, const TPM2B_DIGEST *write_policy, const char *pin, const TPM2B_AUTH *auth, TPM2_HANDLE *ret_nv_index, Tpm2Handle **ret_nv_handle, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *ret_nv_public);
+int tpm2_write_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *policy_session, TPM2_HANDLE nv_index, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy_digest);
+int tpm2_undefine_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2_HANDLE nv_index, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle);
+
+int tpm2_seal_data(Tpm2Context *c, const struct iovec *data, const Tpm2Handle *primary_handle, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, struct iovec *ret_public, struct iovec *ret_private);
+int tpm2_unseal_data(Tpm2Context *c, const struct iovec *public, const struct iovec *private, const Tpm2Handle *primary_handle, const Tpm2Handle *policy_session, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, struct iovec *ret_data);
+
+int tpm2_serialize(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, void **ret_serialized, size_t *ret_serialized_size);
+int tpm2_deserialize(Tpm2Context *c, const void *serialized, size_t serialized_size, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
+
+int tpm2_load_public_key_file(const char *path, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret);
+
+/* The tpm2-tss library has many structs that are simply a combination of an array (or object) and
+ * size. These macros allow easily initializing or assigning instances of such structs from an existing
+ * buffer/object and size, while also checking the size for safety with the struct buffer/object size. If the
+ * provided buffer/object is NULL, the resulting struct's buffer/object will be 0s. If the provided size is
+ * larger than the struct's buffer/object size, this results in assertion failure; to check the size, use one
+ * of the TPM2B_*_CHECK_SIZE() macros. */
+#define TPM2B_AUTH_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_AUTH, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_DATA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_DATA, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET, secret, size)
+#define TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_NAME_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_NAME, name, size)
+#define TPM2B_PRIVATE_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PRIVATE, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA, buffer, size)
+#define TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field) \
+        _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, UNIQ, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field)
+#define _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, uniq, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field) \
+        ({                                                              \
+                typeof(buf) UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq) = (buf);                  \
+                typeof(size) UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) = (size);               \
+                struct_type UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq) = { .size_field = UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq), }; \
+                assert(sizeof(UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq).buffer_field) >= (size_t) UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq)); \
+                if (UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq))                                  \
+                        memcpy_safe(UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq).buffer_field, UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq), UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq)); \
+                UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq);                                   \
+        })
+
+/* Check if the size will fit in the TPM2B struct buffer. Returns 0 if the size will fit, otherwise this logs
+ * a debug message and returns < 0. */
+#define TPM2B_AUTH_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_AUTH, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_DATA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_DATA, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_DIGEST_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_NAME_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_NAME, name)
+#define TPM2B_PRIVATE_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PRIVATE, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA, buffer)
+#define TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, struct_type, buffer_field) \
+        _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, UNIQ, struct_type, buffer_field)
+#define _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, uniq, struct_type, buffer_field) \
+        ({                                                              \
+                size_t UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) = (size_t) (size);            \
+                size_t UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq) = sizeof_field(struct_type, buffer_field); \
+                UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq) < UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) ?            \
+                        log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),        \
+                                        "Size %zu larger than " #struct_type " buffer size %zu.", \
+                                        UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq), UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq)) : \
+                        0;                                              \
+        })
+
+#else /* HAVE_TPM2 */
+typedef struct {} Tpm2Context;
+typedef struct {} Tpm2Handle;
+typedef struct {} Tpm2PCRValue;
+
+#define TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(i, h, v) (Tpm2PCRValue) {}
+
+static inline int tpm2_pcrlock_search_file(const char *path, FILE **ret_file, char **ret_path) {
+        return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_TPM2 */
+
+int tpm2_list_devices(void);
+int tpm2_find_device_auto(char **ret);
+
+int tpm2_make_pcr_json_array(uint32_t pcr_mask, JsonVariant **ret);
+int tpm2_parse_pcr_json_array(JsonVariant *v, uint32_t *ret);
+
+int tpm2_make_luks2_json(int keyslot, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *salt, size_t salt_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, TPM2Flags flags, JsonVariant **ret);
+int tpm2_parse_luks2_json(JsonVariant *v, int *ret_keyslot, uint32_t *ret_hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, void **ret_pubkey, size_t *ret_pubkey_size, uint32_t *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_policy_hash, size_t *ret_policy_hash_size, void **ret_salt, size_t *ret_salt_size, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size, TPM2Flags *ret_flags);
+
+/* Default to PCR 7 only */
+#define TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT UINT32_C(7)
+#define TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT)
+
+/* We want the helpers below to work also if TPM2 libs are not available, hence define these four defines if
+ * they are missing. */
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA1
+#define TPM2_ALG_SHA1 0x4
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA256
+#define TPM2_ALG_SHA256 0xB
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA384
+#define TPM2_ALG_SHA384 0xC
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA512
+#define TPM2_ALG_SHA512 0xD
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_ECC
+#define TPM2_ALG_ECC 0x23
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TPM2_ALG_RSA
+#define TPM2_ALG_RSA 0x1
+#endif
+
+int tpm2_hash_alg_to_size(uint16_t alg);
+
+const char *tpm2_hash_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_;
+int tpm2_hash_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_;
+
+const char *tpm2_asym_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_;
+int tpm2_asym_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_;
+
+const char *tpm2_sym_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_;
+int tpm2_sym_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_;
+
+const char *tpm2_sym_mode_to_string(uint16_t mode) _const_;
+int tpm2_sym_mode_from_string(const char *mode) _pure_;
+
+char *tpm2_pcr_mask_to_string(uint32_t mask);
+
+extern const uint16_t tpm2_hash_algorithms[];
+
+typedef struct {
+        uint32_t search_pcr_mask;
+        const char *device;
+        const char *signature_path;
+        const char *pcrlock_path;
+} systemd_tpm2_plugin_params;
+
+typedef enum Tpm2Support {
+        /* NOTE! The systemd-creds tool returns these flags 1:1 as exit status. Hence these flags are pretty
+         * much ABI! Hence, be extra careful when changing/extending these definitions. */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_NONE      = 0,       /* no support */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_FIRMWARE  = 1 << 0,  /* firmware reports TPM2 was used */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_DRIVER    = 1 << 1,  /* the kernel has a driver loaded for it */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_SYSTEM    = 1 << 2,  /* we support it ourselves */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_SUBSYSTEM = 1 << 3,  /* the kernel has the tpm subsystem enabled */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_LIBRARIES = 1 << 4,  /* we can dlopen the tpm2 libraries */
+        TPM2_SUPPORT_FULL      = TPM2_SUPPORT_FIRMWARE|TPM2_SUPPORT_DRIVER|TPM2_SUPPORT_SYSTEM|TPM2_SUPPORT_SUBSYSTEM|TPM2_SUPPORT_LIBRARIES,
+} Tpm2Support;
+
+Tpm2Support tpm2_support(void);
+
+int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values);
+int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(const char *arg, uint32_t *mask);
+
+int tpm2_load_pcr_signature(const char *path, JsonVariant **ret);
+int tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(const char *path, void **ret_pubkey, size_t *ret_pubkey_size);
+
+int tpm2_util_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256(const void *pass,
+                    size_t passlen,
+                    const void *salt,
+                    size_t saltlen,
+                    uint8_t res[static SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+
+enum {
+        /* Additional defines for the PCR index naming enum from "fundamental/tpm2-pcr.h" */
+        _TPM2_PCR_INDEX_MAX_DEFINED = TPM2_PCRS_MAX,
+        _TPM2_PCR_INDEX_INVALID     = -EINVAL,
+};
+
+int tpm2_pcr_index_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
+const char *tpm2_pcr_index_to_string(int pcr) _const_;