Adding upstream version 255.4.upstream/255.4

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 909 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-65.sh b/test/units/testsuite-65.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a6bb38d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/units/testsuite-65.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,909 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
+# shellcheck disable=SC2016
+set -eux
+
+# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh
+. "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh
+
+systemctl log-level debug
+export SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug
+
+# Sanity checks
+#
+# We can't really test time, critical-chain and plot verbs here, as
+# the testsuite service is a part of the boot transaction, so let's assume
+# they fail
+systemd-analyze || :
+systemd-analyze time || :
+systemd-analyze critical-chain || :
+# blame
+systemd-analyze blame
+systemd-run --wait --user --pipe -M testuser@.host systemd-analyze blame
+# plot
+systemd-analyze plot >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=short >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=off >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty --no-legend >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=short --no-legend >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --json=off --no-legend >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --table >/dev/null || :
+systemd-analyze plot --table --no-legend >/dev/null || :
+# legacy/deprecated options (moved to systemctl, but still usable from analyze)
+systemd-analyze log-level
+systemd-analyze log-level "$(systemctl log-level)"
+systemd-analyze get-log-level
+systemd-analyze set-log-level "$(systemctl log-level)"
+systemd-analyze log-target
+systemd-analyze log-target "$(systemctl log-target)"
+systemd-analyze get-log-target
+systemd-analyze set-log-target "$(systemctl log-target)"
+systemd-analyze service-watchdogs
+systemd-analyze service-watchdogs "$(systemctl service-watchdogs)"
+# dot
+systemd-analyze dot >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*" --from-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot --to-pattern="*" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*.service" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot --order systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot --require systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dot "systemd-*.service" >/dev/null
+(! systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service "*" bbb ccc)
+# dump
+# this should be rate limited to 10 calls in 10 minutes for unprivileged callers
+for _ in {1..10}; do
+    runas testuser systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+done
+(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
+# still limited after a reload
+systemctl daemon-reload
+(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
+# and a re-exec
+systemctl daemon-reexec
+(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
+# privileged call, so should not be rate limited
+for _ in {1..10}; do
+    systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+done
+systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dump "*" >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" "*.service" aaaaaaa ... >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze malloc >/dev/null
+(! systemd-analyze dump "")
+# unit-files
+systemd-analyze unit-files >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze unit-files systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze unit-files "*" >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze unit-files "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze unit-files --user >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze unit-files --user "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null
+# unit-paths
+systemd-analyze unit-paths
+systemd-analyze unit-paths --user
+systemd-analyze unit-paths --global
+# exist-status
+systemd-analyze exit-status
+systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF
+systemd-analyze exit-status 0 1 {63..65}
+(! systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF "hello*")
+# capability
+systemd-analyze capability
+systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL
+systemd-analyze capability 0 1 {30..32}
+(! systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL "hello*")
+# condition
+mkdir -p /run/systemd/system
+UNIT_NAME="analyze-condition-$RANDOM.service"
+cat >"/run/systemd/system/$UNIT_NAME" <<EOF
+[Unit]
+AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release
+AssertEnvironment=!FOOBAR
+ConditionKernelVersion=>1.0
+ConditionPathExists=/etc/os-release
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart=/bin/true
+EOF
+systemctl daemon-reload
+systemd-analyze condition --unit="$UNIT_NAME"
+systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion = ! <4.0' \
+                          'ConditionKernelVersion = >=3.1' \
+                          'ConditionACPower=|false' \
+                          'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' \
+                          'AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release'
+(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' 'AssertXYZ=foo')
+(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion=<1.0')
+(! systemd-analyze condition 'AssertKernelVersion=<1.0')
+# syscall-filter
+systemd-analyze syscall-filter >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync
+systemd-analyze syscall-filter @sync @sync @sync
+(! systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync @foobar)
+# filesystems (requires libbpf support)
+if systemctl --version | grep "+BPF_FRAMEWORK"; then
+    systemd-analyze filesystems >/dev/null
+    systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api
+    systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @basic-api
+    (! systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @foobar @basic-api)
+fi
+# calendar
+systemd-analyze calendar '*-2-29 0:0:0'
+systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-2-29 0:0:0'
+systemd-analyze calendar '*-* *:*:*'
+systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*'
+systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=50 '*-* *:*:*'
+systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* *:*:*'
+systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '01-01-22 01:00:00'
+systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=yesterday --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*'
+(! systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* 99:*:*')
+(! systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=never '*-* *:*:*')
+(! systemd-analyze calendar 1)
+(! systemd-analyze calendar "")
+# timestamp
+systemd-analyze timestamp now
+systemd-analyze timestamp -- -1
+systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday now tomorrow
+(! systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday never tomorrow)
+(! systemd-analyze timestamp 1)
+(! systemd-analyze timestamp '*-2-29 0:0:0')
+(! systemd-analyze timestamp "")
+# timespan
+systemd-analyze timespan 1
+systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s '1year 0.000001s'
+(! systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s aaaaaa '1year 0.000001s')
+(! systemd-analyze timespan -- -1)
+(! systemd-analyze timespan '*-2-29 0:0:0')
+(! systemd-analyze timespan "")
+# cat-config
+systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config foo/bar
+systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
+systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr foo/bar
+# security
+systemd-analyze security
+systemd-analyze security --json=off
+systemd-analyze security --json=pretty | jq
+systemd-analyze security --json=short | jq
+
+if [[ ! -v ASAN_OPTIONS ]]; then
+    # check that systemd-analyze cat-config paths work in a chroot
+    mkdir -p /tmp/root
+    mount --bind / /tmp/root
+    systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out1
+    chroot /tmp/root systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out2
+    diff /tmp/out{1,2}
+fi
+
+# verify
+mkdir -p /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/
+mkdir -p /tmp/img/opt/
+
+touch /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh
+chmod +x /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
+[Service]
+ExecStart = /opt/script0.sh
+EOF
+
+set +e
+# Default behaviour is to recurse through all dependencies when unit is loaded
+(! systemd-analyze verify --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
+
+# As above, recurses through all dependencies when unit is loaded
+(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
+
+# Recurses through unit file and its direct dependencies when unit is loaded
+(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=one --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
+
+set -e
+
+# zero exit status since dependencies are ignored when unit is loaded
+systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
+
+rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service
+[Unit]
+foo = bar
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart = echo hello
+EOF
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile2.service
+[Unit]
+Requires = testfile.service
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart = echo hello
+EOF
+
+# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
+systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/testfile2.service
+
+set +e
+# Non-zero exit status since all associated dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
+(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes /tmp/testfile2.service)
+set -e
+
+rm /tmp/testfile.service
+rm /tmp/testfile2.service
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/sample.service
+[Unit]
+Description = A Sample Service
+
+[Service]
+ExecStart = echo hello
+Slice=support.slice
+EOF
+
+# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
+systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/sample.service
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service
+[Service]
+ExecStart = echo hello
+DeviceAllow=/dev/sda
+EOF
+
+# Prevent regression from #13380 and #20859 where we can't verify hidden files
+cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/.testfile.service
+
+systemd-analyze verify /tmp/.testfile.service
+
+rm /tmp/.testfile.service
+
+# Alias a unit file's name on disk (see #20061)
+cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/testsrvc
+
+(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc)
+
+systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc:alias.service
+
+# Zero exit status since the value used for comparison determine exposure to security threats is by default 100
+systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service
+
+#The overall exposure level assigned to the unit is greater than the set threshold
+(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service)
+
+# Ensure we print the list of ACLs, see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23185
+systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service | grep -q -F "/dev/sda"
+
+rm /tmp/testfile.service
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
+[Service]
+ExecStart = echo hello
+PrivateNetwork = yes
+PrivateDevices = yes
+PrivateUsers = yes
+EOF
+
+# The new overall exposure level assigned to the unit is less than the set thresholds
+# Verifies that the --offline= option works with --root=
+systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/foo@.service
+[Service]
+ExecStart=ls
+EOF
+
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/hoge@test.service
+[Service]
+ExecStart=ls
+EOF
+
+# issue #30357
+pushd /tmp
+systemd-analyze verify foo@bar.service
+systemd-analyze verify foo@.service
+systemd-analyze verify hoge@test.service
+(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@nonexist.service)
+(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@.service)
+popd
+pushd /
+systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@bar.service
+systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@.service
+systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@test.service
+(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
+(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@.service)
+popd
+pushd /usr
+systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@bar.service
+systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@.service
+systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@test.service
+(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
+(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@.service)
+popd
+systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@bar.service
+systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@.service
+systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@test.service
+(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
+(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@.service)
+
+# Added an additional "INVALID_ID" id to the .json to verify that nothing breaks when input is malformed
+# The PrivateNetwork id description and weight was changed to verify that 'security' is actually reading in
+# values from the .json file when required. The default weight for "PrivateNetwork" is 2500, and the new weight
+# assigned to that id in the .json file is 6000. This increased weight means that when the "PrivateNetwork" key is
+# set to 'yes' (as above in the case of testfile.service) in the content of the unit file, the overall exposure
+# level for the unit file should decrease to account for that increased weight.
+cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.json
+{"UserOrDynamicUser":
+    {"description_bad": "Service runs as root user",
+    "weight": 0,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SupplementaryGroups":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no supplementary groups",
+    "description_bad": "Service runs with supplementary groups",
+    "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not matter",
+    "weight": 200,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"PrivateDevices":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no access to hardware devices",
+    "description_bad": "Service potentially has access to hardware devices",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"PrivateMounts":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot install system mounts",
+    "description_bad": "Service may install system mounts",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"PrivateNetwork":
+    {"description_good": "Service doesn't have access to the host's network",
+    "description_bad": "Service has access to the host's network",
+    "weight": 6000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"PrivateTmp":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no access to other software's temporary files",
+    "description_bad": "Service has access to other software's temporary files",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"PrivateUsers":
+    {"description_good": "Service does not have access to other users",
+    "description_bad": "Service has access to other users",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectControlGroups":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot modify the control group file system",
+    "description_bad": "Service may modify the control group file system",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectKernelModules":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot load or read kernel modules",
+    "description_bad": "Service may load or read kernel modules",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectKernelTunables":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot alter kernel tunables (/proc/sys, …)",
+    "description_bad": "Service may alter kernel tunables",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectKernelLogs":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
+    "description_bad": "Service may read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectClock":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot write to the hardware clock or system clock",
+    "description_bad": "Service may write to the hardware clock or system clock",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectHome":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"ProtectHostname":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot change system host/domainname",
+    "description_bad": "Service may change system host/domainname",
+    "weight": 50,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectSystem":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"RootDirectoryOrRootImage":
+    {"description_good": "Service has its own root directory/image",
+    "description_bad": "Service runs within the host's root directory",
+    "weight": 200,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"LockPersonality":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot change ABI personality",
+    "description_bad": "Service may change ABI personality",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"MemoryDenyWriteExecute":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create writable executable memory mappings",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create writable executable memory mappings",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"NoNewPrivileges":
+    {"description_good": "Service processes cannot acquire new privileges",
+    "description_bad": "Service processes may acquire new privileges",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_ADMIN":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no administrator privileges",
+    "description_bad": "Service has administrator privileges",
+    "weight": 1500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SET_UID_GID_PCAP":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot change UID/GID identities/capabilities",
+    "description_bad": "Service may change UID/GID identities/capabilities",
+    "weight": 1500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PTRACE":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no ptrace() debugging abilities",
+    "description_bad": "Service has ptrace() debugging abilities",
+    "weight": 1500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TIME":
+    {"description_good": "Service processes cannot change the system clock",
+    "description_bad": "Service processes may change the system clock",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_ADMIN":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no network configuration privileges",
+    "description_bad": "Service has network configuration privileges",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_RAWIO":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no raw I/O access",
+    "description_bad": "Service has raw I/O access",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_MODULE":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot load kernel modules",
+    "description_bad": "Service may load kernel modules",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_AUDIT":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no audit subsystem access",
+    "description_bad": "Service has audit subsystem access",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYSLOG":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no access to kernel logging",
+    "description_bad": "Service has access to kernel logging",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_NICE_RESOURCE":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no privileges to change resource use parameters",
+    "description_bad": "Service has privileges to change resource use parameters",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MKNOD":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create device nodes",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create device nodes",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_CHOWN_FSETID_SETFCAP":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot change file ownership/access mode/capabilities",
+    "description_bad": "Service may change file ownership/access mode/capabilities unrestricted",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_DAC_FOWNER_IPC_OWNER":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot override UNIX file/IPC permission checks",
+    "description_bad": "Service may override UNIX file/IPC permission checks",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_KILL":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes",
+    "description_bad": "Service may send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE_BROADCAST_RAW":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no elevated networking privileges",
+    "description_bad": "Service has elevated networking privileges",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_BOOT":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue reboot()",
+    "description_bad": "Service may issue reboot()",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MAC":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot adjust SMACK MAC",
+    "description_bad": "Service may adjust SMACK MAC",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot mark files immutable",
+    "description_bad": "Service may mark files immutable",
+    "weight": 75,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_IPC_LOCK":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot lock memory into RAM",
+    "description_bad": "Service may lock memory into RAM",
+    "weight": 50,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_CHROOT":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue chroot()",
+    "description_bad": "Service may issue chroot()",
+    "weight": 50,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot establish wake locks",
+    "description_bad": "Service may establish wake locks",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_WAKE_ALARM":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot program timers that wake up the system",
+    "description_bad": "Service may program timers that wake up the system",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LEASE":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create file leases",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create file leases",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue vhangup()",
+    "description_bad": "Service may issue vhangup()",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PACCT":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot use acct()",
+    "description_bad": "Service may use acct()",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BPF":
+    {"description_good": "Service may load BPF programs",
+    "description_bad": "Service may not load BPF programs",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"UMask":
+    {"weight": 100,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"KeyringMode":
+    {"description_good": "Service doesn't share key material with other services",
+    "description_bad": "Service shares key material with other service",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"ProtectProc":
+    {"description_good": "Service has restricted access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)",
+    "description_bad": "Service has full access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 3
+    },
+"ProcSubset":
+    {"description_good": "Service has no access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)",
+    "description_bad": "Service has full access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)",
+    "weight": 10,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"NotifyAccess":
+    {"description_good": "Service child processes cannot alter service state",
+    "description_bad": "Service child processes may alter service state",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RemoveIPC":
+    {"description_good": "Service user cannot leave SysV IPC objects around",
+    "description_bad": "Service user may leave SysV IPC objects around",
+    "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not apply",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"Delegate":
+    {"description_good": "Service does not maintain its own delegated control group subtree",
+    "description_bad": "Service maintains its own delegated control group subtree",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictRealtime":
+    {"description_good": "Service realtime scheduling access is restricted",
+    "description_bad": "Service may acquire realtime scheduling",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictSUIDSGID":
+    {"description_good": "SUID/SGIDfilecreationbyserviceisrestricted",
+    "description_bad": "ServicemaycreateSUID/SGIDfiles",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_user":
+    {"description_good": "Servicecannotcreateusernamespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Servicemaycreateusernamespaces",
+    "weight": 1500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_mnt":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create file system namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create file system namespaces",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_ipc":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create IPC namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create IPC namespaces",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_pid":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create process namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create process namespaces",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_cgroup":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create cgroup namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create cgroup namespaces",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_net":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create network namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create network namespaces",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictNamespaces_uts":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot create hostname namespaces",
+    "description_bad": "Service may create hostname namespaces",
+    "weight": 100,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_INET_INET6":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate Internet sockets",
+    "description_bad": "Service may allocate Internet sockets",
+    "weight": 1500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_UNIX":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate local sockets",
+    "description_bad": "Service may allocate local sockets",
+    "weight": 25,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_NETLINK":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate netlink sockets",
+    "description_bad": "Service may allocate netlink sockets",
+    "weight": 200,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_PACKET":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate packet sockets",
+    "description_bad": "Service may allocate packet sockets",
+    "weight": 1000,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"RestrictAddressFamilies_OTHER":
+    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate exotic sockets",
+    "description_bad": "Service may allocate exotic sockets",
+    "weight": 1250,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"SystemCallArchitectures":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_swap":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_obsolete":
+    {"weight": 250,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_clock":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_cpu_emulation":
+    {"weight": 250,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_debug":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_mount":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_module":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_raw_io":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_reboot":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_privileged":
+    {"weight": 700,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"SystemCallFilter_resources":
+    {"weight": 700,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"IPAddressDeny":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"DeviceAllow":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    },
+"AmbientCapabilities":
+    {"description_good": "Service process does not receive ambient capabilities",
+    "description_bad": "Service process receives ambient capabilities",
+    "weight": 500,
+    "range": 1
+    },
+"INVALID_ID":
+    {"weight": 1000,
+    "range": 10
+    }
+}
+EOF
+
+# Reads in custom security requirements from the parsed .json file and uses these for comparison
+systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true \
+                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
+                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
+
+# The strict profile adds a lot of sanboxing options
+systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
+                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
+                           --profile=strict \
+                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
+
+# The trusted profile doesn't add any sanboxing options
+(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
+                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
+                           --profile=/usr/lib/systemd/portable/profile/trusted/service.conf \
+                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
+
+(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=50 --offline=true \
+                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
+                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
+
+rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
+
+if systemd-analyze --version | grep -q -F "+ELFUTILS"; then
+    systemd-analyze inspect-elf --json=short /lib/systemd/systemd | grep -q -F '"elfType":"executable"'
+fi
+
+systemd-analyze --threshold=90 security systemd-journald.service
+
+# issue 23663
+check() {(
+    set +x
+    output=$(systemd-analyze security --offline="${2?}" "${3?}" | grep -F 'SystemCallFilter=')
+    assert_in "System call ${1?} list" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@swap" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@resources" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@reboot" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@raw-io" "$output"
+    assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@privileged" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@obsolete" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@mount" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@module" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@debug" "$output"
+    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@cpu-emulation" "$output"
+    assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@clock" "$output"
+)}
+
+export -n SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL
+
+mkdir -p /run/systemd/system
+cat >/run/systemd/system/allow-list.service <<EOF
+[Service]
+ExecStart=false
+SystemCallFilter=@system-service
+SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged
+SystemCallFilter=@clock
+EOF
+
+cat >/run/systemd/system/deny-list.service <<EOF
+[Service]
+ExecStart=false
+SystemCallFilter=~@known
+SystemCallFilter=@system-service
+SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged
+SystemCallFilter=@clock
+EOF
+
+systemctl daemon-reload
+
+check allow yes /run/systemd/system/allow-list.service
+check allow no allow-list.service
+check deny yes /run/systemd/system/deny-list.service
+check deny no deny-list.service
+
+output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1)
+name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1)
+
+check allow yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name"
+check allow no "$name"
+
+output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=~@known" -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1)
+name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1)
+
+check deny yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name"
+check deny no "$name"
+
+# Let's also test the "image-policy" verb
+
+systemd-analyze image-policy '*' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+unused+absent"
+systemd-analyze image-policy '-' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =unused+absent"
+systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: usr=verity:home=encrypted:=unused+absent"
+systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^home \+encrypted \+'
+systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr \+verity \+'
+systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^root \+ignore \+'
+systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr-verity \+unprotected \+'
+
+(! systemd-analyze image-policy 'doedel')
+
+# Output is very hard to predict, but let's run it for coverage anyway
+systemd-analyze pcrs
+systemd-analyze pcrs --json=pretty
+systemd-analyze pcrs 14 7 0 ima
+
+systemd-analyze log-level info
+
+touch /testok