Adding upstream version 256.upstream/256

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 909 deletions

diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-65.sh b/test/units/testsuite-65.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index a6bb38d..0000000
--- a/test/units/testsuite-65.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,909 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
-# shellcheck disable=SC2016
-set -eux
-
-# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh
-. "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh
-
-systemctl log-level debug
-export SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug
-
-# Sanity checks
-#
-# We can't really test time, critical-chain and plot verbs here, as
-# the testsuite service is a part of the boot transaction, so let's assume
-# they fail
-systemd-analyze || :
-systemd-analyze time || :
-systemd-analyze critical-chain || :
-# blame
-systemd-analyze blame
-systemd-run --wait --user --pipe -M testuser@.host systemd-analyze blame
-# plot
-systemd-analyze plot >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=short >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=off >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty --no-legend >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=short --no-legend >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --json=off --no-legend >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --table >/dev/null || :
-systemd-analyze plot --table --no-legend >/dev/null || :
-# legacy/deprecated options (moved to systemctl, but still usable from analyze)
-systemd-analyze log-level
-systemd-analyze log-level "$(systemctl log-level)"
-systemd-analyze get-log-level
-systemd-analyze set-log-level "$(systemctl log-level)"
-systemd-analyze log-target
-systemd-analyze log-target "$(systemctl log-target)"
-systemd-analyze get-log-target
-systemd-analyze set-log-target "$(systemctl log-target)"
-systemd-analyze service-watchdogs
-systemd-analyze service-watchdogs "$(systemctl service-watchdogs)"
-# dot
-systemd-analyze dot >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*" --from-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot --to-pattern="*" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*.service" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot --order systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot --require systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dot "systemd-*.service" >/dev/null
-(! systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service "*" bbb ccc)
-# dump
-# this should be rate limited to 10 calls in 10 minutes for unprivileged callers
-for _ in {1..10}; do
-    runas testuser systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-done
-(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
-# still limited after a reload
-systemctl daemon-reload
-(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
-# and a re-exec
-systemctl daemon-reexec
-(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null)
-# privileged call, so should not be rate limited
-for _ in {1..10}; do
-    systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-done
-systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dump "*" >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" "*.service" aaaaaaa ... >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze malloc >/dev/null
-(! systemd-analyze dump "")
-# unit-files
-systemd-analyze unit-files >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze unit-files systemd-journald.service >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze unit-files "*" >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze unit-files "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze unit-files --user >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze unit-files --user "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null
-# unit-paths
-systemd-analyze unit-paths
-systemd-analyze unit-paths --user
-systemd-analyze unit-paths --global
-# exist-status
-systemd-analyze exit-status
-systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF
-systemd-analyze exit-status 0 1 {63..65}
-(! systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF "hello*")
-# capability
-systemd-analyze capability
-systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL
-systemd-analyze capability 0 1 {30..32}
-(! systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL "hello*")
-# condition
-mkdir -p /run/systemd/system
-UNIT_NAME="analyze-condition-$RANDOM.service"
-cat >"/run/systemd/system/$UNIT_NAME" <<EOF
-[Unit]
-AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release
-AssertEnvironment=!FOOBAR
-ConditionKernelVersion=>1.0
-ConditionPathExists=/etc/os-release
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart=/bin/true
-EOF
-systemctl daemon-reload
-systemd-analyze condition --unit="$UNIT_NAME"
-systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion = ! <4.0' \
-                          'ConditionKernelVersion = >=3.1' \
-                          'ConditionACPower=|false' \
-                          'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' \
-                          'AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release'
-(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' 'AssertXYZ=foo')
-(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion=<1.0')
-(! systemd-analyze condition 'AssertKernelVersion=<1.0')
-# syscall-filter
-systemd-analyze syscall-filter >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync
-systemd-analyze syscall-filter @sync @sync @sync
-(! systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync @foobar)
-# filesystems (requires libbpf support)
-if systemctl --version | grep "+BPF_FRAMEWORK"; then
-    systemd-analyze filesystems >/dev/null
-    systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api
-    systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @basic-api
-    (! systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @foobar @basic-api)
-fi
-# calendar
-systemd-analyze calendar '*-2-29 0:0:0'
-systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-2-29 0:0:0'
-systemd-analyze calendar '*-* *:*:*'
-systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*'
-systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=50 '*-* *:*:*'
-systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* *:*:*'
-systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '01-01-22 01:00:00'
-systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=yesterday --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*'
-(! systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* 99:*:*')
-(! systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=never '*-* *:*:*')
-(! systemd-analyze calendar 1)
-(! systemd-analyze calendar "")
-# timestamp
-systemd-analyze timestamp now
-systemd-analyze timestamp -- -1
-systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday now tomorrow
-(! systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday never tomorrow)
-(! systemd-analyze timestamp 1)
-(! systemd-analyze timestamp '*-2-29 0:0:0')
-(! systemd-analyze timestamp "")
-# timespan
-systemd-analyze timespan 1
-systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s '1year 0.000001s'
-(! systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s aaaaaa '1year 0.000001s')
-(! systemd-analyze timespan -- -1)
-(! systemd-analyze timespan '*-2-29 0:0:0')
-(! systemd-analyze timespan "")
-# cat-config
-systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config foo/bar
-systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null
-systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr foo/bar
-# security
-systemd-analyze security
-systemd-analyze security --json=off
-systemd-analyze security --json=pretty | jq
-systemd-analyze security --json=short | jq
-
-if [[ ! -v ASAN_OPTIONS ]]; then
-    # check that systemd-analyze cat-config paths work in a chroot
-    mkdir -p /tmp/root
-    mount --bind / /tmp/root
-    systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out1
-    chroot /tmp/root systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out2
-    diff /tmp/out{1,2}
-fi
-
-# verify
-mkdir -p /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/
-mkdir -p /tmp/img/opt/
-
-touch /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh
-chmod +x /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
-[Service]
-ExecStart = /opt/script0.sh
-EOF
-
-set +e
-# Default behaviour is to recurse through all dependencies when unit is loaded
-(! systemd-analyze verify --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
-
-# As above, recurses through all dependencies when unit is loaded
-(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
-
-# Recurses through unit file and its direct dependencies when unit is loaded
-(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=one --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
-
-set -e
-
-# zero exit status since dependencies are ignored when unit is loaded
-systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
-
-rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service
-[Unit]
-foo = bar
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart = echo hello
-EOF
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile2.service
-[Unit]
-Requires = testfile.service
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart = echo hello
-EOF
-
-# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
-systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/testfile2.service
-
-set +e
-# Non-zero exit status since all associated dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
-(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes /tmp/testfile2.service)
-set -e
-
-rm /tmp/testfile.service
-rm /tmp/testfile2.service
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/sample.service
-[Unit]
-Description = A Sample Service
-
-[Service]
-ExecStart = echo hello
-Slice=support.slice
-EOF
-
-# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded
-systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/sample.service
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service
-[Service]
-ExecStart = echo hello
-DeviceAllow=/dev/sda
-EOF
-
-# Prevent regression from #13380 and #20859 where we can't verify hidden files
-cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/.testfile.service
-
-systemd-analyze verify /tmp/.testfile.service
-
-rm /tmp/.testfile.service
-
-# Alias a unit file's name on disk (see #20061)
-cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/testsrvc
-
-(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc)
-
-systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc:alias.service
-
-# Zero exit status since the value used for comparison determine exposure to security threats is by default 100
-systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service
-
-#The overall exposure level assigned to the unit is greater than the set threshold
-(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service)
-
-# Ensure we print the list of ACLs, see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23185
-systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service | grep -q -F "/dev/sda"
-
-rm /tmp/testfile.service
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
-[Service]
-ExecStart = echo hello
-PrivateNetwork = yes
-PrivateDevices = yes
-PrivateUsers = yes
-EOF
-
-# The new overall exposure level assigned to the unit is less than the set thresholds
-# Verifies that the --offline= option works with --root=
-systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/foo@.service
-[Service]
-ExecStart=ls
-EOF
-
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/hoge@test.service
-[Service]
-ExecStart=ls
-EOF
-
-# issue #30357
-pushd /tmp
-systemd-analyze verify foo@bar.service
-systemd-analyze verify foo@.service
-systemd-analyze verify hoge@test.service
-(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@nonexist.service)
-(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@.service)
-popd
-pushd /
-systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@bar.service
-systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@.service
-systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@test.service
-(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
-(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@.service)
-popd
-pushd /usr
-systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@bar.service
-systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@.service
-systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@test.service
-(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
-(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@.service)
-popd
-systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@bar.service
-systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@.service
-systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@test.service
-(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@nonexist.service)
-(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@.service)
-
-# Added an additional "INVALID_ID" id to the .json to verify that nothing breaks when input is malformed
-# The PrivateNetwork id description and weight was changed to verify that 'security' is actually reading in
-# values from the .json file when required. The default weight for "PrivateNetwork" is 2500, and the new weight
-# assigned to that id in the .json file is 6000. This increased weight means that when the "PrivateNetwork" key is
-# set to 'yes' (as above in the case of testfile.service) in the content of the unit file, the overall exposure
-# level for the unit file should decrease to account for that increased weight.
-cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.json
-{"UserOrDynamicUser":
-    {"description_bad": "Service runs as root user",
-    "weight": 0,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SupplementaryGroups":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no supplementary groups",
-    "description_bad": "Service runs with supplementary groups",
-    "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not matter",
-    "weight": 200,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"PrivateDevices":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no access to hardware devices",
-    "description_bad": "Service potentially has access to hardware devices",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"PrivateMounts":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot install system mounts",
-    "description_bad": "Service may install system mounts",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"PrivateNetwork":
-    {"description_good": "Service doesn't have access to the host's network",
-    "description_bad": "Service has access to the host's network",
-    "weight": 6000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"PrivateTmp":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no access to other software's temporary files",
-    "description_bad": "Service has access to other software's temporary files",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"PrivateUsers":
-    {"description_good": "Service does not have access to other users",
-    "description_bad": "Service has access to other users",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectControlGroups":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot modify the control group file system",
-    "description_bad": "Service may modify the control group file system",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectKernelModules":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot load or read kernel modules",
-    "description_bad": "Service may load or read kernel modules",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectKernelTunables":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot alter kernel tunables (/proc/sys, …)",
-    "description_bad": "Service may alter kernel tunables",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectKernelLogs":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
-    "description_bad": "Service may read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectClock":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot write to the hardware clock or system clock",
-    "description_bad": "Service may write to the hardware clock or system clock",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectHome":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"ProtectHostname":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot change system host/domainname",
-    "description_bad": "Service may change system host/domainname",
-    "weight": 50,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectSystem":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"RootDirectoryOrRootImage":
-    {"description_good": "Service has its own root directory/image",
-    "description_bad": "Service runs within the host's root directory",
-    "weight": 200,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"LockPersonality":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot change ABI personality",
-    "description_bad": "Service may change ABI personality",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"MemoryDenyWriteExecute":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create writable executable memory mappings",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create writable executable memory mappings",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"NoNewPrivileges":
-    {"description_good": "Service processes cannot acquire new privileges",
-    "description_bad": "Service processes may acquire new privileges",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_ADMIN":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no administrator privileges",
-    "description_bad": "Service has administrator privileges",
-    "weight": 1500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SET_UID_GID_PCAP":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot change UID/GID identities/capabilities",
-    "description_bad": "Service may change UID/GID identities/capabilities",
-    "weight": 1500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PTRACE":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no ptrace() debugging abilities",
-    "description_bad": "Service has ptrace() debugging abilities",
-    "weight": 1500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TIME":
-    {"description_good": "Service processes cannot change the system clock",
-    "description_bad": "Service processes may change the system clock",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_ADMIN":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no network configuration privileges",
-    "description_bad": "Service has network configuration privileges",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_RAWIO":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no raw I/O access",
-    "description_bad": "Service has raw I/O access",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_MODULE":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot load kernel modules",
-    "description_bad": "Service may load kernel modules",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_AUDIT":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no audit subsystem access",
-    "description_bad": "Service has audit subsystem access",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYSLOG":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no access to kernel logging",
-    "description_bad": "Service has access to kernel logging",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_NICE_RESOURCE":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no privileges to change resource use parameters",
-    "description_bad": "Service has privileges to change resource use parameters",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MKNOD":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create device nodes",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create device nodes",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_CHOWN_FSETID_SETFCAP":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot change file ownership/access mode/capabilities",
-    "description_bad": "Service may change file ownership/access mode/capabilities unrestricted",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_DAC_FOWNER_IPC_OWNER":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot override UNIX file/IPC permission checks",
-    "description_bad": "Service may override UNIX file/IPC permission checks",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_KILL":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes",
-    "description_bad": "Service may send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE_BROADCAST_RAW":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no elevated networking privileges",
-    "description_bad": "Service has elevated networking privileges",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_BOOT":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue reboot()",
-    "description_bad": "Service may issue reboot()",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MAC":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot adjust SMACK MAC",
-    "description_bad": "Service may adjust SMACK MAC",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot mark files immutable",
-    "description_bad": "Service may mark files immutable",
-    "weight": 75,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_IPC_LOCK":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot lock memory into RAM",
-    "description_bad": "Service may lock memory into RAM",
-    "weight": 50,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_CHROOT":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue chroot()",
-    "description_bad": "Service may issue chroot()",
-    "weight": 50,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot establish wake locks",
-    "description_bad": "Service may establish wake locks",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_WAKE_ALARM":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot program timers that wake up the system",
-    "description_bad": "Service may program timers that wake up the system",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LEASE":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create file leases",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create file leases",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot issue vhangup()",
-    "description_bad": "Service may issue vhangup()",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PACCT":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot use acct()",
-    "description_bad": "Service may use acct()",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BPF":
-    {"description_good": "Service may load BPF programs",
-    "description_bad": "Service may not load BPF programs",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"UMask":
-    {"weight": 100,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"KeyringMode":
-    {"description_good": "Service doesn't share key material with other services",
-    "description_bad": "Service shares key material with other service",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"ProtectProc":
-    {"description_good": "Service has restricted access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)",
-    "description_bad": "Service has full access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 3
-    },
-"ProcSubset":
-    {"description_good": "Service has no access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)",
-    "description_bad": "Service has full access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)",
-    "weight": 10,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"NotifyAccess":
-    {"description_good": "Service child processes cannot alter service state",
-    "description_bad": "Service child processes may alter service state",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RemoveIPC":
-    {"description_good": "Service user cannot leave SysV IPC objects around",
-    "description_bad": "Service user may leave SysV IPC objects around",
-    "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not apply",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"Delegate":
-    {"description_good": "Service does not maintain its own delegated control group subtree",
-    "description_bad": "Service maintains its own delegated control group subtree",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictRealtime":
-    {"description_good": "Service realtime scheduling access is restricted",
-    "description_bad": "Service may acquire realtime scheduling",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictSUIDSGID":
-    {"description_good": "SUID/SGIDfilecreationbyserviceisrestricted",
-    "description_bad": "ServicemaycreateSUID/SGIDfiles",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_user":
-    {"description_good": "Servicecannotcreateusernamespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Servicemaycreateusernamespaces",
-    "weight": 1500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_mnt":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create file system namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create file system namespaces",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_ipc":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create IPC namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create IPC namespaces",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_pid":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create process namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create process namespaces",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_cgroup":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create cgroup namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create cgroup namespaces",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_net":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create network namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create network namespaces",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictNamespaces_uts":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot create hostname namespaces",
-    "description_bad": "Service may create hostname namespaces",
-    "weight": 100,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_INET_INET6":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate Internet sockets",
-    "description_bad": "Service may allocate Internet sockets",
-    "weight": 1500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_UNIX":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate local sockets",
-    "description_bad": "Service may allocate local sockets",
-    "weight": 25,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_NETLINK":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate netlink sockets",
-    "description_bad": "Service may allocate netlink sockets",
-    "weight": 200,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_PACKET":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate packet sockets",
-    "description_bad": "Service may allocate packet sockets",
-    "weight": 1000,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"RestrictAddressFamilies_OTHER":
-    {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate exotic sockets",
-    "description_bad": "Service may allocate exotic sockets",
-    "weight": 1250,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"SystemCallArchitectures":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_swap":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_obsolete":
-    {"weight": 250,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_clock":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_cpu_emulation":
-    {"weight": 250,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_debug":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_mount":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_module":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_raw_io":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_reboot":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_privileged":
-    {"weight": 700,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"SystemCallFilter_resources":
-    {"weight": 700,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"IPAddressDeny":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"DeviceAllow":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    },
-"AmbientCapabilities":
-    {"description_good": "Service process does not receive ambient capabilities",
-    "description_bad": "Service process receives ambient capabilities",
-    "weight": 500,
-    "range": 1
-    },
-"INVALID_ID":
-    {"weight": 1000,
-    "range": 10
-    }
-}
-EOF
-
-# Reads in custom security requirements from the parsed .json file and uses these for comparison
-systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true \
-                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
-                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
-
-# The strict profile adds a lot of sanboxing options
-systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
-                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
-                           --profile=strict \
-                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
-
-# The trusted profile doesn't add any sanboxing options
-(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
-                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
-                           --profile=/usr/lib/systemd/portable/profile/trusted/service.conf \
-                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
-
-(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=50 --offline=true \
-                           --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
-                           --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service)
-
-rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service
-
-if systemd-analyze --version | grep -q -F "+ELFUTILS"; then
-    systemd-analyze inspect-elf --json=short /lib/systemd/systemd | grep -q -F '"elfType":"executable"'
-fi
-
-systemd-analyze --threshold=90 security systemd-journald.service
-
-# issue 23663
-check() {(
-    set +x
-    output=$(systemd-analyze security --offline="${2?}" "${3?}" | grep -F 'SystemCallFilter=')
-    assert_in "System call ${1?} list" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@swap" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@resources" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@reboot" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@raw-io" "$output"
-    assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@privileged" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@obsolete" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@mount" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@module" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@debug" "$output"
-    assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@cpu-emulation" "$output"
-    assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@clock" "$output"
-)}
-
-export -n SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL
-
-mkdir -p /run/systemd/system
-cat >/run/systemd/system/allow-list.service <<EOF
-[Service]
-ExecStart=false
-SystemCallFilter=@system-service
-SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged
-SystemCallFilter=@clock
-EOF
-
-cat >/run/systemd/system/deny-list.service <<EOF
-[Service]
-ExecStart=false
-SystemCallFilter=~@known
-SystemCallFilter=@system-service
-SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged
-SystemCallFilter=@clock
-EOF
-
-systemctl daemon-reload
-
-check allow yes /run/systemd/system/allow-list.service
-check allow no allow-list.service
-check deny yes /run/systemd/system/deny-list.service
-check deny no deny-list.service
-
-output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1)
-name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1)
-
-check allow yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name"
-check allow no "$name"
-
-output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=~@known" -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1)
-name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1)
-
-check deny yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name"
-check deny no "$name"
-
-# Let's also test the "image-policy" verb
-
-systemd-analyze image-policy '*' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+unused+absent"
-systemd-analyze image-policy '-' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =unused+absent"
-systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: usr=verity:home=encrypted:=unused+absent"
-systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^home \+encrypted \+'
-systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr \+verity \+'
-systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^root \+ignore \+'
-systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr-verity \+unprotected \+'
-
-(! systemd-analyze image-policy 'doedel')
-
-# Output is very hard to predict, but let's run it for coverage anyway
-systemd-analyze pcrs
-systemd-analyze pcrs --json=pretty
-systemd-analyze pcrs 14 7 0 ima
-
-systemd-analyze log-level info
-
-touch /testok