diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c | 2423 |
1 files changed, 2423 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b56b51a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c @@ -0,0 +1,2423 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <getopt.h> +#include <mntent.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "sd-device.h" +#include "sd-messages.h" + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "ask-password-api.h" +#include "build.h" +#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h" +#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h" +#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h" +#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h" +#include "cryptsetup-util.h" +#include "device-util.h" +#include "efi-api.h" +#include "efi-loader.h" +#include "env-util.h" +#include "escape.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "fstab-util.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "libfido2-util.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "main-func.h" +#include "memory-util.h" +#include "mount-util.h" +#include "nulstr-util.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "pkcs11-util.h" +#include "pretty-print.h" +#include "process-util.h" +#include "random-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "tpm2-pcr.h" +#include "tpm2-util.h" + +/* internal helper */ +#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS" +/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */ +#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U +#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U + +typedef enum PassphraseType { + PASSPHRASE_NONE, + PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0, + PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1, + PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY, + _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX, + _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1, +} PassphraseType; + +static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */ +static char *arg_cipher = NULL; +static unsigned arg_key_size = 0; +static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE; +static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT; +static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0; +static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0; +static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false; +static bool arg_try_empty_password = false; +static char *arg_hash = NULL; +static char *arg_header = NULL; +static unsigned arg_tries = 3; +static bool arg_readonly = false; +static bool arg_verify = false; +static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = 0; +static bool arg_discards = false; +static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false; +static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false; +static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false; +static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false; +static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false; +static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false; +static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false; +static uint32_t arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim = 0; +static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL; +static uint64_t arg_offset = 0; +static uint64_t arg_skip = 0; +static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY; +static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL; +static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; +static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL; +static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false; +static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL; +static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0; +static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL; +static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; /* These and the following fields are about locking an encrypted volume to the local TPM */ +static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; +static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; +static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL; +static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false; +static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL; +static bool arg_headless = false; +static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC; +static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */ +static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL; + +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep); +STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep); + +static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = { + [PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase", + [PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key", + [PASSPHRASE_BOTH] = "passphrase or recovery key", +}; + +const char* passphrase_type_to_string(PassphraseType t); +PassphraseType passphrase_type_from_string(const char *s); + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(passphrase_type, PassphraseType); + +/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't: + check= + checkargs= + noearly + loud + quiet + keyscript= + initramfs +*/ + +static int parse_one_option(const char *option) { + const char *val; + int r; + + assert(option); + + /* Handled outside of this tool */ + if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout")) + return 0; + + if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout=")) + return 0; + + if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) { + + r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + if (arg_key_size % 8) { + log_warning("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + arg_key_size /= 8; + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) { + + r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + if (arg_sector_size % 2) { + log_warning("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring."); + return 0; + } + + if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) + log_warning("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) || + (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) { + + arg_type = ANY_LUKS; + r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) { + + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + if (path_is_absolute(val)) { + if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0) + return log_oom(); + } else + log_warning("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute, ignoring.", val); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) { + + r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) { + + r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) { + + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + arg_keyfile_erase = r; + + } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase")) + arg_keyfile_erase = true; + + else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) { + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) { + if (!arg_type || !STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) + arg_type = ANY_LUKS; + + if (!path_is_absolute(val)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); + + if (arg_header) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "Duplicate header= option, refusing."); + + arg_header = strdup(val); + if (!arg_header) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) { + + r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only")) + arg_readonly = true; + else if (streq(option, "verify")) + arg_verify = true; + else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) { + if (streq(val, "masked")) + arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT); + else { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val); + return 0; + } + + SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r); + SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r); + } + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard")) + arg_discards = true; + else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt")) + arg_same_cpu_crypt = true; + else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus")) + arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true; + else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue")) + arg_no_read_workqueue = true; + else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue")) + arg_no_write_workqueue = true; + else if (streq(option, "luks")) + arg_type = ANY_LUKS; +/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ +#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK + else if (streq(option, "bitlk")) + arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK; +#endif + else if (streq(option, "tcrypt")) + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + arg_tcrypt_hidden = true; + } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + arg_tcrypt_system = true; + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) { + arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; + arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true; + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "veracrypt-pim="))) { + + r = safe_atou32(val, &arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") || + startswith(option, "tmp=")) + arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN; + else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) { + + r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) { + + r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) { + + r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) { + + if (streq(val, "auto")) { + arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); + arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true; + } else { + if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing"); + + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; + } + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) { + + if (streq(val, "auto")) { + arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); + arg_fido2_device_auto = true; + } else { + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + arg_fido2_device_auto = false; + } + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) { + + if (streq(val, "auto")) + arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid); + else { + _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL; + size_t cid_size; + + r = unbase64mem(val, SIZE_MAX, &cid, &cid_size); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m"); + + free(arg_fido2_cid); + arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid); + arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size; + } + + /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */ + if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto) + arg_fido2_device_auto = true; + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) { + + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) { + + if (streq(val, "auto")) { + arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); + arg_tpm2_device_auto = true; + } else { + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; + } + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) { + + r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) { + + if (!path_is_absolute(val)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); + + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) { + + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + arg_tpm2_pin = r; + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrlock="))) { + + if (!path_is_absolute(val)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "TPM2 pcrlock policy path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); + + r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_pcrlock, val); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-pcr="))) { + unsigned pcr; + + r = safe_atou(val, &pcr); + if (r < 0) { + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + pcr = r ? TPM2_PCR_SYSTEM_IDENTITY : UINT_MAX; + } else if (!TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(pcr)) { + log_warning("Selected TPM index for measurement %u outside of allowed range 0…%u, ignoring.", pcr, TPM2_PCRS_MAX-1); + return 0; + } + + arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = pcr; + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) { + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + + l = strv_split(optarg, ":"); + if (!l) + return log_oom(); + + STRV_FOREACH(i, l) { + const EVP_MD *implementation; + + implementation = EVP_get_digestbyname(*i); + if (!implementation) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val); + + if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, EVP_MD_name(implementation)) < 0) + return log_oom(); + } +#else + log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option); +#endif + + } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) { + + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + arg_try_empty_password = r; + + } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password")) + arg_try_empty_password = true; + else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) { + + r = parse_boolean(val); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + return 0; + } + + arg_headless = r; + } else if (streq(option, "headless")) + arg_headless = true; + + else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) { + + r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec); + if (r < 0) + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); + + } else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach")) + log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option); + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_crypt_config(const char *options) { + assert(options); + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; + int r; + + r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m"); + if (r == 0) + break; + + r = parse_one_option(word); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + /* sanity-check options */ + if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { + if (arg_offset != 0) + log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type); + if (arg_skip != 0) + log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type); + } + + return 0; +} + +static char* disk_description(const char *path) { + static const char name_fields[] = + "DM_NAME\0" + "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0" + "ID_MODEL\0"; + + _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL; + const char *name; + struct stat st; + + assert(path); + + if (stat(path, &st) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) + return NULL; + + if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0) + return NULL; + + if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL; + ssize_t l; + + /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's + * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or + * other weird stuff. */ + + l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped); + if (l < 0) { + log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m"); + return NULL; + } + + if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL)) + return TAKE_PTR(unescaped); + } + + /* These need no unescaping. */ + NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) + if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 && + !isempty(name)) + return strdup(name); + + return NULL; +} + +static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) { + _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; + _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL; + struct mntent *m; + + /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */ + + device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label); + if (!device) + return NULL; + + f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re"); + if (!f) + return NULL; + + while ((m = getmntent(f))) + if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device)) + return strdup(m->mnt_dir); + + return NULL; +} + +static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) { + _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL; + char *name_buffer = NULL; + int r; + + assert(src); + assert(vol); + + description = disk_description(src); + mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol); + + /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */ + if (description && streq(vol, description)) + description = mfree(description); + + if (mount_point && description) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point); + else if (mount_point) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point); + else if (description) + r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol); + else + return strdup(vol); + if (r < 0) + return NULL; + + return name_buffer; +} + +static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) { + _cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL; + int slot_max; + PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; + + assert(cd); + + if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) { + log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; + } + + /* Search all used slots */ + assert_se((slot_max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0); + slots = new(bool, slot_max); + if (!slots) + return log_oom(); + + for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) + slots[slot] = IN_SET(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST); + + /* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */ + for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) { + _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL; + const char *type; + JsonVariant *w, *z; + int tk; + + tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v); + if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL)) + continue; + if (tk < 0) { + log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m"); + continue; + } + + w = json_variant_by_key(v, "type"); + if (!w || !json_variant_is_string(w)) { + log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring."); + continue; + } + + type = json_variant_string(w); + if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) { + + /* At least exists one recovery key */ + if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery")) + passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY; + + w = json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots"); + if (!w || !json_variant_is_array(w)) { + log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring."); + continue; + } + + JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) { + unsigned u; + int at; + + if (!json_variant_is_string(z)) { + log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring."); + continue; + } + + at = safe_atou(json_variant_string(z), &u); + if (at < 0) { + log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring."); + continue; + } + + if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) { + log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring."); + continue; + } + + slots[u] = false; + } + } + } + + /* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */ + for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) + if (slots[slot]) { + passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; + break; + } + + /* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled, + * we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */ + return passphrase_type; +} + +static int get_password( + const char *vol, + const char *src, + usec_t until, + bool accept_cached, + PassphraseType passphrase_type, + char ***ret) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; + char *id; + int r = 0; + AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE; + + assert(vol); + assert(src); + assert(ret); + + if (arg_headless) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option."); + + friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol); + if (!friendly) + return log_oom(); + + if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + disk_path = cescape(src); + if (!disk_path) + return log_oom(); + + id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path); + + r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, + flags | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED), + &passwords); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m"); + + if (arg_verify) { + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL; + + assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1); + + if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) + return log_oom(); + + id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path); + + r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, flags, &passwords2); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m"); + + assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1); + + if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) + return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "Passwords did not match, retrying."); + } + + strv_uniq(passwords); + + STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { + char *c; + + if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size) + continue; + + /* Pad password if necessary */ + c = new(char, arg_key_size); + if (!c) + return log_oom(); + + strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size); + erase_and_free(*p); + *p = TAKE_PTR(c); + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords); + + return 0; +} + +static int measure_volume_key( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const void *volume_key, + size_t volume_key_size) { + + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(volume_key); + assert(volume_key_size > 0); + + if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { + log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); + return 0; + } + + r = efi_measured_uki(LOG_WARNING); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + log_debug("Kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace measurement, too."); + return 0; + } + +#if HAVE_TPM2 + _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL; + r = tpm2_context_new(arg_tpm2_device, &c); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create TPM2 context: %m"); + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) { + r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m"); + } + + _cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", "); + if (!joined) + return log_oom(); + + /* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an + * unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead + * send a HMAC signature instead. */ + + _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; + escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */ + if (!escaped) + return log_oom(); + + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; + s = strjoin("cryptsetup:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd))); + if (!s) + return log_oom(); + + r = tpm2_extend_bytes(c, l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, SIZE_MAX, volume_key, volume_key_size, TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY, s); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m"); + + log_struct(LOG_INFO, + "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR, + LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, joined), + "MEASURING=%s", s, + "PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, + "BANKS=%s", joined); + + return 0; +#else + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring."); +#endif +} + +static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const void *volume_key, + size_t volume_key_size, + uint32_t flags) { + + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + + /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */ + + r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (volume_key_size == 0) { + log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none specified."); + return r; + } + + (void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */ + return r; +} + +static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + int keyslot, + const char *passphrase, + size_t passphrase_size, + uint32_t flags) { + + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL; + size_t vks; + int r; + + assert(cd); + + /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's + * requested. Note that we need the volume key for the measurement, and + * crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and + * retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */ + + if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { + log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); + goto shortcut; + } + + r = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none defined."); + goto shortcut; + } + + vk = malloc(vks = r); + if (!vk) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot, vk, &vks, passphrase, passphrase_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, vk, vks, flags); + +shortcut: + return crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags); +} + +static int attach_tcrypt( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + char **passwords, + uint32_t flags) { + + int r = 0; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL; + struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = { + .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES, + .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, + .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles) + }; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords)); + + if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto || arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) + /* Ask for a regular password */ + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support."); + + if (arg_tcrypt_hidden) + params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER; + + if (arg_tcrypt_system) + params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER; + + if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt) + params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES; + + if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt && arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim != 0) + params.veracrypt_pim = arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim; + + if (key_data) { + params.passphrase = key_data; + params.passphrase_size = key_data_size; + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); + } else if (key_file) { + r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase); + if (r < 0) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + params.passphrase = passphrase; + params.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase); + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); + } else { + r = -EINVAL; + STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords){ + params.passphrase = *p; + params.passphrase_size = strlen(*p); + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); + if (r >= 0) + break; + } + } + + if (r < 0) { + if (r == -EPERM) { + if (key_data) + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)"); + else if (key_file) + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file); + else + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using supplied passwords."); + + return r; + } + + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + } + + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + + return 0; +} + +static char *make_bindname(const char *volume) { + char *s; + + if (asprintf(&s, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup/%s", random_u64(), volume) < 0) + return NULL; + + return s; +} + +static int make_security_device_monitor( + sd_event **ret_event, + sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { + _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; + _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; + int r; + + assert(ret_event); + assert(ret_monitor); + + /* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */ + + r = sd_event_default(&event); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); + + r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); + + (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device"); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); + + *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); + *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); + return 0; +} + +static int run_security_device_monitor( + sd_event *event, + sd_device_monitor *monitor) { + bool processed = false; + int r; + + assert(event); + assert(monitor); + + /* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the time-out is + * hit. */ + + for (;;) { + int x; + + r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x); + if (r < 0) { + if (r != -ENODATA) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m"); + + /* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */ + } else { + assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT); + return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt."); + } + + /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */ + r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); + if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */ + return 0; + + processed = true; + } +} + +static bool libcryptsetup_plugins_support(void) { + +#if HAVE_TPM2 + /* Currently, there's no way for us to query the volume key when plugins are used. Hence don't use + * plugins, if measurement has been requested. */ + if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX) + return false; +#endif + +#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS + int r; + + /* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */ + r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE"); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m"); + if (r == 0) + return false; + + return crypt_token_external_path(); +#else + return false; +#endif +} + +#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS +static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) { + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL; + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; + int r; + + assert(ret_pins); + + r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m"); + if (r > 0) { + pins = strv_new(envpin); + if (!pins) + return log_oom(); + } + + *ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *type, + usec_t until, + bool headless, + void *userdata, + uint32_t activation_flags, + const char *message, + const char *key_name, + const char *credential_name) { + +#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS + AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; + int r; + + r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, /* pin=*/ NULL, /* pin_size= */ 0, userdata, activation_flags); + if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ + return 0; + if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ + return r; + + r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { + r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags); + if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ + return 0; + if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ + return r; + } + + if (headless) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable."); + + for (;;) { + pins = strv_free_erase(pins); + r = ask_password_auto(message, "drive-harddisk", /* id= */ NULL, key_name, credential_name, until, flags, &pins); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { + r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags); + if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ + return 0; + if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ + return r; + } + + flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; + } + return r; +#else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif +} + +static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + usec_t until, + bool headless, + void *userdata, + uint32_t activation_flags) { + + return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( + cd, + name, + "systemd-fido2", + until, + headless, + userdata, + activation_flags, + "Please enter security token PIN:", + "fido2-pin", + "cryptsetup.fido2-pin"); +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + usec_t until, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; + _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; + size_t decrypted_key_size, cid_size = 0; + _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; + int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; + const char *rp_id = NULL; + const void *cid = NULL; + Fido2EnrollFlags required; + bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support(); + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto); + + if (arg_fido2_cid) { + if (!key_file && !key_data) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing."); + + rp_id = arg_fido2_rp_id; + cid = arg_fido2_cid; + cid_size = arg_fido2_cid_size; + + /* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do + * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we + * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. Eventually, we should make this + * explicitly configurable. */ + required = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT; + } + + friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); + if (!friendly) + return log_oom(); + + for (;;) { + if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) { + r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, arg_fido2_device, flags); + if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + + } else { + if (cid) + r = acquire_fido2_key( + name, + friendly, + arg_fido2_device, + rp_id, + cid, cid_size, + key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, + key_data, key_data_size, + until, + arg_headless, + required, + &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size, + arg_ask_password_flags); + else + r = acquire_fido2_key_auto( + cd, + name, + friendly, + arg_fido2_device, + until, + arg_headless, + &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size, + arg_ask_password_flags); + if (r >= 0) + break; + } + + if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ + return r; + + if (!monitor) { + /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's + * create an event loop and monitor first. */ + + assert(!event); + + r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly); + + /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed + * to create and configure the monitor */ + continue; + } + + r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2..."); + } + + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); + else { + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; + ssize_t base64_encoded_size; + + /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ + + base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); + if (base64_encoded_size < 0) + return log_oom(); + + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); + } + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); + return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *friendly_name, + usec_t until, + bool headless, + uint32_t flags) { + +#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS + int r; + + if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device."); + + systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = { + .friendly_name = friendly_name, + .until = until, + .headless = headless, + .askpw_flags = arg_ask_password_flags, + }; + + r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, ¶ms, flags); + if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ + r = 0; + + return r; +#else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + usec_t until, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL; + size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; + _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL; + int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; + const char *uri = NULL; + bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support(); + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto); + + if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) { + if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) { + r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot); + if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO)) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + uri = discovered_uri; + key_data = discovered_key; + key_data_size = discovered_key_size; + } + } else { + uri = arg_pkcs11_uri; + + if (!key_file && !key_data) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing."); + } + + friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); + if (!friendly) + return log_oom(); + + for (;;) { + if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) + r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(cd, name, friendly, until, arg_headless, flags); + else { + r = decrypt_pkcs11_key( + name, + friendly, + uri, + key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, + key_data, key_data_size, + until, + arg_headless, + &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); + if (r >= 0) + break; + } + + if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ + return r; + + if (!monitor) { + /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's + * create an event loop and monitor first. */ + + assert(!event); + + r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_notice("Security token%s%s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", + uri ? " " : "", strempty(uri), friendly); + + /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed + * to create and configure the monitor */ + continue; + } + + r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11..."); + } + assert(decrypted_key); + + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); + else { + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; + ssize_t base64_encoded_size; + + /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility + * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through + * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do + * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most + * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string + * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob + * via base64 encoding. */ + + base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); + if (base64_encoded_size < 0) + return log_oom(); + + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); + } + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); + return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int make_tpm2_device_monitor( + sd_event **ret_event, + sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { + + _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; + _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; + int r; + + assert(ret_event); + assert(ret_monitor); + + r = sd_event_default(&event); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); + + r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); + + (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); + + r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); + + *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); + *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); + return 0; +} + +static bool use_token_plugins(void) { + int r; + + /* Disable tokens if we shall measure, since we won't get access to the volume key then. */ + if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX) + return false; + + r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE"); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) + log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE value, ignoring: %m"); + + return r != 0; +} + +static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + usec_t until, + bool headless, + uint32_t flags) { + +#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS + systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = { + .search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, + .device = arg_tpm2_device, + .signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature, + .pcrlock_path = arg_tpm2_pcrlock, + }; + + if (!libcryptsetup_plugins_support()) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "Libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled."); + + return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( + cd, + name, + "systemd-tpm2", + until, + headless, + ¶ms, + flags, + "Please enter TPM2 PIN:", + "tpm2-pin", + "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin"); +#else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + usec_t until, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; + _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; + int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; + size_t decrypted_key_size; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto); + + friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); + if (!friendly) + return log_oom(); + + for (;;) { + if (key_file || key_data) { + /* If key data is specified, use that */ + + r = acquire_tpm2_key( + name, + arg_tpm2_device, + arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, + UINT16_MAX, + /* pubkey= */ NULL, /* pubkey_size= */ 0, + /* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0, + /* signature_path= */ NULL, + /* pcrlock_path= */ NULL, + /* primary_alg= */ 0, + key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, + key_data, key_data_size, + /* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* policy_hash_size= */ 0, /* we don't know the policy hash */ + /* salt= */ NULL, /* salt_size= */ 0, + /* srk_buf= */ NULL, /* srk_buf_size= */ 0, + arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0, + until, + arg_headless, + arg_ask_password_flags, + &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); + if (r >= 0) + break; + if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ + if (r != -EAGAIN) { + log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); + return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ + } + } else { + r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, flags); + if (r >= 0) + return 0; + /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found + * EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */ + if (r == -ENXIO) + return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (r == -ENOENT) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) { + log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); + return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ + } + } + + if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */ + _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL; + size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size; + bool found_some = false; + int token = 0; /* first token to look at */ + + /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support + * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them + * works. */ + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ void *pubkey = NULL, *salt = NULL, *srk_buf = NULL; + size_t pubkey_size = 0, salt_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0; + uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask; + uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg; + TPM2Flags tpm2_flags; + + r = find_tpm2_auto_data( + cd, + arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */ + token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */ + &hash_pcr_mask, + &pcr_bank, + &pubkey, &pubkey_size, + &pubkey_pcr_mask, + &primary_alg, + &blob, &blob_size, + &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size, + &salt, &salt_size, + &srk_buf, &srk_buf_size, + &tpm2_flags, + &keyslot, + &token); + if (r == -ENXIO) + /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */ + return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG, + SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + found_some + ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking." + : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) + /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + found_some = true; + + r = acquire_tpm2_key( + name, + arg_tpm2_device, + hash_pcr_mask, + pcr_bank, + pubkey, pubkey_size, + pubkey_pcr_mask, + arg_tpm2_signature, + arg_tpm2_pcrlock, + primary_alg, + /* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */ + blob, blob_size, + policy_hash, policy_hash_size, + salt, salt_size, + srk_buf, srk_buf_size, + tpm2_flags, + until, + arg_headless, + arg_ask_password_flags, + &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); + if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) + return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + if (r != -EPERM) + break; + + token++; /* try a different token next time */ + } + + if (r >= 0) + break; + /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ + if (r != -EAGAIN) { + log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); + return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ + } + } + + if (!monitor) { + /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create + * an event loop and monitor first. */ + + assert(!event); + + if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2()) + return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), + "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking."); + + r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly); + + /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed + * to create and configure the monitor */ + continue; + } + + r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2..."); + } + assert(decrypted_key); + + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); + else { + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; + ssize_t base64_encoded_size; + + /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ + + base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); + if (base64_encoded_size < 0) + return log_oom(); + + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); + } + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); + return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(key_data); + + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags); + else + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags); + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)"); + return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; + size_t kfsize; + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + assert(key_file); + + /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */ + bindname = make_bindname(name); + if (!bindname) + return log_oom(); + + r = read_full_file_full( + AT_FDCWD, key_file, + arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset, + arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size, + READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, + bindname, + &kfdata, &kfsize); + if (r == -E2BIG) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + if (r == -ENOENT) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file); + + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, kfdata, kfsize, flags); + else + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags); + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file); + return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file); + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + char **passwords, + uint32_t flags, + bool pass_volume_key) { + + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + + r = -EINVAL; + STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { + if (pass_volume_key) + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags); + else + r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags); + if (r >= 0) + break; + } + if (r == -EPERM) { + log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)"); + return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m"); + + return 0; +} + +static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk( + struct crypt_device *cd, + const char *name, + const char *key_file, + const void *key_data, + size_t key_data_size, + char **passwords, + uint32_t flags, + usec_t until) { + + bool pass_volume_key = false; + int r; + + assert(cd); + assert(name); + + if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { + struct crypt_params_plain params = { + .offset = arg_offset, + .skip = arg_skip, + .sector_size = arg_sector_size, + }; + const char *cipher, *cipher_mode; + _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL; + + if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain")) + /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */ + params.hash = NULL; + else if (arg_hash) + params.hash = arg_hash; + else if (!key_file) + /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key + * file is provided */ + params.hash = "ripemd160"; + + if (arg_cipher) { + size_t l; + + l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-"); + truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l); + if (!truncated_cipher) + return log_oom(); + + cipher = truncated_cipher; + cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain"; + } else { + cipher = "aes"; + cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256"; + } + + /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */ + arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size; + + /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format + * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */ + r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m"); + + /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */ + pass_volume_key = !params.hash; + } + + log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.", + crypt_get_cipher(cd), + crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), + crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8, + crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + + if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); + if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto) + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); + if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); + if (key_data) + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags, pass_volume_key); + if (key_file) + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key); + + return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key); +} + +static int help(void) { + _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; + int r; + + r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup", "8", &link); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + printf("%1$s attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG]\n" + "%1$s detach VOLUME\n\n" + "%2$sAttach or detach an encrypted block device.%3$s\n\n" + " -h --help Show this help\n" + " --version Show package version\n" + "\nSee the %4$s for details.\n", + program_invocation_short_name, + ansi_highlight(), + ansi_normal(), + link); + + return 0; +} + +static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) { + enum { + ARG_VERSION = 0x100, + }; + + static const struct option options[] = { + { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' }, + { "version", no_argument, NULL, ARG_VERSION }, + {} + }; + + int c; + + assert(argc >= 0); + assert(argv); + + if (argv_looks_like_help(argc, argv)) + return help(); + + while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "h", options, NULL)) >= 0) + switch (c) { + + case 'h': + return help(); + + case ARG_VERSION: + return version(); + + case '?': + return -EINVAL; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + + return 1; +} + +static uint32_t determine_flags(void) { + uint32_t flags = 0; + + if (arg_readonly) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY; + + if (arg_discards) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS; + + if (arg_same_cpu_crypt) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT; + + if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS; + + if (arg_no_read_workqueue) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE; + + if (arg_no_write_workqueue) + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE; + +#ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF + /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */ + /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */ + flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF; +#endif + + return flags; +} + +static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) { + int r; + + if (!*p) + return; + + r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) + log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p); +} + +static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { + _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; + const char *verb; + int r; + + log_setup(); + + umask(0022); + + r = parse_argv(argc, argv); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL); + + if (argc - optind < 2) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), + "This program requires at least two arguments."); + verb = ASSERT_PTR(argv[optind]); + + if (streq(verb, "attach")) { + _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL; + _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL; + crypt_status_info status; + size_t key_data_size = 0; + uint32_t flags = 0; + unsigned tries; + usec_t until; + PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; + + /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG] */ + + if (argc - optind < 3) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments."); + if (argc - optind >= 6) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach does not accept more than four arguments."); + + const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[optind + 1]), + *source = ASSERT_PTR(argv[optind + 2]), + *key_file = argc - optind >= 4 ? mangle_none(argv[optind + 3]) : NULL, + *config = argc - optind >= 5 ? mangle_none(argv[optind + 4]) : NULL; + + if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); + + if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) { + log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file); + key_file = NULL; + } + + if (config) { + r = parse_crypt_config(config); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__, + volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher)); + + /* A delicious drop of snake oil */ + (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE); + + if (!key_file) { + _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; + const char *fn; + + bindname = make_bindname(volume); + if (!bindname) + return log_oom(); + + /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined + * search path, and load it. */ + + fn = strjoina(volume, ".key"); + r = find_key_file( + fn, + STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), + bindname, + &key_data, &key_data_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume); + } else if (arg_keyfile_erase) + destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */ + + if (arg_header) { + if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)){ + log_debug("tcrypt header: %s", arg_header); + r = crypt_init_data_device(&cd, arg_header, source); + } else { + log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header); + r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header); + } + } else + r = crypt_init(&cd, source); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m"); + + cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); + + status = crypt_status(cd, volume); + if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) { + log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume); + return 0; + } + + flags = determine_flags(); + + until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout); + if (until == USEC_INFINITY) + until = 0; + + if (arg_key_size == 0) + arg_key_size = 256U / 8U; + + if (key_file) { + struct stat st; + + /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a + * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */ + if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005)) + log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file); + } + + if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) { + r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + + if (arg_header) { + r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source); + } + + /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */ + if (!key_file && !key_data && use_token_plugins()) { + r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( + cd, + volume, + /* type= */ NULL, + until, + arg_headless, + /* userdata= */ NULL, + flags, + "Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:", + "luks2-pin", + "cryptsetup.luks2-pin"); + if (r >= 0) { + log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", volume, r); + return 0; + } + + log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + } + } + +/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ +#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK + if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) { + r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + } +#endif + + for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) { + _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; + + /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order: + * + * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip + * 2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size + * 3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size + * 4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set + * 5. We enquire the user for a password + */ + + if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto && !arg_tpm2_device && !arg_tpm2_device_auto) { + + if (arg_try_empty_password) { + /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */ + arg_try_empty_password = false; + + key_data = strdup(""); + if (!key_data) + return log_oom(); + + key_data_size = 0; + } else { + /* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we have + * nothing else to check for */ + if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) { + passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd); + if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered."); + } + + r = get_password(volume, source, until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, passphrase_type, &passwords); + if (r == -EAGAIN) + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + } + + if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) + r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags); + else + r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until); + if (r >= 0) + break; + if (r != -EAGAIN) + return r; + + /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */ + + key_file = NULL; + key_data = erase_and_free(key_data); + key_data_size = 0; + arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); + arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; + arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); + arg_fido2_device_auto = false; + arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); + arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; + } + + if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up."); + + } else if (streq(verb, "detach")) { + const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[optind + 1]); + + if (argc - optind >= 3) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach does not accept more than one argument."); + + if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); + + r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume); + if (r == -ENODEV) { + log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume); + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() for volume '%s' failed: %m", volume); + + cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); + + r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate '%s': %m", volume); + + } else + return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", verb); + + return 0; +} + +DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run); |