diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c | 477 |
1 files changed, 477 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b8918a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c @@ -0,0 +1,477 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <sys/statvfs.h> +#include <sys/vfs.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "acl-util.h" +#include "dirent-util.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "missing_magic.h" +#include "nspawn-def.h" +#include "nspawn-patch-uid.h" +#include "stat-util.h" +#include "stdio-util.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "user-util.h" + +#if HAVE_ACL + +static int get_acl(int fd, const char *name, acl_type_t type, acl_t *ret) { + acl_t acl; + + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(ret); + + if (name) { + _cleanup_close_ int child_fd = -EBADF; + + child_fd = openat(fd, name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW); + if (child_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + acl = acl_get_file(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(child_fd), type); + } else if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + acl = acl_get_fd(fd); + else + acl = acl_get_file(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), type); + if (!acl) + return -errno; + + *ret = acl; + return 0; +} + +static int set_acl(int fd, const char *name, acl_type_t type, acl_t acl) { + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(acl); + + if (name) { + _cleanup_close_ int child_fd = -EBADF; + + child_fd = openat(fd, name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW); + if (child_fd < 0) + return -errno; + + r = acl_set_file(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(child_fd), type, acl); + } else if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + r = acl_set_fd(fd, acl); + else + r = acl_set_file(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), type, acl); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + + return 0; +} + +static int shift_acl(acl_t acl, uid_t shift, acl_t *ret) { + _cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t copy = NULL; + acl_entry_t i; + int r; + + assert(acl); + assert(ret); + + r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &i); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + while (r > 0) { + uid_t *old_uid, new_uid; + bool modify = false; + acl_tag_t tag; + + if (acl_get_tag_type(i, &tag) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (IN_SET(tag, ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP)) { + + /* We don't distinguish here between uid_t and gid_t, let's make sure the compiler checks that + * this is actually OK */ + assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(gid_t)); + + old_uid = acl_get_qualifier(i); + if (!old_uid) + return -errno; + + new_uid = shift | (*old_uid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF)); + if (!uid_is_valid(new_uid)) + return -EINVAL; + + modify = new_uid != *old_uid; + if (modify && !copy) { + int n; + + /* There's no copy of the ACL yet? if so, let's create one, and start the loop from the + * beginning, so that we copy all entries, starting from the first, this time. */ + + n = acl_entries(acl); + if (n < 0) + return -errno; + + copy = acl_init(n); + if (!copy) + return -errno; + + /* Seek back to the beginning */ + r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &i); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + continue; + } + } + + if (copy) { + acl_entry_t new_entry; + + if (acl_create_entry(©, &new_entry) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (acl_copy_entry(new_entry, i) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (modify) + if (acl_set_qualifier(new_entry, &new_uid) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &i); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + } + + *ret = TAKE_PTR(copy); + + return !!*ret; +} + +static int patch_acls(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) { + _cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t acl = NULL, shifted = NULL; + bool changed = false; + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(st); + + /* ACLs are not supported on symlinks, there's no point in trying */ + if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) + return 0; + + r = get_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, &acl); + if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) + return 0; + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = shift_acl(acl, shift, &shifted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + r = set_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, shifted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + changed = true; + } + + if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) { + acl_free(acl); + + if (shifted) + acl_free(shifted); + + acl = shifted = NULL; + + r = get_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, &acl); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = shift_acl(acl, shift, &shifted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + r = set_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, shifted); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + changed = true; + } + } + + return changed; +} + +#else + +static int patch_acls(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) { + return 0; +} + +#endif + +static int patch_fd(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) { + uid_t new_uid; + gid_t new_gid; + bool changed = false; + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + assert(st); + + new_uid = shift | (st->st_uid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF)); + new_gid = (gid_t) shift | (st->st_gid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF)); + + if (!uid_is_valid(new_uid) || !gid_is_valid(new_gid)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (st->st_uid != new_uid || st->st_gid != new_gid) { + if (name) + r = fchownat(fd, name, new_uid, new_gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW); + else + r = fchown(fd, new_uid, new_gid); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + + /* The Linux kernel alters the mode in some cases of chown(). Let's undo this. */ + if (name) { + if (!S_ISLNK(st->st_mode)) + r = fchmodat(fd, name, st->st_mode, 0); + else /* Changing the mode of a symlink is not supported by Linux kernel. Don't bother. */ + r = 0; + } else + r = fchmod(fd, st->st_mode); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + + changed = true; + } + + r = patch_acls(fd, name, st, shift); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return r > 0 || changed; +} + +/* + * Check if the filesystem is fully compatible with user namespaces or + * UID/GID patching. Some filesystems in this list can be fully mounted inside + * user namespaces, however their inodes may relate to host resources or only + * valid in the global user namespace, therefore no patching should be applied. + */ +static int is_fs_fully_userns_compatible(const struct statfs *sfs) { + + assert(sfs); + + return F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, BINFMTFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, DEBUGFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, EFIVARFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, HUGETLBFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, MQUEUE_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, PROC_SUPER_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, PSTOREFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, SELINUX_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, SMACK_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, SECURITYFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, BPF_FS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, TRACEFS_MAGIC) || + F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs->f_type, SYSFS_MAGIC); +} + +static int recurse_fd(int fd, bool donate_fd, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift, bool is_toplevel) { + _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL; + bool changed = false; + struct statfs sfs; + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + + if (fstatfs(fd, &sfs) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* We generally want to permit crossing of mount boundaries when patching the UIDs/GIDs. However, we probably + * shouldn't do this for /proc and /sys if that is already mounted into place. Hence, let's stop the recursion + * when we hit procfs, sysfs or some other special file systems. */ + + r = is_fs_fully_userns_compatible(&sfs); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + if (r > 0) { + r = 0; /* don't recurse */ + goto finish; + } + + /* Also, if we hit a read-only file system, then don't bother, skip the whole subtree */ + if ((sfs.f_flags & ST_RDONLY) || + access_fd(fd, W_OK) == -EROFS) + goto read_only; + + if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) { + if (!donate_fd) { + int copy; + + copy = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3); + if (copy < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + fd = copy; + donate_fd = true; + } + + d = take_fdopendir(&fd); + if (!d) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, r = -errno; goto finish) { + struct stat fst; + + if (dot_or_dot_dot(de->d_name)) + continue; + + if (fstatat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + if (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode)) { + int subdir_fd; + + subdir_fd = openat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); + if (subdir_fd < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + + } + + r = recurse_fd(subdir_fd, true, &fst, shift, false); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + if (r > 0) + changed = true; + + } else { + r = patch_fd(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, shift); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + if (r > 0) + changed = true; + } + } + } + + /* After we descended, also patch the directory itself. It's key to do this in this order so that the top-level + * directory is patched as very last object in the tree, so that we can use it as quick indicator whether the + * tree is properly chown()ed already. */ + r = patch_fd(d ? dirfd(d) : fd, NULL, st, shift); + if (r == -EROFS) + goto read_only; + if (r > 0) + changed = true; + + r = changed; + goto finish; + +read_only: + if (!is_toplevel) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; + + /* When we hit a ready-only subtree we simply skip it, but log about it. */ + (void) fd_get_path(fd, &name); + log_debug("Skipping read-only file or directory %s.", strna(name)); + r = changed; + } + +finish: + if (donate_fd) + safe_close(fd); + + return r; +} + +static int fd_patch_uid_internal(int fd, bool donate_fd, uid_t shift, uid_t range) { + struct stat st; + int r; + + assert(fd >= 0); + + /* Recursively adjusts the UID/GIDs of all files of a directory tree. This is used to automatically fix up an + * OS tree to the used user namespace UID range. Note that this automatic adjustment only works for UID ranges + * following the concept that the upper 16-bit of a UID identify the container, and the lower 16-bit are the actual + * UID within the container. */ + + if ((shift & 0xFFFF) != 0) { + /* We only support containers where the shift starts at a 2^16 boundary */ + r = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto finish; + } + + if (shift == UID_BUSY_BASE) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + if (range != 0x10000) { + /* We only support containers with 16-bit UID ranges for the patching logic */ + r = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto finish; + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + + if ((uint32_t) st.st_uid >> 16 != (uint32_t) st.st_gid >> 16) { + /* We only support containers where the uid/gid container ID match */ + r = -EBADE; + goto finish; + } + + /* Try to detect if the range is already right. Of course, this a pretty drastic optimization, as we assume + * that if the top-level dir has the right upper 16-bit assigned, then everything below will have too... */ + if (((uint32_t) (st.st_uid ^ shift) >> 16) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Before we start recursively chowning, mark the top-level dir as "busy" by chowning it to the "busy" + * range. Should we be interrupted in the middle of our work, we'll see it owned by this user and will start + * chown()ing it again, unconditionally, as the busy UID is not a valid UID we'd everpick for ourselves. */ + + if ((st.st_uid & UID_BUSY_MASK) != UID_BUSY_BASE) { + if (fchown(fd, + UID_BUSY_BASE | (st.st_uid & ~UID_BUSY_MASK), + (gid_t) UID_BUSY_BASE | (st.st_gid & ~(gid_t) UID_BUSY_MASK)) < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto finish; + } + } + + return recurse_fd(fd, donate_fd, &st, shift, true); + +finish: + if (donate_fd) + safe_close(fd); + + return r; +} + +int path_patch_uid(const char *path, uid_t shift, uid_t range) { + int fd; + + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + return fd_patch_uid_internal(fd, true, shift, range); +} |