diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 2589 |
1 files changed, 2589 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a192d82 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c @@ -0,0 +1,2589 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "dns-domain.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "gcrypt-util.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "memory-util.h" +#include "memstream-util.h" +#include "openssl-util.h" +#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" +#include "resolved-dns-packet.h" +#include "sort-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3 +# pragma GCC diagnostic push +# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" +DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(RSA*, RSA_free, NULL); +DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC_FULL(EC_KEY*, EC_KEY_free, NULL); +# pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + +#define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) + +/* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ +#define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) + +/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. RFC5155 says 2500 shall be the maximum useful value, but + * RFC9276 § 3.2 says that we should reduce the acceptable iteration count */ +#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 100 + +/* + * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: + * + * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone + * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree + * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs + * + * Example chain: + * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS + */ + +uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { + const uint8_t *p; + uint32_t sum, f; + + /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ + + assert(dnskey); + assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); + + f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; + + if (mask_revoke) + f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; + + sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); + + p = dnskey->dnskey.key; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) + sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; + + sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); + + return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); +} + +#if HAVE_OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT + +static int rr_compare(DnsResourceRecord * const *a, DnsResourceRecord * const *b) { + const DnsResourceRecord *x = *a, *y = *b; + size_t m; + int r; + + /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ + + assert(x); + assert(x->wire_format); + assert(y); + assert(y->wire_format); + + m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(y)); + + r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(y), m); + if (r != 0) + return r; + + return CMP(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(y)); +} + +static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( + hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, + const void *signature, size_t signature_size, + const void *data, size_t data_size, + const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, + const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { + int r; + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL +# pragma GCC diagnostic push +# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" + _cleanup_(RSA_freep) RSA *rpubkey = NULL; + _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *epubkey = NULL; + _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; + _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *e = NULL, *m = NULL; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + + e = BN_bin2bn(exponent, exponent_size, NULL); + if (!e) + return -EIO; + + m = BN_bin2bn(modulus, modulus_size, NULL); + if (!m) + return -EIO; + + rpubkey = RSA_new(); + if (!rpubkey) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (RSA_set0_key(rpubkey, m, e, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + e = m = NULL; + + assert((size_t) RSA_size(rpubkey) == signature_size); + + epubkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (!epubkey) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(epubkey, RSAPublicKey_dup(rpubkey)) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(epubkey, NULL); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, hash_algorithm) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + r = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); + +# pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#else + gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; + gcry_error_t ge; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, + NULL, + "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", + s); + + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, + NULL, + "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", + hash_algorithm, + (int) data_size, + data); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, + NULL, + "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", + n, + e); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); + if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + r = 0; + else if (ge != 0) + r = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); + else + r = 1; + +finish: + if (e) + gcry_mpi_release(e); + if (n) + gcry_mpi_release(n); + if (s) + gcry_mpi_release(s); + + if (public_key_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); + if (signature_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); + if (data_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); +#endif + return r; +} + +static int dnssec_rsa_verify( + hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, + const void *hash, size_t hash_size, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + + size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; + void *exponent, *modulus; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + assert(hash); + assert(hash_size > 0); + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + + if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { + /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ + + exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; + exponent_size = + ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | + ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); + + if (exponent_size < 256) + return -EINVAL; + + if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) + return -EINVAL; + + modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; + modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; + + } else { + /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ + + exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; + exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; + + if (exponent_size <= 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) + return -EINVAL; + + modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; + modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; + } + + return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( + hash_algorithm, + rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, + hash, hash_size, + exponent, exponent_size, + modulus, modulus_size); +} + +static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( + hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, + elliptic_curve_t curve, + const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, + const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, + const void *data, size_t data_size, + const void *key, size_t key_size) { + int k; + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL +# pragma GCC diagnostic push +# pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" + _cleanup_(EC_GROUP_freep) EC_GROUP *ec_group = NULL; + _cleanup_(EC_POINT_freep) EC_POINT *p = NULL; + _cleanup_(EC_KEY_freep) EC_KEY *eckey = NULL; + _cleanup_(BN_CTX_freep) BN_CTX *bctx = NULL; + _cleanup_(BN_freep) BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + _cleanup_(ECDSA_SIG_freep) ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + + ec_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve); + if (!ec_group) + return -ENOMEM; + + p = EC_POINT_new(ec_group); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + bctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (!bctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(ec_group, p, key, key_size, bctx) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + eckey = EC_KEY_new(); + if (!eckey) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, ec_group) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(eckey, p) <= 0) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "EC_POINT_bn2point failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); + + assert(EC_KEY_check_key(eckey) == 1); + + r = BN_bin2bn(signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); + if (!r) + return -EIO; + + s = BN_bin2bn(signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); + if (!s) + return -EIO; + + /* TODO: We should eventually use the EVP API once it supports ECDSA signature verification */ + + sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); + if (!sig) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) <= 0) + return -EIO; + r = s = NULL; + + k = ECDSA_do_verify(data, data_size, sig, eckey); + if (k < 0) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); + +# pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#else + gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; + gcry_error_t ge; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, + NULL, + "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", + r, + s); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, + NULL, + "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", + hash_algorithm, + (int) data_size, + data); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, + NULL, + "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", + curve, + q); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); + if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + k = 0; + else if (ge != 0) { + log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); + k = -EIO; + } else + k = 1; +finish: + if (r) + gcry_mpi_release(r); + if (s) + gcry_mpi_release(s); + if (q) + gcry_mpi_release(q); + + if (public_key_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); + if (signature_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); + if (data_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); +#endif + return k; +} + +static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( + hash_algorithm_t hash_algorithm, + int algorithm, + const void *hash, size_t hash_size, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + + elliptic_curve_t curve; + size_t key_size; + uint8_t *q; + + assert(hash); + assert(hash_size); + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + + if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { + curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "NIST P-256"); /* NIST P-256 */ + key_size = 32; + } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { + curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_secp384r1, "NIST P-384"); /* NIST P-384 */ + key_size = 48; + } else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) + return -EINVAL; + + if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) + return -EINVAL; + + q = newa(uint8_t, key_size*2 + 1); + q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ + memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); + + return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( + hash_algorithm, + curve, + rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, + (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, + hash, hash_size, + q, key_size*2+1); +} + +static int dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw( + elliptic_curve_t curve, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_size) { + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_freep) EVP_PKEY *evkey = NULL; + _cleanup_(EVP_PKEY_CTX_freep) EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int r; + + assert(curve == NID_ED25519); + assert(signature_size == key_size * 2); + + uint8_t *q = newa(uint8_t, signature_size + 1); + q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ + memcpy(q+1, signature, signature_size); + + evkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NULL, key, key_size); + if (!evkey) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); + + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(evkey, NULL); + if (!pctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* This prevents EVP_DigestVerifyInit from managing pctx and complicating our free logic. */ + EVP_MD_CTX_set_pkey_ctx(ctx, pctx); + + /* One might be tempted to use EVP_PKEY_verify_init, but see Ed25519(7ssl). */ + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pctx, NULL, NULL, evkey) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + r = EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, signature, signature_size, data, data_size); + if (r < 0) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "Signature verification failed: 0x%lx", ERR_get_error()); + + return r; + +#elif GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 + gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; + gcry_error_t ge; + int k; + + assert(signature_size == key_size * 2); + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, + NULL, + "(sig-val (eddsa (r %b) (s %b)))", + (int) key_size, + signature, + (int) key_size, + signature + key_size); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, + NULL, + "(data (flags eddsa) (hash-algo sha512) (value %b))", + (int) data_size, + data); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, + NULL, + "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (flags eddsa) (q %b)))", + curve, + (int) key_size, + key); + if (ge != 0) { + k = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); + if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + k = 0; + else if (ge != 0) + k = log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), + "EdDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); + else + k = 1; +finish: + if (public_key_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); + if (signature_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); + if (data_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); + + return k; +#else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#endif +} + +static int dnssec_eddsa_verify( + int algorithm, + const void *data, size_t data_size, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + elliptic_curve_t curve; + size_t key_size; + + if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519) { + curve = OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NID_ED25519, "Ed25519"); + key_size = 32; + } else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) + return -EINVAL; + + return dnssec_eddsa_verify_raw( + curve, + rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, + data, data_size, + dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size); +} + +static int md_add_uint8(hash_context_t ctx, uint8_t v) { +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); +#else + gcry_md_write(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int md_add_uint16(hash_context_t ctx, uint16_t v) { + v = htobe16(v); +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); +#else + gcry_md_write(ctx, &v, sizeof(v)); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static void fwrite_uint8(FILE *fp, uint8_t v) { + fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); +} + +static void fwrite_uint16(FILE *fp, uint16_t v) { + v = htobe16(v); + fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); +} + +static void fwrite_uint32(FILE *fp, uint32_t v) { + v = htobe32(v); + fwrite(&v, sizeof(v), 1, fp); +} + +static int dnssec_rrsig_prepare(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { + int n_key_labels, n_signer_labels; + const char *name; + int r; + + /* Checks whether the specified RRSIG RR is somewhat valid, and initializes the .n_skip_labels_source + * and .n_skip_labels_signer fields so that we can use them later on. */ + + assert(rrsig); + assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); + + /* Check if this RRSIG RR is already prepared */ + if (rrsig->n_skip_labels_source != UINT8_MAX) + return 0; + + if (rrsig->rrsig.inception > rrsig->rrsig.expiration) + return -EINVAL; + + name = dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key); + + n_key_labels = dns_name_count_labels(name); + if (n_key_labels < 0) + return n_key_labels; + if (rrsig->rrsig.labels > n_key_labels) + return -EINVAL; + + n_signer_labels = dns_name_count_labels(rrsig->rrsig.signer); + if (n_signer_labels < 0) + return n_signer_labels; + if (n_signer_labels > rrsig->rrsig.labels) + return -EINVAL; + + r = dns_name_skip(name, n_key_labels - n_signer_labels, &name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Check if the signer is really a suffix of us */ + r = dns_name_equal(name, rrsig->rrsig.signer); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + assert(n_key_labels < UINT8_MAX); /* UINT8_MAX/-1 means unsigned. */ + rrsig->n_skip_labels_source = n_key_labels - rrsig->rrsig.labels; + rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer = n_key_labels - n_signer_labels; + + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { + usec_t expiration, inception, skew; + + assert(rrsig); + assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); + + if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) + realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); + + expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; + inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; + + /* Consider inverted validity intervals as expired */ + if (inception > expiration) + return true; + + /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid + * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's + * resolver. */ + skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; + if (skew > SKEW_MAX) + skew = SKEW_MAX; + + if (inception < skew) + inception = 0; + else + inception -= skew; + + if (expiration + skew < expiration) + expiration = USEC_INFINITY; + else + expiration += skew; + + return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; +} + +static hash_md_t algorithm_to_implementation_id(uint8_t algorithm) { + + /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier. + * + * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in + * RFC6944. We don't implement any algorithms that are listed as "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". + * Specifically, we do not implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and GOST-ECC. */ + + switch (algorithm) { + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha256(), GCRY_MD_SHA256); + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha384(), GCRY_MD_SHA384); + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha512(), GCRY_MD_SHA512); + + default: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); + } +} + +static void dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl( + DnsResourceRecord *list[], + unsigned n, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { + + assert(list); + assert(n > 0); + assert(rrsig); + + for (unsigned k = 0; k < n; k++) { + DnsResourceRecord *rr = list[k]; + + /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the + * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the + * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ + rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); + rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; + + /* Copy over information about the signer and wildcard source of synthesis */ + rr->n_skip_labels_source = rrsig->n_skip_labels_source; + rr->n_skip_labels_signer = rrsig->n_skip_labels_signer; + } + + rrsig->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; +} + +static int dnssec_rrset_serialize_sig( + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + const char *source, + DnsResourceRecord **list, + size_t list_len, + bool wildcard, + char **ret_sig_data, + size_t *ret_sig_size) { + + _cleanup_(memstream_done) MemStream m = {}; + uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + DnsResourceRecord *rr; + FILE *f; + int r; + + assert(rrsig); + assert(source); + assert(list || list_len == 0); + assert(ret_sig_data); + assert(ret_sig_size); + + f = memstream_init(&m); + if (!f) + return -ENOMEM; + + fwrite_uint16(f, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); + fwrite_uint8(f, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); + fwrite_uint8(f, rrsig->rrsig.labels); + fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); + fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); + fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.inception); + fwrite_uint16(f, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + fwrite(wire_format_name, 1, r, f); + + /* Convert the source of synthesis into wire format */ + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(source, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + for (size_t k = 0; k < list_len; k++) { + size_t l; + + rr = list[k]; + + /* Hash the source of synthesis. If this is a wildcard, then prefix it with the *. label */ + if (wildcard) + fwrite((uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, sizeof(uint8_t), 2, f); + fwrite(wire_format_name, 1, r, f); + + fwrite_uint16(f, rr->key->type); + fwrite_uint16(f, rr->key->class); + fwrite_uint32(f, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); + + l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); + assert(l <= 0xFFFF); + + fwrite_uint16(f, (uint16_t) l); + fwrite(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), 1, l, f); + } + + return memstream_finalize(&m, ret_sig_data, ret_sig_size); +} + +static int dnssec_rrset_verify_sig( + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, + const char *sig_data, + size_t sig_size) { + + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + assert(sig_data); + assert(sig_size > 0); + + hash_md_t md_algorithm; + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned hash_size; +#else + _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + void *hash; + size_t hash_size; + + initialize_libgcrypt(false); +#endif + + switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED25519: +#if PREFER_OPENSSL || GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010600 + return dnssec_eddsa_verify( + rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, + sig_data, sig_size, + rrsig, + dnskey); +#endif + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ED448: + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + default: + /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ + md_algorithm = algorithm_to_implementation_id(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + if (!md_algorithm) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_algorithm, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sig_data, sig_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hash_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + assert(hash_size > 0); + +#else + if (md_algorithm < 0) + return md_algorithm; + + gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); + if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) + return -EIO; + + hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); + assert(hash_size > 0); + + gcry_md_write(md, sig_data, sig_size); + + hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!hash) + return -EIO; +#endif + } + + switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: + return dnssec_rsa_verify( + OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)), + hash, hash_size, + rrsig, + dnskey); + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: + return dnssec_ecdsa_verify( + OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(md_algorithm, gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm)), + rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, + hash, hash_size, + rrsig, + dnskey); + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } +} + +int dnssec_verify_rrset( + DnsAnswer *a, + const DnsResourceKey *key, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, + usec_t realtime, + DnssecResult *result) { + + DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; + const char *source, *name; + _cleanup_free_ char *sig_data = NULL; + size_t sig_size = 0; /* avoid false maybe-uninitialized warning */ + size_t n = 0; + bool wildcard; + int r; + + assert(key); + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + assert(result); + assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); + assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); + + /* Verifies that the RRSet matches the specified "key" in "a", + * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's + * assumed that RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ + + r = dnssec_rrsig_prepare(rrsig); + if (r == -EINVAL) { + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + return r; + } + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; + return 0; + } + + name = dns_resource_key_name(key); + + /* Some keys may only appear signed in the zone apex, and are invalid anywhere else. (SOA, NS...) */ + if (dns_type_apex_only(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { + r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + return 0; + } + } + + /* OTOH DS RRs may not appear in the zone apex, but are valid everywhere else. */ + if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered == DNS_TYPE_DS) { + r = dns_name_equal(rrsig->rrsig.signer, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + return 0; + } + } + + /* Determine the "Source of Synthesis" and whether this is a wildcard RRSIG */ + r = dns_name_suffix(name, rrsig->rrsig.labels, &source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0 && !dns_type_may_wildcard(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) { + /* We refuse to validate NSEC3 or SOA RRs that are synthesized from wildcards */ + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + return 0; + } + if (r == 1) { + /* If we stripped a single label, then let's see if that maybe was "*". If so, we are not really + * synthesized from a wildcard, we are the wildcard itself. Treat that like a normal name. */ + r = dns_name_startswith(name, "*"); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + source = name; + + wildcard = r == 0; + } else + wildcard = r > 0; + + /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ + list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, dns_answer_size(a)); + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { + r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ + r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + list[n++] = rr; + + if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) + return -E2BIG; + } + + if (n <= 0) + return -ENODATA; + + /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ + typesafe_qsort(list, n, rr_compare); + + r = dnssec_rrset_serialize_sig(rrsig, source, list, n, wildcard, + &sig_data, &sig_size); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dnssec_rrset_verify_sig(rrsig, dnskey, sig_data, sig_size); + if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { + *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; + return 0; + } + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* Now, fix the ttl, expiry, and remember the synthesizing source and the signer */ + if (r > 0) + dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(list, n, rrsig); + + if (r == 0) + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + else if (wildcard) + *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD; + else + *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; + + return 0; +} + +int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { + + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + + /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for + * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ + + if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return 0; + if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) + return 0; + if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) + return 0; + if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) + return 0; + if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) + return 0; + if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) + return 0; + + if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) + return 0; + + return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); +} + +int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { + assert(key); + assert(rrsig); + + /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ + + if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) + return 0; + if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) + return 0; + if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) + return 0; + + return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key), dns_resource_key_name(key)); +} + +int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( + DnsAnswer *a, + const DnsResourceKey *key, + DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, + usec_t realtime, + DnssecResult *result, + DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { + + bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; + unsigned nvalidations = 0; + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; + int r; + + assert(key); + assert(result); + + /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ + + if (dns_answer_isempty(a)) + return -ENODATA; + + /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; + DnsAnswerFlags flags; + + /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ + r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + found_rrsig = true; + + /* Look for a matching key */ + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { + DnssecResult one_result; + + if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) + continue; + + /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ + r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so + * that we do all validations with the same + * time. */ + if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) + realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); + + /* Have we seen an unreasonable number of invalid signaures? */ + if (nvalidations > DNSSEC_INVALID_MAX) { + if (ret_rrsig) + *ret_rrsig = NULL; + *result = DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS; + return (int) nvalidations; + } + + /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching + * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of + * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY + * combination. */ + + r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + nvalidations++; + + switch (one_result) { + + case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: + case DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD: + /* Yay, the RR has been validated, + * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ + if (ret_rrsig) + *ret_rrsig = rrsig; + + *result = one_result; + return (int) nvalidations; + + case DNSSEC_INVALID: + /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another + key and/or signature. After all they + key_tags and stuff are not unique, and + might be shared by multiple keys. */ + found_invalid = true; + continue; + + case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: + /* If the key algorithm is + unsupported, try another + RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we + encountered this, so that we can + return a proper error when we + encounter nothing better. */ + found_unsupported_algorithm = true; + continue; + + case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: + /* If the signature is expired, try + another one, but remember it, so + that we can return this */ + found_expired_rrsig = true; + continue; + + default: + assert_not_reached(); + } + } + } + + if (found_expired_rrsig) + *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; + else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) + *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; + else if (found_invalid) + *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; + else if (found_rrsig) + *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; + + if (ret_rrsig) + *ret_rrsig = NULL; + + return (int) nvalidations; +} + +int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { + DnsResourceRecord *rr; + int r; + + /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that protects RRs of the specified key */ + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { + r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static hash_md_t digest_to_hash_md(uint8_t algorithm) { + + /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier */ + + switch (algorithm) { + + case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); + + case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha256(), GCRY_MD_SHA256); + + case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha384(), GCRY_MD_SHA384); + + default: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); + } +} + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { + uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + int r; + + assert(dnskey); + assert(ds); + + /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return -EINVAL; + if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) + return -EINVAL; + if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) + return 0; + if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) + return 0; + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), wire_format, sizeof wire_format, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + hash_md_t md_algorithm = digest_to_hash_md(ds->ds.digest_type); + +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + if (!md_algorithm) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; + uint8_t result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + unsigned hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md_algorithm); + assert(hash_size > 0); + + if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) + return 0; + + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md_algorithm, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, wire_format, r) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (mask_revoke) + md_add_uint16(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); + else + md_add_uint16(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.flags); + + r = md_add_uint8(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + r = md_add_uint8(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + +#else + if (md_algorithm < 0) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + initialize_libgcrypt(false); + + _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + + size_t hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); + assert(hash_size > 0); + + if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) + return 0; + + gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); + if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) + return -EIO; + + gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); + if (mask_revoke) + md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); + else + md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); + md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); + md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); + gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); + + void *result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!result) + return -EIO; +#endif + + return memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) == 0; +} + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { + DnsResourceRecord *ds; + DnsAnswerFlags flags; + int r; + + assert(dnskey); + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return 0; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { + + if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) + continue; + + if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) + continue; + if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) + continue; + + r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), dns_resource_key_name(ds->key)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(dnskey, ds, false); + if (IN_SET(r, -EKEYREJECTED, -EOPNOTSUPP)) + return 0; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, or we don't support the digest algorithm */ + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static hash_md_t nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(uint8_t algorithm) { + + /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into an openssl/gcrypt digest identifier */ + + switch (algorithm) { + + case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(EVP_sha1(), GCRY_MD_SHA1); + + default: + return OPENSSL_OR_GCRYPT(NULL, -EOPNOTSUPP); + } +} + +int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { + uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FORMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + int r; + + assert(nsec3); + assert(name); + assert(ret); + + if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) + return -EINVAL; + + if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) + return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), + "Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", + dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); + + hash_md_t algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + if (!algorithm) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + size_t hash_size = EVP_MD_size(algorithm); + assert(hash_size > 0); + + if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + + _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, algorithm, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, wire_format, r) <= 0) + return -EIO; + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + uint8_t result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + for (unsigned k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, algorithm, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, result, hash_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) <= 0) + return -EIO; + + if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, result, NULL) <= 0) + return -EIO; + } +#else + if (algorithm < 0) + return algorithm; + + initialize_libgcrypt(false); + + unsigned hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); + assert(hash_size > 0); + + if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + _cleanup_(gcry_md_closep) gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + gcry_error_t err = gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); + if (gcry_err_code(err) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR || !md) + return -EIO; + + gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); + gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); + + void *result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!result) + return -EIO; + + for (unsigned k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { + uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; + memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); + + gcry_md_reset(md); + gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); + gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); + + result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!result) + return -EIO; + } +#endif + + memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); + return (int) hash_size; +} + +static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { + const char *a, *b; + int r; + + assert(rr); + + if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) + return 0; + + /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ + if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) + return 0; + + /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ +#if PREFER_OPENSSL + if (!nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm)) + return 0; +#else + if (nsec3_hash_to_hash_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) + return 0; +#endif + + /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ + if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) + return 0; + + /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs generated from wildcards. If these NSEC3 RRs weren't correctly signed we can't make this + * check (since rr->n_skip_labels_source is -1), but that's OK, as we won't trust them anyway in that case. */ + if (!IN_SET(rr->n_skip_labels_source, 0, UINT8_MAX)) + return 0; + /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs that are located anywhere else than one label below the zone */ + if (!IN_SET(rr->n_skip_labels_signer, 1, UINT8_MAX)) + return 0; + + if (!nsec3) + return 1; + + /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ + + if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ + return 1; + + if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) + return 0; + if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) + return 0; + if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) + return 0; + if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) + return 0; + if (memcmp_safe(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) + return 0; + + a = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); + r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + b = dns_resource_key_name(nsec3->key); + r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* Make sure both have the same parent */ + return dns_name_equal(a, b); +} + +static int nsec3_hashed_domain_format(const uint8_t *hashed, size_t hashed_size, const char *zone, char **ret) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL; + char *j; + + assert(hashed); + assert(hashed_size > 0); + assert(zone); + assert(ret); + + l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + j = strjoin(l, ".", zone); + if (!j) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ret = j; + return (int) hashed_size; +} + +static int nsec3_hashed_domain_make(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { + uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; + int hashed_size; + + assert(nsec3); + assert(domain); + assert(zone); + assert(ret); + + hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); + if (hashed_size < 0) + return hashed_size; + + return nsec3_hashed_domain_format(hashed, (size_t) hashed_size, zone, ret); +} + +/* See RFC 5155, Section 8 + * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest + * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there + * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that + * matches the wildcard domain. + * + * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or + * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a proof of non-existence of a given + * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records + * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ +static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { + _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; + const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL, *wildcard; + DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *zone_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; + DnsAnswerFlags flags; + int hashed_size, r; + bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; + + assert(key); + assert(result); + + /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. + * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with + * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 + * records from a given zone in a response must use the same + * parameters. */ + zone = dns_resource_key_name(key); + for (;;) { + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(zone_rr, flags, answer) { + r = nsec3_is_good(zone_rr, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = dns_name_equal_skip(dns_resource_key_name(zone_rr->key), 1, zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + goto found_zone; + } + + /* Strip one label from the front */ + r = dns_name_parent(&zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + } + + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + return 0; + +found_zone: + /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ + p = dns_resource_key_name(key); + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; + + hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(zone_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); + if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; + return 0; + } + if (hashed_size < 0) + return hashed_size; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { + + r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, zone_rr); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) + continue; + + r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + goto found_closest_encloser; + } + } + + /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, + * but let's remember this domain name, it might be + * the next closer name */ + + pp = p; + + /* Strip one label from the front */ + r = dns_name_parent(&p); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + } + + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + return 0; + +found_closest_encloser: + /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ + + if (!pp) { + /* We have an exact match! If we area looking for a DS RR, then we must insist that we got the NSEC3 RR + * from the parent. Otherwise the one from the child. Do so, by checking whether SOA and NS are + * appropriately set. */ + + if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + return -EBADMSG; + } else { + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && + !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + return -EBADMSG; + } + + /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = a; + if (ttl) + *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; + + return 0; + } + + /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain + * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't + * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" + * DNS server). */ + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && + !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ + + wildcard = strjoina("*.", p); + r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != hashed_size) + return -EBADMSG; + + r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != hashed_size) + return -EBADMSG; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { + _cleanup_free_ char *next_hashed_domain = NULL; + + r = nsec3_is_good(rr, zone_rr); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, zone, &next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) + optout = true; + + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + no_closer = true; + } + + r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + wildcard_rr = rr; + } + + r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) + /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is + * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on + * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as + * we would wish */ + optout = true; + + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + no_wildcard = true; + } + } + + if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) + return -EBADMSG; + + if (!no_closer) { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + return 0; + } + + if (wildcard_rr) { + /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ + if (optout) + /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but + * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR + * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is + * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; + else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + } else { + if (optout) + /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for + * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should + * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. + * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the + * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide + * any additional information. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; + else if (no_wildcard) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; + else { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + + return 0; + } + } + + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = a; + + if (ttl) + *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; + + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { + char label[DNS_LABEL_MAX]; + const char *n; + int r; + + assert(rr); + assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); + + /* Checks whether the specified RR has a name beginning in "*.", and if the rest is a suffix of our name */ + + if (rr->n_skip_labels_source != 1) + return 0; + + n = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key); + r = dns_label_unescape(&n, label, sizeof label, 0); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + if (r != 1 || label[0] != '*') + return 0; + + return dns_name_endswith(name, n); +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_in_path(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { + const char *nn, *common_suffix; + int r; + + assert(rr); + assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); + + /* Checks whether the specified nsec RR indicates that name is an empty non-terminal (ENT) + * + * A couple of examples: + * + * NSEC bar → waldo.foo.bar: indicates that foo.bar exists and is an ENT + * NSEC waldo.foo.bar → yyy.zzz.xoo.bar: indicates that xoo.bar and zzz.xoo.bar exist and are ENTs + * NSEC yyy.zzz.xoo.bar → bar: indicates pretty much nothing about ENTs + */ + + /* First, determine parent of next domain. */ + nn = rr->nsec.next_domain_name; + r = dns_name_parent(&nn); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* If the name we just determined is not equal or child of the name we are interested in, then we can't say + * anything at all. */ + r = dns_name_endswith(nn, name); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* If the name we are interested in is not a prefix of the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next domain names, then we can't say anything either. */ + r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return dns_name_endswith(name, common_suffix); +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { + int r; + + assert(rr); + assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); + + /* Checks whether this NSEC originates to the parent zone or the child zone. */ + + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_equal(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key)); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* DNAME, and NS without SOA is an indication for a delegation. */ + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) + return 1; + + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_covers(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) { + const char *signer; + int r; + + assert(rr); + assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); + + /* Checks whether the name is covered by this NSEC RR. This means, that the name is somewhere below the NSEC's + * signer name, and between the NSEC's two names. */ + + r = dns_resource_record_signer(rr, &signer); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_endswith(name, signer); /* this NSEC isn't suitable the name is not in the signer's domain */ + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_generate_wildcard(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name, char **wc) { + const char *common_suffix1, *common_suffix2, *signer; + int r, labels1, labels2; + + assert(rr); + assert(rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC); + + /* Generates "Wildcard at the Closest Encloser" for the given name and NSEC RR. */ + + r = dns_resource_record_signer(rr, &signer); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_endswith(name, signer); /* this NSEC isn't suitable the name is not in the signer's domain */ + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_common_suffix(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), &common_suffix1); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_common_suffix(name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix2); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + labels1 = dns_name_count_labels(common_suffix1); + if (labels1 < 0) + return labels1; + + labels2 = dns_name_count_labels(common_suffix2); + if (labels2 < 0) + return labels2; + + if (labels1 > labels2) + r = dns_name_concat("*", common_suffix1, 0, wc); + else + r = dns_name_concat("*", common_suffix2, 0, wc); + + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + +int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { + bool have_nsec3 = false, covering_rr_authenticated = false, wildcard_rr_authenticated = false; + DnsResourceRecord *rr, *covering_rr = NULL, *wildcard_rr = NULL; + DnsAnswerFlags flags; + const char *name; + int r; + + assert(key); + assert(result); + + /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ + + name = dns_resource_key_name(key); + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { + + if (rr->key->class != key->class) + continue; + + have_nsec3 = have_nsec3 || (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_NSEC3); + + if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC) + continue; + + /* The following checks only make sense for NSEC RRs that are not expanded from a wildcard */ + r = dns_resource_record_is_synthetic(rr); + if (r == -ENODATA) /* No signing RR known. */ + continue; + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + continue; + + /* Check if this is a direct match. If so, we have encountered a NODATA case */ + r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) { + /* If it's not a direct match, maybe it's a wild card match? */ + r = dnssec_nsec_wildcard_equal(rr, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + if (r > 0) { + if (key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) { + /* If we look for a DS RR and the server sent us the NSEC RR of the child zone + * we have a problem. For DS RRs we want the NSEC RR from the parent */ + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + continue; + } else { + /* For all RR types, ensure that if NS is set SOA is set too, so that we know + * we got the child's NSEC. */ + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && + !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + continue; + } + + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + if (ttl) + *ttl = rr->ttl; + + return 0; + } + + /* Check if the name we are looking for is an empty non-terminal within the owner or next name + * of the NSEC RR. */ + r = dnssec_nsec_in_path(rr, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + if (ttl) + *ttl = rr->ttl; + + return 0; + } + + /* The following two "covering" checks, are not useful if the NSEC is from the parent */ + r = dnssec_nsec_from_parent_zone(rr, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + continue; + + /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the absence of an explicit RR under this name */ + r = dnssec_nsec_covers(rr, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0 && (!covering_rr || !covering_rr_authenticated)) { + covering_rr = rr; + covering_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + } + } + + if (covering_rr) { + _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; + r = dnssec_nsec_generate_wildcard(covering_rr, name, &wc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { + + if (rr->key->class != key->class) + continue; + + if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC) + continue; + + /* Check if this NSEC RR proves the nonexistence of the wildcard */ + r = dnssec_nsec_covers(rr, wc); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0 && (!wildcard_rr || !wildcard_rr_authenticated)) { + wildcard_rr = rr; + wildcard_rr_authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + } + } + } + + if (covering_rr && wildcard_rr) { + /* If we could prove that neither the name itself, nor the wildcard at the closest encloser exists, we + * proved the NXDOMAIN case. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; + + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = covering_rr_authenticated && wildcard_rr_authenticated; + if (ttl) + *ttl = MIN(covering_rr->ttl, wildcard_rr->ttl); + + return 0; + } + + /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ + if (have_nsec3) + return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated, ttl); + + /* No appropriate NSEC RR found, report this. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(DnsAnswer *answer, uint16_t type, const char *name, const char *zone, bool *authenticated) { + DnsResourceRecord *rr; + DnsAnswerFlags flags; + int r; + + assert(name); + assert(zone); + + /* Checks whether there's an NSEC/NSEC3 that proves that the specified 'name' is non-existing in the specified + * 'zone'. The 'zone' must be a suffix of the 'name'. */ + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { + bool found = false; + + if (rr->key->type != type && type != DNS_TYPE_ANY) + continue; + + switch (rr->key->type) { + + case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: + + /* We only care for NSEC RRs from the indicated zone */ + r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + found = r > 0; + break; + + case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: { + _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; + + /* We only care for NSEC3 RRs from the indicated zone */ + r = dns_resource_record_is_signer(rr, zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = nsec3_is_good(rr, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + + /* Format the domain we are testing with the NSEC3 RR's hash function */ + r = nsec3_hashed_domain_make( + rr, + name, + zone, + &hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if ((size_t) r != rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size) + break; + + /* Format the NSEC3's next hashed name as proper domain name */ + r = nsec3_hashed_domain_format( + rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, + rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, + zone, + &next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), hashed_domain, next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + found = r > 0; + break; + } + + default: + continue; + } + + if (found) { + if (authenticated) + *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *authenticated) { + + const char *next_closer = NULL; + int r; + + /* Run a positive NSEC3 wildcard proof. Specifically: + * + * A proof that the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist. + * + * Note a key difference between the NSEC3 and NSEC versions of the proof. NSEC RRs don't have to exist for + * empty non-transients. NSEC3 RRs however have to. This means it's sufficient to check if the next closer name + * exists for the NSEC3 RR and we are done. + * + * To prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f all we have to check is that + * c.d.e.f does not exist. */ + + for (;;) { + next_closer = name; + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + r = dns_name_equal(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + break; + } + + return dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC3, next_closer, zone, authenticated); +} + +static int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *_authenticated) { + + bool authenticated = true; + int r; + + /* Run a positive NSEC wildcard proof. Specifically: + * + * A proof that there's neither a wildcard name nor a non-wildcard name that is a suffix of the name "name" and + * a prefix of the synthesizing source "source" in the zone "zone". + * + * See RFC 5155, Section 8.8 and RFC 4035, Section 5.3.4 + * + * Note that if we want to prove that a.b.c.d.e.f is rightfully synthesized from a wildcard *.d.e.f, then we + * have to prove that none of the following exist: + * + * 1) a.b.c.d.e.f + * 2) *.b.c.d.e.f + * 3) b.c.d.e.f + * 4) *.c.d.e.f + * 5) c.d.e.f + */ + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *wc = NULL; + bool a = false; + + /* Check if there's an NSEC or NSEC3 RR that proves that the mame we determined is really non-existing, + * i.e between the owner name and the next name of an NSEC RR. */ + r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, name, zone, &a); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + authenticated = authenticated && a; + + /* Strip one label off */ + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* Did we reach the source of synthesis? */ + r = dns_name_equal(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + /* Successful exit */ + *_authenticated = authenticated; + return 1; + } + + /* Safety check, that the source of synthesis is still our suffix */ + r = dns_name_endswith(name, source); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* Replace the label we stripped off with an asterisk */ + wc = strjoin("*.", name); + if (!wc) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* And check if the proof holds for the asterisk name, too */ + r = dnssec_nsec_test_enclosed(answer, DNS_TYPE_NSEC, wc, zone, &a); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + authenticated = authenticated && a; + /* In the next iteration we'll check the non-asterisk-prefixed version */ + } +} + +int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *authenticated) { + + int r; + + assert(name); + assert(source); + assert(zone); + assert(authenticated); + + r = dns_answer_contains_zone_nsec3(answer, zone); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec3(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); + else + return dnssec_test_positive_wildcard_nsec(answer, name, source, zone, authenticated); +} + +#else + +int dnssec_verify_rrset( + DnsAnswer *a, + const DnsResourceKey *key, + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, + usec_t realtime, + DnssecResult *result) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( + DnsAnswer *a, + const DnsResourceKey *key, + DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, + usec_t realtime, + DnssecResult *result, + DnsResourceRecord **ret_rrsig) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +int dnssec_test_positive_wildcard( + DnsAnswer *answer, + const char *name, + const char *source, + const char *zone, + bool *authenticated) { + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +#endif + +static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { + [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", + [DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD] = "validated-wildcard", + [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", + [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", + [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", + [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", + [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", + [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", + [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", + [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", + [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", + [DNSSEC_TOO_MANY_VALIDATIONS] = "too-many-validations", +}; +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); + +static const char* const dnssec_verdict_table[_DNSSEC_VERDICT_MAX] = { + [DNSSEC_SECURE] = "secure", + [DNSSEC_INSECURE] = "insecure", + [DNSSEC_BOGUS] = "bogus", + [DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE] = "indeterminate", +}; +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_verdict, DnssecVerdict); |