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-rw-r--r--src/test/test-creds.c178
1 files changed, 159 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test-creds.c b/src/test/test-creds.c
index acb198c..cc9cc73 100644
--- a/src/test/test-creds.c
+++ b/src/test/test-creds.c
@@ -2,10 +2,16 @@
#include "creds-util.h"
#include "fileio.h"
+#include "format-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "id128-util.h"
+#include "iovec-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "rm-rf.h"
#include "tests.h"
#include "tmpfile-util.h"
+#include "tpm2-util.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
TEST(read_credential_strings) {
_cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *saved = NULL, *p = NULL;
@@ -17,43 +23,37 @@ TEST(read_credential_strings) {
assert_se(saved = strdup(e));
assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) == 0);
- assert_se(x == NULL);
- assert_se(y == NULL);
+ ASSERT_NULL(x);
+ ASSERT_NULL(y);
assert_se(mkdtemp_malloc(NULL, &tmp) >= 0);
assert_se(setenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", tmp, /* override= */ true) >= 0);
assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) == 0);
- assert_se(x == NULL);
- assert_se(y == NULL);
+ ASSERT_NULL(x);
+ ASSERT_NULL(y);
assert_se(p = path_join(tmp, "bar"));
assert_se(write_string_file(p, "piff", WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_AVOID_NEWLINE) >= 0);
assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) == 0);
- assert_se(x == NULL);
- assert_se(streq(y, "piff"));
+ ASSERT_NULL(x);
+ ASSERT_STREQ(y, "piff");
assert_se(write_string_file(p, "paff", WRITE_STRING_FILE_TRUNCATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_AVOID_NEWLINE) >= 0);
assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) == 0);
- assert_se(x == NULL);
- assert_se(streq(y, "piff"));
+ ASSERT_NULL(x);
+ ASSERT_STREQ(y, "paff");
p = mfree(p);
assert_se(p = path_join(tmp, "foo"));
assert_se(write_string_file(p, "knurz", WRITE_STRING_FILE_CREATE|WRITE_STRING_FILE_AVOID_NEWLINE) >= 0);
assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) >= 0);
- assert_se(streq(x, "knurz"));
- assert_se(streq(y, "piff"));
-
- y = mfree(y);
-
- assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("foo", &x, "bar", &y) >= 0);
- assert_se(streq(x, "knurz"));
- assert_se(streq(y, "paff"));
+ ASSERT_STREQ(x, "knurz");
+ ASSERT_STREQ(y, "paff");
p = mfree(p);
assert_se(p = path_join(tmp, "bazz"));
@@ -61,9 +61,11 @@ TEST(read_credential_strings) {
assert_se(fwrite("x\0y", 1, 3, f) == 3); /* embedded NUL byte should result in EBADMSG when reading back with read_credential_strings_many() */
f = safe_fclose(f);
- assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("bazz", &x, "foo", &y) == -EBADMSG);
- assert_se(streq(x, "knurz"));
- assert_se(streq(y, "paff"));
+ y = mfree(y);
+
+ assert_se(read_credential_strings_many("bazz", &x, "bar", &y) == -EBADMSG);
+ ASSERT_STREQ(x, "knurz");
+ ASSERT_STREQ(y, "paff");
if (saved)
assert_se(setenv("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", saved, /* override= */ 1) >= 0);
@@ -118,4 +120,142 @@ TEST(credential_glob_valid) {
assert_se(credential_glob_valid(buf));
}
+static void test_encrypt_decrypt_with(sd_id128_t mode, uid_t uid) {
+ static const struct iovec plaintext = CONST_IOVEC_MAKE_STRING("this is a super secret string");
+ int r;
+
+ if (uid_is_valid(uid))
+ log_notice("Running encryption/decryption test with mode " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR " for UID " UID_FMT ".", SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(mode), uid);
+ else
+ log_notice("Running encryption/decryption test with mode " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR ".", SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(mode));
+
+ _cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec encrypted = {};
+ r = encrypt_credential_and_warn(
+ mode,
+ "foo",
+ /* timestamp= */ USEC_INFINITY,
+ /* not_after=*/ USEC_INFINITY,
+ /* tpm2_device= */ NULL,
+ /* tpm2_hash_pcr_mask= */ 0,
+ /* tpm2_pubkey_path= */ NULL,
+ /* tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0,
+ uid,
+ &plaintext,
+ CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL,
+ &encrypted);
+ if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_MACHINE_ID_UNSET(r)) {
+ log_notice_errno(r, "Skipping test encryption mode " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR ", because /etc/machine-id is not initialized.", SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(mode));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) {
+ log_notice_errno(r, "Skipping test encryption mode " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR ", because encrypted credentials are not supported.", SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(mode));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(r >= 0);
+
+ _cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec decrypted = {};
+ r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(
+ "bar",
+ /* validate_timestamp= */ USEC_INFINITY,
+ /* tpm2_device= */ NULL,
+ /* tpm2_signature_path= */ NULL,
+ uid,
+ &encrypted,
+ CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL,
+ &decrypted);
+ assert_se(r == -EREMOTE); /* name didn't match */
+
+ r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(
+ "foo",
+ /* validate_timestamp= */ USEC_INFINITY,
+ /* tpm2_device= */ NULL,
+ /* tpm2_signature_path= */ NULL,
+ uid,
+ &encrypted,
+ CREDENTIAL_ALLOW_NULL,
+ &decrypted);
+ assert_se(r >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(iovec_memcmp(&plaintext, &decrypted) == 0);
+}
+
+static bool try_tpm2(void) {
+#if HAVE_TPM2
+ _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ r = tpm2_context_new(/* device= */ NULL, &tpm2_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_notice_errno(r, "Failed to create TPM2 context, assuming no TPM2 support or privileges: %m");
+
+ return r >= 0;
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+TEST(credential_encrypt_decrypt) {
+ _cleanup_(rm_rf_physical_and_freep) char *d = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL;
+
+ log_set_max_level(LOG_DEBUG);
+
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL, UID_INVALID);
+
+ assert_se(mkdtemp_malloc(NULL, &d) >= 0);
+ j = path_join(d, "secret");
+ assert_se(j);
+
+ const char *e = getenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET");
+ _cleanup_free_ char *ec = NULL;
+
+ if (e)
+ assert_se(ec = strdup(e));
+
+ assert_se(setenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET", j, true) >= 0);
+
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, UID_INVALID);
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED, 0);
+
+ if (try_tpm2()) {
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, UID_INVALID);
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, UID_INVALID);
+ test_encrypt_decrypt_with(CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (ec)
+ assert_se(setenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET", ec, true) >= 0);
+}
+
+TEST(mime_type_matches) {
+
+ static const sd_id128_t tags[] = {
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_SCOPED,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_SCOPED,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK_SCOPED,
+ CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_NULL,
+ };
+
+ /* Generates the right <match/> expressions for these credentials according to the shared mime-info spec */
+ FOREACH_ELEMENT(t, tags) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL;
+
+ assert_se(base64mem(t, sizeof(sd_id128_t), &encoded) >= 0);
+
+ /* Validate that the size matches expectations for the 4/3 factor size increase (rounding up) */
+ assert_se(strlen(encoded) == DIV_ROUND_UP((128U / 8U), 3U) * 4U);
+
+ /* Cut off rounded string where the ID ends, but now round down to get rid of characters that might contain follow-up data */
+ encoded[128 / 6] = 0;
+
+ printf("<match type=\"string\" value=\"%s\" offset=\"0\"/>\n", encoded);
+ }
+}
+
DEFINE_TEST_MAIN(LOG_INFO);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-15 13:13:43 +0000