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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rwxr-xr-x | test/units/testsuite-65.sh | 909 |
1 files changed, 909 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-65.sh b/test/units/testsuite-65.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a6bb38d --- /dev/null +++ b/test/units/testsuite-65.sh @@ -0,0 +1,909 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later +# shellcheck disable=SC2016 +set -eux + +# shellcheck source=test/units/util.sh +. "$(dirname "$0")"/util.sh + +systemctl log-level debug +export SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug + +# Sanity checks +# +# We can't really test time, critical-chain and plot verbs here, as +# the testsuite service is a part of the boot transaction, so let's assume +# they fail +systemd-analyze || : +systemd-analyze time || : +systemd-analyze critical-chain || : +# blame +systemd-analyze blame +systemd-run --wait --user --pipe -M testuser@.host systemd-analyze blame +# plot +systemd-analyze plot >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=short >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=off >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=pretty --no-legend >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=short --no-legend >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --json=off --no-legend >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --table >/dev/null || : +systemd-analyze plot --table --no-legend >/dev/null || : +# legacy/deprecated options (moved to systemctl, but still usable from analyze) +systemd-analyze log-level +systemd-analyze log-level "$(systemctl log-level)" +systemd-analyze get-log-level +systemd-analyze set-log-level "$(systemctl log-level)" +systemd-analyze log-target +systemd-analyze log-target "$(systemctl log-target)" +systemd-analyze get-log-target +systemd-analyze set-log-target "$(systemctl log-target)" +systemd-analyze service-watchdogs +systemd-analyze service-watchdogs "$(systemctl service-watchdogs)" +# dot +systemd-analyze dot >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*" --from-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot --to-pattern="*" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot --from-pattern="*.service" --to-pattern="*.service" systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot --order systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot --require systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dot "systemd-*.service" >/dev/null +(! systemd-analyze dot systemd-journald.service systemd-logind.service "*" bbb ccc) +# dump +# this should be rate limited to 10 calls in 10 minutes for unprivileged callers +for _ in {1..10}; do + runas testuser systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +done +(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null) +# still limited after a reload +systemctl daemon-reload +(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null) +# and a re-exec +systemctl daemon-reexec +(! runas testuser systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null) +# privileged call, so should not be rate limited +for _ in {1..10}; do + systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +done +systemd-analyze dump >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dump "*" >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dump "*.socket" "*.service" aaaaaaa ... >/dev/null +systemd-analyze dump systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze malloc >/dev/null +(! systemd-analyze dump "") +# unit-files +systemd-analyze unit-files >/dev/null +systemd-analyze unit-files systemd-journald.service >/dev/null +systemd-analyze unit-files "*" >/dev/null +systemd-analyze unit-files "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null +systemd-analyze unit-files --user >/dev/null +systemd-analyze unit-files --user "*" aaaaaa "*.service" "*.target" >/dev/null +# unit-paths +systemd-analyze unit-paths +systemd-analyze unit-paths --user +systemd-analyze unit-paths --global +# exist-status +systemd-analyze exit-status +systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF +systemd-analyze exit-status 0 1 {63..65} +(! systemd-analyze exit-status STDOUT BPF "hello*") +# capability +systemd-analyze capability +systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL +systemd-analyze capability 0 1 {30..32} +(! systemd-analyze capability cap_chown CAP_KILL "hello*") +# condition +mkdir -p /run/systemd/system +UNIT_NAME="analyze-condition-$RANDOM.service" +cat >"/run/systemd/system/$UNIT_NAME" <<EOF +[Unit] +AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release +AssertEnvironment=!FOOBAR +ConditionKernelVersion=>1.0 +ConditionPathExists=/etc/os-release + +[Service] +ExecStart=/bin/true +EOF +systemctl daemon-reload +systemd-analyze condition --unit="$UNIT_NAME" +systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion = ! <4.0' \ + 'ConditionKernelVersion = >=3.1' \ + 'ConditionACPower=|false' \ + 'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' \ + 'AssertPathExists=/etc/os-release' +(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionArchitecture=|!arm' 'AssertXYZ=foo') +(! systemd-analyze condition 'ConditionKernelVersion=<1.0') +(! systemd-analyze condition 'AssertKernelVersion=<1.0') +# syscall-filter +systemd-analyze syscall-filter >/dev/null +systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync +systemd-analyze syscall-filter @sync @sync @sync +(! systemd-analyze syscall-filter @chown @sync @foobar) +# filesystems (requires libbpf support) +if systemctl --version | grep "+BPF_FRAMEWORK"; then + systemd-analyze filesystems >/dev/null + systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api + systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @basic-api + (! systemd-analyze filesystems @basic-api @basic-api @foobar @basic-api) +fi +# calendar +systemd-analyze calendar '*-2-29 0:0:0' +systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-2-29 0:0:0' +systemd-analyze calendar '*-* *:*:*' +systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*' +systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=50 '*-* *:*:*' +systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* *:*:*' +systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=5 '01-01-22 01:00:00' +systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=yesterday --iterations=5 '*-* *:*:*' +(! systemd-analyze calendar --iterations=0 '*-* 99:*:*') +(! systemd-analyze calendar --base-time=never '*-* *:*:*') +(! systemd-analyze calendar 1) +(! systemd-analyze calendar "") +# timestamp +systemd-analyze timestamp now +systemd-analyze timestamp -- -1 +systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday now tomorrow +(! systemd-analyze timestamp yesterday never tomorrow) +(! systemd-analyze timestamp 1) +(! systemd-analyze timestamp '*-2-29 0:0:0') +(! systemd-analyze timestamp "") +# timespan +systemd-analyze timespan 1 +systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s '1year 0.000001s' +(! systemd-analyze timespan 1s 300s aaaaaa '1year 0.000001s') +(! systemd-analyze timespan -- -1) +(! systemd-analyze timespan '*-2-29 0:0:0') +(! systemd-analyze timespan "") +# cat-config +systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config foo/bar +systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr /etc/systemd/system.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr systemd/system.conf foo/bar systemd/journald.conf >/dev/null +systemd-analyze cat-config --tldr foo/bar +# security +systemd-analyze security +systemd-analyze security --json=off +systemd-analyze security --json=pretty | jq +systemd-analyze security --json=short | jq + +if [[ ! -v ASAN_OPTIONS ]]; then + # check that systemd-analyze cat-config paths work in a chroot + mkdir -p /tmp/root + mount --bind / /tmp/root + systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out1 + chroot /tmp/root systemd-analyze cat-config systemd/system-preset >/tmp/out2 + diff /tmp/out{1,2} +fi + +# verify +mkdir -p /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/ +mkdir -p /tmp/img/opt/ + +touch /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh +chmod +x /tmp/img/opt/script0.sh + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service +[Service] +ExecStart = /opt/script0.sh +EOF + +set +e +# Default behaviour is to recurse through all dependencies when unit is loaded +(! systemd-analyze verify --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service) + +# As above, recurses through all dependencies when unit is loaded +(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service) + +# Recurses through unit file and its direct dependencies when unit is loaded +(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=one --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service) + +set -e + +# zero exit status since dependencies are ignored when unit is loaded +systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service + +rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service +[Unit] +foo = bar + +[Service] +ExecStart = echo hello +EOF + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile2.service +[Unit] +Requires = testfile.service + +[Service] +ExecStart = echo hello +EOF + +# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded +systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/testfile2.service + +set +e +# Non-zero exit status since all associated dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded +(! systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=yes /tmp/testfile2.service) +set -e + +rm /tmp/testfile.service +rm /tmp/testfile2.service + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/sample.service +[Unit] +Description = A Sample Service + +[Service] +ExecStart = echo hello +Slice=support.slice +EOF + +# Zero exit status since no additional dependencies are recursively loaded when the unit file is loaded +systemd-analyze verify --recursive-errors=no /tmp/sample.service + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.service +[Service] +ExecStart = echo hello +DeviceAllow=/dev/sda +EOF + +# Prevent regression from #13380 and #20859 where we can't verify hidden files +cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/.testfile.service + +systemd-analyze verify /tmp/.testfile.service + +rm /tmp/.testfile.service + +# Alias a unit file's name on disk (see #20061) +cp /tmp/testfile.service /tmp/testsrvc + +(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc) + +systemd-analyze verify /tmp/testsrvc:alias.service + +# Zero exit status since the value used for comparison determine exposure to security threats is by default 100 +systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service + +#The overall exposure level assigned to the unit is greater than the set threshold +(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service) + +# Ensure we print the list of ACLs, see https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/23185 +systemd-analyze security --offline=true /tmp/testfile.service | grep -q -F "/dev/sda" + +rm /tmp/testfile.service + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service +[Service] +ExecStart = echo hello +PrivateNetwork = yes +PrivateDevices = yes +PrivateUsers = yes +EOF + +# The new overall exposure level assigned to the unit is less than the set thresholds +# Verifies that the --offline= option works with --root= +systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/foo@.service +[Service] +ExecStart=ls +EOF + +cat <<EOF >/tmp/hoge@test.service +[Service] +ExecStart=ls +EOF + +# issue #30357 +pushd /tmp +systemd-analyze verify foo@bar.service +systemd-analyze verify foo@.service +systemd-analyze verify hoge@test.service +(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@nonexist.service) +(! systemd-analyze verify hoge@.service) +popd +pushd / +systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@bar.service +systemd-analyze verify tmp/foo@.service +systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@test.service +(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@nonexist.service) +(! systemd-analyze verify tmp/hoge@.service) +popd +pushd /usr +systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@bar.service +systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/foo@.service +systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@test.service +(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@nonexist.service) +(! systemd-analyze verify ../tmp/hoge@.service) +popd +systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@bar.service +systemd-analyze verify /tmp/foo@.service +systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@test.service +(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@nonexist.service) +(! systemd-analyze verify /tmp/hoge@.service) + +# Added an additional "INVALID_ID" id to the .json to verify that nothing breaks when input is malformed +# The PrivateNetwork id description and weight was changed to verify that 'security' is actually reading in +# values from the .json file when required. The default weight for "PrivateNetwork" is 2500, and the new weight +# assigned to that id in the .json file is 6000. This increased weight means that when the "PrivateNetwork" key is +# set to 'yes' (as above in the case of testfile.service) in the content of the unit file, the overall exposure +# level for the unit file should decrease to account for that increased weight. +cat <<EOF >/tmp/testfile.json +{"UserOrDynamicUser": + {"description_bad": "Service runs as root user", + "weight": 0, + "range": 10 + }, +"SupplementaryGroups": + {"description_good": "Service has no supplementary groups", + "description_bad": "Service runs with supplementary groups", + "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not matter", + "weight": 200, + "range": 1 + }, +"PrivateDevices": + {"description_good": "Service has no access to hardware devices", + "description_bad": "Service potentially has access to hardware devices", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"PrivateMounts": + {"description_good": "Service cannot install system mounts", + "description_bad": "Service may install system mounts", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"PrivateNetwork": + {"description_good": "Service doesn't have access to the host's network", + "description_bad": "Service has access to the host's network", + "weight": 6000, + "range": 1 + }, +"PrivateTmp": + {"description_good": "Service has no access to other software's temporary files", + "description_bad": "Service has access to other software's temporary files", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"PrivateUsers": + {"description_good": "Service does not have access to other users", + "description_bad": "Service has access to other users", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectControlGroups": + {"description_good": "Service cannot modify the control group file system", + "description_bad": "Service may modify the control group file system", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectKernelModules": + {"description_good": "Service cannot load or read kernel modules", + "description_bad": "Service may load or read kernel modules", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectKernelTunables": + {"description_good": "Service cannot alter kernel tunables (/proc/sys, …)", + "description_bad": "Service may alter kernel tunables", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectKernelLogs": + {"description_good": "Service cannot read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer", + "description_bad": "Service may read from or write to the kernel log ring buffer", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectClock": + {"description_good": "Service cannot write to the hardware clock or system clock", + "description_bad": "Service may write to the hardware clock or system clock", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectHome": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"ProtectHostname": + {"description_good": "Service cannot change system host/domainname", + "description_bad": "Service may change system host/domainname", + "weight": 50, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectSystem": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"RootDirectoryOrRootImage": + {"description_good": "Service has its own root directory/image", + "description_bad": "Service runs within the host's root directory", + "weight": 200, + "range": 1 + }, +"LockPersonality": + {"description_good": "Service cannot change ABI personality", + "description_bad": "Service may change ABI personality", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"MemoryDenyWriteExecute": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create writable executable memory mappings", + "description_bad": "Service may create writable executable memory mappings", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"NoNewPrivileges": + {"description_good": "Service processes cannot acquire new privileges", + "description_bad": "Service processes may acquire new privileges", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_ADMIN": + {"description_good": "Service has no administrator privileges", + "description_bad": "Service has administrator privileges", + "weight": 1500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SET_UID_GID_PCAP": + {"description_good": "Service cannot change UID/GID identities/capabilities", + "description_bad": "Service may change UID/GID identities/capabilities", + "weight": 1500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PTRACE": + {"description_good": "Service has no ptrace() debugging abilities", + "description_bad": "Service has ptrace() debugging abilities", + "weight": 1500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TIME": + {"description_good": "Service processes cannot change the system clock", + "description_bad": "Service processes may change the system clock", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_ADMIN": + {"description_good": "Service has no network configuration privileges", + "description_bad": "Service has network configuration privileges", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_RAWIO": + {"description_good": "Service has no raw I/O access", + "description_bad": "Service has raw I/O access", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_MODULE": + {"description_good": "Service cannot load kernel modules", + "description_bad": "Service may load kernel modules", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_AUDIT": + {"description_good": "Service has no audit subsystem access", + "description_bad": "Service has audit subsystem access", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYSLOG": + {"description_good": "Service has no access to kernel logging", + "description_bad": "Service has access to kernel logging", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_NICE_RESOURCE": + {"description_good": "Service has no privileges to change resource use parameters", + "description_bad": "Service has privileges to change resource use parameters", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MKNOD": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create device nodes", + "description_bad": "Service may create device nodes", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_CHOWN_FSETID_SETFCAP": + {"description_good": "Service cannot change file ownership/access mode/capabilities", + "description_bad": "Service may change file ownership/access mode/capabilities unrestricted", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_DAC_FOWNER_IPC_OWNER": + {"description_good": "Service cannot override UNIX file/IPC permission checks", + "description_bad": "Service may override UNIX file/IPC permission checks", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_KILL": + {"description_good": "Service cannot send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes", + "description_bad": "Service may send UNIX signals to arbitrary processes", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE_BROADCAST_RAW": + {"description_good": "Service has no elevated networking privileges", + "description_bad": "Service has elevated networking privileges", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_BOOT": + {"description_good": "Service cannot issue reboot()", + "description_bad": "Service may issue reboot()", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_MAC": + {"description_good": "Service cannot adjust SMACK MAC", + "description_bad": "Service may adjust SMACK MAC", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE": + {"description_good": "Service cannot mark files immutable", + "description_bad": "Service may mark files immutable", + "weight": 75, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_IPC_LOCK": + {"description_good": "Service cannot lock memory into RAM", + "description_bad": "Service may lock memory into RAM", + "weight": 50, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_CHROOT": + {"description_good": "Service cannot issue chroot()", + "description_bad": "Service may issue chroot()", + "weight": 50, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND": + {"description_good": "Service cannot establish wake locks", + "description_bad": "Service may establish wake locks", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_WAKE_ALARM": + {"description_good": "Service cannot program timers that wake up the system", + "description_bad": "Service may program timers that wake up the system", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_LEASE": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create file leases", + "description_bad": "Service may create file leases", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG": + {"description_good": "Service cannot issue vhangup()", + "description_bad": "Service may issue vhangup()", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_SYS_PACCT": + {"description_good": "Service cannot use acct()", + "description_bad": "Service may use acct()", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"CapabilityBoundingSet_CAP_BPF": + {"description_good": "Service may load BPF programs", + "description_bad": "Service may not load BPF programs", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"UMask": + {"weight": 100, + "range": 10 + }, +"KeyringMode": + {"description_good": "Service doesn't share key material with other services", + "description_bad": "Service shares key material with other service", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"ProtectProc": + {"description_good": "Service has restricted access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)", + "description_bad": "Service has full access to process tree(/proc hidepid=)", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 3 + }, +"ProcSubset": + {"description_good": "Service has no access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)", + "description_bad": "Service has full access to non-process/proc files(/proc subset=)", + "weight": 10, + "range": 1 + }, +"NotifyAccess": + {"description_good": "Service child processes cannot alter service state", + "description_bad": "Service child processes may alter service state", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"RemoveIPC": + {"description_good": "Service user cannot leave SysV IPC objects around", + "description_bad": "Service user may leave SysV IPC objects around", + "description_na": "Service runs as root, option does not apply", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"Delegate": + {"description_good": "Service does not maintain its own delegated control group subtree", + "description_bad": "Service maintains its own delegated control group subtree", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictRealtime": + {"description_good": "Service realtime scheduling access is restricted", + "description_bad": "Service may acquire realtime scheduling", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictSUIDSGID": + {"description_good": "SUID/SGIDfilecreationbyserviceisrestricted", + "description_bad": "ServicemaycreateSUID/SGIDfiles", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_user": + {"description_good": "Servicecannotcreateusernamespaces", + "description_bad": "Servicemaycreateusernamespaces", + "weight": 1500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_mnt": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create file system namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create file system namespaces", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_ipc": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create IPC namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create IPC namespaces", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_pid": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create process namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create process namespaces", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_cgroup": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create cgroup namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create cgroup namespaces", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_net": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create network namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create network namespaces", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictNamespaces_uts": + {"description_good": "Service cannot create hostname namespaces", + "description_bad": "Service may create hostname namespaces", + "weight": 100, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_INET_INET6": + {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate Internet sockets", + "description_bad": "Service may allocate Internet sockets", + "weight": 1500, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_UNIX": + {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate local sockets", + "description_bad": "Service may allocate local sockets", + "weight": 25, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_NETLINK": + {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate netlink sockets", + "description_bad": "Service may allocate netlink sockets", + "weight": 200, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictAddressFamilies_AF_PACKET": + {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate packet sockets", + "description_bad": "Service may allocate packet sockets", + "weight": 1000, + "range": 1 + }, +"RestrictAddressFamilies_OTHER": + {"description_good": "Service cannot allocate exotic sockets", + "description_bad": "Service may allocate exotic sockets", + "weight": 1250, + "range": 1 + }, +"SystemCallArchitectures": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_swap": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_obsolete": + {"weight": 250, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_clock": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_cpu_emulation": + {"weight": 250, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_debug": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_mount": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_module": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_raw_io": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_reboot": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_privileged": + {"weight": 700, + "range": 10 + }, +"SystemCallFilter_resources": + {"weight": 700, + "range": 10 + }, +"IPAddressDeny": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"DeviceAllow": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + }, +"AmbientCapabilities": + {"description_good": "Service process does not receive ambient capabilities", + "description_bad": "Service process receives ambient capabilities", + "weight": 500, + "range": 1 + }, +"INVALID_ID": + {"weight": 1000, + "range": 10 + } +} +EOF + +# Reads in custom security requirements from the parsed .json file and uses these for comparison +systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true \ + --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \ + --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service + +# The strict profile adds a lot of sanboxing options +systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \ + --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \ + --profile=strict \ + --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service + +# The trusted profile doesn't add any sanboxing options +(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \ + --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \ + --profile=/usr/lib/systemd/portable/profile/trusted/service.conf \ + --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service) + +(! systemd-analyze security --threshold=50 --offline=true \ + --security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \ + --root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service) + +rm /tmp/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/testfile.service + +if systemd-analyze --version | grep -q -F "+ELFUTILS"; then + systemd-analyze inspect-elf --json=short /lib/systemd/systemd | grep -q -F '"elfType":"executable"' +fi + +systemd-analyze --threshold=90 security systemd-journald.service + +# issue 23663 +check() {( + set +x + output=$(systemd-analyze security --offline="${2?}" "${3?}" | grep -F 'SystemCallFilter=') + assert_in "System call ${1?} list" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@swap" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@resources" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@reboot" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@raw-io" "$output" + assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@privileged" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@obsolete" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@mount" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@module" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@debug" "$output" + assert_in "[+✓] SystemCallFilter=~@cpu-emulation" "$output" + assert_in "[-✗] SystemCallFilter=~@clock" "$output" +)} + +export -n SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL + +mkdir -p /run/systemd/system +cat >/run/systemd/system/allow-list.service <<EOF +[Service] +ExecStart=false +SystemCallFilter=@system-service +SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged +SystemCallFilter=@clock +EOF + +cat >/run/systemd/system/deny-list.service <<EOF +[Service] +ExecStart=false +SystemCallFilter=~@known +SystemCallFilter=@system-service +SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged +SystemCallFilter=@clock +EOF + +systemctl daemon-reload + +check allow yes /run/systemd/system/allow-list.service +check allow no allow-list.service +check deny yes /run/systemd/system/deny-list.service +check deny no deny-list.service + +output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1) +name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1) + +check allow yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name" +check allow no "$name" + +output=$(systemd-run -p "SystemCallFilter=~@known" -p "SystemCallFilter=@system-service" -p "SystemCallFilter=~@resources:ENOANO @privileged" -p "SystemCallFilter=@clock" sleep 60 2>&1) +name=$(echo "$output" | awk '{ print $4 }' | cut -d';' -f1) + +check deny yes /run/systemd/transient/"$name" +check deny no "$name" + +# Let's also test the "image-policy" verb + +systemd-analyze image-policy '*' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =verity+signed+encrypted+unprotected+unused+absent" +systemd-analyze image-policy '-' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: =unused+absent" +systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -F "Long form: usr=verity:home=encrypted:=unused+absent" +systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^home \+encrypted \+' +systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr \+verity \+' +systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^root \+ignore \+' +systemd-analyze image-policy 'home=encrypted:usr=verity' 2>&1 | grep -q -e '^usr-verity \+unprotected \+' + +(! systemd-analyze image-policy 'doedel') + +# Output is very hard to predict, but let's run it for coverage anyway +systemd-analyze pcrs +systemd-analyze pcrs --json=pretty +systemd-analyze pcrs 14 7 0 ima + +systemd-analyze log-level info + +touch /testok |