/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H #include #endif #include "alloc-util.h" #include "capability-util.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "fileio.h" #include "macro.h" #include "memory-util.h" #include "missing_sched.h" #include "missing_syscall.h" #include "nsflags.h" #include "nulstr-util.h" #include "process-util.h" #include "raw-clone.h" #include "rm-rf.h" #include "seccomp-util.h" #include "set.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "tests.h" #include "tmpfile-util.h" #include "virt.h" /* __NR_socket may be invalid due to libseccomp */ #if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__powerpc__) /* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer, * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */ # define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1 #else # define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 0 #endif static bool have_seccomp_privs(void) { return geteuid() == 0 && have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0; /* If we are root but CAP_SYS_ADMIN we can't do caps (unless we also do NNP) */ } TEST(parse_syscall_and_errno) { _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; int e; assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("uname:EILSEQ", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "uname")); assert_se(e == errno_from_name("EILSEQ") && e >= 0); n = mfree(n); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("uname:EINVAL", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "uname")); assert_se(e == errno_from_name("EINVAL") && e >= 0); n = mfree(n); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("@sync:4095", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "@sync")); assert_se(e == 4095); n = mfree(n); /* If errno is omitted, then e is set to -1 */ assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("mount", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "mount")); assert_se(e == -1); n = mfree(n); /* parse_syscall_and_errno() does not check the syscall name is valid or not. */ assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:255", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "hoge")); assert_se(e == 255); n = mfree(n); /* 0 is also a valid errno. */ assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:0", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "hoge")); assert_se(e == 0); n = mfree(n); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:kill", &n, &e) >= 0); assert_se(streq(n, "hoge")); assert_se(e == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL); n = mfree(n); /* The function checks the syscall name is empty or not. */ assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno(":255", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); /* errno must be a valid errno name or number between 0 and ERRNO_MAX == 4095, or "kill" */ assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:4096", &n, &e) == -ERANGE); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:-3", &n, &e) == -ERANGE); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:12.3", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:123junk", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:junk123", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:255:EILSEQ", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:-EINVAL", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:EINVALaaa", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); assert_se(parse_syscall_and_errno("hoge:", &n, &e) == -EINVAL); } TEST(seccomp_arch_to_string) { uint32_t a, b; const char *name; a = seccomp_arch_native(); assert_se(a > 0); name = seccomp_arch_to_string(a); assert_se(name); assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(name, &b) >= 0); assert_se(a == b); } TEST(architecture_table) { const char *n2; NULSTR_FOREACH(n, "native\0" "x86\0" "x86-64\0" "x32\0" "arm\0" "arm64\0" #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_LOONGARCH64 "loongarch64\0" #endif "mips\0" "mips64\0" "mips64-n32\0" "mips-le\0" "mips64-le\0" "mips64-le-n32\0" "parisc\0" "parisc64\0" "ppc\0" "ppc64\0" "ppc64-le\0" #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 "riscv64\0" #endif "s390\0" "s390x\0") { uint32_t c; assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(n, &c) >= 0); n2 = seccomp_arch_to_string(c); log_info("seccomp-arch: %s → 0x%"PRIx32" → %s", n, c, n2); assert_se(streq_ptr(n, n2)); } } TEST(syscall_filter_set_find) { assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(NULL)); assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("")); assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("quux")); assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("@quux")); assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@clock") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK); assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@default") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT); assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@raw-io") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO); } TEST(filter_sets) { if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } for (unsigned i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) { pid_t pid; #if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND && IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SIGNAL)) { /* valgrind at least requires rt_sigprocmask(), read(), write(). */ log_info("Running on valgrind, skipping %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name); continue; } #endif #if HAS_FEATURE_ADDRESS_SANITIZER if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SIGNAL)) { /* ASAN at least requires sigaltstack(), read(), write(). */ log_info("Running on address sanitizer, skipping %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name); continue; } #endif log_info("Testing %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name); pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { /* Child? */ int fd, r; /* If we look at the default set (or one that includes it), allow-list instead of deny-list */ if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN)) r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, true); else r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true); if (r < 0) _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); /* Test the sycall filter with one random system call */ fd = eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK|EFD_CLOEXEC); if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT)) assert_se(fd < 0 && errno == EUCLEAN); else { assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); } _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } } TEST(filter_sets_ordered) { /* Ensure "@default" always remains at the beginning of the list */ assert_se(SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT == 0); assert_se(streq(syscall_filter_sets[0].name, "@default")); /* Ensure "@known" always remains at the end of the list */ assert_se(SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN == _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX - 1); assert_se(streq(syscall_filter_sets[SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KNOWN].name, "@known")); for (size_t i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) { const char *p = NULL; /* Make sure each group has a description */ assert_se(!isempty(syscall_filter_sets[0].help)); /* Make sure the groups are ordered alphabetically, except for the first and last entries */ assert_se(i < 2 || i == _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX - 1 || strcmp(syscall_filter_sets[i-1].name, syscall_filter_sets[i].name) < 0); NULSTR_FOREACH(k, syscall_filter_sets[i].value) { /* Ensure each syscall list is in itself ordered, but groups before names */ assert_se(!p || (*p == '@' && *k != '@') || (((*p == '@' && *k == '@') || (*p != '@' && *k != '@')) && strcmp(p, k) < 0)); p = k; } } } TEST(restrict_namespace) { char *s = NULL; unsigned long ul; pid_t pid; if (!have_namespaces()) { log_notice("Testing without namespaces, skipping %s", __func__); return; } assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(0, &s) == 0 && isempty(s)); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "mnt")); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWIPC, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "ipc mnt")); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWCGROUP, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "cgroup")); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("mnt", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWNS); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(NULL, &ul) == 0 && ul == 0); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("", &ul) == 0 && ul == 0); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("uts", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWUTS); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("mnt uts ipc", &ul) == 0 && ul == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC)); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWUTS, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "uts")); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(s, &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWUTS); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("ipc", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWIPC); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(ul, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "ipc")); s = mfree(s); assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL, &s) == 0); assert_se(streq(s, "cgroup ipc net mnt pid user uts")); assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(s, &ul) == 0 && ul == NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL); s = mfree(s); if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping remaining tests in %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping remaining tests in %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { assert_se(seccomp_restrict_namespaces(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWNET) >= 0); assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) == 0); assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) == 0); assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); /* We use fd 0 (stdin) here, which of course will fail with EINVAL on setns(). Except of course our * seccomp filter worked, and hits first and makes it return EPERM */ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNS) == -1); assert_se(errno == EINVAL); assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET) == -1); assert_se(errno == EINVAL); assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); assert_se(setns(0, 0) == -1); assert_se(errno == EPERM); pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNS); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWUTS); assert_se(pid < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWIPC); assert_se(pid < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS); assert_se(pid < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("nsseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(protect_sysctl) { pid_t pid; _cleanup_free_ char *seccomp = NULL; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } /* in containers _sysctl() is likely missing anyway */ if (detect_container() > 0) { log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__); return; } assert_se(get_proc_field("/proc/self/status", "Seccomp", WHITESPACE, &seccomp) == 0); if (!streq(seccomp, "0")) log_warning("Warning: seccomp filter detected, results may be unreliable for %s", __func__); pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { #if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0); assert_se(IN_SET(errno, EFAULT, ENOSYS)); #endif assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0); #if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) { log_info("Running on valgrind, skipping syscall/EPERM test"); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } #endif #if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("sysctlseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(protect_syslog) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } /* in containers syslog() is likely missing anyway */ if (detect_container() > 0) { log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { #if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, -1, NULL, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EINVAL); #endif assert_se(seccomp_protect_syslog() >= 0); #if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, 0, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("syslogseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(restrict_address_families) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { int fd; Set *s; fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); assert_se(s = set_new(NULL)); assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_UNIX)) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, false) >= 0); fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); #if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); #else assert_se(fd < 0); assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT); #endif fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); set_clear(s); assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_INET)) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, true) >= 0); fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); #if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); #else assert_se(fd < 0); assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT); #endif fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); #if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN assert_se(fd >= 0); safe_close(fd); #else assert_se(fd < 0); assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT); #endif _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("socketseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(restrict_realtime) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } /* in containers RT privs are likely missing anyway */ if (detect_container() > 0) { log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { /* On some CI environments, the restriction may be already enabled. */ if (sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0) { log_full_errno(errno == EPERM ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, "Failed to set scheduler parameter for FIFO: %m"); assert(errno == EPERM); } if (sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0) { log_full_errno(errno == EPERM ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, "Failed to set scheduler parameter for RR: %m"); assert(errno == EPERM); } assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_realtime_full(ENOANO) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0); assert_se(errno == ENOANO); assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0); assert_se(errno == ENOANO); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("realtimeseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(memory_deny_write_execute_mmap) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } #if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) { log_notice("Running on valgrind, skipping %s", __func__); return; } #endif #if HAS_FEATURE_ADDRESS_SANITIZER log_notice("Running on address sanitizer, skipping %s", __func__); return; #endif pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { void *p; p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0); p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0); p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0); #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64) assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif /* Depending on kernel, libseccomp, and glibc versions, other architectures * might fail or not. Let's not assert success. */ if (p != MAP_FAILED) assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) == 0); p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("memoryseccomp-mmap", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(memory_deny_write_execute_shmat) { int shmid; pid_t pid; uint32_t arch; SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { log_debug("arch %s: SCMP_SYS(mmap) = %d", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch), SCMP_SYS(mmap)); log_debug("arch %s: SCMP_SYS(mmap2) = %d", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch), SCMP_SYS(mmap2)); log_debug("arch %s: SCMP_SYS(shmget) = %d", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch), SCMP_SYS(shmget)); log_debug("arch %s: SCMP_SYS(shmat) = %d", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch), SCMP_SYS(shmat)); log_debug("arch %s: SCMP_SYS(shmdt) = %d", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch), SCMP_SYS(shmdt)); } if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs() || have_effective_cap(CAP_IPC_OWNER) <= 0) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } #if HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND) { log_notice("Running on valgrind, skipping %s", __func__); return; } #endif #if HAS_FEATURE_ADDRESS_SANITIZER log_notice("Running on address sanitizer, skipping %s", __func__); return; #endif shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, page_size(), 0); assert_se(shmid >= 0); pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { void *p; p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0); p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0); assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0); p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC); log_debug_errno(p == MAP_FAILED ? errno : 0, "shmat(SHM_EXEC): %m"); #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64) assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif /* Depending on kernel, libseccomp, and glibc versions, other architectures * might fail or not. Let's not assert success. */ if (p != MAP_FAILED) assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0); p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0); log_debug_errno(p == MAP_FAILED ? errno : 0, "shmat(0): %m"); assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED); assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("memoryseccomp-shmat", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(restrict_archs) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL; assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(s = set_new(NULL)); #ifdef __x86_64__ assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(SCMP_ARCH_X86+1)) >= 0); #endif assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(s) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(NULL) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("archseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(load_syscall_filter_set_raw) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *s = NULL; assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, NULL, scmp_act_kill_process(), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); #if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has access()"); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat && __NR_faccessat >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has faccessat()"); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat2 && __NR_faccessat2 >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat2 + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has faccessat2()"); #endif assert_se(!hashmap_isempty(s)); assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0); assert_se(errno == EUCLEAN); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); hashmap_clear(s); #if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat && __NR_faccessat >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat2 && __NR_faccessat2 >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat2 + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0); assert_se(errno == EILSEQ); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); hashmap_clear(s); #if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has poll()"); #endif #if defined __NR_ppoll && __NR_ppoll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has ppoll()"); #endif #if defined __NR_ppoll_time64 && __NR_ppoll_time64 >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll_time64 + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has ppoll_time64()"); #endif assert_se(!hashmap_isempty(s)); assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUNATCH), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0); assert_se(errno == EILSEQ); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EUNATCH); hashmap_clear(s); #if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif #if defined __NR_ppoll && __NR_ppoll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif #if defined __NR_ppoll_time64 && __NR_ppoll_time64 >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll_time64 + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #endif assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUNATCH), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0); assert_se(errno == EILSEQ); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EILSEQ); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("syscallrawseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(native_syscalls_filtered) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { _cleanup_set_free_ Set *arch_s = NULL; _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *s = NULL; /* Passing "native" or an empty set is equivalent, just do both here. */ assert_se(arch_s = set_new(NULL)); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(arch_s) >= 0); assert_se(set_put(arch_s, SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(arch_s) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, NULL, scmp_act_kill_process(), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0); assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); #if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has access()"); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat && __NR_faccessat >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has faccessat()"); #endif #if defined __NR_faccessat2 && __NR_faccessat2 >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat2 + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); log_debug("has faccessat2()"); #endif assert_se(!hashmap_isempty(s)); assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true) >= 0); assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0); assert_se(errno == EUCLEAN); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("nativeseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } TEST(lock_personality) { unsigned long current; pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } assert_se(opinionated_personality(¤t) >= 0); /* On ppc64le sanitizers disable ASLR (i.e. by setting ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE), * which opinionated_personality() doesn't return. Let's tweak the current * personality ourselves in such cases. * See: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/78f7a6eaa601bfdd6ae70ffd3da2254c21ff77f9 */ if (FLAGS_SET(safe_personality(PERSONALITY_INVALID), ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) current |= ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE; log_info("current personality=0x%lX", current); pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { assert_se(seccomp_lock_personality(current) >= 0); assert_se((unsigned long) safe_personality(current) == current); /* Note, we also test that safe_personality() works correctly, by checking whether errno is properly * set, in addition to the return value */ errno = 0; assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | MMAP_PAGE_ZERO) == -EPERM); assert_se(errno == EPERM); if (!FLAGS_SET(current, ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX_32BIT) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_SVR4) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_BSD) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(current == PER_LINUX ? PER_LINUX32 : PER_LINUX) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX32_3GB) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PER_UW7) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(0x42) == -EPERM); assert_se(safe_personality(PERSONALITY_INVALID) == -EPERM); /* maybe remove this later */ assert_se((unsigned long) personality(current) == current); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("lockpersonalityseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { /* glibc internally calls openat() when open() is requested. Let's hence define our own wrapper for * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */ #if defined __NR_open && __NR_open >= 0 return (int) syscall(__NR_open, path, flags, mode); #else return open(path, flags, mode); #endif } static int try_fchmodat2(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flags) { int r; /* glibc does not provide a direct wrapper for fchmodat2(). Let's hence define our own wrapper for * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures and in environments where * SYS_fchmodat2 is defined. Otherwise, let's just fall back to the glibc fchmodat() call. */ /* Not supported by fchmodat() */ assert_se(!FLAGS_SET(flags, AT_EMPTY_PATH)); r = RET_NERRNO(fchmodat2(dirfd, path, mode, flags)); if (r != -ENOSYS) return r; /* The syscall might still be unsupported by kernel or libseccomp. */ return RET_NERRNO(fchmodat(dirfd, path, mode, flags)); } TEST(restrict_suid_sgid) { pid_t pid; if (!is_seccomp_available()) { log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__); return; } if (!have_seccomp_privs()) { log_notice("Not privileged, skipping %s", __func__); return; } pid = fork(); assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { char path[] = "/tmp/suidsgidXXXXXX", dir[] = "/tmp/suidsgiddirXXXXXX"; int fd = -EBADF, k = -EBADF; const char *z; fd = mkostemp_safe(path); assert_se(fd >= 0); assert_se(mkdtemp(dir)); z = strjoina(dir, "/test"); assert_se(chmod(path, 0755 | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(chmod(path, 0755 | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(chmod(path, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(chmod(path, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0755 | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0755 | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755, 0) >= 0); k = real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = creat(z, 0644 | S_ISUID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = creat(z, 0644 | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = creat(z, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = creat(z, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); k = openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISUID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid() >= 0); assert_se(chmod(path, 0775 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(chmod(path, 0775 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(chmod(path, 0775 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(chmod(path, 0775) >= 0); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0775 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0775 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0775 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmod(fd, 0775) >= 0); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755 | S_ISGID | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(try_fchmodat2(AT_FDCWD, path, 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); k = real_open(z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(creat(z, 0644 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(creat(z, 0644 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(creat(z, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); k = creat(z, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); k = openat(AT_FDCWD, z, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL, 0644); k = safe_close(k); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdir(z, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISUID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, z, 0755) >= 0); assert_se(rmdir(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknod(z, S_IFREG | 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755 | S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM); assert_se(mknodat(AT_FDCWD, z, S_IFREG | 0755, 0) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(z) >= 0); assert_se(unlink(path) >= 0); assert_se(rm_rf(dir, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL) >= 0); _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("suidsgidseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS); } DEFINE_TEST_MAIN(LOG_DEBUG);