Adding upstream version 4.99.4.upstream/4.99.4

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 928 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/print-esp.c b/print-esp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cee088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/print-esp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,928 @@
+/*	$NetBSD: print-ah.c,v 1.4 1996/05/20 00:41:16 fvdl Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that: (1) source code distributions
+ * retain the above copyright notice and this paragraph in its entirety, (2)
+ * distributions including binary code include the above copyright notice and
+ * this paragraph in its entirety in the documentation or other materials
+ * provided with the distribution, and (3) all advertising materials mentioning
+ * features or use of this software display the following acknowledgement:
+ * ``This product includes software developed by the University of California,
+ * Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and its contributors.'' Neither the name of
+ * the University nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse
+ * or promote products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+/* \summary: IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) printer */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "netdissect-stdinc.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* Any code in this file that depends on HAVE_LIBCRYPTO depends on
+ * HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H too. Undefining the former when the latter isn't defined
+ * is the simplest way of handling the dependency.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#else
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "netdissect.h"
+#include "extract.h"
+
+#include "diag-control.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+#include "strtoaddr.h"
+#include "ascii_strcasecmp.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "ip.h"
+#include "ip6.h"
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RFC1827/2406 Encapsulated Security Payload.
+ */
+
+struct newesp {
+	nd_uint32_t	esp_spi;	/* ESP */
+	nd_uint32_t	esp_seq;	/* Sequence number */
+	/*variable size*/		/* (IV and) Payload data */
+	/*variable size*/		/* padding */
+	/*8bit*/			/* pad size */
+	/*8bit*/			/* next header */
+	/*8bit*/			/* next header */
+	/*variable size, 32bit bound*/	/* Authentication data */
+};
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+union inaddr_u {
+	nd_ipv4 in4;
+	nd_ipv6 in6;
+};
+struct sa_list {
+	struct sa_list	*next;
+	u_int		daddr_version;
+	union inaddr_u	daddr;
+	uint32_t	spi;          /* if == 0, then IKEv2 */
+	int             initiator;
+	u_char          spii[8];      /* for IKEv2 */
+	u_char          spir[8];
+	const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+	u_int		ivlen;
+	int		authlen;
+	u_char          authsecret[256];
+	int             authsecret_len;
+	u_char		secret[256];  /* is that big enough for all secrets? */
+	int		secretlen;
+};
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_NEW
+/*
+ * Allocate an EVP_CIPHER_CTX.
+ * Used if we have an older version of OpenSSL that doesn't provide
+ * routines to allocate and free them.
+ */
+static EVP_CIPHER_CTX *
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+
+	ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+	return (ctx);
+}
+
+static void
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_DECRYPTINIT_EX
+/*
+ * Initialize the cipher by calling EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), because
+ * calling EVP_DecryptInit() will reset the cipher context, clearing
+ * the cipher, so calling it twice, with the second call having a
+ * null cipher, will clear the already-set cipher.  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(),
+ * however, won't reset the cipher context, so you can use it to specify
+ * the IV in a second call after a first call to EVP_DecryptInit_ex()
+ * to set the cipher and the key.
+ *
+ * XXX - is there some reason why we need to make two calls?
+ */
+static int
+set_cipher_parameters(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+		      const unsigned char *key,
+		      const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+	return EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv);
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * Initialize the cipher by calling EVP_DecryptInit(), because we don't
+ * have EVP_DecryptInit_ex(); we rely on it not trashing the context.
+ */
+static int
+set_cipher_parameters(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
+		      const unsigned char *key,
+		      const unsigned char *iv)
+{
+	return EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv);
+}
+#endif
+
+static u_char *
+do_decrypt(netdissect_options *ndo, const char *caller, struct sa_list *sa,
+    const u_char *iv, const u_char *ct, unsigned int ctlen)
+{
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+	unsigned int block_size;
+	unsigned int ptlen;
+	u_char *pt;
+	int len;
+
+	ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (ctx == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Failed to initialize the cipher context.
+		 * From a look at the OpenSSL code, this appears to
+		 * mean "couldn't allocate memory for the cipher context";
+		 * note that we're not passing any parameters, so there's
+		 * not much else it can mean.
+		 */
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+		    "%s: can't allocate memory for cipher context", caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (set_cipher_parameters(ctx, sa->evp, sa->secret, NULL) < 0) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: espkey init failed", caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (set_cipher_parameters(ctx, NULL, NULL, iv) < 0) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: IV init failed", caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * At least as I read RFC 5996 section 3.14 and RFC 4303 section 2.4,
+	 * if the cipher has a block size of which the ciphertext's size must
+	 * be a multiple, the payload must be padded to make that happen, so
+	 * the ciphertext length must be a multiple of the block size.  Fail
+	 * if that's not the case.
+	 */
+	block_size = (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+	if ((ctlen % block_size) != 0) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo,
+		    "%s: ciphertext size %u is not a multiple of the cipher block size %u",
+		    caller, ctlen, block_size);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to allocate a buffer for the decrypted data, because
+	 * we can't decrypt on top of the input buffer.
+	 */
+	ptlen = ctlen;
+	pt = (u_char *)calloc(1, ptlen);
+	if (pt == NULL) {
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+		    "%s: can't allocate memory for decryption buffer", caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The size of the ciphertext handed to us is a multiple of the
+	 * cipher block size, so we don't need to worry about padding.
+	 */
+	if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0)) {
+		free(pt);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo,
+		    "%s: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding failed", caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, pt, &len, ct, ctlen)) {
+		free(pt);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "%s: EVP_DecryptUpdate failed",
+		    caller);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+	return pt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will allocate a new buffer containing the decrypted data.
+ * It returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * It will push the new buffer and the values of ndo->ndo_packetp and
+ * ndo->ndo_snapend onto the buffer stack, and change ndo->ndo_packetp
+ * and ndo->ndo_snapend to refer to the new buffer.
+ *
+ * Our caller must pop the buffer off the stack when it's finished
+ * dissecting anything in it and before it does any dissection of
+ * anything in the old buffer.  That will free the new buffer.
+ */
+DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION
+int esp_decrypt_buffer_by_ikev2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
+				      int initiator,
+				      const u_char spii[8],
+				      const u_char spir[8],
+				      const u_char *buf, const u_char *end)
+{
+	struct sa_list *sa;
+	const u_char *iv;
+	const u_char *ct;
+	unsigned int ctlen;
+	u_char *pt;
+
+	/* initiator arg is any non-zero value */
+	if(initiator) initiator=1;
+
+	/* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */
+	for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) {
+		if (sa->spi == 0
+		    && initiator == sa->initiator
+		    && memcmp(spii, sa->spii, 8) == 0
+		    && memcmp(spir, sa->spir, 8) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if(sa == NULL) return 0;
+	if(sa->evp == NULL) return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * remove authenticator, and see if we still have something to
+	 * work with
+	 */
+	end = end - sa->authlen;
+	iv  = buf;
+	ct = iv + sa->ivlen;
+	ctlen = end-ct;
+
+	if(end <= ct) return 0;
+
+	pt = do_decrypt(ndo, __func__, sa, iv,
+	    ct, ctlen);
+	if (pt == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to the output buffer for dissection, and save it
+	 * on the buffer stack so it can be freed; our caller must
+	 * pop it when done.
+	 */
+	if (!nd_push_buffer(ndo, pt, pt, ctlen)) {
+		free(pt);
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+			"%s: can't push buffer on buffer stack", __func__);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION
+
+static void esp_print_addsa(netdissect_options *ndo,
+			    const struct sa_list *sa, int sa_def)
+{
+	/* copy the "sa" */
+
+	struct sa_list *nsa;
+
+	/* malloc() return used in a 'struct sa_list': do not free() */
+	nsa = (struct sa_list *)malloc(sizeof(struct sa_list));
+	if (nsa == NULL)
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+				  "%s: malloc", __func__);
+
+	*nsa = *sa;
+
+	if (sa_def)
+		ndo->ndo_sa_default = nsa;
+
+	nsa->next = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head;
+	ndo->ndo_sa_list_head = nsa;
+}
+
+
+static u_int hexdigit(netdissect_options *ndo, char hex)
+{
+	if (hex >= '0' && hex <= '9')
+		return (hex - '0');
+	else if (hex >= 'A' && hex <= 'F')
+		return (hex - 'A' + 10);
+	else if (hex >= 'a' && hex <= 'f')
+		return (hex - 'a' + 10);
+	else {
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_ESP_SECRET,
+				  "invalid hex digit %c in espsecret\n", hex);
+	}
+}
+
+static u_int hex2byte(netdissect_options *ndo, char *hexstring)
+{
+	u_int byte;
+
+	byte = (hexdigit(ndo, hexstring[0]) << 4) + hexdigit(ndo, hexstring[1]);
+	return byte;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns size of binary, 0 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+espprint_decode_hex(netdissect_options *ndo,
+		    u_char *binbuf, unsigned int binbuf_len, char *hex)
+{
+	unsigned int len;
+	int i;
+
+	len = strlen(hex) / 2;
+
+	if (len > binbuf_len) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "secret is too big: %u\n", len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	i = 0;
+	while (hex[0] != '\0' && hex[1]!='\0') {
+		binbuf[i] = hex2byte(ndo, hex);
+		hex += 2;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * decode the form:    SPINUM@IP <tab> ALGONAME:0xsecret
+ */
+
+DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION
+static int
+espprint_decode_encalgo(netdissect_options *ndo,
+			char *decode, struct sa_list *sa)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
+	int authlen = 0;
+	char *colon, *p;
+
+	colon = strchr(decode, ':');
+	if (colon == NULL) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to decode espsecret: %s\n", decode);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*colon = '\0';
+
+	if (strlen(decode) > strlen("-hmac96") &&
+	    !strcmp(decode + strlen(decode) - strlen("-hmac96"),
+		    "-hmac96")) {
+		p = strstr(decode, "-hmac96");
+		*p = '\0';
+		authlen = 12;
+	}
+	if (strlen(decode) > strlen("-cbc") &&
+	    !strcmp(decode + strlen(decode) - strlen("-cbc"), "-cbc")) {
+		p = strstr(decode, "-cbc");
+		*p = '\0';
+	}
+	evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname(decode);
+
+	if (!evp) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to find cipher algo %s\n", decode);
+		sa->evp = NULL;
+		sa->authlen = 0;
+		sa->ivlen = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	sa->evp = evp;
+	sa->authlen = authlen;
+	/* This returns an int, but it should never be negative */
+	sa->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(evp);
+
+	colon++;
+	if (colon[0] == '0' && colon[1] == 'x') {
+		/* decode some hex! */
+
+		colon += 2;
+		sa->secretlen = espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa->secret, sizeof(sa->secret), colon);
+		if(sa->secretlen == 0) return 0;
+	} else {
+		i = strlen(colon);
+
+		if (i < sizeof(sa->secret)) {
+			memcpy(sa->secret, colon, i);
+			sa->secretlen = i;
+		} else {
+			memcpy(sa->secret, colon, sizeof(sa->secret));
+			sa->secretlen = sizeof(sa->secret);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION
+
+/*
+ * for the moment, ignore the auth algorithm, just hard code the authenticator
+ * length. Need to research how openssl looks up HMAC stuff.
+ */
+static int
+espprint_decode_authalgo(netdissect_options *ndo,
+			 char *decode, struct sa_list *sa)
+{
+	char *colon;
+
+	colon = strchr(decode, ':');
+	if (colon == NULL) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "failed to decode espsecret: %s\n", decode);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*colon = '\0';
+
+	if(ascii_strcasecmp(decode,"sha1") == 0 ||
+	   ascii_strcasecmp(decode,"md5") == 0) {
+		sa->authlen = 12;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void esp_print_decode_ikeline(netdissect_options *ndo, char *line,
+				     const char *file, int lineno)
+{
+	/* it's an IKEv2 secret, store it instead */
+	struct sa_list sa1;
+
+	char *init;
+	char *icookie, *rcookie;
+	int   ilen, rlen;
+	char *authkey;
+	char *enckey;
+
+	init = strsep(&line, " \t");
+	icookie = strsep(&line, " \t");
+	rcookie = strsep(&line, " \t");
+	authkey = strsep(&line, " \t");
+	enckey  = strsep(&line, " \t");
+
+	/* if any fields are missing */
+	if(!init || !icookie || !rcookie || !authkey || !enckey) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to find all fields for ikev2 at %s:%u",
+				    file, lineno);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ilen = strlen(icookie);
+	rlen = strlen(rcookie);
+
+	if((init[0]!='I' && init[0]!='R')
+	   || icookie[0]!='0' || icookie[1]!='x'
+	   || rcookie[0]!='0' || rcookie[1]!='x'
+	   || ilen!=18
+	   || rlen!=18) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: line %s:%u improperly formatted.",
+				    file, lineno);
+
+		(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "init=%s icookie=%s(%u) rcookie=%s(%u)",
+				    init, icookie, ilen, rcookie, rlen);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	sa1.spi = 0;
+	sa1.initiator = (init[0] == 'I');
+	if(espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa1.spii, sizeof(sa1.spii), icookie+2)!=8)
+		return;
+
+	if(espprint_decode_hex(ndo, sa1.spir, sizeof(sa1.spir), rcookie+2)!=8)
+		return;
+
+	if(!espprint_decode_encalgo(ndo, enckey, &sa1)) return;
+
+	if(!espprint_decode_authalgo(ndo, authkey, &sa1)) return;
+
+	esp_print_addsa(ndo, &sa1, FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * special form: file /name
+ * causes us to go read from this file instead.
+ *
+ */
+static void esp_print_decode_onesecret(netdissect_options *ndo, char *line,
+				       const char *file, int lineno)
+{
+	struct sa_list sa1;
+	int sa_def;
+
+	char *spikey;
+	char *decode;
+
+	spikey = strsep(&line, " \t");
+	sa_def = 0;
+	memset(&sa1, 0, sizeof(struct sa_list));
+
+	/* if there is only one token, then it is an algo:key token */
+	if (line == NULL) {
+		decode = spikey;
+		spikey = NULL;
+		/* sa1.daddr.version = 0; */
+		/* memset(&sa1.daddr, 0, sizeof(sa1.daddr)); */
+		/* sa1.spi = 0; */
+		sa_def    = 1;
+	} else
+		decode = line;
+
+	if (spikey && ascii_strcasecmp(spikey, "file") == 0) {
+		/* open file and read it */
+		FILE *secretfile;
+		char  fileline[1024];
+		int   subfile_lineno=0;
+		char  *nl;
+		char *filename = line;
+
+		secretfile = fopen(filename, FOPEN_READ_TXT);
+		if (secretfile == NULL) {
+			(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_OPEN_FILE,
+					  "%s: can't open %s: %s\n",
+					  __func__, filename, strerror(errno));
+		}
+
+		while (fgets(fileline, sizeof(fileline)-1, secretfile) != NULL) {
+			subfile_lineno++;
+			/* remove newline from the line */
+			nl = strchr(fileline, '\n');
+			if (nl)
+				*nl = '\0';
+			if (fileline[0] == '#') continue;
+			if (fileline[0] == '\0') continue;
+
+			esp_print_decode_onesecret(ndo, fileline, filename, subfile_lineno);
+		}
+		fclose(secretfile);
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (spikey && ascii_strcasecmp(spikey, "ikev2") == 0) {
+		esp_print_decode_ikeline(ndo, line, file, lineno);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (spikey) {
+
+		char *spistr, *foo;
+		uint32_t spino;
+
+		spistr = strsep(&spikey, "@");
+		if (spistr == NULL) {
+			(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to find the @ token");
+			return;
+		}
+
+		spino = strtoul(spistr, &foo, 0);
+		if (spistr == foo || !spikey) {
+			(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: failed to decode spi# %s\n", foo);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		sa1.spi = spino;
+
+		if (strtoaddr6(spikey, &sa1.daddr.in6) == 1) {
+			sa1.daddr_version = 6;
+		} else if (strtoaddr(spikey, &sa1.daddr.in4) == 1) {
+			sa1.daddr_version = 4;
+		} else {
+			(*ndo->ndo_warning)(ndo, "print_esp: can not decode IP# %s\n", spikey);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (decode) {
+		/* skip any blank spaces */
+		while (*decode == ' ' || *decode == '\t' || *decode == '\r' || *decode == '\n')
+			decode++;
+
+		if(!espprint_decode_encalgo(ndo, decode, &sa1)) {
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	esp_print_addsa(ndo, &sa1, sa_def);
+}
+
+DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION
+static void esp_init(netdissect_options *ndo _U_)
+{
+	/*
+	 * 0.9.6 doesn't appear to define OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, so
+	 * we check whether it's undefined or it's less than the
+	 * value for 1.1.0.
+	 */
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) || OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+	EVP_add_cipher_alias(SN_des_ede3_cbc, "3des");
+}
+DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION
+
+void esp_decodesecret_print(netdissect_options *ndo)
+{
+	char *line;
+	char *p;
+	static int initialized = 0;
+
+	if (!initialized) {
+		esp_init(ndo);
+		initialized = 1;
+	}
+
+	p = ndo->ndo_espsecret;
+
+	while (p && p[0] != '\0') {
+		/* pick out the first line or first thing until a comma */
+		if ((line = strsep(&p, "\n,")) == NULL) {
+			line = p;
+			p = NULL;
+		}
+
+		esp_print_decode_onesecret(ndo, line, "cmdline", 0);
+	}
+
+	ndo->ndo_espsecret = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+#define USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO
+#else
+#define USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO _U_
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+DIAG_OFF_DEPRECATION
+#endif
+void
+esp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
+	  const u_char *bp, u_int length,
+	  const u_char *bp2 USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO,
+	  u_int ver USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO,
+	  int fragmented USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO,
+	  u_int ttl_hl USED_IF_LIBCRYPTO)
+{
+	const struct newesp *esp;
+	const u_char *ep;
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+	const struct ip *ip;
+	struct sa_list *sa = NULL;
+	const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
+	const u_char *iv;
+	u_int ivlen;
+	u_int payloadlen;
+	const u_char *ct;
+	u_char *pt;
+	u_int padlen;
+	u_int nh;
+#endif
+
+	ndo->ndo_protocol = "esp";
+	esp = (const struct newesp *)bp;
+
+	/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
+	ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
+
+	if ((const u_char *)(esp + 1) >= ep) {
+		nd_print_trunc(ndo);
+		return;
+	}
+	ND_PRINT("ESP(spi=0x%08x", GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi));
+	ND_PRINT(",seq=0x%x)", GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_seq));
+	ND_PRINT(", length %u", length);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+	/* initialize SAs */
+	if (ndo->ndo_sa_list_head == NULL) {
+		if (!ndo->ndo_espsecret)
+			return;
+
+		esp_decodesecret_print(ndo);
+	}
+
+	if (ndo->ndo_sa_list_head == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
+	switch (ver) {
+	case 6:
+		ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
+		/* we do not attempt to decrypt jumbograms */
+		if (!GET_BE_U_2(ip6->ip6_plen))
+			return;
+		/* XXX - check whether it's fragmented? */
+		/* if we can't get nexthdr, we do not need to decrypt it */
+
+		/* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */
+		for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) {
+			if (sa->spi == GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi) &&
+			    sa->daddr_version == 6 &&
+			    UNALIGNED_MEMCMP(&sa->daddr.in6, &ip6->ip6_dst,
+				   sizeof(nd_ipv6)) == 0) {
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case 4:
+		/* nexthdr & padding are in the last fragment */
+		if (fragmented)
+			return;
+
+		/* see if we can find the SA, and if so, decode it */
+		for (sa = ndo->ndo_sa_list_head; sa != NULL; sa = sa->next) {
+			if (sa->spi == GET_BE_U_4(esp->esp_spi) &&
+			    sa->daddr_version == 4 &&
+			    UNALIGNED_MEMCMP(&sa->daddr.in4, &ip->ip_dst,
+				   sizeof(nd_ipv4)) == 0) {
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* if we didn't find the specific one, then look for
+	 * an unspecified one.
+	 */
+	if (sa == NULL)
+		sa = ndo->ndo_sa_default;
+
+	/* if not found fail */
+	if (sa == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* pointer to the IV, if there is one */
+	iv = (const u_char *)(esp + 1) + 0;
+	/* length of the IV, if there is one; 0, if there isn't */
+	ivlen = sa->ivlen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get a pointer to the ciphertext.
+	 *
+	 * p points to the beginning of the payload, i.e. to the
+	 * initialization vector, so if we skip past the initialization
+	 * vector, it points to the beginning of the ciphertext.
+	 */
+	ct = iv + ivlen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the authentication data/integrity check value length
+	 * isn't bigger than the total amount of data available after
+	 * the ESP header and initialization vector is removed and,
+	 * if not, slice the authentication data/ICV off.
+	 */
+	if (ep - ct < sa->authlen) {
+		nd_print_trunc(ndo);
+		return;
+	}
+	ep = ep - sa->authlen;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the length of the ciphertext.  ep points to
+	 * the beginning of the authentication data/integrity check
+	 * value, i.e. right past the end of the ciphertext;
+	 */
+	payloadlen = ep - ct;
+
+	if (sa->evp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the next header value is past the end of the available
+	 * data, we won't be able to fetch it once we've decrypted
+	 * the ciphertext, so there's no point in decrypting the data.
+	 *
+	 * Report it as truncation.
+	 */
+	if (!ND_TTEST_1(ep - 1)) {
+		nd_print_trunc(ndo);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pt = do_decrypt(ndo, __func__, sa, iv, ct, payloadlen);
+	if (pt == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Switch to the output buffer for dissection, and
+	 * save it on the buffer stack so it can be freed.
+	 */
+	if (!nd_push_buffer(ndo, pt, pt, payloadlen)) {
+		free(pt);
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+			"%s: can't push buffer on buffer stack", __func__);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check for pad length; if it, plus 2 for the pad
+	 * length and next header fields, is bigger than the ciphertext
+	 * length (which is also the plaintext length), it's too big.
+	 *
+	 * XXX - the check can fail if the packet is corrupt *or* if
+	 * it was not decrypted with the correct key, so that the
+	 * "plaintext" is not what was being sent.
+	 */
+	padlen = GET_U_1(pt + payloadlen - 2);
+	if (padlen + 2 > payloadlen) {
+		nd_print_trunc(ndo);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the next header */
+	nh = GET_U_1(pt + payloadlen - 1);
+
+	ND_PRINT(": ");
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't put padding + padding length(1 byte) + next header(1 byte)
+	 * in the buffer because they are not part of the plaintext to decode.
+	 */
+	if (!nd_push_snaplen(ndo, pt, payloadlen - (padlen + 2))) {
+		(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, S_ERR_ND_MEM_ALLOC,
+			"%s: can't push snaplen on buffer stack", __func__);
+	}
+
+	/* Now dissect the plaintext. */
+	ip_demux_print(ndo, pt, payloadlen - (padlen + 2), ver, fragmented,
+		       ttl_hl, nh, bp2);
+
+	/* Pop the buffer, freeing it. */
+	nd_pop_packet_info(ndo);
+	/* Pop the nd_push_snaplen */
+	nd_pop_packet_info(ndo);
+#endif
+}
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRYPTO
+DIAG_ON_DEPRECATION
+#endif