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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-10 20:34:10 +0000
commite4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc (patch)
tree68cb5ef9081156392f1dd62a00c6ccc1451b93df /epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadwireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.tar.xz
wireshark-e4ba6dbc3f1e76890b22773807ea37fe8fa2b1bc.zip
Adding upstream version 4.2.2.upstream/4.2.2
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos')
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/CMakeLists.txt43
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/KerberosV5Spec2.asn516
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC3244.asn12
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC6113.asn147
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/SPAKE.asn86
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/k5.asn891
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf691
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c5451
-rw-r--r--epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.h134
9 files changed, 7971 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/CMakeLists.txt b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/CMakeLists.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a8b2a43c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# CMakeLists.txt
+#
+# Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
+# By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+# Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+#
+
+set( PROTOCOL_NAME kerberos )
+
+set( PROTO_OPT )
+
+set( EXPORT_FILES
+ ${PROTOCOL_NAME}-exp.cnf
+)
+
+set( EXT_ASN_FILE_LIST
+)
+
+set( ASN_FILE_LIST
+ KerberosV5Spec2.asn
+ k5.asn
+ RFC3244.asn
+ RFC6113.asn
+ SPAKE.asn
+)
+
+set( EXTRA_DIST
+ ${ASN_FILE_LIST}
+ packet-${PROTOCOL_NAME}-template.c
+ packet-${PROTOCOL_NAME}-template.h
+ ${PROTOCOL_NAME}.cnf
+)
+
+set( SRC_FILES
+ ${EXTRA_DIST}
+ ${EXT_ASN_FILE_LIST}
+)
+
+set( A2W_FLAGS -b )
+
+ASN2WRS()
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/KerberosV5Spec2.asn b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/KerberosV5Spec2.asn
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f53f8552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/KerberosV5Spec2.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
+--http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4120.txt?number=4120
+KerberosV5Spec2 {
+ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) krb5spec2(2)
+} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
+
+-- OID arc for KerberosV5
+--
+-- This OID may be used to identify Kerberos protocol messages
+-- encapsulated in other protocols.
+--
+-- This OID also designates the OID arc for KerberosV5-related OIDs.
+--
+-- NOTE: RFC 1510 had an incorrect value (5) for "dod" in its OID.
+-- WS construct
+Applications ::= CHOICE {
+ ticket Ticket, -- 1 --
+ authenticator Authenticator, -- 2 --
+ encTicketPart EncTicketPart, -- 3 --
+ as-req AS-REQ, -- 10 --
+ as-rep AS-REP, -- 11 --
+ tgs-req TGS-REQ, -- 12 --
+ tgs-rep TGS-REP, -- 13 --
+ ap-req AP-REQ, -- 14 --
+ ap-rep AP-REP, -- 15 --
+ krb-safe KRB-SAFE, -- 20 --
+ krb-priv KRB-PRIV, -- 21 --
+ krb-cred KRB-CRED, -- 22 --
+ encASRepPart EncASRepPart, -- 25 --
+ encTGSRepPart EncTGSRepPart, -- 26 --
+ encAPRepPart EncAPRepPart, -- 27 --
+ encKrbPrivPart ENC-KRB-PRIV-PART, -- 28 --
+ encKrbCredPart EncKrbCredPart, -- 29 --
+ krb-error KRB-ERROR -- 30 --
+ }
+-- end WS construct
+id-krb5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) kerberosV5(2)
+}
+
+Int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
+ -- signed values representable in 32 bits
+
+UInt32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
+ -- unsigned 32 bit values
+
+Microseconds ::= INTEGER (0..999999)
+ -- microseconds
+
+KerberosString ::= GeneralString (IA5String)
+CNameString ::= GeneralString (IA5String)
+SNameString ::= GeneralString (IA5String)
+
+Realm ::= KerberosString
+
+PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- name-type [0] Int32, Use the translationj from krb5.asn (Heimdahl)
+ name-type [0] NAME-TYPE,
+ name-string [1] SEQUENCE OF KerberosString
+}
+
+CName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ name-type [0] NAME-TYPE,
+ cname-string [1] SEQUENCE OF CNameString
+}
+
+SName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ name-type [0] NAME-TYPE,
+ sname-string [1] SEQUENCE OF SNameString
+}
+
+KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime -- with no fractional seconds
+
+HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- addr-type [0] Int32,
+ addr-type [0] ADDR-TYPE, --use k5.asn
+ address [1] OCTET STRING
+}
+
+-- NOTE: HostAddresses is always used as an OPTIONAL field and
+-- should not be empty.
+HostAddresses -- NOTE: subtly different from rfc1510,
+ -- but has a value mapping and encodes the same
+ ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
+
+-- NOTE: AuthorizationData is always used as an OPTIONAL field and
+-- should not be empty.
+AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+ ad-type [0] AUTHDATA-TYPE,
+ ad-data [1] OCTET STRING
+}
+
+PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
+ -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
+-- padata-type [1] Int32, use k5.asn
+ padata-type [1] PADATA-TYPE,
+ padata-value [2] OCTET STRING -- might be encoded AP-REQ
+}
+
+KerberosFlags ::= BIT STRING (SIZE (32..MAX))
+ -- minimum number of bits shall be sent,
+ -- but no fewer than 32
+
+EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype [0] Int32 - - EncryptionType - -, Use k5.asn
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ keytype [0] Int32 -- actually encryption type --,
+ keyvalue [1] OCTET STRING
+}
+
+Checksum ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- cksumtype [0] Int32, Use k5.asn
+ cksumtype [0] CKSUMTYPE,
+ checksum [1] OCTET STRING
+}
+
+EncryptedTicketData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedAuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedAuthenticator ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedKDCREPData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedAPREPData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedKrbPrivData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedKrbCredData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE, -- EncryptionType - - Use k5.asn
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
+ tkt-vno [0] INTEGER (5),
+ realm [1] Realm,
+ sname [2] SName,
+ enc-part [3] EncryptedTicketData
+}
+
+-- Encrypted part of ticket
+EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE {
+ flags [0] TicketFlags,
+ key [1] EncryptionKey,
+ crealm [2] Realm,
+ cname [3] CName,
+ transited [4] TransitedEncoding,
+ authtime [5] KerberosTime,
+ starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ endtime [7] KerberosTime,
+ renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ caddr [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+ authorization-data [10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+-- encoded Transited field
+TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
+ tr-type [0] Int32 -- must be registered --,
+ contents [1] OCTET STRING
+}
+-- Use the k5.asn def
+-- TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags
+ -- reserved(0),
+ -- forwardable(1),
+ -- forwarded(2),
+ -- proxiable(3),
+ -- proxy(4),
+ -- may-postdate(5),
+ -- postdated(6),
+ -- invalid(7),
+ -- renewable(8),
+ -- initial(9),
+ -- pre-authent(10),
+ -- hw-authent(11),
+-- the following are new since 1510
+ -- transited-policy-checked(12),
+ -- ok-as-delegate(13)
+
+AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ
+
+TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ
+
+KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
+ -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
+ pvno [1] INTEGER (5) ,
+-- msg-type [2] INTEGER (10 - - AS - - | 12 - - TGS - -),
+-- msg-type [2] INTEGER, use k5.asn
+ msg-type [2] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ padata [3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL
+ -- NOTE: not empty --,
+ req-body [4] KDC-REQ-BODY
+}
+
+KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
+ kdc-options [0] KDCOptions,
+ cname [1] CName OPTIONAL
+ -- Used only in AS-REQ --,
+ realm [2] Realm
+ -- Server's realm
+ -- Also client's in AS-REQ --,
+ sname [3] SName OPTIONAL,
+ from [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+
+-- this field is not optional in the kerberos spec, however, in the packetcable spec it is optional
+-- make it optional here since normal kerberos will still decode the pdu correctly.
+ till [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+
+ rtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ nonce [7] UInt32,
+-- etype [8] SEQUENCE OF Int32 - - EncryptionType Use k5.asn
+ etype [8] SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType
+ -- in preference order --,
+ addresses [9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+ enc-authorization-data [10] EncryptedAuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+ -- AuthorizationData --,
+ additional-tickets [11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
+ -- NOTE: not empty
+}
+
+-- Use th k5.asn def
+--KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags
+ -- reserved(0),
+ -- forwardable(1),
+ -- forwarded(2),
+ -- proxiable(3),
+ -- proxy(4),
+ -- allow-postdate(5),
+ -- postdated(6),
+ -- unused7(7),
+ -- renewable(8),
+ -- unused9(9),
+ -- unused10(10),
+ -- opt-hardware-auth(11),
+ -- unused12(12),
+ -- unused13(13),
+-- 15 is reserved for canonicalize
+ -- unused15(15),
+-- 26 was unused in 1510
+ -- disable-transited-check(26),
+--
+ -- renewable-ok(27),
+ -- enc-tkt-in-skey(28),
+ -- renew(30),
+ -- validate(31)
+
+AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP
+
+TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP
+
+
+KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (11 - - AS - - | 13 - - TGS - -),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER, use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ padata [2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL
+ -- NOTE: not empty --,
+ crealm [3] Realm,
+ cname [4] CName,
+ ticket [5] Ticket,
+ enc-part [6] EncryptedKDCREPData
+ -- EncASRepPart or EncTGSRepPart,
+ -- as appropriate
+}
+
+EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart
+
+EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
+
+EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
+ key [0] EncryptionKey,
+ last-req [1] LastReq,
+ nonce [2] UInt32,
+ key-expiration [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ flags [4] TicketFlags,
+ authtime [5] KerberosTime,
+ starttime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ endtime [7] KerberosTime,
+ renew-till [8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ srealm [9] Realm,
+ sname [10] SName,
+ caddr [11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+ encrypted-pa-data[12] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL -- from k5.asn
+}
+
+LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+-- lr-type [0] Int32, Use k5.asn
+ lr-type [0] LR-TYPE,
+ lr-value [1] KerberosTime
+}
+
+AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (14), use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ ap-options [2] APOptions,
+ ticket [3] Ticket,
+ authenticator [4] EncryptedAuthenticator -- Authenticator
+}
+-- Use the krb5.asn def.
+--APOptions ::= KerberosFlags
+ -- reserved(0),
+ -- use-session-key(1),
+ -- mutual-required(2)
+
+-- Unencrypted authenticator
+Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
+ authenticator-vno [0] INTEGER (5),
+ crealm [1] Realm,
+ cname [2] CName,
+ cksum [3] Checksum OPTIONAL,
+ cusec [4] Microseconds,
+ ctime [5] KerberosTime,
+ subkey [6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+ seq-number [7] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ authorization-data [8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+}
+
+AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (15), Use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ enc-part [2] EncryptedAPREPData -- EncAPRepPart
+}
+
+EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE {
+ ctime [0] KerberosTime,
+ cusec [1] Microseconds,
+ subkey [2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+ seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL
+}
+
+KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (20), use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ safe-body [2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
+ cksum [3] Checksum
+}
+
+KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
+ user-data [0] OCTET STRING,
+ timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
+ seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ s-address [4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- XXX this one is OPTIONAL in packetcable? but mandatory in kerberos
+ r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
+}
+
+KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (21), Use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ -- NOTE: there is no [2] tag
+ enc-part [3] EncryptedKrbPrivData -- EncKrbPrivPart
+}
+
+ENC-KRB-PRIV-PART ::= [APPLICATION 28] EncKrbPrivPart
+
+EncKrbPrivPart ::= SEQUENCE {
+ user-data [0] OCTET STRING,
+ timestamp [1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ usec [2] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
+ seq-number [3] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ s-address [4] HostAddress -- sender's addr --,
+ r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr
+}
+
+KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (22), use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ tickets [2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
+ enc-part [3] EncryptedKrbCredData -- EncKrbCredPart
+}
+
+EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
+ ticket-info [0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
+ nonce [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ timestamp [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ usec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
+ s-address [4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
+ r-address [5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
+}
+
+KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ key [0] EncryptionKey,
+ prealm [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
+ pname [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ flags [3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
+ authtime [4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ starttime [5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ endtime [6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ renew-till [7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ srealm [8] Realm OPTIONAL,
+ sname [9] SName OPTIONAL,
+ caddr [10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
+}
+
+KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+-- msg-type [1] INTEGER (30), use k5.asn
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+ ctime [2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ cusec [3] Microseconds OPTIONAL,
+ stime [4] KerberosTime,
+ susec [5] Microseconds,
+-- error-code [6] Int32,
+ error-code [6] ERROR-CODE, -- Use k5.asn
+ crealm [7] Realm OPTIONAL,
+ cname [8] CName OPTIONAL,
+ realm [9] Realm -- service realm --,
+ sname [10] SName -- service name --,
+ e-text [11] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
+ e-data [12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ e-checksum [13] Checksum OPTIONAL -- used by PacketCable
+}
+
+METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA
+
+TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SEQUENCE {
+ data-type [0] Int32,
+ data-value [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+}
+
+-- preauth stuff follows
+
+PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
+ patimestamp [0] KerberosTime -- client's time --,
+ pausec [1] Microseconds OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype [0] Int32, use k5.asn
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE,
+ salt [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
+
+ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype [0] Int32, use k5.asn
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE,
+ salt [1] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
+ s2kparams [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+}
+
+ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY
+
+AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData
+
+AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE {
+ ad-checksum [0] Checksum,
+ i-realm [1] Realm OPTIONAL,
+ i-sname [2] SName OPTIONAL,
+ elements [3] AuthorizationData
+}
+
+AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
+ condition-count [0] Int32,
+ elements [1] AuthorizationData
+}
+
+AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData
+
+TGT-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE (16),
+ server-name [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ realm [3] Realm OPTIONAL
+}
+
+TGT-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pvno [0] INTEGER (5),
+ msg-type [1] MESSAGE-TYPE (17),
+ ticket [2] Ticket
+}
+
+END
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC3244.asn b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC3244.asn
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4dcd06e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC3244.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-- Extracted from RFC 3244
+
+RFC3244 DEFINITIONS ::=
+BEGIN
+
+ChangePasswdData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING,
+ targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL
+}
+
+END
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC6113.asn b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC6113.asn
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0a3b7321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/RFC6113.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+-- Extracted from RFC 6113
+
+KerberosPreauthFramework {
+ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) preauth-framework(3)
+} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
+
+IMPORTS
+ KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum,
+ Int32, EncryptedData, PA-ENC-TS-ENC, PA-DATA, KDC-REQ-BODY,
+ Microseconds, KerberosFlags, UInt32
+ FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
+ modules(4) krb5spec2(2) };
+ -- as defined in RFC 4120.
+
+PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM
+
+PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pa-type [0] PADATA-TYPE, -- use k5.asn Int32,
+ -- same as padata-type.
+ pa-hint [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ pa-value [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ ...
+}
+
+KrbFastArmorTypes ::= INTEGER {
+ fX-FAST-reserved(0),
+ fX-FAST-ARMOR-AP-REQUEST(1) -- [RFC6113]
+}
+
+KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
+ armor-type [0] KrbFastArmorTypes,
+ -- Type of the armor.
+ armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
+ -- Value of the armor.
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
+ armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
+ ...
+}
+
+EncryptedKrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
+ armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
+ -- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
+ -- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
+ req-checksum [1] Checksum,
+ -- For AS, contains the checksum performed over the type
+ -- KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
+ -- structure;
+ -- For TGS, contains the checksum performed over the type
+ -- AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata.
+ -- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
+ -- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
+ -- the armor key, and the key usage number is
+ -- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.
+ enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedKrbFastReq, -- KrbFastReq --
+ -- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
+ -- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
+ ...
+}
+
+KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
+ fast-options [0] FastOptions,
+ -- Additional options.
+ padata [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
+ -- padata typed holes.
+ req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
+ -- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
+ -- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
+ -- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
+ -- in the KDC request.
+ ...
+}
+
+FastOptions ::= BIT STRING {
+ reserved(0),
+ hide-client-names(1),
+ kdc-follow-referrals(16)
+} (SIZE (32..MAX)) -- KerberosFlags
+
+PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
+ armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
+ ...
+}
+
+EncryptedKrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
+ enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedKrbFastResponse, -- KrbFastResponse --
+ -- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
+ -- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
+ ...
+}
+
+KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ padata [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
+ -- padata typed holes.
+ strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+ -- This, if present, strengthens the reply key for AS and
+ -- TGS. MUST be present for TGS
+ -- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
+ finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
+ -- Present in AS or TGS reply; absent otherwise.
+ nonce [3] UInt32,
+ -- Nonce from the client request.
+ ...
+}
+
+KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
+ timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
+ usec [1] Microseconds,
+ -- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
+ -- the reply was generated.
+ crealm [2] Realm,
+ cname [3] PrincipalName,
+ -- Contains the client realm and the client name.
+ ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
+ -- checksum of the ticket in the KDC-REP using the armor
+ -- and the key usage is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISH.
+ -- The checksum type is the required checksum type
+ -- of the armor key.
+ ...
+}
+
+EncryptedChallenge ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+ -- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
+ -- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
+ -- client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
+
+END
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/SPAKE.asn b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/SPAKE.asn
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0c0d998d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/SPAKE.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+-- Adapted from
+-- https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-kitten-krb-spake-preauth-09.txt
+-- Appendix A.
+
+-- Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the
+-- code. All rights reserved.
+--
+-- Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+-- modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms
+-- contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the
+-- IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
+-- (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
+
+KerberosV5SPAKE {
+ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) spake(8)
+} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
+
+IMPORTS
+ EncryptedData, Int32
+ FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4)
+ krb5spec2(2) };
+ -- as defined in RFC 4120.
+
+EncryptedSpakeData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+EncryptedSpakeResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ etype [0] ENCTYPE -- EncryptionType --,
+ kvno [1] UInt32 OPTIONAL,
+ cipher [2] OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+}
+
+SPAKEGroup ::= INTEGER {
+ sPAKEGroup-edwards25519(1),
+ sPAKEGroup-P-256(2),
+ sPAKEGroup-P-384(3),
+ sPAKEGroup-P-521(4)
+}
+
+SPAKESecondFactorType ::= INTEGER {
+ sPAKESecondFactor-SF-NONE(1)
+}
+
+SPAKESupport ::= SEQUENCE {
+ groups [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SPAKEGroup,
+ ...
+}
+
+SPAKEChallenge ::= SEQUENCE {
+ group [0] SPAKEGroup,
+ pubkey [1] OCTET STRING,
+ factors [2] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SPAKESecondFactor,
+ ...
+}
+
+SPAKESecondFactor ::= SEQUENCE {
+ type [0] SPAKESecondFactorType,
+ data [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+}
+
+SPAKEResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
+ pubkey [0] OCTET STRING,
+ factor [1] EncryptedSpakeResponseData, -- SPAKESecondFactor
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-SPAKE ::= CHOICE {
+ support [0] SPAKESupport,
+ challenge [1] SPAKEChallenge,
+ response [2] SPAKEResponse,
+ encdata [3] EncryptedSpakeData,
+ ...
+}
+
+-- PA-SPAKE-HINT ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- groups [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF Int32,
+-- factors [1] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF SPAKESecondFactor
+-- }
+
+END
+
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/k5.asn b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/k5.asn
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1eb9120a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/k5.asn
@@ -0,0 +1,891 @@
+-- Extracted from http://www.h5l.org/dist/src/heimdal-1.2.tar.gz
+-- Id: k5.asn1 22745 2008-03-24 12:07:54Z lha $
+-- Commented out stuff already in KerberosV5Spec2.asn
+KERBEROS5 DEFINITIONS ::=
+BEGIN
+
+NAME-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ kRB5-NT-UNKNOWN(0), -- Name type not known
+ kRB5-NT-PRINCIPAL(1), -- Just the name of the principal as in
+ kRB5-NT-SRV-INST(2), -- Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
+ kRB5-NT-SRV-HST(3), -- Service with host name as instance
+ kRB5-NT-SRV-XHST(4), -- Service with host as remaining components
+ kRB5-NT-UID(5), -- Unique ID
+ kRB5-NT-X500-PRINCIPAL(6), -- PKINIT
+ kRB5-NT-SMTP-NAME(7), -- Name in form of SMTP email name
+ kRB5-NT-ENTERPRISE-PRINCIPAL(10), -- Windows 2000 UPN
+ kRB5-NT-WELLKNOWN(11), -- Wellknown
+ kRB5-NT-SRV-HST-DOMAIN(12), -- Domain based service with host name as instance (RFC5179)
+ kRB5-NT-ENT-PRINCIPAL-AND-ID(-130), -- Windows 2000 UPN and SID
+ kRB5-NT-MS-PRINCIPAL(-128), -- NT 4 style name
+ kRB5-NT-MS-PRINCIPAL-AND-ID(-129), -- NT style name and SID
+ kRB5-NT-NTLM(-1200), -- NTLM name, realm is domain
+ kRB5-NT-X509-GENERAL-NAME(-1201), -- x509 general name (base64 encoded)
+ kRB5-NT-GSS-HOSTBASED-SERVICE(-1202), -- not used; remove
+ kRB5-NT-CACHE-UUID(-1203), -- name is actually a uuid pointing to ccache, use client name in cache
+ kRB5-NT-SRV-HST-NEEDS-CANON (-195894762) -- Internal: indicates that name canonicalization is needed
+}
+
+-- message types
+
+MESSAGE-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ krb-as-req(10), -- Request for initial authentication
+ krb-as-rep(11), -- Response to KRB_AS_REQ request
+ krb-tgs-req(12), -- Request for authentication based on TGT
+ krb-tgs-rep(13), -- Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request
+ krb-ap-req(14), -- application request to server
+ krb-ap-rep(15), -- Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL
+ krb-tgt-req(16), -- TGT-REQ used in U2U
+ krb-tgt-rep(17), -- TGT-REP used in U2U
+ krb-safe(20), -- Safe (checksummed) application message
+ krb-priv(21), -- Private (encrypted) application message
+ krb-cred(22), -- Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials
+ krb-error(30) -- Error response
+}
+
+
+-- pa-data types
+
+
+PADATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ pA-NONE(0),
+ pA-TGS-REQ(1), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-ENC-TIMESTAMP(2), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-PW-SALT(3), -- [RFC4120]
+ -- [reserved](4), -- -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-ENC-UNIX-TIME(5), -- (deprecated) [RFC4120]
+ pA-SANDIA-SECUREID(6), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-SESAME(7), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-OSF-DCE(8), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID(9), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-AFS3-SALT(10), -- [RFC4120] [RFC3961]
+ pA-ETYPE-INFO(11), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-SAM-CHALLENGE(12), -- [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-SAM-RESPONSE(13), -- [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-PK-AS-REQ-19(14), -- [PK-INIT-1999]
+ pA-PK-AS-REP-19(15), -- [PK-INIT-1999]
+ pA-PK-AS-REQ(16), -- [RFC4556]
+ pA-PK-AS-REP(17), -- [RFC4556]
+ pA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE(18), -- [RFC4557]
+ pA-ETYPE-INFO2(19), -- [RFC4120]
+ pA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO(20), -- [RFC4120]
+-- pA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO(20), -- -- [REFERRALS]
+ pA-SAM-REDIRECT(21), -- [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA(22), -- (embedded in typed data) [RFC4120]
+ tD-PADATA(22), -- (embeds padata) [RFC4120]
+ pA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO(23), -- (sam/otp) [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-ALT-PRINC(24), -- (crawdad@fnal.gov) [HW-AUTH]
+ pA-SERVER-REFERRAL(25), -- [REFERRALS]
+ pA-SAM-CHALLENGE2(30), -- (kenh@pobox.com) [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-SAM-RESPONSE2(31), -- (kenh@pobox.com) [KRB-WG.SAM]
+ pA-EXTRA-TGT(41), -- Reserved extra TGT [RFC6113]
+-- pA-FX-FAST-ARMOR(71), -- -- fast armor
+ tD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES(101),-- CertificateSet from CMS
+ tD-KRB-PRINCIPAL(102), -- PrincipalName
+ tD-KRB-REALM(103), -- Realm
+ tD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS(104), -- [RFC4556]
+ tD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX(105), -- [RFC4556]
+ tD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR(106), -- Application specific [RFC6113]
+ tD-REQ-NONCE(107), -- INTEGER [RFC6113]
+ tD-REQ-SEQ(108), -- INTEGER [RFC6113]
+ tD-DH-PARAMETERS(109), -- [RFC4556]
+ tD-CMS-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS(111), -- [ALG-AGILITY]
+ tD-CERT-DIGEST-ALGORITHMS(112), -- [ALG-AGILITY]
+ pA-PAC-REQUEST(128), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-FOR-USER(129), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-FOR-X509-USER(130), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-FOR-CHECK-DUPS(131), -- [MS-KILE]
+-- pA-AS-CHECKSUM(132), -- -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-PK-AS-09-BINDING(132), -- client send this to
+ -- tell KDC that is supports
+ -- the asCheckSum in the
+ -- PK-AS-REP
+ pA-FX-COOKIE(133), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-AUTHENTICATION-SET(134), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED(135), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-FX-FAST(136), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-FX-ERROR(137), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE(138), -- [RFC6113]
+ pA-OTP-CHALLENGE(141), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com) [OTP-PREAUTH]
+ pA-OTP-REQUEST(142), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com) [OTP-PREAUTH]
+ pA-OTP-CONFIRM(143), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com) [OTP-PREAUTH]
+ pA-OTP-PIN-CHANGE(144), -- (gareth.richards@rsa.com) [OTP-PREAUTH]
+ pA-EPAK-AS-REQ(145), -- (sshock@gmail.com) [RFC6113]
+ pA-EPAK-AS-REP(146), -- (sshock@gmail.com) [RFC6113]
+ pA-PKINIT-KX(147), -- [RFC6112]
+ pA-PKU2U-NAME(148), -- [PKU2U]
+ pA-REQ-ENC-PA-REP(149), -- [RFC6806]
+ pA-AS-FRESHNESS(150), -- [RFC8070]
+ pA-SPAKE(151), -- draft-ietf-kitten-krb-spake-preauth-09
+ pA-REDHAT-IDP-OAUTH2(152), -- (pbrezina@redhat.com)
+ pA-REDHAT-PASSKEY(153), -- (pbrezina@redhat.com)
+ pA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ(161), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP(162), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES(165), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-EXTENDED-ERROR(166), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-PAC-OPTIONS(167), -- [MS-KILE]
+ pA-PROV-SRV-LOCATION(-1) -- 0xffffffff (gint32)0xFF) packetcable stuff
+}
+
+AUTHDATA-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ aD-IF-RELEVANT(1),
+ aD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER(2),
+ aD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS(3),
+ aD-KDC-ISSUED(4),
+ aD-AND-OR(5),
+ aD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(6),
+ aD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS(7),
+ aD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC(8),
+ aD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS(9),
+ aD-OSF-DCE(64),
+ aD-SESAME(65),
+ aD-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID(66),
+ aD-authentication-strength(70), -- [RFC6113]
+ aD-fx-fast-armor(71), -- [RFC6113]
+ aD-fx-fast-used(72), -- [RFC6113]
+ aD-WIN2K-PAC(128), -- [RFC4120] [MS-PAC]
+ aD-GSS-API-ETYPE-NEGOTIATION(129), -- Authenticator only
+ aD-TOKEN-RESTRICTIONS(141), -- [MS-KILE]
+ aD-LOCAL(142), -- [MS-KILE]
+ aD-AP-OPTIONS(143), -- [MS-KILE]
+ aD-TARGET-PRINCIPAL(144), -- [MS-KILE]
+ aD-SIGNTICKET-OLDER(-17),
+ -- aD-SIGNTICKET-OLD(142),
+ aD-SIGNTICKET(512)
+}
+
+-- checksumtypes
+
+CKSUMTYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ cKSUMTYPE-NONE(0),
+ cKSUMTYPE-CRC32(1),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD4(2),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD4-DES(3),
+ cKSUMTYPE-DES-MAC(4),
+ cKSUMTYPE-DES-MAC-K(5),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD4-DES-K(6),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD5(7),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD5-DES(8),
+ cKSUMTYPE-RSA-MD5-DES3(9),
+ cKSUMTYPE-SHA1-OTHER(10),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA1-DES3-KD(12),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA1-DES3(13),
+ cKSUMTYPE-SHA1(14),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA1-96-AES-128(15),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA1-96-AES-256(16),
+ cKSUMTYPE-CMAC-CAMELLIA128(17),
+ cKSUMTYPE-CMAC-CAMELLIA256(18),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA256-128-AES128(19),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-SHA384-192-AES256(20),
+ cKSUMTYPE-GSSAPI(--0x8003--32771),
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-MD5(-138), -- unofficial microsoft number
+ cKSUMTYPE-HMAC-MD5-ENC(-1138) -- even more unofficial
+}
+
+--enctypes https://www.iana.org/assignments/kerberos-parameters/kerberos-parameters.xhtml#kerberos-parameters-1
+ENCTYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ eTYPE-NULL(0),
+ eTYPE-DES-CBC-CRC(1),
+ eTYPE-DES-CBC-MD4(2),
+ eTYPE-DES-CBC-MD5(3),
+ eTYPE-DES3-CBC-MD5(5),
+ eTYPE-OLD-DES3-CBC-SHA1(7),
+ eTYPE-SIGN-DSA-GENERATE(8),
+ eTYPE-DSA-SHA1(9),
+ eTYPE-RSA-MD5(10),
+ eTYPE-RSA-SHA1(11),
+ eTYPE-RC2-CBC(12),
+ eTYPE-RSA(13),
+ eTYPE-RSAES-OAEP(14),
+ eTYPE-DES-EDE3-CBC(15),
+ eTYPE-DES3-CBC-SHA1(16), -- with key derivation
+ eTYPE-AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96(17),
+ eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96(18),
+ eTYPE-AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA256-128(19), -- RFC 8009
+ eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA384-192(20), -- RFC 8009
+ eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5(23),
+ eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5-56(24),
+ eTYPE-CAMELLIA128-CTS-CMAC(25),
+ eTYPE-CAMELLIA256-CTS-CMAC(26),
+ eTYPE-ENCTYPE-PK-CROSS(48),
+-- some "old" windows types
+ eTYPE-ARCFOUR-MD4(-128),
+ eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-OLD(-133),
+ eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-OLD-EXP(-135),
+-- these are for Heimdal internal use
+-- eTYPE-DES-CBC-NONE(-0x1000),
+ eTYPE-DES-CBC-NONE( -4096),
+-- eTYPE-DES3-CBC-NONE(-0x1001),
+ eTYPE-DES3-CBC-NONE(-4097),
+-- eTYPE-DES-CFB64-NONE(-0x1002),
+ eTYPE-DES-CFB64-NONE(-4098),
+-- eTYPE-DES-PCBC-NONE(-0x1003),
+ eTYPE-DES-PCBC-NONE(-4099),
+-- eTYPE-DIGEST-MD5-NONE(-0x1004), - - private use, lukeh@padl.com
+ eTYPE-DIGEST-MD5-NONE(-4100), -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
+-- eTYPE-CRAM-MD5-NONE(-0x1005) - - private use, lukeh@padl.com
+ eTYPE-CRAM-MD5-NONE(-4101) -- private use, lukeh@padl.com
+}
+
+-- addr-types (WS extension )
+ADDR-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ iPv4(2),
+ cHAOS(5),
+ xEROX(6),
+ iSO(7),
+ dECNET(12),
+ aPPLETALK(16),
+ nETBIOS(20),
+ iPv6(24)
+}
+
+-- error-codes (WS extension)
+ERROR-CODE ::= INTEGER {
+--error table constants
+ eRR-NONE(0),
+ eRR-NAME-EXP(1),
+ eRR-SERVICE-EXP(2),
+ eRR-BAD-PVNO(3),
+ eRR-C-OLD-MAST-KVNO(4),
+ eRR-S-OLD-MAST-KVNO(5),
+ eRR-C-PRINCIPAL-UNKNOWN(6),
+ eRR-S-PRINCIPAL-UNKNOWN(7),
+ eRR-PRINCIPAL-NOT-UNIQUE(8),
+ eRR-NULL-KEY(9),
+ eRR-CANNOT-POSTDATE(10),
+ eRR-NEVER-VALID(11),
+ eRR-POLICY(12),
+ eRR-BADOPTION(13),
+ eRR-ETYPE-NOSUPP(14),
+ eRR-SUMTYPE-NOSUPP(15),
+ eRR-PADATA-TYPE-NOSUPP(16),
+ eRR-TRTYPE-NOSUPP(17),
+ eRR-CLIENT-REVOKED(18),
+ eRR-SERVICE-REVOKED(19),
+ eRR-TGT-REVOKED(20),
+ eRR-CLIENT-NOTYET(21),
+ eRR-SERVICE-NOTYET(22),
+ eRR-KEY-EXP(23),
+ eRR-PREAUTH-FAILED(24),
+ eRR-PREAUTH-REQUIRED(25),
+ eRR-SERVER-NOMATCH(26),
+ eRR-MUST-USE-USER2USER(27),
+ eRR-PATH-NOT-ACCEPTED(28),
+ eRR-SVC-UNAVAILABLE(29),
+ eRR-BAD-INTEGRITY(31),
+ eRR-TKT-EXPIRED(32),
+ eRR-TKT-NYV(33),
+ eRR-REPEAT(34),
+ eRR-NOT-US(35),
+ eRR-BADMATCH(36),
+ eRR-SKEW(37),
+ eRR-BADADDR(38),
+ eRR-BADVERSION(39),
+ eRR-MSG-TYPE(40),
+ eRR-MODIFIED(41),
+ eRR-BADORDER(42),
+ eRR-ILL-CR-TKT(43),
+ eRR-BADKEYVER(44),
+ eRR-NOKEY(45),
+ eRR-MUT-FAIL(46),
+ eRR-BADDIRECTION(47),
+ eRR-METHOD(48),
+ eRR-BADSEQ(49),
+ eRR-INAPP-CKSUM(50),
+ pATH-NOT-ACCEPTED(51),
+ eRR-RESPONSE-TOO-BIG(52),
+ eRR-GENERIC(60),
+ eRR-FIELD-TOOLONG(61),
+ eRROR-CLIENT-NOT-TRUSTED(62),
+ eRROR-KDC-NOT-TRUSTED(63),
+ eRROR-INVALID-SIG(64),
+ eRR-KEY-TOO-WEAK(65),
+ eRR-CERTIFICATE-MISMATCH(66),
+ eRR-NO-TGT(67),
+ eRR-WRONG-REALM(68),
+ eRR-USER-TO-USER-REQUIRED(69),
+ eRR-CANT-VERIFY-CERTIFICATE(70),
+ eRR-INVALID-CERTIFICATE(71),
+ eRR-REVOKED-CERTIFICATE(72),
+ eRR-REVOCATION-STATUS-UNKNOWN(73),
+ eRR-REVOCATION-STATUS-UNAVAILABLE(74),
+ eRR-CLIENT-NAME-MISMATCH(75),
+ eRR-KDC-NAME-MISMATCH(76)
+}
+
+-- this is sugar to make something ASN1 does not have: unsigned
+
+Krb5uint32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
+Krb5int32 ::= INTEGER (-2147483648..2147483647)
+
+--KerberosString ::= GeneralString
+
+--Realm ::= GeneralString
+--PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- name-type[0] NAME-TYPE,
+-- name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString
+--}
+
+-- this is not part of RFC1510
+Principal ::= SEQUENCE {
+ name[0] PrincipalName,
+ realm[1] Realm
+}
+
+--HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- addr-type [0] Krb5int32,
+-- address [1] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+-- This is from RFC1510.
+--
+-- HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+-- addr-type[0] Krb5int32,
+-- address[1] OCTET STRING
+-- }
+
+-- This seems much better.
+--HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
+
+
+--KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime - - Specifying UTC time zone (Z)
+
+--AuthorizationDataElement ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- ad-type[0] Krb5int32,
+-- ad-data[1] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+--AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF AuthorizationDataElement
+
+APOptions ::= BIT STRING {
+ reserved(0),
+ use-session-key(1),
+ mutual-required(2)
+}
+
+TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING {
+ reserved(0),
+ forwardable(1),
+ forwarded(2),
+ proxiable(3),
+ proxy(4),
+ may-postdate(5),
+ postdated(6),
+ invalid(7),
+ renewable(8),
+ initial(9),
+ pre-authent(10),
+ hw-authent(11),
+ transited-policy-checked(12),
+ ok-as-delegate(13),
+ unused(14),
+ enc-pa-rep(15),
+ anonymous(16)
+}
+
+KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING {
+ reserved(0),
+ forwardable(1),
+ forwarded(2),
+ proxiable(3),
+ proxy(4),
+ allow-postdate(5),
+ postdated(6),
+ unused7(7),
+ renewable(8),
+ unused9(9),
+ unused10(10),
+ opt-hardware-auth(11), -- taken from KerberosV5Spec2.asn
+ unused12(12),
+ unused13(13),
+ constrained-delegation(14), -- ms extension (aka cname-in-addl-tkt)
+ canonicalize(15),
+ request-anonymous(16),
+ unused17(17),
+ unused18(18),
+ unused19(19),
+ unused20(20),
+ unused21(21),
+ unused22(22),
+ unused23(23),
+ unused24(24),
+ unused25(25),
+ disable-transited-check(26),
+ renewable-ok(27),
+ enc-tkt-in-skey(28),
+ unused29(29),
+ renew(30),
+ validate(31)
+}
+
+LR-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ lR-NONE(0), -- no information
+ lR-INITIAL-TGT(1), -- last initial TGT request
+ lR-INITIAL(2), -- last initial request
+ lR-ISSUE-USE-TGT(3), -- time of newest TGT used
+ lR-RENEWAL(4), -- time of last renewal
+ lR-REQUEST(5), -- time of last request (of any type)
+ lR-PW-EXPTIME(6), -- expiration time of password
+ lR-ACCT-EXPTIME(7) -- expiration time of account
+}
+
+--LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+-- lr-type[0] LR-TYPE,
+-- lr-value[1] KerberosTime
+--}
+
+
+--EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype[0] ENCTYPE, - - EncryptionType
+-- kvno[1] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- cipher[2] OCTET STRING - - ciphertext
+--}
+
+--EncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- keytype[0] Krb5int32,
+-- keyvalue[1] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+-- encoded Transited field
+--TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- tr-type[0] Krb5int32, - - must be registered
+-- contents[1] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+--Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
+-- tkt-vno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- realm[1] Realm,
+-- sname[2] PrincipalName,
+-- enc-part[3] EncryptedData
+--}
+-- Encrypted part of ticket
+--EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE {
+-- flags[0] TicketFlags,
+-- key[1] EncryptionKey,
+-- crealm[2] Realm,
+-- cname[3] PrincipalName,
+-- transited[4] TransitedEncoding,
+-- authtime[5] KerberosTime,
+-- starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- endtime[7] KerberosTime,
+-- renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+-- authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--Checksum ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- cksumtype[0] CKSUMTYPE,
+-- checksum[1] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+--Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
+-- authenticator-vno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- crealm[1] Realm,
+-- cname[2] PrincipalName,
+-- cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL,
+-- cusec[4] Krb5int32,
+-- ctime[5] KerberosTime,
+-- subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+-- seq-number[7] Krb5uint32 OPTIONAL,
+-- authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
+ -- might be encoded AP-REQ
+-- padata-type[1] PADATA-TYPE,
+-- padata-value[2] OCTET STRING
+--}
+
+--ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype[0] ENCTYPE,
+-- salt[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+-- salttype[2] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--ETYPE-INFO ::= SEQUENCE OF ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY
+
+--ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- etype[0] ENCTYPE,
+-- salt[1] KerberosString OPTIONAL,
+-- s2kparams[2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--ETYPE-INFO2 ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY
+
+-- METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA
+
+--TypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- data-type[0] Krb5int32,
+-- data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TypedData
+
+--KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- kdc-options[0] KDCOptions,
+-- cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, - - Used only in AS-REQ
+-- realm[2] Realm, - - Server's realm
+ -- Also client's in AS-REQ
+-- sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+-- from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- nonce[7] Krb5int32,
+-- etype[8] SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE, - - EncryptionType,
+ -- in preference order
+-- addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+-- enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
+ -- Encrypted AuthorizationData encoding
+-- additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[1] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[2] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- padata[3] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
+-- req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY
+--}
+
+--AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ
+--TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ
+
+-- padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP
+-- padata-value ::= EncryptedData - PA-ENC-TS-ENC
+
+--PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, - - client's time
+-- pausec[1] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+-- WS put extensions found elsewhere here
+-- draft-brezak-win2k-krb-authz-01
+-- MS-KILE: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile
+-- MS-SFU: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu
+PA-PAC-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {
+ include-pac[0] BOOLEAN -- Indicates whether a PAC
+ -- should be included or not
+}
+
+-- PacketCable provisioning server location, PKT-SP-SEC-I09-030728.pdf
+PROV-SRV-LOCATION ::= GeneralString
+
+--KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- padata[2] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL,
+-- crealm[3] Realm,
+-- cname[4] PrincipalName,
+-- ticket[5] Ticket,
+-- enc-part[6] EncryptedData
+--}
+
+--AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP
+--TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP
+
+--EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- key[0] EncryptionKey,
+-- last-req[1] LastReq,
+-- nonce[2] Krb5int32,
+-- key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- flags[4] TicketFlags,
+-- authtime[5] KerberosTime,
+-- starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- endtime[7] KerberosTime,
+-- renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- srealm[9] Realm,
+-- sname[10] PrincipalName,
+-- caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
+-- encrypted-pa-data[12] METHOD-DATA OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25] EncKDCRepPart
+--EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
+
+--AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- ap-options[2] APOptions,
+-- ticket[3] Ticket,
+-- authenticator[4] EncryptedData
+--}
+
+--AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- enc-part[2] EncryptedData
+--}
+
+--EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27] SEQUENCE {
+-- ctime[0] KerberosTime,
+-- cusec[1] Krb5int32,
+-- subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+-- seq-number[3] Krb5uint32 OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
+-- timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- usec[2] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- seq-number[3] Krb5uint32 OPTIONAL,
+-- s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
+-- r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
+-- cksum[3] Checksum
+--}
+
+--KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- enc-part[3] EncryptedData
+--}
+--EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28] SEQUENCE {
+-- user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
+-- timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- usec[2] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- seq-number[3] Krb5uint32 OPTIONAL,
+-- s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, - - sender's addr
+-- r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL - - recip's addr
+--}
+
+--KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE, - - KRB_CRED
+-- tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
+-- enc-part[3] EncryptedData
+--}
+
+--KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- key[0] EncryptionKey,
+-- prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
+-- pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+-- flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
+-- authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL,
+-- sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+-- caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
+-- ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
+-- nonce[1] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- usec[3] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
+-- r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+--KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE {
+-- pvno[0] Krb5int32,
+-- msg-type[1] MESSAGE-TYPE,
+-- ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+-- cusec[3] Krb5int32 OPTIONAL,
+-- stime[4] KerberosTime,
+-- susec[5] Krb5int32,
+-- error-code[6] Krb5int32,
+-- crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL,
+-- cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+-- realm[9] Realm, - - Correct realm
+-- sname[10] PrincipalName, - - Correct name
+-- e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+-- e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
+--}
+
+ChangePasswdDataMS ::= SEQUENCE {
+ newpasswd[0] OCTET STRING,
+ targname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ targrealm[2] Realm OPTIONAL
+}
+
+EtypeList ::= SEQUENCE OF Krb5int32
+ -- the client's proposed enctype list in
+ -- decreasing preference order, favorite choice first
+
+--krb5-pvno Krb5int32 ::= 5 - - current Kerberos protocol version number
+
+-- transited encodings
+
+--DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS Krb5int32 ::= 1
+
+-- authorization data primitives
+
+--AD-IF-RELEVANT ::= AuthorizationData
+
+--AD-KDCIssued ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- ad-checksum[0] Checksum,
+-- i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
+-- i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+-- elements[3] AuthorizationData
+--}
+
+--AD-AND-OR ::= SEQUENCE {
+-- condition-count[0] INTEGER,
+-- elements[1] AuthorizationData
+--}
+
+--AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC ::= AuthorizationData
+
+-- PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2/PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2
+
+PA-SAM-TYPE ::= INTEGER {
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-ENIGMA(1), -- Enigma Logic
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-DIGI-PATH(2), -- Digital Pathways
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-SKEY-K0(3), -- S/key where KDC has key 0
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-SKEY(4), -- Traditional S/Key
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-SECURID(5), -- Security Dynamics
+ pA-SAM-TYPE-CRYPTOCARD(6) -- CRYPTOCard
+}
+
+PA-SAM-REDIRECT ::= HostAddresses
+
+SAMFlags ::= BIT STRING {
+ use-sad-as-key(0),
+ send-encrypted-sad(1),
+ must-pk-encrypt-sad(2)
+}
+
+PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sam-type[0] Krb5int32,
+ sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
+ sam-type-name[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-track-id[3] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-challenge-label[4] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-challenge[5] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-response-prompt[6] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-pk-for-sad[7] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+ sam-nonce[8] Krb5int32,
+ sam-etype[9] Krb5int32,
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sam-body[0] PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY,
+ sam-cksum[1] SEQUENCE OF Checksum, -- (1..MAX)
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2 ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sam-type[0] Krb5int32,
+ sam-flags[1] SAMFlags,
+ sam-track-id[2] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ sam-enc-nonce-or-sad[3] EncryptedData, -- PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC
+ sam-nonce[4] Krb5int32,
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
+ sam-nonce[0] Krb5int32,
+ sam-sad[1] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
+ ...
+}
+
+PA-S4U2Self ::= SEQUENCE {
+ name[0] PrincipalName,
+ realm[1] Realm,
+ cksum[2] Checksum,
+ auth[3] GeneralString
+}
+
+PA-S4U-X509-USER::= SEQUENCE {
+ user-id[0] S4UUserID,
+ checksum[1] Checksum
+}
+
+S4UUserID ::= SEQUENCE {
+ nonce [0] UInt32, -- the nonce in KDC-REQ-BODY
+ cname [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL, -- Certificate mapping hints
+ crealm [2] Realm,
+ subject-certificate [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ options [4] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
+ ...
+}
+
+KRB5SignedPathPrincipals ::= SEQUENCE OF Principal
+
+-- never encoded on the wire, just used to checksum over
+KRB5SignedPathData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ encticket[0] EncTicketPart,
+ delegated[1] KRB5SignedPathPrincipals OPTIONAL
+}
+
+KRB5SignedPath ::= SEQUENCE {
+ -- DERcoded KRB5SignedPathData
+ -- krbtgt key (etype), KeyUsage = XXX
+ etype[0] ENCTYPE,
+ cksum[1] Checksum,
+ -- srvs delegated though
+ delegated[2] KRB5SignedPathPrincipals OPTIONAL
+}
+
+PA-ClientCanonicalizedNames ::= SEQUENCE{
+ requested-name [0] PrincipalName,
+ mapped-name [1] PrincipalName
+}
+
+PA-ClientCanonicalized ::= SEQUENCE {
+ names [0] PA-ClientCanonicalizedNames,
+ canon-checksum [1] Checksum
+}
+
+AD-LoginAlias ::= SEQUENCE { -- ad-type number TBD --
+ login-alias [0] PrincipalName,
+ checksum [1] Checksum
+}
+
+-- old ms referral
+PA-SvrReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ referred-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ referred-realm [0] Realm
+}
+
+PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA ::= EncryptedData
+
+PA-ServerReferralData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ referred-realm [0] Realm OPTIONAL,
+ true-principal-name [1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ requested-principal-name [2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
+ referral-valid-until [3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
+ ...
+}
+
+PAC-OPTIONS-FLAGS ::= BIT STRING {
+ claims(0),
+ branch-aware(1),
+ forward-to-full-dc(2),
+ resource-based-constrained-delegation(3)
+}
+
+PA-PAC-OPTIONS ::= SEQUENCE {
+ flags [0] PAC-OPTIONS-FLAGS
+}
+
+-- [MS-KILE]
+-- captures show that [UNIVERSAL 16] is required to parse it
+KERB-AD-RESTRICTION-ENTRY ::= [UNIVERSAL 16] SEQUENCE {
+ restriction-type [0] Int32,
+ restriction [1] OCTET STRING -- LSAP_TOKEN_INFO_INTEGRITY structure
+}
+
+-- [MS-KILE]
+
+-- Section 2.2.11
+PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REQ ::= SEQUENCE OF ENCTYPE
+
+-- Section 2.2.12
+
+-- This is EncryptionKey but we're redefining it so it's named
+PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP-Key ::= EncryptionKey
+
+PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP-Key
+
+
+END
+
+-- etags -r '/\([A-Za-z][-A-Za-z0-9]*\).*::=/\1/' k5.asn1
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fb7b92ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf
@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
+# kerberos.cnf
+# kerberos conformation file
+# Copyright 2008 Anders Broman
+
+#.EXPORTS
+ChangePasswdData
+Applications ONLY_ENUM
+TGT-REQ
+TGT-REP
+
+#.FIELD_RENAME
+Authenticator/_untag/subkey authenticator_subkey
+KDC-REQ-BODY/etype kDC-REQ-BODY_etype
+KRB-SAFE-BODY/user-data kRB-SAFE-BODY_user_data
+EncKrbPrivPart/user-data encKrbPrivPart_user_data
+EncryptedTicketData/cipher encryptedTicketData_cipher
+EncryptedAuthenticator/cipher encryptedAuthenticator_cipher
+EncryptedAuthorizationData/cipher encryptedAuthorizationData_cipher
+EncryptedKDCREPData/cipher encryptedKDCREPData_cipher
+PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/cipher pA-ENC-TIMESTAMP_cipher
+EncryptedAPREPData/cipher encryptedAPREPData_cipher
+EncryptedKrbPrivData/cipher encryptedKrbPrivData_cipher
+EncryptedKrbCredData/cipher encryptedKrbCredData_cipher
+EncryptedKrbFastReq/cipher encryptedKrbFastReq_cipher
+EncryptedKrbFastResponse/cipher encryptedKrbFastResponse_cipher
+EncryptedChallenge/cipher encryptedChallenge_cipher
+EncAPRepPart/_untag/subkey encAPRepPart_subkey
+EncTicketPart/_untag/key encTicketPart_key
+EncKDCRepPart/key encKDCRepPart_key
+KRB-CRED/_untag/enc-part kRB_CRED_enc_part
+KRB-PRIV/_untag/enc-part kRB_PRIV_enc_part
+KrbCredInfo/key krbCredInfo_key
+AP-REP/_untag/enc-part aP_REP_enc_part
+KDC-REP/enc-part kDC_REP_enc_part
+KDC-REP/padata rEP_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA
+KDC-REQ/padata rEQ_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA
+Ticket/_untag/enc-part ticket_enc_part
+ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY/salt info_salt
+ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY/salt info2_salt
+AP-REQ/_untag/authenticator authenticator_enc_part
+PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST/armored-data armored_data_request
+PA-FX-FAST-REPLY/armored-data armored_data_reply
+PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP/_item kerbKeyListRep_key
+
+#.FIELD_ATTR
+KDC-REQ-BODY/etype ABBREV=kdc-req-body.etype
+ETYPE-INFO-ENTRY/salt ABBREV=info_salt
+ETYPE-INFO2-ENTRY/salt ABBREV=info2_salt
+PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP/_item ABBREV=kerbKeyListRep.key NAME="key"
+
+#.OMIT_ASSIGNMENT
+AD-AND-OR
+AD-KDCIssued
+AD-LoginAlias
+AD-MANDATORY-FOR-KDC
+ChangePasswdDataMS
+EncryptedData
+EtypeList
+FastOptions
+KerberosFlags
+KrbFastFinished
+KrbFastResponse
+KrbFastReq
+KRB5SignedPath
+KRB5SignedPathData
+KRB5SignedPathPrincipals
+Krb5int32
+Krb5uint32
+PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET
+PA-ClientCanonicalized
+PA-ClientCanonicalizedNames
+PA-ENC-TS-ENC
+PA-ENC-SAM-RESPONSE-ENC
+PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2
+PA-SAM-CHALLENGE-2-BODY
+PA-SAM-REDIRECT
+PA-SAM-RESPONSE-2
+PA-SAM-TYPE
+PA-SERVER-REFERRAL-DATA
+PA-ServerReferralData
+PA-SvrReferralData
+Principal
+PROV-SRV-LOCATION
+SAMFlags
+TYPED-DATA
+
+#.NO_EMIT ONLY_VALS
+Applications
+PA-FX-FAST-REPLY
+PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST
+
+#.MAKE_DEFINES
+ADDR-TYPE TYPE_PREFIX
+Applications TYPE_PREFIX
+
+#.MAKE_ENUM
+PADATA-TYPE PROT_PREFIX UPPER_CASE
+AUTHDATA-TYPE PROT_PREFIX UPPER_CASE
+KrbFastArmorTypes PROT_PREFIX UPPER_CASE
+
+#.FN_BODY MESSAGE-TYPE VAL_PTR = &msgtype
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ guint32 msgtype;
+
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_FTR MESSAGE-TYPE
+ if (gbl_do_col_info) {
+ col_add_str(actx->pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ val_to_str(msgtype, krb5_msg_types,
+ "Unknown msg type %#x"));
+ }
+ gbl_do_col_info=FALSE;
+
+##if 0
+ /* append the application type to the tree */
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s", val_to_str(msgtype, krb5_msg_types, "Unknown:0x%x"));
+##endif
+ if (private_data->msg_type == 0) {
+ private_data->msg_type = msgtype;
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY ERROR-CODE VAL_PTR = &private_data->errorcode
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_FTR ERROR-CODE
+ if (private_data->errorcode) {
+ col_add_fstr(actx->pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ "KRB Error: %s",
+ val_to_str(private_data->errorcode, krb5_error_codes,
+ "Unknown error code %#x"));
+ }
+
+#.END
+#.FN_BODY KRB-ERROR/_untag/e-data
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ switch (private_data->errorcode) {
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION:
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED:
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP:
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY:
+ /* ms windows kdc sends e-data of this type containing a "salt"
+ * that contains the nt_status code for these error codes.
+ */
+ private_data->try_nt_status = TRUE;
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_kerberos_e_data, dissect_kerberos_PA_DATA);
+ break;
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED:
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED:
+ case KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP:
+ case KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM:
+ case KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED:
+ case KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED:
+ case KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET:
+ case KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_kerberos_e_data, dissect_kerberos_T_rEP_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA);
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_kerberos_e_data, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+
+
+#.FN_BODY PADATA-TYPE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->padata_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+#.FN_FTR PADATA-TYPE
+ if(tree){
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s",
+ val_to_str(private_data->padata_type, kerberos_PADATA_TYPE_vals,
+ "Unknown:%d"));
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY KDC-REQ/padata
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST saved_stack = private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST;
+
+ /*
+ * we need to defer calling dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST,
+ * see dissect_kerberos_defer_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST()
+ */
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST = (struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST) { .defer = TRUE, };
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ if (private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST.tvb != NULL) {
+ struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST used_stack = private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST;
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST = (struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST) { .defer = FALSE, };
+
+ /*
+ * dissect_kerberos_defer_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST() remembered
+ * a tvb, so replay dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST()
+ * here.
+ */
+ dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST(FALSE,
+ used_stack.tvb,
+ 0,
+ actx,
+ used_stack.tree,
+ -1);
+ }
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST = saved_stack;
+
+#.FN_BODY KDC-REP/padata
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY PA-DATA/padata-value
+ proto_tree *sub_tree=tree;
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ if(actx->created_item){
+ sub_tree=proto_item_add_subtree(actx->created_item, ett_kerberos_PA_DATA);
+ }
+
+ switch(private_data->padata_type){
+ case KERBEROS_PA_TGS_REQ:
+ private_data->within_PA_TGS_REQ++;
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_Applications);
+ private_data->within_PA_TGS_REQ--;
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PK_AS_REP_19:
+ private_data->is_win2k_pkinit = TRUE;
+ if (kerberos_private_is_kdc_req(private_data)) {
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_pkinit_PA_PK_AS_REQ_Win2k);
+ } else {
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_pkinit_PA_PK_AS_REP_Win2k);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PK_AS_REQ:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_pkinit_PaPkAsReq);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PK_AS_REP:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_pkinit_PaPkAsRep);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PAC_REQUEST:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_FOR_USER: /* S4U2SELF */
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_S4U2Self);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_FOR_X509_USER:
+ if(private_data->msg_type == KRB5_MSG_AS_REQ){
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_x509af_Certificate);
+ }else if(private_data->is_enc_padata){
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, NULL);
+ }else{
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_S4U_X509_USER);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PROV_SRV_LOCATION:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_krb5_PA_PROV_SRV_LOCATION);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_ETYPE_INFO:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_ETYPE_INFO);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_ETYPE_INFO2:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_ETYPE_INFO2);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PW_SALT:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_krb5_PW_SALT);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_AUTH_SET_SELECTED:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_ELEM);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_FX_FAST:
+ if (kerberos_private_is_kdc_req(private_data)) {
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_defer_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST);
+ }else{
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REPLY);
+ }
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_FX_ERROR:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_Applications);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_EncryptedChallenge);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REQ:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REQ);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REP:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REP);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_PAC_OPTIONS:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_PAC_OPTIONS);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_Checksum);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_PA_SPAKE:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_SPAKE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, sub_tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY HostAddress/address
+ gint8 appclass;
+ bool pc;
+ gint32 tag;
+ guint32 len;
+ const char *address_str;
+ proto_item *it=NULL;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ /* read header and len for the octet string */
+ offset=dissect_ber_identifier(actx->pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, &appclass, &pc, &tag);
+ offset=dissect_ber_length(actx->pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, &len, NULL);
+
+ switch(private_data->addr_type){
+ case KERBEROS_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4:
+ it=proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_address_ip, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
+ address_str = tvb_ip_to_str(actx->pinfo->pool, tvb, offset);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_ADDR_TYPE_NETBIOS:
+ {
+ char netbios_name[(NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1)*4 + 1];
+ int netbios_name_type;
+ int netbios_name_len = (NETBIOS_NAME_LEN - 1)*4 + 1;
+
+ netbios_name_type = process_netbios_name(tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, 16), netbios_name, netbios_name_len);
+ address_str = wmem_strdup_printf(actx->pinfo->pool, "%s<%02x>", netbios_name, netbios_name_type);
+ it=proto_tree_add_string_format(tree, hf_krb_address_netbios, tvb, offset, 16, netbios_name, "NetBIOS Name: %s (%s)", address_str, netbios_name_type_descr(netbios_name_type));
+ }
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6:
+ it=proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_address_ipv6, tvb, offset, INET6_ADDRLEN, ENC_NA);
+ address_str = tvb_ip6_to_str(actx->pinfo->pool, tvb, offset);
+ break;
+ default:
+ proto_tree_add_expert(tree, actx->pinfo, &ei_kerberos_address, tvb, offset, len);
+ address_str = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* push it up two levels in the decode pane */
+ if(it && address_str){
+ proto_item_append_text(proto_item_get_parent(it), " %s",address_str);
+ proto_item_append_text(proto_item_get_parent_nth(it, 2), " %s",address_str);
+ }
+
+ offset+=len;
+
+
+#.TYPE_ATTR
+#xxx TYPE = FT_UINT16 DISPLAY = BASE_DEC STRINGS = VALS(xx_vals)
+
+#.FN_BODY ENCTYPE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->etype)
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedTicketData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_ticket_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedAuthorizationData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_authorization_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedAuthenticator/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_authenticator_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedKDCREPData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_KDC_REP_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedAPREPData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_AP_REP_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedKrbPrivData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_PRIV_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedKrbCredData/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_CRED_data);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY CKSUMTYPE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->checksum_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY Checksum/checksum
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ switch(private_data->checksum_type){
+ case KRB5_CHKSUM_GSSAPI:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, &next_tvb);
+ dissect_krb5_rfc1964_checksum(actx, tree, next_tvb);
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptionKey/keytype VAL_PTR=&gbl_keytype
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ private_data->key_hidden_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_key_hidden_item,
+ tvb, 0, 0, ENC_NA);
+ if (private_data->key_hidden_item != NULL) {
+ proto_item_set_hidden(private_data->key_hidden_item);
+ }
+
+ offset = dissect_ber_integer(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index,
+ &gbl_keytype);
+ private_data->key.keytype = gbl_keytype;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptionKey/keyvalue VAL_PTR=&out_tvb
+ tvbuff_t *out_tvb;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+ private_data->key.keylength = tvb_reported_length(out_tvb);
+ private_data->key.keyvalue = tvb_get_ptr(out_tvb, 0, private_data->key.keylength);
+ private_data->key_tree = tree;
+ private_data->key_tvb = out_tvb;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptionKey
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ int start_offset = offset;
+##endif
+
+ %(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+ if (private_data->key.keytype != 0 && private_data->key.keylength > 0) {
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ int length = offset - start_offset;
+ private_data->last_added_key = NULL;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn(tvb, start_offset, length, actx, tree,
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index,
+ hf_index);
+ private_data->last_added_key = NULL;
+##endif
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY Authenticator/_untag/subkey
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_authenticator;
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_Authenticator_subkey;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncAPRepPart/_untag/subkey
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_encAPRepPart;
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_EncAPRepPart_subkey;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncKDCRepPart/key
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ switch (private_data->msg_type) {
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AS_REP:
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_encASRepPart;
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_TGS_REP:
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_encTGSRepPart;
+ break;
+ default:
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = -1;
+ }
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_EncKDCRepPart_key;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncTicketPart/_untag/key
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_encTicketPart;
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_EncTicketPart_key;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY KrbCredInfo/key
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_ticket_info_item;
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_KrbCredInfo_key;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY PA-KERB-KEY-LIST-REP/_item
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_kerbKeyListRep_key;
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_encryption_key;
+##endif
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+
+#.FN_BODY AUTHDATA-TYPE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->ad_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY AuthorizationData/_item/ad-data
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ switch(private_data->ad_type){
+ case KERBEROS_AD_WIN2K_PAC:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_AD_WIN2K_PAC);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_IF_RELEVANT:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_AD_IF_RELEVANT);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_AUTHENTICATION_STRENGTH:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_ELEM);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_GSS_API_ETYPE_NEGOTIATION:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_SEQUENCE_OF_ENCTYPE);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_TOKEN_RESTRICTIONS:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_KERB_AD_RESTRICTION_ENTRY);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_AP_OPTIONS:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_AD_AP_OPTIONS);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_AD_TARGET_PRINCIPAL:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_AD_TARGET_PRINCIPAL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY S4UUserID/subject-certificate
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,hf_index, dissect_x509af_Certificate);
+
+#.FN_BODY ADDR-TYPE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->addr_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY KDC-REQ-BODY
+ conversation_t *conversation;
+
+ /*
+ * UDP replies to KDC_REQs are sent from the server back to the client's
+ * source port, similar to the way TFTP works. Set up a conversation
+ * accordingly.
+ *
+ * Ref: Section 7.2.1 of
+ * http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-07.txt
+ */
+ if (actx->pinfo->destport == UDP_PORT_KERBEROS && actx->pinfo->ptype == PT_UDP) {
+ conversation = find_conversation(actx->pinfo->num, &actx->pinfo->src, &actx->pinfo->dst, CONVERSATION_UDP,
+ actx->pinfo->srcport, 0, NO_PORT_B);
+ if (conversation == NULL) {
+ conversation = conversation_new(actx->pinfo->num, &actx->pinfo->src, &actx->pinfo->dst, CONVERSATION_UDP,
+ actx->pinfo->srcport, 0, NO_PORT2);
+ conversation_set_dissector(conversation, kerberos_handle_udp);
+ }
+ }
+
+ %(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY KRB-SAFE-BODY/user-data
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, &new_tvb);
+ if (new_tvb) {
+ call_kerberos_callbacks(actx->pinfo, tree, new_tvb, KRB_CBTAG_SAFE_USER_DATA, private_data->callbacks);
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY EncKrbPrivPart/user-data
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, &new_tvb);
+ if (new_tvb) {
+ call_kerberos_callbacks(actx->pinfo, tree, new_tvb, KRB_CBTAG_PRIV_USER_DATA, private_data->callbacks);
+ }
+
+#.FN_HDR EncKDCRepPart/encrypted-pa-data
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ private_data->is_enc_padata = TRUE;
+
+#.FN_FTR EncKDCRepPart/encrypted-pa-data
+ private_data->is_enc_padata = FALSE;
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedKrbFastReq/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_KrbFastReq);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedKrbFastResponse/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_KrbFastResponse);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY EncryptedChallenge/cipher
+##ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(FALSE, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_krb5_decrypt_EncryptedChallenge);
+##else
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+##endif
+
+#.FN_BODY KrbFastArmorTypes VAL_PTR=&(private_data->fast_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+
+#.FN_BODY KrbFastArmor/armor-value
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ switch(private_data->fast_type){
+ case KERBEROS_FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST:
+ private_data->fast_armor_within_armor_value++;
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, dissect_kerberos_Applications);
+ private_data->fast_armor_within_armor_value--;
+ break;
+ default:
+ offset=dissect_ber_octet_string(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_index, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#.FN_BODY PA-SPAKE VAL_PTR=&(private_data->padata_type)
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+%(DEFAULT_BODY)s
+#.FN_FTR PA-SPAKE
+ if(tree){
+ proto_item_append_text(tree, " %s",
+ val_to_str(private_data->padata_type, kerberos_PA_SPAKE_vals,
+ "Unknown:%d"));
+ }
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..49646377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5451 @@
+/* packet-kerberos.c
+ * Routines for Kerberos
+ * Wes Hardaker (c) 2000
+ * wjhardaker@ucdavis.edu
+ * Richard Sharpe (C) 2002, rsharpe@samba.org, modularized a bit more and
+ * added AP-REQ and AP-REP dissection
+ *
+ * Ronnie Sahlberg (C) 2004, major rewrite for new ASN.1/BER API.
+ * decryption of kerberos blobs if keytab is provided
+ *
+ * See RFC 1510, and various I-Ds and other documents showing additions,
+ * e.g. ones listed under
+ *
+ * http://clifford.neuman.name/krb-revisions/
+ *
+ * and
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-07
+ *
+ * and
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-05
+ *
+ * Some structures from RFC2630
+ *
+ * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+ * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some of the development of the Kerberos protocol decoder was sponsored by
+ * Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. ("CableLabs") based upon proprietary
+ * CableLabs' specifications. Your license and use of this protocol decoder
+ * does not mean that you are licensed to use the CableLabs'
+ * specifications. If you have questions about this protocol, contact
+ * jf.mule [AT] cablelabs.com or c.stuart [AT] cablelabs.com for additional
+ * information.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+// krb5.h needs to be included before the defines in packet-kerberos.h
+#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
+#ifdef _WIN32
+/* prevent redefinition warnings in krb5's win-mac.h */
+#define SSIZE_T_DEFINED
+#endif /* _WIN32 */
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <epan/packet.h>
+#include <epan/exceptions.h>
+#include <epan/strutil.h>
+#include <epan/conversation.h>
+#include <epan/asn1.h>
+#include <epan/expert.h>
+#include <epan/prefs.h>
+#include <wsutil/wsgcrypt.h>
+#include <wsutil/file_util.h>
+#include <wsutil/str_util.h>
+#include <wsutil/pint.h>
+#include "packet-kerberos.h"
+#include "packet-netbios.h"
+#include "packet-tcp.h"
+#include "packet-ber.h"
+#include "packet-pkinit.h"
+#include "packet-cms.h"
+#include "packet-windows-common.h"
+
+#include "read_keytab_file.h"
+
+#include "packet-dcerpc-netlogon.h"
+#include "packet-dcerpc.h"
+
+#include "packet-gssapi.h"
+#include "packet-x509af.h"
+
+#define KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM 50
+#define KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
+#define KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
+#define KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED 53
+#define KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
+#define KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
+
+void proto_register_kerberos(void);
+void proto_reg_handoff_kerberos(void);
+
+#define UDP_PORT_KERBEROS 88
+#define TCP_PORT_KERBEROS 88
+
+#define ADDRESS_STR_BUFSIZ 256
+
+typedef struct kerberos_key {
+ guint32 keytype;
+ int keylength;
+ const guint8 *keyvalue;
+} kerberos_key_t;
+
+typedef void (*kerberos_key_save_fn)(tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, int length _U_,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_,
+ int parent_hf_index _U_,
+ int hf_index _U_);
+
+typedef struct {
+ guint32 msg_type;
+ gboolean is_win2k_pkinit;
+ guint32 errorcode;
+ gboolean try_nt_status;
+ guint32 etype;
+ guint32 padata_type;
+ guint32 is_enc_padata;
+ guint32 enctype;
+ kerberos_key_t key;
+ proto_tree *key_tree;
+ proto_item *key_hidden_item;
+ tvbuff_t *key_tvb;
+ kerberos_callbacks *callbacks;
+ guint32 ad_type;
+ guint32 addr_type;
+ guint32 checksum_type;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ enc_key_t *last_decryption_key;
+ enc_key_t *last_added_key;
+ tvbuff_t *last_ticket_enc_part_tvb;
+#endif
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn save_encryption_key_fn;
+ guint learnt_key_ids;
+ guint missing_key_ids;
+ wmem_list_t *decryption_keys;
+ wmem_list_t *learnt_keys;
+ wmem_list_t *missing_keys;
+ guint32 within_PA_TGS_REQ;
+ struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST {
+ gboolean defer;
+ tvbuff_t *tvb;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ } PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ enc_key_t *PA_TGS_REQ_key;
+ enc_key_t *PA_TGS_REQ_subkey;
+#endif
+ guint32 fast_type;
+ guint32 fast_armor_within_armor_value;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ enc_key_t *PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_key;
+ enc_key_t *PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_subkey;
+ enc_key_t *fast_armor_key;
+ enc_key_t *fast_strengthen_key;
+#endif
+} kerberos_private_data_t;
+
+static dissector_handle_t kerberos_handle_tcp;
+static dissector_handle_t kerberos_handle_udp;
+
+/* Forward declarations */
+static int dissect_kerberos_Applications(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_AuthorizationData(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+#endif
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_PAC_REQUEST(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_S4U2Self(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_S4U_X509_USER(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_ETYPE_INFO(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_ETYPE_INFO2(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_AD_IF_RELEVANT(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_AUTHENTICATION_SET_ELEM(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_EncryptedChallenge(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REQ(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_KERB_KEY_LIST_REP(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REPLY(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_PAC_OPTIONS(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_KERB_AD_RESTRICTION_ENTRY(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_SEQUENCE_OF_ENCTYPE(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_PA_SPAKE(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static int dissect_kerberos_KrbFastReq(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_KrbFastResponse(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+static int dissect_kerberos_FastOptions(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_);
+#endif
+
+/* Desegment Kerberos over TCP messages */
+static gboolean krb_desegment = TRUE;
+
+static gint proto_kerberos = -1;
+
+static gint hf_krb_rm_reserved = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_rm_reclen = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_provsrv_location = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pw_salt = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ext_error_nt_status = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ext_error_reserved = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ext_error_flags = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_address_ip = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_address_netbios = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_address_ipv6 = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_bnd = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_dlgopt = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_dlglen = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_deleg = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_mutual = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_replay = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_sequence = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_conf = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_integ = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_dce_style = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_midl_version = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_midl_hdr_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_midl_fill_bytes = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_midl_blob_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_signature_type = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_signature_signature = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_w2k_pac_entries = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_w2k_pac_version = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_w2k_pac_type = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_w2k_pac_size = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_w2k_pac_offset = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_clientid = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_namelen = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_clientname = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_logon_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_credential_data = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_credential_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_credential_info_version = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_credential_info_etype = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_flags = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_upn_constructed = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_has_sam_name_and_sid = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_offset = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_name = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_offset = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_name = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_offset = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_offset = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_len = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_server_checksum = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_client_info_type = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_client_claims_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_device_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_device_claims_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_ticket_checksum = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_attributes_info = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_length = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_requested = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_given_implicitly = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pac_requester_sid = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_crc = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_md5 = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_rc4_hmac = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96 = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_fast_supported = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_compound_identity_supported = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_claims_supported = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_resource_sid_compression_disabled = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ad_ap_options = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ad_ap_options_cbt = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_ad_target_principal = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_key_hidden_item = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_MessageType = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_Flags = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicketLength = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicketLength = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicket = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicket = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_REDIRECTED = -1;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static gint hf_kerberos_KrbFastResponse = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_strengthen_key = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_finished = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_fast_options = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_ticket_checksum = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_patimestamp = -1;
+static gint hf_krb_pausec = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_reserved = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_hide_client_names = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit2 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit3 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit4 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit5 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit6 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit7 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit8 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit9 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit10 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit11 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit12 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit13 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit14 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit15 = -1;
+static gint hf_kerberos_FastOptions_kdc_follow_referrals = -1;
+
+#endif
+#include "packet-kerberos-hf.c"
+
+/* Initialize the subtree pointers */
+static gint ett_kerberos = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_recordmark = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_drep = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_midl_blob = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_logon_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_credential_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info_flags = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_device_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_server_checksum = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_client_info_type = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_ticket_checksum = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_attributes_info = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pac_requester_sid = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_pa_supported_enctypes = -1;
+static gint ett_krb_ad_ap_options = -1;
+static gint ett_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON = -1;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static gint ett_krb_pa_enc_ts_enc = -1;
+static gint ett_kerberos_KrbFastFinished = -1;
+static gint ett_kerberos_KrbFastResponse = -1;
+static gint ett_kerberos_KrbFastReq = -1;
+static gint ett_kerberos_FastOptions = -1;
+#endif
+#include "packet-kerberos-ett.c"
+
+static expert_field ei_kerberos_missing_keytype = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_kerberos_address = EI_INIT;
+static expert_field ei_krb_gssapi_dlglen = EI_INIT;
+
+static dissector_handle_t krb4_handle=NULL;
+
+/* Global variables */
+static guint32 gbl_keytype;
+static gboolean gbl_do_col_info;
+
+#include "packet-kerberos-val.h"
+
+static void
+call_kerberos_callbacks(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int tag, kerberos_callbacks *cb)
+{
+ if(!cb){
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while(cb->tag){
+ if(cb->tag==tag){
+ cb->callback(pinfo, tvb, tree);
+ return;
+ }
+ cb++;
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static kerberos_private_data_t*
+kerberos_new_private_data(packet_info *pinfo)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *p;
+
+ p = wmem_new0(pinfo->pool, kerberos_private_data_t);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p->decryption_keys = wmem_list_new(pinfo->pool);
+ p->learnt_keys = wmem_list_new(pinfo->pool);
+ p->missing_keys = wmem_list_new(pinfo->pool);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+static kerberos_private_data_t*
+kerberos_get_private_data(asn1_ctx_t *actx)
+{
+ if (!actx->private_data) {
+ actx->private_data = kerberos_new_private_data(actx->pinfo);
+ }
+ return (kerberos_private_data_t *)(actx->private_data);
+}
+
+static bool
+kerberos_private_is_kdc_req(kerberos_private_data_t *private_data)
+{
+ switch (private_data->msg_type) {
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AS_REQ:
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_TGS_REQ:
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+gboolean
+kerberos_is_win2k_pkinit(asn1_ctx_t *actx)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ return private_data->is_win2k_pkinit;
+}
+
+static int dissect_kerberos_defer_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t* private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ /*
+ * dissect_ber_octet_string_wcb() always passes
+ * implicit_tag=FALSE, offset=0 and hf_index=-1
+ *
+ * It means we only need to remember tvb and tree
+ * in order to replay dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST()
+ * in dissect_kerberos_T_rEQ_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA()
+ */
+ ws_assert(implicit_tag == FALSE);
+ ws_assert(offset == 0);
+ ws_assert(hf_index == -1);
+
+ if (private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST.defer) {
+ /*
+ * Remember the tvb (and the optional tree)
+ */
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST.tvb = tvb;
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST.tree = tree;
+ /*
+ * only handle the first PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST...
+ */
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST.defer = FALSE;
+ return tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ }
+
+ return dissect_kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST(implicit_tag, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_index);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+
+/* Decrypt Kerberos blobs */
+gboolean krb_decrypt = FALSE;
+
+/* keytab filename */
+static const char *keytab_filename = "";
+
+void
+read_keytab_file_from_preferences(void)
+{
+ static char *last_keytab = NULL;
+
+ if (!krb_decrypt) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (keytab_filename == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (last_keytab && !strcmp(last_keytab, keytab_filename)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ g_free(last_keytab);
+ last_keytab = g_strdup(keytab_filename);
+
+ read_keytab_file(last_keytab);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
+enc_key_t *enc_key_list=NULL;
+static guint kerberos_longterm_ids = 0;
+wmem_map_t *kerberos_longterm_keys = NULL;
+static wmem_map_t *kerberos_all_keys = NULL;
+static wmem_map_t *kerberos_app_session_keys = NULL;
+
+static bool
+enc_key_list_cb(wmem_allocator_t* allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data _U_)
+{
+ enc_key_list = NULL;
+ kerberos_longterm_ids = 0;
+ /* keep the callback registered */
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static gint enc_key_cmp_id(gconstpointer k1, gconstpointer k2)
+{
+ const enc_key_t *key1 = (const enc_key_t *)k1;
+ const enc_key_t *key2 = (const enc_key_t *)k2;
+
+ if (key1->fd_num < key2->fd_num) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (key1->fd_num > key2->fd_num) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (key1->id < key2->id) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (key1->id > key2->id) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static gboolean
+enc_key_content_equal(gconstpointer k1, gconstpointer k2)
+{
+ const enc_key_t *key1 = (const enc_key_t *)k1;
+ const enc_key_t *key2 = (const enc_key_t *)k2;
+ int cmp;
+
+ if (key1->keytype != key2->keytype) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (key1->keylength != key2->keylength) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ cmp = memcmp(key1->keyvalue, key2->keyvalue, key1->keylength);
+ if (cmp != 0) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+static guint
+enc_key_content_hash(gconstpointer k)
+{
+ const enc_key_t *key = (const enc_key_t *)k;
+ guint ret = 0;
+
+ ret += wmem_strong_hash((const guint8 *)&key->keytype,
+ sizeof(key->keytype));
+ ret += wmem_strong_hash((const guint8 *)&key->keylength,
+ sizeof(key->keylength));
+ ret += wmem_strong_hash((const guint8 *)key->keyvalue,
+ key->keylength);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+kerberos_key_map_insert(wmem_map_t *key_map, enc_key_t *new_key)
+{
+ enc_key_t *existing = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *cur = NULL;
+ gint cmp;
+
+ existing = (enc_key_t *)wmem_map_lookup(key_map, new_key);
+ if (existing == NULL) {
+ wmem_map_insert(key_map, new_key, new_key);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (key_map != kerberos_all_keys) {
+ /*
+ * It should already be linked to the existing key...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (existing->fd_num == -1 && new_key->fd_num != -1) {
+ /*
+ * We can't reference a learnt key
+ * from a longterm key. As they have
+ * a shorter lifetime.
+ *
+ * So just let the learnt key remember the
+ * match.
+ */
+ new_key->same_list = existing;
+ new_key->num_same = existing->num_same + 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If a key with the same content (keytype,keylength,keyvalue)
+ * already exists, we want the earliest key to be
+ * in the list.
+ */
+ cmp = enc_key_cmp_id(new_key, existing);
+ if (cmp == 0) {
+ /*
+ * It's the same, nothing to do...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (cmp < 0) {
+ /* The new key has should be added to the list. */
+ new_key->same_list = existing;
+ new_key->num_same = existing->num_same + 1;
+ wmem_map_insert(key_map, new_key, new_key);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We want to link the new_key to the existing one.
+ *
+ * But we want keep the list sorted, so we need to forward
+ * to the correct spot.
+ */
+ for (cur = existing; cur->same_list != NULL; cur = cur->same_list) {
+ cmp = enc_key_cmp_id(new_key, cur->same_list);
+ if (cmp == 0) {
+ /*
+ * It's the same, nothing to do...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cmp < 0) {
+ /*
+ * We found the correct spot,
+ * the new_key should added
+ * between existing and existing->same_list
+ */
+ new_key->same_list = cur->same_list;
+ new_key->num_same = cur->num_same;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * finally link new_key to existing
+ * and fix up the numbers
+ */
+ cur->same_list = new_key;
+ for (cur = existing; cur != new_key; cur = cur->same_list) {
+ cur->num_same += 1;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+struct insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_state {
+ wmem_map_t *key_map;
+};
+
+static void insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_cb(gpointer __key _U_,
+ gpointer value,
+ gpointer user_data)
+{
+ struct insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_state *state =
+ (struct insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_state *)user_data;
+ enc_key_t *key = (enc_key_t *)value;
+
+ kerberos_key_map_insert(state->key_map, key);
+}
+
+static void insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map(wmem_map_t *key_map)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because the kerberos_longterm_keys are allocated on
+ * wmem_epan_scope() and kerberos_all_keys are allocated
+ * on wmem_file_scope(), we need to plug the longterm keys
+ * back to kerberos_all_keys if a new file was loaded
+ * and wmem_file_scope() got cleared.
+ */
+ if (wmem_map_size(key_map) < wmem_map_size(kerberos_longterm_keys)) {
+ struct insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_state state = {
+ .key_map = key_map,
+ };
+ /*
+ * Reference all longterm keys into kerberos_all_keys
+ */
+ wmem_map_foreach(kerberos_longterm_keys,
+ insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map_cb,
+ &state);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+kerberos_key_list_append(wmem_list_t *key_list, enc_key_t *new_key)
+{
+ enc_key_t *existing = NULL;
+
+ existing = (enc_key_t *)wmem_list_find(key_list, new_key);
+ if (existing != NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ wmem_list_append(key_list, new_key);
+}
+
+static void
+add_encryption_key(packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ proto_tree *key_tree,
+ proto_item *key_hidden_item,
+ tvbuff_t *key_tvb,
+ int keytype, int keylength, const char *keyvalue,
+ const char *origin,
+ enc_key_t *src1, enc_key_t *src2)
+{
+ wmem_allocator_t *key_scope = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *new_key = NULL;
+ const char *methodl = "learnt";
+ const char *methodu = "Learnt";
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+
+ private_data->last_added_key = NULL;
+
+ if (src1 != NULL && src2 != NULL) {
+ methodl = "derived";
+ methodu = "Derived";
+ }
+
+ if(pinfo->fd->visited){
+ /*
+ * We already processed this,
+ * we can use a shortterm scope
+ */
+ key_scope = pinfo->pool;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * As long as we have enc_key_list, we need to
+ * use wmem_epan_scope(), when that's gone
+ * we can dynamically select the scope based on
+ * how long we'll need the particular key.
+ */
+ key_scope = wmem_epan_scope();
+ }
+
+ new_key = wmem_new0(key_scope, enc_key_t);
+ snprintf(new_key->key_origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "%s %s in frame %u",
+ methodl, origin, pinfo->num);
+ new_key->fd_num = pinfo->num;
+ new_key->id = ++private_data->learnt_key_ids;
+ snprintf(new_key->id_str, KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN, "%d.%u",
+ new_key->fd_num, new_key->id);
+ new_key->keytype=keytype;
+ new_key->keylength=keylength;
+ memcpy(new_key->keyvalue, keyvalue, MIN(keylength, KRB_MAX_KEY_LENGTH));
+ new_key->src1 = src1;
+ new_key->src2 = src2;
+
+ if(!pinfo->fd->visited){
+ /*
+ * Only keep it if we don't processed it before.
+ */
+ new_key->next=enc_key_list;
+ enc_key_list=new_key;
+ insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map(kerberos_all_keys);
+ kerberos_key_map_insert(kerberos_all_keys, new_key);
+ }
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(key_tree, pinfo, &ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype,
+ key_tvb, 0, keylength,
+ "%s %s keytype %d (id=%d.%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ methodu, origin, keytype, pinfo->num, new_key->id,
+ keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ if (item != NULL && key_hidden_item != NULL) {
+ proto_tree_move_item(key_tree, key_hidden_item, item);
+ }
+ if (src1 != NULL) {
+ enc_key_t *sek = src1;
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype,
+ "SRC1 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+ if (src2 != NULL) {
+ enc_key_t *sek = src2;
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype,
+ "SRC2 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+
+ kerberos_key_list_append(private_data->learnt_keys, new_key);
+ private_data->last_added_key = new_key;
+}
+
+static void
+save_encryption_key(tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, int length _U_,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_,
+ int parent_hf_index _U_,
+ int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ const char *parent = proto_registrar_get_name(parent_hf_index);
+ const char *element = proto_registrar_get_name(hf_index);
+ char origin[KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN] = { 0, };
+
+ snprintf(origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "%s_%s", parent, element);
+
+ add_encryption_key(actx->pinfo,
+ private_data,
+ private_data->key_tree,
+ private_data->key_hidden_item,
+ private_data->key_tvb,
+ private_data->key.keytype,
+ private_data->key.keylength,
+ private_data->key.keyvalue,
+ origin,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+save_Authenticator_subkey(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+
+ if (private_data->last_decryption_key == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (private_data->last_added_key == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (private_data->within_PA_TGS_REQ != 0) {
+ private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_key = private_data->last_decryption_key;
+ private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey = private_data->last_added_key;
+ }
+ if (private_data->fast_armor_within_armor_value != 0) {
+ private_data->PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_key = private_data->last_decryption_key;
+ private_data->PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_subkey = private_data->last_added_key;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncAPRepPart_subkey(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+
+ if (actx->pinfo->fd->visited) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (private_data->last_added_key == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kerberos_key_map_insert(kerberos_app_session_keys, private_data->last_added_key);
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncKDCRepPart_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncTicketPart_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_KrbCredInfo_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_KrbFastResponse_strengthen_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+
+ private_data->fast_strengthen_key = private_data->last_added_key;
+}
+
+static void used_encryption_key(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ enc_key_t *ek, int usage, tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ const char *keymap_name,
+ guint keymap_size,
+ guint decryption_count)
+{
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *sek = NULL;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ cryptotvb, 0, 0,
+ "Decrypted keytype %d usage %d "
+ "using %s (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ ek->keytype, usage, ek->key_origin, ek->id_str, ek->num_same,
+ ek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ ek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "Used keymap=%s num_keys=%u num_tries=%u)",
+ keymap_name,
+ keymap_size,
+ decryption_count);
+ if (ek->src1 != NULL) {
+ sek = ek->src1;
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "SRC1 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+ if (ek->src2 != NULL) {
+ sek = ek->src2;
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "SRC2 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+ sek = ek->same_list;
+ while (sek != NULL) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "Decrypted keytype %d usage %d "
+ "using %s (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->keytype, usage, sek->key_origin, sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ sek = sek->same_list;
+ }
+ kerberos_key_list_append(private_data->decryption_keys, ek);
+ private_data->last_decryption_key = ek;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS || HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS
+
+static void missing_encryption_key(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ int keytype, int usage, tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ const char *keymap_name,
+ guint keymap_size,
+ guint decryption_count)
+{
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *mek = NULL;
+
+ mek = wmem_new0(pinfo->pool, enc_key_t);
+ snprintf(mek->key_origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN,
+ "keytype %d usage %d missing in frame %u",
+ keytype, usage, pinfo->num);
+ mek->fd_num = pinfo->num;
+ mek->id = ++private_data->missing_key_ids;
+ snprintf(mek->id_str, KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN, "missing.%u",
+ mek->id);
+ mek->keytype=keytype;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype,
+ cryptotvb, 0, 0,
+ "Missing keytype %d usage %d (id=%s)",
+ keytype, usage, mek->id_str);
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype,
+ "Used keymap=%s num_keys=%u num_tries=%u)",
+ keymap_name,
+ keymap_size,
+ decryption_count);
+
+ kerberos_key_list_append(private_data->missing_keys, mek);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_PAC_VERIFY
+static void used_signing_key(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ enc_key_t *ek, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ krb5_cksumtype checksum,
+ const char *reason,
+ const char *keymap_name,
+ guint keymap_size,
+ guint verify_count)
+{
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *sek = NULL;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ tvb, 0, 0,
+ "%s checksum %d keytype %d "
+ "using %s (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ reason, checksum, ek->keytype, ek->key_origin,
+ ek->id_str, ek->num_same,
+ ek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ ek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "Used keymap=%s num_keys=%u num_tries=%u)",
+ keymap_name,
+ keymap_size,
+ verify_count);
+ sek = ek->same_list;
+ while (sek != NULL) {
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ "%s checksum %d keytype %d "
+ "using %s (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ reason, checksum, sek->keytype, sek->key_origin,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ sek = sek->same_list;
+ }
+ kerberos_key_list_append(private_data->decryption_keys, ek);
+}
+
+static void missing_signing_key(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ krb5_cksumtype checksum,
+ int keytype,
+ const char *reason,
+ const char *keymap_name,
+ guint keymap_size,
+ guint verify_count)
+{
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *mek = NULL;
+
+ mek = wmem_new0(pinfo->pool, enc_key_t);
+ snprintf(mek->key_origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN,
+ "checksum %d keytype %d missing in frame %u",
+ checksum, keytype, pinfo->num);
+ mek->fd_num = pinfo->num;
+ mek->id = ++private_data->missing_key_ids;
+ snprintf(mek->id_str, KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN, "missing.%u",
+ mek->id);
+ mek->keytype=keytype;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype,
+ tvb, 0, 0,
+ "%s checksum %d keytype %d (id=%s)",
+ reason, checksum, keytype, mek->id_str);
+ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype,
+ "Used keymap=%s num_keys=%u num_tries=%u)",
+ keymap_name,
+ keymap_size,
+ verify_count);
+
+ kerberos_key_list_append(private_data->missing_keys, mek);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_PAC_VERIFY */
+
+static krb5_context krb5_ctx;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE
+static void
+krb5_fast_key(asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb,
+ enc_key_t *ek1 _U_, const char *p1 _U_,
+ enc_key_t *ek2 _U_, const char *p2 _U_,
+ const char *origin _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_keyblock k1;
+ krb5_keyblock k2;
+ krb5_keyblock *k = NULL;
+
+ if (!krb_decrypt) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ek1 == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ek2 == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ k1.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k1.enctype = ek1->keytype;
+ k1.length = ek1->keylength;
+ k1.contents = (guint8 *)ek1->keyvalue;
+
+ k2.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k2.enctype = ek2->keytype;
+ k2.length = ek2->keylength;
+ k2.contents = (guint8 *)ek2->keyvalue;
+
+ ret = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(krb5_ctx, &k1, p1, &k2, p2, &k);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ add_encryption_key(actx->pinfo,
+ private_data,
+ tree, NULL, tvb,
+ k->enctype, k->length,
+ (const char *)k->contents,
+ origin,
+ ek1, ek2);
+
+ krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_ctx, k);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE */
+static void
+krb5_fast_key(asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_,
+ enc_key_t *ek1 _U_, const char *p1 _U_,
+ enc_key_t *ek2 _U_, const char *p2 _U_,
+ const char *origin _U_)
+{
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE */
+
+USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API
+void
+read_keytab_file(const char *filename)
+{
+ krb5_keytab keytab;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_keytab_entry key;
+ krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
+ static gboolean first_time=TRUE;
+
+ if (filename == NULL || filename[0] == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if(first_time){
+ first_time=FALSE;
+ ret = krb5_init_context(&krb5_ctx);
+ if(ret && ret != KRB5_CONFIG_CANTOPEN){
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* should use a file in the wireshark users dir */
+ ret = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_ctx, filename, &keytab);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Badly formatted keytab filename :%s\n",filename);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krb5_ctx, keytab, &cursor);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not open or could not read from keytab file :%s\n",filename);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do{
+ ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(krb5_ctx, keytab, &key, &cursor);
+ if(ret==0){
+ enc_key_t *new_key;
+ int i;
+ char *pos;
+
+ new_key = wmem_new0(wmem_epan_scope(), enc_key_t);
+ new_key->fd_num = -1;
+ new_key->id = ++kerberos_longterm_ids;
+ snprintf(new_key->id_str, KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN, "keytab.%u", new_key->id);
+ new_key->next = enc_key_list;
+
+ /* generate origin string, describing where this key came from */
+ pos=new_key->key_origin;
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN,
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "keytab principal "));
+ for(i=0;i<key.principal->length;i++){
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin),
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin), "%s%s",(i?"/":""),(key.principal->data[i]).data));
+ }
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin),
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin), "@%s",key.principal->realm.data));
+ *pos=0;
+ new_key->keytype=key.key.enctype;
+ new_key->keylength=key.key.length;
+ memcpy(new_key->keyvalue,
+ key.key.contents,
+ MIN(key.key.length, KRB_MAX_KEY_LENGTH));
+
+ enc_key_list=new_key;
+ ret = krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krb5_ctx, &key);
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not release the entry: %d", ret);
+ ret = 0; /* try to continue with the next entry */
+ }
+ kerberos_key_map_insert(kerberos_longterm_keys, new_key);
+ }
+ }while(ret==0);
+
+ ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krb5_ctx, keytab, &cursor);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not release the keytab cursor: %d", ret);
+ }
+ ret = krb5_kt_close(krb5_ctx, keytab);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not close the key table handle: %d", ret);
+ }
+}
+
+struct decrypt_krb5_with_cb_state {
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ packet_info *pinfo;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data;
+ int usage;
+ int keytype;
+ tvbuff_t *cryptotvb;
+ krb5_error_code (*decrypt_cb_fn)(
+ const krb5_keyblock *key,
+ int usage,
+ void *decrypt_cb_data);
+ void *decrypt_cb_data;
+ guint count;
+ enc_key_t *ek;
+};
+
+static void
+decrypt_krb5_with_cb_try_key(gpointer __key _U_, gpointer value, gpointer userdata)
+{
+ struct decrypt_krb5_with_cb_state *state =
+ (struct decrypt_krb5_with_cb_state *)userdata;
+ enc_key_t *ek = (enc_key_t *)value;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_keytab_entry key;
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE
+ enc_key_t *ak = state->private_data->fast_armor_key;
+ enc_key_t *sk = state->private_data->fast_strengthen_key;
+ gboolean try_with_armor_key = FALSE;
+ gboolean try_with_strengthen_key = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+ if (state->ek != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * we're done.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE
+ if (ak != NULL && ak != ek && ak->keytype == state->keytype && ek->fd_num == -1) {
+ switch (state->usage) {
+ case KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT:
+ case KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC:
+ if (ek->fd_num == -1) {
+ /* Challenges are based on a long term key */
+ try_with_armor_key = TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we already have a strengthen_key
+ * we don't need to try with the armor key
+ * again
+ */
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ try_with_armor_key = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sk != NULL && sk != ek && sk->keytype == state->keytype && sk->keytype == ek->keytype) {
+ switch (state->usage) {
+ case 3:
+ if (ek->fd_num == -1) {
+ /* AS-REP is based on a long term key */
+ try_with_strengthen_key = TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ case 9:
+ if (ek->fd_num != -1) {
+ /* TGS-REP is not based on a long term key */
+ try_with_strengthen_key = TRUE;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (try_with_armor_key) {
+ krb5_keyblock k1;
+ krb5_keyblock k2;
+ krb5_keyblock *k = NULL;
+ const char *p1 = NULL;
+
+ k1.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k1.enctype = ak->keytype;
+ k1.length = ak->keylength;
+ k1.contents = (guint8 *)ak->keyvalue;
+
+ k2.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k2.enctype = ek->keytype;
+ k2.length = ek->keylength;
+ k2.contents = (guint8 *)ek->keyvalue;
+
+ switch (state->usage) {
+ case KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT:
+ p1 = "clientchallengearmor";
+ break;
+ case KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC:
+ p1 = "kdcchallengearmor";
+ break;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Should never be called!
+ */
+ /*
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(krb5_ctx,
+ &k1, p1,
+ &k2, "challengelongterm",
+ &k);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /*
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ state->count += 1;
+ ret = state->decrypt_cb_fn(k,
+ state->usage,
+ state->decrypt_cb_data);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ add_encryption_key(state->pinfo,
+ state->private_data,
+ state->tree,
+ NULL,
+ state->cryptotvb,
+ k->enctype, k->length,
+ (const char *)k->contents,
+ p1,
+ ak, ek);
+ krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_ctx, k);
+ /*
+ * remember the key and stop traversing
+ */
+ state->ek = state->private_data->last_added_key;
+ return;
+ }
+ krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_ctx, k);
+ /*
+ * don't stop traversing...
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (try_with_strengthen_key) {
+ krb5_keyblock k1;
+ krb5_keyblock k2;
+ krb5_keyblock *k = NULL;
+
+ k1.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k1.enctype = sk->keytype;
+ k1.length = sk->keylength;
+ k1.contents = (guint8 *)sk->keyvalue;
+
+ k2.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ k2.enctype = ek->keytype;
+ k2.length = ek->keylength;
+ k2.contents = (guint8 *)ek->keyvalue;
+
+ ret = krb5_c_fx_cf2_simple(krb5_ctx,
+ &k1, "strengthenkey",
+ &k2, "replykey",
+ &k);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /*
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ state->count += 1;
+ ret = state->decrypt_cb_fn(k,
+ state->usage,
+ state->decrypt_cb_data);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ add_encryption_key(state->pinfo,
+ state->private_data,
+ state->tree,
+ NULL,
+ state->cryptotvb,
+ k->enctype, k->length,
+ (const char *)k->contents,
+ "strengthen-reply-key",
+ sk, ek);
+ krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_ctx, k);
+ /*
+ * remember the key and stop traversing
+ */
+ state->ek = state->private_data->last_added_key;
+ return;
+ }
+ krb5_free_keyblock(krb5_ctx, k);
+ /*
+ * don't stop traversing...
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_C_FX_CF2_SIMPLE */
+
+ /* shortcircuit and bail out if enctypes are not matching */
+ if ((state->keytype != -1) && (ek->keytype != state->keytype)) {
+ /*
+ * don't stop traversing...
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ key.key.enctype=ek->keytype;
+ key.key.length=ek->keylength;
+ key.key.contents=ek->keyvalue;
+ state->count += 1;
+ ret = state->decrypt_cb_fn(&(key.key),
+ state->usage,
+ state->decrypt_cb_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /*
+ * don't stop traversing...
+ * try the next one...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we're done, remember the key
+ */
+ state->ek = ek;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+decrypt_krb5_with_cb(proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ int usage,
+ int keytype,
+ tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ krb5_error_code (*decrypt_cb_fn)(
+ const krb5_keyblock *key,
+ int usage,
+ void *decrypt_cb_data),
+ void *decrypt_cb_data)
+{
+ const char *key_map_name = NULL;
+ wmem_map_t *key_map = NULL;
+ struct decrypt_krb5_with_cb_state state = {
+ .tree = tree,
+ .pinfo = pinfo,
+ .private_data = private_data,
+ .usage = usage,
+ .cryptotvb = cryptotvb,
+ .keytype = keytype,
+ .decrypt_cb_fn = decrypt_cb_fn,
+ .decrypt_cb_data = decrypt_cb_data,
+ };
+
+ read_keytab_file_from_preferences();
+
+ switch (usage) {
+ case KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL:
+ case KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL:
+ key_map_name = "app_session_keys";
+ key_map = kerberos_app_session_keys;
+ break;
+ default:
+ key_map_name = "all_keys";
+ key_map = kerberos_all_keys;
+ insert_longterm_keys_into_key_map(key_map);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ wmem_map_foreach(key_map, decrypt_krb5_with_cb_try_key, &state);
+ if (state.ek != NULL) {
+ used_encryption_key(tree, pinfo, private_data,
+ state.ek, usage, cryptotvb,
+ key_map_name,
+ wmem_map_size(key_map),
+ state.count);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ missing_encryption_key(tree, pinfo, private_data,
+ keytype, usage, cryptotvb,
+ key_map_name,
+ wmem_map_size(key_map),
+ state.count);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+struct decrypt_krb5_data_state {
+ krb5_data input;
+ krb5_data output;
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code
+decrypt_krb5_data_cb(const krb5_keyblock *key,
+ int usage,
+ void *decrypt_cb_data)
+{
+ struct decrypt_krb5_data_state *state =
+ (struct decrypt_krb5_data_state *)decrypt_cb_data;
+ krb5_enc_data input;
+
+ memset(&input, 0, sizeof(input));
+ input.enctype = key->enctype;
+ input.ciphertext = state->input;
+
+ return krb5_c_decrypt(krb5_ctx,
+ key,
+ usage,
+ 0,
+ &input,
+ &state->output);
+}
+
+static guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data_private(proto_tree *tree _U_, packet_info *pinfo,
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data,
+ int usage, tvbuff_t *cryptotvb, int keytype,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+#define HAVE_DECRYPT_KRB5_DATA_PRIVATE 1
+ struct decrypt_krb5_data_state state;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ int length = tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb);
+ const guint8 *cryptotext = tvb_get_ptr(cryptotvb, 0, length);
+
+ /* don't do anything if we are not attempting to decrypt data */
+ if(!krb_decrypt || length < 1){
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+ if (tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb) < tvb_reported_length(cryptotvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
+ state.input.length = length;
+ state.input.data = (guint8 *)cryptotext;
+ state.output.data = (char *)wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, length);
+ state.output.length = length;
+
+ ret = decrypt_krb5_with_cb(tree,
+ pinfo,
+ private_data,
+ usage,
+ keytype,
+ cryptotvb,
+ decrypt_krb5_data_cb,
+ &state);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (datalen) {
+ *datalen = state.output.length;
+ }
+ return (guint8 *)state.output.data;
+}
+
+guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data(proto_tree *tree _U_, packet_info *pinfo,
+ int usage,
+ tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ int keytype,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *zero_private = kerberos_new_private_data(pinfo);
+ return decrypt_krb5_data_private(tree, pinfo, zero_private,
+ usage, cryptotvb, keytype,
+ datalen);
+}
+
+USES_APPLE_RST
+
+#ifdef KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY
+struct decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_state {
+ const guint8 *gssapi_header_ptr;
+ guint gssapi_header_len;
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_encrypted_tvb;
+ guint8 *gssapi_payload;
+ guint gssapi_payload_len;
+ const guint8 *gssapi_trailer_ptr;
+ guint gssapi_trailer_len;
+ tvbuff_t *checksum_tvb;
+ guint8 *checksum;
+ guint checksum_len;
+};
+
+static krb5_error_code
+decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_cb(const krb5_keyblock *key,
+ int usage,
+ void *decrypt_cb_data)
+{
+ struct decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_state *state =
+ (struct decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_state *)decrypt_cb_data;
+ unsigned int k5_headerlen = 0;
+ unsigned int k5_headerofs = 0;
+ unsigned int k5_trailerlen = 0;
+ unsigned int k5_trailerofs = 0;
+ size_t _k5_blocksize = 0;
+ guint k5_blocksize;
+ krb5_crypto_iov iov[6];
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ guint checksum_remain = state->checksum_len;
+ guint checksum_crypt_len;
+
+ memset(iov, 0, sizeof(iov));
+
+ ret = krb5_c_crypto_length(krb5_ctx,
+ key->enctype,
+ KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER,
+ &k5_headerlen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (checksum_remain < k5_headerlen) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ checksum_remain -= k5_headerlen;
+ k5_headerofs = checksum_remain;
+ ret = krb5_c_crypto_length(krb5_ctx,
+ key->enctype,
+ KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER,
+ &k5_trailerlen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (checksum_remain < k5_trailerlen) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ checksum_remain -= k5_trailerlen;
+ k5_trailerofs = checksum_remain;
+ checksum_crypt_len = checksum_remain;
+
+ ret = krb5_c_block_size(krb5_ctx,
+ key->enctype,
+ &_k5_blocksize);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The cast is required for the Windows build in order
+ * to avoid the following warning.
+ *
+ * warning C4267: '-=': conversion from 'size_t' to 'guint',
+ * possible loss of data
+ */
+ k5_blocksize = (guint)_k5_blocksize;
+ if (checksum_remain < k5_blocksize) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ checksum_remain -= k5_blocksize;
+ if (checksum_remain < 16) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ tvb_memcpy(state->gssapi_encrypted_tvb,
+ state->gssapi_payload,
+ 0,
+ state->gssapi_payload_len);
+ tvb_memcpy(state->checksum_tvb,
+ state->checksum,
+ 0,
+ state->checksum_len);
+
+ iov[0].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER;
+ iov[0].data.data = state->checksum + k5_headerofs;
+ iov[0].data.length = k5_headerlen;
+
+ if (state->gssapi_header_ptr != NULL) {
+ iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+ iov[1].data.data = (guint8 *)(guintptr)state->gssapi_header_ptr;
+ iov[1].data.length = state->gssapi_header_len;
+ } else {
+ iov[1].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_EMPTY;
+ }
+
+ iov[2].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[2].data.data = state->gssapi_payload;
+ iov[2].data.length = state->gssapi_payload_len;
+
+ if (state->gssapi_trailer_ptr != NULL) {
+ iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
+ iov[3].data.data = (guint8 *)(guintptr)state->gssapi_trailer_ptr;
+ iov[3].data.length = state->gssapi_trailer_len;
+ } else {
+ iov[3].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_EMPTY;
+ }
+
+ iov[4].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[4].data.data = state->checksum;
+ iov[4].data.length = checksum_crypt_len;
+
+ iov[5].flags = KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER;
+ iov[5].data.data = state->checksum + k5_trailerofs;
+ iov[5].data.length = k5_trailerlen;
+
+ return krb5_c_decrypt_iov(krb5_ctx,
+ key,
+ usage,
+ 0,
+ iov,
+ 6);
+}
+
+tvbuff_t *
+decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce(proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info *pinfo,
+ int usage,
+ int keytype,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_header_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_encrypted_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_trailer_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *checksum_tvb)
+{
+ struct decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_state state;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *zero_private = kerberos_new_private_data(pinfo);
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_decrypted_tvb = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ /* don't do anything if we are not attempting to decrypt data */
+ if (!krb_decrypt) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
+
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+#define __CHECK_TVB_LEN(__tvb) (tvb_captured_length(__tvb) < tvb_reported_length(__tvb))
+ if (gssapi_header_tvb != NULL) {
+ if (__CHECK_TVB_LEN(gssapi_header_tvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ state.gssapi_header_len = tvb_captured_length(gssapi_header_tvb);
+ state.gssapi_header_ptr = tvb_get_ptr(gssapi_header_tvb,
+ 0,
+ state.gssapi_header_len);
+ }
+ if (gssapi_encrypted_tvb == NULL || __CHECK_TVB_LEN(gssapi_encrypted_tvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ state.gssapi_encrypted_tvb = gssapi_encrypted_tvb;
+ state.gssapi_payload_len = tvb_captured_length(gssapi_encrypted_tvb);
+ state.gssapi_payload = (guint8 *)wmem_alloc0(pinfo->pool, state.gssapi_payload_len);
+ if (state.gssapi_payload == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_trailer_tvb != NULL) {
+ if (__CHECK_TVB_LEN(gssapi_trailer_tvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ state.gssapi_trailer_len = tvb_captured_length(gssapi_trailer_tvb);
+ state.gssapi_trailer_ptr = tvb_get_ptr(gssapi_trailer_tvb,
+ 0,
+ state.gssapi_trailer_len);
+ }
+ if (checksum_tvb == NULL || __CHECK_TVB_LEN(checksum_tvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ state.checksum_tvb = checksum_tvb;
+ state.checksum_len = tvb_captured_length(checksum_tvb);
+ state.checksum = (guint8 *)wmem_alloc0(pinfo->pool, state.checksum_len);
+ if (state.checksum == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = decrypt_krb5_with_cb(tree,
+ pinfo,
+ zero_private,
+ usage,
+ keytype,
+ gssapi_encrypted_tvb,
+ decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce_cb,
+ &state);
+ wmem_free(pinfo->pool, state.checksum);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ wmem_free(pinfo->pool, state.gssapi_payload);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ gssapi_decrypted_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(gssapi_encrypted_tvb,
+ state.gssapi_payload,
+ state.gssapi_payload_len,
+ state.gssapi_payload_len);
+ if (gssapi_decrypted_tvb == NULL) {
+ wmem_free(pinfo->pool, state.gssapi_payload);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return gssapi_decrypted_tvb;
+}
+#else /* NOT KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY */
+#define NEED_DECRYPT_KRB5_KRB_CFX_DCE_NOOP 1
+#endif /* NOT KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KRB5_PAC_VERIFY
+/*
+ * macOS up to 10.14.5 only has a MIT shim layer on top
+ * of heimdal. It means that krb5_pac_verify() is not available
+ * in /usr/lib/libkrb5.dylib
+ *
+ * https://opensource.apple.com/tarballs/Heimdal/Heimdal-520.260.1.tar.gz
+ * https://opensource.apple.com/tarballs/MITKerberosShim/MITKerberosShim-71.200.1.tar.gz
+ */
+
+extern krb5_error_code
+krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(krb5_context, krb5_enctype, krb5_cksumtype *);
+
+extern void krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(krb5_context, krb5_enc_tkt_part *);
+extern krb5_error_code
+decode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(const krb5_data *output, krb5_enc_tkt_part **rep);
+extern krb5_error_code
+encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(const krb5_enc_tkt_part *rep, krb5_data **code);
+
+static int
+keytype_for_cksumtype(krb5_cksumtype checksum)
+{
+#define _ARRAY_SIZE(X) (sizeof(X) / sizeof((X)[0]))
+ static const int keytypes[] = {
+ 18,
+ 17,
+ 23,
+ };
+ guint i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < _ARRAY_SIZE(keytypes); i++) {
+ krb5_cksumtype checksumtype = 0;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(krb5_ctx,
+ keytypes[i],
+ &checksumtype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (checksum == checksumtype) {
+ return keytypes[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+struct verify_krb5_pac_state {
+ krb5_pac pac;
+ krb5_cksumtype server_checksum;
+ guint server_count;
+ enc_key_t *server_ek;
+ krb5_cksumtype kdc_checksum;
+ guint kdc_count;
+ enc_key_t *kdc_ek;
+ krb5_cksumtype ticket_checksum_type;
+ const krb5_data *ticket_checksum_data;
+};
+
+static void
+verify_krb5_pac_try_server_key(gpointer __key _U_, gpointer value, gpointer userdata)
+{
+ struct verify_krb5_pac_state *state =
+ (struct verify_krb5_pac_state *)userdata;
+ enc_key_t *ek = (enc_key_t *)value;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock;
+ krb5_cksumtype checksumtype = 0;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (state->server_checksum == 0) {
+ /*
+ * nothing more todo, stop traversing.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (state->server_ek != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * we're done.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(krb5_ctx, ek->keytype,
+ &checksumtype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /*
+ * the key is not usable, keep traversing.
+ * try the next key...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ keyblock.enctype = ek->keytype;
+ keyblock.length = ek->keylength;
+ keyblock.contents = (guint8 *)ek->keyvalue;
+
+ if (checksumtype == state->server_checksum) {
+ state->server_count += 1;
+ ret = krb5_pac_verify(krb5_ctx, state->pac, 0, NULL,
+ &keyblock, NULL);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ state->server_ek = ek;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+verify_krb5_pac_try_kdc_key(gpointer __key _U_, gpointer value, gpointer userdata)
+{
+ struct verify_krb5_pac_state *state =
+ (struct verify_krb5_pac_state *)userdata;
+ enc_key_t *ek = (enc_key_t *)value;
+ krb5_keyblock keyblock;
+ krb5_cksumtype checksumtype = 0;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (state->kdc_checksum == 0) {
+ /*
+ * nothing more todo, stop traversing.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (state->kdc_ek != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * we're done.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(krb5_ctx, ek->keytype,
+ &checksumtype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /*
+ * the key is not usable, keep traversing.
+ * try the next key...
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ keyblock.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ keyblock.enctype = ek->keytype;
+ keyblock.length = ek->keylength;
+ keyblock.contents = (guint8 *)ek->keyvalue;
+
+ if (checksumtype == state->kdc_checksum) {
+ state->kdc_count += 1;
+ ret = krb5_pac_verify(krb5_ctx, state->pac, 0, NULL,
+ NULL, &keyblock);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ state->kdc_ek = ek;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define __KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM 16
+
+static void
+verify_krb5_pac_ticket_checksum(proto_tree *tree _U_,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_,
+ tvbuff_t *pactvb _U_,
+ struct verify_krb5_pac_state *state _U_)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_DECODE_KRB5_ENC_TKT_PART
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *teptvb = private_data->last_ticket_enc_part_tvb;
+ guint teplength = 0;
+ const guint8 *tepbuffer = NULL;
+ krb5_data tepdata = { .length = 0, };
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *tep = NULL;
+ krb5_data *tmpdata = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_authdata **recoded_container = NULL;
+ gint ad_orig_idx = -1;
+ krb5_authdata *ad_orig_ptr = NULL;
+ gint l0idx = 0;
+ krb5_keyblock kdc_key = { .magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK, };
+ size_t checksum_length = 0;
+ krb5_checksum checksum = { .checksum_type = 0, };
+ krb5_boolean valid = FALSE;
+
+ if (state->kdc_ek == NULL) {
+ int keytype = keytype_for_cksumtype(state->ticket_checksum_type);
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ keytype,
+ "Missing KDC (for ticket)",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 0,
+ 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (teptvb == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ teplength = tvb_captured_length(teptvb);
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+ if (teplength < tvb_reported_length(teptvb)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tepbuffer = tvb_get_ptr(teptvb, 0, teplength);
+ if (tepbuffer == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ kdc_key.magic = KV5M_KEYBLOCK;
+ kdc_key.enctype = state->kdc_ek->keytype;
+ kdc_key.length = state->kdc_ek->keylength;
+ kdc_key.contents = (guint8 *)state->kdc_ek->keyvalue;
+
+ checksum.checksum_type = state->ticket_checksum_type;
+ checksum.length = state->ticket_checksum_data->length;
+ checksum.contents = (guint8 *)state->ticket_checksum_data->data;
+ if (checksum.length >= 4) {
+ checksum.length -= 4;
+ checksum.contents += 4;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_c_checksum_length(krb5_ctx,
+ checksum.checksum_type,
+ &checksum_length);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "krb5_c_checksum_length failed for Ticket Signature",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ checksum.length = MIN(checksum.length, (unsigned int)checksum_length);
+
+ tepdata.data = (void *)(uintptr_t)tepbuffer;
+ tepdata.length = teplength;
+
+ ret = decode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(&tepdata, &tep);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "decode_krb5_enc_tkt_part failed",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (l0idx = 0; tep->authorization_data[l0idx]; l0idx++) {
+ krb5_authdata *adl0 = tep->authorization_data[l0idx];
+ krb5_authdata **decoded_container = NULL;
+ krb5_authdata *ad_pac = NULL;
+ gint l1idx = 0;
+
+ if (adl0->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_decode_authdata_container(krb5_ctx,
+ KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
+ adl0,
+ &decoded_container);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "krb5_decode_authdata_container failed",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 0);
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(krb5_ctx, tep);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (l1idx = 0; decoded_container[l1idx]; l1idx++) {
+ krb5_authdata *adl1 = decoded_container[l1idx];
+
+ if (adl1->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ad_pac = adl1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ad_pac == NULL) {
+ krb5_free_authdata(krb5_ctx, decoded_container);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ad_pac->length = 1;
+ ad_pac->contents[0] = '\0';
+
+ ret = krb5_encode_authdata_container(krb5_ctx,
+ KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT,
+ decoded_container,
+ &recoded_container);
+ krb5_free_authdata(krb5_ctx, decoded_container);
+ decoded_container = NULL;
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "krb5_encode_authdata_container failed",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 0);
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(krb5_ctx, tep);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ad_orig_idx = l0idx;
+ ad_orig_ptr = adl0;
+ tep->authorization_data[l0idx] = recoded_container[0];
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part(tep, &tmpdata);
+ if (ad_orig_ptr != NULL) {
+ tep->authorization_data[ad_orig_idx] = ad_orig_ptr;
+ }
+ krb5_free_enc_tkt_part(krb5_ctx, tep);
+ tep = NULL;
+ if (recoded_container != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_authdata(krb5_ctx, recoded_container);
+ recoded_container = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "encode_krb5_enc_tkt_part failed",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_c_verify_checksum(krb5_ctx, &kdc_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_APP_DATA_CKSUM,
+ tmpdata, &checksum, &valid);
+ krb5_free_data(krb5_ctx, tmpdata);
+ tmpdata = NULL;
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "krb5_c_verify_checksum failed for Ticket Signature",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (valid == FALSE) {
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ state->kdc_ek->keytype,
+ "Invalid Ticket",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 1);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ used_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ state->kdc_ek, pactvb,
+ state->ticket_checksum_type,
+ "Verified Ticket",
+ "kdc_checksum_key",
+ 1,
+ 1);
+#endif /* HAVE_DECODE_KRB5_ENC_TKT_PART */
+}
+
+static void
+verify_krb5_pac(proto_tree *tree _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx, tvbuff_t *pactvb)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_data checksum_data = {0,0,NULL};
+ krb5_data ticket_checksum_data = {0,0,NULL};
+ int length = tvb_captured_length(pactvb);
+ const guint8 *pacbuffer = NULL;
+ struct verify_krb5_pac_state state = {
+ .kdc_checksum = 0,
+ };
+
+ /* don't do anything if we are not attempting to decrypt data */
+ if(!krb_decrypt || length < 1){
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+ if (tvb_captured_length(pactvb) < tvb_reported_length(pactvb)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pacbuffer = tvb_get_ptr(pactvb, 0, length);
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_parse(krb5_ctx, pacbuffer, length, &state.pac);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, actx->pinfo, &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ pactvb, 0, 0,
+ "Failed to parse PAC buffer %d in frame %u",
+ ret, actx->pinfo->fd->num);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(krb5_ctx, state.pac, KRB5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM,
+ &checksum_data);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ state.server_checksum = pletoh32(checksum_data.data);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_ctx, &checksum_data);
+ };
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(krb5_ctx, state.pac, KRB5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM,
+ &checksum_data);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ state.kdc_checksum = pletoh32(checksum_data.data);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_ctx, &checksum_data);
+ };
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(krb5_ctx, state.pac,
+ __KRB5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM,
+ &ticket_checksum_data);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ state.ticket_checksum_data = &ticket_checksum_data;
+ state.ticket_checksum_type = pletoh32(ticket_checksum_data.data);
+ };
+
+ read_keytab_file_from_preferences();
+
+ wmem_map_foreach(kerberos_all_keys,
+ verify_krb5_pac_try_server_key,
+ &state);
+ if (state.server_ek != NULL) {
+ used_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ state.server_ek, pactvb,
+ state.server_checksum, "Verified Server",
+ "all_keys",
+ wmem_map_size(kerberos_all_keys),
+ state.server_count);
+ } else {
+ int keytype = keytype_for_cksumtype(state.server_checksum);
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state.server_checksum, keytype,
+ "Missing Server",
+ "all_keys",
+ wmem_map_size(kerberos_all_keys),
+ state.server_count);
+ }
+ wmem_map_foreach(kerberos_longterm_keys,
+ verify_krb5_pac_try_kdc_key,
+ &state);
+ if (state.kdc_ek != NULL) {
+ used_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ state.kdc_ek, pactvb,
+ state.kdc_checksum, "Verified KDC",
+ "longterm_keys",
+ wmem_map_size(kerberos_longterm_keys),
+ state.kdc_count);
+ } else {
+ int keytype = keytype_for_cksumtype(state.kdc_checksum);
+ missing_signing_key(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ pactvb, state.kdc_checksum, keytype,
+ "Missing KDC",
+ "longterm_keys",
+ wmem_map_size(kerberos_longterm_keys),
+ state.kdc_count);
+ }
+
+ if (state.ticket_checksum_type != 0) {
+ verify_krb5_pac_ticket_checksum(tree, actx, pactvb, &state);
+ }
+
+ if (state.ticket_checksum_data != NULL) {
+ krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_ctx, &ticket_checksum_data);
+ }
+
+ krb5_pac_free(krb5_ctx, state.pac);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_PAC_VERIFY */
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS)
+static krb5_context krb5_ctx;
+
+USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API
+
+static void
+krb5_fast_key(asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_,
+ enc_key_t *ek1 _U_, const char *p1 _U_,
+ enc_key_t *ek2 _U_, const char *p2 _U_,
+ const char *origin _U_)
+{
+/* TODO: use krb5_crypto_fx_cf2() from Heimdal */
+}
+void
+read_keytab_file(const char *filename)
+{
+ krb5_keytab keytab;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_keytab_entry key;
+ krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
+ enc_key_t *new_key;
+ static gboolean first_time=TRUE;
+
+ if (filename == NULL || filename[0] == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if(first_time){
+ first_time=FALSE;
+ ret = krb5_init_context(&krb5_ctx);
+ if(ret){
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* should use a file in the wireshark users dir */
+ ret = krb5_kt_resolve(krb5_ctx, filename, &keytab);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not open keytab file :%s\n",filename);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krb5_ctx, keytab, &cursor);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not read from keytab file :%s\n",filename);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ do{
+ ret = krb5_kt_next_entry(krb5_ctx, keytab, &key, &cursor);
+ if(ret==0){
+ unsigned int i;
+ char *pos;
+
+ new_key = wmem_new0(wmem_epan_scope(), enc_key_t);
+ new_key->fd_num = -1;
+ new_key->id = ++kerberos_longterm_ids;
+ snprintf(new_key->id_str, KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN, "keytab.%u", new_key->id);
+ new_key->next = enc_key_list;
+
+ /* generate origin string, describing where this key came from */
+ pos=new_key->key_origin;
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN,
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "keytab principal "));
+ for(i=0;i<key.principal->name.name_string.len;i++){
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin),
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin), "%s%s",(i?"/":""),key.principal->name.name_string.val[i]));
+ }
+ pos+=MIN(KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin),
+ snprintf(pos, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN-(pos-new_key->key_origin), "@%s",key.principal->realm));
+ *pos=0;
+ new_key->keytype=key.keyblock.keytype;
+ new_key->keylength=(int)key.keyblock.keyvalue.length;
+ memcpy(new_key->keyvalue,
+ key.keyblock.keyvalue.data,
+ MIN((guint)key.keyblock.keyvalue.length, KRB_MAX_KEY_LENGTH));
+
+ enc_key_list=new_key;
+ ret = krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5_ctx, &key);
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not release the entry: %d", ret);
+ ret = 0; /* try to continue with the next entry */
+ }
+ kerberos_key_map_insert(kerberos_longterm_keys, new_key);
+ }
+ }while(ret==0);
+
+ ret = krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krb5_ctx, keytab, &cursor);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not release the keytab cursor: %d", ret);
+ }
+ ret = krb5_kt_close(krb5_ctx, keytab);
+ if(ret){
+ fprintf(stderr, "KERBEROS ERROR: Could not close the key table handle: %d", ret);
+ }
+
+}
+USES_APPLE_RST
+
+
+guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data(proto_tree *tree _U_, packet_info *pinfo,
+ int usage,
+ tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ int keytype,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *zero_private = kerberos_new_private_data(pinfo);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_data data;
+ enc_key_t *ek;
+ int length = tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb);
+ const guint8 *cryptotext = tvb_get_ptr(cryptotvb, 0, length);
+
+ /* don't do anything if we are not attempting to decrypt data */
+ if(!krb_decrypt){
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+ if (tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb) < tvb_reported_length(cryptotvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ read_keytab_file_from_preferences();
+
+ for(ek=enc_key_list;ek;ek=ek->next){
+ krb5_keytab_entry key;
+ krb5_crypto crypto;
+ guint8 *cryptocopy; /* workaround for pre-0.6.1 heimdal bug */
+
+ /* shortcircuit and bail out if enctypes are not matching */
+ if((keytype != -1) && (ek->keytype != keytype)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ key.keyblock.keytype=ek->keytype;
+ key.keyblock.keyvalue.length=ek->keylength;
+ key.keyblock.keyvalue.data=ek->keyvalue;
+ ret = krb5_crypto_init(krb5_ctx, &(key.keyblock), (krb5_enctype)ENCTYPE_NULL, &crypto);
+ if(ret){
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* pre-0.6.1 versions of Heimdal would sometimes change
+ the cryptotext data even when the decryption failed.
+ This would obviously not work since we iterate over the
+ keys. So just give it a copy of the crypto data instead.
+ This has been seen for RC4-HMAC blobs.
+ */
+ cryptocopy = (guint8 *)wmem_memdup(pinfo->pool, cryptotext, length);
+ ret = krb5_decrypt_ivec(krb5_ctx, crypto, usage,
+ cryptocopy, length,
+ &data,
+ NULL);
+ if((ret == 0) && (length>0)){
+ char *user_data;
+
+ used_encryption_key(tree, pinfo, zero_private,
+ ek, usage, cryptotvb,
+ "enc_key_list", 0, 0);
+
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(krb5_ctx, crypto);
+ /* return a private wmem_alloced blob to the caller */
+ user_data = (char *)wmem_memdup(pinfo->pool, data.data, (guint)data.length);
+ if (datalen) {
+ *datalen = (int)data.length;
+ }
+ return user_data;
+ }
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(krb5_ctx, crypto);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#define NEED_DECRYPT_KRB5_KRB_CFX_DCE_NOOP 1
+
+#elif defined (HAVE_LIBNETTLE)
+
+#define SERVICE_KEY_SIZE (DES3_KEY_SIZE + 2)
+#define KEYTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 5 /* Currently the only one supported */
+
+typedef struct _service_key_t {
+ guint16 kvno;
+ int keytype;
+ int length;
+ guint8 *contents;
+ char origin[KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN+1];
+} service_key_t;
+GSList *service_key_list = NULL;
+
+
+static void
+add_encryption_key(packet_info *pinfo, int keytype, int keylength, const char *keyvalue, const char *origin)
+{
+ service_key_t *new_key;
+
+ if(pinfo->fd->visited){
+ return;
+ }
+
+ new_key = g_malloc(sizeof(service_key_t));
+ new_key->kvno = 0;
+ new_key->keytype = keytype;
+ new_key->length = keylength;
+ new_key->contents = g_memdup2(keyvalue, keylength);
+ snprintf(new_key->origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "%s learnt from frame %u", origin, pinfo->num);
+ service_key_list = g_slist_append(service_key_list, (gpointer) new_key);
+}
+
+static void
+save_encryption_key(tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, int length _U_,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_,
+ int parent_hf_index _U_,
+ int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ const char *parent = proto_registrar_get_name(parent_hf_index);
+ const char *element = proto_registrar_get_name(hf_index);
+ char origin[KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN] = { 0, };
+
+ snprintf(origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "%s_%s", parent, element);
+
+ add_encryption_key(actx->pinfo,
+ private_data->key.keytype,
+ private_data->key.keylength,
+ private_data->key.keyvalue,
+ origin);
+}
+
+static void
+save_Authenticator_subkey(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncAPRepPart_subkey(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncKDCRepPart_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_EncTicketPart_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_KrbCredInfo_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, int length,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree,
+ int parent_hf_index,
+ int hf_index)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, parent_hf_index, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+save_KrbFastResponse_strengthen_key(tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, int length _U_,
+ asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ save_encryption_key(tvb, offset, length, actx, tree, hf_index);
+}
+
+static void
+clear_keytab(void) {
+ GSList *ske;
+ service_key_t *sk;
+
+ for(ske = service_key_list; ske != NULL; ske = g_slist_next(ske)){
+ sk = (service_key_t *) ske->data;
+ if (sk) {
+ g_free(sk->contents);
+ g_free(sk);
+ }
+ }
+ g_slist_free(service_key_list);
+ service_key_list = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+read_keytab_file(const char *service_key_file)
+{
+ FILE *skf;
+ ws_statb64 st;
+ service_key_t *sk;
+ unsigned char buf[SERVICE_KEY_SIZE];
+ int newline_skip = 0, count = 0;
+
+ if (service_key_file != NULL && ws_stat64 (service_key_file, &st) == 0) {
+
+ /* The service key file contains raw 192-bit (24 byte) 3DES keys.
+ * There can be zero, one (\n), or two (\r\n) characters between
+ * keys. Trailing characters are ignored.
+ */
+
+ /* XXX We should support the standard keytab format instead */
+ if (st.st_size > SERVICE_KEY_SIZE) {
+ if ( (st.st_size % (SERVICE_KEY_SIZE + 1) == 0) ||
+ (st.st_size % (SERVICE_KEY_SIZE + 1) == SERVICE_KEY_SIZE) ) {
+ newline_skip = 1;
+ } else if ( (st.st_size % (SERVICE_KEY_SIZE + 2) == 0) ||
+ (st.st_size % (SERVICE_KEY_SIZE + 2) == SERVICE_KEY_SIZE) ) {
+ newline_skip = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ skf = ws_fopen(service_key_file, "rb");
+ if (! skf) return;
+
+ while (fread(buf, SERVICE_KEY_SIZE, 1, skf) == 1) {
+ sk = g_malloc(sizeof(service_key_t));
+ sk->kvno = buf[0] << 8 | buf[1];
+ sk->keytype = KEYTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5;
+ sk->length = DES3_KEY_SIZE;
+ sk->contents = g_memdup2(buf + 2, DES3_KEY_SIZE);
+ snprintf(sk->origin, KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN, "3DES service key file, key #%d, offset %ld", count, ftell(skf));
+ service_key_list = g_slist_append(service_key_list, (gpointer) sk);
+ if (fseek(skf, newline_skip, SEEK_CUR) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "unable to seek...\n");
+ fclose(skf);
+ return;
+ }
+ count++;
+ }
+ fclose(skf);
+ }
+}
+
+#define CONFOUNDER_PLUS_CHECKSUM 24
+
+guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ int _U_ usage,
+ tvbuff_t *cryptotvb,
+ int keytype,
+ int *datalen)
+{
+ tvbuff_t *encr_tvb;
+ guint8 *decrypted_data = NULL, *plaintext = NULL;
+ guint8 cls;
+ bool pc;
+ guint32 tag, item_len, data_len;
+ int id_offset, offset;
+ guint8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+ guint8 initial_vector[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ gcry_md_hd_t md5_handle;
+ guint8 *digest;
+ guint8 zero_fill[] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ guint8 confounder[8];
+ bool ind;
+ GSList *ske;
+ service_key_t *sk;
+ struct des3_ctx ctx;
+ int length = tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb);
+ const guint8 *cryptotext = tvb_get_ptr(cryptotvb, 0, length);
+
+
+ /* don't do anything if we are not attempting to decrypt data */
+ if(!krb_decrypt){
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* make sure we have all the data we need */
+ if (tvb_captured_length(cryptotvb) < tvb_reported_length(cryptotvb)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (keytype != KEYTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 || service_key_list == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ decrypted_data = wmem_alloc(pinfo->pool, length);
+ for(ske = service_key_list; ske != NULL; ske = g_slist_next(ske)){
+ gboolean do_continue = FALSE;
+ gboolean digest_ok;
+ sk = (service_key_t *) ske->data;
+
+ des_fix_parity(DES3_KEY_SIZE, key, sk->contents);
+
+ memset(initial_vector, 0, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ des3_set_key(&ctx, key);
+ cbc_decrypt(&ctx, des3_decrypt, DES_BLOCK_SIZE, initial_vector,
+ length, decrypted_data, cryptotext);
+ encr_tvb = tvb_new_real_data(decrypted_data, length, length);
+
+ tvb_memcpy(encr_tvb, confounder, 0, 8);
+
+ /* We have to pull the decrypted data length from the decrypted
+ * content. If the key doesn't match or we otherwise get garbage,
+ * an exception may get thrown while decoding the ASN.1 header.
+ * Catch it, just in case.
+ */
+ TRY {
+ id_offset = get_ber_identifier(encr_tvb, CONFOUNDER_PLUS_CHECKSUM, &cls, &pc, &tag);
+ offset = get_ber_length(encr_tvb, id_offset, &item_len, &ind);
+ }
+ CATCH_BOUNDS_ERRORS {
+ tvb_free(encr_tvb);
+ do_continue = TRUE;
+ }
+ ENDTRY;
+
+ if (do_continue) continue;
+
+ data_len = item_len + offset - CONFOUNDER_PLUS_CHECKSUM;
+ if ((int) item_len + offset > length) {
+ tvb_free(encr_tvb);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (gcry_md_open(&md5_handle, GCRY_MD_MD5, 0)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ gcry_md_write(md5_handle, confounder, 8);
+ gcry_md_write(md5_handle, zero_fill, 16);
+ gcry_md_write(md5_handle, decrypted_data + CONFOUNDER_PLUS_CHECKSUM, data_len);
+ digest = gcry_md_read(md5_handle, 0);
+
+ digest_ok = (tvb_memeql (encr_tvb, 8, digest, HASH_MD5_LENGTH) == 0);
+ gcry_md_close(md5_handle);
+ if (digest_ok) {
+ plaintext = (guint8* )tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, encr_tvb, CONFOUNDER_PLUS_CHECKSUM, data_len);
+ tvb_free(encr_tvb);
+
+ if (datalen) {
+ *datalen = data_len;
+ }
+ return(plaintext);
+ }
+ tvb_free(encr_tvb);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS / HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS / HAVE_LIBNETTLE */
+
+#ifdef NEED_DECRYPT_KRB5_KRB_CFX_DCE_NOOP
+tvbuff_t *
+decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce(proto_tree *tree _U_,
+ packet_info *pinfo _U_,
+ int usage _U_,
+ int keytype _U_,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_header_tvb _U_,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_encrypted_tvb _U_,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_trailer_tvb _U_,
+ tvbuff_t *checksum_tvb _U_)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* NEED_DECRYPT_KRB5_KRB_CFX_DCE_NOOP */
+
+#define INET6_ADDRLEN 16
+
+/* TCP Record Mark */
+#define KRB_RM_RESERVED 0x80000000U
+#define KRB_RM_RECLEN 0x7fffffffU
+
+#define KRB5_MSG_TICKET 1 /* Ticket */
+#define KRB5_MSG_AUTHENTICATOR 2 /* Authenticator */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_TICKET_PART 3 /* EncTicketPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_AS_REQ 10 /* AS-REQ type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_AS_REP 11 /* AS-REP type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_TGS_REQ 12 /* TGS-REQ type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_TGS_REP 13 /* TGS-REP type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_AP_REQ 14 /* AP-REQ type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_AP_REP 15 /* AP-REP type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_TGT_REQ 16 /* TGT-REQ type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_TGT_REP 17 /* TGT-REP type */
+
+#define KRB5_MSG_SAFE 20 /* KRB-SAFE type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_PRIV 21 /* KRB-PRIV type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_CRED 22 /* KRB-CRED type */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_AS_REP_PART 25 /* EncASRepPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_TGS_REP_PART 26 /* EncTGSRepPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_AP_REP_PART 27 /* EncAPRepPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_PRIV_PART 28 /* EncKrbPrivPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_CRED_PART 29 /* EncKrbCredPart */
+#define KRB5_MSG_ERROR 30 /* KRB-ERROR type */
+
+#define KRB5_CHKSUM_GSSAPI 0x8003
+/*
+ * For KERB_ENCTYPE_RC4_HMAC and KERB_ENCTYPE_RC4_HMAC_EXP, see
+ *
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brezak-win2k-krb-rc4-hmac-04
+ *
+ * unless it's expired.
+ */
+
+/* Principal name-type */
+#define KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN 0
+#define KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL 1
+#define KRB5_NT_SRV_INST 2
+#define KRB5_NT_SRV_HST 3
+#define KRB5_NT_SRV_XHST 4
+#define KRB5_NT_UID 5
+#define KRB5_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6
+#define KRB5_NT_SMTP_NAME 7
+#define KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE 10
+
+/*
+ * MS specific name types, from
+ *
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/security/security/kerb_external_name.asp
+ */
+#define KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL -128
+#define KRB5_NT_MS_PRINCIPAL_AND_SID -129
+#define KRB5_NT_ENT_PRINCIPAL_AND_SID -130
+#define KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_AND_SID -131
+#define KRB5_NT_SRV_INST_AND_SID -132
+
+/* error table constants */
+/* I prefixed the krb5_err.et constant names with KRB5_ET_ for these */
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE 0
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY 12
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP 23
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 28
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT 43
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68
+#define KRB5_ET_KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED 90
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED 91
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET 92
+#define KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS 93
+
+static const value_string krb5_error_codes[] = {
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE, "KRB5KDC_ERR_NONE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO, "KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "KRB5KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO, "KRB5KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN, "KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE, "KRB5KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY, "KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE, "KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID, "KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY, "KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION, "KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET, "KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP, "KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER, "KRB5KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED, "KRB5KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE, "KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_ILL_CR_TKT" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM, "KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED, "KRB5KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG, "KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG"},
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC, "KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB5KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG, "KRB5KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED, "KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED, "KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG, "KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK, "KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH, "KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT, "KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM, "KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED, "KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE, "KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE, "KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, "KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN, "KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE, "KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH, "KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH, "KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED, "KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED, "KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET, "KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET" },
+ { KRB5_ET_KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS, "KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+
+#define PAC_LOGON_INFO 1
+#define PAC_CREDENTIAL_TYPE 2
+#define PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM 6
+#define PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM 7
+#define PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE 10
+#define PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO 11
+#define PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO 12
+#define PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO 13
+#define PAC_DEVICE_INFO 14
+#define PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO 15
+#define PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM 16
+#define PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO 17
+#define PAC_REQUESTER_SID 18
+static const value_string w2k_pac_types[] = {
+ { PAC_LOGON_INFO , "Logon Info" },
+ { PAC_CREDENTIAL_TYPE , "Credential Type" },
+ { PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM , "Server Checksum" },
+ { PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM , "Privsvr Checksum" },
+ { PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE , "Client Info Type" },
+ { PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO , "S4U Delegation Info" },
+ { PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO , "UPN DNS Info" },
+ { PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO , "Client Claims Info" },
+ { PAC_DEVICE_INFO , "Device Info" },
+ { PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO , "Device Claims Info" },
+ { PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM , "Ticket Checksum" },
+ { PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO , "Attributes Info" },
+ { PAC_REQUESTER_SID , "Requester Sid" },
+ { 0, NULL },
+};
+
+static const value_string krb5_msg_types[] = {
+ { KRB5_MSG_TICKET, "Ticket" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_AUTHENTICATOR, "Authenticator" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_TICKET_PART, "EncTicketPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_TGS_REQ, "TGS-REQ" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_TGS_REP, "TGS-REP" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_AS_REQ, "AS-REQ" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_AS_REP, "AS-REP" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_AP_REQ, "AP-REQ" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_AP_REP, "AP-REP" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_TGT_REQ, "TGT-REQ" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_TGT_REP, "TGT-REP" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_SAFE, "KRB-SAFE" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_PRIV, "KRB-PRIV" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_CRED, "KRB-CRED" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_AS_REP_PART, "EncASRepPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_TGS_REP_PART, "EncTGSRepPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_AP_REP_PART, "EncAPRepPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_PRIV_PART, "EncKrbPrivPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_CRED_PART, "EncKrbCredPart" },
+ { KRB5_MSG_ERROR, "KRB-ERROR" },
+ { 0, NULL },
+};
+
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG 0x01
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG 0x02
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG 0x04
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG 0x08
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_CONF_FLAG 0x10
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG 0x20
+#define KRB5_GSS_C_DCE_STYLE 0x1000
+
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_deleg = {
+ "Delegate credentials to remote peer",
+ "Do NOT delegate"
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_mutual = {
+ "Request that remote peer authenticates itself",
+ "Mutual authentication NOT required"
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_replay = {
+ "Enable replay protection for signed or sealed messages",
+ "Do NOT enable replay protection"
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_sequence = {
+ "Enable Out-of-sequence detection for sign or sealed messages",
+ "Do NOT enable out-of-sequence detection"
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_conf = {
+ "Confidentiality (sealing) may be invoked",
+ "Do NOT use Confidentiality (sealing)"
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_integ = {
+ "Integrity protection (signing) may be invoked",
+ "Do NOT use integrity protection"
+};
+
+static const true_false_string tfs_gss_flags_dce_style = {
+ "DCE-STYLE",
+ "Not using DCE-STYLE"
+};
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(proto_tree *tree, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ int usage, tvbuff_t *cryptotvb, int *datalen)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DECRYPT_KRB5_DATA_PRIVATE
+ return decrypt_krb5_data_private(tree, actx->pinfo, private_data,
+ usage, cryptotvb,
+ private_data->etype,
+ datalen);
+#else
+ return decrypt_krb5_data(tree, actx->pinfo, usage, cryptotvb,
+ private_data->etype, datalen);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_ticket_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * All Ticket encrypted parts use usage == 2
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 2, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *last_ticket_enc_part_tvb = private_data->last_ticket_enc_part_tvb;
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 Ticket");
+
+ private_data->last_ticket_enc_part_tvb = child_tvb;
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ private_data->last_ticket_enc_part_tvb = last_ticket_enc_part_tvb;
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_authenticator_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * Authenticators are encrypted with usage
+ * == 7 or
+ * == 11
+ *
+ * 7. TGS-REQ PA-TGS-REQ padata AP-REQ Authenticator
+ * (includes TGS authenticator subkey), encrypted with the
+ * TGS session key (section 5.5.1)
+ * 11. AP-REQ Authenticator (includes application
+ * authenticator subkey), encrypted with the application
+ * session key (section 5.5.1)
+ */
+ if (private_data->within_PA_TGS_REQ > 0) {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 7, next_tvb, &length);
+ } else {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 11, next_tvb, &length);
+ }
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 Authenticator");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_authorization_data(bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * Authenticators are encrypted with usage
+ * == 5 or
+ * == 4
+ *
+ * 4. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with
+ * the TGS session key (section 5.4.1)
+ * 5. TGS-REQ KDC-REQ-BODY AuthorizationData, encrypted with
+ * the TGS authenticator subkey (section 5.4.1)
+ */
+ if (private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey != NULL) {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 5, next_tvb, &length);
+ } else {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 4, next_tvb, &length);
+ }
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 AuthorizationData");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_AuthorizationData(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_KDC_REP_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ guint8 *plaintext = NULL;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * ASREP/TGSREP encryptedparts are encrypted with usage
+ * == 3 or
+ * == 8 or
+ * == 9
+ *
+ * 3. AS-REP encrypted part (includes TGS session key or
+ * application session key), encrypted with the client key
+ * (section 5.4.2)
+ *
+ * 8. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session
+ * key), encrypted with the TGS session key (section
+ * 5.4.2)
+ * 9. TGS-REP encrypted part (includes application session
+ * key), encrypted with the TGS authenticator subkey
+ * (section 5.4.2)
+ *
+ * We currently don't have a way to find the TGS-REQ state
+ * in order to check if an authenticator subkey was used.
+ *
+ * But if we client used FAST and we got a strengthen_key,
+ * we're sure an authenticator subkey was used.
+ *
+ * Windows don't use an authenticator subkey without FAST,
+ * but heimdal does.
+ *
+ * For now try 8 before 9 in order to avoid overhead and false
+ * positives for the 'kerberos.missing_keytype' filter in pure
+ * windows captures.
+ */
+ switch (private_data->msg_type) {
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_AS_REP:
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 3, next_tvb, &length);
+ break;
+ case KERBEROS_APPLICATIONS_TGS_REP:
+ if (private_data->fast_strengthen_key != NULL) {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 9, next_tvb, &length);
+ } else {
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 8, next_tvb, &length);
+ if(!plaintext){
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 9, next_tvb, &length);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 KDC-REP");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * AS-REQ PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP are encrypted with usage
+ * == 1
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 1, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 EncTimestamp");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_AP_REP_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-05.txt :
+ * 7.5.1
+ * AP-REP are encrypted with usage == 12
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 12, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 AP-REP");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_PRIV_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* RFC4120 :
+ * EncKrbPrivPart encrypted with usage
+ * == 13
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 13, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 PRIV");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_CRED_data (bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ if (private_data->etype == 0) {
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, next_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC4120 :
+ * EncKrbCredPart encrypted with usage
+ * == 14
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, 14, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 CRED");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_KrbFastReq(bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ private_data->fast_armor_key = NULL;
+ if (private_data->PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_subkey != NULL) {
+ krb5_fast_key(actx, tree, tvb,
+ private_data->PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_subkey,
+ "subkeyarmor",
+ private_data->PA_FAST_ARMOR_AP_key,
+ "ticketarmor",
+ "KrbFastReq_FAST_armorKey");
+ if (private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey != NULL) {
+ enc_key_t *explicit_armor_key = private_data->last_added_key;
+
+ /*
+ * See [MS-KILE] 3.3.5.7.4 Compound Identity
+ */
+ krb5_fast_key(actx, tree, tvb,
+ explicit_armor_key,
+ "explicitarmor",
+ private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey,
+ "tgsarmor",
+ "KrbFastReq_explicitArmorKey");
+ }
+ private_data->fast_armor_key = private_data->last_added_key;
+ } else if (private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey != NULL) {
+ krb5_fast_key(actx, tree, tvb,
+ private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_subkey,
+ "subkeyarmor",
+ private_data->PA_TGS_REQ_key,
+ "ticketarmor",
+ "KrbFastReq_TGS_armorKey");
+ private_data->fast_armor_key = private_data->last_added_key;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC6113 :
+ * KrbFastResponse encrypted with usage
+ * KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC,
+ next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 FastReq");
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_KrbFastReq(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_KrbFastResponse(bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC6113 :
+ * KrbFastResponse encrypted with usage
+ * KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
+ */
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP,
+ next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 FastRep");
+
+ private_data->fast_armor_key = private_data->last_decryption_key;
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_KrbFastResponse(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_decrypt_EncryptedChallenge(bool imp_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx,
+ proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint8 *plaintext;
+ int length;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+ int usage = 0;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ /* RFC6113 :
+ * KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
+ * KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
+ */
+ if (kerberos_private_is_kdc_req(private_data)) {
+ usage = KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT;
+ name = "Krb5 CHALLENGE_CLIENT";
+ } else {
+ usage = KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC;
+ name = "Krb5 CHALLENGE_KDC";
+ }
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data_asn1(tree, actx, usage, next_tvb, &length);
+
+ if(plaintext){
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, length, length);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, name);
+
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(FALSE, child_tvb, 0, actx , tree, /* hf_index*/ -1);
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+static int * const hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_fields[] = {
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_crc,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_md5,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_rc4_hmac,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_fast_supported,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_compound_identity_supported,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_claims_supported,
+ &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_resource_sid_compression_disabled,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_PA_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_,
+ int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_,
+ proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ actx->created_item = proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset,
+ hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes,
+ ett_krb_pa_supported_enctypes,
+ hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_fields,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int * const hf_krb_ad_ap_options_fields[] = {
+ &hf_krb_ad_ap_options_cbt,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_AD_AP_OPTIONS(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_,
+ int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_,
+ proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ actx->created_item = proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset,
+ hf_krb_ad_ap_options,
+ ett_krb_ad_ap_options,
+ hf_krb_ad_ap_options_fields,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_AD_TARGET_PRINCIPAL(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_,
+ int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_,
+ proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ int tp_offset, tp_len;
+ guint16 bc;
+
+ bc = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ tp_offset = offset;
+ tp_len = bc;
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_ad_target_principal, tvb,
+ tp_offset, tp_len,
+ ENC_UTF_16 | ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+/* Dissect a GSSAPI checksum as per RFC1964. This is NOT ASN.1 encoded.
+ */
+static int
+dissect_krb5_rfc1964_checksum(asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb)
+{
+ int offset=0;
+ guint32 len;
+ guint16 dlglen;
+
+ /* Length of Bnd field */
+ len=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_len, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* Bnd field */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_bnd, tvb, offset, len, ENC_NA);
+ offset += len;
+
+
+ /* flags */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_dce_style, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_integ, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_conf, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_sequence, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_replay, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_mutual, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_deleg, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* the next fields are optional so we have to check that we have
+ * more data in our buffers */
+ if(tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)<2){
+ return offset;
+ }
+ /* dlgopt identifier */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_dlgopt, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)<2){
+ return offset;
+ }
+ /* dlglen identifier */
+ dlglen=tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_gssapi_dlglen, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 2;
+
+ if(dlglen!=tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)){
+ proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, actx->pinfo, &ei_krb_gssapi_dlglen, tvb, 0, 0,
+ "Error: DlgLen:%d is not the same as number of bytes remaining:%d", dlglen, tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset));
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ /* this should now be a KRB_CRED message */
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, tree, /* hf_index */ -1);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PA_PROV_SRV_LOCATION(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ offset=dissect_ber_GeneralString(actx, tree, tvb, offset, hf_krb_provsrv_location, NULL, 0);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PW_SALT(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint length;
+ guint32 nt_status = 0;
+ guint32 reserved = 0;
+ guint32 flags = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Microsoft stores a special 12 byte blob here
+ * [MS-KILE] 2.2.1 KERB-EXT-ERROR
+ * guint32 NT_status
+ * guint32 reserved (== 0)
+ * guint32 flags (at least 0x00000001 is set)
+ */
+ length = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ if (length <= 0) {
+ return offset;
+ }
+ if (length != 12) {
+ goto no_error;
+ }
+
+ if (private_data->errorcode == 0) {
+ goto no_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!private_data->try_nt_status) {
+ goto no_error;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ reserved = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset + 4);
+ flags = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset + 8);
+
+ if (nt_status == 0 || reserved != 0 || flags == 0) {
+ goto no_error;
+ }
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_ext_error_nt_status, tvb, offset, 4,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ col_append_fstr(actx->pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
+ " NT Status: %s",
+ val_to_str(nt_status, NT_errors,
+ "Unknown error code %#x"));
+ offset += 4;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_ext_error_reserved, tvb, offset, 4,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_ext_error_flags, tvb, offset, 4,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ return offset;
+
+ no_error:
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pw_salt, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA);
+ offset += length;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_DREP(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 *drep)
+{
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint8 val;
+
+ tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(parent_tree, tvb, offset, 16, ett_krb_pac_drep, NULL, "DREP");
+
+ val = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_dcerpc_drep_byteorder, tvb, offset, 1, val>>4);
+
+ offset++;
+
+ if (drep) {
+ *drep = val;
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+/* This might be some sort of header that MIDL generates when creating
+ * marshalling/unmarshalling code for blobs that are not to be transported
+ * ontop of DCERPC and where the DREP fields specifying things such as
+ * endianess and similar are not available.
+ */
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_NDRHEADERBLOB(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, guint8 *drep, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(parent_tree, tvb, offset, 16, ett_krb_pac_midl_blob, NULL, "MES header");
+
+ /* modified DREP field that is used for stuff that is transporetd ontop
+ of non dcerpc
+ */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_midl_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset++;
+
+ offset = dissect_krb5_PAC_DREP(tree, tvb, offset, drep);
+
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_midl_hdr_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_midl_fill_bytes, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* length of blob that follows */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_midl_blob_len, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset += 8;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_LOGON_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint8 drep[4] = { 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; /* fake DREP struct */
+ static dcerpc_info di; /* fake dcerpc_info struct */
+ static dcerpc_call_value call_data;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_logon_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_logon_info);
+
+ /* skip the first 16 bytes, they are some magic created by the idl
+ * compiler the first 4 bytes might be flags?
+ */
+ offset = dissect_krb5_PAC_NDRHEADERBLOB(tree, tvb, offset, &drep[0], actx);
+
+ /* the PAC_LOGON_INFO blob */
+ /* fake whatever state the dcerpc runtime support needs */
+ di.conformant_run=0;
+ /* we need di->call_data->flags.NDR64 == 0 */
+ di.call_data=&call_data;
+ init_ndr_pointer_list(&di);
+ offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(tvb, offset, actx->pinfo, tree, &di, drep,
+ netlogon_dissect_PAC_LOGON_INFO, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
+ "PAC_LOGON_INFO:", -1);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo _U_)
+{
+ proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_credential_data, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint8 *plaintext = NULL;
+ int plainlen = 0;
+ int length = 0;
+#define KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED 16
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ guint32 etype;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+ int usage = KRB5_KU_OTHER_ENCRYPTED;
+#endif
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_credential_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_credential_info);
+
+ /* version */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_credential_info_version, tvb,
+ offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ /* etype */
+ etype = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+#endif
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_credential_info_etype, tvb,
+ offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ /* data */
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+ length=tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ plaintext=decrypt_krb5_data(tree, actx->pinfo, usage, next_tvb, (int)etype, &plainlen);
+#endif
+
+ if (plaintext != NULL) {
+ tvbuff_t *child_tvb;
+ child_tvb = tvb_new_child_real_data(tvb, plaintext, plainlen, plainlen);
+
+ /* Add the decrypted data to the data source list. */
+ add_new_data_source(actx->pinfo, child_tvb, "Krb5 PAC_CREDENTIAL");
+
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA(tree, child_tvb, 0, actx->pinfo);
+ }
+
+ return offset + length;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint8 drep[4] = { 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; /* fake DREP struct */
+ static dcerpc_info di; /* fake dcerpc_info struct */
+ static dcerpc_call_value call_data;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info);
+
+ /* skip the first 16 bytes, they are some magic created by the idl
+ * compiler the first 4 bytes might be flags?
+ */
+ offset = dissect_krb5_PAC_NDRHEADERBLOB(tree, tvb, offset, &drep[0], actx);
+
+
+ /* the S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob. See [MS-PAC] */
+ /* fake whatever state the dcerpc runtime support needs */
+ di.conformant_run=0;
+ /* we need di->call_data->flags.NDR64 == 0 */
+ di.call_data=&call_data;
+ init_ndr_pointer_list(&di);
+ offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(tvb, offset, actx->pinfo, tree, &di, drep,
+ netlogon_dissect_PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
+ "PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO:", -1);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+#define PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_CONSTRUCTED 0x00000001
+#define PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_HAS_SAM_NAME_AND_SID 0x00000002
+static const true_false_string tfs_krb_pac_upn_flag_upn_constructed = {
+ "UPN Name is Constructed",
+ "UPN Name is NOT Constructed",
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_krb_pac_upn_flag_has_sam_name_and_sid = {
+ "SAM_NAME and SID are included",
+ "SAM_NAME and SID are NOT included",
+};
+static int * const hf_krb_pac_upn_flags_fields[] = {
+ &hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_upn_constructed,
+ &hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_has_sam_name_and_sid,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint16 dns_offset, dns_len;
+ guint16 upn_offset, upn_len;
+ guint16 samaccountname_offset = 0, samaccountname_len = 0;
+ guint16 objectsid_offset = 0, objectsid_len = 0;
+ guint32 flags;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info);
+
+ /* upn */
+ upn_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+ upn_offset = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_offset, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+
+ /* dns */
+ dns_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+ dns_offset = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_offset, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+
+ /* flags */
+ flags = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset,
+ hf_krb_pac_upn_flags,
+ ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info_flags,
+ hf_krb_pac_upn_flags_fields,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ if (flags & PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_HAS_SAM_NAME_AND_SID) {
+ samaccountname_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+ samaccountname_offset = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_offset, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+
+ objectsid_len = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=2;
+ objectsid_offset = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_offset, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ /* offset+=2; */
+ }
+
+ /* upn */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_name, tvb, upn_offset, upn_len, ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+
+ /* dns */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_name, tvb, dns_offset, dns_len, ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+
+ /* samaccountname */
+ if (samaccountname_offset != 0 && samaccountname_len != 0) {
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname, tvb, samaccountname_offset, samaccountname_len, ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ }
+ /* objectsid */
+ if (objectsid_offset != 0 && objectsid_len != 0) {
+ tvbuff_t *sid_tvb;
+ sid_tvb=tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, objectsid_offset, objectsid_len);
+ dissect_nt_sid(sid_tvb, 0, tree, "objectSid", NULL, -1);
+ }
+
+ return dns_offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ int length = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ if (length == 0) {
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_client_claims_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_DEVICE_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint8 drep[4] = { 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}; /* fake DREP struct */
+ static dcerpc_info di; /* fake dcerpc_info struct */
+ static dcerpc_call_value call_data;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_device_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_device_info);
+
+ /* skip the first 16 bytes, they are some magic created by the idl
+ * compiler the first 4 bytes might be flags?
+ */
+ offset = dissect_krb5_PAC_NDRHEADERBLOB(tree, tvb, offset, &drep[0], actx);
+
+ /* the PAC_DEVICE_INFO blob */
+ /* fake whatever state the dcerpc runtime support needs */
+ di.conformant_run=0;
+ /* we need di->call_data->flags.NDR64 == 0 */
+ di.call_data=&call_data;
+ init_ndr_pointer_list(&di);
+ offset = dissect_ndr_pointer(tvb, offset, actx->pinfo, tree, &di, drep,
+ netlogon_dissect_PAC_DEVICE_INFO, NDR_POINTER_UNIQUE,
+ "PAC_DEVICE_INFO:", -1);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ int length = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ if (length == 0) {
+ return offset;
+ }
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_device_claims_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_server_checksum, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_server_checksum);
+
+ /* signature type */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_type, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* signature data */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_signature, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum);
+
+ /* signature type */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_type, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* signature data */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_signature, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ guint16 namelen;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_client_info_type, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_client_info_type);
+
+ /* clientid */
+ offset = dissect_nt_64bit_time(tvb, tree, offset, hf_krb_pac_clientid);
+
+ /* name length */
+ namelen=tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_krb_pac_namelen, tvb, offset, 2, namelen);
+ offset+=2;
+
+ /* client name */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_clientname, tvb, offset, namelen, ENC_UTF_16|ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=namelen;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_ticket_checksum, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_ticket_checksum);
+
+ /* signature type */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_type, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* signature data */
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_signature_signature, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+#define PAC_ATTRIBUTE_FLAG_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED 0x00000001
+#define PAC_ATTRIBUTE_FLAG_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY 0x00000002
+static const true_false_string tfs_krb_pac_attributes_info_pac_was_requested = {
+ "PAC was requested",
+ "PAC was NOT requested",
+};
+static const true_false_string tfs_krb_pac_attributes_info_pac_was_given_implicitly = {
+ "PAC was given implicitly",
+ "PAC was NOT given implicitly",
+};
+static int * const hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_fields[] = {
+ &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_requested,
+ &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_given_implicitly,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_attributes_info, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_attributes_info);
+
+ /* flags length*/
+ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_length, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* flags */
+ proto_tree_add_bitmask(tree, tvb, offset,
+ hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags,
+ ett_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags,
+ hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_fields,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_PAC_REQUESTER_SID(proto_tree *parent_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *tree;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_krb_pac_requester_sid, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_krb_pac_requester_sid);
+
+ offset = dissect_nt_sid(tvb, offset, tree, "RequesterSid", NULL, -1);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_AD_WIN2K_PAC_struct(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx)
+{
+ guint32 pac_type;
+ guint32 pac_size;
+ guint32 pac_offset;
+ proto_item *it=NULL;
+ proto_tree *tr=NULL;
+ tvbuff_t *next_tvb;
+
+ /* type of pac data */
+ pac_type=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ it=proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_krb_w2k_pac_type, tvb, offset, 4, pac_type);
+ tr=proto_item_add_subtree(it, ett_krb_pac);
+
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* size of pac data */
+ pac_size=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tr, hf_krb_w2k_pac_size, tvb, offset, 4, pac_size);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* offset to pac data */
+ pac_offset=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tr, hf_krb_w2k_pac_offset, tvb, offset, 4, pac_offset);
+ offset += 8;
+
+ next_tvb=tvb_new_subset_length_caplen(tvb, pac_offset, pac_size, pac_size);
+ switch(pac_type){
+ case PAC_LOGON_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_LOGON_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_CREDENTIAL_TYPE:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_DEVICE_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_DEVICE_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+ case PAC_REQUESTER_SID:
+ dissect_krb5_PAC_REQUESTER_SID(tr, next_tvb, 0, actx);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_krb5_AD_WIN2K_PAC(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree, int hf_index _U_)
+{
+ guint32 entries;
+ guint32 version;
+ guint32 i;
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS) && defined(HAVE_KRB5_PAC_VERIFY)
+ verify_krb5_pac(tree, actx, tvb);
+#endif
+
+ /* first in the PAC structure comes the number of entries */
+ entries=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_krb_w2k_pac_entries, tvb, offset, 4, entries);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ /* second comes the version */
+ version=tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_krb_w2k_pac_version, tvb, offset, 4, version);
+ offset += 4;
+
+ for(i=0;i<entries;i++){
+ offset=dissect_krb5_AD_WIN2K_PAC_struct(tree, tvb, offset, actx);
+ }
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+#include "packet-kerberos-fn.c"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+static const ber_sequence_t PA_ENC_TS_ENC_sequence[] = {
+ { &hf_krb_patimestamp, BER_CLASS_CON, 0, 0, dissect_kerberos_KerberosTime },
+ { &hf_krb_pausec , BER_CLASS_CON, 1, BER_FLAGS_OPTIONAL, dissect_kerberos_Microseconds },
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ offset = dissect_ber_sequence(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,
+ PA_ENC_TS_ENC_sequence, hf_index, ett_krb_pa_enc_ts_enc);
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_T_strengthen_key(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ gint save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ kerberos_key_save_fn saved_encryption_key_fn = private_data->save_encryption_key_fn;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = hf_kerberos_KrbFastResponse;
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = save_KrbFastResponse_strengthen_key;
+#endif
+ offset = dissect_kerberos_EncryptionKey(implicit_tag, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_index);
+
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index = save_encryption_key_parent_hf_index;
+ private_data->save_encryption_key_fn = saved_encryption_key_fn;
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static const ber_sequence_t KrbFastFinished_sequence[] = {
+ { &hf_kerberos_timestamp , BER_CLASS_CON, 0, 0, dissect_kerberos_KerberosTime },
+ { &hf_kerberos_usec , BER_CLASS_CON, 1, 0, dissect_kerberos_Microseconds },
+ { &hf_kerberos_crealm , BER_CLASS_CON, 2, 0, dissect_kerberos_Realm },
+ { &hf_kerberos_cname_01 , BER_CLASS_CON, 3, 0, dissect_kerberos_PrincipalName },
+ { &hf_kerberos_ticket_checksum, BER_CLASS_CON, 4, 0, dissect_kerberos_Checksum },
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_KrbFastFinished(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ offset = dissect_ber_sequence(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,
+ KrbFastFinished_sequence, hf_index, ett_kerberos_KrbFastFinished);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static const ber_sequence_t KrbFastResponse_sequence[] = {
+ { &hf_kerberos_rEP_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA, BER_CLASS_CON, 0, 0, dissect_kerberos_T_rEP_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA },
+ { &hf_kerberos_strengthen_key, BER_CLASS_CON, 1, BER_FLAGS_OPTIONAL, dissect_kerberos_T_strengthen_key },
+ { &hf_kerberos_finished , BER_CLASS_CON, 2, BER_FLAGS_OPTIONAL, dissect_kerberos_KrbFastFinished },
+ { &hf_kerberos_nonce , BER_CLASS_CON, 3, 0, dissect_kerberos_UInt32 },
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_KrbFastResponse(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ offset = dissect_ber_sequence(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,
+ KrbFastResponse_sequence, hf_index, ett_kerberos_KrbFastResponse);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static const ber_sequence_t KrbFastReq_sequence[] = {
+ { &hf_kerberos_fast_options, BER_CLASS_CON, 0, 0, dissect_kerberos_FastOptions },
+ { &hf_kerberos_rEQ_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA, BER_CLASS_CON, 1, 0, dissect_kerberos_T_rEQ_SEQUENCE_OF_PA_DATA },
+ { &hf_kerberos_req_body , BER_CLASS_CON, 2, 0, dissect_kerberos_KDC_REQ_BODY },
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_KrbFastReq(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(actx);
+ struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST saved_stack = private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST;
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST = (struct _kerberos_PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST) { .defer = FALSE, };
+ offset = dissect_ber_sequence(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,
+ KrbFastReq_sequence, hf_index, ett_kerberos_KrbFastReq);
+ private_data->PA_FX_FAST_REQUEST = saved_stack;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static int * const FastOptions_bits[] = {
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_reserved,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_hide_client_names,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit2,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit3,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit4,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit5,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit6,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit7,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit8,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit9,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit10,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit11,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit12,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit13,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit14,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit15,
+ &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_kdc_follow_referrals,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_FastOptions(bool implicit_tag _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, int offset _U_, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_, proto_tree *tree _U_, int hf_index _U_) {
+ offset = dissect_ber_bitstring(implicit_tag, actx, tree, tvb, offset,
+ FastOptions_bits, 17, hf_index, ett_kerberos_FastOptions,
+ NULL);
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+/* Make wrappers around exported functions for now */
+int
+dissect_krb5_Checksum(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ return dissect_kerberos_Checksum(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_kerberos_cksum);
+
+}
+
+int
+dissect_krb5_ctime(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ return dissect_kerberos_KerberosTime(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_kerberos_ctime);
+}
+
+
+int
+dissect_krb5_cname(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ return dissect_kerberos_PrincipalName(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_kerberos_cname);
+}
+int
+dissect_krb5_realm(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_)
+{
+ return dissect_kerberos_Realm(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, tree, hf_kerberos_realm);
+}
+
+struct kerberos_display_key_state {
+ proto_tree *tree;
+ packet_info *pinfo;
+ expert_field *expindex;
+ const char *name;
+ tvbuff_t *tvb;
+ gint start;
+ gint length;
+};
+
+static void
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+kerberos_display_key(gpointer data, gpointer userdata)
+#else
+kerberos_display_key(gpointer data _U_, gpointer userdata _U_)
+#endif
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ struct kerberos_display_key_state *state =
+ (struct kerberos_display_key_state *)userdata;
+ const enc_key_t *ek = (const enc_key_t *)data;
+ proto_item *item = NULL;
+ enc_key_t *sek = NULL;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_expert_format(state->tree,
+ state->pinfo,
+ state->expindex,
+ state->tvb,
+ state->start,
+ state->length,
+ "%s %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ state->name,
+ ek->key_origin, ek->keytype,
+ ek->id_str, ek->num_same,
+ ek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ ek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, ek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ if (ek->src1 != NULL) {
+ sek = ek->src1;
+ expert_add_info_format(state->pinfo,
+ item,
+ state->expindex,
+ "SRC1 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+ if (ek->src2 != NULL) {
+ sek = ek->src2;
+ expert_add_info_format(state->pinfo,
+ item,
+ state->expindex,
+ "SRC2 %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ }
+ sek = ek->same_list;
+ while (sek != NULL) {
+ expert_add_info_format(state->pinfo,
+ item,
+ state->expindex,
+ "%s %s keytype %d (id=%s same=%u) (%02x%02x%02x%02x...)",
+ state->name,
+ sek->key_origin, sek->keytype,
+ sek->id_str, sek->num_same,
+ sek->keyvalue[0] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[1] & 0xFF,
+ sek->keyvalue[2] & 0xFF, sek->keyvalue[3] & 0xFF);
+ sek = sek->same_list;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+}
+
+static const value_string KERB_LOGON_SUBMIT_TYPE[] = {
+ { 2, "KerbInteractiveLogon" },
+ { 6, "KerbSmartCardLogon" },
+ { 7, "KerbWorkstationUnlockLogon" },
+ { 8, "KerbSmartCardUnlockLogon" },
+ { 9, "KerbProxyLogon" },
+ { 10, "KerbTicketLogon" },
+ { 11, "KerbTicketUnlockLogon" },
+ { 12, "KerbS4ULogon" },
+ { 13, "KerbCertificateLogon" },
+ { 14, "KerbCertificateS4ULogon" },
+ { 15, "KerbCertificateUnlockLogon" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+
+#define KERB_LOGON_FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET 0x1
+#define KERB_LOGON_FLAG_REDIRECTED 0x2
+
+static int* const ktl_flags_bits[] = {
+ &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET,
+ &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_REDIRECTED,
+ NULL
+};
+
+int
+dissect_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree)
+{
+ proto_item *item;
+ proto_tree *subtree;
+ guint32 ServiceTicketLength;
+ guint32 TicketGrantingTicketLength;
+ int orig_offset;
+
+ if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) < 32)
+ return offset;
+
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
+ subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON);
+
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_MessageType, tvb, offset, 4,
+ ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ proto_tree_add_bitmask(subtree, tvb, offset, hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_Flags,
+ ett_kerberos, ktl_flags_bits, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ ServiceTicketLength = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicketLength, tvb,
+ offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ TicketGrantingTicketLength = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
+ proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicketLength,
+ tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+ offset+=4;
+
+ /* Skip two PUCHAR of ServiceTicket and TicketGrantingTicket */
+ offset+=16;
+
+ if (ServiceTicketLength == 0)
+ return offset;
+
+ orig_offset = offset;
+ offset = dissect_kerberos_Ticket(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, subtree,
+ hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicket);
+
+ if ((unsigned)(offset-orig_offset) != ServiceTicketLength)
+ return offset;
+
+ if (TicketGrantingTicketLength == 0)
+ return offset;
+
+ offset = dissect_kerberos_KRB_CRED(FALSE, tvb, offset, actx, subtree,
+ hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicket);
+
+ if ((unsigned)(offset-orig_offset) != ServiceTicketLength + TicketGrantingTicketLength)
+ return offset;
+
+ return offset;
+}
+
+static gint
+dissect_kerberos_common(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
+ bool dci, bool do_col_protocol, bool have_rm,
+ kerberos_callbacks *cb)
+{
+ volatile int offset = 0;
+ proto_tree *volatile kerberos_tree = NULL;
+ proto_item *volatile item = NULL;
+ kerberos_private_data_t *private_data = NULL;
+ asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx;
+
+ /* TCP record mark and length */
+ guint32 krb_rm = 0;
+ gint krb_reclen = 0;
+
+ gbl_do_col_info=dci;
+
+ if (have_rm) {
+ krb_rm = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ krb_reclen = kerberos_rm_to_reclen(krb_rm);
+ /*
+ * What is a reasonable size limit?
+ */
+ if (krb_reclen > 10 * 1024 * 1024) {
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (do_col_protocol) {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "KRB5");
+ }
+
+ if (tree) {
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_kerberos, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
+ kerberos_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_kerberos);
+ }
+
+ show_krb_recordmark(kerberos_tree, tvb, offset, krb_rm);
+ offset += 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Do some sanity checking here,
+ * All krb5 packets start with a TAG class that is BER_CLASS_APP
+ * and a tag value that is either of the values below:
+ * If it doesn't look like kerberos, return 0 and let someone else have
+ * a go at it.
+ */
+ gint8 tmp_class;
+ bool tmp_pc;
+ gint32 tmp_tag;
+
+ get_ber_identifier(tvb, offset, &tmp_class, &tmp_pc, &tmp_tag);
+ if(tmp_class!=BER_CLASS_APP){
+ return 0;
+ }
+ switch(tmp_tag){
+ case KRB5_MSG_TICKET:
+ case KRB5_MSG_AUTHENTICATOR:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_TICKET_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_AS_REQ:
+ case KRB5_MSG_AS_REP:
+ case KRB5_MSG_TGS_REQ:
+ case KRB5_MSG_TGS_REP:
+ case KRB5_MSG_AP_REQ:
+ case KRB5_MSG_AP_REP:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_AS_REP_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_TGS_REP_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_AP_REP_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_PRIV_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ENC_KRB_CRED_PART:
+ case KRB5_MSG_SAFE:
+ case KRB5_MSG_PRIV:
+ case KRB5_MSG_ERROR:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (do_col_protocol) {
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "KRB5");
+ }
+ if (gbl_do_col_info) {
+ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
+ }
+ if (tree) {
+ item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_kerberos, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
+ kerberos_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_kerberos);
+ }
+ }
+ asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo);
+ asn1_ctx.private_data = NULL;
+ private_data = kerberos_get_private_data(&asn1_ctx);
+ private_data->callbacks = cb;
+
+ TRY {
+ offset=dissect_kerberos_Applications(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx , kerberos_tree, /* hf_index */ -1);
+ } CATCH_BOUNDS_ERRORS {
+ RETHROW;
+ } ENDTRY;
+
+ if (kerberos_tree != NULL) {
+ struct kerberos_display_key_state display_state = {
+ .tree = kerberos_tree,
+ .pinfo = pinfo,
+ .expindex = &ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype,
+ .name = "Provides",
+ .tvb = tvb,
+ };
+
+ wmem_list_foreach(private_data->learnt_keys,
+ kerberos_display_key,
+ &display_state);
+ }
+
+ if (kerberos_tree != NULL) {
+ struct kerberos_display_key_state display_state = {
+ .tree = kerberos_tree,
+ .pinfo = pinfo,
+ .expindex = &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype,
+ .name = "Missing",
+ .tvb = tvb,
+ };
+
+ wmem_list_foreach(private_data->missing_keys,
+ kerberos_display_key,
+ &display_state);
+ }
+
+ if (kerberos_tree != NULL) {
+ struct kerberos_display_key_state display_state = {
+ .tree = kerberos_tree,
+ .pinfo = pinfo,
+ .expindex = &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype,
+ .name = "Used",
+ .tvb = tvb,
+ };
+
+ wmem_list_foreach(private_data->decryption_keys,
+ kerberos_display_key,
+ &display_state);
+ }
+
+ proto_item_set_len(item, offset);
+ return offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the TCP record mark.
+ */
+void
+show_krb_recordmark(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint start, guint32 krb_rm)
+{
+ gint rec_len;
+ proto_tree *rm_tree;
+
+ if (tree == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ rec_len = kerberos_rm_to_reclen(krb_rm);
+ rm_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree_format(tree, tvb, start, 4, ett_krb_recordmark, NULL,
+ "Record Mark: %u %s", rec_len, plurality(rec_len, "byte", "bytes"));
+ proto_tree_add_boolean(rm_tree, hf_krb_rm_reserved, tvb, start, 4, krb_rm);
+ proto_tree_add_uint(rm_tree, hf_krb_rm_reclen, tvb, start, 4, krb_rm);
+}
+
+gint
+dissect_kerberos_main(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int do_col_info, kerberos_callbacks *cb)
+{
+ return (dissect_kerberos_common(tvb, pinfo, tree, do_col_info, FALSE, FALSE, cb));
+}
+
+guint32
+kerberos_output_keytype(void)
+{
+ return gbl_keytype;
+}
+
+static gint
+dissect_kerberos_udp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_)
+{
+ /* Some weird kerberos implementation apparently do krb4 on the krb5 port.
+ Since all (except weirdo transarc krb4 stuff) use
+ an opcode <=16 in the first byte, use this to see if it might
+ be krb4.
+ All krb5 commands start with an APPL tag and thus is >=0x60
+ so if first byte is <=16 just blindly assume it is krb4 then
+ */
+ if(tvb_captured_length(tvb) >= 1 && tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 0)<=0x10){
+ if(krb4_handle){
+ gboolean res;
+
+ res=call_dissector_only(krb4_handle, tvb, pinfo, tree, NULL);
+ return res;
+ }else{
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ return dissect_kerberos_common(tvb, pinfo, tree, TRUE, TRUE, FALSE, NULL);
+}
+
+gint
+kerberos_rm_to_reclen(guint krb_rm)
+{
+ return (krb_rm & KRB_RM_RECLEN);
+}
+
+guint
+get_krb_pdu_len(packet_info *pinfo _U_, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, void *data _U_)
+{
+ guint krb_rm;
+ gint pdulen;
+
+ krb_rm = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, offset);
+ pdulen = kerberos_rm_to_reclen(krb_rm);
+ return (pdulen + 4);
+}
+static void
+kerberos_prefs_apply_cb(void) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNETTLE
+ clear_keytab();
+ read_keytab_file(keytab_filename);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_tcp_pdu(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data _U_)
+{
+ pinfo->fragmented = TRUE;
+ if (dissect_kerberos_common(tvb, pinfo, tree, TRUE, TRUE, TRUE, NULL) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * The dissector failed to recognize this as a valid
+ * Kerberos message. Mark it as a continuation packet.
+ */
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Continuation");
+ }
+
+ return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
+}
+
+static int
+dissect_kerberos_tcp(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data)
+{
+ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "KRB5");
+ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
+
+ tcp_dissect_pdus(tvb, pinfo, tree, krb_desegment, 4, get_krb_pdu_len,
+ dissect_kerberos_tcp_pdu, data);
+ return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
+}
+
+/*--- proto_register_kerberos -------------------------------------------*/
+void proto_register_kerberos(void) {
+
+ /* List of fields */
+
+ static hf_register_info hf[] = {
+ { &hf_krb_rm_reserved, {
+ "Reserved", "kerberos.rm.reserved", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_set_notset), KRB_RM_RESERVED, "Record mark reserved bit", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_rm_reclen, {
+ "Record Length", "kerberos.rm.length", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, KRB_RM_RECLEN, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_provsrv_location, {
+ "PROVSRV Location", "kerberos.provsrv_location", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PacketCable PROV SRV Location", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pw_salt,
+ { "pw-salt", "kerberos.pw_salt", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ext_error_nt_status, /* we keep kerberos.smb.nt_status for compat reasons */
+ { "NT Status", "kerberos.smb.nt_status", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ VALS(NT_errors), 0, "NT Status code", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ext_error_reserved,
+ { "Reserved", "kerberos.ext_error.reserved", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ext_error_flags,
+ { "Flags", "kerberos.ext_error.flags", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_address_ip, {
+ "IP Address", "kerberos.addr_ip", FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_address_ipv6, {
+ "IPv6 Address", "kerberos.addr_ipv6", FT_IPv6, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_address_netbios, {
+ "NetBIOS Address", "kerberos.addr_nb", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "NetBIOS Address and type", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_len, {
+ "Length", "kerberos.gssapi.len", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of GSSAPI Bnd field", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_bnd, {
+ "Bnd", "kerberos.gssapi.bdn", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "GSSAPI Bnd field", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_deleg, {
+ "Deleg", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.deleg", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_deleg), KRB5_GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_mutual, {
+ "Mutual", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.mutual", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_mutual), KRB5_GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_replay, {
+ "Replay", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.replay", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_replay), KRB5_GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_sequence, {
+ "Sequence", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.sequence", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_sequence), KRB5_GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_conf, {
+ "Conf", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.conf", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_conf), KRB5_GSS_C_CONF_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_integ, {
+ "Integ", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.integ", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_integ), KRB5_GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_c_flag_dce_style, {
+ "DCE-style", "kerberos.gssapi.checksum.flags.dce-style", FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_gss_flags_dce_style), KRB5_GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_dlgopt, {
+ "DlgOpt", "kerberos.gssapi.dlgopt", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "GSSAPI DlgOpt", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_gssapi_dlglen, {
+ "DlgLen", "kerberos.gssapi.dlglen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "GSSAPI DlgLen", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_midl_blob_len, {
+ "Blob Length", "kerberos.midl_blob_len", FT_UINT64, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of NDR encoded data that follows", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_midl_fill_bytes, {
+ "Fill bytes", "kerberos.midl.fill_bytes", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, "Just some fill bytes", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_midl_version, {
+ "Version", "kerberos.midl.version", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Version of pickling", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_midl_hdr_len, {
+ "HDR Length", "kerberos.midl.hdr_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of header", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_signature_type, {
+ "Type", "kerberos.pac.signature.type", FT_INT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC Signature Type", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_signature_signature, {
+ "Signature", "kerberos.pac.signature.signature", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "A PAC signature blob", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_w2k_pac_entries, {
+ "Num Entries", "kerberos.pac.entries", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Number of W2k PAC entries", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_w2k_pac_version, {
+ "Version", "kerberos.pac.version", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Version of PAC structures", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_w2k_pac_type, {
+ "Type", "kerberos.pac.type", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ VALS(w2k_pac_types), 0, "Type of W2k PAC entry", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_w2k_pac_size, {
+ "Size", "kerberos.pac.size", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Size of W2k PAC entry", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_w2k_pac_offset, {
+ "Offset", "kerberos.pac.offset", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Offset to W2k PAC entry", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_clientid, {
+ "ClientID", "kerberos.pac.clientid", FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL,
+ NULL, 0, "ClientID Timestamp", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_namelen, {
+ "Name Length", "kerberos.pac.namelen", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, "Length of client name", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_clientname, {
+ "Name", "kerberos.pac.name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "Name of the Client in the PAC structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_logon_info, {
+ "PAC_LOGON_INFO", "kerberos.pac_logon_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_LOGON_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_credential_data, {
+ "PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA", "kerberos.pac_credential_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_credential_info, {
+ "PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO", "kerberos.pac_credential_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_credential_info_version, {
+ "Version", "kerberos.pac_credential_info.version", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_credential_info_etype, {
+ "Etype", "kerberos.pac_credential_info.etype", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_server_checksum, {
+ "PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM", "kerberos.pac_server_checksum", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum, {
+ "PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM", "kerberos.pac_privsvr_checksum", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_client_info_type, {
+ "PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE", "kerberos.pac_client_info_type", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_CLIENT_INFO_TYPE structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info, {
+ "PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO", "kerberos.pac_s4u_delegation_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_S4U_DELEGATION_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_info, {
+ "UPN_DNS_INFO", "kerberos.pac_upn_dns_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "UPN_DNS_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_flags, {
+ "Flags", "kerberos.pac.upn.flags", FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX,
+ NULL, 0, "UPN flags", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_upn_constructed, {
+ "UPN Name Constructed",
+ "kerberos.pac.upn.flags.upn_constructed",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_krb_pac_upn_flag_upn_constructed),
+ PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_CONSTRUCTED,
+ "Is the UPN Name constructed?", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_flag_has_sam_name_and_sid, {
+ "SAM_NAME and SID Included",
+ "kerberos.pac.upn.flags.has_sam_name_and_sid",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_krb_pac_upn_flag_has_sam_name_and_sid),
+ PAC_UPN_DNS_FLAG_HAS_SAM_NAME_AND_SID,
+ "Are SAM_NAME and SID included?", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_offset, {
+ "UPN Offset", "kerberos.pac.upn.upn_offset", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_len, {
+ "UPN Len", "kerberos.pac.upn.upn_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_upn_name, {
+ "UPN Name", "kerberos.pac.upn.upn_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_offset, {
+ "DNS Offset", "kerberos.pac.upn.dns_offset", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_len, {
+ "DNS Len", "kerberos.pac.upn.dns_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_dns_name, {
+ "DNS Name", "kerberos.pac.upn.dns_name", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_offset, {
+ "sAMAccountName Offset", "kerberos.pac.upn.samaccountname_offset", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname_len, {
+ "sAMAccountName Len", "kerberos.pac.upn.samaccountname_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_samaccountname, {
+ "sAMAccountName", "kerberos.pac.upn.samaccountname", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_offset, {
+ "objectSid Offset", "kerberos.pac.upn.objectsid_offset", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_upn_objectsid_len, {
+ "objectSid Len", "kerberos.pac.upn.objectsid_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_client_claims_info, {
+ "PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO", "kerberos.pac_client_claims_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_device_info, {
+ "PAC_DEVICE_INFO", "kerberos.pac_device_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_DEVICE_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_device_claims_info, {
+ "PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO", "kerberos.pac_device_claims_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_ticket_checksum, {
+ "PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM", "kerberos.pac_ticket_checksum", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info, {
+ "PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO", "kerberos.pac_attributes_info", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_ATTRIBUTES_INFO structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_length, {
+ "Flags Valid Length", "kerberos.pac.attributes_info.length", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags, {
+ "Flags", "kerberos.pac.attributes_info.flags",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_requested, {
+ "PAC Requested",
+ "kerberos.pac.attributes.flags.pac_was_requested",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_krb_pac_attributes_info_pac_was_requested),
+ PAC_ATTRIBUTE_FLAG_PAC_WAS_REQUESTED,
+ "Was a PAC requested?", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags_pac_was_given_implicitly, {
+ "PAC given Implicitly",
+ "kerberos.pac.attributes.flags.pac_was_given_implicitly",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32,
+ TFS(&tfs_krb_pac_attributes_info_pac_was_given_implicitly),
+ PAC_ATTRIBUTE_FLAG_PAC_WAS_GIVEN_IMPLICITLY,
+ "Was PAC given implicitly?", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pac_requester_sid, {
+ "PAC_REQUESTER_SID", "kerberos.pac_requester_sid", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE,
+ NULL, 0, "PAC_REQUESTER_SID structure", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes,
+ { "SupportedEnctypes", "kerberos.supported_entypes",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_crc,
+ { "des-cbc-crc", "kerberos.supported_entypes.des-cbc-crc",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00000001, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_des_cbc_md5,
+ { "des-cbc-md5", "kerberos.supported_entypes.des-cbc-md5",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00000002, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_rc4_hmac,
+ { "rc4-hmac", "kerberos.supported_entypes.rc4-hmac",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00000004, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes128_cts_hmac_sha1_96,
+ { "aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96", "kerberos.supported_entypes.aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00000008, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_aes256_cts_hmac_sha1_96,
+ { "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96", "kerberos.supported_entypes.aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00000010, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_fast_supported,
+ { "fast-supported", "kerberos.supported_entypes.fast-supported",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00010000, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_compound_identity_supported,
+ { "compound-identity-supported", "kerberos.supported_entypes.compound-identity-supported",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00020000, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_claims_supported,
+ { "claims-supported", "kerberos.supported_entypes.claims-supported",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00040000, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pa_supported_enctypes_resource_sid_compression_disabled,
+ { "resource-sid-compression-disabled", "kerberos.supported_entypes.resource-sid-compression-disabled",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_supported_not_supported), 0x00080000, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ad_ap_options,
+ { "AD-AP-Options", "kerberos.ad_ap_options",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ad_ap_options_cbt,
+ { "ChannelBindings", "kerberos.ad_ap_options.cbt",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, TFS(&tfs_set_notset), 0x00004000, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_ad_target_principal,
+ { "Target Principal", "kerberos.ad_target_principal",
+ FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_key_hidden_item,
+ { "KeyHiddenItem", "krb5.key_hidden_item",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON,
+ { "KERB_TICKET_LOGON", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_MessageType,
+ { "MessageType", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.MessageType",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, VALS(KERB_LOGON_SUBMIT_TYPE), 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_Flags,
+ { "Flags", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.Flags",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicketLength,
+ { "ServiceTicketLength", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.ServiceTicketLength",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicketLength,
+ { "TicketGrantingTicketLength", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.TicketGrantingTicketLength",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_ServiceTicket,
+ { "ServiceTicket", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.ServiceTicket",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_TicketGrantingTicket,
+ { "TicketGrantingTicket", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.TicketGrantingTicket",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET,
+ { "allow_expired_ticket", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, NULL, KERB_LOGON_FLAG_ALLOW_EXPIRED_TICKET,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON_FLAG_REDIRECTED,
+ { "redirected", "kerberos.KERB_TICKET_LOGON.FLAG_REDIRECTED",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 32, NULL, KERB_LOGON_FLAG_REDIRECTED,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ { &hf_kerberos_KrbFastResponse,
+ { "KrbFastResponse", "kerberos.KrbFastResponse_element",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0, NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_strengthen_key,
+ { "strengthen-key", "kerberos.strengthen_key_element",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_finished,
+ { "finished", "kerberos.finished_element",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ "KrbFastFinished", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_fast_options,
+ { "fast-options", "kerberos.fast_options",
+ FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ "FastOptions", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_reserved,
+ { "reserved", "kerberos.FastOptions.reserved",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x80,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_hide_client_names,
+ { "hide-client-names", "kerberos.FastOptions.hide.client.names",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x40,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit2,
+ { "spare_bit2", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit2",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x20,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit3,
+ { "spare_bit3", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit3",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x10,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit4,
+ { "spare_bit4", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit4",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x08,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit5,
+ { "spare_bit5", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit5",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x04,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit6,
+ { "spare_bit6", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit6",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x02,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit7,
+ { "spare_bit7", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit7",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x01,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit8,
+ { "spare_bit8", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit8",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x80,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit9,
+ { "spare_bit9", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit9",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x40,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit10,
+ { "spare_bit10", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit10",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x20,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit11,
+ { "spare_bit11", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit11",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x10,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit12,
+ { "spare_bit12", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit12",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x08,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit13,
+ { "spare_bit13", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit13",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x04,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit14,
+ { "spare_bit14", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit14",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x02,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_spare_bit15,
+ { "spare_bit15", "kerberos.FastOptions.spare.bit15",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x01,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_FastOptions_kdc_follow_referrals,
+ { "kdc-follow-referrals", "kerberos.FastOptions.kdc.follow.referrals",
+ FT_BOOLEAN, 8, NULL, 0x80,
+ NULL, HFILL }},
+ { &hf_kerberos_ticket_checksum,
+ { "ticket-checksum", "kerberos.ticket_checksum_element",
+ FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0,
+ "Checksum", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_patimestamp,
+ { "patimestamp", "kerberos.patimestamp",
+ FT_ABSOLUTE_TIME, ABSOLUTE_TIME_LOCAL, NULL, 0, "KerberosTime", HFILL }},
+ { &hf_krb_pausec,
+ { "pausec", "kerberos.pausec",
+ FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0, "Microseconds", HFILL }},
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+#include "packet-kerberos-hfarr.c"
+ };
+
+ /* List of subtrees */
+ static gint *ett[] = {
+ &ett_kerberos,
+ &ett_krb_recordmark,
+ &ett_krb_pac,
+ &ett_krb_pac_drep,
+ &ett_krb_pac_midl_blob,
+ &ett_krb_pac_logon_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_credential_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_s4u_delegation_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_upn_dns_info_flags,
+ &ett_krb_pac_device_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_server_checksum,
+ &ett_krb_pac_privsvr_checksum,
+ &ett_krb_pac_client_info_type,
+ &ett_krb_pac_ticket_checksum,
+ &ett_krb_pac_attributes_info,
+ &ett_krb_pac_attributes_info_flags,
+ &ett_krb_pac_requester_sid,
+ &ett_krb_pa_supported_enctypes,
+ &ett_krb_ad_ap_options,
+ &ett_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON,
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ &ett_krb_pa_enc_ts_enc,
+ &ett_kerberos_KrbFastFinished,
+ &ett_kerberos_KrbFastResponse,
+ &ett_kerberos_KrbFastReq,
+ &ett_kerberos_FastOptions,
+#endif
+#include "packet-kerberos-ettarr.c"
+ };
+
+ static ei_register_info ei[] = {
+ { &ei_kerberos_missing_keytype, { "kerberos.missing_keytype", PI_DECRYPTION, PI_WARN, "Missing keytype", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_kerberos_decrypted_keytype, { "kerberos.decrypted_keytype", PI_SECURITY, PI_CHAT, "Decrypted keytype", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_kerberos_learnt_keytype, { "kerberos.learnt_keytype", PI_SECURITY, PI_CHAT, "Learnt keytype", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_kerberos_address, { "kerberos.address.unknown", PI_UNDECODED, PI_WARN, "KRB Address: I don't know how to parse this type of address yet", EXPFILL }},
+ { &ei_krb_gssapi_dlglen, { "kerberos.gssapi.dlglen.error", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "DlgLen is not the same as number of bytes remaining", EXPFILL }},
+ };
+
+ expert_module_t* expert_krb;
+ module_t *krb_module;
+
+ proto_kerberos = proto_register_protocol("Kerberos", "KRB5", "kerberos");
+ proto_register_field_array(proto_kerberos, hf, array_length(hf));
+ proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
+ expert_krb = expert_register_protocol(proto_kerberos);
+ expert_register_field_array(expert_krb, ei, array_length(ei));
+
+ /* Register dissectors */
+ kerberos_handle_udp = register_dissector("kerberos.udp", dissect_kerberos_udp, proto_kerberos);
+ kerberos_handle_tcp = register_dissector("kerberos.tcp", dissect_kerberos_tcp, proto_kerberos);
+
+ /* Register preferences */
+ krb_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_kerberos, kerberos_prefs_apply_cb);
+ prefs_register_bool_preference(krb_module, "desegment",
+ "Reassemble Kerberos over TCP messages spanning multiple TCP segments",
+ "Whether the Kerberos dissector should reassemble messages spanning multiple TCP segments."
+ " To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.",
+ &krb_desegment);
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+ prefs_register_bool_preference(krb_module, "decrypt",
+ "Try to decrypt Kerberos blobs",
+ "Whether the dissector should try to decrypt "
+ "encrypted Kerberos blobs. This requires that the proper "
+ "keytab file is installed as well.", &krb_decrypt);
+
+ prefs_register_filename_preference(krb_module, "file",
+ "Kerberos keytab file",
+ "The keytab file containing all the secrets",
+ &keytab_filename, FALSE);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
+ wmem_register_callback(wmem_epan_scope(), enc_key_list_cb, NULL);
+ kerberos_longterm_keys = wmem_map_new(wmem_epan_scope(),
+ enc_key_content_hash,
+ enc_key_content_equal);
+ kerberos_all_keys = wmem_map_new_autoreset(wmem_epan_scope(),
+ wmem_file_scope(),
+ enc_key_content_hash,
+ enc_key_content_equal);
+ kerberos_app_session_keys = wmem_map_new_autoreset(wmem_epan_scope(),
+ wmem_file_scope(),
+ enc_key_content_hash,
+ enc_key_content_equal);
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS) */
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+}
+static int wrap_dissect_gss_kerb(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
+ proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di _U_,guint8 *drep _U_)
+{
+ tvbuff_t *auth_tvb;
+
+ auth_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset);
+
+ dissect_kerberos_main(auth_tvb, pinfo, tree, FALSE, NULL);
+
+ return tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
+}
+
+
+static dcerpc_auth_subdissector_fns gss_kerb_auth_connect_fns = {
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind ACK */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* AUTH3 */
+ NULL, /* Request verifier */
+ NULL, /* Response verifier */
+ NULL, /* Request data */
+ NULL /* Response data */
+};
+
+static dcerpc_auth_subdissector_fns gss_kerb_auth_sign_fns = {
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind ACK */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* AUTH3 */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_verf, /* Request verifier */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_verf, /* Response verifier */
+ NULL, /* Request data */
+ NULL /* Response data */
+};
+
+static dcerpc_auth_subdissector_fns gss_kerb_auth_seal_fns = {
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* Bind ACK */
+ wrap_dissect_gss_kerb, /* AUTH3 */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_verf, /* Request verifier */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_verf, /* Response verifier */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_payload, /* Request data */
+ wrap_dissect_gssapi_payload /* Response data */
+};
+
+
+
+void
+proto_reg_handoff_kerberos(void)
+{
+ krb4_handle = find_dissector_add_dependency("krb4", proto_kerberos);
+
+ dissector_add_uint_with_preference("udp.port", UDP_PORT_KERBEROS, kerberos_handle_udp);
+ dissector_add_uint_with_preference("tcp.port", TCP_PORT_KERBEROS, kerberos_handle_tcp);
+
+ register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_CONNECT,
+ DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_GSS_KERBEROS,
+ &gss_kerb_auth_connect_fns);
+
+ register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY,
+ DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_GSS_KERBEROS,
+ &gss_kerb_auth_sign_fns);
+
+ register_dcerpc_auth_subdissector(DCE_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
+ DCE_C_RPC_AUTHN_PROTOCOL_GSS_KERBEROS,
+ &gss_kerb_auth_seal_fns);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html
+ *
+ * Local variables:
+ * c-basic-offset: 8
+ * tab-width: 8
+ * indent-tabs-mode: t
+ * End:
+ *
+ * vi: set shiftwidth=8 tabstop=8 noexpandtab:
+ * :indentSize=8:tabSize=8:noTabs=false:
+ */
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.h b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4f776ae9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/epan/dissectors/asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.h
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* packet-kerberos.h
+ * Routines for kerberos packet dissection
+ * Copyright 2007, Anders Broman <anders.broman@ericsson.com>
+ *
+ * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer
+ * By Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
+ * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PACKET_KERBEROS_H
+#define __PACKET_KERBEROS_H
+
+#include "ws_symbol_export.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif /* __cplusplus */
+
+#ifndef KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL
+#define KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SEAL 22
+#endif
+#ifndef KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN
+#define KRB5_KU_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN 23
+#endif
+#ifndef KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL
+#define KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SEAL 24
+#endif
+#ifndef KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN
+#define KRB5_KU_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN 25
+#endif
+
+/* This is a list of callback functions a caller can use to specify that
+ octet strings in kerberos to be passed back to application specific
+ dissectors, outside of kerberos.
+ This is used for dissection of application specific data for PacketCable
+ KRB_SAFE user data and eventually to pass kerberos session keys
+ to future DCERPC decryption and other uses.
+ The list is terminated by {0, NULL }
+*/
+#define KRB_CBTAG_SAFE_USER_DATA 1
+#define KRB_CBTAG_PRIV_USER_DATA 2
+typedef struct _kerberos_callbacks {
+ int tag;
+ int (*callback)(packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree);
+} kerberos_callbacks;
+
+/* Function prototypes */
+
+gboolean
+kerberos_is_win2k_pkinit(asn1_ctx_t *actx);
+
+gint
+dissect_kerberos_main(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, gboolean do_col_info, kerberos_callbacks *cb);
+
+int
+dissect_krb5_Checksum(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_);
+
+int
+dissect_krb5_ctime(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_);
+
+int dissect_krb5_cname(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_);
+int dissect_krb5_realm(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx _U_);
+guint32 kerberos_output_keytype(void);
+
+guint get_krb_pdu_len(packet_info *, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, void *data _U_);
+
+gint kerberos_rm_to_reclen(guint krb_rm);
+
+void
+show_krb_recordmark(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint start, guint32 krb_rm);
+
+int
+dissect_kerberos_KERB_TICKET_LOGON(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, asn1_ctx_t *actx, proto_tree *tree);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_KERBEROS
+#define KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN 256
+#define KRB_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
+/*
+ * "18446744073709551615.18446744073709551615"
+ * sizeof("18446744073709551615") includes '\0',
+ * which is used once for '.' and then for '\0'.
+ */
+#define KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN (sizeof("18446744073709551615")*2)
+
+#if defined(HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS) || defined(HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS)
+typedef struct _enc_key_t {
+ struct _enc_key_t *next;
+ int keytype;
+ int keylength;
+ guint8 keyvalue[KRB_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ char key_origin[KRB_MAX_ORIG_LEN+1];
+ int fd_num; /* remember where we learned a key */
+ guint id; /* a unique id of the key, relative to fd_num */
+ char id_str[KRB_MAX_ID_STR_LEN+1];
+ struct _enc_key_t *same_list;
+ guint num_same;
+ struct _enc_key_t *src1;
+ struct _enc_key_t *src2;
+} enc_key_t;
+extern enc_key_t *enc_key_list;
+extern wmem_map_t *kerberos_longterm_keys;
+
+guint8 *
+decrypt_krb5_data(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
+ int usage,
+ tvbuff_t *crypototvb,
+ int keytype,
+ int *datalen);
+
+tvbuff_t *
+decrypt_krb5_krb_cfx_dce(proto_tree *tree,
+ packet_info *pinfo,
+ int usage,
+ int keytype,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_header_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_encrypted_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *gssapi_trailer_tvb,
+ tvbuff_t *checksum_tvb);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_KERBEROS || HAVE_MIT_KERBEROS */
+
+extern gboolean krb_decrypt;
+
+#endif /* HAVE_KERBEROS */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif /* __cplusplus */
+
+#include "packet-kerberos-exp.h"
+
+#endif /* __PACKET_KERBEROS_H */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-18 09:03:10 +0000