diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c | 2456 |
1 files changed, 1483 insertions, 973 deletions
diff --git a/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c index 2a60d835..84f066aa 100644 --- a/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c +++ b/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c @@ -14,10 +14,18 @@ #include "config.h" -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined(HAVE_ZLIB) && !defined(HAVE_ZLIBNG) #define ZLIB_CONST +#define ZLIB_PREFIX(x) x #include <zlib.h> -#endif +typedef z_stream zlib_stream; +#endif /* HAVE_ZLIB */ + +#ifdef HAVE_ZLIBNG +#define ZLIB_PREFIX(x) zng_ ## x +#include <zlib-ng.h> +typedef zng_stream zlib_stream; +#endif /* HAVE_ZLIBNG */ #include <stdlib.h> #include <errno.h> @@ -25,13 +33,13 @@ #include <epan/packet.h> #include <epan/strutil.h> #include <epan/addr_resolv.h> -#include <epan/ipv6.h> #include <epan/expert.h> #include <epan/asn1.h> #include <epan/proto_data.h> #include <epan/oids.h> #include <epan/secrets.h> +#include <wsutil/inet_cidr.h> #include <wsutil/filesystem.h> #include <wsutil/file_util.h> #include <wsutil/str_util.h> @@ -64,6 +72,8 @@ */ #define IS_GREASE_QUIC(x) ((x) > 27 ? ((((x) - 27) % 31) == 0) : 0) +#define DTLS13_MAX_EPOCH 10 + /* Lookup tables {{{ */ const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = { { SSLV2_VERSION, "SSLv2" }, @@ -75,6 +85,7 @@ const value_string ssl_version_short_names[] = { { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "TLSv1.3" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "DTLSv1.0" }, { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "DTLSv1.2" }, + { DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "DTLSv1.3" }, { DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION, "DTLS 1.0 (OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f)" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; @@ -127,7 +138,7 @@ const value_string ssl_versions[] = { { 0x00, NULL } }; -const value_string ssl_version_ja4_names[] = { +static const value_string ssl_version_ja4_names[] = { { 0x0100, "s1" }, { SSLV2_VERSION, "s2" }, { SSLV3_VERSION, "s3" }, @@ -135,6 +146,9 @@ const value_string ssl_version_ja4_names[] = { { TLSV1DOT1_VERSION, "11" }, { TLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "12" }, { TLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "13" }, + { DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION, "d1" }, + { DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION, "d2" }, + { DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION, "d3" }, { 0x00, NULL } }; @@ -510,6 +524,16 @@ const value_string ssl_extension_curves[] = { { 28, "brainpoolP512r1" }, /* RFC 7027 */ { 29, "x25519" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */ { 30, "x448" }, /* RFC 8446 / RFC 8422 */ + { 31, "brainpoolP256r1tls13" }, /* RFC8734 */ + { 32, "brainpoolP384r1tls13" }, /* RFC8734 */ + { 33, "brainpoolP512r1tls13" }, /* RFC8734 */ + { 34, "GC256A" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 35, "GC256B" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 36, "GC256C" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 37, "GC256D" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 38, "GC512A" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 39, "GC512B" }, /* RFC9189 */ + { 40, "GC512C" }, /* RFC9189 */ { 41, "curveSM2" }, /* RFC 8998 */ { 256, "ffdhe2048" }, /* RFC 7919 */ { 257, "ffdhe3072" }, /* RFC 7919 */ @@ -1235,7 +1259,7 @@ static const value_string ssl_31_ciphersuite[] = { { 0xCCAC, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAD, "TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, { 0xCCAE, "TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256" }, - /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead */ + /* RFC 8442 */ { 0xD001, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256" }, { 0xD002, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384" }, { 0xD003, "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" }, @@ -1406,7 +1430,7 @@ const value_string tls13_key_update_request[] = { /* https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml */ /* Note that the TLS 1.3 SignatureScheme registry reserves all values * with first octet 0x00-0x06 and all values with second octet 0x00-0x03 - * for backwards compatiblilty with TLS 1.2 SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. + * for backwards compatibility with TLS 1.2 SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. * * RFC 8422 and RFC 9189 add official support in TLS 1.2 for some algorithms * originally defined for TLS 1.3, and extend the TLS SignatureAlgorithm @@ -1455,11 +1479,21 @@ const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[] = { { 0x0203, "ecdsa_sha1" }, { 0x0401, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256" }, { 0x0403, "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" }, + { 0x0420, "rsa_pkcs1_sha256_legacy" }, /* draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1-01 */ { 0x0501, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384" }, { 0x0503, "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" }, + { 0x0520, "rsa_pkcs1_sha384_legacy" }, /* draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1-01 */ { 0x0601, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512" }, { 0x0603, "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" }, + { 0x0620, "rsa_pkcs1_sha512_legacy" }, /* draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1-01 */ { 0x0708, "sm2sig_sm3" }, + { 0x0709, "gostr34102012_256a" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070a, "gostr34102012_256b" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070b, "gostr34102012_256c" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070c, "gostr34102012_256d" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070d, "gostr34102012_512a" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070e, "gostr34102012_512b" }, /* RFC9367 */ + { 0x070f, "gostr34102012_512c" }, /* RFC9367 */ { 0x0804, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" }, { 0x0805, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384" }, { 0x0806, "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512" }, @@ -1468,6 +1502,9 @@ const value_string tls13_signature_algorithm[] = { { 0x0809, "rsa_pss_pss_sha256" }, { 0x080a, "rsa_pss_pss_sha384" }, { 0x080b, "rsa_pss_pss_sha512" }, + { 0x081a, "ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1tls13_sha256" }, /* RFC8734 */ + { 0x081b, "ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1tls13_sha384" }, /* RFC8734 */ + { 0x081c, "ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1tls13_sha512" }, /* RFC8734 */ /* PQC digital signature algorithms from OQS-OpenSSL, see https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssl/blob/OQS-OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable/oqs-template/oqs-sig-info.md */ { 0xfea0, "dilithium2" }, @@ -1533,7 +1570,7 @@ const value_string tls_cert_status_type[] = { }; /* Generated by tools/make-tls-ct-logids.py - * Last-Modified Sat, 27 Jan 2024 13:28:00 GMT, 138 entries. */ + * Last-Modified Sun, 18 Aug 2024 13:38:00 GMT, 163 entries. */ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { { (const uint8_t[]){ 0xb2, 0x1e, 0x05, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0xa2, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x87, @@ -1578,6 +1615,18 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "Google 'Argon2025h2' log" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x0e, 0x57, 0x94, 0xbc, 0xf3, 0xae, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0x33, 0x1b, 0x2c, + 0x99, 0x07, 0xb3, 0xf7, 0x90, 0xdf, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0x3d, 0x71, 0x32, + 0x25, 0xdd, 0x21, 0xa9, 0x25, 0xac, 0x61, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x21, + }, + 32, "Google 'Argon2026h1' log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xd7, 0x6d, 0x7d, 0x10, 0xd1, 0xa7, 0xf5, 0x77, 0xc2, 0xc7, 0xe9, + 0x5f, 0xd7, 0x00, 0xbf, 0xf9, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x33, 0x5a, 0x65, 0xe1, + 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x01, 0x73, 0x17, 0xc0, 0xc8, 0xc5, 0x69, 0x77, + }, + 32, "Google 'Argon2026h2' log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0x07, 0xb7, 0x5c, 0x1b, 0xe5, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xff, 0xf1, 0xb0, 0xc6, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x15, 0xc7, 0xba, 0xe6, 0x57, 0x7c, 0x57, 0x94, 0xb7, 0x6a, 0xee, 0xbc, 0x61, 0x3a, 0x1a, 0x69, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x1c, @@ -1620,6 +1669,18 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "Google 'Xenon2025h2' log" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x96, 0x97, 0x64, 0xbf, 0x55, 0x58, 0x97, 0xad, 0xf7, 0x43, 0x87, + 0x68, 0x37, 0x08, 0x42, 0x77, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x3a, 0xd5, 0xf6, 0xa4, + 0xf3, 0x36, 0x6e, 0x46, 0xa4, 0x3f, 0x0f, 0xca, 0xa9, 0xc6, + }, + 32, "Google 'Xenon2026h1' log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xd8, 0x09, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x94, 0x4f, 0x7a, 0xff, 0xc8, 0x16, 0x19, + 0x6f, 0x94, 0x4f, 0x85, 0xab, 0xb0, 0xf8, 0xfc, 0x5e, 0x87, 0x55, + 0x26, 0x0f, 0x15, 0xd1, 0x2e, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x45, 0x4b, 0x14, + }, + 32, "Google 'Xenon2026h2' log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0x68, 0xf6, 0x98, 0xf8, 0x1f, 0x64, 0x82, 0xbe, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xee, 0xb9, 0x28, 0x1d, 0x4c, 0xfc, 0x71, 0x51, 0x5d, 0x67, 0x93, 0xd4, 0x44, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x67, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0xc4, @@ -1794,6 +1855,12 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2025'" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xcb, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x89, 0x7c, 0x84, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x5b, + 0xc1, 0xdd, 0xfb, 0xc9, 0x6e, 0xf2, 0x9a, 0x59, 0xcd, 0x47, 0x0a, + 0x69, 0x05, 0x85, 0xb0, 0xcb, 0x14, 0xc3, 0x14, 0x58, 0xe7, + }, + 32, "Cloudflare 'Nimbus2026'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0x1f, 0xbc, 0x36, 0xe0, 0x02, 0xed, 0xe9, 0x7f, 0x40, 0x19, 0x9e, 0x86, 0xb3, 0x57, 0x3b, 0x8a, 0x42, 0x17, 0xd8, 0x01, 0x87, 0x74, 0x6a, 0xd0, 0xda, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x60, 0x54, 0xd2, 0x0d, 0xf4, @@ -1896,6 +1963,78 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "DigiCert Nessie2025 Log" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xb6, 0x9d, 0xdc, 0xbc, 0x3c, 0x1a, 0xbd, 0xef, 0x6f, 0x9f, 0xd6, + 0x0c, 0x88, 0xb1, 0x06, 0x7b, 0x77, 0xf0, 0x82, 0x68, 0x8b, 0x2d, + 0x78, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xab, 0xe9, 0x27, 0xa5, 0x75, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2024h1' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x0c, 0x2a, 0xef, 0x2c, 0x4a, 0x5b, 0x98, 0x83, 0xd4, 0xdd, 0xa3, + 0x82, 0xfe, 0x50, 0xfb, 0x51, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x73, 0x33, 0xa1, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xa0, 0x9d, 0xc9, 0xa7, 0x9d, 0x0d, 0x08, 0x20, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2024h2' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x73, 0x20, 0x22, 0x0f, 0x08, 0x16, 0x8a, 0xf9, 0xf3, 0xc4, 0xa6, + 0x8b, 0x0a, 0xb2, 0x6a, 0x9a, 0x4a, 0x00, 0xee, 0xf5, 0x77, 0x85, + 0x8a, 0x08, 0x4d, 0x05, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa5, 0x42, 0x44, 0x59, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2025h1' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xed, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0xd6, 0xe8, 0x06, 0xc2, 0xa4, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x57, + 0xdb, 0xcb, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x38, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x51, 0x2f, 0xed, 0xc4, + 0x86, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x0f, 0x20, 0xdd, 0xb7, 0x3e, 0x3f, 0xe0, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2025h2' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x64, 0x11, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0xa4, 0x12, 0xec, 0xa7, 0x89, 0x1c, 0xa2, + 0x02, 0x2e, 0x00, 0xbc, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x28, 0x07, 0xd4, 0x1e, 0x35, + 0x27, 0xab, 0xea, 0xfe, 0xd5, 0x03, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xcd, 0xf0, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2026h1'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xc2, 0x31, 0x7e, 0x57, 0x45, 0x19, 0xa3, 0x45, 0xee, 0x7f, 0x38, + 0xde, 0xb2, 0x90, 0x41, 0xeb, 0xc7, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x5a, 0x22, 0xbf, + 0x7f, 0xd5, 0xb5, 0xad, 0x76, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0x0e, 0x52, 0xcd, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Wyvern2026h2'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xdb, 0x07, 0x6c, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x8b, 0x78, 0xec, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x05, + 0x64, 0x96, 0xeb, 0x6a, 0x26, 0xa8, 0xc5, 0x9e, 0x72, 0x12, 0x93, + 0xe8, 0xac, 0x03, 0x27, 0xdd, 0xde, 0x89, 0xdb, 0x5a, 0x2a, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2024h1' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xdc, 0xc9, 0x5e, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xb0, 0xfd, 0xbd, 0x6c, + 0xa6, 0xa3, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0x72, 0xc4, 0x21, 0x2f, 0xdd, 0x1e, 0x0f, + 0x47, 0x55, 0x3a, 0x36, 0xd6, 0xcf, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x8d, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2024h2' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xde, 0x85, 0x81, 0xd7, 0x50, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x6b, 0xcd, 0xcb, 0xaf, + 0x56, 0x37, 0xc5, 0xe7, 0x81, 0xc6, 0x4c, 0xe4, 0x6e, 0xd6, 0x17, + 0x63, 0x9f, 0x8f, 0x34, 0xa7, 0x26, 0xc9, 0xe2, 0xbd, 0x37, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2025h1' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xa4, 0x42, 0xc5, 0x06, 0x49, 0x60, 0x61, 0x54, 0x8f, 0x0f, 0xd4, + 0xea, 0x9c, 0xfb, 0x7a, 0x2d, 0x26, 0x45, 0x4d, 0x87, 0xa9, 0x7f, + 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x45, 0x59, 0xf6, 0x27, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x84, 0x54, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2025h2' Log" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x49, 0x9c, 0x9b, 0x69, 0xde, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0xec, 0xfc, 0x36, 0xde, + 0xcd, 0x87, 0x64, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0x87, 0x80, 0x19, + 0xd1, 0x55, 0x52, 0xfb, 0xe9, 0xeb, 0x29, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0xc3, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2026h1'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x94, 0x4e, 0x43, 0x87, 0xfa, 0xec, 0xc1, 0xef, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x19, + 0x24, 0x26, 0xa8, 0x18, 0x65, 0x01, 0xc7, 0xd3, 0x5f, 0x38, 0x02, + 0x01, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x67, 0x7d, 0x55, 0x37, 0x2e, 0x19, 0xd8, + }, + 32, "DigiCert 'Sphinx2026h2'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0xdd, 0xeb, 0x1d, 0x2b, 0x7a, 0x0d, 0x4f, 0xa6, 0x20, 0x8b, 0x81, 0xad, 0x81, 0x68, 0x70, 0x7e, 0x2e, 0x8e, 0x9d, 0x01, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0x88, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x11, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xb6, 0xec, 0xbe, 0xcc, @@ -2076,6 +2215,30 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "Sectigo 'Mammoth2025h2'" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x25, 0x2f, 0x94, 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x6e, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x1a, + 0x72, 0x07, 0x2b, 0x69, 0x5c, 0x5b, 0x52, 0xff, 0x97, 0xa9, 0x0d, + 0x25, 0x40, 0xbb, 0xfc, 0xdc, 0x51, 0xec, 0x4d, 0xee, 0x0b, + }, + 32, "Sectigo 'Mammoth2026h1'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x94, 0xb1, 0xc1, 0x8a, 0xb0, 0xd0, 0x57, 0xc4, 0x7b, 0xe0, 0xac, + 0x04, 0x0e, 0x1f, 0x2c, 0xbc, 0x8d, 0xc3, 0x75, 0x72, 0x7b, 0xc9, + 0x51, 0xf2, 0x0a, 0x52, 0x61, 0x26, 0x86, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x3c, + }, + 32, "Sectigo 'Mammoth2026h2'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x56, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0xa3, 0x76, 0xbe, 0x83, 0xdf, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xb6, + 0x75, 0xc4, 0x9c, 0x23, 0x24, 0x98, 0xa7, 0x69, 0xba, 0xc3, 0x82, + 0xcb, 0xab, 0x49, 0xa3, 0x87, 0x7d, 0x9a, 0xb3, 0x2d, 0x01, + }, + 32, "Sectigo 'Sabre2026h1'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x1f, 0x56, 0xd1, 0xab, 0x94, 0x70, 0x4a, 0x41, 0xdd, 0x3f, 0xea, + 0xfd, 0xf4, 0x69, 0x93, 0x55, 0x30, 0x2c, 0x14, 0x31, 0xbf, 0xe6, + 0x13, 0x46, 0x08, 0x9f, 0xff, 0xae, 0x79, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0x2f, + }, + 32, "Sectigo 'Sabre2026h2'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0xdb, 0x76, 0xfd, 0xad, 0xac, 0x65, 0xe7, 0xd0, 0x95, 0x08, 0x88, 0x6e, 0x21, 0x59, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x90, 0x35, 0x2f, 0x5f, 0xea, 0xd3, 0xe3, 0xdc, 0x5e, 0x22, 0xeb, 0x35, 0x0a, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x98, @@ -2130,6 +2293,18 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2025h2'" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x19, 0x86, 0xd4, 0xc7, 0x28, 0xaa, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0xba, 0x03, 0x6f, + 0x78, 0x2a, 0x4d, 0x01, 0x91, 0xaa, 0xce, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x31, 0x0f, + 0xae, 0xce, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x41, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x4c, 0xc7, 0xd4, + }, + 32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2026h1'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0xac, 0xab, 0x30, 0x70, 0x6c, 0xeb, 0xec, 0x84, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x13, + 0xd2, 0xf4, 0x91, 0x5f, 0x11, 0x1e, 0x42, 0x24, 0x43, 0xb1, 0xf2, + 0xa6, 0x8c, 0x4f, 0x3c, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x1e, 0x02, 0xc3, + }, + 32, "Let's Encrypt 'Oak2026h2'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0x65, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x3b, 0x12, 0xcc, 0x5e, 0xa5, 0xab, 0x4e, 0xc7, 0x65, 0xd3, 0xfd, 0xe6, 0xc8, 0x82, 0x43, 0x77, 0x77, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x20, 0x03, 0xf9, 0xeb, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x31, 0x29, @@ -2238,6 +2413,18 @@ static const bytes_string ct_logids[] = { }, 32, "TrustAsia Log2025b" }, { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x74, 0xdb, 0x9d, 0x58, 0xf7, 0xd4, 0x7e, 0x9d, 0xfd, 0x78, 0x7a, + 0x16, 0x2a, 0x99, 0x1c, 0x18, 0xcf, 0x69, 0x8d, 0xa7, 0xc7, 0x29, + 0x91, 0x8c, 0x9a, 0x18, 0xb0, 0x45, 0x0d, 0xba, 0x44, 0xbc, + }, + 32, "TrustAsia 'log2026a'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ + 0x25, 0xb7, 0xef, 0xde, 0xa1, 0x13, 0x01, 0x93, 0xed, 0x93, 0x07, + 0x97, 0x70, 0xaa, 0x32, 0x2a, 0x26, 0x62, 0x0d, 0xe3, 0x5a, 0xc8, + 0xaa, 0x7c, 0x75, 0x19, 0x7d, 0xe0, 0xb1, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0x65, + }, + 32, "TrustAsia 'log2026b'" }, + { (const uint8_t[]){ 0x45, 0x35, 0x94, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x89, 0xe0, 0x28, 0x03, 0x08, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0x62, 0x6d, 0xc4, 0x23, 0x75, 0x47, 0x58, 0xdc, 0xe0, 0x37, 0x00, 0x36, 0xfb, 0xab, 0x0e, 0xdf, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0xcf, @@ -2436,7 +2623,9 @@ const val64_string quic_transport_parameter_id[] = { { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_MIN_ACK_DELAY, "min_ack_delay" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH_DRAFT04, "enable_multipath (draft-04)" }, { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH_DRAFT05, "enable_multipath (draft-05)" }, - { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH, "enable_multipath" }, + { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH, "enable_multipath (draft-06)" }, + { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_PATHS, "initial_max_paths (draft-07/08)" }, + { SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_PATH_ID, "initial_max_path_id" }, { 0, NULL } }; @@ -2498,7 +2687,7 @@ const value_string token_binding_key_parameter_vals[] = { /* Lookup tables }}} */ void -quic_transport_parameter_id_base_custom(gchar *result, guint64 parameter_id) +quic_transport_parameter_id_base_custom(char *result, uint64_t parameter_id) { const char *label; if (IS_GREASE_QUIC(parameter_id)) { @@ -2515,15 +2704,15 @@ quic_transport_parameter_id_base_custom(gchar *result, guint64 parameter_id) This also allows us to hide the dependency on zlib. */ struct _SslDecompress { - gint compression; -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB - z_stream istream; + int compression; +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) + zlib_stream istream; #endif }; /* To assist in parsing client/server key exchange messages 0 indicates unknown */ -gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher) +int ssl_get_keyex_alg(int cipher) { /* Map Cipher suite number to Key Exchange algorithm {{{ */ switch(cipher) { @@ -2716,6 +2905,10 @@ gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher) case 0xccac: case 0xe418: case 0xe419: + case 0xd001: + case 0xd002: + case 0xd003: + case 0xd005: return KEX_ECDHE_PSK; case 0xc010: case 0xc011: @@ -2858,7 +3051,7 @@ gint ssl_get_keyex_alg(gint cipher) /* }}} */ } -static wmem_list_t *connection_id_session_list = NULL; +static wmem_list_t *connection_id_session_list; void ssl_init_cid_list(void) { @@ -2877,7 +3070,7 @@ ssl_add_session_by_cid(SslDecryptSession *session) } SslDecryptSession * -ssl_get_session_by_cid(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset) +ssl_get_session_by_cid(tvbuff_t *tvb, uint32_t offset) { SslDecryptSession * ssl_cid = NULL; wmem_list_frame_t *it = wmem_list_head(connection_id_session_list); @@ -2907,30 +3100,30 @@ ssl_get_session_by_cid(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset) /* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions {{{ */ -gint +int ssl_data_alloc(StringInfo* str, size_t len) { - str->data = (guchar *)g_malloc(len); + str->data = (unsigned char *)g_malloc(len); /* the allocator can return a null pointer for a size equal to 0, * and that must be allowed */ if (len > 0 && !str->data) return -1; - str->data_len = (guint) len; + str->data_len = (unsigned) len; return 0; } void -ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const guchar* data, guint len) +ssl_data_set(StringInfo* str, const unsigned char* data, unsigned len) { DISSECTOR_ASSERT(data); memcpy(str->data, data, len); str->data_len = len; } -static gint -ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, guint len) +static int +ssl_data_realloc(StringInfo* str, unsigned len) { - str->data = (guchar *)g_realloc(str->data, len); + str->data = (unsigned char *)g_realloc(str->data, len); if (!str->data) return -1; str->data_len = len; @@ -2943,12 +3136,12 @@ ssl_data_clone(StringInfo *str) StringInfo *cloned_str; cloned_str = (StringInfo *) wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), sizeof(StringInfo) + str->data_len); - cloned_str->data = (guchar *) (cloned_str + 1); + cloned_str->data = (unsigned char *) (cloned_str + 1); ssl_data_set(cloned_str, str->data, str->data_len); return cloned_str; } -static gint +static int ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src) { if (dst->data_len < src->data_len) { @@ -2961,24 +3154,24 @@ ssl_data_copy(StringInfo* dst, StringInfo* src) } /* from_hex converts |hex_len| bytes of hex data from |in| and sets |*out| to - * the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns TRUE on + * the result. |out->data| will be allocated using wmem_file_scope. Returns true on * success. */ -static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) { - gsize i; +static bool from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, size_t hex_len) { + size_t i; if (hex_len & 1) - return FALSE; + return false; - out->data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2); + out->data = (unsigned char *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), hex_len / 2); for (i = 0; i < hex_len / 2; i++) { int a = ws_xton(in[i*2]); int b = ws_xton(in[i*2 + 1]); if (a == -1 || b == -1) - return FALSE; + return false; out->data[i] = a << 4 | b; } - out->data_len = (guint)hex_len / 2; - return TRUE; + out->data_len = (unsigned)hex_len / 2; + return true; } /* StringInfo structure (len + data) functions }}} */ @@ -2987,8 +3180,8 @@ static gboolean from_hex(StringInfo* out, const char* in, gsize hex_len) { /* hmac abstraction layer */ #define SSL_HMAC gcry_md_hd_t -static inline gint -ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, gint algo) +static inline int +ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, int algo) { gcry_error_t err; const char *err_str, *err_src; @@ -3003,8 +3196,8 @@ ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC* md, gint algo) return 0; } -static inline gint -ssl_hmac_setkey(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len) +static inline int +ssl_hmac_setkey(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, int len) { gcry_error_t err; const char *err_str, *err_src; @@ -3019,7 +3212,7 @@ ssl_hmac_setkey(SSL_HMAC* md, const void * key, gint len) return 0; } -static inline gint +static inline int ssl_hmac_reset(SSL_HMAC* md) { gcry_md_reset(*md); @@ -3027,15 +3220,15 @@ ssl_hmac_reset(SSL_HMAC* md) } static inline void -ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, gint len) +ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC* md, const void* data, int len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void -ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen) +ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC* md, unsigned char* data, unsigned* datalen) { - gint algo; - guint len; + int algo; + unsigned len; algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md)); len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo); @@ -3052,8 +3245,8 @@ ssl_hmac_cleanup(SSL_HMAC* md) /* message digest abstraction layer*/ #define SSL_MD gcry_md_hd_t -static inline gint -ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo) +static inline int +ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, int algo) { gcry_error_t err; const char *err_str, *err_src; @@ -3067,15 +3260,15 @@ ssl_md_init(SSL_MD* md, gint algo) return 0; } static inline void -ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, gint len) +ssl_md_update(SSL_MD* md, unsigned char* data, int len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void -ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, guchar* data, guint* datalen) +ssl_md_final(SSL_MD* md, unsigned char* data, unsigned* datalen) { - gint algo; - gint len; + int algo; + int len; algo = gcry_md_get_algo (*(md)); len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo); memcpy(data, gcry_md_read(*(md), algo), len); @@ -3097,18 +3290,27 @@ ssl_md_reset(SSL_MD* md) #define SSL_SHA_CTX gcry_md_hd_t #define SSL_MD5_CTX gcry_md_hd_t -static inline void +static inline int ssl_sha_init(SSL_SHA_CTX* md) { - gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); + gcry_error_t err; + const char *err_str, *err_src; + err = gcry_md_open(md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); + if (err != 0) { + err_str = gcry_strerror(err); + err_src = gcry_strsource(err); + ssl_debug_printf("ssl_sha_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src); + return -1; + } + return 0; } static inline void -ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len) +ssl_sha_update(SSL_SHA_CTX* md, unsigned char* data, int len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void -ssl_sha_final(guchar* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md) +ssl_sha_final(unsigned char* buf, SSL_SHA_CTX* md) { memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_SHA1), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_SHA1)); @@ -3126,18 +3328,27 @@ ssl_sha_cleanup(SSL_SHA_CTX* md) gcry_md_close(*(md)); } -static inline gint +static inline int ssl_md5_init(SSL_MD5_CTX* md) { - return gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0); + gcry_error_t err; + const char *err_str, *err_src; + err = gcry_md_open(md,GCRY_MD_MD5, 0); + if (err != 0) { + err_str = gcry_strerror(err); + err_src = gcry_strsource(err); + ssl_debug_printf("ssl_md5_init(): gcry_md_open failed %s/%s", err_str, err_src); + return -1; + } + return 0; } static inline void -ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, guchar* data, gint len) +ssl_md5_update(SSL_MD5_CTX* md, unsigned char* data, int len) { gcry_md_write(*(md), data, len); } static inline void -ssl_md5_final(guchar* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md) +ssl_md5_final(unsigned char* buf, SSL_MD5_CTX* md) { memcpy(buf, gcry_md_read(*(md), GCRY_MD_MD5), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(GCRY_MD_MD5)); @@ -3157,13 +3368,13 @@ ssl_md5_cleanup(SSL_MD5_CTX* md) /* libgcrypt wrappers for HMAC/message digest operations }}} */ /* libgcrypt wrappers for Cipher state manipulation {{{ */ -gint -ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len) +int +ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, unsigned char* iv, int iv_len) { - gint ret; + int ret; #if 0 - guchar *ivp; - gint i; + unsigned char *ivp; + int i; gcry_cipher_hd_t c; c=(gcry_cipher_hd_t)*cipher; #endif @@ -3188,19 +3399,20 @@ ssl_cipher_setiv(SSL_CIPHER_CTX *cipher, guchar* iv, gint iv_len) return ret; } /* stream cipher abstraction layer*/ -static gint -ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk, - guchar* iv, gint mode) +static int +ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, int algo, unsigned char* sk, + unsigned char* iv, int mode) { - gint gcry_modes[] = { + int gcry_modes[] = { GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305, + GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB, /* used for DTLSv1.3 seq number encryption */ }; - gint err; + int err; if (algo == -1) { /* NULL mode */ *(cipher) = (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1; @@ -3220,9 +3432,9 @@ ssl_cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, gint algo, guchar* sk, } return 0; } -static inline gint -ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl, - const guchar * in, gint inl) +static inline int +ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, unsigned char * out, int outl, + const unsigned char * in, int inl) { if ((*cipher) == (gcry_cipher_hd_t)-1) { @@ -3232,13 +3444,13 @@ ssl_cipher_decrypt(gcry_cipher_hd_t *cipher, guchar * out, gint outl, } return gcry_cipher_decrypt ( *(cipher), out, outl, in, inl); } -static inline gint -ssl_get_digest_by_name(const gchar*name) +static inline int +ssl_get_digest_by_name(const char*name) { return gcry_md_map_name(name); } -static inline gint -ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const gchar* name) +static inline int +ssl_get_cipher_by_name(const char* name) { return gcry_cipher_map_name(name); } @@ -3270,7 +3482,7 @@ ssl_cipher_suite_dig(const SslCipherSuite *cs) { return &digests[cs->dig - DIG_MD5]; } -static const gchar *ciphers[]={ +static const char *ciphers[]={ "DES", "3DES", "ARCFOUR", /* libgcrypt does not support rc4, but this should be 100% compatible*/ @@ -3560,6 +3772,10 @@ static const SslCipherSuite cipher_suites[]={ {0xCCAC,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAD,KEX_DHE_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ {0xCCAE,KEX_RSA_PSK, ENC_CHACHA20, DIG_SHA256, MODE_POLY1305 }, /* TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ + {0xD001,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_GCM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ + {0xD002,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES256, DIG_SHA384, MODE_GCM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ + {0xD003,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM_8}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */ + {0xD005,KEX_ECDHE_PSK, ENC_AES, DIG_SHA256, MODE_CCM}, /* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */ /* GM */ {0xe001,KEX_ECDHE_SM2, ENC_SM1, DIG_SM3, MODE_CBC}, /* ECDHE_SM1_SM3 */ {0xe003,KEX_ECC_SM2, ENC_SM1, DIG_SM3, MODE_CBC}, /* ECC_SM1_SM3 */ @@ -3605,16 +3821,16 @@ ssl_get_cipher_algo(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite) return gcry_cipher_map_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - ENC_START]); } -guint +unsigned ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite) { - gint cipher_algo; + int cipher_algo; if (cipher_suite->mode != MODE_CBC) return 0; cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(ciphers[cipher_suite->enc - ENC_START]); - return (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); + return (unsigned)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); } -static guint +static unsigned ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num) { switch (cipher_suite_num) { @@ -3654,9 +3870,9 @@ ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(int cipher_suite_num) /* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function {{{ */ -static gint -tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md, - StringInfo *out, guint out_len) +static int +tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, int md, + StringInfo *out, unsigned out_len) { /* RFC 2246 5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function * '+' denotes concatenation. @@ -3665,11 +3881,11 @@ tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md, * A(0) = seed * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i - 1)) */ - guint8 *ptr; - guint left, tocpy; - guint8 *A; - guint8 _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; - guint A_l, tmp_l; + uint8_t *ptr; + unsigned left, tocpy; + uint8_t *A; + uint8_t _A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE], tmp[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned A_l, tmp_l; SSL_HMAC hm; ptr = out->data; @@ -3714,23 +3930,23 @@ tls_hash(StringInfo *secret, StringInfo *seed, gint md, return 0; } -static gboolean -tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage, - StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) +static bool +tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const char *usage, + StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, unsigned out_len) { StringInfo seed, sha_out, md5_out; - guint8 *ptr; + uint8_t *ptr; StringInfo s1, s2; - guint i,s_l; + unsigned i,s_l; size_t usage_len, rnd2_len; - gboolean success = FALSE; + bool success = false; usage_len = strlen(usage); rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0; - /* initalize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/ + /* initialize buffer for sha, md5 random seed*/ if (ssl_data_alloc(&sha_out, MAX(out_len, 20)) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate sha out\n"); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (ssl_data_alloc(&md5_out, MAX(out_len, 16)) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate md5 out\n"); @@ -3752,7 +3968,7 @@ tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage, /*ptr+=rnd2->data_len;*/ } - /* initalize buffer for client/server seeds*/ + /* initialize buffer for client/server seeds*/ s_l=secret->data_len/2 + secret->data_len%2; if (ssl_data_alloc(&s1, s_l) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls_prf: can't allocate secret %d\n", s_l); @@ -3777,7 +3993,7 @@ tls_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar *usage, out->data[i] = md5_out.data[i] ^ sha_out.data[i]; /* success, now store the new meaningful data length */ out->data_len = out_len; - success = TRUE; + success = true; ssl_print_string("PRF out",out); free_s2: @@ -3793,19 +4009,19 @@ free_sha: return success; } -static gboolean -tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, - StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) +static bool +tls12_prf(int md, StringInfo* secret, const char* usage, + StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, unsigned out_len) { StringInfo label_seed; - gint success; + int success; size_t usage_len, rnd2_len; rnd2_len = rnd2 ? rnd2->data_len : 0; usage_len = strlen(usage); if (ssl_data_alloc(&label_seed, usage_len+rnd1->data_len+rnd2_len) < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("tls12_prf: can't allocate label_seed\n"); - return FALSE; + return false; } memcpy(label_seed.data, usage, usage_len); memcpy(label_seed.data+usage_len, rnd1->data, rnd1->data_len); @@ -3817,19 +4033,21 @@ tls12_prf(gint md, StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, g_free(label_seed.data); if(success != -1){ ssl_print_string("PRF out", out); - return TRUE; + return true; } - return FALSE; + return false; } -static void +static bool ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2, - StringInfo *out, guint out_len) + StringInfo *out, unsigned out_len) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; - guint8 tmp[16]; + uint8_t tmp[16]; - ssl_md5_init(&md5); + if (ssl_md5_init(&md5) != 0) { + return false; + } ssl_md5_update(&md5,r1->data,r1->data_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,r2->data,r2->data_len); ssl_md5_final(tmp,&md5); @@ -3838,22 +4056,28 @@ ssl3_generate_export_iv(StringInfo *r1, StringInfo *r2, DISSECTOR_ASSERT(out_len <= sizeof(tmp)); ssl_data_set(out, tmp, out_len); ssl_print_string("export iv", out); + return true; } -static gboolean -ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, - StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, guint out_len) +static bool +ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const char* usage, + StringInfo* rnd1, StringInfo* rnd2, StringInfo* out, unsigned out_len) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; SSL_SHA_CTX sha; - guint off; - gint i = 0,j; - guint8 buf[20]; + unsigned off; + int i = 0,j; + uint8_t buf[20]; - ssl_sha_init(&sha); - ssl_md5_init(&md5); + if (ssl_sha_init(&sha) != 0) { + return false; + } + if (ssl_md5_init(&md5) != 0) { + ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha); + return false; + } for (off = 0; off < out_len; off += 16) { - guchar outbuf[16]; + unsigned char outbuf[16]; i++; ssl_debug_printf("ssl3_prf: sha1_hash(%d)\n",i); @@ -3892,14 +4116,14 @@ ssl3_prf(StringInfo* secret, const gchar* usage, ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); out->data_len = out_len; - return TRUE; + return true; } /* out_len is the wanted output length for the pseudorandom function. * Ensure that ssl->cipher_suite is set. */ -static gboolean -prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage, - StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, guint out_len) +static bool +prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const char *usage, + StringInfo *rnd1, StringInfo *rnd2, StringInfo *out, unsigned out_len) { switch (ssl->session.version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: @@ -3918,7 +4142,7 @@ prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage, return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SM3, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, out, out_len); #else - return FALSE; + return false; #endif case DIG_SHA384: return tls12_prf(GCRY_MD_SHA384, secret, usage, rnd1, rnd2, @@ -3930,7 +4154,7 @@ prf(SslDecryptSession *ssl, StringInfo *secret, const gchar *usage, } } -static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out) +static int tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out) { SSL_MD5_CTX md5; SSL_SHA_CTX sha; @@ -3938,25 +4162,28 @@ static gint tls_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, StringInfo* out) if (ssl_data_alloc(out, 36) < 0) return -1; - ssl_md5_init(&md5); + if (ssl_md5_init(&md5) != 0) + return -1; ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_md5_final(out->data,&md5); ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); - ssl_sha_init(&sha); + if (ssl_sha_init(&sha) != 0) + return -1; ssl_sha_update(&sha,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_sha_final(out->data+16,&sha); ssl_sha_cleanup(&sha); return 0; } -static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* out) +static int tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, int md, StringInfo* out) { SSL_MD mc; - guint8 tmp[48]; - guint len; + uint8_t tmp[48]; + unsigned len; - ssl_md_init(&mc, md); + if (ssl_md_init(&mc, md) != 0) + return -1; ssl_md_update(&mc,ssl->handshake_data.data,ssl->handshake_data.data_len); ssl_md_final(&mc, tmp, &len); ssl_md_cleanup(&mc); @@ -3972,10 +4199,12 @@ static gint tls12_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession* ssl, gint md, StringInfo* ou * inlined and removed once support for draft 19 and before is dropped. */ static inline const char * -tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(guint8 tls13_draft_version) +tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session) { - if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) { + if (ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version && ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version < 20) { return "TLS 1.3, "; + } else if (ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + return "dtls13"; } else { return "tls13 "; } @@ -3986,11 +4215,11 @@ tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(guint8 tls13_draft_version) * custom label prefix. If "context_hash" is NULL, then an empty context is * used. Otherwise it must have the same length as the hash algorithm output. */ -gboolean +bool tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(int md, const StringInfo *secret, const char *label_prefix, const char *label, - const guint8 *context_hash, guint8 context_length, - guint16 out_len, guchar **out) + const uint8_t *context_hash, uint8_t context_length, + uint16_t out_len, unsigned char **out) { /* RFC 8446 Section 7.1: * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) = @@ -4005,52 +4234,52 @@ tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(int md, const StringInfo *secret, * HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */ gcry_error_t err; - const guint label_prefix_length = (guint) strlen(label_prefix); - const guint label_length = (guint) strlen(label); + const unsigned label_prefix_length = (unsigned) strlen(label_prefix); + const unsigned label_length = (unsigned) strlen(label); /* Some sanity checks */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT(label_length > 0 && label_prefix_length + label_length <= 255); /* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, context } */ GByteArray *info = g_byte_array_new(); - const guint16 length = g_htons(out_len); - g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)&length, sizeof(length)); + const uint16_t length = g_htons(out_len); + g_byte_array_append(info, (const uint8_t *)&length, sizeof(length)); - const guint8 label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length; + const uint8_t label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length; g_byte_array_append(info, &label_vector_length, 1); - g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)label_prefix, label_prefix_length); - g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8*)label, label_length); + g_byte_array_append(info, (const uint8_t *)label_prefix, label_prefix_length); + g_byte_array_append(info, (const uint8_t*)label, label_length); g_byte_array_append(info, &context_length, 1); if (context_length) { g_byte_array_append(info, context_hash, context_length); } - *out = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len); + *out = (unsigned char *)wmem_alloc(NULL, out_len); err = hkdf_expand(md, secret->data, secret->data_len, info->data, info->len, *out, out_len); - g_byte_array_free(info, TRUE); + g_byte_array_free(info, true); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed %d: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, md, gcry_strerror(err)); wmem_free(NULL, *out); *out = NULL; - return FALSE; + return false; } - return TRUE; + return true; } -gboolean +bool tls13_hkdf_expand_label(int md, const StringInfo *secret, const char *label_prefix, const char *label, - guint16 out_len, guchar **out) + uint16_t out_len, unsigned char **out) { return tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(md, secret, label_prefix, label, NULL, 0, out_len, out); } /* HMAC and the Pseudorandom function }}} */ /* Record Decompression (after decryption) {{{ */ -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) /* memory allocation functions for zlib initialization */ static void* ssl_zalloc(void* opaque _U_, unsigned int no, unsigned int size) { @@ -4063,10 +4292,10 @@ static void ssl_zfree(void* opaque _U_, void* addr) #endif static SslDecompress* -ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression) +ssl_create_decompressor(int compression) { SslDecompress *decomp; -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) int err; #endif @@ -4075,7 +4304,7 @@ ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression) decomp = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslDecompress); decomp->compression = compression; switch (decomp->compression) { -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) case 1: /* DEFLATE */ decomp->istream.zalloc = ssl_zalloc; decomp->istream.zfree = ssl_zfree; @@ -4084,7 +4313,7 @@ ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression) decomp->istream.next_out = Z_NULL; decomp->istream.avail_in = 0; decomp->istream.avail_out = 0; - err = inflateInit(&decomp->istream); + err = ZLIB_PREFIX(inflateInit)(&decomp->istream); if (err != Z_OK) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_create_decompressor: inflateInit_() failed - %d\n", err); return NULL; @@ -4098,11 +4327,11 @@ ssl_create_decompressor(gint compression) return decomp; } -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) static int -ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const guchar* in, guint inl, StringInfo* out_str, guint* outl) +ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp, const unsigned char* in, unsigned inl, StringInfo* out_str, unsigned* outl) { - gint err; + int err; switch (decomp->compression) { case 1: /* DEFLATE */ @@ -4121,7 +4350,7 @@ DIAG_ON(cast-qual) decomp->istream.next_out = out_str->data; decomp->istream.avail_out = out_str->data_len; if (inl > 0) - err = inflate(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); + err = ZLIB_PREFIX(inflate)(&decomp->istream, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); if (err != Z_OK) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: inflate() failed - %d\n", err); return -1; @@ -4136,7 +4365,7 @@ DIAG_ON(cast-qual) } #else int -ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const guchar* in _U_, guint inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, guint* outl _U_) +ssl_decompress_record(SslDecompress* decomp _U_, const unsigned char* in _U_, unsigned inl _U_, StringInfo* out_str _U_, unsigned* outl _U_) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decompress_record: unsupported compression method %d\n", decomp->compression); return -1; @@ -4160,7 +4389,7 @@ ssl_create_flow(void) /* Use the negotiated security parameters for decryption. {{{ */ void -ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, gboolean server) +ssl_change_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, bool server) { SslDecoder **new_decoder = server ? &ssl_session->server_new : &ssl_session->client_new; SslDecoder **dest = server ? &ssl_session->server : &ssl_session->client; @@ -4178,8 +4407,8 @@ static bool ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *, wmem_cb_event_t, void *); static SslDecoder* -ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo, - gint compression, guint8 *mk, guint8 *sk, guint8 *iv, guint iv_length) +ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, int cipher_algo, + int compression, uint8_t *mk, uint8_t *sk, uint8_t *sn_key, uint8_t *iv, unsigned iv_length) { SslDecoder *dec; ssl_cipher_mode_t mode = cipher_suite->mode; @@ -4191,7 +4420,7 @@ ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo, dec->compression = compression; if ((mode == MODE_STREAM && mk != NULL) || mode == MODE_CBC) { // AEAD ciphers use no MAC key, but stream and block ciphers do. Note - // the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficieny + // the special case for NULL ciphers, even if there is insufficiency // keying material (including MAC key), we will can still create // decoders since "decryption" is easy for such ciphers. dec->mac_key.data = dec->_mac_key_or_write_iv; @@ -4212,6 +4441,29 @@ ssl_create_decoder(const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite, gint cipher_algo, return NULL; } + if (cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL && sn_key != NULL) { + if (cipher_suite->enc == ENC_AES || cipher_suite->enc == ENC_AES256) { + mode = MODE_ECB; + } else if (cipher_suite->enc == ENC_CHACHA20) { + mode = MODE_STREAM; + } else { + ssl_debug_printf("not supported encryption algorithm for DTLSv1.3\n"); + return NULL; + } + + if (ssl_cipher_init(&dec->sn_evp, cipher_algo, sn_key, NULL, mode) < 0) { + ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't create cipher id:%d mode:%d for seq number decryption\n", G_STRFUNC, + cipher_algo, MODE_ECB); + ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp); + dec->evp = NULL; + return NULL; + } + } else { + dec->sn_evp = NULL; + } + + dec->dtls13_aad.data = NULL; + dec->dtls13_aad.data_len = 0; ssl_debug_printf("decoder initialized (digest len %d)\n", ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->len); return dec; } @@ -4223,90 +4475,34 @@ ssl_decoder_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U if (dec->evp) ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->evp); + if (dec->sn_evp) + ssl_cipher_cleanup(&dec->sn_evp); -#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB +#if defined (HAVE_ZLIB) || defined (HAVE_ZLIBNG) if (dec->decomp != NULL && dec->decomp->compression == 1 /* DEFLATE */) - inflateEnd(&dec->decomp->istream); + ZLIB_PREFIX(inflateEnd)(&dec->decomp->istream); #endif - return FALSE; -} - -static bool -tls13_cipher_destroy_cb(wmem_allocator_t *allocator _U_, wmem_cb_event_t event _U_, void *user_data) -{ - tls13_cipher *cipher = (tls13_cipher *) user_data; - - gcry_cipher_close(cipher->hd); - - return FALSE; -} - -tls13_cipher * -tls13_cipher_create(const char *label_prefix, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, int hash_algo, const StringInfo *secret, const gchar **error) -{ - tls13_cipher *cipher = NULL; - guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL; - guint key_length, iv_length; - gcry_cipher_hd_t hd = NULL; - gcry_error_t err; - - /* - * Calculate traffic keys based on RFC 8446 Section 7. - */ - key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); - iv_length = TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH; - - if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) { - *error = "Key expansion (key) failed"; - return NULL; - } - if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) { - *error = "Key expansion (IV) failed"; - goto end; - } - - err = gcry_cipher_open(&hd, cipher_algo, cipher_mode, 0); - if (err) { - *error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (initialization) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err)); - goto end; - } - err = gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, write_key, key_length); - if (err) { - *error = wmem_strdup_printf(wmem_packet_scope(), "Decryption (setkey) failed: %s", gcry_strerror(err)); - gcry_cipher_close(hd); - goto end; - } - - cipher = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher); - wmem_register_callback(wmem_file_scope(), tls13_cipher_destroy_cb, cipher); - cipher->hd = hd; - memcpy(cipher->iv, write_iv, iv_length); - *error = NULL; - -end: - wmem_free(NULL, write_key); - wmem_free(NULL, write_iv); - return cipher; + return false; } /* }}} */ /* (Pre-)master secrets calculations {{{ */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS -static int +static bool ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master, GHashTable *key_hash); #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ -static gboolean +static bool ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, - gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key); + bool is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key); -gboolean +bool ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, - guint32 length, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, - const gchar *ssl_psk, packet_info *pinfo, + uint32_t length, tvbuff_t *tvb, uint32_t offset, + const char *ssl_psk, packet_info *pinfo, #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS GHashTable *key_hash, #endif @@ -4319,49 +4515,49 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: not enough data to generate key (required state %X)\n", G_STRFUNC, (SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION)); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3 which has no pre-master secrets\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* check to see if the PMS was provided to us*/ - if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", TRUE, + if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Unencrypted pre-master secret", true, mk_map->pms, &ssl_session->client_random)) { - return TRUE; + return true; } if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_PSK) { /* calculate pre master secret*/ StringInfo pre_master_secret; - guint psk_len, pre_master_len; + unsigned psk_len, pre_master_len; if (!ssl_psk || (ssl_psk[0] == 0)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't find pre-shared key\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* convert hex string into char*/ if (!from_hex(&ssl_session->psk, ssl_psk, strlen(ssl_psk))) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk contains invalid hex\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } psk_len = ssl_session->psk.data_len; if (psk_len >= (2 << 15)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: ssl.psk/dtls.psk must not be larger than 2^15 - 1\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } pre_master_len = psk_len * 2 + 4; - pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len); + pre_master_secret.data = (unsigned char *)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), pre_master_len); pre_master_secret.data_len = pre_master_len; /* 2 bytes psk_len*/ pre_master_secret.data[0] = psk_len >> 8; @@ -4383,11 +4579,11 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, case we're renegotiating */ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; - return TRUE; + return true; } else { - guint encrlen, skip; + unsigned encrlen, skip; encrlen = length; skip = 0; @@ -4409,7 +4605,7 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, { ssl_debug_printf("%s: wrong encrypted length (%d max %d)\n", G_STRFUNC, encrlen, length); - return FALSE; + return false; } } /* the valid lower bound is higher than 8, but it is sufficient for the @@ -4417,11 +4613,11 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, if (encrlen < 8) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: invalid encrypted pre-master key length %d\n", G_STRFUNC, encrlen); - return FALSE; + return false; } StringInfo encrypted_pre_master = { - .data = (guchar *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset + skip, encrlen), + .data = (unsigned char *)tvb_memdup(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset + skip, encrlen), .data_len = encrlen, }; @@ -4429,7 +4625,7 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, /* Try to lookup an appropriate RSA private key to decrypt the Encrypted Pre-Master Secret. */ if (ssl_session->cert_key_id) { if (ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(ssl_session, &encrypted_pre_master, key_hash)) - return TRUE; + return true; ssl_debug_printf("%s: can't decrypt pre-master secret\n", G_STRFUNC); @@ -4440,10 +4636,10 @@ ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, * ssl key logfile stores only the first 8 bytes, so truncate it */ encrypted_pre_master.data_len = 8; if (ssl_restore_master_key(ssl_session, "Encrypted pre-master secret", - TRUE, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master)) - return TRUE; + true, mk_map->pre_master, &encrypted_pre_master)) + return true; } - return FALSE; + return false; } /* Used for (D)TLS 1.2 and earlier versions (not with TLS 1.3). */ @@ -4451,25 +4647,25 @@ int ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) { StringInfo key_block = { NULL, 0 }; - guint8 _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; - guint8 _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; - gint needed; - gint cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */ - guint encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0; - gboolean is_export_cipher; - guint8 *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL; - guint8 *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL; + uint8_t _iv_c[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],_iv_s[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint8_t _key_c[MAX_KEY_SIZE],_key_s[MAX_KEY_SIZE]; + int needed; + int cipher_algo = -1; /* special value (-1) for NULL encryption */ + unsigned encr_key_len, write_iv_len = 0; + bool is_export_cipher; + uint8_t *ptr, *c_iv = NULL, *s_iv = NULL; + uint8_t *c_wk = NULL, *s_wk = NULL, *c_mk = NULL, *s_mk = NULL; const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite; - /* TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */ - if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + /* (D)TLS 1.3 is handled directly in tls13_change_key. */ + if (ssl_session->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: detected TLS 1.3. Should not have been called!\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } - /* check for enough info to proced */ - guint need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION; - guint need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; + /* check for enough info to proceed */ + unsigned need_all = SSL_CIPHER|SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM|SSL_VERSION; + unsigned need_any = SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; if (((ssl_session->state & need_all) != need_all) || ((ssl_session->state & need_any) == 0)) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_generate_keyring_material not enough data to generate key " "(0x%02X required 0x%02X or 0x%02X)\n", ssl_session->state, @@ -4491,7 +4687,7 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) if (!(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) { if ((ssl_session->state & SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) == SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_MASK) { StringInfo handshake_hashed_data; - gint ret; + int ret; handshake_hashed_data.data = NULL; handshake_hashed_data.data_len = 0; @@ -4552,7 +4748,7 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) } ssl_print_string("master secret",&ssl_session->master_secret); - /* the pre-master secret has been 'consumend' so we must clear it now */ + /* the pre-master secret has been 'consumed' so we must clear it now */ ssl_session->state &= ~SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; ssl_session->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET; } @@ -4572,11 +4768,11 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) encr_key_len = ssl_get_cipher_export_keymat_size(cipher_suite->number); is_export_cipher = encr_key_len > 0; if (!is_export_cipher && cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) { - encr_key_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); + encr_key_len = (unsigned)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); } if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { - write_iv_len = (guint)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); + write_iv_len = (unsigned)gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(cipher_algo); } else if (cipher_suite->mode == MODE_GCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) { /* account for a four-byte salt for client and server side (from * client_write_IV and server_write_IV), see GCMNonce (RFC 5288) */ @@ -4591,7 +4787,7 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) needed += 2 * encr_key_len; /* encryption key */ needed += 2 * write_iv_len; /* write IV */ - key_block.data = (guchar *)g_malloc(needed); + key_block.data = (unsigned char *)g_malloc(needed); ssl_debug_printf("%s sess key generation\n", G_STRFUNC); if (!prf(ssl_session, &ssl_session->master_secret, "key expansion", &ssl_session->server_random,&ssl_session->client_random, @@ -4635,17 +4831,21 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) iv_s.data = _iv_s; ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random, - &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len); + if (!ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->client_random, + &ssl_session->server_random, &iv_c, write_iv_len)) { + goto fail; + } ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl3_generate_export_iv(2)\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random, - &ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len); + if (!ssl3_generate_export_iv(&ssl_session->server_random, + &ssl_session->client_random, &iv_s, write_iv_len)) { + goto fail; + } } else{ - guint8 _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2]; + uint8_t _iv_block[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE * 2]; StringInfo iv_block; StringInfo key_null; - guint8 _key_null; + uint8_t _key_null; key_null.data = &_key_null; key_null.data_len = 0; @@ -4674,7 +4874,8 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) SSL_MD5_CTX md5; ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(client_random)\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl_md5_init(&md5); + if (ssl_md5_init(&md5) != 0) + goto fail; ssl_md5_update(&md5,c_wk,encr_key_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->client_random.data, ssl_session->client_random.data_len); @@ -4684,7 +4885,8 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) ssl_md5_cleanup(&md5); c_wk=_key_c; - ssl_md5_init(&md5); + if (ssl_md5_init(&md5) != 0) + goto fail; ssl_debug_printf("%s MD5(server_random)\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_md5_update(&md5,s_wk,encr_key_len); ssl_md5_update(&md5,ssl_session->server_random.data, @@ -4740,13 +4942,13 @@ ssl_generate_keyring_material(SslDecryptSession*ssl_session) create_decoders: /* create both client and server ciphers*/ ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(client)\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, c_iv, write_iv_len); + ssl_session->client_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, c_mk, c_wk, NULL, c_iv, write_iv_len); if (!ssl_session->client_new) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init client decoder\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; } ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(server)\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, s_iv, write_iv_len); + ssl_session->server_new = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, ssl_session->session.compression, s_mk, s_wk, NULL, s_iv, write_iv_len); if (!ssl_session->server_new) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init server decoder\n", G_STRFUNC); goto fail; @@ -4768,31 +4970,32 @@ fail: } /* Generated the key material based on the given secret. */ -gboolean -tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gboolean is_from_server) +bool +tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, bool is_from_server) { - gboolean success = FALSE; - guchar *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL; + bool success = false; + unsigned char *write_key = NULL, *write_iv = NULL; + unsigned char *sn_key = NULL; SslDecoder *decoder; - guint key_length, iv_length; + unsigned key_length, iv_length; int hash_algo; const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl_session->cipher_suite; int cipher_algo; - if (ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + if ((ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) && (ssl_session->session.version != DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s only usable for TLS 1.3, not %#x!\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.version); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (cipher_suite == NULL) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Unknown cipher\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (cipher_suite->kex != KEX_TLS13) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite 0x%04x spotted!\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_suite->number); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* Find the Libgcrypt cipher algorithm for the given SSL cipher suite ID */ @@ -4801,36 +5004,46 @@ tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gb cipher_algo = ssl_get_cipher_by_name(cipher_name); if (cipher_algo == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find cipher %s\n", G_STRFUNC, cipher_name); - return FALSE; + return false; } const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name; hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name); if (!hash_algo) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find hash function %s\n", G_STRFUNC, hash_name); - return FALSE; + return false; } - key_length = (guint) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); + key_length = (unsigned) gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo); /* AES-GCM/AES-CCM/Poly1305-ChaCha20 all have N_MIN=N_MAX = 12. */ iv_length = 12; ssl_debug_printf("%s key_length %u iv_length %u\n", G_STRFUNC, key_length, iv_length); - const char *label_prefix = tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(ssl_session->session.tls13_draft_version); + const char *label_prefix = tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(ssl_session); if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "key", key_length, &write_key)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s write_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "iv", iv_length, &write_iv)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s write_iv expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); goto end; } + if (ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, secret, label_prefix, "sn", key_length, &sn_key)) { + ssl_debug_printf("%s sn_key expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); + goto end; + } + } + ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write Key" : "Client Write Key", write_key, key_length); ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write IV" : "Client Write IV", write_iv, iv_length); + if (ssl_session->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + ssl_print_data(is_from_server ? "Server Write SN" : "Client Write SN", sn_key, key_length); + } ssl_debug_printf("%s ssl_create_decoder(%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client"); - decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, write_iv, iv_length); + decoder = ssl_create_decoder(cipher_suite, cipher_algo, 0, NULL, write_key, sn_key, write_iv, iv_length); if (!decoder) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't init %s decoder\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "server" : "client"); goto end; @@ -4847,25 +5060,27 @@ tls13_generate_keys(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, const StringInfo *secret, gb } ssl_debug_printf("%s %s ready using cipher suite 0x%04x (cipher %s hash %s)\n", G_STRFUNC, is_from_server ? "Server" : "Client", cipher_suite->number, cipher_name, hash_name); - success = TRUE; + success = true; end: wmem_free(NULL, write_key); wmem_free(NULL, write_iv); + if (sn_key) + wmem_free(NULL, sn_key); return success; } /* (Pre-)master secrets calculations }}} */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS /* Decrypt RSA pre-master secret using RSA private key. {{{ */ -static gboolean +static bool ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, StringInfo *encrypted_pre_master, GHashTable *key_hash) { int ret; if (!encrypted_pre_master) - return FALSE; + return false; if (KEX_IS_DH(ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: session uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange " @@ -4874,11 +5089,11 @@ ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->session.cipher, val_to_str_ext_const(ssl_session->session.cipher, &ssl_31_ciphersuite_ext, "unknown")); - return FALSE; + return false; } else if (ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex != KEX_RSA) { ssl_debug_printf("%s key exchange %d different from KEX_RSA (%d)\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_session->cipher_suite->kex, KEX_RSA); - return FALSE; + return false; } gnutls_privkey_t pk = (gnutls_privkey_t)g_hash_table_lookup(key_hash, ssl_session->cert_key_id); @@ -4896,7 +5111,7 @@ ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, } if (ret < 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: decryption failed: %d (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, ret, gnutls_strerror(ret)); - return FALSE; + return false; } if (pms.size != 48) { @@ -4907,10 +5122,10 @@ ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, } else { g_free(pms.data); } - return FALSE; + return false; } - ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = (guint8 *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), pms.data, 48); + ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data = (uint8_t *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), pms.data, 48); ssl_session->pre_master_secret.data_len = 48; if (pk) { gnutls_free(pms.data); @@ -4924,21 +5139,21 @@ ssl_decrypt_pre_master_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, case we're renegotiating */ ssl_session->state &= ~(SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY); ssl_session->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; - return TRUE; + return true; } /* }}} */ #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ /* Decryption integrity check {{{ */ -static gint -tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data, - guint32 datalen, guint8* mac) +static int +tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, int ct, int ver, uint8_t* data, + uint32_t datalen, uint8_t* mac) { SSL_HMAC hm; - gint md; - guint32 len; - guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; - gint16 temp; + int md; + uint32_t len; + uint8_t buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; + int16_t temp; md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); ssl_debug_printf("tls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n", @@ -4961,12 +5176,12 @@ tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data, ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,1); /* hash version,data length and data*/ - /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */ + /* *((int16_t*)buf) = g_htons(ver); */ temp = g_htons(ver); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); - /* *((gint16*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ + /* *((int16_t*)buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ temp = g_htons(datalen); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,2); @@ -4984,19 +5199,19 @@ tls_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, gint ver, guint8* data, } static int -ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data, - guint32 datalen, guint8* mac) +ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,uint8_t* data, + uint32_t datalen, uint8_t* mac) { SSL_MD mc; - gint md; - guint32 len; - guint8 buf[64],dgst[20]; - gint pad_ct; - gint16 temp; + int md; + uint32_t len; + uint8_t buf[64],dgst[20]; + int pad_ct; + int16_t temp; pad_ct=(decoder->cipher_suite->dig==DIG_SHA)?40:48; - /* get cipher used for digest comptuation */ + /* get cipher used for digest computation */ md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); if (ssl_md_init(&mc,md) !=0) return -1; @@ -5018,7 +5233,7 @@ ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data, ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,1); /* hash data length in network byte order and data*/ - /* *((gint16* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ + /* *((int16_t* )buf) = g_htons(datalen); */ temp = g_htons(datalen); memcpy(buf, &temp, 2); ssl_md_update(&mc,buf,2); @@ -5042,21 +5257,21 @@ ssl3_check_mac(SslDecoder*decoder,int ct,guint8* data, if(memcmp(mac,dgst,len)) return -1; - return(0); + return 0; } -static gint -dtls_check_mac(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, guint8* data, - guint32 datalen, guint8* mac, const guchar *cid, guint8 cidl) +static int +dtls_check_mac(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder*decoder, int ct, uint8_t* data, + uint32_t datalen, uint8_t* mac, const unsigned char *cid, uint8_t cidl) { SSL_HMAC hm; - gint md; - guint32 len; - guint8 buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; - gint16 temp; + int md; + uint32_t len; + uint8_t buf[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE]; + int16_t temp; int ver = ssl->session.version; - gboolean is_cid = ((ct == SSL_ID_TLS12_CID) && (ver == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION)); + bool is_cid = ((ct == SSL_ID_TLS12_CID) && (ver == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION)); md=ssl_get_digest_by_name(ssl_cipher_suite_dig(decoder->cipher_suite)->name); ssl_debug_printf("dtls_check_mac mac type:%s md %d\n", @@ -5088,7 +5303,7 @@ dtls_check_mac(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, guint8* data /* hash sequence number */ phton64(buf, decoder->seq); buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8; - buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch; + buf[1]=(uint8_t)decoder->epoch; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8); /* hash cid */ @@ -5097,7 +5312,7 @@ dtls_check_mac(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, guint8* data /* hash sequence number */ phton64(buf, decoder->seq); buf[0]=decoder->epoch>>8; - buf[1]=(guint8)decoder->epoch; + buf[1]=(uint8_t)decoder->epoch; ssl_hmac_update(&hm,buf,8); /* hash content type */ @@ -5133,18 +5348,18 @@ dtls_check_mac(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder*decoder, gint ct, guint8* data if(memcmp(mac,buf,len)) return -1; - return(0); + return 0; } /* Decryption integrity check }}} */ -static gboolean +static bool tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, - guint8 ct, guint16 record_version, - gboolean ignore_mac_failed, - const guchar *in, guint16 inl, - const guchar *cid, guint8 cidl, - StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl) + uint8_t ct, uint16_t record_version, + bool ignore_mac_failed, + const unsigned char *in, uint16_t inl, + const unsigned char *cid, uint8_t cidl, + StringInfo *out_str, unsigned *outl) { /* RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) 6.2.3.3 defines the TLSCipherText.fragment as: * GenericAEADCipher: { nonce_explicit, [content] } @@ -5152,19 +5367,19 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, * With AES GCM/CCM, "[content]" is actually the concatenation of the * ciphertext and authentication tag. */ - const guint16 version = ssl->session.version; - const gboolean is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == TLCPV1_VERSION; + const uint16_t version = ssl->session.version; + const bool is_v12 = version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION || version == TLCPV1_VERSION; gcry_error_t err; - const guchar *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext; - guint ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len; - guchar nonce[12]; + const unsigned char *explicit_nonce = NULL, *ciphertext; + unsigned ciphertext_len, auth_tag_len; + unsigned char nonce[12]; const ssl_cipher_mode_t cipher_mode = decoder->cipher_suite->mode; - const gboolean is_cid = ct == SSL_ID_TLS12_CID && version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION; - const guint8 draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version; - const guchar *auth_tag_wire; - guchar auth_tag_calc[16]; - guchar *aad = NULL; - guint aad_len = 0; + const bool is_cid = ct == SSL_ID_TLS12_CID && version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION; + const uint8_t draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version; + const unsigned char *auth_tag_wire; + unsigned char auth_tag_calc[16]; + unsigned char *aad = NULL; + unsigned aad_len = 0; switch (cipher_mode) { case MODE_GCM: @@ -5177,7 +5392,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, break; default: ssl_debug_printf("%s unsupported cipher!\n", G_STRFUNC); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* Parse input into explicit nonce (TLS 1.2 only), ciphertext and tag. */ @@ -5185,21 +5400,21 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, if (inl < EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN + auth_tag_len) { ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d is too small for explicit nonce %d and auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, auth_tag_len); - return FALSE; + return false; } explicit_nonce = in; ciphertext = explicit_nonce + EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN; ciphertext_len = inl - EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN - auth_tag_len; - } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { + } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { if (inl < auth_tag_len) { ssl_debug_printf("%s input %d has no space for auth tag %d\n", G_STRFUNC, inl, auth_tag_len); - return FALSE; + return false; } ciphertext = in; ciphertext_len = inl - auth_tag_len; } else { ssl_debug_printf("%s Unexpected TLS version %#x\n", G_STRFUNC, version); - return FALSE; + return false; } auth_tag_wire = ciphertext + ciphertext_len; @@ -5213,12 +5428,12 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); memcpy(nonce + IMPLICIT_NONCE_LEN, explicit_nonce, EXPLICIT_NONCE_LEN); - } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { + } else if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION || cipher_mode == MODE_POLY1305) { /* * Technically the nonce length must be at least 8 bytes, but for * AES-GCM, AES-CCM and Poly1305-ChaCha20 the nonce length is exact 12. */ - const guint nonce_len = 12; + const unsigned nonce_len = 12; DISSECTOR_ASSERT(decoder->write_iv.data_len == nonce_len); memcpy(nonce, decoder->write_iv.data, decoder->write_iv.data_len); /* Sequence number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */ @@ -5232,7 +5447,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, err = gcry_cipher_setiv(decoder->evp, nonce, 12); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set nonce: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* (D)TLS 1.2 needs specific AAD, TLS 1.3 (before -25) uses empty AAD. */ @@ -5270,6 +5485,9 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, aad[8] = ct; /* TLSCompressed.type */ phton16(aad + 9, record_version); /* TLSCompressed.version */ phton16(aad + 11, ciphertext_len); /* TLSCompressed.length */ + } else if (version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + aad_len = decoder->dtls13_aad.data_len; + aad = decoder->dtls13_aad.data; } else if (draft_version >= 25 || draft_version == 0) { aad_len = 5; aad = wmem_alloc(wmem_packet_scope(), aad_len); @@ -5280,7 +5498,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8) { /* size of plaintext, additional authenticated data and auth tag. */ - guint64 lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, aad_len, auth_tag_len }; + uint64_t lengths[3] = { ciphertext_len, aad_len, auth_tag_len }; gcry_cipher_ctl(decoder->evp, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, lengths, sizeof(lengths)); } @@ -5290,7 +5508,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(decoder->evp, aad, aad_len); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s failed to set AAD: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); - return FALSE; + return false; } } @@ -5298,7 +5516,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(decoder->evp, out_str->data, out_str->data_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len); if (err) { ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypt failed: %s\n", G_STRFUNC, gcry_strerror(err)); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* Check authentication tag for authenticity (replaces MAC) */ @@ -5316,7 +5534,7 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, if (ignore_mac_failed) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: auth check failed, but ignored for troubleshooting ;-)\n", G_STRFUNC); } else { - return FALSE; + return false; } } @@ -5331,25 +5549,26 @@ tls_decrypt_aead_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, ssl_print_data("Plaintext", out_str->data, ciphertext_len); *outl = ciphertext_len; - return TRUE; + return true; } /* Record decryption glue based on security parameters {{{ */ /* Assume that we are called only for a non-NULL decoder which also means that * we have a non-NULL decoder->cipher_suite. */ -gint -ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint16 record_version, - gboolean ignore_mac_failed, - const guchar *in, guint16 inl, const guchar *cid, guint8 cidl, - StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, guint *outl) +int +ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, uint8_t ct, uint16_t record_version, + bool ignore_mac_failed, + const unsigned char *in, uint16_t inl, const unsigned char *cid, uint8_t cidl, + StringInfo *comp_str, StringInfo *out_str, unsigned *outl) { - guint pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0; - guint8 *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL; + unsigned pad, worklen, uncomplen, maclen, mac_fraglen = 0; + uint8_t *mac = NULL, *mac_frag = NULL; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_decrypt_record ciphertext len %d\n", inl); ssl_print_data("Ciphertext",in, inl); - if ((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) { + if (((ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || ssl->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION)) + != (decoder->cipher_suite->kex == KEX_TLS13)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Invalid cipher suite for the protocol version!\n", G_STRFUNC); return -1; } @@ -5368,7 +5587,8 @@ ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CCM_8 || decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_POLY1305 || - ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || + ssl->session.version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { if (!tls_decrypt_aead_record(ssl, decoder, ct, record_version, ignore_mac_failed, in, inl, cid, cidl, out_str, &worklen)) { /* decryption failed */ @@ -5392,13 +5612,14 @@ ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint /* (TLS 1.1 and later, DTLS) Extract explicit IV for GenericBlockCipher */ if (decoder->cipher_suite->mode == MODE_CBC) { - guint blocksize = 0; + unsigned blocksize = 0; switch (ssl->session.version) { case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: + case DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: case TLCPV1_VERSION: blocksize = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(decoder->cipher_suite); @@ -5433,8 +5654,8 @@ ssl_decrypt_record(SslDecryptSession *ssl, SslDecoder *decoder, guint8 ct, guint return -1; } inl -= maclen; - mac = (guint8 *)in + inl; - mac_frag = (guint8 *)in - blocksize; + mac = (uint8_t *)in + inl; + mac_frag = (uint8_t *)in - blocksize; mac_fraglen = blocksize + inl; } } @@ -5670,17 +5891,19 @@ ssl_get_session(conversation_t *conversation, dissector_handle_t tls_handle) clear_address(&ssl_session->session.srv_addr); ssl_session->session.srv_ptype = PT_NONE; ssl_session->session.srv_port = 0; + ssl_session->session.dtls13_current_epoch[0] = ssl_session->session.dtls13_current_epoch[1] = 0; + ssl_session->session.dtls13_next_seq_num[0] = ssl_session->session.dtls13_next_seq_num[1] = 0; conversation_add_proto_data(conversation, proto_ssl, ssl_session); return ssl_session; } -void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_client) +void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, bool is_client) { if (ssl) { /* Ensure that secrets are not restored using stale identifiers. Split * between client and server in case the packets somehow got out of order. */ - gint clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; + int clear_flags = SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY | SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; if (is_client) { clear_flags |= SSL_CLIENT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; @@ -5688,7 +5911,7 @@ void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_ ssl->session_ticket.data_len = 0; ssl->master_secret.data_len = 0; ssl->client_random.data_len = 0; - ssl->has_early_data = FALSE; + ssl->has_early_data = false; if (ssl->handshake_data.data_len > 0) { // The EMS handshake hash starts with at the Client Hello, // ensure that any messages before it are forgotten. @@ -5722,6 +5945,8 @@ void ssl_reset_session(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_ session->server_cert_type = 0; /* session->is_session_resumed is already handled in the ServerHello dissection. */ } + session->dtls13_next_seq_num[0] = session->dtls13_next_seq_num[1] = 0; + session->dtls13_current_epoch[0] = session->dtls13_current_epoch[1] = 0; } void @@ -5740,9 +5965,9 @@ tls_set_appdata_dissector(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo, session->app_handle = app_handle; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo, - dissector_handle_t app_handle, guint32 last_nontls_frame) + dissector_handle_t app_handle, uint32_t last_nontls_frame) { conversation_t *conversation; SslSession *session; @@ -5779,14 +6004,14 @@ ssl_starttls(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo, } /* ssl_starttls_ack: mark future frames as encrypted. */ -guint32 +uint32_t ssl_starttls_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo, dissector_handle_t app_handle) { return ssl_starttls(tls_handle, pinfo, app_handle, pinfo->num); } -guint32 +uint32_t ssl_starttls_post_ack(dissector_handle_t tls_handle, packet_info *pinfo, dissector_handle_t app_handle) { @@ -5803,8 +6028,8 @@ ssl_find_appdata_dissector(const char *name) } /* Functions for TLS/DTLS sessions and RSA private keys hashtables. {{{ */ -static gint -ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2) +static int +ssl_equal (const void *v, const void *v2) { const StringInfo *val1; const StringInfo *val2; @@ -5818,22 +6043,22 @@ ssl_equal (gconstpointer v, gconstpointer v2) return 0; } -static guint -ssl_hash (gconstpointer v) +static unsigned +ssl_hash (const void *v) { - guint l,hash; + unsigned l,hash; const StringInfo* id; - const guint* cur; + const unsigned* cur; hash = 0; id = (const StringInfo*) v; /* id and id->data are mallocated in ssl_save_master_key(). As such 'data' - * should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a guint as + * should be aligned for any kind of access (for example as a unsigned as * is done below). The intermediate void* cast is to prevent "cast * increases required alignment of target type" warnings on CPUs (such * as SPARCs) that do not allow misaligned memory accesses. */ - cur = (const guint*)(void*) id->data; + cur = (const unsigned*)(void*) id->data; for (l=4; (l < id->data_len); l+=4, cur++) hash = hash ^ (*cur); @@ -5844,7 +6069,7 @@ ssl_hash (gconstpointer v) /* Handling of association between tls/dtls ports and clear text protocol. {{{ */ void -ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp) +ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, unsigned port, bool tcp) { DISSECTOR_ASSERT(main_handle); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(subdissector_handle); @@ -5866,7 +6091,7 @@ ssl_association_add(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_ha } void -ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, guint port, gboolean tcp) +ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, dissector_handle_t subdissector_handle, unsigned port, bool tcp) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_association_remove removing %s %u - handle %p\n", tcp?"TCP":"UDP", port, (void *)subdissector_handle); @@ -5881,7 +6106,7 @@ ssl_association_remove(const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main } void -ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port) +ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, uint32_t port) { copy_address_wmem(wmem_file_scope(), &session->srv_addr, addr); session->srv_ptype = ptype; @@ -5889,9 +6114,9 @@ ssl_set_server(SslSession *session, address *addr, port_type ptype, guint32 port } int -ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info *pinfo) +ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, const packet_info *pinfo) { - gint ret; + int ret; if (session && session->srv_addr.type != AT_NONE) { ret = (session->srv_ptype == pinfo->ptype) && (session->srv_port == pinfo->srcport) && @@ -5908,7 +6133,7 @@ ssl_packet_from_server(SslSession *session, dissector_table_t table, packet_info /* Links SSL records with the real packet data. {{{ */ SslPacketInfo * -tls_add_packet_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) +tls_add_packet_info(int proto, packet_info *pinfo, uint8_t curr_layer_num_ssl) { SslPacketInfo *pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto, curr_layer_num_ssl); if (!pi) { @@ -5936,13 +6161,13 @@ tls_add_packet_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) * @param curr_layer_num_ssl The layer identifier for this TLS session. */ void -ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint data_len, gint record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) +ssl_add_record_info(int proto, packet_info *pinfo, const unsigned char *data, int data_len, int record_id, SslFlow *flow, ContentType type, uint8_t curr_layer_num_ssl) { SslRecordInfo* rec, **prec; SslPacketInfo *pi = tls_add_packet_info(proto, pinfo, curr_layer_num_ssl); rec = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), SslRecordInfo); - rec->plain_data = (guchar *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len); + rec->plain_data = (unsigned char *)wmem_memdup(wmem_file_scope(), data, data_len); rec->data_len = data_len; rec->id = record_id; rec->type = type; @@ -5964,7 +6189,7 @@ ssl_add_record_info(gint proto, packet_info *pinfo, const guchar *data, gint dat /* search in packet data for the specified id; return a newly created tvb for the associated data */ tvbuff_t* -ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record) +ssl_get_record_info(tvbuff_t *parent_tvb, int proto, packet_info *pinfo, int record_id, uint8_t curr_layer_num_ssl, SslRecordInfo **matched_record) { SslRecordInfo* rec; SslPacketInfo* pi; @@ -6043,24 +6268,24 @@ ssl_common_cleanup(ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, FILE **ssl_keylog_file, #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) /* Load a single RSA key file item from preferences. {{{ */ void -ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, gboolean tcp) +ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const char* dissector_table_name, dissector_handle_t main_handle, bool tcp) { gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_priv_key; gnutls_privkey_t priv_key = NULL; FILE* fp = NULL; int ret; size_t key_id_len = 20; - guchar *key_id = NULL; + unsigned char *key_id = NULL; char *err = NULL; dissector_handle_t handle; /* try to load keys file first */ fp = ws_fopen(uats->keyfile, "rb"); if (!fp) { - report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, FALSE); + report_open_failure(uats->keyfile, errno, false); return; } - if ((gint)strlen(uats->password) == 0) { + if ((int)strlen(uats->password) == 0) { x509_priv_key = rsa_load_pem_key(fp, &err); } else { x509_priv_key = rsa_load_pkcs12(fp, uats->password, &err); @@ -6092,7 +6317,7 @@ ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const c goto end; } - key_id = (guchar *) g_malloc0(key_id_len); + key_id = (unsigned char *) g_malloc0(key_id_len); ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_get_key_id(x509_priv_key, 0, key_id, &key_id_len); if (ret < 0) { report_failure("Can't calculate public key ID for %s: %s", @@ -6114,7 +6339,7 @@ ssl_parse_key_list(const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *uats, GHashTable *key_hash, const c handle = ssl_find_appdata_dissector(uats->protocol); if (handle) { /* Port to subprotocol mapping */ - guint16 port = 0; + uint16_t port = 0; if (ws_strtou16(uats->port, NULL, &port)) { if (port > 0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_init port '%d' filename '%s' password(only for p12 file) '%s'\n", @@ -6156,7 +6381,7 @@ ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key, return; } - /* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for guint access + /* ssl_hash() depends on session_ticket->data being aligned for unsigned access * so be careful in changing how it is allocated. */ ht_key = ssl_data_clone(key); master_secret = ssl_data_clone(mk); @@ -6168,23 +6393,23 @@ ssl_save_master_key(const char *label, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key, } /** restore a (pre-)master secret given some key in the cache */ -static gboolean +static bool ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, - gboolean is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key) + bool is_pre_master, GHashTable *ht, StringInfo *key) { StringInfo *ms; if (key->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't restore %smaster secret using an empty %s\n", G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); - return FALSE; + return false; } ms = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(ht, key); if (!ms) { ssl_debug_printf("%s can't find %smaster secret by %s\n", G_STRFUNC, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); - return FALSE; + return false; } /* (pre)master secret found, clear knowledge of other keys and set it in the @@ -6194,7 +6419,7 @@ ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, if (is_pre_master) { /* unlike master secret, pre-master secret has a variable size (48 for * RSA, varying for PSK) and is therefore not statically allocated */ - ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (guchar *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), + ssl->pre_master_secret.data = (unsigned char *) wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(), ms->data_len); ssl_data_set(&ssl->pre_master_secret, ms->data, ms->data_len); ssl->state |= SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET; @@ -6206,7 +6431,7 @@ ssl_restore_master_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, const char *label, is_pre_master ? "pre-" : "", label); ssl_print_string(label, key); ssl_print_string("(pre-)master secret", ms); - return TRUE; + return true; } /* Store/load a known (pre-)master secret from/for this SSL session. }}} */ @@ -6235,12 +6460,12 @@ ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) * from pre-master secret). If missing, try to pick a master key from cache * (an earlier packet in the capture or key logfile). */ if (!(ssl->state & (SSL_MASTER_SECRET | SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET)) && - !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", FALSE, + !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session ID", false, mk_map->session, &ssl->session_id) && (!ssl->session.is_session_resumed || - !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", FALSE, + !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Session Ticket", false, mk_map->tickets, &ssl->session_ticket)) && - !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", FALSE, + !ssl_restore_master_key(ssl, "Client Random", false, mk_map->crandom, &ssl->client_random)) { if (ssl->cipher_suite->enc != ENC_NULL) { /* how unfortunate, the master secret could not be found */ @@ -6272,12 +6497,12 @@ ssl_finalize_decryption(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) /* Load the traffic key secret from the keylog file. */ StringInfo * tls13_load_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, - gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type) + bool is_from_server, TLSRecordType type) { GHashTable *key_map; const char *label; - if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + if (ssl->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && ssl->session.version != DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { ssl_debug_printf("%s TLS version %#x is not 1.3\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version); return NULL; } @@ -6342,7 +6567,7 @@ tls13_load_secret(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, /* Load the new key. */ void tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, - gboolean is_from_server, TLSRecordType type) + bool is_from_server, TLSRecordType type) { if (ssl->state & SSL_QUIC_RECORD_LAYER) { /* @@ -6365,7 +6590,7 @@ tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client; StringInfo *app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret; if (type == TLS_SECRET_APP) { - app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), + app_secret->data = (unsigned char *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data, secret->data_len); ssl_data_set(app_secret, secret->data, secret->data_len); @@ -6382,7 +6607,7 @@ tls13_change_key(SslDecryptSession *ssl, ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, * secret should have been set by tls13_change_key. */ void -tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server) +tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, bool is_from_server) { /* RFC 8446 Section 7.2: * application_traffic_secret_N+1 = @@ -6394,7 +6619,7 @@ tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server) const SslCipherSuite *cipher_suite = ssl->cipher_suite; SslDecoder *decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client; StringInfo *app_secret = decoder ? &decoder->app_traffic_secret : NULL; - guint8 tls13_draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version; + uint8_t tls13_draft_version = ssl->session.tls13_draft_version; if (!cipher_suite || !app_secret || app_secret->data_len == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot perform Key Update due to missing info\n", G_STRFUNC); @@ -6407,14 +6632,14 @@ tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server) */ const char *hash_name = ssl_cipher_suite_dig(cipher_suite)->name; int hash_algo = ssl_get_digest_by_name(hash_name); - const guint hash_len = app_secret->data_len; - guchar *new_secret; + const unsigned hash_len = app_secret->data_len; + unsigned char *new_secret; const char *label = "traffic upd"; if (tls13_draft_version && tls13_draft_version < 20) { label = "application traffic secret"; } if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_algo, app_secret, - tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(tls13_draft_version), + tls13_hkdf_label_prefix(ssl), label, hash_len, &new_secret)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s traffic_secret_N+1 expansion failed\n", G_STRFUNC); return; @@ -6427,7 +6652,7 @@ tls13_key_update(SslDecryptSession *ssl, gboolean is_from_server) */ decoder = is_from_server ? ssl->server : ssl->client; app_secret = &decoder->app_traffic_secret; - app_secret->data = (guchar *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), + app_secret->data = (unsigned char *) wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), app_secret->data, hash_len); ssl_data_set(app_secret, new_secret, hash_len); @@ -6449,7 +6674,7 @@ static GRegex * ssl_compile_keyfile_regex(void) { #define OCTET "(?:[[:xdigit:]]{2})" - const gchar *pattern = + const char *pattern = "(?:" /* Matches Client Hellos having this Client Random */ "PMS_CLIENT_RANDOM (?<client_random_pms>" OCTET "{32}) " @@ -6500,7 +6725,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_master_key_match_group { } ssl_master_key_match_group_t; void -tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const guint8 *data, guint datalen) +tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const uint8_t *data, unsigned datalen) { ssl_master_key_match_group_t mk_groups[] = { { "encrypted_pmk", mk_map->pre_master }, @@ -6564,13 +6789,13 @@ tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const guint8 *data, while (next_line && next_line < line_end) { const char *line = next_line; next_line = (const char *)memchr(line, '\n', line_end - line); - gssize linelen; + ssize_t linelen; if (next_line) { linelen = next_line - line; next_line++; /* drop LF */ } else { - linelen = (gssize)(line_end - line); + linelen = (ssize_t)(line_end - line); } if (linelen > 0 && line[linelen - 1] == '\r') { linelen--; /* drop CR */ @@ -6579,7 +6804,7 @@ tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const guint8 *data, ssl_debug_printf(" checking keylog line: %.*s\n", (int)linelen, line); GMatchInfo *mi; if (g_regex_match_full(regex, line, linelen, 0, G_REGEX_MATCH_ANCHORED, &mi, NULL)) { - gchar *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms; + char *hex_key, *hex_pre_ms_or_ms; StringInfo *key = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), StringInfo); StringInfo *pre_ms_or_ms = NULL; GHashTable *ht = NULL; @@ -6630,7 +6855,7 @@ tls_keylog_process_lines(const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map, const guint8 *data, } void -ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *tls_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file, +ssl_load_keyfile(const char *tls_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file, const ssl_master_key_map_t *mk_map) { /* no need to try if no key log file is configured. */ @@ -6676,20 +6901,20 @@ ssl_load_keyfile(const gchar *tls_keylog_filename, FILE **keylog_file, } break; } - tls_keylog_process_lines(mk_map, (guint8 *)line, (int)strlen(line)); + tls_keylog_process_lines(mk_map, (uint8_t *)line, (int)strlen(line)); } } /** SSL keylog file handling. }}} */ #ifdef SSL_DECRYPT_DEBUG /* {{{ */ -static FILE* ssl_debug_file=NULL; +static FILE* ssl_debug_file; void -ssl_set_debug(const gchar* name) +ssl_set_debug(const char* name) { - static gint debug_file_must_be_closed; - gint use_stderr; + static int debug_file_must_be_closed; + int use_stderr; use_stderr = name?(strcmp(name, SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR) == 0):0; @@ -6724,7 +6949,7 @@ ssl_debug_flush(void) } void -ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...) +ssl_debug_printf(const char* fmt, ...) { va_list ap; @@ -6737,7 +6962,7 @@ ssl_debug_printf(const gchar* fmt, ...) } void -ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len) +ssl_print_data(const char* name, const unsigned char* data, size_t len) { size_t i, j, k; if (!ssl_debug_file) @@ -6751,7 +6976,7 @@ ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len) fprintf(ssl_debug_file," "); fputc('|', ssl_debug_file); for (j=i, k=0; k<16 && j<len; ++j, ++k) { - guchar c = data[j]; + unsigned char c = data[j]; if (!g_ascii_isprint(c) || (c=='\t')) c = '.'; fputc(c, ssl_debug_file); } @@ -6762,7 +6987,7 @@ ssl_print_data(const gchar* name, const guchar* data, size_t len) } void -ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data) +ssl_print_string(const char* name, const StringInfo* data) { ssl_print_data(name, data->data, data->data_len); } @@ -6772,55 +6997,55 @@ ssl_print_string(const gchar* name, const StringInfo* data) /* checks for SSL and DTLS UAT key list fields */ bool -ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p _U_, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) +ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p _U_, unsigned len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional. *err = NULL; - return TRUE; + return true; } bool -ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) +ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, unsigned len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional. *err = NULL; - return TRUE; + return true; } if (strcmp(p, "start_tls") != 0){ - guint16 port; + uint16_t port; if (!ws_strtou16(p, NULL, &port)) { *err = g_strdup("Invalid port given."); - return FALSE; + return false; } } *err = NULL; - return TRUE; + return true; } bool -ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) +ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, unsigned len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { ws_statb64 st; if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { *err = g_strdup("No filename given."); - return FALSE; + return false; } else { if (ws_stat64(p, &st) != 0) { *err = ws_strdup_printf("File '%s' does not exist or access is denied.", p); - return FALSE; + return false; } } *err = NULL; - return TRUE; + return true; } bool -ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err) +ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, unsigned len _U_, const void *u1 _U_, const void *u2 _U_, char **err) { #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) ssldecrypt_assoc_t* f = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r; @@ -6835,22 +7060,22 @@ ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_ fclose(fp); *err = ws_strdup_printf("Could not load PKCS#12 key file: %s", msg); g_free(msg); - return FALSE; + return false; } g_free(msg); gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(priv_key); fclose(fp); } else { *err = ws_strdup_printf("Leave this field blank if the keyfile is not PKCS#12."); - return FALSE; + return false; } } *err = NULL; - return TRUE; + return true; #else *err = g_strdup("Cannot load key files, support is not compiled in."); - return FALSE; + return false; #endif } /* UAT preferences callbacks. }}} */ @@ -6860,7 +7085,7 @@ ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb(void *r _U_, const char *p _U_, guint len _U_ typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data { - gchar *str; + char *str; const char *table_protocol; } ssl_association_info_callback_data_t; @@ -6868,7 +7093,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_association_info_callback_data * callback function used by ssl_association_info() to traverse the SSL associations. */ static void -ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_data) +ssl_association_info_(const char *table _U_, void *handle, void *user_data) { ssl_association_info_callback_data_t* data = (ssl_association_info_callback_data_t*)user_data; const int l = (const int)strlen(data->str); @@ -6878,12 +7103,12 @@ ssl_association_info_(const gchar *table _U_, gpointer handle, gpointer user_dat /** * @return an information string on the SSL protocol associations. The string has ephemeral lifetime/scope. */ -gchar* +char* ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protocol) { ssl_association_info_callback_data_t data; - data.str = (gchar *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN); + data.str = (char *)g_malloc0(SSL_ASSOC_MAX_LEN); data.table_protocol = table_protocol; dissector_table_foreach_handle(dissector_table_name, ssl_association_info_, &data); return data.str; @@ -6893,13 +7118,13 @@ ssl_association_info(const char* dissector_table_name, const char* table_protoco /** Begin of code related to dissection of wire data. */ /* Helpers for dissecting Variable-Length Vectors. {{{ */ -gboolean +bool ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint offset, guint offset_end, guint32 *ret_length, - int hf_length, guint32 min_value, guint32 max_value) + unsigned offset, unsigned offset_end, uint32_t *ret_length, + int hf_length, uint32_t min_value, uint32_t max_value) { - guint veclen_size; - guint32 veclen_value; + unsigned veclen_size; + uint32_t veclen_value; proto_item *pi; DISSECTOR_ASSERT_CMPUINT(min_value, <=, max_value); @@ -6908,7 +7133,7 @@ ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, prot "Vector offset is past buffer end offset (%u > %u)", offset, offset_end); *ret_length = 0; - return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */ + return false; /* Cannot read length. */ } if (max_value > 0xffffff) { @@ -6927,7 +7152,7 @@ ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, prot "No more room for vector of length %u", veclen_size); *ret_length = 0; - return FALSE; /* Cannot read length. */ + return false; /* Cannot read length. */ } pi = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf_length, tvb, offset, veclen_size, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &veclen_value); @@ -6948,53 +7173,53 @@ ssl_add_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, prot "Vector length %u is too large, truncating it to %u", veclen_value, offset_end - offset); *ret_length = offset_end - offset; - return FALSE; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */ + return false; /* Length is truncated to avoid overflow. */ } *ret_length = veclen_value; - return TRUE; /* Length is OK. */ + return true; /* Length is OK. */ } -gboolean +bool ssl_end_vector(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint offset, guint offset_end) + unsigned offset, unsigned offset_end) { if (offset < offset_end) { - guint trailing = offset_end - offset; + unsigned trailing = offset_end - offset; proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_trailing_data, tvb, offset, trailing, "%u trailing byte%s unprocessed", trailing, plurality(trailing, " was", "s were")); - return FALSE; /* unprocessed data warning */ + return false; /* unprocessed data warning */ } else if (offset > offset_end) { /* * Returned offset runs past the end. This should not happen and is * possibly a dissector bug. */ - guint excess = offset - offset_end; + unsigned excess = offset - offset_end; proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, pinfo, &hf->ei.malformed_buffer_too_small, tvb, offset_end, excess, "Dissector processed too much data (%u byte%s)", excess, plurality(excess, "", "s")); - return FALSE; /* overflow error */ + return false; /* overflow error */ } - return TRUE; /* OK, offset matches. */ + return true; /* OK, offset matches. */ } /** }}} */ -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig); + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version, int hf_sig_len, int hf_sig); /* change_cipher_spec(20) dissection */ void ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, SslSession *session, - gboolean is_from_server, + uint32_t offset, SslSession *session, + bool is_from_server, const SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* @@ -7015,7 +7240,7 @@ ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, } /* Remember frame number of first CCS */ - guint32 *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame; + uint32_t *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame; if (*ccs_frame == 0) *ccs_frame = pinfo->num; @@ -7051,9 +7276,9 @@ ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* Dissects a SignatureScheme (TLS 1.3) or SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (TLS 1.2). * {{{ */ static void -tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) +tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { - guint32 sighash, hashalg, sigalg; + uint32_t sighash, hashalg, sigalg; proto_item *ti_sigalg; proto_tree *sigalg_tree; @@ -7083,9 +7308,9 @@ tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_t /* dissect a list of hash algorithms, return the number of bytes dissected this is used for the signature algorithms extension and for the TLS1.2 certificate request. {{{ */ -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, - packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) + packet_info* pinfo, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 * struct { @@ -7096,12 +7321,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t */ proto_tree *subtree; proto_item *ti; - guint sh_alg_length; - guint32 next_offset; + unsigned sh_alg_length; + uint32_t next_offset; /* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sh_alg_length, - hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16 - 1)) { + hf->hf.hs_sig_hash_alg_len, 2, UINT16_MAX - 1)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7126,20 +7351,20 @@ ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t /* Dissection of DistinguishedName (for CertificateRequest and * certificate_authorities extension). {{{ */ -static guint32 +static uint32_t tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; - guint32 dnames_length, next_offset; + uint32_t dnames_length, next_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; int dnames_count = 100; /* the maximum number of DNs to add to the tree */ /* Note: minimum length is 0 for TLS 1.1/1.2 and 3 for earlier/later */ /* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &dnames_length, - hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_dnames_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7154,11 +7379,11 @@ tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pac plurality(dnames_length, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.dnames); - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); while (offset < next_offset) { /* get the length of the current certificate */ - guint32 name_length; + uint32_t name_length; if (dnames_count-- == 0) { /* stop adding to tree when the list is considered too large @@ -7174,12 +7399,12 @@ tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pac /* opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, next_offset, &name_length, - hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_dname_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; - dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, + dissect_x509if_DistinguishedName(false, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_dname); offset += name_length; } @@ -7189,16 +7414,16 @@ tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pac /** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). {{{ */ -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_sig_hash_algs(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) + proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, ja4_data); } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_ext_delegated_credentials(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type) + proto_tree *tree, packet_info* pinfo, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint8_t hnd_type) { if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* @@ -7210,7 +7435,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_ext_delegated_credentials(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv return ssl_dissect_hash_alg_list(hf, tvb, tree, pinfo, offset, offset_end, NULL); } else { asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; - guint pubkey_length, sign_length; + unsigned pubkey_length, sign_length; /* * struct { @@ -7226,7 +7451,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_ext_delegated_credentials(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv * } DelegatedCredential; */ - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_cred_valid_time, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; @@ -7239,14 +7464,14 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_ext_delegated_credentials(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv return offset_end; } offset += 3; - dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf->hf.hs_cred_pubkey); + dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(false, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, hf->hf.hs_cred_pubkey); offset += pubkey_length; tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, tree, offset, NULL); offset += 2; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sign_length, - hf->hf.hs_cred_signature_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_cred_signature_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7258,11 +7483,11 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_ext_delegated_credentials(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv } } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alps(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type) { /* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vvv-tls-alps-01#section-4 */ @@ -7271,7 +7496,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alps(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: { proto_tree *alps_tree; proto_item *ti; - guint32 next_offset, alps_length, name_length; + uint32_t next_offset, alps_length, name_length; /* * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; @@ -7281,7 +7506,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alps(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alps_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_alps_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_alps_len, 2, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7295,7 +7520,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alps(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * ensures that data is always available.) */ while (offset < next_offset) { if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alps_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_alps_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_alps_alpn_str_len, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset++; @@ -7317,12 +7542,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alps(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset_end; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslSession *session, - gboolean is_dtls, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslSession *session, + bool is_dtls, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1 @@ -7333,12 +7558,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, */ proto_tree *alpn_tree; proto_item *ti; - guint32 next_offset, alpn_length, name_length; - guint8 *proto_name = NULL; + uint32_t next_offset, alpn_length, name_length; + uint8_t *proto_name = NULL, *client_proto_name = NULL; /* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &alpn_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_len, 2, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7353,7 +7578,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, while (offset < next_offset) { /* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, alpn_tree, offset, next_offset, &name_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str_len, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset++; @@ -7361,8 +7586,8 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree_add_item(alpn_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_alpn_str, tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA); if (ja4_data && wmem_strbuf_get_len(ja4_data->alpn) == 0) { - const char alpn_first_char = (char)tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset); - const char alpn_last_char = (char)tvb_get_guint8(tvb,offset + name_length - 1); + const char alpn_first_char = (char)tvb_get_uint8(tvb,offset); + const char alpn_last_char = (char)tvb_get_uint8(tvb,offset + name_length - 1); if ((g_ascii_isprint(alpn_first_char)) && g_ascii_isprint(alpn_last_char)) { wmem_strbuf_append_printf(ja4_data->alpn, "%c%c", alpn_first_char, alpn_last_char); } @@ -7377,6 +7602,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * comparison purposes. */ proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, name_length, ENC_ASCII); + } else if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { + client_proto_name = tvb_get_string_enc(pinfo->pool, tvb, offset, + name_length, ENC_ASCII); } offset += name_length; } @@ -7418,15 +7646,19 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_alpn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(handle)); session->app_handle = handle; } + } else if (client_proto_name) { + // No current use for looking up the handle as the only consumer of this API is currently the QUIC dissector + // and it just needs the string since there are/were various HTTP/3 ALPNs to check for. + session->client_alpn_name = wmem_strdup(wmem_file_scope(), client_proto_name); } return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04#page-3 * The "extension_data" field of a "next_protocol_negotiation" extension @@ -7436,7 +7668,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * length prefixed byte strings. Implementations MUST ensure that the * empty string is not included and that no byte strings are truncated. */ - guint32 npn_length; + uint32_t npn_length; proto_tree *npn_tree; /* List is optional, do not add tree if there are no entries. */ @@ -7449,7 +7681,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, while (offset < offset_end) { /* non-empty, 8-bit length prefixed strings means range 1..255 */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, npn_tree, offset, offset_end, &npn_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_npn_str_len, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset++; @@ -7462,10 +7694,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_npn(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.2 * struct { @@ -7474,7 +7706,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * */ proto_tree *reneg_info_tree; - guint32 reneg_info_length; + uint32_t reneg_info_length; reneg_info_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.hs_ext_reneg_info, NULL, "Renegotiation Info extension"); @@ -7493,10 +7725,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_reneg_info(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - const gchar **group_name_out) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + const char **group_name_out) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.8 * struct { @@ -7504,14 +7736,14 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; * } KeyShareEntry; */ - guint32 key_exchange_length, group; + uint32_t key_exchange_length, group; proto_tree *ks_tree; ks_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_key_share_ks, NULL, "Key Share Entry"); proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ks_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &group); offset += 2; - const gchar *group_name = val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)"); + const char *group_name = val_to_str(group, ssl_extension_curves, "Unknown (%u)"); proto_item_append_text(ks_tree, ": Group: %s", group_name); if (group_name_out) { *group_name_out = !IS_GREASE_TLS(group) ? group_name : NULL; @@ -7519,7 +7751,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv /* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ks_tree, offset, offset_end, &key_exchange_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_key_exchange_length, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; /* Bad (possible truncated) length, skip to end of KeyShare extension. */ } offset += 2; @@ -7532,18 +7764,18 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share_entry(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tv return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type) { proto_tree *key_share_tree; - guint32 next_offset; - guint32 client_shares_length; - guint32 group; - const gchar *group_name = NULL; + uint32_t next_offset; + uint32_t client_shares_length; + uint32_t group; + const char *group_name = NULL; - if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > guint32) */ + if (offset_end <= offset) { /* Check if ext_len == 0 and "overflow" (offset + ext_len) > uint32_t) */ return offset; } @@ -7553,7 +7785,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pac case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: /* KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, key_share_tree, offset, offset_end, &client_shares_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_key_share_client_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7589,10 +7821,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_key_share(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pac return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11 * struct { @@ -7617,25 +7849,25 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb switch (hnd_type){ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: { - guint32 identities_length, identities_end, binders_length; + uint32_t identities_length, identities_end, binders_length; /* PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &identities_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identities_length, 7, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; identities_end = offset + identities_length; while (offset < identities_end) { - guint32 identity_length; + uint32_t identity_length; proto_tree *identity_tree; identity_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(psk_tree, tvb, offset, 4, hf->ett.hs_ext_psk_identity, NULL, "PSK Identity ("); /* opaque identity<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, identity_tree, offset, identities_end, &identity_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_identity_identity_length, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return identities_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7655,7 +7887,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb /* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, psk_tree, offset, offset_end, &binders_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_binders_length, 33, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7676,10 +7908,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_pre_shared_key(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end _U_, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end _U_, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.10 * struct {} Empty; @@ -7696,7 +7928,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pa /* Remember that early_data will follow the handshake. */ if (ssl) { ssl_debug_printf("%s found early_data extension\n", G_STRFUNC); - ssl->has_early_data = TRUE; + ssl->has_early_data = true; } break; case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: @@ -7709,10 +7941,61 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_early_data(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pa return offset; } -static gint +static uint16_t +tls_try_get_version(bool is_dtls, uint16_t version, uint8_t *draft_version) +{ + if (draft_version) { + *draft_version = 0; + } + if (!is_dtls) { + uint8_t tls13_draft = extract_tls13_draft_version(version); + if (tls13_draft != 0) { + /* This is TLS 1.3 (a draft version). */ + if (draft_version) { + *draft_version = tls13_draft; + } + version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + } + if (version == 0xfb17 || version == 0xfb1a) { + /* Unofficial TLS 1.3 draft version for Facebook fizz. */ + tls13_draft = (uint8_t)version; + if (draft_version) { + *draft_version = tls13_draft; + } + version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + } + } + + switch (version) { + case SSLV3_VERSION: + case TLSV1_VERSION: + case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: + case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: + case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: + case TLCPV1_VERSION: + if (is_dtls) + return SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; + break; + + case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: + case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: + case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: + case DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION: + if (!is_dtls) + return SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; + break; + + default: /* invalid version number */ + return SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; + } + + return version; +} + +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - SslSession *session, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + SslSession *session, bool is_dtls, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.1 @@ -7721,7 +8004,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t * } SupportedVersions; * Note that ServerHello and HelloRetryRequest are handled by the caller. */ - guint32 versions_length, next_offset; + uint32_t versions_length, next_offset; /* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &versions_length, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_versions_len, 2, 254)) { @@ -7730,8 +8013,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t offset++; next_offset = offset + versions_length; - guint version; - guint8 draft_version, max_draft_version = 0; + unsigned version; + unsigned current_version, lowest_version = SSL_VER_UNKNOWN; + uint8_t draft_version, max_draft_version = 0; const char *sep = " "; while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) { proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version); @@ -7742,12 +8026,31 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t sep = ", "; } - draft_version = extract_tls13_draft_version(version); + current_version = tls_try_get_version(is_dtls, version, &draft_version); + if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { + if (lowest_version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { + lowest_version = current_version; + } else if (current_version != SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { + if (!is_dtls) { + lowest_version = MIN(lowest_version, current_version); + } else { + lowest_version = MAX(lowest_version, current_version); + } + } + } max_draft_version = MAX(draft_version, max_draft_version); if (ja4_data && !IS_GREASE_TLS(version)) { + /* The DTLS version numbers get mapped to "00" for unknown per + * JA4 spec, but if JA4 ever does support DTLS we'll probably + * need to take the MIN instead of MAX here for DTLS. + */ ja4_data->max_version = MAX(version, ja4_data->max_version); } } + if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN && lowest_version != SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { + col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, + val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, is_dtls ? "DTLS" : "TLS")); + } if (!ssl_end_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset)) { offset = next_offset; } @@ -7761,20 +8064,20 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.2 * struct { * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; * } Cookie; */ - guint32 cookie_length; + uint32_t cookie_length; /* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_cookie_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7785,9 +8088,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cookie(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.9 * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; @@ -7796,7 +8099,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuf * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; * } PskKeyExchangeModes; */ - guint32 ke_modes_length, next_offset; + uint32_t ke_modes_length, next_offset; /* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &ke_modes_length, @@ -7814,9 +8117,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_psk_key_exchange_modes(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuf return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.4 * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; @@ -7827,9 +8130,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_certificate_authorities(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbu return tls_dissect_certificate_authorities(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.5 * struct { @@ -7841,19 +8144,19 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, p * } OIDFilterExtension; */ proto_tree *subtree; - guint32 filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset; + uint32_t filters_length, oid_length, values_length, value_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; const char *oid, *name; /* OIDFilter filters<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &filters_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_psk_ke_modes_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; offset_end = offset + filters_length; - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); while (offset < offset_end) { subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, @@ -7861,11 +8164,11 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, p /* opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &oid_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid_length, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset++; - dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(FALSE, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset, + dissect_ber_object_identifier_str(false, &asn1_ctx, subtree, tvb, offset, hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_oid, &oid); offset += oid_length; @@ -7875,7 +8178,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, p /* opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &values_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_oid_filters_values_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -7892,10 +8195,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_oid_filters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, p return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3 * @@ -7917,7 +8220,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * } ServerNameList; */ proto_tree *server_name_tree; - guint32 list_length, server_name_length, next_offset; + uint32_t list_length, server_name_length, next_offset; /* The server SHALL include "server_name" extension with empty data. */ if (offset == offset_end) { @@ -7928,22 +8231,22 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_list_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + list_length; while (offset < next_offset) { - guint32 name_type; - const guint8 *server_name = NULL; + uint32_t name_type; + const uint8_t *server_name = NULL; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(server_name_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &name_type); offset++; /* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, server_name_tree, offset, next_offset, &server_name_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_server_name_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; @@ -7956,21 +8259,37 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, if (name_type == 0) { proto_item_append_text(tree, " name=%s", server_name); col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " (SNI=%s)", server_name); + + if (gbl_resolv_flags.handshake_sni_addr_resolution) { + // Client Hello: Client (Src) -> Server (Dst) + switch (pinfo->dst.type) { + case AT_IPv4: + if (pinfo->dst.len == sizeof(uint32_t)) { + add_ipv4_name(*(uint32_t *)pinfo->dst.data, server_name, false); + } + break; + case AT_IPv6: + if (pinfo->dst.len == sizeof(ws_in6_addr)) { + add_ipv6_name(pinfo->dst.data, server_name, false); + } + break; + } + } } } return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { - guint ext_len = offset_end - offset; + unsigned ext_len = offset_end - offset; if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO && ssl && ext_len != 0) { tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ext_len); /* Save the Session Ticket such that it can be used as identifier for * restoring a previous Master Secret (in ChangeCipherSpec) */ - ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), + ssl->session_ticket.data = (unsigned char*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl->session_ticket.data, ext_len); ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ext_len; tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ext_len); @@ -7980,23 +8299,23 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_session_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb return offset + ext_len; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, guint16 ext_type, SslSession *session) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, uint16_t ext_type, SslSession *session) { - guint8 cert_list_length; - guint8 cert_type; + uint8_t cert_list_length; + uint8_t cert_type; proto_tree *cert_list_tree; proto_item *ti; switch(hnd_type){ case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: - cert_list_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + cert_list_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; - if (offset_end - offset != (guint32)cert_list_length) + if (offset_end - offset != (uint32_t)cert_list_length) return offset; ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_types, tvb, offset, @@ -8017,7 +8336,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: - cert_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + cert_type = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CERT_TYPE || ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CLIENT_CERT_TYPE) { @@ -8034,12 +8353,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_cert_type(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { - guint32 compress_certificate_algorithms_length, next_offset; + uint32_t compress_certificate_algorithms_length, next_offset; /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-certificate-compression-03#section-3.0 * enum { @@ -8057,7 +8376,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_ case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: /* CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithms<1..2^8-1>;*/ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compress_certificate_algorithms_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_algorithms_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8-1)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_compress_certificate_algorithms_length, 1, UINT8_MAX-1)) { return offset_end; } offset += 1; @@ -8076,12 +8395,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_ return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_token_binding(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { - guint32 key_parameters_length, next_offset; + uint32_t key_parameters_length, next_offset; proto_item *p_ti; proto_tree *p_tree; @@ -8111,7 +8430,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_token_binding(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset += 1; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &key_parameters_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_token_binding_key_parameters_length, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_token_binding_key_parameters_length, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 1; @@ -8143,13 +8462,13 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_token_binding(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { - gboolean use_varint_encoding = TRUE; // Whether this is draft -27 or newer. - guint32 next_offset; + bool use_varint_encoding = true; // Whether this is draft -27 or newer. + uint32_t next_offset; /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-25#section-18 * @@ -8173,21 +8492,21 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv */ if (offset_end - offset >= 6 && - 2 + (guint)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) == offset_end - offset && - 6 + (guint)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4) <= offset_end - offset) { + 2 + (unsigned)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset) == offset_end - offset && + 6 + (unsigned)tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4) <= offset_end - offset) { // Assume encoding of Transport Parameters draft -26 or older with at // least one transport parameter that has a valid length. - use_varint_encoding = FALSE; + use_varint_encoding = false; } if (use_varint_encoding) { next_offset = offset_end; } else { - guint32 quic_length; + uint32_t quic_length; // Assume draft -26 or earlier. /* TransportParameter TransportParameters<0..2^16-1>; */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &quic_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8195,19 +8514,19 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv } while (offset < next_offset) { - guint64 parameter_type; /* 62-bit space */ - guint32 parameter_length; + uint64_t parameter_type; /* 62-bit space */ + uint32_t parameter_length; proto_tree *parameter_tree; - guint32 parameter_end_offset; - guint64 value; - guint32 len = 0, i; + uint32_t parameter_end_offset; + uint64_t value; + uint32_t len = 0, i; parameter_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 2, hf->ett.hs_ext_quictp_parameter, NULL, "Parameter"); /* TransportParameter ID and Length. */ if (use_varint_encoding) { - guint64 parameter_length64; - guint32 type_len = 0; + uint64_t parameter_length64; + uint32_t type_len = 0; proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_type, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, ¶meter_type, &type_len); @@ -8215,7 +8534,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, ¶meter_length64, &len); - parameter_length = (guint32)parameter_length64; + parameter_length = (uint32_t)parameter_length64; offset += len; proto_item_set_len(parameter_tree, type_len + len + parameter_length); @@ -8227,7 +8546,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv /* opaque value<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, parameter_tree, offset, next_offset, ¶meter_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len_old, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_len_old, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset += 2; @@ -8324,7 +8643,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv /* No Payload */ break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_PREFERRED_ADDRESS: { - guint32 connectionid_length; + uint32_t connectionid_length; quic_cid_t cid; proto_tree_add_item(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_pa_ipv4address, @@ -8354,6 +8673,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv // parameter is sent, the sequence number of the supplied // connection ID is 1." cid.seq_num = 1; + // Multipath draft-07 "Also, the Path Identifier for the + // connection ID specified in the "preferred address" + // transport parameter is 0." + cid.path_id = 0; tvb_memcpy(tvb, cid.cid, offset, connectionid_length); quic_add_connection(pinfo, &cid); } @@ -8431,7 +8754,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 4; if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { /* From server */ - guint32 versions_length; + uint32_t versions_length; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_google_supported_versions_length, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &versions_length); @@ -8502,14 +8825,32 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_enable_multipath, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len); if (value == 1) { - quic_add_multipath(pinfo); + quic_add_multipath(pinfo, QUIC_MP_NO_PATH_ID); } offset += parameter_length; break; case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH_DRAFT05: case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_ENABLE_MULTIPATH: /* No Payload */ - quic_add_multipath(pinfo); + quic_add_multipath(pinfo, QUIC_MP_NO_PATH_ID); + break; + case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_PATHS: + proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_paths, + tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len); + if (value > 1) { + quic_add_multipath(pinfo, QUIC_MP_PATH_ID); + } + /* multipath draft-07: "The value of the initial_max_paths + * parameter MUST be at least 2." TODO: Expert Info? */ + offset += parameter_length; + break; + case SSL_HND_QUIC_TP_INITIAL_MAX_PATH_ID: + proto_tree_add_item_ret_varint(parameter_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_quictp_parameter_initial_max_path_id, + tvb, offset, -1, ENC_VARINT_QUIC, &value, &len); + if (value > 1) { + quic_add_multipath(pinfo, QUIC_MP_PATH_ID); + } + offset += parameter_length; break; default: offset += parameter_length; @@ -8526,16 +8867,16 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_quic_transport_parameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tv return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean from_server, gboolean is_hrr) + bool from_server, bool is_hrr) { - guint8 sessid_length; + uint8_t sessid_length; proto_tree *rnd_tree; proto_tree *ti_rnd; - guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; + uint8_t draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; if (ssl) { StringInfo *rnd; @@ -8557,7 +8898,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, ti_rnd = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_random, tvb, offset, 32, ENC_NA); - if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */ + if ((session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) && (session->version != DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION)) { /* No time on first bytes random with TLS 1.3 */ rnd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti_rnd, hf->ett.hs_random); /* show the time */ @@ -8580,13 +8921,13 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* No Session ID with TLS 1.3 on Server Hello before draft -22 */ if (from_server == 0 || !(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) { /* show the session id (length followed by actual Session ID) */ - sessid_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + sessid_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_session_id_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; if (ssl) { - /* save the authorative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec. + /* save the authoritative SID for later use in ChangeCipherSpec. * (D)TLS restricts the SID to 32 chars, it does not make sense to * save more, so ignore larger ones. */ if (from_server && sessid_length <= 32) { @@ -8604,10 +8945,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - gboolean has_length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + bool has_length) { /* TLS 1.2/1.3 status_request Client Hello Extension. * TLS 1.2 status_request_v2 CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 type. @@ -8630,9 +8971,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb * opaque ResponderID<1..2^16-1>; * opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1>; */ - guint cert_status_type; + unsigned cert_status_type; - cert_status_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + cert_status_type = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA); offset++; @@ -8647,12 +8988,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP: case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS_TYPE_OCSP_MULTI: { - guint32 responder_id_list_len; - guint32 request_extensions_len; + uint32_t responder_id_list_len; + uint32_t request_extensions_len; /* ResponderID responder_id_list<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &responder_id_list_len, - hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_responder_id_list_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8666,7 +9007,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb /* opaque Extensions<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &request_extensions_len, - hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_extensions_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8684,37 +9025,37 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb return offset; } -static guint +static unsigned ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request_v2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6961#section-2.2 * struct { * CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1>; * } CertificateStatusRequestListV2; */ - guint32 req_list_length, next_offset; + uint32_t req_list_length, next_offset; /* CertificateStatusRequestItemV2 certificate_status_req_list<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &req_list_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_request_list_len, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; next_offset = offset + req_list_length; while (offset < next_offset) { - offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, TRUE); + offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, true); } return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t tls_dissect_ocsp_response(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { - guint32 response_length; + uint32_t response_length; proto_item *ocsp_resp; proto_tree *ocsp_resp_tree; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; @@ -8731,17 +9072,17 @@ tls_dissect_ocsp_response(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info * proto_item_set_text(ocsp_resp, "OCSP Response"); ocsp_resp_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ocsp_resp, hf->ett.ocsp_response); if (proto_is_protocol_enabled(find_protocol_by_id(proto_ocsp))) { - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); - dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); + dissect_ocsp_OCSPResponse(false, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, ocsp_resp_tree, -1); } - offset += response_length;; + offset += response_length; return offset; } -guint32 +uint32_t tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* TLS 1.2 "CertificateStatus" handshake message. * TLS 1.3 "status_request" Certificate extension. @@ -8757,7 +9098,7 @@ tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pack * OCSPResponse ocsp_response_list<1..2^24-1>; * } OCSPResponseList; // status_request_v2 */ - guint32 status_type, resp_list_length, next_offset; + uint32_t status_type, resp_list_length, next_offset; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_status_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &status_type); @@ -8786,9 +9127,9 @@ tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pack return offset; } -static guint +static unsigned ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.2.7 @@ -8800,14 +9141,14 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *t * NOTE: "NamedCurve" (RFC 4492) is renamed to "NamedGroup" (RFC 7919) and * the extension itself from "elliptic_curves" to "supported_groups". */ - guint32 groups_length, next_offset; + uint32_t groups_length, next_offset; proto_tree *groups_tree; proto_item *ti; - gchar *ja3_dash = ""; + char *ja3_dash = ""; /* NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &groups_length, - hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_groups_len, 2, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8828,7 +9169,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *t } /* loop over all groups */ while (offset + 2 <= offset_end) { - guint32 ext_supported_group; + uint32_t ext_supported_group; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(groups_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_supported_group, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &ext_supported_group); @@ -8845,15 +9186,15 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_groups(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *t return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3) { - guint8 ecpf_length; + uint8_t ecpf_length; proto_tree *ecpf_tree; proto_item *ti; - ecpf_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + ecpf_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_formats_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); @@ -8874,7 +9215,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *t /* loop over all point formats */ while (ecpf_length > 0) { - guint32 ext_ec_point_format; + uint32_t ext_ec_point_format; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(ecpf_tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_ec_point_format, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &ext_ec_point_format); @@ -8891,18 +9232,18 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ec_point_formats(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *t return offset; } -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_srp(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 next_offset) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t next_offset) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5054#section-2.8.1 * opaque srp_I<1..2^8-1>; */ - guint32 username_len; + uint32_t username_len; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, next_offset, &username_len, - hf->hf.hs_ext_srp_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_srp_len, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return next_offset; } offset++; @@ -8914,9 +9255,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_srp(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint16_t version) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.2 * enum { v1(0), (255) } Version; @@ -8932,11 +9273,11 @@ tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, pro * digitally-signed struct { ... }; * } SignedCertificateTimestamp; */ - guint32 sct_version; - guint64 sct_timestamp_ms; + uint32_t sct_version; + uint64_t sct_timestamp_ms; nstime_t sct_timestamp; - guint32 exts_len; - const gchar *log_name; + uint32_t exts_len; + const char *log_name; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.sct_sct_version, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_NA, &sct_version); offset++; @@ -8955,7 +9296,7 @@ tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, pro offset += 8; /* opaque CtExtensions<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len, - hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.sct_sct_extensions_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8969,9 +9310,9 @@ tls_dissect_sct(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, pro return offset; } -guint32 +uint32_t tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint16_t version) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3 * opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1>; @@ -8979,12 +9320,12 @@ tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo * SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1>; * } SignedCertificateTimestampList; */ - guint32 list_length, sct_length, next_offset; + uint32_t list_length, sct_length, next_offset; proto_tree *subtree; /* SerializedSCT sct_list <1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &list_length, - hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.sct_scts_length, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -8994,7 +9335,7 @@ tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo /* opaque SerializedSCT<1..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &sct_length, - hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.sct_sct_length, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9011,9 +9352,9 @@ tls_dissect_sct_list(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo static int dissect_ech_hpke_cipher_suite(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset) { - guint32 kdf_id, aead_id; + uint32_t kdf_id, aead_id; proto_item *cs_ti; proto_tree *cs_tree; @@ -9036,13 +9377,13 @@ dissect_ech_hpke_cipher_suite(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_in static int dissect_ech_hpke_key_config(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint32 *config_id) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint32_t *config_id) { - guint32 length, cipher_suite_length; + uint32_t length, cipher_suite_length; proto_item *kc_ti, *css_ti; proto_tree *kc_tree, *css_tree; - guint32 original_offset = offset, next_offset; + uint32_t original_offset = offset, next_offset; kc_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.ech_hpke_keyconfig, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); @@ -9063,7 +9404,7 @@ dissect_ech_hpke_key_config(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info /* HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, kc_tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length, - hf->hf.ech_hpke_keyconfig_cipher_suites_length, 4, G_MAXUINT16 - 3)) { + hf->hf.ech_hpke_keyconfig_cipher_suites_length, 4, UINT16_MAX - 3)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9093,10 +9434,10 @@ dissect_ech_hpke_key_config(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info static int dissect_ech_echconfig_contents(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - const guint8 **public_name, guint32 *config_id) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + const uint8_t **public_name, uint32_t *config_id) { - guint32 public_name_length, extensions_length, next_offset; + uint32_t public_name_length, extensions_length, next_offset; offset = dissect_ech_hpke_key_config(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, config_id); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.ech_echconfigcontents_maximum_name_length, @@ -9111,7 +9452,7 @@ dissect_ech_echconfig_contents(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &extensions_length, - hf->hf.ech_echconfigcontents_extensions_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.ech_echconfigcontents_extensions_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9132,13 +9473,13 @@ dissect_ech_echconfig_contents(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i static int dissect_ech_echconfig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { - guint32 version, length; + uint32_t version, length; proto_item *ech_ti; proto_tree *ech_tree; - const guint8 *public_name = NULL; - guint32 config_id = 0; + const uint8_t *public_name = NULL; + uint32_t config_id = 0; ech_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.ech_echconfig, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); ech_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ech_ti, hf->ett.ech_echconfig); @@ -9154,7 +9495,7 @@ dissect_ech_echconfig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinf switch(version) { case 0xfe0d: - offset = dissect_ech_echconfig_contents(hf, tvb, pinfo, ech_tree, offset, offset_end, &public_name, &config_id); + dissect_ech_echconfig_contents(hf, tvb, pinfo, ech_tree, offset, offset_end, &public_name, &config_id); proto_item_append_text(ech_ti, ": id=%d %s", config_id, public_name); break; @@ -9165,15 +9506,15 @@ dissect_ech_echconfig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinf return 4 + length; } -guint32 +uint32_t ssl_dissect_ext_ech_echconfiglist(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { - guint32 echconfiglist_length, next_offset; + uint32_t echconfiglist_length, next_offset; /* ECHConfig ECHConfigList<1..2^16-1>; */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &echconfiglist_length, - hf->hf.ech_echconfiglist_length, 1, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.ech_echconfiglist_length, 1, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9190,12 +9531,12 @@ ssl_dissect_ext_ech_echconfiglist(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packe return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ech(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { - guint32 ch_type, length; + uint32_t ch_type, length; proto_item *retry_ti; proto_tree *retry_tree; @@ -9269,12 +9610,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_ech(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb _U_, packe return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint8 hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint8_t hnd_type, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_) { - guint32 record_digest_length, encrypted_sni_length; + uint32_t record_digest_length, encrypted_sni_length; switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: @@ -9292,7 +9633,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* opaque record_digest<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &record_digest_length, - hf->hf.esni_record_digest_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.esni_record_digest_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9303,7 +9644,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* opaque encrypted_sni<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &encrypted_sni_length, - hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni_length, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.esni_encrypted_sni_length, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -9324,16 +9665,16 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /** TLS Extensions (in Client Hello and Server Hello). }}} */ /* Connection ID dissection. {{{ */ -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - guint8 cidl, guint8 **session_cid, guint8 *session_cidl) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl, + uint8_t cidl, uint8_t **session_cid, uint8_t *session_cidl) { /* keep track of the decrypt session only for the first pass */ if (cidl > 0 && !PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset + 1, cidl); *session_cidl = cidl; - *session_cid = (guint8*)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), cidl); + *session_cid = (uint8_t*)wmem_alloc0(wmem_file_scope(), cidl); tvb_memcpy(tvb, *session_cid, offset + 1, cidl); if (ssl) { ssl_add_session_by_cid(ssl); @@ -9353,20 +9694,20 @@ ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_in return offset; } -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint8 hnd_type, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint8_t hnd_type, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { - guint8 cidl = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + uint8_t cidl = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: - session->client_cid_len_present = TRUE; + session->client_cid_len_present = true; return ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, ssl, cidl, &session->client_cid, &session->client_cid_len); case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: - session->server_cid_len_present = TRUE; + session->server_cid_len_present = true; return ssl_dissect_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, ssl, cidl, &session->server_cid, &session->server_cid_len); default: @@ -9375,8 +9716,8 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_connection_id(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, } /* }}} */ /* Whether the Content and Handshake Types are valid; handle Protocol Version. {{{ */ -gboolean -ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type) +bool +ssl_is_valid_content_type(uint8_t type) { switch ((ContentType) type) { case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC: @@ -9385,13 +9726,14 @@ ssl_is_valid_content_type(guint8 type) case SSL_ID_APP_DATA: case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT: case SSL_ID_TLS12_CID: - return TRUE; + case SSL_ID_DTLS13_ACK: + return true; } - return FALSE; + return false; } -gboolean -ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls) +bool +ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(uint8_t hs_type, bool is_dtls) { switch ((HandshakeType) hs_type) { case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: @@ -9418,14 +9760,14 @@ ssl_is_valid_handshake_type(guint8 hs_type, gboolean is_dtls) case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE: case SSL_HND_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE: case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS: - return TRUE; + return true; } - return FALSE; + return false; } -static gboolean -ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type, - gboolean is_dtls) +static bool +ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(uint8_t content_type, uint8_t handshake_type, + bool is_dtls) { /* Consider all valid Handshake messages (except for Client Hello) and * all other valid record types (other than Handshake) */ @@ -9439,17 +9781,18 @@ ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type, /** * Scan a Server Hello handshake message for the negotiated version. For TLS 1.3 * draft 22 and newer, it also checks whether it is a HelloRetryRequest. + * Returns true if the supported_versions extension was found, false if not. */ -void -tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 *server_version, gboolean *is_hrr) +bool +tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t *server_version, bool *is_hrr) { /* SHA256("HelloRetryRequest") */ - static const guint8 tls13_hrr_random_magic[] = { + static const uint8_t tls13_hrr_random_magic[] = { 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c }; - guint8 session_id_length; + uint8_t session_id_length; *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); @@ -9458,78 +9801,121 @@ tls_scan_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, * 2 + 32 + 1 = 35 (version, random, session id length) * 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 (cipher suite, compression method, extensions length) * 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 (ext type, ext len, version) + * + * We only check for the [legacy_]version field to be [D]TLS 1.2; if it's 1.3, + * there's a separate expert info warning for that. */ - if (*server_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION && offset_end - offset >= 46) { + if ((*server_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || *server_version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION) && offset_end - offset >= 46) { offset += 2; - *is_hrr = tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, tls13_hrr_random_magic, sizeof(tls13_hrr_random_magic)) == 0; + if (is_hrr) { + *is_hrr = tvb_memeql(tvb, offset, tls13_hrr_random_magic, sizeof(tls13_hrr_random_magic)) == 0; + } offset += 32; - session_id_length = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + session_id_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); offset++; if (offset_end - offset < session_id_length + 5u) { - return; + return false; } offset += session_id_length + 5; while (offset_end - offset >= 6) { - guint16 ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); - guint16 ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + uint16_t ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + uint16_t ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); if (offset_end - offset < 4u + ext_len) { break; /* not enough data for type, length and data */ } - if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS && ext_len == 2) { - *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); - return; + if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) { + if (ext_len == 2) { + *server_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); + } + return true; } offset += 4 + ext_len; } } else { - *is_hrr = FALSE; + if (is_hrr) { + *is_hrr = false; + } } + return false; } -void -ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - guint8 content_type, guint8 handshake_type, - gboolean is_dtls, guint16 version) +/** + * Scan a Client Hello handshake message to see if the supported_versions + * extension is found, in which case the version field is legacy_version. + */ +static bool +tls_scan_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { - guint8 tls13_draft = 0; + uint8_t session_id_length; - if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type, - is_dtls)) - return; + uint16_t client_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); - if (handshake_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) { - tls13_draft = extract_tls13_draft_version(version); - if (tls13_draft != 0) { - /* This is TLS 1.3 (a draft version). */ - version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + /* + * Try to look for supported_versions extension. Minimum length: + * 2 + 32 + 1 = 35 (version, random, session id length) + * 2 + 2 + 1 + 2 = 5 (cipher suite, compression method, extensions length) + * 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 (ext type, ext len, version) + * + * We only check for the [legacy_]version field to be [D]TLS 1.2; if it's 1.3, + * there's a separate expert info warning for that. + */ + if ((client_version == TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || client_version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION) && offset_end - offset >= 46) { + offset += 2; + offset += 32; + session_id_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); + offset++; + if (offset_end - offset < session_id_length + 2u) { + return false; } - if (version == 0xfb17 || version == 0xfb1a) { - /* Unofficial TLS 1.3 draft version for Facebook fizz. */ - tls13_draft = (guint8)version; - version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + offset += session_id_length; + if (client_version == DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION) { + uint8_t cookie_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); + offset++; + if (offset_end - offset < cookie_length + 2u) { + return false; + } } - } + uint16_t cipher_suites_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + offset += 2; + if (offset_end - offset < cipher_suites_length + 1u) { + return false; + } + offset += cipher_suites_length; + uint8_t compression_methods_length = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); + offset++; + if (offset_end - offset < compression_methods_length + 2u) { + return false; + } + offset += compression_methods_length + 2; - switch (version) { - case SSLV3_VERSION: - case TLSV1_VERSION: - case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: - case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: - case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: - case TLCPV1_VERSION: - if (is_dtls) - return; - break; + while (offset_end - offset >= 6) { + uint16_t ext_type = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); + uint16_t ext_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); + if (offset_end - offset < 4u + ext_len) { + break; /* not enough data for type, length and data */ + } + if (ext_type == SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) { + return true; + } + offset += 4 + ext_len; + } + } + return false; +} +void +ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, + uint8_t content_type, uint8_t handshake_type, + bool is_dtls, uint16_t version) +{ + uint8_t tls13_draft = 0; - case DTLSV1DOT0_VERSION: - case DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION: - case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: - if (!is_dtls) - return; - break; + if (!ssl_is_authoritative_version_message(content_type, handshake_type, + is_dtls)) + return; - default: /* invalid version number */ + version = tls_try_get_version(is_dtls, version, &tls13_draft); + if (version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { return; } @@ -9544,10 +9930,10 @@ ssl_try_set_version(SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, void ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo, ContentType content_type, - guint record_length, proto_item *length_pi, - guint16 version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb) + unsigned record_length, proto_item *length_pi, + uint16_t version, tvbuff_t *decrypted_tvb) { - guint max_expansion; + unsigned max_expansion; if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* TLS 1.3: Max length is 2^14 + 256 */ max_expansion = 256; @@ -9582,7 +9968,7 @@ ssl_check_record_length(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, packet_info *pinfo, } static void -ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher) +ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, uint16_t cipher) { /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */ ssl->session.cipher = cipher; @@ -9612,15 +9998,15 @@ ssl_set_cipher(SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint16 cipher) /* Client Hello and Server Hello dissections. {{{ */ -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, - packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, + packet_info* pinfo, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint8_t hnd_type, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3, ja4_data_t *ja4_data); + bool is_dtls, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3, ja4_data_t *ja4_data); void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 offset_end, SslSession *session, + packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, dtls_hfs_t *dtls_hfs) { /* struct { @@ -9635,15 +10021,15 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *cs_tree; - guint32 client_version; - guint32 cipher_suite_length; - guint32 compression_methods_length; - guint8 compression_method; - guint32 next_offset; + uint32_t client_version; + uint32_t cipher_suite_length; + uint32_t compression_methods_length; + uint8_t compression_method; + uint32_t next_offset; wmem_strbuf_t *ja3 = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); - gchar *ja3_hash; - gchar *ja3_dash = ""; - gchar *ja4, *ja4_r, *ja4_hash, *ja4_b, *ja4_c; + char *ja3_hash; + char *ja3_dash = ""; + char *ja4, *ja4_r, *ja4_hash, *ja4_b, *ja4_c; ja4_data_t ja4_data; wmem_strbuf_t *ja4_a = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); wmem_strbuf_t *ja4_br = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); @@ -9651,7 +10037,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, wmem_list_frame_t *curr_entry; ja4_data.max_version = 0; - ja4_data.server_name_present = FALSE; + ja4_data.server_name_present = false; ja4_data.num_cipher_suites = 0; ja4_data.num_extensions = 0; ja4_data.alpn = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); @@ -9663,6 +10049,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, ti = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_client_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &client_version); + if (tls_scan_client_hello(tvb, offset, offset_end)) { + expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.legacy_version); + } offset += 2; wmem_strbuf_append_printf(ja3, "%i,", client_version); @@ -9686,11 +10075,11 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, } /* dissect fields that are present in both ClientHello and ServerHello */ - offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, FALSE, FALSE); + offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, false, false); /* fields specific for DTLS (cookie_len, cookie) */ if (dtls_hfs != NULL) { - guint32 cookie_length; + uint32_t cookie_length; /* opaque cookie<0..32> (for DTLS only) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cookie_length, dtls_hfs->hf_dtls_handshake_cookie_len, 0, 32)) { @@ -9706,7 +10095,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cipher_suite_length, - hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_cipher_suites_len, 2, UINT16_MAX)) { return; } offset += 2; @@ -9719,7 +10108,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, plurality(cipher_suite_length/2, "", "s")); cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.cipher_suites); while (offset + 2 <= next_offset) { - guint32 cipher_suite; + uint32_t cipher_suite; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_cipher_suite, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &cipher_suite); @@ -9738,7 +10127,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &compression_methods_length, - hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_comp_methods_len, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return; } offset++; @@ -9752,7 +10141,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, "", "s")); cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, hf->ett.comp_methods); while (offset < next_offset) { - compression_method = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + compression_method = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); /* TODO: make reserved/private comp meth. fields selectable */ if (compression_method < 64) proto_tree_add_uint(cs_tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, @@ -9782,8 +10171,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, if (proto_is_frame_protocol(pinfo->layers,"tcp")) { wmem_strbuf_append(ja4_a, "t"); - } else if (proto_is_frame_protocol(pinfo->layers,"udp")) { - wmem_strbuf_append(ja4_a, "u"); + } else if (proto_is_frame_protocol(pinfo->layers,"quic")) { + wmem_strbuf_append(ja4_a, "q"); + } else if (proto_is_frame_protocol(pinfo->layers,"dtls")) { + wmem_strbuf_append(ja4_a, "d"); } wmem_strbuf_append_printf(ja4_a, "%s", val_to_str_const(client_version, ssl_version_ja4_names, "00")); wmem_strbuf_append_printf(ja4_a, "%s", ja4_data.server_name_present ? "d" : "i"); @@ -9858,9 +10249,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, void ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls, gboolean is_hrr) + bool is_dtls, bool is_hrr) { /* struct { * ProtocolVersion server_version; @@ -9871,12 +10262,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * Extension server_hello_extension_list<0..2^16-1>; * } ServerHello; */ - guint8 draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; + uint8_t draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; proto_item *ti; - guint32 server_version; - guint32 cipher_suite; + uint32_t server_version; + uint32_t cipher_suite; wmem_strbuf_t *ja3 = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); - gchar *ja3_hash; + char *ja3_hash; col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); @@ -9884,16 +10275,40 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* Initially assume that the session is resumed. If this is not the case, a * ServerHelloDone will be observed before the ChangeCipherSpec message * which will reset this flag. */ - session->is_session_resumed = TRUE; + session->is_session_resumed = true; /* show the server version */ - proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb, + ti = proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &server_version); + + uint16_t supported_server_version; + if (tls_scan_server_hello(tvb, offset, offset_end, &supported_server_version, NULL)) { + expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.legacy_version); + } + /* + * Is it version 1.3? + * If so, that's an error; TLS and DTLS 1.3 Server Hellos claim + * to be TLS 1.2, and mention 1.3 in an extension. See RFC 8446 + * section 4.1.3 "Server Hello" and RFC 9147 Section 5.4 "Server + * Hello". + */ + if (is_dtls) { + if (server_version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + /* Don't do that. */ + expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.server_version_error); + } + } else { + if (server_version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + /* Don't do that. */ + expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &hf->ei.server_version_error); + } + } + offset += 2; wmem_strbuf_append_printf(ja3, "%i", server_version); /* dissect fields that are present in both ClientHello and ServerHello */ - offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, TRUE, is_hrr); + offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_common(hf, tvb, tree, offset, session, ssl, true, is_hrr); if (ssl) { /* store selected cipher suite for decryption */ @@ -9910,7 +10325,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, if (!(session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && draft_version > 0 && draft_version < 22)) { if (ssl) { /* store selected compression method for decryption */ - ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + ssl->session.compression = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); } /* and the server-selected compression method */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_comp_method, @@ -9939,9 +10354,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* New Session Ticket dissection. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash) + bool is_dtls, GHashTable *session_hash) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-3.3 (TLS >= 1.0): * struct { @@ -9960,10 +10375,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i */ proto_tree *subtree; proto_item *subitem; - guint32 ticket_len; - gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; - guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; - guint32 lifetime_hint; + uint32_t ticket_len; + bool is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + unsigned char draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; + uint32_t lifetime_hint; subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, hf->ett.session_ticket, NULL, @@ -9975,7 +10390,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i offset += 4; if (lifetime_hint >= 60) { - gchar *time_str = unsigned_time_secs_to_str(pinfo->pool, lifetime_hint); + char *time_str = unsigned_time_secs_to_str(pinfo->pool, lifetime_hint); proto_item_append_text(subitem, " (%s)", time_str); } @@ -9988,7 +10403,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* for TLS 1.3: ticket_nonce (coming with Draft 21)*/ if (draft_version == 0 || draft_version >= 21) { - guint32 ticket_nonce_len; + uint32_t ticket_nonce_len; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_nonce_len, hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_nonce_len, 0, 255)) { @@ -10004,7 +10419,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1> (with TLS 1.3 the minimum is 1) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, subtree, offset, offset_end, &ticket_len, - hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_session_ticket_len, is_tls13 ? 1 : 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return; } offset += 2; @@ -10015,7 +10430,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* save the session ticket to cache for ssl_finalize_decryption */ if (ssl && !is_tls13) { tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, ticket_len); - ssl->session_ticket.data = (guchar*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), + ssl->session_ticket.data = (unsigned char*)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl->session_ticket.data, ticket_len); ssl->session_ticket.data_len = ticket_len; tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl->session_ticket.data, offset, ticket_len); @@ -10039,9 +10454,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i void ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls) + bool is_dtls) { /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19#section-4.1.4 * struct { @@ -10051,8 +10466,8 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * } HelloRetryRequest; * Note: no longer used since draft -22 */ - guint32 version; - guint8 draft_version; + uint32_t version; + uint8_t draft_version; proto_tree_add_item_ret_uint(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN, &version); @@ -10072,9 +10487,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, void ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + packet_info* pinfo, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls) + bool is_dtls) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.3.1 * struct { @@ -10089,9 +10504,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* Certificate and Certificate Request dissections. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, packet_info *pinfo, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl _U_, - gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls) + bool is_from_server, bool is_dtls) { /* opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>; * @@ -10130,12 +10545,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) gnutls_datum_t subjectPublicKeyInfo = { NULL, 0 }; - guint certificate_index = 0; + unsigned certificate_index = 0; #endif - guint32 next_offset, certificate_list_length, cert_length; + uint32_t next_offset, certificate_list_length, cert_length; proto_tree *subtree = tree; - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); if ((is_from_server && session->server_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY) || (!is_from_server && session->client_cert_type == SSL_HND_CERT_TYPE_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY)) { @@ -10151,10 +10566,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, #endif /* TLS 1.3: opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */ - if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { - guint32 context_length; + if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + uint32_t context_length; if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length, - hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, UINT8_MAX)) { return; } offset++; @@ -10165,7 +10580,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, } } - if (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && cert_type == CERT_RPK) { + if ((session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && session->version != DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION) && cert_type == CERT_RPK) { /* For RPK before TLS 1.3, the single RPK is stored directly without * another "certificate_list" field. */ certificate_list_length = offset_end - offset; @@ -10205,7 +10620,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, } offset += 3; - dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); + dissect_x509af_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(false, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); offset += cert_length; break; case CERT_X509: @@ -10216,7 +10631,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, } offset += 3; - dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); + dissect_x509af_Certificate(false, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, subtree, hf->hf.hs_certificate); #if defined(HAVE_LIBGNUTLS) if (is_from_server && ssl && certificate_index == 0) { ssl_find_private_key_by_pubkey(ssl, &subjectPublicKeyInfo); @@ -10229,7 +10644,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, } /* TLS 1.3: Extension extensions<0..2^16-1> */ - if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { + if ((session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION)) { offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(hf, tvb, subtree, pinfo, offset, next_offset, SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE, session, ssl, is_dtls, NULL, NULL); @@ -10243,8 +10658,8 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, void ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - SslSession *session, gboolean is_dtls) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + SslSession *session, bool is_dtls) { /* From SSL 3.0 and up (note that since TLS 1.1 certificate_authorities can be empty): * enum { @@ -10310,21 +10725,21 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *p */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; - guint32 next_offset; + uint32_t next_offset; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; - gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; - guchar draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; + bool is_tls13 = (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || session->version == DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION); + unsigned char draft_version = session->tls13_draft_version; if (!tree) return; - asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); + asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, true, pinfo); if (is_tls13) { - guint32 context_length; + uint32_t context_length; /* opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &context_length, - hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_certificate_request_context_length, 0, UINT8_MAX)) { return; } offset++; @@ -10334,10 +10749,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *p offset += context_length; } } else { - guint32 cert_types_count; + uint32_t cert_types_count; /* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &cert_types_count, - hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, G_MAXUINT8)) { + hf->hf.hs_cert_types_count, 1, UINT8_MAX)) { return; } offset++; @@ -10387,7 +10802,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *p void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint16 version) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint16_t version) { ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, version, hf->hf.hs_client_cert_vrfy_sig_len, @@ -10397,7 +10812,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_ /* Finished dissection. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, const SslSession *session, ssl_hfs_t *ssl_hfs) { /* For SSLv3: @@ -10435,9 +10850,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* RFC 6066 Certificate URL handshake message dissection. {{{ */ void -ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) +ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset) { - guint16 url_hash_len; + uint16_t url_hash_len; /* enum { * individual_certs(0), pkipath(1), (255) @@ -10466,7 +10881,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tr while (url_hash_len-- > 0) { proto_item *urlhash_item; proto_tree *urlhash_tree; - guint16 url_len; + uint16_t url_len; urlhash_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_ext_cert_url_item, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA); @@ -10494,12 +10909,12 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tr void ssl_dissect_hnd_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, - guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, packet_info *pinfo, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, packet_info *pinfo, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_from_server, gboolean is_dtls) + bool is_from_server, bool is_dtls) { - guint32 algorithm, uncompressed_length; - guint32 compressed_certificate_message_length; + uint32_t algorithm, uncompressed_length; + uint32_t compressed_certificate_message_length; tvbuff_t *uncompressed_tvb = NULL; proto_item *ti; /* @@ -10562,26 +10977,26 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_compress_certificate(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pr } /* Dissection of TLS Extensions in Client Hello, Server Hello, etc. {{{ */ -static gint +static int ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, - packet_info* pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, guint8 hnd_type, + packet_info* pinfo, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, uint8_t hnd_type, SslSession *session, SslDecryptSession *ssl, - gboolean is_dtls, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) + bool is_dtls, wmem_strbuf_t *ja3, ja4_data_t *ja4_data) { - guint32 exts_len; - guint16 ext_type; - guint32 ext_len; - guint32 next_offset; + uint32_t exts_len; + uint16_t ext_type; + uint32_t ext_len; + uint32_t next_offset; proto_tree *ext_tree; - gboolean is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; + bool is_tls13 = session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; wmem_strbuf_t *ja3_sg = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); wmem_strbuf_t *ja3_ecpf = wmem_strbuf_new(pinfo->pool, ""); - gchar *ja3_dash = ""; - guint supported_version; + char *ja3_dash = ""; + unsigned supported_version; /* Extension extensions<0..2^16-2> (for TLS 1.3 HRR/CR min-length is 2) */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &exts_len, - hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_exts_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -10618,7 +11033,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t /* opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1> */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, offset_end, &ext_len, - hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf->hf.hs_ext_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -10629,7 +11044,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_server_name(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); if (ja4_data) { - ja4_data->server_name_present = TRUE; + ja4_data->server_name_present = true; } } break; @@ -10639,7 +11054,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST: if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { - offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, FALSE); + offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_status_request(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, false); } else if (is_tls13 && hnd_type == SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE) { offset = tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset); } @@ -10682,9 +11097,9 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_USE_SRTP: if (is_dtls) { if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO) { - offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(pinfo, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, FALSE); + offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(pinfo, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, false); } else if (hnd_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO) { - offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(pinfo, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, TRUE); + offset = dtls_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_use_srtp(pinfo, tvb, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, true); } } else { // XXX expert info: This extension MUST only be used with DTLS, and not with TLS. @@ -10773,7 +11188,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: switch (hnd_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: - offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session, ja4_data); + offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_supported_versions(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, session, is_dtls, ja4_data); break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: @@ -10810,7 +11225,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_esni(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, next_offset, hnd_type, ssl); break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CONNECTION_ID_DEPRECATED: - session->deprecated_cid = TRUE; + session->deprecated_cid = true; /* FALLTHRU */ case SSL_HND_HELLO_EXT_CONNECTION_ID: offset = ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_ext_connection_id(hf, tvb, pinfo, ext_tree, offset, hnd_type, session, ssl); @@ -10856,17 +11271,17 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_extension(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *t static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t length) { - gint point_len; + int point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree; ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "EC Diffie-Hellman Client Params"); /* point */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_point, tvb, @@ -10874,10 +11289,10 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, } static void -dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t length) { - gint yc_len; + int yc_len; proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree; ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, @@ -10893,10 +11308,10 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 length, const SslSession *session) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t length, const SslSession *session) { - gint epms_len; + int epms_len; proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree; ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, @@ -10926,14 +11341,14 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, } /* Used in PSK cipher suites */ -static void +static uint32_t dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset) { - guint identity_len; + unsigned identity_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; - ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, + ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, -1, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Client Params"); /* identity */ identity_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); @@ -10941,15 +11356,18 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_identity, tvb, offset + 2, identity_len, ENC_NA); + + proto_item_set_len(ssl_psk_tree, 2 + identity_len); + return 2 + identity_len; } /* Used in RSA PSK cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t length) { - gint identity_len, epms_len; + int identity_len, epms_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, @@ -10971,11 +11389,49 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset + 2, epms_len, ENC_NA); } +/* Used in Diffie-Hellman PSK cipher suites */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dhe_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t length) +{ + /* + * struct { + * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + * case diffie_hellman_psk: + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public; + * } exchange_keys; + * } ClientKeyExchange; + */ + + uint32_t psk_len = dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, tree, offset + psk_len, length - psk_len); +} + +/* Used in EC Diffie-Hellman PSK cipher suites */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t length) +{ + /* + * struct { + * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + * case ec_diffie_hellman_psk: + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; + * } exchange_keys; + * } ClientKeyExchange; + */ + + uint32_t psk_len = dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset + psk_len, length - psk_len); +} + /* Used in EC J-PAKE cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t length) { /* * struct { @@ -10998,7 +11454,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * } ClientKeyExchange; */ - gint point_len; + int point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecjpake_tree; ssl_ecjpake_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, @@ -11006,7 +11462,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, "EC J-PAKE Client Params"); /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.X */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_xc_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_xc, tvb, @@ -11014,7 +11470,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset += 1 + point_len; /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.V */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_vc_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_vc, tvb, @@ -11022,7 +11478,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset += 1 + point_len; /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.r */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_rc_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_client_keyex_rc, tvb, @@ -11031,10 +11487,10 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecc_sm2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, - guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, + uint32_t length) { - gint epms_len; + int epms_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecc_sm2_tree; ssl_ecc_sm2_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, @@ -11052,17 +11508,18 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecc_sm2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* Dissects DigitallySigned (see RFC 5246 4.7 Cryptographic Attributes). {{{ */ -static guint32 +static uint32_t ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version, gint hf_sig_len, gint hf_sig) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version, int hf_sig_len, int hf_sig) { - guint32 sig_len; + uint32_t sig_len; switch (version) { case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case DTLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: + case DTLSV1DOT3_VERSION: tls_dissect_signature_algorithm(hf, tvb, tree, offset, NULL); offset += 2; break; @@ -11073,7 +11530,7 @@ ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_inf /* Sig */ if (!ssl_add_vector(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, &sig_len, - hf_sig_len, 0, G_MAXUINT16)) { + hf_sig_len, 0, UINT16_MAX)) { return offset_end; } offset += 2; @@ -11087,8 +11544,8 @@ ssl_dissect_digitally_signed(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_inf /* dissects signed_params inside a ServerKeyExchange for some keyex algos */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version) { /* * TLSv1.2 (RFC 5246 sec 7.4.8) @@ -11109,8 +11566,8 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_sig(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_sig); } -static guint32 -dissect_tls_ecparameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) +static uint32_t +dissect_tls_ecparameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* * RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS @@ -11128,10 +11585,10 @@ dissect_tls_ecparameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tr * } ECParameters; */ - gint curve_type; + int curve_type; /* ECParameters.curve_type */ - curve_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + curve_type = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_curve_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; @@ -11149,8 +11606,8 @@ dissect_tls_ecparameters(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tr static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version, gboolean anon) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version, bool anon) { /* * RFC 4492 ECC cipher suites for TLS @@ -11171,7 +11628,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_ * } ServerKeyExchange; */ - gint point_len; + int point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecdh_tree; ssl_ecdh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, @@ -11182,7 +11639,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_ return; /* only named_curves are supported */ /* ECPoint.point */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecdh_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_point, tvb, @@ -11197,10 +11654,10 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version, gboolean anon) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version, bool anon) { - gint p_len, g_len, ys_len; + int p_len, g_len, ys_len; proto_tree *ssl_dh_tree; ssl_dh_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, @@ -11239,10 +11696,10 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i /* Only used in RSA-EXPORT cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version) { - gint modulus_len, exponent_len; + int modulus_len, exponent_len; proto_tree *ssl_rsa_tree; ssl_rsa_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, @@ -11269,33 +11726,69 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_i } /* Used in RSA PSK and PSK cipher suites */ -static void +static uint32_t dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset) { - guint hint_len; + unsigned hint_len; proto_tree *ssl_psk_tree; - hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); - if ((2 + hint_len) != length) { - /* Lengths don't line up (wasn't what we expected?) */ - return; - } - - ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, length, + ssl_psk_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, -1, hf->ett.keyex_params, NULL, "PSK Server Params"); /* hint */ + hint_len = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_psk_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_hint, tvb, offset + 2, hint_len, ENC_NA); + + proto_item_set_len(ssl_psk_tree, 2 + hint_len); + return 2 + hint_len; +} + +/* Used in Diffie-Hellman PSK cipher suites */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) +{ + /* + * struct { + * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + * case diffie_hellman_psk: + * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; + * ServerDHParams params; + * }; + * } ServerKeyExchange; + */ + + uint32_t psk_len = dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset + psk_len, offset_end, 0, true); +} + +/* Used in EC Diffie-Hellman PSK cipher suites */ +static void +dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh_psk(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) +{ + /* + * struct { + * select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { + * case ec_diffie_hellman_psk: + * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; + * ServerECDHParams params; + * }; + * } ServerKeyExchange; + */ + + uint32_t psk_len = dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset + psk_len, offset_end, 0, true); } /* Used in EC J-PAKE cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end) { /* * struct { @@ -11319,7 +11812,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, * } ServerKeyExchange; */ - gint point_len; + int point_len; proto_tree *ssl_ecjpake_tree; ssl_ecjpake_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, @@ -11331,7 +11824,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, return; /* only named_curves are supported */ /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.X */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_xs_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_xs, tvb, @@ -11339,7 +11832,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset += 1 + point_len; /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.V */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_vs_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_vs, tvb, @@ -11347,7 +11840,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, offset += 1 + point_len; /* ECJPAKEKeyKP.zkp.r */ - point_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); + point_len = tvb_get_uint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_rs_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_ecjpake_tree, hf->hf.hs_server_keyex_rs, tvb, @@ -11357,8 +11850,8 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, /* Only used in ECC-SM2-EXPORT cipher suites */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecc_sm2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, - guint16 version) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, + uint16_t version) { proto_tree *ssl_ecc_sm2_tree; @@ -11373,7 +11866,7 @@ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecc_sm2(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, pack /* Client Key Exchange and Server Key Exchange handshake dissections. {{{ */ void ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 length, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t length, const SslSession *session) { switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) { @@ -11382,10 +11875,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, case KEX_DH_RSA: case KEX_DHE_DSS: case KEX_DHE_RSA: - dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientDiffieHellmanPublic */ - /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */ + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_dhe_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */ case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: @@ -11395,13 +11888,17 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; ec_diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity, ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic */ - /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */ + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecdh_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; krb5: KerberosWrapper */ /* XXX: implement support for KRB5 */ + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_ciphersuite_undecoded, + tvb, offset, length, + "Kerberos ciphersuites (RFC 2712) are not implemented, contact Wireshark" + " developers if you want them to be supported"); break; case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk: psk_identity */ - dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); break; case KEX_RSA: /* RFC 5246; rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length, session); @@ -11413,6 +11910,10 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS: case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA: /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */ + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_ciphersuite_undecoded, + tvb, offset, length, + "SRP_SHA ciphersuites (RFC 5054) are not implemented, contact Wireshark" + " developers if you want them to be supported"); break; case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 used in Thread Commissioning */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecjpake(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); @@ -11421,65 +11922,74 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, dissect_ssl3_hnd_cli_keyex_ecc_sm2(hf, tvb, tree, offset, length); break; default: - /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */ + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_ciphersuite_undecoded, + tvb, offset, length); break; } } void ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset, uint32_t offset_end, const SslSession *session) { switch (ssl_get_keyex_alg(session->cipher)) { case KEX_DH_ANON: /* RFC 5246; ServerDHParams */ - dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, true); break; case KEX_DH_DSS: /* RFC 5246; not allowed */ case KEX_DH_RSA: - /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */ + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_srv_keyex_illegal, + tvb, offset, offset_end - offset); break; case KEX_DHE_DSS: /* RFC 5246; dhe_dss, dhe_rsa: ServerDHParams, Signature */ case KEX_DHE_RSA: - dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, false); break; case KEX_DHE_PSK: /* RFC 4279; diffie_hellman_psk: psk_identity_hint, ServerDHParams */ - /* XXX: implement support for DHE_PSK */ + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_dhe_psk(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); break; case KEX_ECDH_ANON: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams (without signature for anon) */ - dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, TRUE); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, true); break; case KEX_ECDHE_PSK: /* RFC 5489; psk_identity_hint, ServerECDHParams */ - /* XXX: implement support for ECDHE_PSK */ + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh_psk(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end); break; case KEX_ECDH_ECDSA: /* RFC 4492; ec_diffie_hellman: ServerECDHParams, Signature */ case KEX_ECDH_RSA: case KEX_ECDHE_ECDSA: case KEX_ECDHE_RSA: - dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, FALSE); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecdh(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version, false); break; case KEX_KRB5: /* RFC 2712; not allowed */ - /* XXX: add error on not allowed KEX */ + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_srv_keyex_illegal, + tvb, offset, offset_end - offset); break; - case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity*/ + case KEX_PSK: /* RFC 4279; psk, rsa: psk_identity */ case KEX_RSA_PSK: - dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end - offset); + dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_psk(hf, tvb, tree, offset); break; - case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits*/ + case KEX_RSA: /* only allowed if the public key in the server certificate is longer than 512 bits */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_rsa(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version); break; case KEX_ECC_SM2: /* GB/T 38636 */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecc_sm2(hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, offset_end, session->version); + break; case KEX_SRP_SHA: /* RFC 5054; srp: ServerSRPParams, Signature */ case KEX_SRP_SHA_DSS: case KEX_SRP_SHA_RSA: /* XXX: implement support for SRP_SHA* */ + proto_tree_add_expert_format(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_ciphersuite_undecoded, + tvb, offset, offset_end - offset, + "SRP_SHA ciphersuites (RFC 5054) are not implemented, contact Wireshark" + " developers if you want them to be supported"); break; case KEX_ECJPAKE: /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 used in Thread Commissioning */ dissect_ssl3_hnd_srv_keyex_ecjpake(hf, tvb, tree, offset, offset_end); break; default: - /* XXX: add info message for not supported KEX algo */ + proto_tree_add_expert(tree, NULL, &hf->ei.hs_ciphersuite_undecoded, + tvb, offset, offset_end - offset); break; } } @@ -11487,7 +11997,7 @@ ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info * void tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(ssl_common_dissect_t *hf, tvbuff_t *tvb, - proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) + proto_tree *tree, uint32_t offset) { /* RFC 8446 Section 4.6.3 * enum { @@ -11520,7 +12030,7 @@ ssl_common_register_dtls_alpn_dissector_table(const char *name, } void -ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options, gboolean is_dtls) +ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options, bool is_dtls) { prefs_register_string_preference(module, "psk", "Pre-Shared Key", "Pre-Shared Key as HEX string. Should be 0 to 16 bytes.", @@ -11551,18 +12061,18 @@ ssl_common_register_options(module_t *module, ssl_common_options_t *options, gbo "<CRAND> = The Client's random number from the ClientHello message\n" "\n" "(All fields are in hex notation)", - &(options->keylog_filename), FALSE); + &(options->keylog_filename), false); } void -ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length) +ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, uint32_t offset, uint32_t length) { if (ssl_session && ssl_session->session.version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && !(ssl_session->state & SSL_MASTER_SECRET)) { - guint32 old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len; + uint32_t old_length = ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len; ssl_debug_printf("Calculating hash with offset %d %d\n", offset, length); if (tvb) { if (tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, length)) { - ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length); + ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (unsigned char *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length); tvb_memcpy(tvb, ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, offset, length); ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length; } @@ -11572,7 +12082,7 @@ ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, tvbuff_t *tvb, guin * in a null tvbuff to add 3 bytes for a zero fragment offset. */ DISSECTOR_ASSERT_CMPINT(length, <, 4); - ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (guchar *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length); + ssl_session->handshake_data.data = (unsigned char *)wmem_realloc(wmem_file_scope(), ssl_session->handshake_data.data, old_length + length); memset(ssl_session->handshake_data.data + old_length, 0, length); ssl_session->handshake_data.data_len += length; } |