/* packet-tls.c * Routines for TLS dissection * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Scott Renfro * Copyright 2013-2019, Peter Wu * * Wireshark - Network traffic analyzer * By Gerald Combs * Copyright 1998 Gerald Combs * * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Supported protocol versions: * * TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.0, and SSL 3.0. SSL 2.0 is no longer supported, except for * the SSL 2.0-compatible Client Hello. * * Primary protocol specifications: * * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hickman-netscape-ssl-00 - SSL 2.0 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101 - SSL 3.0 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246 - TLS 1.0 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346 - TLS 1.1 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 - TLS 1.2 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446 - TLS 1.3 * * Important IANA registries: * * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/ * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/ * * Notes: * * - Decryption needs to be performed 'sequentially', so it's done * at packet reception time. This may cause a significant packet capture * slow down. This also causes dissection of some ssl info that in previous * dissector versions was dissected only when a proto_tree context was * available * * We are at Packet reception if time pinfo->fd->visited == 0 * * - Many dissection and decryption operations are implemented in * epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c and * epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.h due to an overlap of functionality * with DTLS (epan/dissectors/packet-dtls.c). * */ #include "config.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet-tcp.h" #include "packet-x509af.h" #include "packet-tls.h" #include "packet-tls-utils.h" #include "packet-ber.h" void proto_register_tls(void); #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static ssldecrypt_assoc_t *tlskeylist_uats = NULL; static guint ntlsdecrypt = 0; #endif static gboolean tls_desegment = TRUE; static gboolean tls_desegment_app_data = TRUE; static gboolean tls_ignore_mac_failed = FALSE; /********************************************************************* * * Protocol Constants, Variables, Data Structures * *********************************************************************/ /* Initialize the protocol and registered fields */ static gint tls_tap = -1; static gint exported_pdu_tap = -1; static gint proto_tls = -1; static gint hf_tls_record = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_content_type = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_opaque_type = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_version = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_length = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_appdata = -1; static gint hf_tls_record_appdata_proto = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record_is_escape = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_record_padding_length = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_msg_type = -1; static gint hf_tls_alert_message = -1; static gint hf_tls_alert_message_level = -1; static gint hf_tls_alert_message_description = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_protocol = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_type = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_length = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding_len = -1; static gint hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len = -1; static gint hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id = -1; static int hf_tls_reassembled_in = -1; static int hf_tls_reassembled_length = -1; static int hf_tls_reassembled_data = -1; static int hf_tls_segments = -1; static int hf_tls_segment = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_overlap = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_overlap_conflict = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_multiple_tails = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_too_long_fragment = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_error = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_count = -1; static int hf_tls_segment_data = -1; static int hf_tls_handshake_reassembled_in = -1; static int hf_tls_handshake_fragments = -1; static int hf_tls_handshake_fragment = -1; static int hf_tls_handshake_fragment_count = -1; static gint hf_tls_heartbeat_message = -1; static gint hf_tls_heartbeat_message_type = -1; static gint hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload_length = -1; static gint hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload = -1; static gint hf_tls_heartbeat_message_padding = -1; static ssl_hfs_t ssl_hfs = { -1, -1 }; /* Initialize the subtree pointers */ static gint ett_tls = -1; static gint ett_tls_record = -1; static gint ett_tls_alert = -1; static gint ett_tls_handshake = -1; static gint ett_tls_heartbeat = -1; static gint ett_tls_certs = -1; static gint ett_tls_segments = -1; static gint ett_tls_segment = -1; static gint ett_tls_hs_fragments = -1; static gint ett_tls_hs_fragment = -1; static expert_field ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length = EI_INIT; static expert_field ei_tls_unexpected_message = EI_INIT; /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ static expert_field ei_tls_ignored_unknown_record = EI_INIT; /* not all of the hf_fields below make sense for TLS but we have to provide them anyways to comply with the api (which was aimed for ip fragment reassembly) */ static const fragment_items ssl_segment_items = { &ett_tls_segment, &ett_tls_segments, &hf_tls_segments, &hf_tls_segment, &hf_tls_segment_overlap, &hf_tls_segment_overlap_conflict, &hf_tls_segment_multiple_tails, &hf_tls_segment_too_long_fragment, &hf_tls_segment_error, &hf_tls_segment_count, &hf_tls_reassembled_in, &hf_tls_reassembled_length, &hf_tls_reassembled_data, "Segments" }; /* Fragmented handshake messages. */ static const fragment_items tls_hs_fragment_items = { &ett_tls_hs_fragment, &ett_tls_hs_fragments, &hf_tls_handshake_fragments, &hf_tls_handshake_fragment, &hf_tls_segment_overlap, // Do not care about the errors, should not happen. &hf_tls_segment_overlap_conflict, &hf_tls_segment_multiple_tails, &hf_tls_segment_too_long_fragment, &hf_tls_segment_error, &hf_tls_handshake_fragment_count, NULL, /* unused - &hf_tls_handshake_reassembled_in, */ NULL, /* do not display redundant length */ NULL, /* do not display redundant data */ "Fragments" }; static SSL_COMMON_LIST_T(dissect_ssl3_hf); static void ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data( proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, gint length, const gchar *prefix) { proto_tree_add_bytes_format( tree, hf_tls_segment_data, tvb, offset, length, NULL, "%sTLS segment data (%u %s)", prefix != NULL ? prefix : "", length == -1 ? tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) : length, plurality(length, "byte", "bytes")); } static ssl_master_key_map_t ssl_master_key_map; #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static GHashTable *ssl_key_hash = NULL; static wmem_stack_t *key_list_stack = NULL; static uat_t *ssldecrypt_uat = NULL; static const gchar *ssl_keys_list = NULL; #endif static dissector_table_t ssl_associations = NULL; static dissector_handle_t tls_handle = NULL; static StringInfo ssl_compressed_data = {NULL, 0}; static StringInfo ssl_decrypted_data = {NULL, 0}; static gint ssl_decrypted_data_avail = 0; static FILE *ssl_keylog_file = NULL; static ssl_common_options_t ssl_options = { NULL, NULL}; /* List of dissectors to call for TLS data */ static heur_dissector_list_t ssl_heur_subdissector_list; static const gchar *ssl_debug_file_name = NULL; /* Forward declaration we need below */ void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void); /* Desegmentation of TLS streams */ /* table to hold defragmented TLS streams */ static reassembly_table ssl_reassembly_table; /* Table to hold fragmented TLS handshake records. */ static reassembly_table tls_hs_reassembly_table; static guint32 hs_reassembly_id_count; /* initialize/reset per capture state data (ssl sessions cache) */ static void ssl_init(void) { module_t *ssl_module = prefs_find_module("tls"); pref_t *keys_list_pref; ssl_common_init(&ssl_master_key_map, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_compressed_data); ssl_debug_flush(); /* We should have loaded "keys_list" by now. Mark it obsolete */ if (ssl_module) { keys_list_pref = prefs_find_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list"); if (! prefs_get_preference_obsolete(keys_list_pref)) { prefs_set_preference_obsolete(keys_list_pref); } } /* Reset the identifier for a group of handshake fragments. */ hs_reassembly_id_count = 0; } static void ssl_cleanup(void) { #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS if (key_list_stack != NULL) { wmem_destroy_stack(key_list_stack); key_list_stack = NULL; } #endif ssl_common_cleanup(&ssl_master_key_map, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_compressed_data); } ssl_master_key_map_t * tls_get_master_key_map(gboolean load_secrets) { // Try to load new keys. if (load_secrets) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); } return &ssl_master_key_map; } #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS /* parse ssl related preferences (private keys and ports association strings) */ static void ssl_parse_uat(void) { guint i; guint16 port; dissector_handle_t handle; ssl_set_debug(ssl_debug_file_name); if (ssl_key_hash) { g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash); } /* remove only associations created from key list */ if (key_list_stack != NULL) { while (wmem_stack_count(key_list_stack) > 0) { port = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(wmem_stack_pop(key_list_stack)); handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, port); if (handle != NULL) ssl_association_remove("tls.port", tls_handle, handle, port, FALSE); } } /* parse private keys string, load available keys and put them in key hash*/ ssl_key_hash = privkey_hash_table_new(); if (ntlsdecrypt > 0) { if (key_list_stack == NULL) key_list_stack = wmem_stack_new(NULL); for (i = 0; i < ntlsdecrypt; i++) { ssldecrypt_assoc_t *ssl_uat = &(tlskeylist_uats[i]); ssl_parse_key_list(ssl_uat, ssl_key_hash, "tls.port", tls_handle, TRUE); if (key_list_stack && ws_strtou16(ssl_uat->port, NULL, &port) && port > 0) wmem_stack_push(key_list_stack, GUINT_TO_POINTER(port)); } } ssl_debug_flush(); } static void ssl_reset_uat(void) { g_hash_table_destroy(ssl_key_hash); ssl_key_hash = NULL; } static void ssl_parse_old_keys(void) { gchar **old_keys, **parts, *err; gchar *uat_entry; guint i; /* Import old-style keys */ if (ssldecrypt_uat && ssl_keys_list && ssl_keys_list[0]) { old_keys = g_strsplit(ssl_keys_list, ";", 0); for (i = 0; old_keys[i] != NULL; i++) { parts = g_strsplit(old_keys[i], ",", 5); if (parts[0] && parts[1] && parts[2] && parts[3]) { gchar *path = uat_esc(parts[3], (guint)strlen(parts[3])); const gchar *password = parts[4] ? parts[4] : ""; uat_entry = wmem_strdup_printf(NULL, "\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\",\"%s\"", parts[0], parts[1], parts[2], path, password); g_free(path); if (!uat_load_str(ssldecrypt_uat, uat_entry, &err)) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_parse_old_keys: Can't load UAT string %s: %s\n", uat_entry, err); g_free(err); } wmem_free(NULL, uat_entry); } g_strfreev(parts); } g_strfreev(old_keys); } } #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ static tap_packet_status ssl_follow_tap_listener(void *tapdata, packet_info *pinfo, epan_dissect_t *edt _U_, const void *ssl, tap_flags_t flags _U_) { follow_info_t * follow_info = (follow_info_t*) tapdata; follow_record_t * follow_record = NULL; const SslRecordInfo *appl_data = NULL; const SslPacketInfo *pi = (const SslPacketInfo*)ssl; show_stream_t from = FROM_CLIENT; /* Skip packets without decrypted payload data. */ if (!pi || !pi->records) return TAP_PACKET_DONT_REDRAW; /* Compute the packet's sender. */ if (follow_info->client_port == 0) { follow_info->client_port = pinfo->srcport; copy_address(&follow_info->client_ip, &pinfo->src); follow_info->server_port = pinfo->destport; copy_address(&follow_info->server_ip, &pinfo->dst); } if (addresses_equal(&follow_info->client_ip, &pinfo->src) && follow_info->client_port == pinfo->srcport) { from = FROM_CLIENT; } else { from = FROM_SERVER; } for (appl_data = pi->records; appl_data != NULL; appl_data = appl_data->next) { /* Include only application data in the record, skipping things like * Handshake messages and alerts. */ if (appl_data->type != SSL_ID_APP_DATA) continue; /* TCP segments that contain the end of two or more TLS PDUs will be queued to TLS taps for each of those PDUs. Therefore a single packet could be processed by this TLS tap listener multiple times. The following test handles that scenario by treating the follow_info->bytes_written[] values as the next expected appl_data->seq. Any appl_data instances that fall below that have already been processed and must be skipped. */ if (appl_data->seq < follow_info->bytes_written[from]) continue; /* Allocate a follow_record_t to hold the current appl_data instance's decrypted data. Even though it would be possible to consolidate multiple appl_data instances into a single record, it is beneficial to use a one-to-one mapping. This affords the Follow Stream dialog view modes (ASCII, EBCDIC, Hex Dump, C Arrays, Raw) the opportunity to accurately reflect TLS PDU boundaries. Currently the Hex Dump view does by starting a new line, and the C Arrays view does by starting a new array declaration. */ follow_record = g_new(follow_record_t,1); follow_record->is_server = (from == FROM_SERVER); follow_record->packet_num = pinfo->num; follow_record->abs_ts = pinfo->abs_ts; follow_record->data = g_byte_array_sized_new(appl_data->data_len); follow_record->data = g_byte_array_append(follow_record->data, appl_data->plain_data, appl_data->data_len); /* Add the record to the follow_info structure. */ follow_info->payload = g_list_prepend(follow_info->payload, follow_record); follow_info->bytes_written[from] += appl_data->data_len; } return TAP_PACKET_DONT_REDRAW; } /********************************************************************* * * Forward Declarations * *********************************************************************/ /* * SSL version 3 and TLS dissectors * */ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *conv_data, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo); /* alert message dissector */ static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 record_length, const SslSession *session, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo); /* handshake protocol dissector */ static void dissect_tls_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, gboolean maybe_encrypted, guint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_tls, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *ssl, const guint16 version); static void dissect_tls_handshake_full(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *conv_data, const guint16 version, gboolean is_first_msg, guint8 curr_layer_num_tls); /* heartbeat message dissector */ static void dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session, guint32 record_length, gboolean decrypted); static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* * SSL version 2 dissectors * */ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl); /* client hello dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl); /* client master key dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset); /* server hello dissector */ static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo); /* * Support Functions * */ static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(const guint16 version); static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset); static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length); static void process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo); static guint32 tls_msp_fragment_id(struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp); static void print_tls_fragment_tree(fragment_head *ipfd_head, proto_tree *tree, proto_tree *tls_tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *next_tvb); /********************************************************************* * * Main dissector * *********************************************************************/ /* * Code to actually dissect the packets */ static int dissect_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_) { conversation_t *conversation; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *ssl_tree; guint32 offset; gboolean need_desegmentation; SslDecryptSession *ssl_session, *ssl_session_save; SslSession *session; gint is_from_server; struct tcpinfo *tcpinfo; struct tlsinfo tlsinfo; /* * A single packet may contain multiple TLS records. Two possible scenarios: * * - Multiple TLS records belonging to the same TLS session. * - TLS within a different encrypted TLS tunnel. * * To support the second case, 'curr_layer_num_ssl' is used as identifier * for the current TLS layer. */ guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl = pinfo->curr_proto_layer_num; ti = NULL; ssl_tree = NULL; offset = 0; ssl_session = NULL; memset(&tlsinfo, 0, sizeof(tlsinfo)); tcpinfo = (struct tcpinfo*)data; if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) > 4) { const guint8 *tmp = tvb_get_ptr(tvb, 0, 4); if (g_ascii_isprint(tmp[0]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[1]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[2]) && g_ascii_isprint(tmp[3])) { /* it is extremely unlikely that real TLS traffic starts with four * printable ascii characters; this looks like it's unencrypted * text, so assume it's not ours (SSL does have some unencrypted * text fields in certain packets, but you'd have to get very * unlucky with TCP fragmentation to have one of those fields at the * beginning of a TCP payload at the beginning of the capture where * reassembly hasn't started yet) */ return 0; } } ssl_debug_printf("\ndissect_ssl enter frame #%u (%s)\n", pinfo->num, (pinfo->fd->visited)?"already visited":"first time"); /* Track the version using conversations to reduce the * chance that a packet that simply *looks* like a v2 or * v3 packet is dissected improperly. This also allows * us to more frequently set the protocol column properly * for continuation data frames. * * Also: We use the copy in conv_version as our cached copy, * so that we don't have to search the conversation * table every time we want the version; when setting * the conv_version, must set the copy in the conversation * in addition to conv_version */ conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); ssl_session_save = ssl_session = ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle); session = &ssl_session->session; is_from_server = ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo); if (session->last_nontls_frame != 0 && session->last_nontls_frame >= pinfo->num) { /* This conversation started at a different protocol and STARTTLS was * used, but this packet comes too early. */ return 0; } /* try decryption only the first time we see this packet * (to keep cipher synchronized) */ if (pinfo->fd->visited) ssl_session = NULL; ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl_session); /* Initialize the protocol column; we'll override it later when we * detect a different version or flavor of TLS (assuming we don't * throw an exception before we get the chance to do so). */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); /* clear the info column */ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); /* TCP packets and TLS records are orthogonal. * A tcp packet may contain multiple ssl records and an ssl * record may be spread across multiple tcp packets. * * This loop accounts for multiple ssl records in a single * frame, but not a single ssl record across multiple tcp * packets. * * Handling the single ssl record across multiple packets * may be possible using wireshark conversations, but * probably not cleanly. May have to wait for tcp stream * reassembly. */ /* Create display subtree for TLS as a whole */ if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_tls, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA); ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls); } /* iterate through the records in this tvbuff */ while (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 0) { ssl_debug_printf(" record: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); /* * Assume, for now, that this doesn't need desegmentation. */ need_desegmentation = FALSE; /* first try to dispatch off the cached version * known to be associated with the conversation */ switch (session->version) { case SSLV2_VERSION: offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session); break; case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLCPV1_VERSION: /* SSLv3/TLS record headers need at least 1+2+2 = 5 bytes. */ if (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) < 5) { if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; need_desegmentation = TRUE; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb); } break; } /* the version tracking code works too well ;-) * at times, we may visit a v2 client hello after * we already know the version of the connection; * work around that here by detecting and calling * the v2 dissector instead */ if (ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvb, offset)) { offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session); } else { offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, curr_layer_num_ssl, &tlsinfo); } break; /* that failed, so apply some heuristics based * on this individual packet */ default: /* * If the version is unknown, assume SSLv3/TLS which has a record * size of at least 5 bytes (SSLv2 record header is two or three * bytes, but the data will hopefully be larger than three bytes). */ if (tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) < 5) { if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; need_desegmentation = TRUE; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb); } break; } if (ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvb, offset)) { /* looks like sslv2 client hello */ offset = dissect_ssl2_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session); } else if (ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvb, offset)) { /* looks like sslv3 or tls */ offset = dissect_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, &need_desegmentation, ssl_session, curr_layer_num_ssl, &tlsinfo); } else { /* looks like something unknown, so lump into * continuation data */ offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb); col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Continuation Data"); } break; } /* Desegmentation return check */ if (need_desegmentation) { ssl_debug_printf(" need_desegmentation: offset = %d, reported_length_remaining = %d\n", offset, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); /* Make data available to ssl_follow_tap_listener */ tap_queue_packet(tls_tap, pinfo, p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, curr_layer_num_ssl)); return tvb_captured_length(tvb); } } guint ret = tvb_captured_length(tvb); /* Check for needing to reassemble at end of stream */ ssl_session = ssl_session_save; if (ssl_session) { SslDecoder *decoder; /* retrieve decoder for this packet direction. Retrieve it * here because the decoder could have been created while * processing the records (e.g., an Early Data HTTP request * and response, with no Content-Length.) */ if (is_from_server != 0) { decoder = ssl_session->server; } else { decoder = ssl_session->client; } if (decoder && decoder->flow && decoder->flow->flags & TCP_FLOW_REASSEMBLE_UNTIL_FIN) { /* We want to reassemble at the end of the stream. Are we * there? */ /* There might be more than one record, and we don't want to tell * the application dissector that we got a TCP FIN if there are * more app data records to come. We add the FIN here. * XXX: We could have some logic to do so in dissect_ssl3_record() * when we're on the last record. Note that the last record could * be an alert, or this could be a FIN with no data, so we'd still * have to check here anyway.) */ if (tcpinfo) { tlsinfo.end_of_stream |= (tcpinfo->flags & TH_FIN); } if (!tlsinfo.end_of_stream) { /* No. Tell the TCP dissector that we want to desegment * at FIN, so that it will call the TLS dissector at FIN * even if there is no TCP payload. * * However, tell it that we've already dissected all the * the data in the packet, so that we avoid getting it * later and trying to decrypt the records again. * (XXX: An alternative would be checking for already decrypted * records before trying to decrypt on the first pass.) */ pinfo->desegment_offset = tvb_captured_length(tvb); pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN; } else { ssl_debug_printf(" desegmenting at end of stream (FIN)\n"); struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp; msp = (struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *)wmem_tree_lookup32_le(decoder->flow->multisegment_pdus, decoder->flow->byte_seq); if (msp) { fragment_head *ipfd_head; ipfd_head = fragment_add(&ssl_reassembly_table, tvb, offset, pinfo, tls_msp_fragment_id(msp), msp, decoder->flow->byte_seq - msp->seq, 0, FALSE); if (ipfd_head && ipfd_head->reassembled_in == pinfo->num) { tvbuff_t *next_tvb; /* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */ next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, ipfd_head->tvb_data); /* add desegmented data to the data source list */ add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Reassembled TLS"); /* Show details of the reassembly */ print_tls_fragment_tree(ipfd_head, tree, ssl_tree, pinfo, next_tvb); /* * Supply the sequence number of the first of the * reassembled bytes. */ tlsinfo.seq = msp->seq; /* indicate that this is reassembled data */ tlsinfo.is_reassembled = TRUE; /* call subdissector */ process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, session, session->app_handle, &tlsinfo); if (ret == 0) { /* XXX: Workaround for #15159. Ordinarily we * return the number of bytes dissected, but zero * indicates the dissector rejecting the data. If * we are dissecting at FIN, but there were no new * records added, we want to indicate that the * dissector accepted the zero length payload so * that the TLS (and, e.g. HTTP) layers don't get * removed. So artificially return 1 instead. * (The TCP dissector will ignore the number.) */ ret = 1; } } } } } } col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); ssl_debug_flush(); /* Make data available to ssl_follow_tap_listener */ tap_queue_packet(tls_tap, pinfo, p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, curr_layer_num_ssl)); return ret; } /* * Dissect ECHConfigList structure, for use by the DNS dissector. */ static int dissect_tls_echconfig(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_) { return ssl_dissect_ext_ech_echconfiglist(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, 0, tvb_reported_length(tvb)); } /* * Dissect TLS 1.3 handshake messages (without the record layer). * For use by QUIC (draft -13). */ static int dissect_tls13_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data) { conversation_t *conversation; SslDecryptSession *ssl_session; SslSession *session; gint is_from_server; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *ssl_tree; /** * A value that uniquely identifies this fragment in this frame. */ guint record_id = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(data); ssl_debug_printf("\n%s enter frame #%u (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, pinfo->num, (pinfo->fd->visited)?"already visited":"first time"); conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); ssl_session = ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle); session = &ssl_session->session; is_from_server = ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo); if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { session->version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; ssl_session->state |= SSL_VERSION; ssl_session->state |= SSL_QUIC_RECORD_LAYER; } /* * First pass: collect state (including Client Random for key matching). * Second pass: dissection only, no need to collect state. */ if (PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { ssl_session = NULL; } ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p, from_server = %d\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl_session, is_from_server); /* Add a proto_tls item to allow simple "tls" display filter */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_tls, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA); ssl_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls); dissect_tls_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_tree, 0, tvb_reported_length(tvb), FALSE, record_id, pinfo->curr_layer_num, session, is_from_server, ssl_session, TLSV1DOT3_VERSION); ssl_debug_flush(); return tvb_captured_length(tvb); } static gboolean is_sslv3_or_tls(tvbuff_t *tvb) { guint8 content_type; guint16 protocol_version, record_length; /* * Heuristics should match the TLS record header. * ContentType (1), ProtocolVersion (2), Length (2) * * We do not check for an actual payload, IBM WebSphere is known * to separate the record header and payload over two separate packets. */ if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) < 5) { return FALSE; } content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 0); protocol_version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, 1); record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, 3); /* These are the common types. */ if (content_type != SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE && content_type != SSL_ID_APP_DATA) { return FALSE; } /* * Match SSLv3, TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 (TLS 1.3 uses same value as TLS 1.0). Most * likely you'll see 0x300 (SSLv3) or 0x301 (TLS 1.1) for interoperability * reasons. Per RFC 5246 we should accept any 0x3xx value, but this is just * a heuristic that catches common/likely cases. */ if (protocol_version != SSLV3_VERSION && protocol_version != TLSV1_VERSION && protocol_version != TLSV1DOT1_VERSION && protocol_version != TLSV1DOT2_VERSION && protocol_version != TLCPV1_VERSION ) { return FALSE; } /* Check for sane length, see also ssl_check_record_length in packet-tls-utils.c */ if (record_length == 0 || record_length >= TLS_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + 2048) { return FALSE; } return TRUE; } static gboolean is_sslv2_clienthello(tvbuff_t *tvb) { /* * Detect SSL 2.0 compatible Client Hello as used in SSLv3 and TLS. * * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#appendix-E.2 * uint8 V2CipherSpec[3]; * struct { * uint16 msg_length; // 0: highest bit must be 1 * uint8 msg_type; // 2: 1 for Client Hello * Version version; // 3: equal to ClientHello.client_version * uint16 cipher_spec_length; // 5: cannot be 0, must be multiple of 3 * uint16 session_id_length; // 7: zero or 16 (in TLS 1.0) * uint16 challenge_length; // 9: must be 32 * // length so far: 2 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 11 * V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length]; // len: min 3 * opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length]; // len: zero or 16 * opaque challenge[V2ClientHello.challenge_length; // len: 32 * // min. length: 11 + 3 + (0 or 16) + 32 = 46 or 62 * } V2ClientHello; */ if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) < 46) { return FALSE; } /* Assume that message length is less than 256 (at most 64 cipherspecs). */ if (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 0) != 0x80) { return FALSE; } /* msg_type must be 1 for Client Hello */ if (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, 2) != 1) { return FALSE; } /* cipher spec length must be a non-zero multiple of 3 */ guint16 cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, 5); if (cipher_spec_length == 0 || cipher_spec_length % 3 != 0) { return FALSE; } /* session ID length must be 0 or 16 in TLS 1.0 */ guint16 session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, 7); if (session_id_length != 0 && session_id_length != 16) { return FALSE; } /* Challenge Length must be 32 */ if (tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, 9) != 32) { return FALSE; } return TRUE; } static int dissect_ssl_heur(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data) { conversation_t *conversation; if (!is_sslv3_or_tls(tvb) && !is_sslv2_clienthello(tvb)) { return 0; } conversation = find_or_create_conversation(pinfo); conversation_set_dissector_from_frame_number(conversation, pinfo->num, tls_handle); return dissect_ssl(tvb, pinfo, tree, data); } static void tls_save_decrypted_record(packet_info *pinfo, gint record_id, SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint8 content_type, SslDecoder *decoder, gboolean allow_fragments, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) { const guchar *data = ssl_decrypted_data.data; guint datalen = ssl_decrypted_data_avail; if (datalen == 0) { return; } if (ssl->session.version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* * The actual data is followed by the content type and then zero or * more padding. Scan backwards for content type, skipping padding. */ while (datalen > 0 && data[datalen - 1] == 0) { datalen--; } ssl_debug_printf("%s found %d padding bytes\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl_decrypted_data_avail - datalen); if (datalen == 0) { ssl_debug_printf("%s there is no room for content type!\n", G_STRFUNC); return; } content_type = data[--datalen]; if (datalen == 0) { /* * XXX zero-length Handshake fragments are forbidden by RFC 8446, * Section 5.1. Empty Application Data fragments are allowed though. */ return; } } /* In TLS 1.3 only Handshake and Application Data can be fragmented. * Alert messages MUST NOT be fragmented across records, so do not * bother maintaining a flow for those. */ ssl_add_record_info(proto_tls, pinfo, data, datalen, record_id, allow_fragments ? decoder->flow : NULL, (ContentType)content_type, curr_layer_num_ssl); } /** * Try to decrypt the record and update the internal cipher state. * On success, the decrypted data will be available in "ssl_decrypted_data" of * length "ssl_decrypted_data_avail". */ static gboolean decrypt_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint8 content_type, guint16 record_version, guint16 record_length, gboolean allow_fragments, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) { gboolean success; gint direction; StringInfo *data_for_iv; gint data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_offset; SslDecoder *decoder; /* if we can decrypt and decryption was a success * add decrypted data to this packet info */ ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: app_data len %d, ssl state 0x%02X\n", record_length, ssl->state); direction = ssl_packet_from_server(&ssl->session, ssl_associations, pinfo); /* retrieve decoder for this packet direction */ if (direction != 0) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using server decoder\n"); decoder = ssl->server; } else { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: using client decoder\n"); decoder = ssl->client; } /* save data to update IV if decoder is available or updated later */ data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv; data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24; data_for_iv_offset = offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len; if (!tvb_bytes_exist(tvb, data_for_iv_offset, data_for_iv_len)) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: record truncated\n"); return FALSE; } ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (const guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, data_for_iv_offset, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len); if (!decoder) { ssl_debug_printf("decrypt_ssl3_record: no decoder available\n"); return FALSE; } /* run decryption and add decrypted payload to protocol data, if decryption * is successful*/ ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len; success = ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, decoder, content_type, record_version, tls_ignore_mac_failed, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length), record_length, NULL, 0, &ssl_compressed_data, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0; /* */ if (!success) { /* save data to update IV if valid session key is obtained later */ data_for_iv = (direction != 0) ? &ssl->server_data_for_iv : &ssl->client_data_for_iv; data_for_iv_len = (record_length < 24) ? record_length : 24; ssl_data_set(data_for_iv, (const guchar*)tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset + record_length - data_for_iv_len, data_for_iv_len), data_for_iv_len); } if (success) { tls_save_decrypted_record(pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset, ssl, content_type, decoder, allow_fragments, curr_layer_num_ssl); } return success; } /** * Try to guess the early data cipher using trial decryption. * Requires Libgcrypt 1.6 or newer for verifying that decryption is successful. */ static gboolean decrypt_tls13_early_data(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset, guint16 record_length, SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl) { gboolean success = FALSE; ssl_debug_printf("Trying early data encryption, first record / trial decryption: %s\n", !(ssl->state & SSL_SEEN_0RTT_APPDATA) ? "true" : "false"); /* Only try trial decryption for the first record. */ if (ssl->state & SSL_SEEN_0RTT_APPDATA) { if (!ssl->client) { return FALSE; // sanity check, should not happen in valid captures. } ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len; success = ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, ssl->client, SSL_ID_APP_DATA, 0x303, FALSE, tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length), record_length, NULL, 0, &ssl_compressed_data, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0; if (success) { tls_save_decrypted_record(pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset, ssl, SSL_ID_APP_DATA, ssl->client, TRUE, curr_layer_num_ssl); } else { ssl_debug_printf("early data decryption failed, end of early data?\n"); } return success; } ssl->state |= SSL_SEEN_0RTT_APPDATA; ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); StringInfo *secret = tls13_load_secret(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, FALSE, TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP); if (!secret) { ssl_debug_printf("Missing secrets, early data decryption not possible!\n"); return FALSE; } const guint16 tls13_ciphers[] = { 0x1301, /* TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 */ 0x1302, /* TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 */ 0x1303, /* TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 */ 0x1304, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 */ 0x1305, /* TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 */ 0x00c6, /* TLS_SM4_GCM_SM3 */ }; const guchar *record = tvb_get_ptr(tvb, offset, record_length); for (guint i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS(tls13_ciphers); i++) { guint16 cipher = tls13_ciphers[i]; ssl_debug_printf("Performing early data trial decryption, cipher = %#x\n", cipher); ssl->session.cipher = cipher; ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(cipher); if (!tls13_generate_keys(ssl, secret, FALSE)) { /* Unable to create cipher (old Libgcrypt) */ continue; } ssl_decrypted_data_avail = ssl_decrypted_data.data_len; success = ssl_decrypt_record(ssl, ssl->client, SSL_ID_APP_DATA, 0x303, FALSE, record, record_length, NULL, 0, &ssl_compressed_data, &ssl_decrypted_data, &ssl_decrypted_data_avail) == 0; if (success) { ssl_debug_printf("Early data decryption succeeded, cipher = %#x\n", cipher); tls_save_decrypted_record(pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset, ssl, SSL_ID_APP_DATA, ssl->client, TRUE, curr_layer_num_ssl); break; } } if (!success) { ssl_debug_printf("Trial decryption of early data failed!\n"); } return success; } static void print_tls_fragment_tree(fragment_head *ipfd_head, proto_tree *tree, proto_tree *tls_tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *next_tvb) { proto_item *tls_tree_item, *frag_tree_item; /* * The subdissector thought it was completely * desegmented (although the stuff at the * end may, in turn, require desegmentation), * so we show a tree with all segments. */ show_fragment_tree(ipfd_head, &ssl_segment_items, tree, pinfo, next_tvb, &frag_tree_item); /* * The toplevel fragment subtree is now * behind all desegmented data; move it * right behind the TLS tree. */ tls_tree_item = proto_tree_get_parent(tls_tree); if (frag_tree_item && tls_tree_item) { proto_tree_move_item(tree, tls_tree_item, frag_tree_item); } } static guint32 tls_msp_fragment_id(struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp) { /* * If a frame contains multiple appdata PDUs, then "first_frame" is not * sufficient to uniquely identify groups of fragments. Therefore we use * the tcp reassembly functions that also test msp->seq (the position of * the initial fragment in the TLS stream). * As a frame most likely does not have multiple PDUs (except maybe for * HTTP2), just check 'seq' at the end instead of using it in the hash. */ guint32 id = msp->first_frame; #if 0 id ^= (msp->seq & 0xff) << 24; id ^= (msp->seq & 0xff00) << 16; #endif return id; } static void desegment_ssl(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, int offset, guint32 seq, guint32 nxtseq, SslSession *session, proto_tree *root_tree, proto_tree *tree, SslFlow *flow, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo) { fragment_head *ipfd_head; gboolean must_desegment; gboolean called_dissector; int another_pdu_follows; gboolean another_segment_in_frame = FALSE; int deseg_offset; guint32 deseg_seq; gint nbytes; proto_item *item; struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *msp; again: ipfd_head = NULL; must_desegment = FALSE; called_dissector = FALSE; another_pdu_follows = 0; msp = NULL; /* * Initialize these to assume no desegmentation. * If that's not the case, these will be set appropriately * by the subdissector. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = 0; pinfo->desegment_len = 0; /* * Initialize this to assume that this segment will just be * added to the middle of a desegmented chunk of data, so * that we should show it all as data. * If that's not the case, it will be set appropriately. */ deseg_offset = offset; /* If we've seen this segment before (e.g., it's a retransmission), * there's nothing for us to do. Certainly, don't add it to the list * of multisegment_pdus (that would cause subsequent lookups to find * the retransmission instead of the original transmission, breaking * dissection of the desegmented pdu if we'd already seen the end of * the pdu). */ if ((msp = (struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *)wmem_tree_lookup32(flow->multisegment_pdus, seq))) { const char *prefix; gboolean is_retransmission = FALSE; if (msp->first_frame == pinfo->num) { /* This must be after the first pass. */ prefix = ""; if (msp->last_frame == pinfo->num) { col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); } else { col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[TLS segment of a reassembled PDU]"); } } else { prefix = "Retransmitted "; is_retransmission = TRUE; } if (!is_retransmission) { ipfd_head = fragment_get(&ssl_reassembly_table, pinfo, msp->first_frame, msp); if (ipfd_head != NULL && ipfd_head->reassembled_in !=0 && ipfd_head->reassembled_in != pinfo->num) { /* Show what frame this was reassembled in if not this one. */ item=proto_tree_add_uint(tree, *ssl_segment_items.hf_reassembled_in, tvb, 0, 0, ipfd_head->reassembled_in); proto_item_set_generated(item); } } nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, nbytes, prefix); return; } /* Else, find the most previous PDU starting before this sequence number */ msp = (struct tcp_multisegment_pdu *)wmem_tree_lookup32_le(flow->multisegment_pdus, seq-1); if (msp && msp->seq <= seq && msp->nxtpdu > seq) { int len; if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { msp->last_frame = pinfo->num; msp->last_frame_time = pinfo->abs_ts; } /* OK, this PDU was found, which means the segment continues * a higher-level PDU and that we must desegment it. */ if (msp->flags & MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT) { /* The dissector asked for the entire segment */ len = MAX(0, tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); } else { len = MIN(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu) - seq; } ipfd_head = fragment_add(&ssl_reassembly_table, tvb, offset, pinfo, tls_msp_fragment_id(msp), msp, seq - msp->seq, len, (LT_SEQ (nxtseq,msp->nxtpdu))); if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo) && msp->flags & MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT) { msp->flags &= (~MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT); /* If we consumed the entire segment there is no * other pdu starting anywhere inside this segment. * So update nxtpdu to point at least to the start * of the next segment. * (If the subdissector asks for even more data we * will advance nxtpdu even further later down in * the code.) */ msp->nxtpdu = nxtseq; } if ( (msp->nxtpdu < nxtseq) && (msp->nxtpdu >= seq) && (len > 0)) { another_pdu_follows = msp->nxtpdu - seq; } } else { /* This segment was not found in our table, so it doesn't * contain a continuation of a higher-level PDU. * Call the normal subdissector. */ /* * Supply the sequence number of this segment. We set this here * because this segment could be after another in the same packet, * in which case seq was incremented at the end of the loop. */ tlsinfo->seq = seq; process_ssl_payload(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port, tlsinfo); called_dissector = TRUE; /* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment some more data * before it could handle the packet? * If so we have to create some structures in our table but * this is something we only do the first time we see this * packet. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len) { if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) must_desegment = TRUE; /* * Set "deseg_offset" to the offset in "tvb" * of the first byte of data that the * subdissector didn't process. */ deseg_offset = offset + pinfo->desegment_offset; } /* Either no desegmentation is necessary, or this is * segment contains the beginning but not the end of * a higher-level PDU and thus isn't completely * desegmented. */ ipfd_head = NULL; } /* is it completely desegmented? */ if (ipfd_head && ipfd_head->reassembled_in == pinfo->num) { /* * Yes, we think it is. * We only call subdissector for the last segment. * Note that the last segment may include more than what * we needed. */ if (nxtseq < msp->nxtpdu) { /* * This is *not* the last segment. It is part of a PDU in the same * frame, so no another PDU can follow this one. * Do not reassemble TLS yet, it will be done in the final segment. * (If we are reassembling at FIN, we will do that in dissect_ssl() * after iterating through all the records.) * Clear the Info column and avoid displaying [TLS segment of a * reassembled PDU], the payload dissector will typically set it. * (This is needed here for the second pass.) */ another_pdu_follows = 0; col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); another_segment_in_frame = TRUE; } else { /* * OK, this is the last segment of the PDU and also the * last segment in this frame. * Let's call the subdissector with the desegmented * data. */ tvbuff_t *next_tvb; int old_len; /* * Reset column in case multiple TLS segments form the * PDU and this last TLS segment is not in the first TCP segment of * this frame. * XXX prevent clearing the column if the last layer is not SSL? */ /* Clear column during the first pass. */ col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); /* create a new TVB structure for desegmented data */ next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, ipfd_head->tvb_data); /* add desegmented data to the data source list */ add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Reassembled TLS"); /* * Supply the sequence number of the first of the * reassembled bytes. */ tlsinfo->seq = msp->seq; /* indicate that this is reassembled data */ tlsinfo->is_reassembled = TRUE; /* call subdissector */ process_ssl_payload(next_tvb, 0, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port, tlsinfo); called_dissector = TRUE; /* * OK, did the subdissector think it was completely * desegmented, or does it think we need even more * data? */ old_len = (int)(tvb_reported_length(next_tvb) - tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset)); if (pinfo->desegment_len && pinfo->desegment_offset <= old_len) { /* * "desegment_len" isn't 0, so it needs more * data for something - and "desegment_offset" * is before "old_len", so it needs more data * to dissect the stuff we thought was * completely desegmented (as opposed to the * stuff at the beginning being completely * desegmented, but the stuff at the end * being a new higher-level PDU that also * needs desegmentation). */ fragment_set_partial_reassembly(&ssl_reassembly_table, pinfo, tls_msp_fragment_id(msp), msp); /* Update msp->nxtpdu to point to the new next * pdu boundary. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT) { /* We want reassembly of at least one * more segment so set the nxtpdu * boundary to one byte into the next * segment. * This means that the next segment * will complete reassembly even if it * is only one single byte in length. */ msp->nxtpdu = seq + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + 1; msp->flags |= MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT; } else if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN) { /* This is not the first segment, and we thought reassembly * would be done now, but now we know we desegment at FIN. * E.g., a HTTP response where the headers were split * across segments (so previous ONE_MORE_SEGMENT) and * also no Content-Length (so now DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN). */ flow->flags |= TCP_FLOW_REASSEMBLE_UNTIL_FIN; msp->nxtpdu = nxtseq + 0x40000000; } else { msp->nxtpdu = seq + tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) + pinfo->desegment_len; } /* Since we need at least some more data * there can be no pdu following in the * tail of this segment. */ another_pdu_follows = 0; } else { /* * Show the stuff in this TCP segment as * just raw TCP segment data. */ nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, nbytes, NULL); /* Show details of the reassembly */ print_tls_fragment_tree(ipfd_head, root_tree, tree, pinfo, next_tvb); /* Did the subdissector ask us to desegment * some more data? This means that the data * at the beginning of this segment completed * a higher-level PDU, but the data at the * end of this segment started a higher-level * PDU but didn't complete it. * * If so, we have to create some structures * in our table, but this is something we * only do the first time we see this packet. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len) { if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) must_desegment = TRUE; /* The stuff we couldn't dissect * must have come from this segment, * so it's all in "tvb". * * "pinfo->desegment_offset" is * relative to the beginning of * "next_tvb"; we want an offset * relative to the beginning of "tvb". * * First, compute the offset relative * to the *end* of "next_tvb" - i.e., * the number of bytes before the end * of "next_tvb" at which the * subdissector stopped. That's the * length of "next_tvb" minus the * offset, relative to the beginning * of "next_tvb, at which the * subdissector stopped. */ deseg_offset = ipfd_head->datalen - pinfo->desegment_offset; /* "tvb" and "next_tvb" end at the * same byte of data, so the offset * relative to the end of "next_tvb" * of the byte at which we stopped * is also the offset relative to * the end of "tvb" of the byte at * which we stopped. * * Convert that back into an offset * relative to the beginning of * "tvb", by taking the length of * "tvb" and subtracting the offset * relative to the end. */ deseg_offset = tvb_reported_length(tvb) - deseg_offset; } } } } if (must_desegment) { /* If the dissector requested "reassemble until FIN" * just set this flag for the flow and let reassembly * proceed at normal. We will check/pick up these * reassembled PDUs later down in dissect_tcp() when checking * for the FIN flag. */ if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN) { flow->flags |= TCP_FLOW_REASSEMBLE_UNTIL_FIN; } /* * The sequence number at which the stuff to be desegmented * starts is the sequence number of the byte at an offset * of "deseg_offset" into "tvb". * * The sequence number of the byte at an offset of "offset" * is "seq", i.e. the starting sequence number of this * segment, so the sequence number of the byte at * "deseg_offset" is "seq + (deseg_offset - offset)". */ deseg_seq = seq + (deseg_offset - offset); if (((nxtseq - deseg_seq) <= 1024*1024) && (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo))) { if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT) { /* The subdissector asked to reassemble using the * entire next segment. * Just ask reassembly for one more byte * but set this msp flag so we can pick it up * above. */ msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo, deseg_seq, nxtseq+1, flow->multisegment_pdus); msp->flags |= MSP_FLAGS_REASSEMBLE_ENTIRE_SEGMENT; } else if (pinfo->desegment_len == DESEGMENT_UNTIL_FIN) { /* Set nxtseq very large so that reassembly won't happen * until we force it at the end of the stream in dissect_ssl() * outside this function. */ msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo, deseg_seq, nxtseq+0x40000000, flow->multisegment_pdus); } else { msp = pdu_store_sequencenumber_of_next_pdu(pinfo, deseg_seq, nxtseq+pinfo->desegment_len, flow->multisegment_pdus); } /* add this segment as the first one for this new pdu */ fragment_add(&ssl_reassembly_table, tvb, deseg_offset, pinfo, tls_msp_fragment_id(msp), msp, 0, nxtseq - deseg_seq, LT_SEQ(nxtseq, msp->nxtpdu)); } } if (!called_dissector || pinfo->desegment_len != 0) { if (ipfd_head != NULL && ipfd_head->reassembled_in != 0 && ipfd_head->reassembled_in != pinfo->num && !(ipfd_head->flags & FD_PARTIAL_REASSEMBLY)) { /* * We know what other frame this PDU is reassembled in; * let the user know. */ item=proto_tree_add_uint(tree, *ssl_segment_items.hf_reassembled_in, tvb, 0, 0, ipfd_head->reassembled_in); proto_item_set_generated(item); } /* * Either we didn't call the subdissector at all (i.e., * this is a segment that contains the middle of a * higher-level PDU, but contains neither the beginning * nor the end), or the subdissector couldn't dissect it * all, as some data was missing (i.e., it set * "pinfo->desegment_len" to the amount of additional * data it needs). */ if (!another_segment_in_frame && pinfo->desegment_offset == 0) { /* * It couldn't, in fact, dissect any of it (the * first byte it couldn't dissect is at an offset * of "pinfo->desegment_offset" from the beginning * of the payload, and that's 0). * Just mark this as SSL. */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "[TLS segment of a reassembled PDU]"); } /* * Show what's left in the packet as just raw TCP segment * data. * XXX - remember what protocol the last subdissector * was, and report it as a continuation of that, instead? */ nbytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, deseg_offset); ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, deseg_offset, nbytes, NULL); } pinfo->can_desegment = 0; pinfo->desegment_offset = 0; pinfo->desegment_len = 0; if (another_pdu_follows) { /* there was another pdu following this one. */ pinfo->can_desegment=2; /* we also have to prevent the dissector from changing the * PROTOCOL and INFO colums since what follows may be an * incomplete PDU and we don't want it be changed back from * to */ col_set_fence(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO); col_set_writable(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, FALSE); offset += another_pdu_follows; seq += another_pdu_follows; goto again; } } static void export_pdu_packet(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint8 tag, const gchar *name) { exp_pdu_data_t *exp_pdu_data = export_pdu_create_common_tags(pinfo, name, tag); exp_pdu_data->tvb_captured_length = tvb_captured_length(tvb); exp_pdu_data->tvb_reported_length = tvb_reported_length(tvb); exp_pdu_data->pdu_tvb = tvb; tap_queue_packet(exported_pdu_tap, pinfo, exp_pdu_data); } static void process_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo) { tvbuff_t *next_tvb; heur_dtbl_entry_t *hdtbl_entry; guint16 saved_match_port; tlsinfo->app_handle = &session->app_handle; next_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); /* If the appdata proto is not yet known (no STARTTLS), try heuristics * first, then ports-based dissectors. Port 443 is too overloaded... */ if (!session->app_handle) { /* The heuristics dissector should set the app_handle via tlsinfo * if it wants to be called in the future. */ if (dissector_try_heuristic(ssl_heur_subdissector_list, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree), &hdtbl_entry, tlsinfo)) { ssl_debug_printf("%s: found heuristics dissector %s, app_handle is %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, hdtbl_entry->short_name, (void *)session->app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); if (have_tap_listener(exported_pdu_tap)) { export_pdu_packet(next_tvb, pinfo, EXP_PDU_TAG_HEUR_DISSECTOR_NAME, hdtbl_entry->short_name); } return; } if (app_handle_port) { /* Heuristics failed, just try the port-based dissector. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s: no heuristics dissector, falling back to " "handle %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *)app_handle_port, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(app_handle_port)); session->app_handle = app_handle_port; } else { /* No heuristics, no port-based proto, unknown protocol. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s: no appdata dissector found\n", G_STRFUNC); call_data_dissector(next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree)); return; } } ssl_debug_printf("%s: found handle %p (%s)\n", G_STRFUNC, (void *)session->app_handle, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); if (have_tap_listener(exported_pdu_tap)) { export_pdu_packet(next_tvb, pinfo, EXP_PDU_TAG_DISSECTOR_NAME, dissector_handle_get_dissector_name(session->app_handle)); } saved_match_port = pinfo->match_uint; if (ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)) { pinfo->match_uint = pinfo->srcport; } else { pinfo->match_uint = pinfo->destport; } call_dissector_with_data(session->app_handle, next_tvb, pinfo, proto_tree_get_root(tree), tlsinfo); pinfo->match_uint = saved_match_port; } static void dissect_ssl_payload(tvbuff_t *decrypted, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, SslSession *session, SslRecordInfo *record, dissector_handle_t app_handle_port, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo) { gboolean save_fragmented; guint16 save_can_desegment; tlsinfo->seq = record->seq; /* Preserve current desegmentation ability to prevent the subdissector * from messing up the ssl desegmentation */ save_can_desegment = pinfo->can_desegment; /* try to dissect decrypted data*/ ssl_debug_printf("%s decrypted len %d\n", G_STRFUNC, record->data_len); ssl_print_data("decrypted app data fragment", record->plain_data, record->data_len); /* Can we desegment this segment? */ if (tls_desegment_app_data) { /* Yes. */ pinfo->can_desegment = 2; desegment_ssl(decrypted, pinfo, 0, record->seq, record->seq + record->data_len, session, proto_tree_get_root(tree), tree, record->flow, app_handle_port, tlsinfo); } else if (session->app_handle || app_handle_port) { /* No - just call the subdissector. Mark this as fragmented, so if somebody throws an exception, we don't report it as a malformed frame. */ pinfo->can_desegment = 0; save_fragmented = pinfo->fragmented; pinfo->fragmented = TRUE; process_ssl_payload(decrypted, 0, pinfo, tree, session, app_handle_port, tlsinfo); pinfo->fragmented = save_fragmented; } /* restore desegmentation ability */ pinfo->can_desegment = save_can_desegment; } /********************************************************************* * * SSL version 3 and TLS Dissection Routines * *********************************************************************/ static gint dissect_ssl3_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl, guint8 curr_layer_num_ssl, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo) { /* * struct { * uint8 major, minor; * } ProtocolVersion; * * * enum { * change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22), * application_data(23), (255) * } ContentType; * * struct { * ContentType type; * ProtocolVersion version; * uint16 length; * opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length]; * } TLSPlaintext; */ guint32 record_length; guint16 record_version, version; guint8 content_type; guint8 next_byte; proto_tree *ti; proto_tree *ssl_record_tree; proto_item *length_pi, *ct_pi; guint content_type_offset; guint32 available_bytes; tvbuff_t *decrypted; SslRecordInfo *record = NULL; ti = NULL; ssl_record_tree = NULL; available_bytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); /* TLS 1.0/1.1 just ignores unknown records - RFC 2246 chapter 6. The TLS Record Protocol */ if ((session->version==TLSV1_VERSION || session->version==TLSV1DOT1_VERSION || session->version==TLSV1DOT2_VERSION || session->version==TLCPV1_VERSION ) && (available_bytes >=1 ) && !ssl_is_valid_content_type(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset))) { proto_tree_add_expert(tree, pinfo, &ei_tls_ignored_unknown_record, tvb, offset, available_bytes); col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Ignored Unknown Record"); return offset + available_bytes; } /* * Is the record header split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < 5) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, -1, NULL); if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and that we need * "some more data." Don't tell it exactly how many bytes we * need because if/when we ask for even more (after the header) * that will break reassembly. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } /* * Get the record layer fields of interest */ content_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); record_version = version; record_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 3); if (ssl_is_valid_content_type(content_type)) { /* * Is the record split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < record_length + 5) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, -1, NULL); if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many * more bytes we need, and return. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; /* Don't use: * pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; * it avoids some minor display glitches when a frame contains * the continuation of a previous PDU together with a full new * PDU, but it completely breaks dissection for jumbo TLS frames */ pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length + 5) - available_bytes; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } } else { /* if we don't have a valid content_type, there's no sense * continuing any further */ col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Continuation Data"); return offset + 5 + record_length; } /* add the record layer subtree header */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_record, tvb, offset, 5 + record_length, ENC_NA); ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls_record); /* show the one-byte content type */ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && content_type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA) { ct_pi = proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_opaque_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } else { ct_pi = proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_content_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } content_type_offset = offset; offset++; /* add the version */ proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* add the length */ length_pi = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_length, tvb, offset, 2, record_length); offset += 2; /* move past length field itself */ /* * if we don't already have a version set for this conversation, * but this message's version is authoritative (i.e., it's * not client_hello, then save the version to the conversation * structure and print the column version. If the message is not authorative * (i.e. it is a Client Hello), then this version will still be used for * display purposes only (it will not be stored in the conversation). */ next_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { ssl_try_set_version(session, ssl, content_type, next_byte, FALSE, version); /* Version has possibly changed, adjust the column accordingly. */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); } else { version = session->version; } /* * now dissect the next layer */ ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_record: content_type %d %s\n",content_type, val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown")); /* try to decrypt record on the first pass, if possible. Store decrypted * record for later usage (without having to decrypt again). The offset is * used as 'key' to identify this record in the packet (we can have multiple * handshake records in the same frame). * In TLS 1.3, an encrypted record always has (outer) opaque_type of * "Application Data". The actual content type of the record is found * after decryption. */ if (ssl && record_length && (session->version != TLSV1DOT3_VERSION || content_type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA)) { gboolean decrypt_ok = FALSE; /* Try to decrypt TLS 1.3 early data first */ if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && content_type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA && ssl->has_early_data && !ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)) { decrypt_ok = decrypt_tls13_early_data(tvb, pinfo, offset, record_length, ssl, curr_layer_num_ssl); if (!decrypt_ok) { /* Either trial decryption failed (e.g. missing key) or end of * early data is reached. Switch to HS secrets if available. */ if (ssl->state & SSL_SERVER_RANDOM) { tls13_change_key(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, FALSE, TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE); } ssl->has_early_data = FALSE; } } if (!decrypt_ok) { decrypt_ssl3_record(tvb, pinfo, offset, ssl, content_type, record_version, record_length, content_type == SSL_ID_APP_DATA || content_type == SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE, curr_layer_num_ssl); } } /* try to retrieve and use decrypted alert/handshake/appdata record, if any. */ decrypted = ssl_get_record_info(tvb, proto_tls, pinfo, tvb_raw_offset(tvb)+offset, curr_layer_num_ssl, &record); if (decrypted) { add_new_data_source(pinfo, decrypted, "Decrypted TLS"); if (session->version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { content_type = record->type; ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_content_type, tvb, content_type_offset, 1, record->type); proto_item_set_generated(ti); } } ssl_check_record_length(&dissect_ssl3_hf, pinfo, (ContentType)content_type, record_length, length_pi, version, decrypted); switch ((ContentType) content_type) { case SSL_ID_CHG_CIPHER_SPEC: if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION && session->tls13_draft_version > 0 && session->tls13_draft_version < 22) { /* CCS was reintroduced in TLS 1.3 draft -22 */ expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ct_pi, &ei_tls_unexpected_message, "Record type is not allowed in TLS 1.3"); break; } col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Change Cipher Spec"); ssl_dissect_change_cipher_spec(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, session, is_from_server, ssl); if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { /* CCS is a dummy message in TLS 1.3, do not try to load keys. */ break; } if (ssl) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); ssl_finalize_decryption(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map); ssl_change_cipher(ssl, ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)); } /* Heuristic: any later ChangeCipherSpec is not a resumption of this * session. Set the flag after ssl_finalize_decryption such that it has * a chance to use resume using Session Tickets. */ if (is_from_server) session->is_session_resumed = FALSE; break; case SSL_ID_ALERT: if (decrypted) { dissect_ssl3_alert(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, 2, session, tlsinfo); } else { dissect_ssl3_alert(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, record_length, session, tlsinfo); } break; case SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE: if (decrypted) { guint record_id = record->id; dissect_tls_handshake(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, tvb_reported_length(decrypted), FALSE, record_id, curr_layer_num_ssl, session, is_from_server, ssl, version); } else { // Combine both the offset within this TCP segment and the layer // number in case a record consists of multiple reassembled TCP // segments. The exact value does not matter, but it should be // unique per frame. guint record_id = tvb_raw_offset(tvb) + offset + curr_layer_num_ssl; dissect_tls_handshake(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, offset + record_length, TRUE, record_id, curr_layer_num_ssl, session, is_from_server, ssl, version); } break; case SSL_ID_APP_DATA: { dissector_handle_t app_handle; /* show on info column what we are decoding */ col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Application Data"); /* app_handle discovery is done here instead of dissect_ssl_payload() * because the protocol name needs to be displayed below. */ app_handle = session->app_handle; if (!app_handle) { /* Unknown protocol handle, ssl_starttls_ack was not called before. * Try to find a port-based protocol and use it if there is no * heuristics dissector (see process_ssl_payload). */ app_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, pinfo->srcport); if (!app_handle) app_handle = dissector_get_uint_handle(ssl_associations, pinfo->destport); } proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), app_handle ? dissector_handle_get_protocol_long_name(app_handle) : "Application Data"); proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_appdata, tvb, offset, record_length, ENC_NA); if (app_handle) { ti = proto_tree_add_string(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_appdata_proto, tvb, 0, 0, dissector_handle_get_protocol_long_name(app_handle)); proto_item_set_generated(ti); } if (decrypted) { dissect_ssl_payload(decrypted, pinfo, tree, session, record, app_handle, tlsinfo); } /* Set app proto again in case the heuristics found a different proto. */ if (session->app_handle && session->app_handle != app_handle) proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), val_to_str_const(content_type, ssl_31_content_type, "unknown"), dissector_handle_get_protocol_long_name(session->app_handle)); break; } case SSL_ID_HEARTBEAT: if (version == TLSV1DOT3_VERSION) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ct_pi, &ei_tls_unexpected_message, "Record type is not allowed in TLS 1.3"); break; } if (decrypted) { dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(decrypted, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, 0, session, tvb_reported_length (decrypted), TRUE); } else { gboolean plaintext = TRUE; /* heartbeats before ChangeCipherSpec are unencrypted */ if (ssl) { if (ssl_packet_from_server(session, ssl_associations, pinfo)) { plaintext = ssl->server == NULL; } else { plaintext = ssl->client == NULL; } } dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, session, record_length, plaintext); } break; case SSL_ID_TLS12_CID: break; } offset += record_length; /* skip to end of record */ return offset; } /* dissects the alert message, filling in the tree */ static void dissect_ssl3_alert(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 record_length, const SslSession *session, struct tlsinfo *tlsinfo) { /* struct { * AlertLevel level; * AlertDescription description; * } Alert; */ proto_tree *ti; proto_tree *alert_tree = NULL; const gchar *level; const gchar *desc; guint8 level_byte, desc_byte; if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_alert_message, tvb, offset, record_length, ENC_NA); alert_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls_alert); } /* * Assume that TLS alert records are not fragmented. Any larger message is * assumed to be encrypted. */ if (record_length != 2) { col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Encrypted Alert"); proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Alert", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "TLS")); proto_item_set_text(alert_tree, "Alert Message: Encrypted Alert"); return; } /* * set the record layer label */ /* first lookup the names for the alert level and description */ level_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); /* grab the level byte */ level = val_to_str_const(level_byte, ssl_31_alert_level, "Unknown"); desc_byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+1); /* grab the desc byte */ desc = val_to_str_const(desc_byte, ssl_31_alert_description, "Unknown"); if (desc_byte == 0) { /* If this is a close_notify, mark it as the end of the stream. * (XXX: Maybe we should do this for other alerts, and maybe * reassembling at FIN should also try reassembling at RST as well?) */ tlsinfo->end_of_stream = TRUE; } /* now set the text in the record layer line */ col_append_sep_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Alert (Level: %s, Description: %s)", level, desc); if (tree) { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Alert " "(Level: %s, Description: %s)", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "TLS"), level, desc); proto_tree_add_item(alert_tree, hf_tls_alert_message_level, tvb, offset++, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); proto_tree_add_item(alert_tree, hf_tls_alert_message_description, tvb, offset++, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } } /** * Checks whether a handshake message seems encrypted and cannot be dissected. */ static gboolean is_encrypted_handshake_message(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, gboolean maybe_encrypted, SslSession *session, gboolean is_from_server) { guint record_length = offset_end - offset; guint msg_length; guint8 msg_type; guint16 version; if (record_length < 16) { /* * Encrypted data has additional overhead. For TLS 1.0/1.1 with stream * and block ciphers, there is at least a MAC which is at minimum 16 * bytes for MD5. In TLS 1.2, AEAD adds an explicit nonce and auth tag. * For AES-GCM/CCM the auth tag is 16 bytes. AES_CCM_8 (RFC 6655) uses 8 * byte auth tags, but the explicit nonce is also 8 (sums up to 16). * * So anything smaller than 16 bytes is assumed to be plaintext. */ return FALSE; } /* * If this is not a decrypted buffer, then perhaps it is still in plaintext. * Heuristics: if the buffer is too small, it is likely not encrypted. * Otherwise assume that the Handshake does not contain two successive * HelloRequest messages (type=0x00 length=0x000000, type=0x00). If this * occurs, then we have possibly found the explicit nonce preceding the * encrypted contents for GCM/CCM cipher suites as used in TLS 1.2. */ if (maybe_encrypted) { maybe_encrypted = tvb_get_ntoh40(tvb, offset) == 0; /* * TODO handle Finished message after CCS in the same frame and remove the * above nonce-based heuristic. */ } if (!maybe_encrypted) { /* * Assume encrypted if the message type makes no sense. If this still * leads to false positives (detecting plaintext while it should mark * stuff as encrypted), some other ideas include: * - Perform additional validation based on the message type. * - Disallow handshake fragmentation except for some common cases like * Certificate messages (due to large certificates). */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); maybe_encrypted = try_val_to_str(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type) == NULL; if (!maybe_encrypted) { msg_length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1); // Assume handshake messages are below 64K. maybe_encrypted = msg_length >= 0x010000; } } if (!maybe_encrypted) { /* * Everything after the ChangeCipherSpec message should be encrypted. * At least some buggy clients send a new handshake in the clear * when renegotiating, though. (#18867). */ guint32 *ccs_frame = is_from_server ? &session->server_ccs_frame : &session->client_ccs_frame; if (*ccs_frame != 0 && pinfo->num > *ccs_frame) { switch (msg_type) { case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); maybe_encrypted = !ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); if (!maybe_encrypted) { // Assume ClientHello and ServerHello are < 1024. maybe_encrypted = msg_length >= 0x400; } if (!maybe_encrypted) { /* * This is after the CCS, but looks like an unencrypted * ClientHello or ServerHello. This is a new handshake; * it's a buggy renegotiation or possibly retransmissions. */ *ccs_frame = 0; /* XXX: Resetting the CCS frame state will allow us to * detect the new handshake, but can mean false positives * on earlier frames on later passes (reporting as * cleartext handshake messages that were encrypted and * we failed to decrypt on the first pass.) Maybe we * should store some additional state, either per packet * in SslPacketInfo or more complicated information about * encrypted handshake state changes. (E.g., in a wmem_tree * store the frames where we get a CCS and the frames * where this happens.) */ } break; default: maybe_encrypted = TRUE; } } } return maybe_encrypted; } static TlsHsFragment * save_tls_handshake_fragment(packet_info *pinfo, guint8 curr_layer_num_tls, guint record_id, guint reassembly_id, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint frag_len, guint frag_offset, guint8 msg_type, gboolean is_last) { // Full handshake messages should not be saved. DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!(frag_offset == 0 && is_last)); // 0 is a special value indicating no reassembly in progress. DISSECTOR_ASSERT(reassembly_id != 0); if (tvb_reported_length(tvb) > tvb_captured_length(tvb)) { // The reassembly API will refuse to add fragments when not all // available data has been captured. Since we were given a tvb with at // least 'frag_len' data, we must always succeed in obtaining a subset. tvb = tvb_new_subset_length(tvb, 0, offset + frag_len); } SslPacketInfo *pi = tls_add_packet_info(proto_tls, pinfo, curr_layer_num_tls); TlsHsFragment *frag_info = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), TlsHsFragment); frag_info->record_id = record_id; frag_info->reassembly_id = reassembly_id; frag_info->is_last = is_last; frag_info->offset = frag_offset; frag_info->type = msg_type; TlsHsFragment **p = &pi->hs_fragments; while (*p) p = &(*p)->next; *p = frag_info; // Add (subset of) record data. fragment_add_check(&tls_hs_reassembly_table, tvb, offset, pinfo, reassembly_id, NULL, frag_offset, frag_len, !is_last); return frag_info; } /** * Populate the Info column and record layer tree item based on the message type. * * @param pinfo Packet info. * @param record_tree The Record layer tree item. * @param version Record version. * @param msg_type The message type (not necessarily the same as the first byte * of the buffer in case of HRR in TLS 1.3). * @param is_first_msg TRUE if this is the first message in this record. * @param complete TRUE if the buffer describes the full (encrypted) message. * @param tvb Buffer that covers the start of this handshake fragment. * @param offset Position within the record data. * @param length Length of the record fragment that is part of the handshake * message. May be smaller than the record length if this is a fragment. */ static proto_item * tls_show_handshake_details(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *record_tree, guint version, guint8 msg_type, gboolean is_encrypted, gboolean is_first_msg, gboolean complete, tvbuff_t *tvb, guint32 offset, guint32 length) { const char *msg_type_str = "Encrypted Handshake Message"; if (!is_encrypted) { msg_type_str = val_to_str_const(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type, msg_type_str); } /* * Update our info string if this is the first message (possibly a fragment * of a handshake message), or if this is a complete (reassembled) message. */ if (complete) { col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, msg_type_str); } else if (is_first_msg) { /* * Only mark the first message to avoid an empty Info column. If another * message came before this one, do not bother mentioning this fragment. */ col_append_sep_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "[%s Fragment]", msg_type_str); } /* set the label text on the record layer expanding node */ if (is_first_msg) { proto_item_set_text(record_tree, "%s Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "TLS"), msg_type_str); if (!complete && !is_encrypted) { proto_item_append_text(record_tree, " (fragment)"); } } else { proto_item_set_text(record_tree, "%s Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: %s", val_to_str_const(version, ssl_version_short_names, "TLS"), "Multiple Handshake Messages"); } proto_item *ti = proto_tree_add_item(record_tree, hf_tls_handshake_protocol, tvb, offset, length, ENC_NA); proto_item_set_text(ti, "Handshake Protocol: %s", msg_type_str); if (!complete && !is_encrypted) { proto_item_append_text(ti, " (fragment)"); } return ti; } /* dissects the handshake protocol, filling the tree */ static void dissect_tls_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, guint32 offset_end, gboolean maybe_encrypted, guint record_id, guint8 curr_layer_num_tls, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *ssl, const guint16 version) { // Handshake fragment processing: // 1. (First pass:) If a previous handshake message needed reasembly, add // (a subset of) the new data for reassembly. // 2. Did this fragment complete reasembly in the previous step? // - Yes: dissect message and continue. // - No: show details and stop. // 3. Not part of a reassembly, so this is a new handshake message. Does it // look like encrypted data? // - Yes: show details and stop. // 4. Loop through remaining handshake messages. Is there sufficient data? // - Yes: dissect message and continue with next message. // - No (first pass): Add all data for reassembly, show details and stop. // - No (second pass): Show details and stop. fragment_head *fh = NULL; guint subset_len; guint32 msg_len = 0; TlsHsFragment *frag_info = NULL; gboolean is_first_msg = TRUE; proto_item *frag_tree_item; guint *hs_reassembly_id_p = is_from_server ? &session->server_hs_reassembly_id : &session->client_hs_reassembly_id; if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { // 1. (First pass:) If a previous handshake message needed reasembly. if (*hs_reassembly_id_p) { // Continuation, so a previous fragment *must* exist. fh = fragment_get(&tls_hs_reassembly_table, pinfo, *hs_reassembly_id_p, NULL); DISSECTOR_ASSERT(fh); // We expect that reassembly has not completed yet. DISSECTOR_ASSERT(fh->tvb_data == NULL); // Combine all previous segments plus data from the current record // in order to find the length. tvbuff_t *len_tvb = tvb_new_composite(); guint frags_len = 0; for (fragment_item *fd = fh->next; fd; fd = fd->next) { if (frags_len < 4) { tvb_composite_append(len_tvb, fd->tvb_data); } frags_len += tvb_reported_length(fd->tvb_data); } if (frags_len < 4) { tvbuff_t *remaining_tvb = tvb_new_subset_remaining(tvb, offset); tvb_composite_append(len_tvb, remaining_tvb); } tvb_composite_finalize(len_tvb); // Extract the actual handshake message length (0 means unknown) and // check whether only a subset of the current record is needed. subset_len = offset_end - offset; if (tvb_reported_length(len_tvb) >= 4) { msg_len = 4 + tvb_get_ntoh24(len_tvb, 1); if (subset_len > msg_len - frags_len) { subset_len = msg_len - frags_len; } } if (tvb_captured_length(tvb) < offset + subset_len) { // Not all data has been captured. As we are missing data, the // reassembly cannot be completed nor do we know the boundary // where the next handshake message starts. Stop reassembly. *hs_reassembly_id_p = 0; } else { // Check if the handshake message is complete. guint8 msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(len_tvb, 0); gboolean is_last = frags_len + subset_len == msg_len; frag_info = save_tls_handshake_fragment(pinfo, curr_layer_num_tls, record_id, *hs_reassembly_id_p, tvb, offset, subset_len, frags_len, msg_type, is_last); if (is_last) { // Reassembly finished, next message should not continue this message. *hs_reassembly_id_p = 0; } } } } else { // Lookup the reassembled handshake matching this frame (if any). SslPacketInfo *pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, curr_layer_num_tls); if (pi) { for (TlsHsFragment *rec = pi->hs_fragments; rec; rec = rec->next) { if (rec->record_id == record_id) { frag_info = rec; break; } } } } // 2. Did this fragment complete reasembly in the previous step? if (frag_info && frag_info->offset != 0) { fh = fragment_get_reassembled_id(&tls_hs_reassembly_table, pinfo, frag_info->reassembly_id); if (frag_info->is_last) { // This is the last fragment of the handshake message. // Skip a subset of the bytes of this buffer. subset_len = tvb_reported_length_remaining(fh->tvb_data, frag_info->offset); // Add a tree item to mark the handshake fragment. proto_item *ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_handshake_protocol, tvb, offset, subset_len, ENC_NA); offset += subset_len; proto_item_set_text(ti, "Handshake Protocol: %s (last fragment)", val_to_str_const(frag_info->type, ssl_31_handshake_type, "Encrypted Handshake Message")); // Now display the full, reassembled handshake message. tvbuff_t *next_tvb = tvb_new_chain(tvb, fh->tvb_data); add_new_data_source(pinfo, next_tvb, "Reassembled TLS Handshake"); show_fragment_tree(fh, &tls_hs_fragment_items, tree, pinfo, next_tvb, &frag_tree_item); dissect_tls_handshake_full(next_tvb, pinfo, tree, 0, session, is_from_server, ssl, version, TRUE, curr_layer_num_tls); is_first_msg = FALSE; // Skip to the next fragment in case this records ends with another // fragment for which information is presented below. frag_info = frag_info->next; if (frag_info && frag_info->record_id != record_id) { frag_info = NULL; } } else if (frag_info->offset != 0) { // The full TVB is in the middle of a handshake message and needs more data. tls_show_handshake_details(pinfo, tree, version, frag_info->type, FALSE, FALSE, FALSE, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset); if (fh) { proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_tls_handshake_reassembled_in, tvb, 0, 0, fh->reassembled_in); } return; } } else if (!frag_info) { // 3. Not part of a reassembly, so this is a new handshake message. Does it // look like encrypted data? if (is_encrypted_handshake_message(tvb, pinfo, offset, offset_end, maybe_encrypted, session, is_from_server)) { // Update Info column and record tree. tls_show_handshake_details(pinfo, tree, version, 0, TRUE, TRUE, TRUE, tvb, offset, offset_end - offset); return; } } // 4. Loop through remaining handshake messages. // The previous reassembly has been handled, so at this point, offset should // start a new, valid handshake message. while (offset < offset_end) { msg_len = 0; subset_len = offset_end - offset; if (subset_len >= 4) { msg_len = 4 + tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1); } if (msg_len == 0 || subset_len < msg_len) { // Need more data to find the message length or complete it. if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { guint8 msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); *hs_reassembly_id_p = ++hs_reassembly_id_count; frag_info = save_tls_handshake_fragment(pinfo, curr_layer_num_tls, record_id, *hs_reassembly_id_p, tvb, offset, subset_len, 0, msg_type, FALSE); } else { // The first pass must have created a new fragment. DISSECTOR_ASSERT(frag_info && frag_info->offset == 0); } tls_show_handshake_details(pinfo, tree, version, frag_info->type, FALSE, is_first_msg, FALSE, tvb, offset, subset_len); fh = fragment_get_reassembled_id(&tls_hs_reassembly_table, pinfo, frag_info->reassembly_id); if (fh) { proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_tls_handshake_reassembled_in, tvb, 0, 0, fh->reassembled_in); } break; } dissect_tls_handshake_full(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, session, is_from_server, ssl, version, is_first_msg, curr_layer_num_tls); offset += msg_len; is_first_msg = FALSE; } } /* Dissects a single (reassembled) Handshake message. */ static void dissect_tls_handshake_full(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gint is_from_server, SslDecryptSession *ssl, const guint16 version, gboolean is_first_msg, guint8 curr_layer_num_tls) { /* struct { * HandshakeType msg_type; * uint24 length; * select (HandshakeType) { * case hello_request: HelloRequest; * case client_hello: ClientHello; * case server_hello: ServerHello; * case certificate: Certificate; * case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange; * case certificate_request: CertificateRequest; * case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone; * case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify; * case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange; * case finished: Finished; * case certificate_url: CertificateURL; * case certificate_status: CertificateStatus; * case encrypted_extensions:NextProtocolNegotiationEncryptedExtension; * } body; * } Handshake; */ proto_tree *ssl_hand_tree = NULL; const gchar *msg_type_str; guint8 msg_type; guint32 length; proto_item *ti; SslPacketInfo *pi; { guint32 hs_offset = offset; gboolean is_hrr = FALSE; msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); length = tvb_get_ntoh24(tvb, offset + 1); // The caller should have given us a fully reassembled record. DISSECTOR_ASSERT((guint)tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset + 4) >= length); msg_type_str = try_val_to_str(msg_type, ssl_31_handshake_type); ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake iteration %d type %d offset %d length %d " "bytes\n", is_first_msg, msg_type, offset, length); if (!msg_type_str && !is_first_msg) { /* only dissect / report messages if they're * either the first message in this record * or they're a valid message type */ return; } if (is_first_msg && msg_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO && length > 2) { guint16 server_version; tls_scan_server_hello(tvb, offset + 4, offset + 4 + length, &server_version, &is_hrr); ssl_try_set_version(session, ssl, SSL_ID_HANDSHAKE, SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO, FALSE, server_version); if (is_hrr) { msg_type_str = "Hello Retry Request"; } } /* Populate Info column and set record layer text. */ ti = tls_show_handshake_details(pinfo, tree, version, is_hrr ? SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : msg_type, FALSE, is_first_msg, TRUE, tvb, offset, length + 4); /* if we don't have a valid handshake type, just quit dissecting */ if (!msg_type_str) return; /* add a subtree for the handshake protocol */ ssl_hand_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls_handshake); /* add nodes for the message type and message length */ proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_tls_handshake_type, tvb, offset, 1, msg_type); offset += 1; proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_hand_tree, hf_tls_handshake_length, tvb, offset, 3, length); offset += 3; if ((msg_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO || msg_type == SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO)) { /* Prepare for renegotiation by resetting the state. */ ssl_reset_session(session, ssl, msg_type == SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO); } /* * Add handshake message (including type, length, etc.) to hash (for * Extended Master Secret). * Hash ClientHello up to and including ClientKeyExchange. As the * premaster secret is looked up during ChangeCipherSpec processing (an * implementation detail), we must skip the CertificateVerify message * which can appear between CKE and CCS when mutual auth is enabled. */ if (msg_type != SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY) { ssl_calculate_handshake_hash(ssl, tvb, hs_offset, 4 + length); } /* now dissect the handshake message, if necessary */ switch ((HandshakeType) msg_type) { case SSL_HND_HELLO_REQUEST: /* hello_request has no fields, so nothing to do! */ break; case SSL_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: if (ssl) { /* ClientHello is first packet so set direction */ ssl_set_server(session, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, pinfo->destport); } ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_hello(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, ssl, NULL); /* * Cannot call tls13_change_key here with TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE * since the server may not agree on using TLS 1.3. If * early_data is advertised, it must be TLS 1.3 though. */ if (ssl) { tls_save_crandom(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map); if (ssl->has_early_data) { session->version = TLSV1DOT3_VERSION; ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION; ssl_debug_printf("%s forcing version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, version, ssl->state); } } break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_HELLO: ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_hello(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, ssl, FALSE, is_hrr); if (ssl) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); /* Create client and server decoders for TLS 1.3. * Create client decoder based on HS secret only if there is * no early data, or if there is no decryptable early data. */ if (!ssl->has_early_data || ((ssl->state & SSL_SEEN_0RTT_APPDATA) && !ssl->client)) { tls13_change_key(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, FALSE, TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE); } tls13_change_key(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, TRUE, TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE); } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: /* only valid for DTLS */ break; case SSL_HND_NEWSESSION_TICKET: /* no need to load keylog file here as it only links a previous * master key with this Session Ticket */ ssl_dissect_hnd_new_ses_ticket(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, ssl, FALSE, ssl_master_key_map.tickets); break; case SSL_HND_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: /* RFC 8446 Section 4.5 */ if (!is_from_server && ssl) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); tls13_change_key(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, FALSE, TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE); ssl->has_early_data = FALSE; } break; case SSL_HND_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: /* TLS 1.3 draft -21 and before */ ssl_dissect_hnd_hello_retry_request(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, ssl, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: /* XXX expert info if used with non-TLS 1.3? */ ssl_dissect_hnd_encrypted_extensions(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, ssl, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_CERTIFICATE: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, pinfo, session, ssl, is_from_server, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHG: if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { pi = tls_add_packet_info(proto_tls, pinfo, curr_layer_num_tls); pi->cipher = session->cipher; } else { pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, curr_layer_num_tls); if (pi) { session->cipher = pi->cipher; } } ssl_dissect_hnd_srv_keyex(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_REQUEST: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_req(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_SVR_HELLO_DONE: /* This is not an abbreviated handshake, it is certainly not resumed. */ session->is_session_resumed = FALSE; break; case SSL_HND_CERT_VERIFY: ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_cert_verify(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session->version); break; case SSL_HND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHG: if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) { pi = tls_add_packet_info(proto_tls, pinfo, curr_layer_num_tls); pi->cipher = session->cipher; } else { pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, curr_layer_num_tls); if (pi) { session->cipher = pi->cipher; } } ssl_dissect_hnd_cli_keyex(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, length, session); if (!ssl) break; ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); /* try to find master key from pre-master key */ if (!ssl_generate_pre_master_secret(ssl, length, tvb, offset, ssl_options.psk, pinfo, #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS ssl_key_hash, #endif &ssl_master_key_map)) { ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl3_handshake can't generate pre master secret\n"); } break; case SSL_HND_FINISHED: ssl_dissect_hnd_finished(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, session, &ssl_hfs); if (ssl) { ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); tls13_change_key(ssl, &ssl_master_key_map, is_from_server, TLS_SECRET_APP); } break; case SSL_HND_CERT_URL: ssl_dissect_hnd_cert_url(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); break; case SSL_HND_CERT_STATUS: tls_dissect_hnd_certificate_status(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length); break; case SSL_HND_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA: /* TODO: dissect this? */ break; case SSL_HND_KEY_UPDATE: tls13_dissect_hnd_key_update(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, tree, offset); if (ssl) { tls13_key_update(ssl, is_from_server); } break; case SSL_HND_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE: ssl_dissect_hnd_compress_certificate(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset, offset + length, pinfo, session, ssl, is_from_server, FALSE); break; case SSL_HND_ENCRYPTED_EXTS: dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvb, ssl_hand_tree, offset); break; } } } /* dissects the heartbeat message, filling in the tree */ static void dissect_ssl3_heartbeat(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, const SslSession *session, guint32 record_length, gboolean decrypted) { /* struct { * HeartbeatMessageType type; * uint16 payload_length; * opaque payload; * opaque padding; * } HeartbeatMessage; */ proto_item *ti; proto_tree *tls_heartbeat_tree; const gchar *type; guint8 byte; guint16 payload_length; guint16 padding_length; tls_heartbeat_tree = NULL; if (tree) { ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_heartbeat_message, tvb, offset, record_length, ENC_NA); tls_heartbeat_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls_heartbeat); } /* * set the record layer label */ /* first lookup the names for the message type and the payload length */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); type = try_val_to_str(byte, tls_heartbeat_type); payload_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); padding_length = record_length - 3 - payload_length; /* assume plaintext if the (expected) record size is smaller than the type * (1), length (2)[, payload] and padding (16) fields combined */ if (record_length <= 19u || 3u + payload_length + 16 <= record_length) { decrypted = TRUE; } /* now set the text in the record layer line */ if (type && decrypted) { col_append_sep_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Heartbeat %s", type); } else { col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Encrypted Heartbeat"); } if (type && decrypted) { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Heartbeat " "%s", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL"), type); proto_tree_add_item(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_tls_heartbeat_message_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload_length, tvb, offset, 2, payload_length); offset += 2; if (3u + payload_length + 16 > record_length) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length, "Invalid heartbeat payload length (%d)", payload_length); /* There is no room for padding... truncate the payload such that * the field can be selected (for the interested). */ payload_length = record_length - 3; padding_length = 0; proto_item_append_text (ti, " (invalid, using %u to decode payload)", payload_length); } proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload, tvb, offset, payload_length, NULL, "Payload (%u byte%s)", payload_length, plurality(payload_length, "", "s")); offset += payload_length; if (padding_length) proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tls_heartbeat_tree, hf_tls_heartbeat_message_padding, tvb, offset, padding_length, NULL, "Padding and HMAC (%u byte%s)", padding_length, plurality(padding_length, "", "s")); } else { proto_item_set_text(tree, "%s Record Layer: Encrypted Heartbeat", val_to_str_const(session->version, ssl_version_short_names, "SSL")); proto_item_set_text(tls_heartbeat_tree, "Encrypted Heartbeat Message"); } } /* based on https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-04 */ static void dissect_ssl3_hnd_encrypted_exts(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { guint8 selected_protocol_len; guint8 padding_len; selected_protocol_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol, tvb, offset, selected_protocol_len, ENC_ASCII); offset += selected_protocol_len; padding_len = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding_len, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset++; proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding, tvb, offset, padding_len, ENC_NA); } /********************************************************************* * * SSL version 2 Dissectors * *********************************************************************/ /* record layer dissector */ static gint dissect_ssl2_record(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslSession *session, gboolean *need_desegmentation, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { guint32 initial_offset; guint8 byte; guint8 record_length_length; guint32 record_length; gint is_escape; gint16 padding_length; guint8 msg_type; const gchar *msg_type_str; guint32 available_bytes; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *ssl_record_tree; initial_offset = offset; record_length = 0; is_escape = -1; padding_length = -1; msg_type_str = NULL; ssl_record_tree = NULL; /* pull first byte; if high bit is unset, then record * length is three bytes due to padding; otherwise * record length is two bytes */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); record_length_length = (byte & 0x80) ? 2 : 3; available_bytes = tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset); /* * Is the record header split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < record_length_length) { /* * Yes - can we do reassembly? */ ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, -1, NULL); if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and that we need * "some more data." Don't tell it exactly how many bytes we * need because if/when we ask for even more (after the header) * that will break reassembly. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = DESEGMENT_ONE_MORE_SEGMENT; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } /* parse out the record length */ switch (record_length_length) { case 2: /* two-byte record length */ record_length = (byte & 0x7f) << 8; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); record_length += byte; break; case 3: /* three-byte record length */ is_escape = (byte & 0x40) ? TRUE : FALSE; record_length = (byte & 0x3f) << 8; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 1); record_length += byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); padding_length = byte; } /* * Is the record split across segment boundaries? */ if (available_bytes < (record_length_length + record_length)) { /* * Yes - Can we do reassembly? */ ssl_proto_tree_add_segment_data(tree, tvb, offset, -1, NULL); if (tls_desegment && pinfo->can_desegment) { /* * Yes. Tell the TCP dissector where the data for this * message starts in the data it handed us, and how many * more bytes we need, and return. */ pinfo->desegment_offset = offset; pinfo->desegment_len = (record_length_length + record_length) - available_bytes; *need_desegmentation = TRUE; return offset; } else { /* Not enough bytes available. Stop here. */ return offset + available_bytes; } } offset += record_length_length; /* add the record layer subtree header */ ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_record, tvb, initial_offset, record_length_length + record_length, ENC_NA); ssl_record_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_tls_record); /* pull the msg_type so we can bail if it's unknown */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length); /* if we get a server_hello or later handshake in v2, then set * this to sslv2 */ if (session->version == SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) { if (msg_type >= 2 && msg_type <= 8) { session->version = SSLV2_VERSION; } } /* if we get here, but don't have a version set for the * conversation, then set a version for just this frame * (e.g., on a client hello) */ col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "SSLv2"); /* see if the msg_type is valid; if not the payload is * probably encrypted, so note that fact and bail */ msg_type_str = try_val_to_str(msg_type, ssl_20_msg_types); if (!msg_type_str || (!ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvb, initial_offset + record_length_length, record_length))) { if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", "SSLv2", "Encrypted Data"); /* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a * version field. To make it possible to filter on record * layer version we create a generated field with ssl * record layer version 0x0002 */ ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_version, tvb, initial_offset, 0, 0x0002); proto_item_set_generated(ti); } col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, "Encrypted Data"); return initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length; } else { col_append_sep_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, NULL, msg_type_str); if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_item_set_text(ssl_record_tree, "%s Record Layer: %s", "SSLv2", msg_type_str); } } /* We have a valid message type, so move forward, filling in the * tree by adding the length, is_escape boolean and padding_length, * if present in the original packet */ if (ssl_record_tree) { /* Unlike SSLv3, the SSLv2 record layer does not have a * version field. To make it possible to filter on record * layer version we create a generated field with ssl * record layer version 0x0002 */ ti = proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_version, tvb, initial_offset, 0, 0x0002); proto_item_set_generated(ti); /* add the record length */ tvb_ensure_bytes_exist(tvb, offset, record_length_length); proto_tree_add_uint (ssl_record_tree, hf_tls_record_length, tvb, initial_offset, record_length_length, record_length); } if (ssl_record_tree && is_escape != -1) { proto_tree_add_boolean(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, tvb, initial_offset, 1, is_escape); } if (ssl_record_tree && padding_length != -1) { proto_tree_add_uint(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, tvb, initial_offset + 2, 1, padding_length); } /* * dissect the record data */ /* jump forward to the start of the record data */ offset = initial_offset + record_length_length; /* add the message type */ if (ssl_record_tree) { proto_tree_add_item(ssl_record_tree, hf_ssl2_msg_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); } offset += 1; /* move past msg_type byte */ { /* dissect the message (only handle client hello right now) */ switch (msg_type) { case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvb, pinfo, ssl_record_tree, offset, ssl); break; case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset); break; case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvb, ssl_record_tree, offset, pinfo); break; case SSL2_HND_ERROR: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_FINISHED: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_VERIFY: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_FINISHED: case SSL2_HND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: /* unimplemented */ break; default: /* unknown */ break; } } return (initial_offset + record_length_length + record_length); } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, SslDecryptSession *ssl) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * Version version; * uint16 cipher_spec_length; * uint16 session_id_length; * uint16 challenge_length; * V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length]; * opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length]; * Random challenge; * } V2ClientHello; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at Version * */ guint16 version; guint16 cipher_spec_length; guint16 session_id_length; guint16 challenge_length; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *cs_tree; cs_tree=0; version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) { /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ return; } if (ssl) { ssl_set_server(&ssl->session, &pinfo->dst, pinfo->ptype, pinfo->destport); } /* show the version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_client_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; session_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); if (session_id_length > SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES) { expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error, "Session ID length (%u) must be less than %u.", session_id_length, SSLV2_MAX_SESSION_ID_LENGTH_IN_BYTES); return; } offset += 2; challenge_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); if (tree) proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; if (tree) { /* tell the user how many cipher specs they've won */ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_cipher_suites, tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, "Cipher Specs (%u specs)", cipher_spec_length/3); /* make this a subtree and expand the actual specs below */ cs_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, dissect_ssl3_hf.ett.cipher_suites); if (!cs_tree) { cs_tree = tree; /* failsafe */ } } /* iterate through the cipher specs, showing them */ while (cipher_spec_length > 0) { if (cs_tree) proto_tree_add_item(cs_tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; /* length of one cipher spec */ cipher_spec_length -= 3; } /* if there's a session id, show it */ if (session_id_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_bytes_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_session_id, tvb, offset, session_id_length, NULL, "Session ID (%u byte%s)", session_id_length, plurality(session_id_length, "", "s")); /* PAOLO: get session id and reset session state for key [re]negotiation */ if (ssl) { tvb_memcpy(tvb,ssl->session_id.data, offset, session_id_length); ssl->session_id.data_len = session_id_length; ssl->state &= ~(SSL_HAVE_SESSION_KEY|SSL_MASTER_SECRET|SSL_PRE_MASTER_SECRET| SSL_CIPHER|SSL_SERVER_RANDOM); } offset += session_id_length; } /* if there's a challenge, show it */ if (challenge_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, tvb, offset, challenge_length, ENC_NA); if (ssl) { /* PAOLO: get client random data; we get at most 32 bytes from challenge */ gint max; max = challenge_length > 32? 32: challenge_length; ssl_debug_printf("client random len: %d padded to 32\n", challenge_length); /* client random is padded with zero and 'right' aligned */ memset(ssl->client_random.data, 0, 32 - max); tvb_memcpy(tvb, &ssl->client_random.data[32 - max], offset, max); ssl->client_random.data_len = 32; ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_hello found CLIENT RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } } } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_client_master_key(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * V2Cipherspec cipher; * uint16 clear_key_length; * uint16 encrypted_key_length; * uint16 key_arg_length; * opaque clear_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.clear_key_length]; * opaque encrypted_key_data[V2ClientMasterKey.encrypted_key_length]; * opaque key_arg_data[V2ClientMasterKey.key_arg_length]; * } V2ClientMasterKey; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at cipher */ guint16 clear_key_length; guint16 encrypted_key_length; guint16 key_arg_length; /* at this point, everything we do involves the tree, * so quit now if we don't have one ;-) */ if (!tree) { return; } /* show the selected cipher */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; /* get the fixed fields */ clear_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; encrypted_key_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; key_arg_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* show the variable length fields */ if (clear_key_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, tvb, offset, clear_key_length, ENC_NA); offset += clear_key_length; } if (encrypted_key_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, tvb, offset, encrypted_key_length, ENC_NA); offset += encrypted_key_length; } if (key_arg_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, tvb, offset, key_arg_length, ENC_NA); } } static void dissect_ssl2_hnd_server_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, proto_tree *tree, guint32 offset, packet_info *pinfo) { /* struct { * uint8 msg_type; * uint8 session_id_hit; * uint8 certificate_type; * uint16 server_version; * uint16 certificate_length; * uint16 cipher_specs_length; * uint16 connection_id_length; * opaque certificate_data[V2ServerHello.certificate_length]; * opaque cipher_specs_data[V2ServerHello.cipher_specs_length]; * opaque connection_id_data[V2ServerHello.connection_id_length]; * } V2ServerHello; * * Note: when we get here, offset's already pointing at session_id_hit */ guint16 certificate_length; guint16 cipher_spec_length; guint16 connection_id_length; guint16 version; proto_item *ti; proto_tree *subtree; asn1_ctx_t asn1_ctx; asn1_ctx_init(&asn1_ctx, ASN1_ENC_BER, TRUE, pinfo); /* everything we do only makes sense with a tree, so * quit now if we don't have one */ if (!tree) { return; } version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 2); if (!ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version)) { /* invalid version; probably encrypted data */ return; } /* is there a hit? */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; /* what type of certificate is this? */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 1; /* now the server version */ proto_tree_add_item(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_server_version, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 2; /* get the fixed fields */ certificate_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_certificate_len, tvb, offset, 2, certificate_length); offset += 2; cipher_spec_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, tvb, offset, 2, cipher_spec_length); offset += 2; connection_id_length = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset); proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, tvb, offset, 2, connection_id_length); offset += 2; /* now the variable length fields */ if (certificate_length > 0) { (void)dissect_x509af_Certificate(FALSE, tvb, offset, &asn1_ctx, tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_certificate); offset += certificate_length; } if (cipher_spec_length > 0) { /* provide a collapsing node for the cipher specs */ ti = proto_tree_add_none_format(tree, dissect_ssl3_hf.hf.hs_cipher_suites, tvb, offset, cipher_spec_length, "Cipher Specs (%u spec%s)", cipher_spec_length/3, plurality(cipher_spec_length/3, "", "s")); subtree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, dissect_ssl3_hf.ett.cipher_suites); if (!subtree) { subtree = tree; } /* iterate through the cipher specs */ while (cipher_spec_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(subtree, hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN); offset += 3; cipher_spec_length -= 3; } } if (connection_id_length > 0) { proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, tvb, offset, connection_id_length, ENC_NA); } } void ssl_set_master_secret(guint32 frame_num, address *addr_srv, address *addr_cli, port_type ptype, guint32 port_srv, guint32 port_cli, guint32 version, gint cipher, const guchar *_master_secret, const guchar *_client_random, const guchar *_server_random, guint32 client_seq, guint32 server_seq) { conversation_t *conversation; SslDecryptSession *ssl; guint iv_len; ssl_debug_printf("\nssl_set_master_secret enter frame #%u\n", frame_num); conversation = find_conversation(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, conversation_pt_to_conversation_type(ptype), port_srv, port_cli, 0); if (!conversation) { /* create a new conversation */ conversation = conversation_new(frame_num, addr_srv, addr_cli, conversation_pt_to_conversation_type(ptype), port_srv, port_cli, 0); ssl_debug_printf(" new conversation = %p created\n", (void *)conversation); } ssl = ssl_get_session(conversation, tls_handle); ssl_debug_printf(" conversation = %p, ssl_session = %p\n", (void *)conversation, (void *)ssl); ssl_set_server(&ssl->session, addr_srv, ptype, port_srv); /* version */ if ((ssl->session.version==SSL_VER_UNKNOWN) && (version!=SSL_VER_UNKNOWN)) { switch (version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLCPV1_VERSION: ssl->session.version = version; ssl->state |= SSL_VERSION; ssl_debug_printf("%s set version 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", G_STRFUNC, ssl->session.version, ssl->state); break; default: /* API change: version number is no longer an internal value * (SSL_VER_*) but the ProtocolVersion from wire (*_VERSION) */ ssl_debug_printf("%s WARNING must pass ProtocolVersion, not 0x%04x!\n", G_STRFUNC, version); break; } } /* cipher */ if (cipher > 0) { ssl->session.cipher = cipher; if (!(ssl->cipher_suite = ssl_find_cipher(ssl->session.cipher))) { ssl->state &= ~SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't find cipher suite 0x%X\n", ssl->session.cipher); } else { ssl->state |= SSL_CIPHER; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CIPHER 0x%04X -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->session.cipher, ssl->state); } } /* client random */ if (_client_random) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->client_random, _client_random, 32); ssl->state |= SSL_CLIENT_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set CLIENT RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } /* server random */ if (_server_random) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->server_random, _server_random, 32); ssl->state |= SSL_SERVER_RANDOM; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set SERVER RANDOM -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } /* master secret */ if (_master_secret) { ssl_data_set(&ssl->master_secret, _master_secret, 48); ssl->state |= SSL_MASTER_SECRET; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret set MASTER SECRET -> state 0x%02X\n", ssl->state); } ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret trying to generate keys\n"); if (ssl_generate_keyring_material(ssl)<0) { ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret can't generate keyring material\n"); return; } /* change ciphers immediately */ ssl_change_cipher(ssl, TRUE); ssl_change_cipher(ssl, FALSE); /* update seq numbers if available */ /* TODO change API to accept 64-bit sequence numbers. */ if (ssl->client && (client_seq != (guint32)-1)) { ssl->client->seq = client_seq; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret client->seq updated to %" PRIu64 "\n", ssl->client->seq); } if (ssl->server && (server_seq != (guint32)-1)) { ssl->server->seq = server_seq; ssl_debug_printf("ssl_set_master_secret server->seq updated to %" PRIu64 "\n", ssl->server->seq); } /* update IV from last data */ iv_len = ssl_get_cipher_blocksize(ssl->cipher_suite); if (ssl->client && ((ssl->client->seq > 0) || (ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) { ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->client->evp, ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret client IV updated",ssl->client_data_for_iv.data + ssl->client_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); } if (ssl->server && ((ssl->server->seq > 0) || (ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len > iv_len))) { ssl_cipher_setiv(&ssl->server->evp, ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); ssl_print_data("ssl_set_master_secret server IV updated",ssl->server_data_for_iv.data + ssl->server_data_for_iv.data_len - iv_len, iv_len); } } /********************************************************************* * * Support Functions * *********************************************************************/ static gint ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(const guint16 version) { const gchar *version_str; version_str = try_val_to_str(version, ssl_versions); return version_str != NULL; } static gint ssl_is_v2_client_hello(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { guint8 byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (byte != 0x80) /* v2 client hello should start this way */ { return 0; } byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset+2); if (byte != 0x01) /* v2 client hello msg type */ { return 0; } /* 1 in 2^16 of being right; improve later if necessary */ return 1; } /* this applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a * valid sslv2 record. this isn't really possible, * but we'll try to do a reasonable job anyway. */ static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv2(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { /* here's the current approach: * * we only try to catch unencrypted handshake messages, so we can * assume that there is not padding. This means that the * first byte must be >= 0x80 and there must be a valid sslv2 * msg_type in the third byte */ /* get the first byte; must have high bit set */ guint8 byte; byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (byte < 0x80) { return 0; } /* get the supposed msg_type byte; since we only care about * unencrypted handshake messages (we can't tell the type for * encrypted messages), we just check against that list */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset + 2); switch (byte) { case SSL2_HND_ERROR: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: return 1; } return 0; } /* this applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks like a * valid sslv3 record. this is somewhat more reliable * than sslv2 due to the structure of the v3 protocol */ static gint ssl_looks_like_sslv3(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset) { /* have to have a valid content type followed by a valid * protocol version */ guint8 byte; guint16 version; /* see if the first byte is a valid content type */ byte = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); if (!ssl_is_valid_content_type(byte)) { return 0; } /* now check to see if the version byte appears valid */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 1); switch (version) { case SSLV3_VERSION: case TLSV1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT1_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT2_VERSION: case TLSV1DOT3_VERSION: case TLCPV1_VERSION: return 1; } return 0; } /* applies a heuristic to determine whether * or not the data beginning at offset looks * like a valid, unencrypted v2 handshake message. * since it isn't possible to completely tell random * data apart from a valid message without state, * we try to help the odds. */ static gint ssl_looks_like_valid_v2_handshake(tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint32 offset, const guint32 record_length) { /* first byte should be a msg_type. * * - we know we only see client_hello, client_master_key, * and server_hello in the clear, so check to see if * msg_type is one of those (this gives us a 3 in 2^8 * chance of saying yes with random payload) * * - for those three types that we know about, do some * further validation to reduce the chance of an error */ guint8 msg_type; guint16 version; guint32 sum; gint ret = 0; /* fetch the msg_type */ msg_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset); switch (msg_type) { case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_HELLO: /* version follows msg byte, so verify that this is valid */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+1); ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); break; case SSL2_HND_SERVER_HELLO: /* version is three bytes after msg_type */ version = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset+3); ret = ssl_is_valid_ssl_version(version); break; case SSL2_HND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: /* sum of clear_key_length, encrypted_key_length, and key_arg_length * must be less than record length */ sum = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 4); /* clear_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 6); /* encrypted_key_length */ sum += tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset + 8); /* key_arg_length */ if (sum <= record_length) { ret = 1; } break; default: break; } return ret; } gboolean tls_get_cipher_info(packet_info *pinfo, guint16 cipher_suite, int *cipher_algo, int *cipher_mode, int *hash_algo) { if (cipher_suite == 0) { conversation_t *conv = find_conversation_pinfo(pinfo, 0); if (!conv) { return FALSE; } void *conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conv, proto_tls); if (conv_data == NULL) { return FALSE; } SslDecryptSession *ssl_session = (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data; cipher_suite = ssl_session->session.cipher; } const SslCipherSuite *suite = ssl_find_cipher(cipher_suite); if (!suite) { return FALSE; } /* adapted from ssl_cipher_init in packet-tls-utils.c */ static const gint gcry_modes[] = { GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305, }; static const int gcry_mds[] = { GCRY_MD_MD5, GCRY_MD_SHA1, GCRY_MD_SHA256, GCRY_MD_SHA384, -1, }; int mode = gcry_modes[suite->mode]; int cipher_algo_id = ssl_get_cipher_algo(suite); int hash_algo_id = gcry_mds[suite->dig-DIG_MD5]; if (mode == -1 || cipher_algo_id == 0 || hash_algo_id == -1) { /* Identifiers are unusable, fail. */ return FALSE; } if (cipher_algo) { *cipher_algo = cipher_algo_id; } if (cipher_mode) { *cipher_mode = mode; } if (hash_algo) { *hash_algo = hash_algo_id; } return TRUE; } /** * Load the QUIC traffic secret from the keylog file. * Returns the secret length (at most 'secret_max_len') and the secret into * 'secret' if a secret was found, or zero otherwise. */ gint tls13_get_quic_secret(packet_info *pinfo, gboolean is_from_server, int type, guint secret_min_len, guint secret_max_len, guint8 *secret_out) { GHashTable *key_map; const char *label; conversation_t *conv = find_conversation_pinfo(pinfo, 0); if (!conv) { return 0; } SslDecryptSession *ssl = (SslDecryptSession *)conversation_get_proto_data(conv, proto_tls); if (ssl == NULL) { return 0; } gboolean is_quic = !!(ssl->state & SSL_QUIC_RECORD_LAYER); ssl_debug_printf("%s frame %d is_quic=%d\n", G_STRFUNC, pinfo->num, is_quic); if (!is_quic) { return 0; } if (ssl->client_random.data_len == 0) { /* May happen if Hello message is missing and Finished is found. */ ssl_debug_printf("%s missing Client Random\n", G_STRFUNC); return 0; } // Not strictly necessary as QUIC CRYPTO frames have just been processed // which also calls ssl_load_keyfile for key transitions. ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); switch ((TLSRecordType)type) { case TLS_SECRET_0RTT_APP: DISSECTOR_ASSERT(!is_from_server); label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = ssl_master_key_map.tls13_client_early; break; case TLS_SECRET_HANDSHAKE: if (is_from_server) { label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = ssl_master_key_map.tls13_server_handshake; } else { label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; key_map = ssl_master_key_map.tls13_client_handshake; } break; case TLS_SECRET_APP: if (is_from_server) { label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; key_map = ssl_master_key_map.tls13_server_appdata; } else { label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; key_map = ssl_master_key_map.tls13_client_appdata; } break; default: ws_assert_not_reached(); } StringInfo *secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl->client_random); if (!secret || secret->data_len < secret_min_len || secret->data_len > secret_max_len) { ssl_debug_printf("%s Cannot find QUIC %s of size %d..%d, found bad size %d!\n", G_STRFUNC, label, secret_min_len, secret_max_len, secret ? secret->data_len : 0); return 0; } ssl_debug_printf("%s Retrieved QUIC traffic secret.\n", G_STRFUNC); ssl_print_string("Client Random", &ssl->client_random); ssl_print_string(label, secret); memcpy(secret_out, secret->data, secret->data_len); return secret->data_len; } const char * tls_get_alpn(packet_info *pinfo) { conversation_t *conv = find_conversation_pinfo(pinfo, 0); if (!conv) { return NULL; } SslDecryptSession *session = (SslDecryptSession *)conversation_get_proto_data(conv, proto_tls); if (session == NULL) { return NULL; } return session->session.alpn_name; } /* TLS Exporters {{{ */ /** * Computes the TLS 1.3 Exporter value (RFC 8446 Section 7.5). * * "secret" is the [early_]exporter_master_secret. On success, TRUE is returned * and the key is returned via "out" (free with "wmem_free(NULL, out)"). */ static gboolean tls13_exporter_common(int algo, const StringInfo *secret, const char *label, guint8 *context, guint context_length, guint key_length, guchar **out) { /* TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) = * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""), * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length) * * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) = * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length) */ gcry_error_t err; gcry_md_hd_t hd; const char *hash_value; StringInfo derived_secret = { NULL, 0 }; // QUIC -09 currently uses draft 23, so no need to support older TLS drafts const char *label_prefix = "tls13 "; err = gcry_md_open(&hd, algo, 0); if (err) { return FALSE; } /* Calculate Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""). */ hash_value = gcry_md_read(hd, 0); /* Empty Messages */ guint8 hash_len = (guint8) gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo); derived_secret.data_len = hash_len; if (!tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(algo, secret, label_prefix, label, hash_value, hash_len, derived_secret.data_len, &derived_secret.data)) { gcry_md_close(hd); return FALSE; } /* HKDF-Expand-Label(..., "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length) */ gcry_md_write(hd, context, context_length); hash_value = gcry_md_read(hd, 0); tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(algo, &derived_secret, label_prefix, "exporter", hash_value, hash_len, key_length, out); wmem_free(NULL, derived_secret.data); gcry_md_close(hd); return TRUE; } /** * Exports keying material using "[early_]exporter_master_secret". See * tls13_exporter_common for more details. */ gboolean tls13_exporter(packet_info *pinfo, gboolean is_early, const char *label, guint8 *context, guint context_length, guint key_length, guchar **out) { int hash_algo = 0; GHashTable *key_map; const StringInfo *secret; if (!tls_get_cipher_info(pinfo, 0, NULL, NULL, &hash_algo)) { return FALSE; } /* Lookup EXPORTER_SECRET based on client_random from conversation */ conversation_t *conv = find_conversation_pinfo(pinfo, 0); if (!conv) { return FALSE; } void *conv_data = conversation_get_proto_data(conv, proto_tls); if (conv_data == NULL) { return FALSE; } SslDecryptSession *ssl_session = (SslDecryptSession *)conv_data; ssl_load_keyfile(ssl_options.keylog_filename, &ssl_keylog_file, &ssl_master_key_map); key_map = is_early ? ssl_master_key_map.tls13_early_exporter : ssl_master_key_map.tls13_exporter; secret = (StringInfo *)g_hash_table_lookup(key_map, &ssl_session->client_random); if (!secret) { return FALSE; } return tls13_exporter_common(hash_algo, secret, label, context, context_length, key_length, out); } /* }}} */ /* UAT */ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static void ssldecrypt_free_cb(void *r) { ssldecrypt_assoc_t *h = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)r; g_free(h->ipaddr); g_free(h->port); g_free(h->protocol); g_free(h->keyfile); g_free(h->password); } static void* ssldecrypt_copy_cb(void *dest, const void *orig, size_t len _U_) { const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *o = (const ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)orig; ssldecrypt_assoc_t *d = (ssldecrypt_assoc_t *)dest; d->ipaddr = g_strdup(o->ipaddr); d->port = g_strdup(o->port); d->protocol = g_strdup(o->protocol); d->keyfile = g_strdup(o->keyfile); d->password = g_strdup(o->password); return d; } UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,ipaddr,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,port,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,protocol,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_FILENAME_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,keyfile,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) UAT_CSTRING_CB_DEF(sslkeylist_uats,password,ssldecrypt_assoc_t) static bool ssldecrypt_uat_fld_protocol_chk_cb(void* r _U_, const char* p, guint len _U_, const void* u1 _U_, const void* u2 _U_, char** err) { if (!p || strlen(p) == 0u) { // This should be removed in favor of Decode As. Make it optional. *err = NULL; return TRUE; } if (!ssl_find_appdata_dissector(p)) { if (proto_get_id_by_filter_name(p) != -1) { *err = ws_strdup_printf("While '%s' is a valid dissector filter name, that dissector is not configured" " to support TLS decryption.\n\n" "If you need to decrypt '%s' over TLS, please contact the Wireshark development team.", p, p); } else { char* ssl_str = ssl_association_info("tls.port", "TCP"); *err = ws_strdup_printf("Could not find dissector for: '%s'\nCommonly used TLS dissectors include:\n%s", p, ssl_str); g_free(ssl_str); } return FALSE; } *err = NULL; return TRUE; } #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ static void ssl_src_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { SslPacketInfo* pi; guint32 srcport = pinfo->srcport; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, pinfo->curr_layer_num); if (pi != NULL) srcport = pi->srcport; snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "source (%u%s)", srcport, UTF8_RIGHTWARDS_ARROW); } static gpointer ssl_src_value(packet_info *pinfo) { SslPacketInfo* pi; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, pinfo->curr_layer_num); if (pi == NULL) return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->srcport); return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pi->srcport); } static void ssl_dst_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { SslPacketInfo* pi; guint32 destport = pinfo->destport; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, pinfo->curr_layer_num); if (pi != NULL) destport = pi->destport; snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "destination (%s%u)", UTF8_RIGHTWARDS_ARROW, destport); } static gpointer ssl_dst_value(packet_info *pinfo) { SslPacketInfo* pi; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, pinfo->curr_layer_num); if (pi == NULL) return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pinfo->destport); return GUINT_TO_POINTER(pi->destport); } static void ssl_both_prompt(packet_info *pinfo, gchar *result) { SslPacketInfo* pi; guint32 srcport = pinfo->srcport, destport = pinfo->destport; pi = (SslPacketInfo *)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_tls, pinfo->curr_layer_num); if (pi != NULL) { srcport = pi->srcport; destport = pi->destport; } snprintf(result, MAX_DECODE_AS_PROMPT_LEN, "both (%u%s%u)", srcport, UTF8_LEFT_RIGHT_ARROW, destport); } static void tls_secrets_block_callback(const void *secrets, guint size) { tls_keylog_process_lines(&ssl_master_key_map, (const guint8 *)secrets, size); } /********************************************************************* * * Standard Wireshark Protocol Registration and housekeeping * *********************************************************************/ void proto_register_tls(void) { /* Setup list of header fields See Section 1.6.1 for details*/ static hf_register_info hf[] = { { &hf_tls_record, { "Record Layer", "tls.record", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_record_content_type, { "Content Type", "tls.record.content_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0, NULL, HFILL} }, { &hf_tls_record_opaque_type, { "Opaque Type", "tls.record.opaque_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_content_type), 0x0, "Always set to value 23, actual content type is known after decryption", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl2_msg_type, { "Handshake Message Type", "tls.ssl2.handshake.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_msg_types), 0x0, "SSLv2 handshake message type", HFILL} }, { &hf_tls_record_version, { "Version", "tls.record.version", FT_UINT16, BASE_HEX, VALS(ssl_versions), 0x0, "Record layer version", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_record_length, { "Length", "tls.record.length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of TLS record data", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_record_appdata, { "Encrypted Application Data", "tls.app_data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Payload is encrypted application data", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_record_appdata_proto, { "Application Data Protocol", "tls.app_data_proto", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_record, { "SSLv2 Record Header", "tls.record", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "SSLv2 record data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_record_is_escape, { "Is Escape", "tls.record.is_escape", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Indicates a security escape", HFILL} }, { &hf_ssl2_record_padding_length, { "Padding Length", "tls.record.padding_length", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of padding at end of record", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_alert_message, { "Alert Message", "tls.alert_message", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_alert_message_level, { "Level", "tls.alert_message.level", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_level), 0x0, "Alert message level", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_alert_message_description, { "Description", "tls.alert_message.desc", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_alert_description), 0x0, "Alert message description", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_protocol, { "Handshake Protocol", "tls.handshake", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Handshake protocol message", HFILL} }, { &hf_tls_handshake_type, { "Handshake Type", "tls.handshake.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_31_handshake_type), 0x0, "Type of handshake message", HFILL} }, { &hf_tls_handshake_length, { "Length", "tls.handshake.length", FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of handshake message", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec, { "Cipher Spec", "tls.ssl2.handshake.cipherspec", FT_UINT24, BASE_HEX|BASE_EXT_STRING, &ssl_20_cipher_suites_ext, 0x0, "Cipher specification", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol_len, { "Selected Protocol Length", "tls.handshake.npn_selected_protocol_len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_npn_selected_protocol, { "Selected Protocol", "tls.handshake.npn_selected_protocol", FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Protocol to be used for connection", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding_len, { "Padding Length", "tls.handshake.npn_padding_len", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_npn_padding, { "Padding", "tls.handshake.npn_padding", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &ssl_hfs.hs_md5_hash, { "MD5 Hash", "tls.handshake.md5_hash", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } }, { &ssl_hfs.hs_sha_hash, { "SHA-1 Hash", "tls.handshake.sha_hash", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Hash of messages, master_secret, etc.", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_heartbeat_message, { "Heartbeat Message", "tls.heartbeat_message", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_heartbeat_message_type, { "Type", "tls.heartbeat_message.type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(tls_heartbeat_type), 0x0, "Heartbeat message type", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload_length, { "Payload Length", "tls.heartbeat_message.payload_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_heartbeat_message_payload, { "Payload Length", "tls.heartbeat_message.payload", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_heartbeat_message_padding, { "Payload Length", "tls.heartbeat_message.padding", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge, { "Challenge", "tls.handshake.challenge", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Challenge data used to authenticate server", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cipher_spec_len, { "Cipher Spec Length", "tls.handshake.cipher_spec_len", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of cipher specs field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len, { "Session ID Length", "tls.handshake.session_id_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of session ID field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_challenge_len, { "Challenge Length", "tls.handshake.challenge_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of challenge field", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key_len, { "Clear Key Data Length", "tls.handshake.clear_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of clear key data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key_len, { "Encrypted Key Data Length", "tls.handshake.encrypted_key_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of encrypted key data", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg_len, { "Key Argument Length", "tls.handshake.key_arg_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of key argument", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_clear_key, { "Clear Key Data", "tls.handshake.clear_key_data", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Clear portion of MASTER-KEY", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_enc_key, { "Encrypted Key", "tls.handshake.encrypted_key", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Secret portion of MASTER-KEY encrypted to server", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_key_arg, { "Key Argument", "tls.handshake.key_arg", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Key Argument (e.g., Initialization Vector)", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_session_id_hit, { "Session ID Hit", "tls.handshake.session_id_hit", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Did the server find the client's Session ID?", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_cert_type, { "Certificate Type", "tls.ssl2.handshake.cert_type", FT_UINT8, BASE_DEC, VALS(ssl_20_certificate_type), 0x0, NULL, HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id_len, { "Connection ID Length", "tls.handshake.connection_id_length", FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "Length of connection ID", HFILL } }, { &hf_ssl2_handshake_connection_id, { "Connection ID", "tls.handshake.connection_id", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Server's challenge to client", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_segment_overlap, { "Segment overlap", "tls.segment.overlap", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Segment overlaps with other segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_overlap_conflict, { "Conflicting data in segment overlap", "tls.segment.overlap.conflict", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Overlapping segments contained conflicting data", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_multiple_tails, { "Multiple tail segments found", "tls.segment.multipletails", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Several tails were found when reassembling the pdu", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_too_long_fragment, { "Segment too long", "tls.segment.toolongfragment", FT_BOOLEAN, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Segment contained data past end of the pdu", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_error, { "Reassembling error", "tls.segment.error", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "Reassembling error due to illegal segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_count, { "Segment count", "tls.segment.count", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment, { "TLS segment", "tls.segment", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segments, { "Reassembled TLS segments", "tls.segments", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "TLS Segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_reassembled_in, { "Reassembled PDU in frame", "tls.reassembled_in", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "The PDU that doesn't end in this segment is reassembled in this frame", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_reassembled_length, { "Reassembled PDU length", "tls.reassembled.length", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, "The total length of the reassembled payload", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_reassembled_data, { "Reassembled PDU data", "tls.reassembled.data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, "The payload of multiple reassembled TLS segments", HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_segment_data, { "TLS segment data", "tls.segment.data", FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x00, "The payload of a single TLS segment", HFILL } }, { &hf_tls_handshake_fragment_count, { "Handshake Fragment count", "tls.handshake.fragment.count", FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_handshake_fragment, { "Handshake Fragment", "tls.handshake.fragment", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_handshake_fragments, { "Reassembled Handshake Fragments", "tls.handshake.fragments", FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL }}, { &hf_tls_handshake_reassembled_in, { "Reassembled Handshake Message in frame", "tls.handshake.reassembled_in", FT_FRAMENUM, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0, "The handshake message is fully reassembled in this frame", HFILL }}, SSL_COMMON_HF_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf, "tls") }; /* Setup protocol subtree array */ static gint *ett[] = { &ett_tls, &ett_tls_record, &ett_tls_alert, &ett_tls_handshake, &ett_tls_heartbeat, &ett_tls_certs, &ett_tls_segments, &ett_tls_segment, &ett_tls_hs_fragments, &ett_tls_hs_fragment, SSL_COMMON_ETT_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf) }; static ei_register_info ei[] = { { &ei_ssl2_handshake_session_id_len_error, { "tls.handshake.session_id_length.error", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Session ID length error", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_ssl3_heartbeat_payload_length, { "tls.heartbeat_message.payload_length.invalid", PI_MALFORMED, PI_ERROR, "Invalid heartbeat payload length", EXPFILL }}, { &ei_tls_unexpected_message, { "tls.unexpected_message", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_ERROR, "Unexpected message", EXPFILL }}, /* Generated from convert_proto_tree_add_text.pl */ { &ei_tls_ignored_unknown_record, { "tls.ignored_unknown_record", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Ignored Unknown Record", EXPFILL }}, SSL_COMMON_EI_LIST(dissect_ssl3_hf, "tls") }; static build_valid_func ssl_da_src_values[1] = {ssl_src_value}; static build_valid_func ssl_da_dst_values[1] = {ssl_dst_value}; static build_valid_func ssl_da_both_values[2] = {ssl_src_value, ssl_dst_value}; static decode_as_value_t ssl_da_values[3] = {{ssl_src_prompt, 1, ssl_da_src_values}, {ssl_dst_prompt, 1, ssl_da_dst_values}, {ssl_both_prompt, 2, ssl_da_both_values}}; static decode_as_t ssl_da = {"tls", "tls.port", 3, 2, ssl_da_values, "TCP", "port(s) as", decode_as_default_populate_list, decode_as_default_reset, decode_as_default_change, NULL}; expert_module_t* expert_ssl; /* Register the protocol name and description */ proto_tls = proto_register_protocol("Transport Layer Security", "TLS", "tls"); ssl_associations = register_dissector_table("tls.port", "TLS Port", proto_tls, FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC); register_dissector_table_alias(ssl_associations, "ssl.port"); /* Required function calls to register the header fields and * subtrees used */ proto_register_field_array(proto_tls, hf, array_length(hf)); proto_register_alias(proto_tls, "ssl"); proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett)); expert_ssl = expert_register_protocol(proto_tls); expert_register_field_array(expert_ssl, ei, array_length(ei)); { module_t *ssl_module = prefs_register_protocol(proto_tls, proto_reg_handoff_ssl); #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS static uat_field_t sslkeylist_uats_flds[] = { UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, ipaddr, "IP address", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_ip_chk_cb, "IPv4 or IPv6 address (unused)"), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, port, "Port", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_port_chk_cb, "Port Number (optional)"), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, protocol, "Protocol", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_protocol_chk_cb, "Application Layer Protocol (optional)"), UAT_FLD_FILENAME_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, keyfile, "Key File", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_fileopen_chk_cb, "Private keyfile."), UAT_FLD_CSTRING_OTHER(sslkeylist_uats, password,"Password", ssldecrypt_uat_fld_password_chk_cb, "Password (for PCKS#12 keyfile)"), UAT_END_FIELDS }; ssldecrypt_uat = uat_new("TLS Decrypt", sizeof(ssldecrypt_assoc_t), "ssl_keys", /* filename */ TRUE, /* from_profile */ &tlskeylist_uats, /* data_ptr */ &ntlsdecrypt, /* numitems_ptr */ UAT_AFFECTS_DISSECTION, /* affects dissection of packets, but not set of named fields */ NULL, /* Help section (currently a wiki page) */ ssldecrypt_copy_cb, NULL, ssldecrypt_free_cb, ssl_parse_uat, ssl_reset_uat, sslkeylist_uats_flds); prefs_register_uat_preference(ssl_module, "key_table", "RSA keys list", "A table of RSA keys for TLS decryption", ssldecrypt_uat); prefs_register_string_preference(ssl_module, "keys_list", "RSA keys list (deprecated)", "Semicolon-separated list of private RSA keys used for TLS decryption. " "Used by versions of Wireshark prior to 1.6", &ssl_keys_list); #endif /* HAVE_LIBGNUTLS */ prefs_register_filename_preference(ssl_module, "debug_file", "TLS debug file", "Redirect TLS debug to the file specified. Leave empty to disable debugging " "or use \"" SSL_DEBUG_USE_STDERR "\" to redirect output to stderr.", &ssl_debug_file_name, TRUE); prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "desegment_ssl_records", "Reassemble TLS records spanning multiple TCP segments", "Whether the TLS dissector should reassemble TLS records spanning multiple TCP segments. " "To use this option, you must also enable \"Allow subdissectors to reassemble TCP streams\" in the TCP protocol settings.", &tls_desegment); prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "desegment_ssl_application_data", "Reassemble TLS Application Data spanning multiple TLS records", "Whether the TLS dissector should reassemble TLS Application Data spanning multiple TLS records. ", &tls_desegment_app_data); prefs_register_bool_preference(ssl_module, "ignore_ssl_mac_failed", "Message Authentication Code (MAC), ignore \"mac failed\"", "For troubleshooting ignore the mac check result and decrypt also if the Message Authentication Code (MAC) fails.", &tls_ignore_mac_failed); ssl_common_register_options(ssl_module, &ssl_options, FALSE); } /* heuristic dissectors for any premable e.g. CredSSP before RDP */ ssl_heur_subdissector_list = register_heur_dissector_list("tls", proto_tls); ssl_common_register_ssl_alpn_dissector_table("tls.alpn", "SSL/TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs", proto_tls); tls_handle = register_dissector("tls", dissect_ssl, proto_tls); register_dissector("tls13-handshake", dissect_tls13_handshake, proto_tls); register_dissector("tls-echconfig", dissect_tls_echconfig, proto_tls); register_init_routine(ssl_init); register_cleanup_routine(ssl_cleanup); reassembly_table_register(&ssl_reassembly_table, &tcp_reassembly_table_functions); reassembly_table_register(&tls_hs_reassembly_table, &addresses_ports_reassembly_table_functions); register_decode_as(&ssl_da); /* XXX: this seems unused due to new "Follow TLS" method, remove? */ tls_tap = register_tap("tls"); ssl_debug_printf("proto_register_ssl: registered tap %s:%d\n", "tls", tls_tap); register_follow_stream(proto_tls, "tls", tcp_follow_conv_filter, tcp_follow_index_filter, tcp_follow_address_filter, tcp_port_to_display, ssl_follow_tap_listener, get_tcp_stream_count, NULL); secrets_register_type(SECRETS_TYPE_TLS, tls_secrets_block_callback); } static int dissect_tls_sct_ber(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data _U_) { guint32 offset = 0; /* Skip through tag and length for OCTET STRING encoding. */ offset = dissect_ber_identifier(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, NULL, NULL, NULL); offset = dissect_ber_length(pinfo, tree, tvb, offset, NULL, NULL); /* * RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency) refers to RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2) for the * DigitallySigned format, so asssume that version. */ return tls_dissect_sct_list(&dissect_ssl3_hf, tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, tvb_captured_length(tvb), TLSV1DOT2_VERSION); } /* If this dissector uses sub-dissector registration add a registration * routine. This format is required because a script is used to find * these routines and create the code that calls these routines. */ void proto_reg_handoff_ssl(void) { #ifdef HAVE_LIBGNUTLS /* parse key list */ ssl_parse_uat(); ssl_parse_old_keys(); #endif /* * XXX the port preferences should probably be removed in favor of Decode * As. Then proto_reg_handoff_ssl can be removed from * prefs_register_protocol. */ static gboolean initialized = FALSE; if (initialized) { return; } initialized = TRUE; exported_pdu_tap = find_tap_id(EXPORT_PDU_TAP_NAME_LAYER_7); /* Certificate Transparency extensions: 2 (Certificate), 5 (OCSP Response) */ register_ber_oid_dissector("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2", dissect_tls_sct_ber, proto_tls, "SignedCertificateTimestampList"); register_ber_oid_dissector("1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.5", dissect_tls_sct_ber, proto_tls, "SignedCertificateTimestampList"); heur_dissector_add("tcp", dissect_ssl_heur, "SSL/TLS over TCP", "tls_tcp", proto_tls, HEURISTIC_ENABLE); dissector_add_string("http.upgrade", "tls", tls_handle); } void ssl_dissector_add(guint port, dissector_handle_t handle) { ssl_association_add("tls.port", tls_handle, handle, port, TRUE); } void ssl_dissector_delete(guint port, dissector_handle_t handle) { ssl_association_remove("tls.port", tls_handle, handle, port, TRUE); } /* * Editor modelines - https://www.wireshark.org/tools/modelines.html * * Local variables: * c-basic-offset: 4 * tab-width: 8 * indent-tabs-mode: nil * End: * * vi: set shiftwidth=4 tabstop=8 expandtab: * :indentSize=4:tabSize=8:noTabs=true: */