Adding upstream version 2.4.57.upstream/2.4.57

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 591 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_util_ssl.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_util_ssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38079a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_util_ssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
+/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/*                      _             _
+ *  _ __ ___   ___   __| |    ___ ___| |  mod_ssl
+ * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` |   / __/ __| |  Apache Interface to OpenSSL
+ * | | | | | | (_) | (_| |   \__ \__ \ |
+ * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_|
+ *                      |_____|
+ *  ssl_util_ssl.c
+ *  Additional Utility Functions for OpenSSL
+ */
+
+#include "ssl_private.h"
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Additional High-Level Functions for OpenSSL
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+/* we initialize this index at startup time
+ * and never write to it at request time,
+ * so this static is thread safe.
+ * also note that OpenSSL increments at static variable when
+ * SSL_get_ex_new_index() is called, so we _must_ do this at startup.
+ */
+static int app_data2_idx = -1;
+
+void modssl_init_app_data2_idx(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (app_data2_idx > -1) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* we _do_ need to call this twice */
+    for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
+        app_data2_idx =
+            SSL_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                 "Second Application Data for SSL",
+                                 NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+void *modssl_get_app_data2(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return (void *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, app_data2_idx);
+}
+
+void modssl_set_app_data2(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+{
+    SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, app_data2_idx, (char *)arg);
+    return;
+}
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  High-Level Private Key Loading
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+EVP_PKEY *modssl_read_privatekey(const char *filename, pem_password_cb *cb, void *s)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *rc;
+    BIO *bioS;
+    BIO *bioF;
+
+    /* 1. try PEM (= DER+Base64+headers) */
+    if ((bioS=BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    rc = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bioS, NULL, cb, s);
+    BIO_free(bioS);
+
+    if (rc == NULL) {
+        /* 2. try DER+Base64 */
+        if ((bioS = BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+
+        if ((bioF = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64())) == NULL) {
+            BIO_free(bioS);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        bioS = BIO_push(bioF, bioS);
+        rc = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(bioS, NULL);
+        BIO_free_all(bioS);
+
+        if (rc == NULL) {
+            /* 3. try plain DER */
+            if ((bioS = BIO_new_file(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+                return NULL;
+            rc = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(bioS, NULL);
+            BIO_free(bioS);
+        }
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Smart shutdown
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+int modssl_smart_shutdown(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    int i;
+    int rc;
+    int flush;
+
+    /*
+     * Repeat the calls, because SSL_shutdown internally dispatches through a
+     * little state machine. Usually only one or two iterations should be
+     * needed, so we restrict the total number of restrictions in order to
+     * avoid process hangs in case the client played bad with the socket
+     * connection and OpenSSL cannot recognize it.
+     */
+    rc = 0;
+    flush = !(SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN);
+    for (i = 0; i < 4 /* max 2x pending + 2x data = 4 */; i++) {
+        rc = SSL_shutdown(ssl);
+        if (rc >= 0 && flush && (SSL_get_shutdown(ssl) & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
+            /* Once the close notify is sent through the output filters,
+             * ensure it is flushed through the socket.
+             */
+            if (BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(ssl)) <= 0) {
+                rc = -1;
+                break;
+            }
+            flush = 0;
+        }
+        if (rc != 0)
+            break;
+    }
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Certificate Checks
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+/* retrieve basic constraints ingredients */
+BOOL modssl_X509_getBC(X509 *cert, int *ca, int *pathlen)
+{
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bc;
+    BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+    char *cp;
+
+    bc = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL);
+    if (bc == NULL)
+        return FALSE;
+    *ca = bc->ca;
+    *pathlen = -1 /* unlimited */;
+    if (bc->pathlen != NULL) {
+        if ((bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(bc->pathlen, NULL)) == NULL) {
+            BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+        if ((cp = BN_bn2dec(bn)) == NULL) {
+            BN_free(bn);
+            BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
+            return FALSE;
+        }
+        *pathlen = atoi(cp);
+        OPENSSL_free(cp);
+        BN_free(bn);
+    }
+    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bc);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+char *modssl_bio_free_read(apr_pool_t *p, BIO *bio)
+{
+    int len = BIO_pending(bio);
+    char *result = NULL;
+
+    if (len > 0) {
+        result = apr_palloc(p, len+1);
+        len = BIO_read(bio, result, len);
+        result[len] = NUL;
+    }
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    return result;
+}
+
+/* Convert ASN.1 string to a pool-allocated char * string, escaping
+ * control characters.  If raw is zero, convert to UTF-8, otherwise
+ * unchanged from the character set. */
+static char *asn1_string_convert(apr_pool_t *p, ASN1_STRING *asn1str, int raw)
+{
+    BIO *bio;
+    int flags = ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (!raw) flags |= ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT;
+    
+    ASN1_STRING_print_ex(bio, asn1str, flags);
+
+    return modssl_bio_free_read(p, bio);
+}
+
+#define asn1_string_to_utf8(p, a) asn1_string_convert(p, a, 0)
+
+/* convert a NAME_ENTRY to UTF8 string */
+char *modssl_X509_NAME_ENTRY_to_string(apr_pool_t *p, X509_NAME_ENTRY *xsne,
+                                       int raw)
+{
+    char *result = asn1_string_convert(p, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xsne), raw);
+    ap_xlate_proto_from_ascii(result, len);
+    return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * convert an X509_NAME to an RFC 2253 formatted string, optionally truncated
+ * to maxlen characters (specify a maxlen of 0 for no length limit)
+ */
+char *modssl_X509_NAME_to_string(apr_pool_t *p, X509_NAME *dn, int maxlen)
+{
+    char *result = NULL;
+    BIO *bio;
+    int len;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, dn, 0, XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
+    len = BIO_pending(bio);
+    if (len > 0) {
+        result = apr_palloc(p, (maxlen > 0) ? maxlen+1 : len+1);
+        if (maxlen > 0 && maxlen < len) {
+            len = BIO_read(bio, result, maxlen);
+            if (maxlen > 2) {
+                /* insert trailing ellipsis if there's enough space */
+                apr_snprintf(result + maxlen - 3, 4, "...");
+            }
+        } else {
+            len = BIO_read(bio, result, len);
+        }
+        result[len] = NUL;
+    }
+    BIO_free(bio);
+
+    return result;
+}
+
+static void parse_otherName_value(apr_pool_t *p, ASN1_TYPE *value,
+                                  const char *onf, apr_array_header_t **entries)
+{
+    const char *str;
+    int nid = onf ? OBJ_txt2nid(onf) : NID_undef;
+
+    if (!value || (nid == NID_undef) || !*entries)
+       return;
+
+    /* 
+     * Currently supported otherName forms (values for "onf"):
+     * "msUPN" (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3): Microsoft User Principal Name
+     * "id-on-dnsSRV" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7): SRVName, as specified in RFC 4985
+     */
+    if ((nid == NID_ms_upn) && (value->type == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) &&
+        (str = asn1_string_to_utf8(p, value->value.utf8string))) {
+        APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*entries, const char *) = str;
+    } else if (strEQ(onf, "id-on-dnsSRV") &&
+               (value->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) &&
+               (str = asn1_string_to_utf8(p, value->value.ia5string))) {
+        APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*entries, const char *) = str;
+    }
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Return an array of subjectAltName entries of type "type". If idx is -1,
+ * return all entries of the given type, otherwise return an array consisting
+ * of the n-th occurrence of that type only. Currently supported types:
+ * GEN_EMAIL (rfc822Name)
+ * GEN_DNS (dNSName)
+ * GEN_OTHERNAME (requires the otherName form ["onf"] argument to be supplied,
+ *                see parse_otherName_value for the currently supported forms)
+ */
+BOOL modssl_X509_getSAN(apr_pool_t *p, X509 *x509, int type, const char *onf,
+                        int idx, apr_array_header_t **entries)
+{
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names;
+    int nid = onf ? OBJ_txt2nid(onf) : NID_undef;
+
+    if (!x509 || (type < GEN_OTHERNAME) ||
+        ((type == GEN_OTHERNAME) && (nid == NID_undef)) ||
+        (type > GEN_RID) || (idx < -1) ||
+        !(*entries = apr_array_make(p, 0, sizeof(char *)))) {
+        *entries = NULL;
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if ((names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL))) {
+        int i, n = 0;
+        GENERAL_NAME *name;
+        const char *utf8str;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
+            name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
+
+            if (name->type != type)
+                continue;
+
+            switch (type) {
+            case GEN_EMAIL:
+            case GEN_DNS:
+                if (((idx == -1) || (n == idx)) &&
+                    (utf8str = asn1_string_to_utf8(p, name->d.ia5))) {
+                    APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*entries, const char *) = utf8str;
+                }
+                n++;
+                break;
+            case GEN_OTHERNAME:
+                if (OBJ_obj2nid(name->d.otherName->type_id) == nid) {
+                    if (((idx == -1) || (n == idx))) {
+                        parse_otherName_value(p, name->d.otherName->value,
+                                              onf, entries);
+                    }
+                    n++;
+                }
+                break;
+            default:
+                /*
+                 * Not implemented right now:
+                 * GEN_X400 (x400Address)
+                 * GEN_DIRNAME (directoryName)
+                 * GEN_EDIPARTY (ediPartyName)
+                 * GEN_URI (uniformResourceIdentifier)
+                 * GEN_IPADD (iPAddress)
+                 * GEN_RID (registeredID)
+                 */
+                break;
+            }
+
+            if ((idx != -1) && (n > idx))
+               break;
+        }
+
+        sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    }
+
+    return apr_is_empty_array(*entries) ? FALSE : TRUE;
+}
+
+/* return an array of (RFC 6125 coined) DNS-IDs and CN-IDs in a certificate */
+static BOOL getIDs(apr_pool_t *p, X509 *x509, apr_array_header_t **ids)
+{
+    X509_NAME *subj;
+    int i = -1;
+
+    /* First, the DNS-IDs (dNSName entries in the subjectAltName extension) */
+    if (!x509 ||
+        (modssl_X509_getSAN(p, x509, GEN_DNS, NULL, -1, ids) == FALSE && !*ids)) {
+        *ids = NULL;
+        return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* Second, the CN-IDs (commonName attributes in the subject DN) */
+    subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
+    while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
+        APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*ids, const char *) = 
+            modssl_X509_NAME_ENTRY_to_string(p, X509_NAME_get_entry(subj, i), 0);
+    }
+
+    return apr_is_empty_array(*ids) ? FALSE : TRUE;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Check if a certificate matches for a particular name, by iterating over its
+ * DNS-IDs and CN-IDs (RFC 6125), optionally with basic wildcard matching.
+ * If server_rec is non-NULL, some (debug/trace) logging is enabled.
+ */
+BOOL modssl_X509_match_name(apr_pool_t *p, X509 *x509, const char *name,
+                            BOOL allow_wildcard, server_rec *s)
+{
+    BOOL matched = FALSE;
+    apr_array_header_t *ids;
+
+    /*
+     * At some day in the future, this might be replaced with X509_check_host()
+     * (available in OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later), but two points should be noted:
+     * 1) wildcard matching in X509_check_host() might yield different
+     *    results (by default, it supports a broader set of patterns, e.g.
+     *    wildcards in non-initial positions);
+     * 2) we lose the option of logging each DNS- and CN-ID (until a match
+     *    is found).
+     */
+
+    if (getIDs(p, x509, &ids)) {
+        const char *cp;
+        int i;
+        char **id = (char **)ids->elts;
+        BOOL is_wildcard;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < ids->nelts; i++) {
+            if (!id[i])
+                continue;
+
+            /*
+             * Determine if it is a wildcard ID - we're restrictive
+             * in the sense that we require the wildcard character to be
+             * THE left-most label (i.e., the ID must start with "*.")
+             */
+            is_wildcard = (*id[i] == '*' && *(id[i]+1) == '.') ? TRUE : FALSE;
+
+            /*
+             * If the ID includes a wildcard character (and the caller is
+             * allowing wildcards), check if it matches for the left-most
+             * DNS label - i.e., the wildcard character is not allowed
+             * to match a dot. Otherwise, try a simple string compare.
+             */
+            if ((allow_wildcard == TRUE && is_wildcard == TRUE &&
+                 (cp = ap_strchr_c(name, '.')) && !strcasecmp(id[i]+1, cp)) ||
+                !strcasecmp(id[i], name)) {
+                matched = TRUE;
+            }
+
+            if (s) {
+                ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE3, 0, s,
+                             "[%s] modssl_X509_match_name: expecting name '%s', "
+                             "%smatched by ID '%s'",
+                             (mySrvConfig(s))->vhost_id, name,
+                             matched == TRUE ? "" : "NOT ", id[i]);
+            }
+
+            if (matched == TRUE) {
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+
+    }
+
+    if (s) {
+        ssl_log_xerror(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, p, s, x509,
+                       APLOGNO(02412) "[%s] Cert %s for name '%s'",
+                       (mySrvConfig(s))->vhost_id,
+                       matched == TRUE ? "matches" : "does not match",
+                       name);
+    }
+
+    return matched;
+}
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Custom (EC)DH parameter support
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+DH *ssl_dh_GetParamFromFile(const char *file)
+{
+    DH *dh = NULL;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    return (dh);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ECC
+EC_GROUP *ssl_ec_GetParamFromFile(const char *file)
+{
+    EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    group = PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    return (group);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Session Stuff
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+char *modssl_SSL_SESSION_id2sz(IDCONST unsigned char *id, int idlen,
+                               char *str, int strsize)
+{
+    if (idlen > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+        idlen = SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+        
+    /* We must ensure not to process more than what would fit in the
+     * destination buffer, including terminating NULL */
+    if (idlen > (strsize-1) / 2)
+        idlen = (strsize-1) / 2;
+
+    ap_bin2hex(id, idlen, str);
+
+    return str;
+}
+
+/*  _________________________________________________________________
+**
+**  Certificate/Key Stuff
+**  _________________________________________________________________
+*/
+
+apr_status_t modssl_read_cert(apr_pool_t *p, 
+                              const char *cert_pem, const char *key_pem,
+                              pem_password_cb *cb, void *ud,
+                              X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+    BIO *in;
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
+    apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS;
+
+    in = BIO_new_mem_buf(cert_pem, -1);
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        rv = APR_ENOMEM;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    
+    x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, cb, ud);
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        rv = APR_ENOENT;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    
+    BIO_free(in);
+    in = BIO_new_mem_buf(key_pem? key_pem : cert_pem, -1);
+    if (in == NULL) {
+        rv = APR_ENOMEM;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, cb, ud);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        rv = APR_ENOENT;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    
+cleanup:
+    if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
+        *pcert = x;
+        *pkey = key;
+    }
+    else {
+        *pcert = NULL;
+        *pkey = NULL;
+        if (x) X509_free(x);
+        if (key) EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+    }
+    if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+apr_status_t modssl_cert_get_pem(apr_pool_t *p,
+                                 X509 *cert1, X509 *cert2,
+                                 const char **ppem)
+{
+    apr_status_t rv = APR_ENOMEM;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) goto cleanup;
+    if (PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, cert1) != 1) goto cleanup;
+    if (cert2 && PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, cert2) != 1) goto cleanup;
+    rv = APR_SUCCESS;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+        *ppem = NULL;
+        if (bio) BIO_free(bio);
+    }
+    else {
+        *ppem = modssl_bio_free_read(p, bio);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}