Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2302 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..39a0f5014a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/netwerk/sctp/src/netinet/sctp_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2302 @@
+/*-
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2008, by Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Randall Stewart. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008-2012, by Michael Tuexen. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * a) Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * b) Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * c) Neither the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its
+ *    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ *    from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
+ * THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
+ * THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(__Userspace__)
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/sctp_os.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_header.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_pcb.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_var.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_sysctl.h>
+#include <netinet/sctputil.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_indata.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_output.h>
+#include <netinet/sctp_auth.h>
+
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG		(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1)
+#define SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG2	(SCTP_BASE_SYSCTL(sctp_debug_on) & SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2)
+#endif /* SCTP_DEBUG */
+
+void
+sctp_clear_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist)
+{
+	memset(chklist, 0, sizeof(*chklist));
+	/* chklist->num_chunks = 0; */
+}
+
+sctp_auth_chklist_t *
+sctp_alloc_chunklist(void)
+{
+	sctp_auth_chklist_t *chklist;
+
+	SCTP_MALLOC(chklist, sctp_auth_chklist_t *, sizeof(*chklist),
+		    SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
+	if (chklist == NULL) {
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "sctp_alloc_chunklist: failed to get memory!\n");
+	} else {
+		sctp_clear_chunklist(chklist);
+	}
+	return (chklist);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	if (list != NULL)
+		SCTP_FREE(list, SCTP_M_AUTH_CL);
+}
+
+sctp_auth_chklist_t *
+sctp_copy_chunklist(sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	sctp_auth_chklist_t *new_list;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/* get a new list */
+	new_list = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
+	if (new_list == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	/* copy it */
+	memcpy(new_list, list, sizeof(*new_list));
+
+	return (new_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add a chunk to the required chunks list
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_add_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* is chunk restricted? */
+	if ((chunk == SCTP_INITIATION) ||
+	    (chunk == SCTP_INITIATION_ACK) ||
+	    (chunk == SCTP_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) ||
+	    (chunk == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION)) {
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (list->chunks[chunk] == 0) {
+		list->chunks[chunk] = 1;
+		list->num_chunks++;
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP: added chunk %u (0x%02x) to Auth list\n",
+			chunk, chunk);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * delete a chunk from the required chunks list
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_delete_chunk(uint8_t chunk, sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (list->chunks[chunk] == 1) {
+		list->chunks[chunk] = 0;
+		list->num_chunks--;
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP: deleted chunk %u (0x%02x) from Auth list\n",
+			chunk, chunk);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+size_t
+sctp_auth_get_chklist_size(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	else
+		return (list->num_chunks);
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the current number and list of required chunks caller must
+ * guarantee ptr has space for up to 256 bytes
+ */
+int
+sctp_serialize_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	int i, count = 0;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+		if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+			*ptr++ = i;
+			count++;
+		}
+	}
+	return (count);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_pack_auth_chunks(const sctp_auth_chklist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	int i, size = 0;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (list->num_chunks <= 32) {
+		/* just list them, one byte each */
+		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+			if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+				*ptr++ = i;
+				size++;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		int index, offset;
+
+		/* pack into a 32 byte bitfield */
+		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+			if (list->chunks[i] != 0) {
+				index = i / 8;
+				offset = i % 8;
+				ptr[index] |= (1 << offset);
+			}
+		}
+		size = 32;
+	}
+	return (size);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_unpack_auth_chunks(const uint8_t *ptr, uint8_t num_chunks,
+    sctp_auth_chklist_t *list)
+{
+	int i;
+	int size;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (num_chunks <= 32) {
+		/* just pull them, one byte each */
+		for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+			(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(*ptr++, list);
+		}
+		size = num_chunks;
+	} else {
+		int index, offset;
+
+		/* unpack from a 32 byte bitfield */
+		for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+			for (offset = 0; offset < 8; offset++) {
+				if (ptr[index] & (1 << offset)) {
+					(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk((index * 8) + offset, list);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		size = 32;
+	}
+	return (size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate structure space for a key of length keylen
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_alloc_key(uint32_t keylen)
+{
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+	SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_key_t *, sizeof(*new_key) + keylen,
+		    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+	if (new_key == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	new_key->keylen = keylen;
+	return (new_key);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_key(sctp_key_t *key)
+{
+	if (key != NULL)
+		SCTP_FREE(key,SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_print_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
+		return;
+	}
+	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
+	if (key->keylen) {
+		for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
+			SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
+	} else {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+sctp_show_key(sctp_key_t *key, const char *str)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("%s: [Null key]\n", str);
+		return;
+	}
+	SCTP_PRINTF("%s: len %u, ", str, key->keylen);
+	if (key->keylen) {
+		for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
+			SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", key->key[i]);
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\n");
+	} else {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("[Null key]\n");
+	}
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+sctp_get_keylen(sctp_key_t *key)
+{
+	if (key != NULL)
+		return (key->keylen);
+	else
+		return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * generate a new random key of length 'keylen'
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_generate_random_key(uint32_t keylen)
+{
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+	if (new_key == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key, keylen);
+	new_key->keylen = keylen;
+	return (new_key);
+}
+
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_set_key(uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen)
+{
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+
+	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+	if (new_key == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(new_key->key, key, keylen);
+	return (new_key);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * given two keys of variable size, compute which key is "larger/smaller"
+ * returns:  1 if key1 > key2
+ *          -1 if key1 < key2
+ *           0 if key1 = key2
+ */
+static int
+sctp_compare_key(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2)
+{
+	uint32_t maxlen;
+	uint32_t i;
+	uint32_t key1len, key2len;
+	uint8_t *key_1, *key_2;
+	uint8_t val1, val2;
+
+	/* sanity/length check */
+	key1len = sctp_get_keylen(key1);
+	key2len = sctp_get_keylen(key2);
+	if ((key1len == 0) && (key2len == 0))
+		return (0);
+	else if (key1len == 0)
+		return (-1);
+	else if (key2len == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	if (key1len < key2len) {
+		maxlen = key2len;
+	} else {
+		maxlen = key1len;
+	}
+	key_1 = key1->key;
+	key_2 = key2->key;
+	/* check for numeric equality */
+	for (i = 0; i < maxlen; i++) {
+		/* left-pad with zeros */
+		val1 = (i < (maxlen - key1len)) ? 0 : *(key_1++);
+		val2 = (i < (maxlen - key2len)) ? 0 : *(key_2++);
+		if (val1 > val2) {
+			return (1);
+		} else if (val1 < val2) {
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+	/* keys are equal value, so check lengths */
+	if (key1len == key2len)
+		return (0);
+	else if (key1len < key2len)
+		return (-1);
+	else
+		return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * generate the concatenated keying material based on the two keys and the
+ * shared key (if available). draft-ietf-tsvwg-auth specifies the specific
+ * order for concatenation
+ */
+sctp_key_t *
+sctp_compute_hashkey(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2, sctp_key_t *shared)
+{
+	uint32_t keylen;
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+	uint8_t *key_ptr;
+
+	keylen = sctp_get_keylen(key1) + sctp_get_keylen(key2) +
+	    sctp_get_keylen(shared);
+
+	if (keylen > 0) {
+		/* get space for the new key */
+		new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+		if (new_key == NULL) {
+			/* out of memory */
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		new_key->keylen = keylen;
+		key_ptr = new_key->key;
+	} else {
+		/* all keys empty/null?! */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* concatenate the keys */
+	if (sctp_compare_key(key1, key2) <= 0) {
+		/* key is shared + key1 + key2 */
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, shared->key, shared->keylen);
+			key_ptr += shared->keylen;
+		}
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, key1->key, key1->keylen);
+			key_ptr += key1->keylen;
+		}
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, key2->key, key2->keylen);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* key is shared + key2 + key1 */
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(shared)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, shared->key, shared->keylen);
+			key_ptr += shared->keylen;
+		}
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(key2)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, key2->key, key2->keylen);
+			key_ptr += key2->keylen;
+		}
+		if (sctp_get_keylen(key1)) {
+			memcpy(key_ptr, key1->key, key1->keylen);
+		}
+	}
+	return (new_key);
+}
+
+sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_alloc_sharedkey(void)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *new_key;
+
+	SCTP_MALLOC(new_key, sctp_sharedkey_t *, sizeof(*new_key),
+		    SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+	if (new_key == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	new_key->keyid = 0;
+	new_key->key = NULL;
+	new_key->refcount = 1;
+	new_key->deactivated = 0;
+	return (new_key);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_sharedkey(sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
+{
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (SCTP_DECREMENT_AND_CHECK_REFCOUNT(&skey->refcount)) {
+		if (skey->key != NULL)
+			sctp_free_key(skey->key);
+		SCTP_FREE(skey, SCTP_M_AUTH_KY);
+	}
+}
+
+sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_find_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys, uint16_t key_id)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
+		if (skey->keyid == key_id)
+			return (skey);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_insert_sharedkey(struct sctp_keyhead *shared_keys,
+		      sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	if ((shared_keys == NULL) || (new_skey == NULL))
+		return (EINVAL);
+
+	/* insert into an empty list? */
+	if (LIST_EMPTY(shared_keys)) {
+		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(shared_keys, new_skey, next);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* insert into the existing list, ordered by key id */
+	LIST_FOREACH(skey, shared_keys, next) {
+		if (new_skey->keyid < skey->keyid) {
+			/* insert it before here */
+			LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
+			return (0);
+		} else if (new_skey->keyid == skey->keyid) {
+			/* replace the existing key */
+			/* verify this key *can* be replaced */
+			if ((skey->deactivated) || (skey->refcount > 1)) {
+				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+					"can't replace shared key id %u\n",
+					new_skey->keyid);
+				return (EBUSY);
+			}
+			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+				"replacing shared key id %u\n",
+				new_skey->keyid);
+			LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(skey, new_skey, next);
+			LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+			sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (LIST_NEXT(skey, next) == NULL) {
+			/* belongs at the end of the list */
+			LIST_INSERT_AFTER(skey, new_skey, next);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	/* shouldn't reach here */
+	return (EINVAL);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_auth_key_acquire(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	/* find the shared key */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
+
+	/* bump the ref count */
+	if (skey) {
+		atomic_add_int(&skey->refcount, 1);
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+			"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount acquire to %d\n",
+			__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+sctp_auth_key_release(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t key_id, int so_locked)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	/* find the shared key */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, key_id);
+
+	/* decrement the ref count */
+	if (skey) {
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+			"%s: stcb %p key %u refcount release to %d\n",
+			__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+
+		/* see if a notification should be generated */
+		if ((skey->refcount <= 2) && (skey->deactivated)) {
+			/* notify ULP that key is no longer used */
+			sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb,
+					key_id, 0, so_locked);
+			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH2,
+				"%s: stcb %p key %u no longer used, %d\n",
+				__func__, (void *)stcb, key_id, skey->refcount);
+		}
+		sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);
+	}
+}
+
+static sctp_sharedkey_t *
+sctp_copy_sharedkey(const sctp_sharedkey_t *skey)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *new_skey;
+
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	new_skey = sctp_alloc_sharedkey();
+	if (new_skey == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	if (skey->key != NULL)
+		new_skey->key = sctp_set_key(skey->key->key, skey->key->keylen);
+	else
+		new_skey->key = NULL;
+	new_skey->keyid = skey->keyid;
+	return (new_skey);
+}
+
+int
+sctp_copy_skeylist(const struct sctp_keyhead *src, struct sctp_keyhead *dest)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey, *new_skey;
+	int count = 0;
+
+	if ((src == NULL) || (dest == NULL))
+		return (0);
+	LIST_FOREACH(skey, src, next) {
+		new_skey = sctp_copy_sharedkey(skey);
+		if (new_skey != NULL) {
+			if (sctp_insert_sharedkey(dest, new_skey)) {
+				sctp_free_sharedkey(new_skey);
+			} else {
+				count++;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return (count);
+}
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_alloc_hmaclist(uint16_t num_hmacs)
+{
+	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+	int alloc_size;
+
+	alloc_size = sizeof(*new_list) + num_hmacs * sizeof(new_list->hmac[0]);
+	SCTP_MALLOC(new_list, sctp_hmaclist_t *, alloc_size,
+		    SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
+	if (new_list == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	new_list->max_algo = num_hmacs;
+	new_list->num_algo = 0;
+	return (new_list);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
+{
+	if (list != NULL) {
+		SCTP_FREE(list,SCTP_M_AUTH_HL);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sctp_auth_add_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t hmac_id)
+{
+	int i;
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if (list->num_algo == list->max_algo) {
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP: HMAC id list full, ignoring add %u\n", hmac_id);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	if ((hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) &&
+	    (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256)) {
+#else
+	if (hmac_id != SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+#endif
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	/* Now is it already in the list */
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
+		if (list->hmac[i] == hmac_id) {
+			/* already in list */
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "SCTP: add HMAC id %u to list\n", hmac_id);
+	list->hmac[list->num_algo++] = hmac_id;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_copy_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list)
+{
+	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+	int i;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	/* get a new list */
+	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(list->max_algo);
+	if (new_list == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	/* copy it */
+	new_list->max_algo = list->max_algo;
+	new_list->num_algo = list->num_algo;
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
+		new_list->hmac[i] = list->hmac[i];
+	return (new_list);
+}
+
+sctp_hmaclist_t *
+sctp_default_supported_hmaclist(void)
+{
+	sctp_hmaclist_t *new_list;
+
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(2);
+#else
+	new_list = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(1);
+#endif
+	if (new_list == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	/* We prefer SHA256, so list it first */
+	(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256);
+#endif
+	(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(new_list, SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1);
+	return (new_list);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * HMAC algos are listed in priority/preference order
+ * find the best HMAC id to use for the peer based on local support
+ */
+uint16_t
+sctp_negotiate_hmacid(sctp_hmaclist_t *peer, sctp_hmaclist_t *local)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	if ((local == NULL) || (peer == NULL))
+		return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < peer->num_algo; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < local->num_algo; j++) {
+			if (peer->hmac[i] == local->hmac[j]) {
+				/* found the "best" one */
+				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+					"SCTP: negotiated peer HMAC id %u\n",
+					peer->hmac[i]);
+				return (peer->hmac[i]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/* didn't find one! */
+	return (SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * serialize the HMAC algo list and return space used
+ * caller must guarantee ptr has appropriate space
+ */
+int
+sctp_serialize_hmaclist(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+	int i;
+	uint16_t hmac_id;
+
+	if (list == NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++) {
+		hmac_id = htons(list->hmac[i]);
+		memcpy(ptr, &hmac_id, sizeof(hmac_id));
+		ptr += sizeof(hmac_id);
+	}
+	return (list->num_algo * sizeof(hmac_id));
+}
+
+int
+sctp_verify_hmac_param (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs, uint32_t num_hmacs)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
+		if (ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]) == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) {
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+sctp_authinfo_t *
+sctp_alloc_authinfo(void)
+{
+	sctp_authinfo_t *new_authinfo;
+
+	SCTP_MALLOC(new_authinfo, sctp_authinfo_t *, sizeof(*new_authinfo),
+		    SCTP_M_AUTH_IF);
+
+	if (new_authinfo == NULL) {
+		/* out of memory */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memset(new_authinfo, 0, sizeof(*new_authinfo));
+	return (new_authinfo);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_free_authinfo(sctp_authinfo_t *authinfo)
+{
+	if (authinfo == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (authinfo->random != NULL)
+		sctp_free_key(authinfo->random);
+	if (authinfo->peer_random != NULL)
+		sctp_free_key(authinfo->peer_random);
+	if (authinfo->assoc_key != NULL)
+		sctp_free_key(authinfo->assoc_key);
+	if (authinfo->recv_key != NULL)
+		sctp_free_key(authinfo->recv_key);
+
+	/* We are NOT dynamically allocating authinfo's right now... */
+	/* SCTP_FREE(authinfo, SCTP_M_AUTH_??); */
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sctp_get_auth_chunk_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+	int size;
+
+	size = sizeof(struct sctp_auth_chunk) + sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+	return (SCTP_SIZE32(size));
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+	switch (hmac_algo) {
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+		return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA1);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+		return (SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256);
+#endif
+	default:
+		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+		return (0);
+	} /* end switch */
+}
+
+static inline int
+sctp_get_hmac_block_len(uint16_t hmac_algo)
+{
+	switch (hmac_algo) {
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+		return (64);
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+		return (64);
+#endif
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+	default:
+		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+		return (0);
+	} /* end switch */
+}
+
+#if defined(__Userspace__)
+/* __Userspace__ SHA1_Init is defined in libcrypto.a (libssl-dev on Ubuntu) */
+#endif
+static void
+sctp_hmac_init(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx)
+{
+	switch (hmac_algo) {
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+		SCTP_SHA1_INIT(&ctx->sha1);
+		break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+		SCTP_SHA256_INIT(&ctx->sha256);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+	default:
+		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+		return;
+	} /* end switch */
+}
+
+static void
+sctp_hmac_update(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
+    uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen)
+{
+	switch (hmac_algo) {
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+		SCTP_SHA1_UPDATE(&ctx->sha1, text, textlen);
+		break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+		SCTP_SHA256_UPDATE(&ctx->sha256, text, textlen);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+	default:
+		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+		return;
+	} /* end switch */
+}
+
+static void
+sctp_hmac_final(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_hash_context_t *ctx,
+    uint8_t *digest)
+{
+	switch (hmac_algo) {
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1:
+		SCTP_SHA1_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha1);
+		break;
+#if defined(SCTP_SUPPORT_HMAC_SHA256)
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA256:
+		SCTP_SHA256_FINAL(digest, &ctx->sha256);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD:
+	default:
+		/* unknown HMAC algorithm: can't do anything */
+		return;
+	} /* end switch */
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication: FIPS 198 (RFC 2104)
+ *
+ * Compute the HMAC digest using the desired hash key, text, and HMAC
+ * algorithm.  Resulting digest is placed in 'digest' and digest length
+ * is returned, if the HMAC was performed.
+ *
+ * WARNING: it is up to the caller to supply sufficient space to hold the
+ * resultant digest.
+ */
+uint32_t
+sctp_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
+    uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	uint32_t blocklen;
+	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+	uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
+	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	/* sanity check the material and length */
+	if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (text == NULL) ||
+	    (textlen == 0) || (digest == NULL)) {
+		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (digestlen == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (keylen > blocklen) {
+		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
+		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+		/* set the hashed key as the key */
+		keylen = digestlen;
+		key = temp;
+	}
+	/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
+	memset(ipad, 0, blocklen);
+	memset(opad, 0, blocklen);
+	memcpy(ipad, key, keylen);
+	memcpy(opad, key, keylen);
+
+	/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
+	for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
+		ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+		opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+	}
+
+	/* perform inner hash */
+	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, text, textlen);
+	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+
+	/* perform outer hash */
+	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
+	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
+
+	return (digestlen);
+}
+
+/* mbuf version */
+uint32_t
+sctp_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, uint8_t *key, uint32_t keylen,
+    struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest, uint32_t trailer)
+{
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	uint32_t blocklen;
+	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+	uint8_t ipad[128], opad[128];	/* keyed hash inner/outer pads */
+	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+	uint32_t i;
+	struct mbuf *m_tmp;
+
+	/* sanity check the material and length */
+	if ((key == NULL) || (keylen == 0) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
+		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (digestlen == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (keylen > blocklen) {
+		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key, keylen);
+		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+		/* set the hashed key as the key */
+		keylen = digestlen;
+		key = temp;
+	}
+	/* initialize the inner/outer pads with the key and "append" zeroes */
+	memset(ipad, 0, blocklen);
+	memset(opad, 0, blocklen);
+	memcpy(ipad, key, keylen);
+	memcpy(opad, key, keylen);
+
+	/* XOR the key with ipad and opad values */
+	for (i = 0; i < blocklen; i++) {
+		ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+		opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+	}
+
+	/* perform inner hash */
+	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, ipad, blocklen);
+	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start of text) */
+	m_tmp = m;
+	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+	}
+	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain for the text */
+	while (m_tmp != NULL) {
+		if ((SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp) == NULL) && trailer) {
+			sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
+					 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - (trailer+m_offset));
+		} else {
+			sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset,
+					 SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
+		}
+
+		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
+		m_offset = 0;
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+	}
+	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+
+	/* perform outer hash */
+	sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, opad, blocklen);
+	sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp, digestlen);
+	sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, digest);
+
+	return (digestlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * computes the requested HMAC using a key struct (which may be modified if
+ * the keylen exceeds the HMAC block len).
+ */
+uint32_t
+sctp_compute_hmac(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, uint8_t *text,
+    uint32_t textlen, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	uint32_t blocklen;
+	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+	/* sanity check */
+	if ((key == NULL) || (text == NULL) || (textlen == 0) ||
+	    (digest == NULL)) {
+		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (digestlen == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
+		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
+		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+		/* save the hashed key as the new key */
+		key->keylen = digestlen;
+		memcpy(key->key, temp, key->keylen);
+	}
+	return (sctp_hmac(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, text, textlen,
+	    digest));
+}
+
+/* mbuf version */
+uint32_t
+sctp_compute_hmac_m(uint16_t hmac_algo, sctp_key_t *key, struct mbuf *m,
+    uint32_t m_offset, uint8_t *digest)
+{
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	uint32_t blocklen;
+	sctp_hash_context_t ctx;
+	uint8_t temp[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+	/* sanity check */
+	if ((key == NULL) || (m == NULL) || (digest == NULL)) {
+		/* can't do HMAC with empty key or text or digest store */
+		return (0);
+	}
+	/* validate the hmac algo and get the digest length */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (digestlen == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	/* hash the key if it is longer than the hash block size */
+	blocklen = sctp_get_hmac_block_len(hmac_algo);
+	if (key->keylen > blocklen) {
+		sctp_hmac_init(hmac_algo, &ctx);
+		sctp_hmac_update(hmac_algo, &ctx, key->key, key->keylen);
+		sctp_hmac_final(hmac_algo, &ctx, temp);
+		/* save the hashed key as the new key */
+		key->keylen = digestlen;
+		memcpy(key->key, temp, key->keylen);
+	}
+	return (sctp_hmac_m(hmac_algo, key->key, key->keylen, m, m_offset, digest, 0));
+}
+
+int
+sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(sctp_hmaclist_t *list, uint16_t id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if ((list == NULL) || (id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_RSVD))
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_algo; i++)
+		if (list->hmac[i] == id)
+			return (1);
+
+	/* not in the list */
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id on an association.
+ * the cached key(s) will be recomputed and re-cached at next use.
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+void
+sctp_clear_cachedkeys(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	if (stcb == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) {
+		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key = NULL;
+	}
+	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid) {
+		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/*-
+ * clear any cached key(s) if they match the given key id for all assocs on
+ * an endpoint.
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+void
+sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	struct sctp_tcb *stcb;
+
+	if (inp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* clear the cached keys on all assocs on this instance */
+	LIST_FOREACH(stcb, &inp->sctp_asoc_list, sctp_tcblist) {
+		SCTP_TCB_LOCK(stcb);
+		sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
+		SCTP_TCB_UNLOCK(stcb);
+	}
+}
+
+/*-
+ * delete a shared key from an association
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_delete_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	if (stcb == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
+	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* does the key exist? */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
+	if (skey->refcount > 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* remove it */
+	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
+
+	/* clear any cached keys */
+	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, keyid);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deletes a shared key from the endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_delete_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	if (inp == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
+	if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* does the key exist? */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
+
+	/* remove it */
+	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
+
+	/* clear any cached keys */
+	sctp_clear_cachedkeys_ep(inp, keyid);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * set the active key on an association
+ * ASSUMES TCB_LOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_setactivekey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey = NULL;
+
+	/* find the key on the assoc */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL) {
+		/* that key doesn't exist */
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if ((skey->deactivated) && (skey->refcount > 1)) {
+		/* can't reactivate a deactivated key with other refcounts */
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* set the (new) active key */
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = keyid;
+	/* reset the deactivated flag */
+	skey->deactivated = 0;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * set the active key on an endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_auth_setactivekey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	/* find the key */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL) {
+		/* that key doesn't exist */
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid = keyid;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deactivates a shared key from the association
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_deact_sharedkey(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	if (stcb == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* is the keyid the assoc active sending key */
+	if (keyid == stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* does the key exist? */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* are there other refcount holders on the key? */
+	if (skey->refcount == 1) {
+		/* no other users, send a notification for this key */
+		sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_FREE_KEY, stcb, keyid, 0,
+				SCTP_SO_LOCKED);
+	}
+
+	/* mark the key as deactivated */
+	skey->deactivated = 1;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * deactivates a shared key from the endpoint
+ * ASSUMES INP_WLOCK is already held
+ */
+int
+sctp_deact_sharedkey_ep(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+
+	if (inp == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* is the keyid the active sending key on the endpoint */
+	if (keyid == inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* does the key exist? */
+	skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys, keyid);
+	if (skey == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* endpoint keys are not refcounted */
+
+	/* remove it */
+	LIST_REMOVE(skey, next);
+	sctp_free_sharedkey(skey);	/* frees skey->key as well */
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get local authentication parameters from cookie (from INIT-ACK)
+ */
+void
+sctp_auth_get_cookie_params(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct mbuf *m,
+    uint32_t offset, uint32_t length)
+{
+	struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, tmp_param;
+	uint16_t plen, ptype;
+	uint8_t random_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+	struct sctp_auth_random *p_random = NULL;
+	uint16_t random_len = 0;
+	uint8_t hmacs_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+	struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs = NULL;
+	uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
+	uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+	struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks = NULL;
+	uint16_t num_chunks = 0;
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+	uint32_t keylen;
+
+	/* convert to upper bound */
+	length += offset;
+
+	phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset,
+	    sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr), (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
+	while (phdr != NULL) {
+		ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
+		plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
+
+		if ((plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) ||
+		    (offset + plen > length))
+			break;
+
+		if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
+			if (plen > sizeof(random_store))
+				break;
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)random_store, plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL)
+				return;
+			/* save the random and length for the key */
+			p_random = (struct sctp_auth_random *)phdr;
+			random_len = plen - sizeof(*p_random);
+		} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
+			uint16_t num_hmacs;
+			uint16_t i;
+
+			if (plen > sizeof(hmacs_store))
+				break;
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)hmacs_store, plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL)
+				return;
+			/* save the hmacs list and num for the key */
+			hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
+			hmacs_len = plen - sizeof(*hmacs);
+			num_hmacs = hmacs_len / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
+			if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL)
+				sctp_free_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
+			stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_alloc_hmaclist(num_hmacs);
+			if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
+				for (i = 0; i < num_hmacs; i++) {
+					(void)sctp_auth_add_hmacid(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
+					    ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]));
+				}
+			}
+		} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
+			int i;
+
+			if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store))
+				break;
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+			    (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store, plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL)
+				return;
+			chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
+			num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
+			/* save chunks list and num for the key */
+			if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL)
+				sctp_clear_chunklist(stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
+			else
+				stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks = sctp_alloc_chunklist();
+			for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+				(void)sctp_auth_add_chunk(chunks->chunk_types[i],
+				    stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks);
+			}
+		}
+		/* get next parameter */
+		offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
+		if (offset + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) > length)
+			break;
+		phdr = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)sctp_m_getptr(m, offset, sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr),
+		    (uint8_t *)&tmp_param);
+	}
+	/* concatenate the full random key */
+	keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len + sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len;
+	if (chunks != NULL) {
+		keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
+	}
+	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+	if (new_key != NULL) {
+		/* copy in the RANDOM */
+		if (p_random != NULL) {
+			keylen = sizeof(*p_random) + random_len;
+			memcpy(new_key->key, p_random, keylen);
+		} else {
+			keylen = 0;
+		}
+		/* append in the AUTH chunks */
+		if (chunks != NULL) {
+			memcpy(new_key->key + keylen, chunks,
+			       sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks);
+			keylen += sizeof(*chunks) + num_chunks;
+		}
+		/* append in the HMACs */
+		if (hmacs != NULL) {
+			memcpy(new_key->key + keylen, hmacs,
+			       sizeof(*hmacs) + hmacs_len);
+		}
+	}
+	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
+		sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
+	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
+	sctp_clear_cachedkeys(stcb, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
+
+	/* negotiate what HMAC to use for the peer */
+	stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id = sctp_negotiate_hmacid(stcb->asoc.peer_hmacs,
+	    stcb->asoc.local_hmacs);
+
+	/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
+	/* FIX ME: put in cookie? */
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
+	/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
+	(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
+				 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
+}
+
+/*
+ * compute and fill in the HMAC digest for a packet
+ */
+void
+sctp_fill_hmac_digest_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t auth_offset,
+    struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth, struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+	sctp_key_t *key;
+
+	if ((stcb == NULL) || (auth == NULL))
+		return;
+
+	/* zero the digest + chunk padding */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id);
+	memset(auth->hmac, 0, SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
+
+	/* is the desired key cached? */
+	if ((keyid != stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid) ||
+	    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key == NULL)) {
+		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key != NULL) {
+			/* free the old cached key */
+			sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key);
+		}
+		skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys, keyid);
+		/* the only way skey is NULL is if null key id 0 is used */
+		if (skey != NULL)
+			key = skey->key;
+		else
+			key = NULL;
+		/* compute a new assoc key and cache it */
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key =
+		    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
+					 stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, key);
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid = keyid;
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1, "caching key id %u\n",
+			stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_keyid);
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+		if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
+			sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
+				       "Assoc Key");
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* set in the active key id */
+	auth->shared_key_id = htons(keyid);
+
+	/* compute and fill in the digest */
+	(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(stcb->asoc.peer_hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.assoc_key,
+				  m, auth_offset, auth->hmac);
+}
+
+static void
+sctp_zero_m(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t m_offset, uint32_t size)
+{
+	struct mbuf *m_tmp;
+	uint8_t *data;
+
+	/* sanity check */
+	if (m == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* find the correct starting mbuf and offset (get start position) */
+	m_tmp = m;
+	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (m_offset >= (uint32_t) SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp))) {
+		m_offset -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp);
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+	}
+	/* now use the rest of the mbuf chain */
+	while ((m_tmp != NULL) && (size > 0)) {
+		data = mtod(m_tmp, uint8_t *) + m_offset;
+		if (size > (uint32_t)(SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset)) {
+			memset(data, 0, SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset);
+			size -= SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_tmp) - m_offset;
+		} else {
+			memset(data, 0, size);
+			size = 0;
+		}
+		/* clear the offset since it's only for the first mbuf */
+		m_offset = 0;
+		m_tmp = SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_tmp);
+	}
+}
+
+/*-
+ * process the incoming Authentication chunk
+ * return codes:
+ *   -1 on any authentication error
+ *    0 on authentication verification
+ */
+int
+sctp_handle_auth(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, struct sctp_auth_chunk *auth,
+    struct mbuf *m, uint32_t offset)
+{
+	uint16_t chunklen;
+	uint16_t shared_key_id;
+	uint16_t hmac_id;
+	sctp_sharedkey_t *skey;
+	uint32_t digestlen;
+	uint8_t digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+	uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+	/* auth is checked for NULL by caller */
+	chunklen = ntohs(auth->ch.chunk_length);
+	if (chunklen < sizeof(*auth)) {
+		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauth);
+
+	/* get the auth params */
+	shared_key_id = ntohs(auth->shared_key_id);
+	hmac_id = ntohs(auth->hmac_id);
+	SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+		"SCTP AUTH Chunk: shared key %u, HMAC id %u\n",
+		shared_key_id, hmac_id);
+
+#if defined(__Userspace__) && defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
+	return (0);
+#endif
+	/* is the indicated HMAC supported? */
+	if (!sctp_auth_is_supported_hmac(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs, hmac_id)) {
+		struct mbuf *op_err;
+		struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac *cause;
+
+		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalhmacid);
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP Auth: unsupported HMAC id %u\n",
+			hmac_id);
+		/*
+		 * report this in an Error Chunk: Unsupported HMAC
+		 * Identifier
+		 */
+		op_err = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac),
+		                               0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
+		if (op_err != NULL) {
+			/* pre-reserve some space */
+			SCTP_BUF_RESV_UF(op_err, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr));
+			/* fill in the error */
+			cause = mtod(op_err, struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac *);
+			cause->cause.code = htons(SCTP_CAUSE_UNSUPPORTED_HMACID);
+			cause->cause.length = htons(sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac));
+			cause->hmac_id = ntohs(hmac_id);
+			SCTP_BUF_LEN(op_err) = sizeof(struct sctp_error_auth_invalid_hmac);
+			/* queue it */
+			sctp_queue_op_err(stcb, op_err);
+		}
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	/* get the indicated shared key, if available */
+	if ((stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key == NULL) ||
+	    (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)) {
+		/* find the shared key on the assoc first */
+		skey = sctp_find_sharedkey(&stcb->asoc.shared_keys,
+					   shared_key_id);
+		/* if the shared key isn't found, discard the chunk */
+		if (skey == NULL) {
+			SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvivalkeyid);
+			SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+				"SCTP Auth: unknown key id %u\n",
+				shared_key_id);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* generate a notification if this is a new key id */
+		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid != shared_key_id)
+			/*
+			 * sctp_ulp_notify(SCTP_NOTIFY_AUTH_NEW_KEY, stcb,
+			 * shared_key_id, (void
+			 * *)stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid);
+			 */
+			sctp_notify_authentication(stcb, SCTP_AUTH_NEW_KEY,
+			    shared_key_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid,
+			    SCTP_SO_NOT_LOCKED);
+		/* compute a new recv assoc key and cache it */
+		if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key != NULL)
+			sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key);
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key =
+		    sctp_compute_hashkey(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random,
+		    stcb->asoc.authinfo.peer_random, skey->key);
+		stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_keyid = shared_key_id;
+#ifdef SCTP_DEBUG
+		if (SCTP_AUTH_DEBUG)
+			sctp_print_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key, "Recv Key");
+#endif
+	}
+	/* validate the digest length */
+	digestlen = sctp_get_hmac_digest_len(hmac_id);
+	if (chunklen < (sizeof(*auth) + digestlen)) {
+		/* invalid digest length */
+		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP Auth: chunk too short for HMAC\n");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	/* save a copy of the digest, zero the pseudo header, and validate */
+	memcpy(digest, auth->hmac, digestlen);
+	sctp_zero_m(m, offset + sizeof(*auth), SCTP_SIZE32(digestlen));
+	(void)sctp_compute_hmac_m(hmac_id, stcb->asoc.authinfo.recv_key,
+	    m, offset, computed_digest);
+
+	/* compare the computed digest with the one in the AUTH chunk */
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
+		SCTP_STAT_INCR(sctps_recvauthfailed);
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP Auth: HMAC digest check failed\n");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate NOTIFICATION
+ */
+void
+sctp_notify_authentication(struct sctp_tcb *stcb, uint32_t indication,
+			   uint16_t keyid, uint16_t alt_keyid, int so_locked)
+{
+	struct mbuf *m_notify;
+	struct sctp_authkey_event *auth;
+	struct sctp_queued_to_read *control;
+
+	if ((stcb == NULL) ||
+	   (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_GONE) ||
+	   (stcb->sctp_ep->sctp_flags & SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_SOCKET_ALLGONE) ||
+	   (stcb->asoc.state & SCTP_STATE_CLOSED_SOCKET)
+		) {
+		/* If the socket is gone we are out of here */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (sctp_stcb_is_feature_off(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, SCTP_PCB_FLAGS_AUTHEVNT))
+		/* event not enabled */
+		return;
+
+	m_notify = sctp_get_mbuf_for_msg(sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event),
+					  0, M_NOWAIT, 1, MT_HEADER);
+	if (m_notify == NULL)
+		/* no space left */
+		return;
+
+	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = 0;
+	auth = mtod(m_notify, struct sctp_authkey_event *);
+	memset(auth, 0, sizeof(struct sctp_authkey_event));
+	auth->auth_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT;
+	auth->auth_flags = 0;
+	auth->auth_length = sizeof(*auth);
+	auth->auth_keynumber = keyid;
+	auth->auth_altkeynumber = alt_keyid;
+	auth->auth_indication = indication;
+	auth->auth_assoc_id = sctp_get_associd(stcb);
+
+	SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify) = sizeof(*auth);
+	SCTP_BUF_NEXT(m_notify) = NULL;
+
+	/* append to socket */
+	control = sctp_build_readq_entry(stcb, stcb->asoc.primary_destination,
+	    0, 0, stcb->asoc.context, 0, 0, 0, m_notify);
+	if (control == NULL) {
+		/* no memory */
+		sctp_m_freem(m_notify);
+		return;
+	}
+	control->length = SCTP_BUF_LEN(m_notify);
+	control->spec_flags = M_NOTIFICATION;
+	/* not that we need this */
+	control->tail_mbuf = m_notify;
+	sctp_add_to_readq(stcb->sctp_ep, stcb, control,
+	    &stcb->sctp_socket->so_rcv, 1, SCTP_READ_LOCK_NOT_HELD, so_locked);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * validates the AUTHentication related parameters in an INIT/INIT-ACK
+ * Note: currently only used for INIT as INIT-ACK is handled inline
+ * with sctp_load_addresses_from_init()
+ */
+int
+sctp_validate_init_auth_params(struct mbuf *m, int offset, int limit)
+{
+	struct sctp_paramhdr *phdr, param_buf;
+	uint16_t ptype, plen;
+	int peer_supports_asconf = 0;
+	int peer_supports_auth = 0;
+	int got_random = 0, got_hmacs = 0, got_chklist = 0;
+	uint8_t saw_asconf = 0;
+	uint8_t saw_asconf_ack = 0;
+
+	/* go through each of the params. */
+	phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &param_buf, sizeof(param_buf));
+	while (phdr) {
+		ptype = ntohs(phdr->param_type);
+		plen = ntohs(phdr->param_length);
+
+		if (offset + plen > limit) {
+			break;
+		}
+		if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ptype == SCTP_SUPPORTED_CHUNK_EXT) {
+			/* A supported extension chunk */
+			struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *pr_supported;
+			uint8_t local_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
+			int num_ent, i;
+
+			if (plen > sizeof(local_store)) {
+				break;
+			}
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+			                           (struct sctp_paramhdr *)&local_store,
+			                           plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL) {
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			pr_supported = (struct sctp_supported_chunk_types_param *)phdr;
+			num_ent = plen - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
+			for (i = 0; i < num_ent; i++) {
+				switch (pr_supported->chunk_types[i]) {
+				case SCTP_ASCONF:
+				case SCTP_ASCONF_ACK:
+					peer_supports_asconf = 1;
+					break;
+				default:
+					/* one we don't care about */
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		} else if (ptype == SCTP_RANDOM) {
+			/* enforce the random length */
+			if (plen != (sizeof(struct sctp_auth_random) +
+				     SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_REQUIRED)) {
+				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+					"SCTP: invalid RANDOM len\n");
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			got_random = 1;
+		} else if (ptype == SCTP_HMAC_LIST) {
+			struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *hmacs;
+			uint8_t store[SCTP_PARAM_BUFFER_SIZE];
+			int num_hmacs;
+
+			if (plen > sizeof(store)) {
+				break;
+			}
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+			                           (struct sctp_paramhdr *)store,
+			                           plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL) {
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			hmacs = (struct sctp_auth_hmac_algo *)phdr;
+			num_hmacs = (plen - sizeof(*hmacs)) / sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]);
+			/* validate the hmac list */
+			if (sctp_verify_hmac_param(hmacs, num_hmacs)) {
+				SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+					"SCTP: invalid HMAC param\n");
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			got_hmacs = 1;
+		} else if (ptype == SCTP_CHUNK_LIST) {
+			struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *chunks;
+			uint8_t chunks_store[SCTP_SMALL_CHUNK_STORE];
+			int i, num_chunks;
+
+			if (plen > sizeof(chunks_store)) {
+				break;
+			}
+			phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset,
+						   (struct sctp_paramhdr *)chunks_store,
+						   plen);
+			if (phdr == NULL) {
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			/*-
+			 * Flip through the list and mark that the
+			 * peer supports asconf/asconf_ack.
+			 */
+			chunks = (struct sctp_auth_chunk_list *)phdr;
+			num_chunks = plen - sizeof(*chunks);
+			for (i = 0; i < num_chunks; i++) {
+				/* record asconf/asconf-ack if listed */
+				if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF)
+					saw_asconf = 1;
+				if (chunks->chunk_types[i] == SCTP_ASCONF_ACK)
+					saw_asconf_ack = 1;
+			}
+			if (num_chunks)
+				got_chklist = 1;
+		}
+
+		offset += SCTP_SIZE32(plen);
+		if (offset >= limit) {
+			break;
+		}
+		phdr = sctp_get_next_param(m, offset, &param_buf,
+		    sizeof(param_buf));
+	}
+	/* validate authentication required parameters */
+	if (got_random && got_hmacs) {
+		peer_supports_auth = 1;
+	} else {
+		peer_supports_auth = 0;
+	}
+	if (!peer_supports_auth && got_chklist) {
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP: peer sent chunk list w/o AUTH\n");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (peer_supports_asconf && !peer_supports_auth) {
+		SCTPDBG(SCTP_DEBUG_AUTH1,
+			"SCTP: peer supports ASCONF but not AUTH\n");
+		return (-1);
+	} else if ((peer_supports_asconf) && (peer_supports_auth) &&
+		   ((saw_asconf == 0) || (saw_asconf_ack == 0))) {
+		return (-2);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+sctp_initialize_auth_params(struct sctp_inpcb *inp, struct sctp_tcb *stcb)
+{
+	uint16_t chunks_len = 0;
+	uint16_t hmacs_len = 0;
+	uint16_t random_len = SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+	sctp_key_t *new_key;
+	uint16_t keylen;
+
+	/* initialize hmac list from endpoint */
+	stcb->asoc.local_hmacs = sctp_copy_hmaclist(inp->sctp_ep.local_hmacs);
+	if (stcb->asoc.local_hmacs != NULL) {
+		hmacs_len = stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->num_algo *
+		    sizeof(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs->hmac[0]);
+	}
+	/* initialize auth chunks list from endpoint */
+	stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks =
+	    sctp_copy_chunklist(inp->sctp_ep.local_auth_chunks);
+	if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks != NULL) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+			if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
+				chunks_len++;
+		}
+	}
+	/* copy defaults from the endpoint */
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.active_keyid = inp->sctp_ep.default_keyid;
+
+	/* copy out the shared key list (by reference) from the endpoint */
+	(void)sctp_copy_skeylist(&inp->sctp_ep.shared_keys,
+				 &stcb->asoc.shared_keys);
+
+	/* now set the concatenated key (random + chunks + hmacs) */
+	/* key includes parameter headers */
+	keylen = (3 * sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + random_len + chunks_len +
+	    hmacs_len;
+	new_key = sctp_alloc_key(keylen);
+	if (new_key != NULL) {
+		struct sctp_paramhdr *ph;
+		int plen;
+		/* generate and copy in the RANDOM */
+		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)new_key->key;
+		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_RANDOM);
+		plen = sizeof(*ph) + random_len;
+		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+		SCTP_READ_RANDOM(new_key->key + sizeof(*ph), random_len);
+		keylen = plen;
+
+		/* append in the AUTH chunks */
+		/* NOTE: currently we always have chunks to list */
+		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
+		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_CHUNK_LIST);
+		plen = sizeof(*ph) + chunks_len;
+		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+		keylen += sizeof(*ph);
+		if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks) {
+			int i;
+			for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+				if (stcb->asoc.local_auth_chunks->chunks[i])
+					new_key->key[keylen++] = i;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* append in the HMACs */
+		ph = (struct sctp_paramhdr *)(new_key->key + keylen);
+		ph->param_type = htons(SCTP_HMAC_LIST);
+		plen = sizeof(*ph) + hmacs_len;
+		ph->param_length = htons(plen);
+		keylen += sizeof(*ph);
+		(void)sctp_serialize_hmaclist(stcb->asoc.local_hmacs,
+					new_key->key + keylen);
+	}
+	if (stcb->asoc.authinfo.random != NULL)
+	    sctp_free_key(stcb->asoc.authinfo.random);
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random = new_key;
+	stcb->asoc.authinfo.random_len = random_len;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef SCTP_HMAC_TEST
+/*
+ * HMAC and key concatenation tests
+ */
+static void
+sctp_print_digest(uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen, const char *str)
+{
+	uint32_t i;
+
+	SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s: 0x", str);
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < digestlen; i++)
+		SCTP_PRINTF("%02x", digest[i]);
+}
+
+static int
+sctp_test_hmac(const char *str, uint16_t hmac_id, uint8_t *key,
+    uint32_t keylen, uint8_t *text, uint32_t textlen,
+    uint8_t *digest, uint32_t digestlen)
+{
+	uint8_t computed_digest[SCTP_AUTH_DIGEST_LEN_MAX];
+
+	SCTP_PRINTF("\n%s:", str);
+	sctp_hmac(hmac_id, key, keylen, text, textlen, computed_digest);
+	sctp_print_digest(digest, digestlen, "Expected digest");
+	sctp_print_digest(computed_digest, digestlen, "Computed digest");
+	if (memcmp(digest, computed_digest, digestlen) != 0) {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
+		return (-1);
+	} else {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2202: HMAC-SHA1 test cases
+ */
+void
+sctp_test_hmac_sha1(void)
+{
+	uint8_t *digest;
+	uint8_t key[128];
+	uint32_t keylen;
+	uint8_t text[128];
+	uint32_t textlen;
+	uint32_t digestlen = 20;
+	int failed = 0;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     1
+	 * key =           0x0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b
+	 * key_len =       20
+	 * data =          "Hi There"
+	 * data_len =      8
+	 * digest =        0xb617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00
+	 */
+	keylen = 20;
+	memset(key, 0x0b, keylen);
+	textlen = 8;
+	strcpy(text, "Hi There");
+	digest = "\xb6\x17\x31\x86\x55\x05\x72\x64\xe2\x8b\xc0\xb6\xfb\x37\x8c\x8e\xf1\x46\xbe\x00";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 1", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     2
+	 * key =           "Jefe"
+	 * key_len =       4
+	 * data =          "what do ya want for nothing?"
+	 * data_len =      28
+	 * digest =        0xeffcdf6ae5eb2fa2d27416d5f184df9c259a7c79
+	 */
+	keylen = 4;
+	strcpy(key, "Jefe");
+	textlen = 28;
+	strcpy(text, "what do ya want for nothing?");
+	digest = "\xef\xfc\xdf\x6a\xe5\xeb\x2f\xa2\xd2\x74\x16\xd5\xf1\x84\xdf\x9c\x25\x9a\x7c\x79";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 2", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     3
+	 * key =           0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
+	 * key_len =       20
+	 * data =          0xdd repeated 50 times
+	 * data_len =      50
+	 * digest =        0x125d7342b9ac11cd91a39af48aa17b4f63f175d3
+	 */
+	keylen = 20;
+	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+	textlen = 50;
+	memset(text, 0xdd, textlen);
+	digest = "\x12\x5d\x73\x42\xb9\xac\x11\xcd\x91\xa3\x9a\xf4\x8a\xa1\x7b\x4f\x63\xf1\x75\xd3";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 3", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     4
+	 * key =           0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819
+	 * key_len =       25
+	 * data =          0xcd repeated 50 times
+	 * data_len =      50
+	 * digest =        0x4c9007f4026250c6bc8414f9bf50c86c2d7235da
+	 */
+	keylen = 25;
+	memcpy(key, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19", keylen);
+	textlen = 50;
+	memset(text, 0xcd, textlen);
+	digest = "\x4c\x90\x07\xf4\x02\x62\x50\xc6\xbc\x84\x14\xf9\xbf\x50\xc8\x6c\x2d\x72\x35\xda";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 4", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     5
+	 * key =           0x0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c0c
+	 * key_len =       20
+	 * data =          "Test With Truncation"
+	 * data_len =      20
+	 * digest =        0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1d58bb9324a9a5a04
+	 * digest-96 =     0x4c1a03424b55e07fe7f27be1
+	 */
+	keylen = 20;
+	memset(key, 0x0c, keylen);
+	textlen = 20;
+	strcpy(text, "Test With Truncation");
+	digest = "\x4c\x1a\x03\x42\x4b\x55\xe0\x7f\xe7\xf2\x7b\xe1\xd5\x8b\xb9\x32\x4a\x9a\x5a\x04";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 5", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     6
+	 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
+	 * key_len =       80
+	 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First"
+	 * data_len =      54
+	 * digest =        0xaa4ae5e15272d00e95705637ce8a3b55ed402112
+	 */
+	keylen = 80;
+	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+	textlen = 54;
+	strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First");
+	digest = "\xaa\x4a\xe5\xe1\x52\x72\xd0\x0e\x95\x70\x56\x37\xce\x8a\x3b\x55\xed\x40\x21\x12";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 6", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/*-
+	 * test_case =     7
+	 * key =           0xaa repeated 80 times
+	 * key_len =       80
+	 * data =          "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data"
+	 * data_len =      73
+	 * digest =        0xe8e99d0f45237d786d6bbaa7965c7808bbff1a91
+	 */
+	keylen = 80;
+	memset(key, 0xaa, keylen);
+	textlen = 73;
+	strcpy(text, "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key and Larger Than One Block-Size Data");
+	digest = "\xe8\xe9\x9d\x0f\x45\x23\x7d\x78\x6d\x6b\xba\xa7\x96\x5c\x78\x08\xbb\xff\x1a\x91";
+	if (sctp_test_hmac("SHA1 test case 7", SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1, key, keylen,
+	    text, textlen, digest, digestlen) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* done with all tests */
+	if (failed)
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: %d cases failed", failed);
+	else
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nSHA1 test results: all test cases passed");
+}
+
+/*
+ * test assoc key concatenation
+ */
+static int
+sctp_test_key_concatenation(sctp_key_t *key1, sctp_key_t *key2,
+    sctp_key_t *expected_key)
+{
+	sctp_key_t *key;
+	int ret_val;
+
+	sctp_show_key(key1, "\nkey1");
+	sctp_show_key(key2, "\nkey2");
+	key = sctp_compute_hashkey(key1, key2, NULL);
+	sctp_show_key(expected_key, "\nExpected");
+	sctp_show_key(key, "\nComputed");
+	if (memcmp(key, expected_key, expected_key->keylen) != 0) {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nFAILED");
+		ret_val = -1;
+	} else {
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nPASSED");
+		ret_val = 0;
+	}
+	sctp_free_key(key1);
+	sctp_free_key(key2);
+	sctp_free_key(expected_key);
+	sctp_free_key(key);
+	return (ret_val);
+}
+
+
+void
+sctp_test_authkey(void)
+{
+	sctp_key_t *key1, *key2, *expected_key;
+	int failed = 0;
+
+	/* test case 1 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01", 4);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01\x02\x03\x04", 4);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x02\x03\x04", 8);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 2 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x02", 1);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02", 5);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 3 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x02", 4);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02", 5);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 4 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 5 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x01", 1);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01", 5);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 6 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* test case 7 */
+	key1 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 11);
+	key2 = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07", 11);
+	expected_key = sctp_set_key("\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x08", 22);
+	if (sctp_test_key_concatenation(key1, key2, expected_key) < 0)
+		failed++;
+
+	/* done with all tests */
+	if (failed)
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: %d cases failed", failed);
+	else
+		SCTP_PRINTF("\nKey concatenation test results: all test cases passed");
+}
+
+
+#if defined(STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST)
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	sctp_test_hmac_sha1();
+	sctp_test_authkey();
+}
+
+#endif /* STANDALONE_HMAC_TEST */
+
+#endif /* SCTP_HMAC_TEST */