Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2679 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..310d656627
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2679 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file contains functions to manage asymetric keys, (public and
+ * private keys).
+ */
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "keyi.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secasn1.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+
+#include "secpkcs5.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
+
+static SECItem *
+pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+    /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
+    SECItem *pubKeyIndex = NULL;
+    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
+        case rsaKey:
+            pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.rsa.modulus;
+            break;
+        case dsaKey:
+            pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue;
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.dh.publicValue;
+            break;
+        case ecKey:
+            pubKeyIndex = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue;
+            break;
+        default:
+            return NULL;
+    }
+    PORT_Assert(pubKeyIndex != NULL);
+
+    return PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(pubKeyIndex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * import a public key into the desired slot
+ *
+ * This function takes a public key structure and creates a public key in a
+ * given slot. If isToken is set, then a persistant public key is created.
+ *
+ * Note: it is possible for this function to return a handle for a key which
+ * is persistant, even if isToken is not set.
+ */
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+                     PRBool isToken)
+{
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[11];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *signedattr = NULL;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
+    SECItem *ckaId = NULL;
+    SECItem *pubValue = NULL;
+    int signedcount = 0;
+    unsigned int templateCount = 0;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* if we already have an object in the desired slot, use it */
+    if (!isToken && pubKey->pkcs11Slot == slot) {
+        return pubKey->pkcs11ID;
+    }
+
+    /* free the existing key */
+    if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot != NULL) {
+        PK11SlotInfo *oSlot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
+        if (!PK11_IsPermObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot, pubKey->pkcs11ID)) {
+            PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(oSlot);
+            (void)PK11_GETTAB(oSlot)->C_DestroyObject(oSlot->session,
+                                                      pubKey->pkcs11ID);
+            PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(oSlot);
+        }
+        PK11_FreeSlot(oSlot);
+        pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
+    }
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, isToken ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    if (isToken) {
+        ckaId = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(pubKey);
+        if (ckaId == NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+            return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+        }
+        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, ckaId->data, ckaId->len);
+        attrs++;
+    }
+
+    /* now import the key */
+    {
+        switch (pubKey->keyType) {
+            case rsaKey:
+                keyType = CKK_RSA;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT, &cktrue,
+                              sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                signedattr = attrs;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.data,
+                              pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                              pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.data,
+                              pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent.len);
+                attrs++;
+                break;
+            case dsaKey:
+                keyType = CKK_DSA;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                signedattr = attrs;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dsa.params.base.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue.len);
+                attrs++;
+                break;
+            case fortezzaKey:
+                keyType = CKK_DSA;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                signedattr = attrs;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.data,
+                              pubKey->u.fortezza.params.prime.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+                              pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.data,
+                              pubKey->u.fortezza.params.subPrime.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.data,
+                              pubKey->u.fortezza.params.base.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.data,
+                              pubKey->u.fortezza.DSSKey.len);
+                attrs++;
+                break;
+            case dhKey:
+                keyType = CKK_DH;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                signedattr = attrs;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dh.prime.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, pubKey->u.dh.base.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dh.base.len);
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data,
+                              pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len);
+                attrs++;
+                break;
+            case ecKey:
+                keyType = CKK_EC;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+                attrs++;
+                PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+                              pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
+                              pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len);
+                attrs++;
+                if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
+                    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
+                                  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
+                    attrs++;
+                } else {
+                    pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+                                                  &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
+                                                  SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+                    if (pubValue == NULL) {
+                        if (ckaId) {
+                            SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId, PR_TRUE);
+                        }
+                        return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+                    }
+                    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT,
+                                  pubValue->data, pubValue->len);
+                    attrs++;
+                }
+                break;
+            default:
+                if (ckaId) {
+                    SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId, PR_TRUE);
+                }
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+                return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+        }
+        templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
+        PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)));
+        if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
+            PORT_Assert(signedattr);
+            signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
+            for (attrs = signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
+                pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
+            }
+        }
+        rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, theTemplate,
+                                  templateCount, isToken, &objectID);
+        if (ckaId) {
+            SECITEM_FreeItem(ckaId, PR_TRUE);
+        }
+        if (pubValue) {
+            SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+        }
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    pubKey->pkcs11ID = objectID;
+    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+
+    return objectID;
+}
+
+/*
+ * take an attribute and copy it into a secitem
+ */
+static CK_RV
+pk11_Attr2SecItem(PLArenaPool *arena, const CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, SECItem *item)
+{
+    item->data = NULL;
+
+    (void)SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, item, attr->ulValueLen);
+    if (item->data == NULL) {
+        return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+    }
+    PORT_Memcpy(item->data, attr->pValue, item->len);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get a curve length from a set of ecParams.
+ *
+ * We need this so we can reliably determine if the ecPoint passed to us
+ * was encoded or not. With out this, for many curves, we would incorrectly
+ * identify an unencoded curve as an encoded curve 1 in 65536 times, and for
+ * a few we would make that same mistake 1 in 32768 times. These are bad
+ * numbers since they are rare enough to pass tests, but common enough to
+ * be tripped over in the field.
+ *
+ * This function will only work for curves we recognized as of March 2009.
+ * The assumption is curves in use after March of 2009 would be supplied by
+ * PKCS #11 modules that already pass the correct encoding to us.
+ *
+ * Point length = (Roundup(curveLenInBits/8)*2+1)
+ */
+static int
+pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(PLArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams,
+                            PRBool *plain)
+{
+    SECItem oid;
+    SECOidTag tag;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* decode the OID tag */
+    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &oid,
+                                SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate), ecParams);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        /* could be explict curves, allow them to work if the
+         * PKCS #11 module support them. If we try to parse the
+         * explicit curve value in the future, we may return -1 here
+         * to indicate an invalid parameter if the explicit curve
+         * decode fails. */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *plain = PR_FALSE;
+    tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid);
+    switch (tag) {
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2:
+            return 29; /* curve len in bytes = 14 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2:
+            return 31; /* curve len in bytes = 15 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2:
+            return 33; /* curve len in bytes = 16 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2:
+            return 35; /* curve len in bytes = 17 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2:
+            return 41; /* curve len in bytes = 20 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3:
+            return 43; /* curve len in bytes = 21 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1:
+            return 45; /* curve len in bytes = 22 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3:
+            return 49; /*curve len in bytes = 24 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2:
+            return 51; /*curve len in bytes = 25 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1:
+            return 53; /*curve len in bytes = 26 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224R1:
+            return 57; /*curve len in bytes = 28 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3:
+            return 61; /*curve len in bytes = 30 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1:
+            return 65; /*curve len in bytes = 32 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1:
+            return 69; /*curve len in bytes = 34 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1:
+            return 73; /*curve len in bytes = 36 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1:
+            return 77; /*curve len in bytes = 38 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1:
+            return 91; /*curve len in bytes = 45 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1:
+            return 93; /*curve len in bytes = 46 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
+            return 97; /*curve len in bytes = 48 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1:
+            return 105; /*curve len in bytes = 52 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1:
+            return 109; /*curve len in bytes = 54 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
+            return 133; /*curve len in bytes = 66 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1:
+        case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1:
+            return 145; /*curve len in bytes = 72 bytes */
+        case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
+            *plain = PR_TRUE;
+            return 32; /* curve len in bytes = 32 bytes (only X) */
+        /* unknown or unrecognized OIDs. return unknown length */
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns the decoded point. In some cases the point may already be decoded.
+ * this function tries to detect those cases and return the point in
+ * publicKeyValue. In other cases it's DER encoded. In those cases the point
+ * is first decoded and returned. Space for the point is allocated out of
+ * the passed in arena.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(PLArenaPool *arena, const SECItem *ecParams,
+                         const CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecPoint, SECItem *publicKeyValue)
+{
+    SECItem encodedPublicValue;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    int keyLen;
+    PRBool plain = PR_FALSE;
+
+    if (ecPoint->ulValueLen == 0) {
+        return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The PKCS #11 spec requires ecPoints to be encoded as a DER OCTET String.
+     * NSS has mistakenly passed unencoded values, and some PKCS #11 vendors
+     * followed that mistake. Now we need to detect which encoding we were
+     * passed in. The task is made more complicated by the fact the the
+     * DER encoding byte (SEC_ASN_OCTET_STRING) is the same as the
+     * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED byte (0x04), so we can't use that to
+     * determine which curve we are using.
+     */
+
+    /* get the expected key length for the passed in curve.
+     * pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes only returns valid values for curves
+     * NSS has traditionally recognized. If the curve is not recognized,
+     * it will return '0', and we have to figure out if the key was
+     * encoded or not heuristically. If the ecParams are invalid, it
+     * will return -1 for the keyLen.
+     */
+    keyLen = pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes(arena, ecParams, &plain);
+    if (keyLen < 0) {
+        return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Some curves are not encoded but we don't have the name here.
+     * Instead, pk11_get_EC_PointLenInBytes returns true plain if this is the
+     * case.
+     */
+    if (plain && ecPoint->ulValueLen == (unsigned int)keyLen) {
+        return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
+    }
+
+    /* If the point is uncompressed and the lengths match, it
+     * must be an unencoded point */
+    if ((*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) &&
+        (ecPoint->ulValueLen == (unsigned int)keyLen)) {
+        return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
+    }
+
+    /* now assume the key passed to us was encoded and decode it */
+    if (*((char *)ecPoint->pValue) == SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
+        /* OK, now let's try to decode it and see if it's valid */
+        encodedPublicValue.data = ecPoint->pValue;
+        encodedPublicValue.len = ecPoint->ulValueLen;
+        rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, publicKeyValue,
+                                    SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), &encodedPublicValue);
+
+        /* it coded correctly & we know the key length (and they match)
+         * then we are done, return the results. */
+        if (keyLen && rv == SECSuccess && publicKeyValue->len == (unsigned int)keyLen) {
+            return CKR_OK;
+        }
+
+        /* if we know the key length, one of the above tests should have
+         * succeded. If it doesn't the module gave us bad data */
+        if (keyLen) {
+            return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+        }
+
+        /* We don't know the key length, so we don't know deterministically
+         * which encoding was used. We now will try to pick the most likely
+         * form that's correct, with a preference for the encoded form if we
+         * can't determine for sure. We do this by checking the key we got
+         * back from SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem for defects. If no defects are
+         * found, we assume the encoded parameter was was passed to us.
+         * our defect tests include:
+         *   1) it didn't decode.
+         *   2) The decode key had an invalid length (must be odd).
+         *   3) The decoded key wasn't an UNCOMPRESSED key.
+         *   4) The decoded key didn't include the entire encoded block
+         *   except the DER encoding values. (fixing DER length to one
+         *   particular value).
+         */
+        if ((rv != SECSuccess) || ((publicKeyValue->len & 1) != 1) ||
+            (publicKeyValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) ||
+            (PORT_Memcmp(&encodedPublicValue.data[encodedPublicValue.len - publicKeyValue->len],
+                         publicKeyValue->data,
+                         publicKeyValue->len) != 0)) {
+            /* The decoded public key was flawed, the original key must have
+             * already been in decoded form. Do a quick sanity check then
+             * return the original key value.
+             */
+            if ((encodedPublicValue.len & 1) == 0) {
+                return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+            }
+            return pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecPoint, publicKeyValue);
+        }
+
+        /* as best we can figure, the passed in key was encoded, and we've
+         * now decoded it. Note: there is a chance this could be wrong if the
+         * following conditions hold:
+         *  1) The first byte or bytes of the X point looks like a valid length
+         * of precisely the right size (2*curveSize -1). this means for curves
+         * less than 512 bits (64 bytes), this will happen 1 in 256 times*.
+         * for curves between 512 and 1024, this will happen 1 in 65,536 times*
+         * for curves between 1024 and 256K this will happen 1 in 16 million*
+         *  2) The length of the 'DER length field' is odd
+         * (making both the encoded and decode
+         * values an odd length. this is true of all curves less than 512,
+         * as well as curves between 1024 and 256K).
+         *  3) The X[length of the 'DER length field'] == 0x04, 1 in 256.
+         *
+         *  (* assuming all values are equally likely in the first byte,
+         * This isn't true if the curve length is not a multiple of 8. In these
+         * cases, if the DER length is possible, it's more likely,
+         * if it's not possible, then we have no false decodes).
+         *
+         * For reference here are the odds for the various curves we currently
+         * have support for (and the only curves SSL will negotiate at this
+         * time). NOTE: None of the supported curves will show up here
+         * because we return a valid length for all of these curves.
+         * The only way to get here is to have some application (not SSL)
+         * which supports some unknown curve and have some vendor supplied
+         * PKCS #11 module support that curve. NOTE: in this case, one
+         * presumes that that pkcs #11 module is likely to be using the
+         * correct encodings.
+         *
+         * Prime Curves (GFp):
+         *   Bit    False       Odds of
+         *  Size    DER Len  False Decode Positive
+         *  112     27     1 in 65536
+         *  128     31     1 in 65536
+         *  160     39     1 in 65536
+         *  192     47     1 in 65536
+         *  224     55     1 in 65536
+         *  239     59     1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
+         *  256     63     1 in 65536
+         *  521     129,131      0        (decoded value would be even)
+         *
+         * Binary curves (GF2m).
+         *   Bit    False       Odds of
+         *  Size    DER Len  False Decode Positive
+         *  131     33       0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
+         *  163     41       0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
+         *  176     43     1 in 65536
+         *  191     47     1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
+         *  193     49       0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
+         *  208     51     1 in 65536
+         *  233     59       0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
+         *  239     59     1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
+         *  272     67     1 in 65536
+         *  283     71       0        (top byte can only be 0-7)
+         *  304     75     1 in 65536
+         *  359     89     1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
+         *  368     91     1 in 65536
+         *  409     103      0        (top byte can only be 0-1)
+         *  431     107    1 in 32768 (top byte can only be 0-127)
+         *  571     129,143      0        (decoded value would be even)
+         *
+         */
+
+        return CKR_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* In theory, we should handle the case where the curve == 0 and
+     * the first byte is EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED, (which would be
+     * handled by doing a santity check on the key length and returning
+     * pk11_Attr2SecItem() to copy the ecPoint to the publicKeyValue).
+     *
+     * This test is unnecessary, however, due to the fact that
+     * EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED == SEC_ASIN1_OCTET_STRING, that case is
+     * handled in the above if. That means if we get here, the initial
+     * byte of our ecPoint value was invalid, so we can safely return.
+     * invalid attribute.
+     */
+
+    return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extract a public key from a slot and id
+ */
+SECKEYPublicKey *
+PK11_ExtractPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, KeyType keyType, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id)
+{
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    PLArenaPool *tmp_arena;
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+    unsigned int templateCount = 0;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE pk11KeyType;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[8];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *modulus, *exponent, *base, *prime, *subprime, *value;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *ecparams;
+
+    /* if we didn't know the key type, get it */
+    if (keyType == nullKey) {
+
+        pk11KeyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, id, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+        if (pk11KeyType == CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        switch (pk11KeyType) {
+            case CKK_RSA:
+                keyType = rsaKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_DSA:
+                keyType = dsaKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_DH:
+                keyType = dhKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_EC:
+                keyType = ecKey;
+                break;
+            default:
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+                return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* now we need to create space for the public key */
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    tmp_arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (tmp_arena == NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pubKey = (SECKEYPublicKey *)
+        PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
+    if (pubKey == NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        PORT_FreeArena(tmp_arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pubKey->arena = arena;
+    pubKey->keyType = keyType;
+    pubKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+    pubKey->pkcs11ID = id;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass,
+                  sizeof(keyClass));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &pk11KeyType,
+                  sizeof(pk11KeyType));
+    attrs++;
+    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
+        case rsaKey:
+            modulus = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            exponent = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+
+            templateCount = attrs - template;
+            PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+            crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena, slot, id, template, templateCount);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_RSA)) {
+                crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, modulus, &pubKey->u.rsa.modulus);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, exponent, &pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            break;
+        case dsaKey:
+            prime = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            subprime = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            base = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            value = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            templateCount = attrs - template;
+            PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+            crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena, slot, id, template, templateCount);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DSA)) {
+                crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, prime, &pubKey->u.dsa.params.prime);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, subprime, &pubKey->u.dsa.params.subPrime);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, base, &pubKey->u.dsa.params.base);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, value, &pubKey->u.dsa.publicValue);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            prime = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            base = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            value = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            templateCount = attrs - template;
+            PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+            crv = PK11_GetAttributes(tmp_arena, slot, id, template, templateCount);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_DH)) {
+                crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, prime, &pubKey->u.dh.prime);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, base, &pubKey->u.dh.base);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, value, &pubKey->u.dh.publicValue);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            break;
+        case ecKey:
+            pubKey->u.ec.size = 0;
+            ecparams = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            value = attrs;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_POINT, NULL, 0);
+            attrs++;
+            templateCount = attrs - template;
+            PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(template) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+            crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, slot, id, template, templateCount);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+
+            if ((keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) || (pk11KeyType != CKK_EC)) {
+                crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+                break;
+            }
+
+            crv = pk11_Attr2SecItem(arena, ecparams,
+                                    &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK)
+                break;
+            pubKey->u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined;
+            crv = pk11_get_Decoded_ECPoint(arena,
+                                           &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, value,
+                                           &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue);
+            break;
+        case fortezzaKey:
+        case nullKey:
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    PORT_FreeArena(tmp_arena, PR_FALSE);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return pubKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build a Private Key structure from raw PKCS #11 information.
+ */
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_MakePrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, KeyType keyType,
+                 PRBool isTemp, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID, void *wincx)
+{
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+    PRBool isPrivate;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* don't know? look it up */
+    if (keyType == nullKey) {
+        CK_KEY_TYPE pk11Type = CKK_RSA;
+
+        pk11Type = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, privID, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+        isTemp = (PRBool)!PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot, privID, CKA_TOKEN, PR_FALSE);
+        switch (pk11Type) {
+            case CKK_RSA:
+                keyType = rsaKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_DSA:
+                keyType = dsaKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_DH:
+                keyType = dhKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_KEA:
+                keyType = fortezzaKey;
+                break;
+            case CKK_EC:
+                keyType = ecKey;
+                break;
+            default:
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* if the key is private, make sure we are authenticated to the
+     * token before we try to use it */
+    isPrivate = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot, privID, CKA_PRIVATE, PR_FALSE);
+    if (isPrivate) {
+        rv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* now we need to create space for the private key */
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    privKey = (SECKEYPrivateKey *)
+        PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPrivateKey));
+    if (privKey == NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    privKey->arena = arena;
+    privKey->keyType = keyType;
+    privKey->pkcs11Slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+    privKey->pkcs11ID = privID;
+    privKey->pkcs11IsTemp = isTemp;
+    privKey->wincx = wincx;
+
+    return privKey;
+}
+
+PK11SlotInfo *
+PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
+{
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
+    slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+    return slot;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the modulus length for raw parsing
+ */
+int
+PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(SECKEYPrivateKey *key)
+{
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate = { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 };
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = key->pkcs11Slot;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    int length;
+
+    switch (key->keyType) {
+        case rsaKey:
+            crv = PK11_GetAttributes(NULL, slot, key->pkcs11ID, &theTemplate, 1);
+            if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+                return -1;
+            }
+            if (theTemplate.pValue == NULL) {
+                PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID));
+                return -1;
+            }
+            length = theTemplate.ulValueLen;
+            if (*(unsigned char *)theTemplate.pValue == 0) {
+                length--;
+            }
+            PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
+            return (int)length;
+
+        case fortezzaKey:
+        case dsaKey:
+        case dhKey:
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    if (theTemplate.pValue != NULL)
+        PORT_Free(theTemplate.pValue);
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * take a private key in one pkcs11 module and load it into another:
+ *  NOTE: the source private key is a rare animal... it can't be sensitive.
+ *  This is used to do a key gen using one pkcs11 module and storing the
+ *  result into another.
+ */
+static SECKEYPrivateKey *
+pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+                          SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags)
+{
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
+        /* class must be first */
+        { CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
+        /* RSA - the attributes below will be replaced for other
+         *       key types.
+         */
+        { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SIGN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_UNWRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        /* reserve space for the attributes that may be
+         * specified in attrFlags */
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0 },
+#define NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS 5 /* number of reserved attributes above */
+    };
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = NULL, *ap;
+    const int templateSize = sizeof(privTemplate) / sizeof(privTemplate[0]);
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
+    int i, count = 0;
+    int extra_count = 0;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);
+
+    if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < templateSize; i++) {
+        if (privTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS) {
+            attrs = &privTemplate[i];
+            count = i;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    PORT_Assert(attrs != NULL);
+    if (attrs == NULL) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    ap = attrs;
+
+    switch (privKey->keyType) {
+        case rsaKey:
+            count = templateSize - NUM_RESERVED_ATTRS;
+            extra_count = count - (attrs - privTemplate);
+            break;
+        case dsaKey:
+            ap->type = CKA_PRIME;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_SUBPRIME;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_BASE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_VALUE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_SIGN;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            ap->type = CKA_PRIME;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_BASE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_VALUE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_DERIVE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            break;
+        case ecKey:
+            ap->type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_VALUE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_DERIVE;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            ap->type = CKA_SIGN;
+            ap++;
+            count++;
+            extra_count++;
+            break;
+        default:
+            count = 0;
+            extra_count = 0;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (count == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    /*
+      * read out the old attributes.
+      */
+    crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID,
+                             privTemplate, count);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Set token, private, modifiable, sensitive, and extractable */
+    count += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, &privTemplate[count],
+                                        &cktrue, &ckfalse);
+
+    /* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give
+     * them the raw data as unsigned. The exception is EC,
+     * where the values are encoded or zero-preserving
+     * per-RFC5915 */
+    if (privKey->keyType != ecKey) {
+        for (ap = attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
+            pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* now Store the puppies */
+    rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, privTemplate,
+                              count, token, &objectID);
+    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* try loading the public key */
+    if (pubKey) {
+        PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, token);
+        if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot) {
+            PK11_FreeSlot(pubKey->pkcs11Slot);
+            pubKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL;
+            pubKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* build new key structure */
+    return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, privKey->keyType, !token,
+                            objectID, privKey->wincx);
+}
+
+static SECKEYPrivateKey *
+pk11_loadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+                 SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive)
+{
+    PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
+    if (token) {
+        attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
+    } else {
+        attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SESSION | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
+    }
+    if (sensitive) {
+        attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE;
+    } else {
+        attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE;
+    }
+    return pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot, privKey, pubKey, attrFlags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * export this for PSM
+ */
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_LoadPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
+                 SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, PRBool token, PRBool sensitive)
+{
+    return pk11_loadPrivKey(slot, privKey, pubKey, token, sensitive);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the token to generate a key pair.
+ */
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                                void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags,
+                                CK_FLAGS opFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlagsMask, void *wincx)
+{
+    /* we have to use these native types because when we call PKCS 11 modules
+     * we have to make sure that we are using the correct sizes for all the
+     * parameters. */
+    CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_ULONG modulusBits;
+    CK_BYTE publicExponent[4];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE privTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_SENSITIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PRIVATE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_UNWRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SIGN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DECRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_EXTRACTABLE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE rsaPubTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_MODULUS_BITS, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE dsaPubTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE dhPubTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE ecPubTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_TOKEN, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_DERIVE, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_WRAP, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_MODIFIABLE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    SECKEYECParams *ecParams;
+
+    /*CK_ULONG key_size = 0;*/
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *pubTemplate;
+    int privCount = 0;
+    int pubCount = 0;
+    PK11RSAGenParams *rsaParams;
+    SECKEYPQGParams *dsaParams;
+    SECKEYDHParams *dhParams;
+    CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+    CK_MECHANISM test_mech;
+    CK_MECHANISM test_mech2;
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session_handle;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privID, pubID;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+    KeyType keyType;
+    PRBool restore;
+    int peCount, i;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *privattrs;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate;
+    CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass;
+    SECItem *cka_id;
+    PRBool haslock = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool pubIsToken = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool token = ((attrFlags & PK11_ATTR_TOKEN) != 0);
+    /* subset of attrFlags applicable to the public key */
+    PK11AttrFlags pubKeyAttrFlags = attrFlags &
+                                    (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_SESSION | PK11_ATTR_MODIFIABLE | PK11_ATTR_UNMODIFIABLE);
+
+    if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!param) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The opFlags and opFlagMask parameters allow us to control the
+     * settings of the key usage attributes (CKA_ENCRYPT and friends).
+     * opFlagMask is set to one if the flag is specified in opFlags and
+     *  zero if it is to take on a default value calculated by
+     *  PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags.
+     * opFlags specifies the actual value of the flag 1 or 0.
+     *   Bits not corresponding to one bits in opFlagMask should be zero.
+     */
+
+    /* if we are trying to turn on a flag, it better be in the mask */
+    PORT_Assert((opFlags & ~opFlagsMask) == 0);
+    opFlags &= opFlagsMask;
+
+    PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
+    if (slot == NULL) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* if our slot really doesn't do this mechanism, Generate the key
+     * in our internal token and write it out */
+    if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type)) {
+        PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+
+        /* don't loop forever looking for a slot */
+        if (slot == int_slot) {
+            PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* if there isn't a suitable slot, then we can't do the keygen */
+        if (int_slot == NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* generate the temporary key to load */
+        privKey = PK11_GenerateKeyPair(int_slot, type, param, pubKey, PR_FALSE,
+                                       PR_FALSE, wincx);
+        PK11_FreeSlot(int_slot);
+
+        /* if successful, load the temp key into the new token */
+        if (privKey != NULL) {
+            SECKEYPrivateKey *newPrivKey = pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(slot,
+                                                                     privKey, *pubKey, attrFlags);
+            SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+            if (newPrivKey == NULL) {
+                SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
+                *pubKey = NULL;
+            }
+            return newPrivKey;
+        }
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    mechanism.mechanism = type;
+    mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+    mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+    test_mech.pParameter = NULL;
+    test_mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+    test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM;
+    test_mech2.pParameter = NULL;
+    test_mech2.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+    /* set up the private key template */
+    privattrs = privTemplate;
+    privattrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, privattrs,
+                                            &cktrue, &ckfalse);
+
+    /* set up the mechanism specific info */
+    switch (type) {
+        case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+        case CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            rsaParams = (PK11RSAGenParams *)param;
+            if (rsaParams->pe == 0) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            modulusBits = rsaParams->keySizeInBits;
+            peCount = 0;
+
+            /* convert pe to a PKCS #11 string */
+            for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+                if (peCount || (rsaParams->pe &
+                                ((unsigned long)0xff000000L >> (i * 8)))) {
+                    publicExponent[peCount] =
+                        (CK_BYTE)((rsaParams->pe >> (3 - i) * 8) & 0xff);
+                    peCount++;
+                }
+            }
+            PORT_Assert(peCount != 0);
+            attrs = rsaPubTemplate;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_MODULUS_BITS,
+                          &modulusBits, sizeof(modulusBits));
+            attrs++;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                          publicExponent, peCount);
+            attrs++;
+            pubTemplate = rsaPubTemplate;
+            keyType = rsaKey;
+            test_mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            dsaParams = (SECKEYPQGParams *)param;
+            attrs = dsaPubTemplate;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dsaParams->prime.data,
+                          dsaParams->prime.len);
+            attrs++;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_SUBPRIME, dsaParams->subPrime.data,
+                          dsaParams->subPrime.len);
+            attrs++;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dsaParams->base.data,
+                          dsaParams->base.len);
+            attrs++;
+            pubTemplate = dsaPubTemplate;
+            keyType = dsaKey;
+            test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
+            break;
+        case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            dhParams = (SECKEYDHParams *)param;
+            attrs = dhPubTemplate;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIME, dhParams->prime.data,
+                          dhParams->prime.len);
+            attrs++;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_BASE, dhParams->base.data,
+                          dhParams->base.len);
+            attrs++;
+            pubTemplate = dhPubTemplate;
+            keyType = dhKey;
+            test_mech.mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE;
+            break;
+        case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
+            ecParams = (SECKEYECParams *)param;
+            attrs = ecPubTemplate;
+            PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecParams->data,
+                          ecParams->len);
+            attrs++;
+            pubTemplate = ecPubTemplate;
+            keyType = ecKey;
+            /*
+             * ECC supports 2 different mechanism types (unlike RSA, which
+             * supports different usages with the same mechanism).
+             * We may need to query both mechanism types and or the results
+             * together -- but we only do that if either the user has
+             * requested both usages, or not specified any usages.
+             */
+            if ((opFlags & (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DERIVE)) == (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DERIVE)) {
+                /* We've explicitly turned on both flags, use both mechanism */
+                test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
+                test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+            } else if (opFlags & CKF_SIGN) {
+                /* just do signing */
+                test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+            } else if (opFlags & CKF_DERIVE) {
+                /* just do ECDH */
+                test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
+            } else {
+                /* neither was specified default to both */
+                test_mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE;
+                test_mech2.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+            return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* now query the slot to find out how "good" a key we can generate */
+    if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
+        PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
+                                                test_mech.mechanism, &mechanism_info);
+    /*
+     * EC keys are used in multiple different types of mechanism, if we
+     * are using dual use keys, we need to query the second mechanism
+     * as well.
+     */
+    if (test_mech2.mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+        CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info2;
+        CK_RV crv2;
+
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            /* the first failed, make sure there is no trash in the
+             * mechanism flags when we or it below */
+            mechanism_info.flags = 0;
+        }
+        crv2 = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID,
+                                                     test_mech2.mechanism, &mechanism_info2);
+        if (crv2 == CKR_OK) {
+            crv = CKR_OK; /* succeed if either mechnaism info succeeds */
+            /* combine the 2 sets of mechnanism flags */
+            mechanism_info.flags |= mechanism_info2.flags;
+        }
+    }
+    if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
+        PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+    if ((crv != CKR_OK) || (mechanism_info.flags == 0)) {
+        /* must be old module... guess what it should be... */
+        switch (test_mech.mechanism) {
+            case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
+                mechanism_info.flags = (CKF_SIGN | CKF_DECRYPT |
+                                        CKF_WRAP | CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER | CKF_ENCRYPT | CKF_WRAP);
+                break;
+            case CKM_DSA:
+                mechanism_info.flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+                break;
+            case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
+                mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
+                break;
+            case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
+                mechanism_info.flags = CKF_DERIVE;
+                if (test_mech2.mechanism == CKM_ECDSA) {
+                    mechanism_info.flags |= CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+                }
+                break;
+            case CKM_ECDSA:
+                mechanism_info.flags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY;
+                break;
+            default:
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    /* now adjust our flags according to the user's key usage passed to us */
+    mechanism_info.flags = (mechanism_info.flags & (~opFlagsMask)) | opFlags;
+    /* set the public key attributes */
+    attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(pubKeyAttrFlags, attrs,
+                                        &cktrue, &ckfalse);
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_WRAP,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_WRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ENCRYPT,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    attrs++;
+    /* set the private key attributes */
+    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DERIVE,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    privattrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_UNWRAP,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_UNWRAP ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    privattrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_SIGN,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_SIGN ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    privattrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(privattrs, CKA_DECRYPT,
+                  mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
+                  sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+    privattrs++;
+
+    if (token) {
+        session_handle = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
+        haslock = PK11_RWSessionHasLock(slot, session_handle);
+        restore = PR_TRUE;
+    } else {
+        session_handle = slot->session;
+        if (session_handle != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+            PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+        restore = PR_FALSE;
+        haslock = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (session_handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    privCount = privattrs - privTemplate;
+    pubCount = attrs - pubTemplate;
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GenerateKeyPair(session_handle, &mechanism,
+                                               pubTemplate, pubCount, privTemplate, privCount, &pubID, &privID);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (restore) {
+            PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session_handle);
+        } else
+            PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /* This locking code is dangerous and needs to be more thought
+     * out... the real problem is that we're holding the mutex open this long
+     */
+    if (haslock) {
+        PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+    }
+
+    /* swap around the ID's for older PKCS #11 modules */
+    keyClass = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, pubID, CKA_CLASS);
+    if (keyClass != CKO_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE tmp = pubID;
+        pubID = privID;
+        privID = tmp;
+    }
+
+    *pubKey = PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot, keyType, pubID);
+    if (*pubKey == NULL) {
+        if (restore) {
+            /* we may have to restore the mutex so it get's exited properly
+             * in RestoreROSession */
+            if (haslock)
+                PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+            PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session_handle);
+        }
+        PK11_DestroyObject(slot, pubID);
+        PK11_DestroyObject(slot, privID);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* set the ID to the public key so we can find it again */
+    cka_id = pk11_MakeIDFromPublicKey(*pubKey);
+    pubIsToken = (PRBool)PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot, pubID, CKA_TOKEN, PR_FALSE);
+
+    PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_ID, cka_id->data, cka_id->len);
+
+    if (haslock) {
+        PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+    }
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, privID,
+                                                 &setTemplate, 1);
+
+    if (crv == CKR_OK && pubIsToken) {
+        crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(session_handle, pubID,
+                                                     &setTemplate, 1);
+    }
+
+    if (restore) {
+        PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session_handle);
+    } else {
+        PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+    }
+    SECITEM_FreeItem(cka_id, PR_TRUE);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PK11_DestroyObject(slot, pubID);
+        PK11_DestroyObject(slot, privID);
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        *pubKey = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, keyType, !token, privID, wincx);
+    if (privKey == NULL) {
+        SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(*pubKey);
+        PK11_DestroyObject(slot, privID);
+        *pubKey = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return privKey;
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                              void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
+{
+    return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithOpFlags(slot, type, param, pubKey, attrFlags,
+                                           0, 0, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the token to generate a key pair.
+ */
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_GenerateKeyPair(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                     void *param, SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, PRBool token,
+                     PRBool sensitive, void *wincx)
+{
+    PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
+
+    if (token) {
+        attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_TOKEN;
+    } else {
+        attrFlags |= PK11_ATTR_SESSION;
+    }
+    if (sensitive) {
+        attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_SENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
+    } else {
+        attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_INSENSITIVE | PK11_ATTR_PUBLIC);
+    }
+    return PK11_GenerateKeyPairWithFlags(slot, type, param, pubKey,
+                                         attrFlags, wincx);
+}
+
+/* build a public KEA key from the public value */
+SECKEYPublicKey *
+PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(unsigned char *keyData, int length)
+{
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubk;
+    SECItem pkData;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+    pkData.data = keyData;
+    pkData.len = length;
+    pkData.type = siBuffer;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    pubk = (SECKEYPublicKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPublicKey));
+    if (pubk == NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    pubk->arena = arena;
+    pubk->pkcs11Slot = 0;
+    pubk->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+    pubk->keyType = fortezzaKey;
+    rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &pubk->u.fortezza.KEAKey, &pkData);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return pubk;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SECKEY_SetPublicValue(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECItem *publicValue)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE privKeyID;
+
+    if (privKey == NULL || publicValue == NULL ||
+        publicValue->data == NULL || publicValue->len == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    pubKey.arena = NULL;
+    pubKey.keyType = privKey->keyType;
+    pubKey.pkcs11Slot = NULL;
+    pubKey.pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+    /* can't use PORT_InitCheapArena here becase SECKEY_DestroyPublic is used
+      * to free it, and it uses PORT_FreeArena which not only frees the 
+      * underlying arena, it also frees the allocated arena struct. */
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    pubKey.arena = arena;
+    if (arena == NULL) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
+    privKeyID = privKey->pkcs11ID;
+    rv = SECFailure;
+    switch (privKey->keyType) {
+        default:
+            /* error code already set to SECFailure */
+            break;
+        case rsaKey:
+            pubKey.u.rsa.modulus = *publicValue;
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.rsa.publicExponent);
+            break;
+        case dsaKey:
+            pubKey.u.dsa.publicValue = *publicValue;
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_PRIME,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.dsa.params.prime);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                break;
+            }
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_SUBPRIME,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.dsa.params.subPrime);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                break;
+            }
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_BASE,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.dsa.params.base);
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            pubKey.u.dh.publicValue = *publicValue;
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_PRIME,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.dh.prime);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                break;
+            }
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_BASE,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.dh.base);
+            break;
+        case ecKey:
+            pubKey.u.ec.publicValue = *publicValue;
+            pubKey.u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined;
+            pubKey.u.ec.size = 0;
+            rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, privKeyID, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
+                                    arena, &pubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
+            break;
+    }
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+        rv = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, &pubKey, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+    /* Even though pubKey is stored on the stack, we've allocated
+     * some of it's data from the arena. SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey
+     * destroys keys by freeing the arena, so this will clean up all
+     * the data we allocated specifically for the key above. It will
+     * also free any slot references which we may have picked up in
+     * PK11_ImportPublicKey. It won't delete the underlying key if
+     * its a Token/Permanent key (which it will be if
+     * PK11_ImportPublicKey succeeds). */
+    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(&pubKey);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: This function doesn't return a SECKEYPrivateKey struct to represent
+ * the new private key object.  If it were to create a session object that
+ * could later be looked up by its nickname, it would leak a SECKEYPrivateKey.
+ * So isPerm must be true.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
+                                   SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
+                                   SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
+                                   PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType,
+                                   unsigned int keyUsage, void *wincx)
+{
+    if (!isPerm) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(slot, epki,
+                                                          pwitem, nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate, keyType,
+                                                          keyUsage, NULL, wincx);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_ImportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
+                                               SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki, SECItem *pwitem,
+                                               SECItem *nickname, SECItem *publicValue, PRBool isPerm,
+                                               PRBool isPrivate, KeyType keyType,
+                                               unsigned int keyUsage, SECKEYPrivateKey **privk,
+                                               void *wincx)
+{
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pbeMechType;
+    SECItem *crypto_param = NULL;
+    PK11SymKey *key = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL;
+    PRBool faulty3DES = PR_FALSE;
+    int usageCount = 0;
+    CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE *usage = NULL;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE rsaUsage[] = {
+        CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_SIGN, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER
+    };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dsaUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE dhUsage[] = { CKA_DERIVE };
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE ecUsage[] = { CKA_SIGN, CKA_DERIVE };
+    if ((epki == NULL) || (pwitem == NULL))
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_FindOIDTag(
+        &epki->algorithm.algorithm));
+
+    switch (keyType) {
+        default:
+        case rsaKey:
+            key_type = CKK_RSA;
+            switch (keyUsage & (KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+                case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT:
+                    usage = rsaUsage;
+                    usageCount = 2;
+                    break;
+                case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
+                    usage = &rsaUsage[2];
+                    usageCount = 2;
+                    break;
+                case KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
+                case 0: /* default to everything */
+                    usage = rsaUsage;
+                    usageCount = 4;
+                    break;
+            }
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            key_type = CKK_DH;
+            usage = dhUsage;
+            usageCount = sizeof(dhUsage) / sizeof(dhUsage[0]);
+            break;
+        case dsaKey:
+            key_type = CKK_DSA;
+            usage = dsaUsage;
+            usageCount = sizeof(dsaUsage) / sizeof(dsaUsage[0]);
+            break;
+        case ecKey:
+            key_type = CKK_EC;
+            switch (keyUsage & (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
+                case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE:
+                    usage = ecUsage;
+                    usageCount = 1;
+                    break;
+                case KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
+                    usage = &ecUsage[1];
+                    usageCount = 1;
+                    break;
+                case KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT:
+                default: /* default to everything */
+                    usage = ecUsage;
+                    usageCount = 2;
+                    break;
+            }
+            break;
+    }
+
+try_faulty_3des:
+
+    key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, &epki->algorithm, pwitem, faulty3DES, wincx);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto done;
+    }
+    cryptoMechType = pk11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(&epki->algorithm,
+                                                &crypto_param, pwitem, faulty3DES);
+    if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);
+
+    PORT_Assert(usage != NULL);
+    PORT_Assert(usageCount != 0);
+    privKey = PK11_UnwrapPrivKey(slot, key, cryptoMechType,
+                                 crypto_param, &epki->encryptedData,
+                                 nickname, publicValue, isPerm, isPrivate,
+                                 key_type, usage, usageCount, wincx);
+    if (privKey) {
+        rv = SECSuccess;
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    /* if we are unable to import the key and the pbeMechType is
+     * CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC, then it is possible that
+     * the encrypted blob was created with a buggy key generation method
+     * which is described in the PKCS 12 implementation notes.  So we
+     * need to try importing via that method.
+     */
+    if ((pbeMechType == CKM_NSS_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC) && (!faulty3DES)) {
+        /* clean up after ourselves before redoing the key generation. */
+
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
+        key = NULL;
+
+        if (crypto_param) {
+            SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
+            crypto_param = NULL;
+        }
+
+        faulty3DES = PR_TRUE;
+        goto try_faulty_3des;
+    }
+
+    /* key import really did fail */
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+done:
+    if ((rv == SECSuccess) && isPerm) {
+        /* If we are importing a token object,
+         * create the corresponding public key.
+         * If this fails, just continue as the target
+         * token simply might not support persistant
+         * public keys. Such tokens are usable, but
+         * need to be authenticated before searching
+         * for user certs. */
+        (void)SECKEY_SetPublicValue(privKey, publicValue);
+    }
+
+    if (privKey) {
+        if (privk) {
+            *privk = privKey;
+        } else {
+            SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+        }
+        privKey = NULL;
+    }
+    if (crypto_param != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
+    }
+
+    if (key != NULL) {
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *
+PK11_ExportPrivateKeyInfo(CERTCertificate *cert, void *wincx)
+{
+    SECKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, wincx);
+    if (pk != NULL) {
+        pki = PK11_ExportPrivKeyInfo(pk, wincx);
+        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
+    }
+    return pki;
+}
+
+/* V2 refers to PKCS #5 V2 here. If a PKCS #5 v1 or PKCS #12 pbe is passed
+ * for pbeTag, then encTag and hashTag are ignored. If pbe is an encryption
+ * algorithm, then PKCS #5 V2 is used with prfTag for the prf. If prfTag isn't
+ * supplied prf will be SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 */
+SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
+PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfoV2(
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot,   /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
+    SECOidTag pbeAlg,     /* PBE algorithm to encrypt the with key */
+    SECOidTag encAlg,     /* Encryption algorithm to Encrypt the key with */
+    SECOidTag prfAlg,     /* Hash algorithm for PRF */
+    SECItem *pwitem,      /* password for PBE encryption */
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk, /* encrypt this private key */
+    int iteration,        /* interations for PBE alg */
+    void *pwArg)          /* context for password callback */
+{
+    SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    SECAlgorithmID *algid;
+    SECOidTag pbeAlgTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+    SECItem *crypto_param = NULL;
+    PK11SymKey *key = NULL;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *tmpPK = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_ULONG encBufLen;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pbeMechType;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cryptoMechType;
+    CK_MECHANISM cryptoMech;
+
+    if (!pwitem || !pk) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    algid = sec_pkcs5CreateAlgorithmID(pbeAlg, encAlg, prfAlg,
+                                       &pbeAlgTag, 0, NULL, iteration);
+    if (algid == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
+    if (arena)
+        epki = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo);
+    if (epki == NULL) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    epki->arena = arena;
+
+    /* if we didn't specify a slot, use the slot the private key was in */
+    if (!slot) {
+        slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
+    }
+
+    /* if we specified a different slot, and the private key slot can do the
+     * pbe key gen, generate the key in the private key slot so we don't have
+     * to move it later */
+    pbeMechType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(pbeAlgTag);
+    if (slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
+        if (PK11_DoesMechanism(pk->pkcs11Slot, pbeMechType)) {
+            slot = pk->pkcs11Slot;
+        }
+    }
+    key = PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot, algid, pwitem, PR_FALSE, pwArg);
+    if (key == NULL) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    cryptoMechType = PK11_GetPBECryptoMechanism(algid, &crypto_param, pwitem);
+    if (cryptoMechType == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    cryptoMech.mechanism = PK11_GetPadMechanism(cryptoMechType);
+    cryptoMech.pParameter = crypto_param ? crypto_param->data : NULL;
+    cryptoMech.ulParameterLen = crypto_param ? crypto_param->len : 0;
+
+    /* If the key isn't in the private key slot, move it */
+    if (key->slot != pk->pkcs11Slot) {
+        PK11SymKey *newkey = pk11_CopyToSlot(pk->pkcs11Slot,
+                                             key->type, CKA_WRAP, key);
+        if (newkey == NULL) {
+            /* couldn't import the wrapping key, try exporting the
+             * private key */
+            tmpPK = pk11_loadPrivKey(key->slot, pk, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
+            if (tmpPK == NULL) {
+                rv = SECFailure;
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            pk = tmpPK;
+        } else {
+            /* free the old key and use the new key */
+            PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
+            key = newkey;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* we are extracting an encrypted privateKey structure.
+     * which needs to be freed along with the buffer into which it is
+     * returned.  eventually, we should retrieve an encrypted key using
+     * pkcs8/pkcs5.
+     */
+    encBufLen = 0;
+    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session, &cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, NULL, &encBufLen);
+    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    epki->encryptedData.data = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, encBufLen);
+    if (!epki->encryptedData.data) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(pk->pkcs11Slot)->C_WrapKey(pk->pkcs11Slot->session, &cryptoMech, key->objectID, pk->pkcs11ID, epki->encryptedData.data, &encBufLen);
+    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(pk->pkcs11Slot);
+    epki->encryptedData.len = (unsigned int)encBufLen;
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    if (!epki->encryptedData.len) {
+        rv = SECFailure;
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(arena, &epki->algorithm, algid);
+
+loser:
+    if (crypto_param != NULL) {
+        SECITEM_ZfreeItem(crypto_param, PR_TRUE);
+        crypto_param = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (key != NULL) {
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(key);
+    }
+    if (tmpPK != NULL) {
+        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(tmpPK);
+    }
+    SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
+
+    if (rv == SECFailure) {
+        if (arena != NULL) {
+            PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
+        }
+        epki = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return epki;
+}
+
+SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
+PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfo(
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot,   /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
+    SECOidTag algTag,     /* PBE algorithm to encrypt the with key */
+    SECItem *pwitem,      /* password for PBE encryption */
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk, /* encrypt this private key */
+    int iteration,        /* interations for PBE alg */
+    void *pwArg)          /* context for password callback */
+{
+    return PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfoV2(slot, algTag, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
+                                             SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, pwitem, pk,
+                                             iteration, pwArg);
+}
+
+/* V2 refers to PKCS #5 V2 here. If a PKCS #5 v1 or PKCS #12 pbe is passed
+ * for pbeTag, then encTag and hashTag are ignored. If pbe is an encryption
+ * algorithm, then PKCS #5 V2 is used with prfTag for the prf. If prfTag isn't
+ * supplied prf will be SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 */
+SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
+PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoV2(
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot,    /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
+    SECOidTag pbeAlg,      /* PBE algorithm to encrypt the with key */
+    SECOidTag encAlg,      /* Encryption algorithm to Encrypt the key with */
+    SECOidTag prfAlg,      /* HMAC algorithm for PRF*/
+    SECItem *pwitem,       /* password for PBE encryption */
+    CERTCertificate *cert, /* wrap priv key for this user cert */
+    int iteration,         /* interations for PBE alg */
+    void *pwArg)           /* context for password callback */
+{
+    SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *epki = NULL;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *pk = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, pwArg);
+    if (pk != NULL) {
+        epki = PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivKeyInfoV2(slot, pbeAlg, encAlg, prfAlg,
+                                                 pwitem, pk, iteration,
+                                                 pwArg);
+        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(pk);
+    }
+    return epki;
+}
+
+SECKEYEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo *
+PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfo(
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot,    /* optional, encrypt key in this slot */
+    SECOidTag algTag,      /* encrypt key with this algorithm */
+    SECItem *pwitem,       /* password for PBE encryption */
+    CERTCertificate *cert, /* wrap priv key for this user cert */
+    int iteration,         /* interations for PBE alg */
+    void *pwArg)           /* context for password callback */
+{
+    return PK11_ExportEncryptedPrivateKeyInfoV2(slot, algTag, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
+                                                SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, pwitem, cert,
+                                                iteration, pwArg);
+}
+
+SECItem *
+PK11_DEREncodePublicKey(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubk)
+{
+    return SECKEY_EncodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(pubk);
+}
+
+char *
+PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+    return PK11_GetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID);
+}
+
+char *
+PK11_GetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+    return PK11_GetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot, pubKey->pkcs11ID);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_SetPrivateKeyNickname(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const char *nickname)
+{
+    return PK11_SetObjectNickname(privKey->pkcs11Slot,
+                                  privKey->pkcs11ID, nickname);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_SetPublicKeyNickname(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const char *nickname)
+{
+    return PK11_SetObjectNickname(pubKey->pkcs11Slot,
+                                  pubKey->pkcs11ID, nickname);
+}
+
+SECKEYPQGParams *
+PK11_GetPQGParamsFromPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE pTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_PRIME, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_SUBPRIME, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_BASE, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    int pTemplateLen = sizeof(pTemplate) / sizeof(pTemplate[0]);
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    SECKEYPQGParams *params;
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
+    if (arena == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    params = (SECKEYPQGParams *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECKEYPQGParams));
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    crv = PK11_GetAttributes(arena, privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID,
+                             pTemplate, pTemplateLen);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    params->arena = arena;
+    params->prime.data = pTemplate[0].pValue;
+    params->prime.len = pTemplate[0].ulValueLen;
+    params->subPrime.data = pTemplate[1].pValue;
+    params->subPrime.len = pTemplate[1].ulValueLen;
+    params->base.data = pTemplate[2].pValue;
+    params->base.len = pTemplate[2].ulValueLen;
+
+    return params;
+
+loser:
+    if (arena != NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_CopyTokenPrivKeyToSessionPrivKey(PK11SlotInfo *destSlot,
+                                      SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
+
+    static const CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+    static const CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1] = {
+        { CKA_TOKEN, (CK_BBOOL *)&ckfalse, sizeof ckfalse }
+    };
+
+    if (destSlot && destSlot != privKey->pkcs11Slot) {
+        SECKEYPrivateKey *newKey =
+            pk11_loadPrivKey(destSlot,
+                             privKey,
+                             NULL,      /* pubKey    */
+                             PR_FALSE,  /* token     */
+                             PR_FALSE); /* sensitive */
+        if (newKey)
+            return newKey;
+    }
+    destSlot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
+    PK11_Authenticate(destSlot, PR_TRUE, privKey->wincx);
+    PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(destSlot);
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(destSlot)->C_CopyObject(destSlot->session,
+                                              privKey->pkcs11ID,
+                                              (CK_ATTRIBUTE *)template,
+                                              1, &newKeyID);
+    PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(destSlot);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return PK11_MakePrivKey(destSlot, privKey->keyType, PR_TRUE /*isTemp*/,
+                            newKeyID, privKey->wincx);
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_ConvertSessionPrivKeyToTokenPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, void *wincx)
+{
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = privk->pkcs11Slot;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
+    CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
+
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
+    attrs++;
+
+    PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+    rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
+    if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(rwsession, privk->pkcs11ID,
+                                          template, 1, &newKeyID);
+    PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey /*KeyType*/, PR_FALSE /*isTemp*/,
+                            newKeyID, NULL /*wincx*/);
+}
+
+/*
+ * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
+ * this function also frees the privKey structure.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DeleteTokenPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, PRBool force)
+{
+    CERTCertificate *cert = PK11_GetCertFromPrivateKey(privKey);
+    SECStatus rv = SECWouldBlock;
+
+    if (!cert || force) {
+        /* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
+        rv = PK11_DestroyTokenObject(privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID);
+    }
+    if (cert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert);
+    }
+    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * destroy a private key if there are no matching certs.
+ * this function also frees the privKey structure.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DeleteTokenPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+    /* now, then it's safe for the key to go away */
+    if (pubKey->pkcs11Slot == NULL) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PK11_DestroyTokenObject(pubKey->pkcs11Slot, pubKey->pkcs11ID);
+    SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * key call back structure.
+ */
+typedef struct pk11KeyCallbackStr {
+    SECStatus (*callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey *, void *);
+    void *callbackArg;
+    void *wincx;
+} pk11KeyCallback;
+
+/*
+ * callback to map Object Handles to Private Keys;
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_DoKeys(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle, void *arg)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+    pk11KeyCallback *keycb = (pk11KeyCallback *)arg;
+    if (!arg) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_TRUE, keyHandle, keycb->wincx);
+
+    if (privKey == NULL) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (keycb->callback) {
+        rv = (*keycb->callback)(privKey, keycb->callbackArg);
+    }
+
+    SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/***********************************************************************
+ * PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot
+ *
+ * Traverses all the private keys on a slot.
+ *
+ * INPUTS
+ *      slot
+ *          The PKCS #11 slot whose private keys you want to traverse.
+ *      callback
+ *          A callback function that will be called for each key.
+ *      arg
+ *          An argument that will be passed to the callback function.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot,
+                               SECStatus (*callback)(SECKEYPrivateKey *, void *), void *arg)
+{
+    pk11KeyCallback perKeyCB;
+    pk11TraverseSlot perObjectCB;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS privkClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[2];
+    int templateSize = 2;
+
+    theTemplate[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+    theTemplate[0].pValue = &privkClass;
+    theTemplate[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(privkClass);
+    theTemplate[1].type = CKA_TOKEN;
+    theTemplate[1].pValue = &ckTrue;
+    theTemplate[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(ckTrue);
+
+    if (slot == NULL) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    perObjectCB.callback = pk11_DoKeys;
+    perObjectCB.callbackArg = &perKeyCB;
+    perObjectCB.findTemplate = theTemplate;
+    perObjectCB.templateCount = templateSize;
+    perKeyCB.callback = callback;
+    perKeyCB.callbackArg = arg;
+    perKeyCB.wincx = NULL;
+
+    return PK11_TraverseSlot(slot, &perObjectCB);
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the private key with the given ID
+ */
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID)
+{
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS privKey = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE theTemplate[] = {
+        { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 },
+        { CKA_CLASS, NULL, 0 },
+    };
+    /* if you change the array, change the variable below as well */
+    int tsize = sizeof(theTemplate) / sizeof(theTemplate[0]);
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = theTemplate;
+
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len);
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &privKey, sizeof(privKey));
+
+    return pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot, theTemplate, tsize);
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKey *
+PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyID, void *wincx)
+{
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle;
+    SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
+
+    keyHandle = pk11_FindPrivateKeyFromCertID(slot, keyID);
+    if (keyHandle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    privKey = PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_TRUE, keyHandle, wincx);
+    return privKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a CKA_ID from the relevant public key data. The CKA_ID is generated
+ * from the pubKeyData by SHA1_Hashing it to produce a smaller CKA_ID (to make
+ * smart cards happy.
+ */
+SECItem *
+PK11_MakeIDFromPubKey(SECItem *pubKeyData)
+{
+    PK11Context *context;
+    SECItem *certCKA_ID;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (pubKeyData->len <= SHA1_LENGTH) {
+        /* probably an already hashed value. The strongest known public
+         * key values <= 160 bits would be less than 40 bit symetric in
+         * strength. Don't hash them, just return the value. There are
+         * none at the time of this writing supported by previous versions
+         * of NSS, so change is binary compatible safe */
+        return SECITEM_DupItem(pubKeyData);
+    }
+
+    context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1);
+    if (context == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+        rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, pubKeyData->data, pubKeyData->len);
+    }
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certCKA_ID = (SECItem *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SECItem));
+    if (certCKA_ID == NULL) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    certCKA_ID->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
+    certCKA_ID->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(certCKA_ID->len);
+    if (certCKA_ID->data == NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(certCKA_ID);
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, certCKA_ID->data, &certCKA_ID->len,
+                          SHA1_LENGTH);
+    PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        SECITEM_FreeItem(certCKA_ID, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return certCKA_ID;
+}
+
+/* Looking for PK11_GetKeyIDFromPrivateKey?
+ * Call PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey instead.
+ */
+
+SECItem *
+PK11_GetLowLevelKeyIDForPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+    return pk11_GetLowLevelKeyFromHandle(privKey->pkcs11Slot, privKey->pkcs11ID);
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+privateKeyListCallback(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, void *arg)
+{
+    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list = (SECKEYPrivateKeyList *)arg;
+    return SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(list, SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key));
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKeyList *
+PK11_ListPrivateKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot)
+{
+    SECStatus status;
+    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
+
+    keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
+    if (keys == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    status = PK11_TraversePrivateKeysInSlot(slot, privateKeyListCallback,
+                                            (void *)keys);
+
+    if (status != SECSuccess) {
+        SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(keys);
+        keys = NULL;
+    }
+
+    return keys;
+}
+
+SECKEYPublicKeyList *
+PK11_ListPublicKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname)
+{
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    size_t tsize = 0;
+    int objCount = 0;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
+    SECKEYPublicKeyList *keys;
+    int i, len;
+
+    attrs = findTemp;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
+    attrs++;
+    if (nickname) {
+        len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
+        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len);
+        attrs++;
+    }
+    tsize = attrs - findTemp;
+    PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+    key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize, &objCount);
+    if (key_ids == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    keys = SECKEY_NewPublicKeyList();
+    if (keys == NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(key_ids);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < objCount; i++) {
+        SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey =
+            PK11_ExtractPublicKey(slot, nullKey, key_ids[i]);
+        if (pubKey) {
+            SECKEY_AddPublicKeyToListTail(keys, pubKey);
+        }
+    }
+
+    PORT_Free(key_ids);
+    return keys;
+}
+
+SECKEYPrivateKeyList *
+PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
+{
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+    CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+    size_t tsize = 0;
+    int objCount = 0;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
+    SECKEYPrivateKeyList *keys;
+    int i, len;
+
+    attrs = findTemp;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
+    attrs++;
+    PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
+    attrs++;
+    if (nickname) {
+        len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
+        PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len);
+        attrs++;
+    }
+    tsize = attrs - findTemp;
+    PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+    key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize, &objCount);
+    if (key_ids == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    keys = SECKEY_NewPrivateKeyList();
+    if (keys == NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(key_ids);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < objCount; i++) {
+        SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey =
+            PK11_MakePrivKey(slot, nullKey, PR_TRUE, key_ids[i], wincx);
+        SECKEY_AddPrivateKeyToListTail(keys, privKey);
+    }
+
+    PORT_Free(key_ids);
+    return keys;
+}