Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1795 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f170c352b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1795 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file PK11Contexts which are  used in multipart hashing,
+ * encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations.
+ */
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "nssilock.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "sechash.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "blapit.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+
+static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 };
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ *                   Now Deal with Crypto Contexts
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * the monitors...
+ */
+void
+PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+    /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+     * the Context */
+    if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+        /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+        PZ_Lock(cx->sessionLock);
+    } else {
+        PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+    /* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
+     * the Context */
+    if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+        /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+        PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock);
+    } else {
+        PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free up a Cipher Context
+ */
+void
+PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit)
+{
+    pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession);
+    /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+    if (context->savedData != NULL)
+        PORT_Free(context->savedData);
+    if (context->key)
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key);
+    if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params)
+        SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE);
+    if (context->sessionLock)
+        PZ_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock);
+    PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot);
+    if (freeit)
+        PORT_Free(context);
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary.
+ */
+static unsigned char *
+pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer,
+                       unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+
+    /* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+    if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+        /* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we
+         * have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the
+         * correct length
+         */
+        unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength;
+        buffer = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
+        if (buffer == NULL) {
+            return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+        }
+        crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer, savedLength);
+        if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+            PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufLen);
+        }
+    }
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+    }
+    return buffer;
+}
+
+void *
+pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength)
+{
+    return pk11_saveContextHelper(context,
+                                  (unsigned char *)space, savedLength);
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the current context
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long savedLength)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = context->objectID;
+
+    PORT_Assert(space != NULL);
+    if (space == NULL) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0);
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context);
+
+/*
+ *  Initialize a Message function. Particular function is passed in as a
+ *  function pointer. Since all C_Message*Init funcitons have the same
+ *  prototype, we just pick one of the the prototypes to declare our init
+ *  function.
+ */
+static CK_RV
+pk11_contextInitMessage(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM_PTR mech,
+                        CK_C_MessageEncryptInit initFunc,
+                        CK_FLAGS flags, CK_RV scrv)
+{
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = context->slot;
+    CK_VERSION version = slot->module->cryptokiVersion;
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+
+    context->ivCounter = 0;
+    context->ivMaxCount = 0;
+    context->ivFixedBits = 0;
+    context->ivLen = 0;
+    context->ivGen = CKG_NO_GENERATE;
+    context->simulate_mechanism = (mech)->mechanism;
+    context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE;
+    /* check that we can do the Message interface. We need to check
+     * for either 1) are we using a PKCS #11 v3 interface and 2) is the
+     * Message flag set on the mechanism. If either is false we simulate
+     * the message interface for the Encrypt and Decrypt cases using the
+     * PKCS #11 V2 interface.
+     * Sign and verify do not have V2 interfaces, so we go ahead and fail
+     * if those cases */
+    if ((version.major >= 3) &&
+        PK11_DoesMechanismFlag(slot, (mech)->mechanism, flags)) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+        crv = (*initFunc)((context)->session, (mech), (context)->objectID);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+        if ((crv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
+            (crv == CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID)) {
+            /* we have a 3.0 interface, and the flag was set (or ignored)
+             * but the implementation was not there, use the V2 interface */
+            crv = (scrv);
+            context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+    } else {
+        crv = (scrv);
+        context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return crv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE;
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DECRYPT:
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+            if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+                CK_ULONG count = 0;
+                /* generate the IV for fortezza */
+                crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+                if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+                    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+                    break;
+                }
+                PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)
+                    ->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
+                                     NULL, &count);
+            }
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            break;
+        case CKA_SIGN:
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            break;
+        case CKA_VERIFY:
+            /* NOTE: we previously has this set to C_SignInit for Macing.
+             * It turns out now one could possibly use it that way, though,
+             * because PK11_HashOp() always called C_VerifyUpdate on CKA_VERIFY,
+             * which would have failed. So everyone just calls us with CKA_SIGN
+             * when Macing even when they are verifying, no need to 'do it
+             * for them'. It needs to be VerifyInit now so that we can do
+             * PKCS #11 hash/Verify combo operations. */
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyInit(context->session, mech_info, context->objectID);
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DIGEST:
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session, mech_info);
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            break;
+
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+                                          PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptInit,
+                                          CKF_MESSAGE_ENCRYPT, CKR_OK);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+            crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+                                          PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptInit,
+                                          CKF_MESSAGE_DECRYPT, CKR_OK);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+            crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+                                          PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageSignInit,
+                                          CKF_MESSAGE_SIGN, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+            crv = pk11_contextInitMessage(context, mech_info,
+                                          PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageVerifyInit,
+                                          CKF_MESSAGE_VERIFY, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* handle the case where the token is using the old NSS mechanism */
+    if (context->simulate_message &&
+        !PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, context->simulate_mechanism)) {
+        if ((context->simulate_mechanism == CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305) &&
+            PK11_DoesMechanism(context->slot, CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) {
+            context->simulate_mechanism = CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+        } else {
+            PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID));
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+     */
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+        context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                              &context->savedLength);
+        if (context->savedData == NULL)
+            rv = SECFailure;
+        /* clear out out session for others to use */
+        pk11_Finalize(context);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Testing interfaces, not for general use. This function forces
+ * an AEAD context into simulation mode even though the target token
+ * can already do PKCS #11 v3.0 Message (i.e. softoken).
+ */
+SECStatus
+_PK11_ContextSetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context)
+{
+    CK_RV crv;
+    /* only message encrypt and message decrypt contexts can be simulated */
+    if ((context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT)) &&
+        (context->operation != (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT))) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    /* if we are already simulating, return */
+    if (context->simulate_message) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    /* we need to shutdown the existing AEAD operation */
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED);
+            return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+_PK11_ContextGetAEADSimulation(PK11Context *context)
+{
+    return context->simulate_message;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common Helper Function do come up with a new context.
+ */
+static PK11Context *
+pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                            PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+                            PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID,
+                            const SECItem *param, void *pwArg)
+{
+    CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+    PK11Context *context;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
+    if (!slot || ((objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) && ((operation != CKA_DIGEST) ||
+                                                      (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)))) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    context = (PK11Context *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context));
+    if (context == NULL) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt
+     * to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA
+     * LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be
+     * use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to
+     * do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it),
+     * Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side
+     * of the connection.*/
+    context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+    if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
+        if (symKey && (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack)) {
+            context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+    context->operation = operation;
+    /* If we were given a symKey, keep our own reference to it so
+     * that the key doesn't disappear in the middle of the operation
+     * if the caller frees it. Public and Private keys are not reference
+     * counted, so the caller just has to keep his copies around until
+     * the operation completes */
+    context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL;
+    context->objectID = objectID;
+    context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+    context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &context->ownSession);
+    context->pwArg = pwArg;
+    /* get our session */
+    context->savedData = NULL;
+
+    /* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple
+     * begins on a single context */
+    context->type = type;
+    if (param) {
+        if (param->len > 0) {
+            context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param);
+        } else {
+            context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params;
+        }
+    } else {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        context->param = NULL;
+    }
+    context->init = PR_FALSE;
+    context->sessionLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockPK11cxt);
+    if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    mech_info.mechanism = type;
+    mech_info.pParameter = param->data;
+    mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+    rv = pk11_context_init(context, &mech_info);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    context->init = PR_TRUE;
+    return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different
+ * parts of libsec.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+__PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                             PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+                             SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+    PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+    PK11Context *context = NULL;
+
+    /* first get a slot */
+    if (slot == NULL) {
+        slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx);
+        if (slot == NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    } else {
+        PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+    }
+
+    /* now import the key */
+    symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx);
+    if (symKey == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param);
+
+loser:
+    if (symKey) {
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+    }
+    if (slot) {
+        PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    }
+
+    return context;
+}
+
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+                           PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+                           SECItem *param, void *wincx)
+{
+    return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation,
+                                        key, param, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using
+ * the same key in multiple sessions!
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+                           PK11SymKey *symKey, const SECItem *param)
+{
+    PK11SymKey *newKey;
+    PK11Context *context;
+
+    /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+    newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, type, operation);
+    if (newKey == NULL) {
+        PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
+    } else {
+        symKey = newKey;
+    }
+
+    /* Context keeps its reference to the symKey, so it's safe to
+     * free our reference we we are through, even though we may have
+     * created the key using pk11_ForceSlot. */
+    context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey,
+                                          symKey->objectID, param, symKey->cx);
+    PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+    return context;
+}
+
+/* To support multipart public key operations (like hash/verify operations),
+ * we need to create contexts with public keys. */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByPubKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+                           SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECItem *param,
+                           void *pwArg)
+{
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
+    SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+    /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+    /* public keys have all their data in the public key data structure,
+     * so there's no need to export the old key, just  import this one. The
+     * import manages consistancy of the public key data structure */
+    if (slot == NULL || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type)) {
+        CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID;
+        slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
+        if (slot == NULL) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        objectID = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
+        PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+        if (objectID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter
+     * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of
+     * PK11_VerifyWithMechanism */
+    return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, pubKey->pkcs11Slot, operation,
+                                       NULL, pubKey->pkcs11ID,
+                                       param ? param : &nullparam, pwArg);
+}
+
+/* To support multipart private key operations (like hash/sign operations),
+ * we need to create contexts with private keys. */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateContextByPrivKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+                            SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const SECItem *param)
+{
+    SECItem nullparam = { 0, 0, 0 };
+    /* Private keys are generally not movable. If the token the
+     * private key lives on can't do the operation, generally we are 
+     * stuck anyway. So no need to try to manipulate the key into
+     * another token */
+
+    /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+    /* unlike symkeys, we accept a NULL parameter. map a null parameter
+     * to the empty parameter. This matches the semantics of
+     * PK11_SignWithMechanism */
+    return pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, privKey->pkcs11Slot, operation,
+                                       NULL, privKey->pkcs11ID,
+                                       param ? param : &nullparam,
+                                       privKey->wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot.
+ * Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg)
+{
+    /* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
+    PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+    PK11Context *context;
+    SECItem param;
+
+    type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg);
+    slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
+    if (slot == NULL) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */
+    param.data = NULL;
+    param.len = 0;
+    param.type = 0;
+
+    context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL,
+                                          CK_INVALID_HANDLE, &param, NULL);
+    PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+    return context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context.
+ */
+PK11Context *
+PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old)
+{
+    PK11Context *newcx;
+    PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    void *data;
+    unsigned long len;
+
+    newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation,
+                                        old->key, old->objectID, old->param,
+                                        old->pwArg);
+    if (newcx == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state
+      * of the old session. If the old context owns it's session,
+      * the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */
+    if (old->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old);
+        data = pk11_saveContext(old, NULL, &len);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old);
+        needFree = PR_TRUE;
+    } else {
+        data = old->savedData;
+        len = old->savedLength;
+    }
+
+    if (data == NULL) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different
+      * work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we
+      * restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the
+      * saveData pointer... */
+    if (newcx->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx);
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx, data, len);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx);
+    } else {
+        PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL);
+        if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+            rv = SECFailure;
+        } else {
+            PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData, data, len);
+            newcx->savedLength = len;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (needFree)
+        PORT_Free(data);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(newcx, PR_TRUE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return newcx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA
+ * work.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int *len, int saveLength)
+{
+    unsigned char *data = NULL;
+    CK_ULONG length = saveLength;
+
+    if (cx->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+        data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+        if (data)
+            *len = length;
+    } else if ((unsigned)saveLength >= cx->savedLength) {
+        data = (unsigned char *)cx->savedData;
+        if (cx->savedData) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(save, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+        }
+        *len = cx->savedLength;
+    }
+    if (data != NULL) {
+        if (cx->ownSession) {
+            PORT_ZFree(data, length);
+        }
+        return SECSuccess;
+    } else {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+}
+
+/* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */
+unsigned char *
+PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx,
+                      unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen,
+                      unsigned int *stateLen)
+{
+    unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
+    unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen;
+
+    if (cx->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+        stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+        *stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL) ? length : 0;
+    } else {
+        if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) {
+            stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(cx->savedLength);
+            if (!stateBuf) {
+                return (unsigned char *)NULL;
+            }
+        } else {
+            stateBuf = preAllocBuf;
+        }
+        if (cx->savedData) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
+        }
+        *stateLen = cx->savedLength;
+    }
+    return stateBuf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for
+ * FORTEZZA .
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx, unsigned char *save, int len)
+{
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    if (cx->ownSession) {
+        PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+        pk11_Finalize(cx);
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx, save, len);
+        PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+    } else {
+        PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL);
+        if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned)len)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+            rv = SECFailure;
+        } else {
+            PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData, save, len);
+            cx->savedLength = len;
+        }
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is  to get FIPS compliance until we can convert
+ * libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE
+ * if we can't get a PK11 Context.
+ */
+PRBool
+PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID)
+{
+    PK11Context *cx;
+
+    cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID);
+    if (cx == NULL)
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
+    return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx)
+{
+    CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * make sure the old context is clear first
+     */
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
+    pk11_Finalize(cx);
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
+
+    mech_info.mechanism = cx->type;
+    mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data;
+    mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len;
+    rv = pk11_context_init(cx, &mech_info);
+
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    cx->init = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+             PRInt32 len)
+{
+    PK11Context *context;
+    unsigned int max_length;
+    unsigned int out_length;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */
+    if (len < 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg);
+    if (context == NULL)
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    /* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */
+    max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
+    PORT_Assert(max_length);
+    if (!max_length)
+        max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
+
+    rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context, out, &out_length, max_length);
+    PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a bulk encryption operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+              int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_ULONG length = maxout;
+    CK_ULONG offset = 0;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    unsigned char *saveOut = out;
+    unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
+
+    /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+     * state.
+     */
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                 context->savedLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and
+     * lose them on the first decrypt.
+     */
+    if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+        unsigned char random[8];
+        if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random));
+            PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+
+            /* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into
+             * the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this
+             * call. */
+            allocOut = out = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(maxout);
+            if (out == NULL) {
+                PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, random, sizeof(random), out, &length);
+
+            out += length;
+            maxout -= length;
+            offset = length;
+        } else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) {
+            length = sizeof(random);
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, sizeof(random), random, &length);
+            inlen -= length;
+            in += length;
+            context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            length = maxout;
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+            length += offset;
+            break;
+        case CKA_DECRYPT:
+            length = maxout;
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        *outlen = 0;
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    } else {
+        *outlen = length;
+    }
+
+    if (context->fortezzaHack) {
+        if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
+            PORT_Assert(allocOut);
+            PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
+            PORT_Free(allocOut);
+        }
+        context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+     */
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                              &context->savedLength);
+        if (context->savedData == NULL)
+            rv = SECFailure;
+
+        /* clear out out session for others to use */
+        pk11_Finalize(context);
+    }
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simulate the IV generation that normally would happen in the token.
+ *
+ * This is a modifed copy of what is in freebl/gcm.c. We can't use the
+ * version in freebl because of layering, since freebl is inside the token
+ * boundary. These issues are traditionally handled by moving them to util,
+ * but we also have two different Random functions we have two switch between.
+ * Since this is primarily here for tokens that don't support the PKCS #11
+ * Message Interface, it's OK if they diverge a bit. Slight semantic
+ * differences from the freebl/gcm.c version shouldn't be much more than the
+ * sematic differences between freebl and other tokens which do implement the
+ * Message Interface. */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_GenerateIV(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen,
+                int fixedBits, unsigned char *iv, int ivLen)
+{
+    unsigned int i;
+    unsigned int flexBits;
+    unsigned int ivOffset;
+    unsigned int ivNewCount;
+    unsigned char ivMask;
+    unsigned char ivSave;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (context->ivCounter != 0) {
+        /* If we've already generated a message, make sure all subsequent
+         * messages are using the same generator */
+        if ((context->ivGen != ivgen) ||
+            (context->ivFixedBits != fixedBits) ||
+            (context->ivLen != ivLen)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* remember these values */
+        context->ivGen = ivgen;
+        context->ivFixedBits = fixedBits;
+        context->ivLen = ivLen;
+        /* now calculate how may bits of IV we have to supply */
+        flexBits = ivLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+        /* first make sure we aren't going to overflow */
+        if (flexBits < fixedBits) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        flexBits -= fixedBits;
+        /* if we are generating a random number reduce the acceptable bits to
+         * avoid birthday attacks */
+        if (ivgen == CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM) {
+            if (flexBits <= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            /* see freebl/blapit.h for how GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS is
+             * calculated. */
+            flexBits -= GCMIV_RANDOM_BIRTHDAY_BITS;
+            flexBits = flexBits >> 1;
+        }
+        if (flexBits == 0) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        /* Turn those bits into the number of IV's we can safely return */
+        if (flexBits >= sizeof(context->ivMaxCount) * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
+            context->ivMaxCount = PR_UINT64(0xffffffffffffffff);
+        } else {
+            context->ivMaxCount = (PR_UINT64(1) << flexBits);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* no generate, accept the IV from the source */
+    if (ivgen == CKG_NO_GENERATE) {
+        context->ivCounter = 1;
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* make sure we haven't exceeded the number of IVs we can return
+     * for this key, generator, and IV size */
+    if (context->ivCounter >= context->ivMaxCount) {
+        /* use a unique error from just bad user input */
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXTRA_INPUT);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* build to mask to handle the first byte of the IV */
+    ivOffset = fixedBits / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+    ivMask = 0xff >> ((PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - (fixedBits & 7)) & 7);
+    ivNewCount = ivLen - ivOffset;
+
+    /* finally generate the IV */
+    switch (ivgen) {
+        case CKG_GENERATE: /* default to counter */
+        case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER:
+            iv[ivOffset] = (iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask) |
+                           (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount) & ivMask);
+            for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) {
+                iv[ivOffset + i] =
+                    PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount);
+            }
+            break;
+        case CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR:
+            iv[ivOffset] ^=
+                (PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, 0, ivNewCount) & ivMask);
+            for (i = 1; i < ivNewCount; i++) {
+                iv[ivOffset + i] ^=
+                    PORT_GET_BYTE_BE(context->ivCounter, i, ivNewCount);
+            }
+            break;
+        case CKG_GENERATE_RANDOM:
+            ivSave = iv[ivOffset] & ~ivMask;
+            rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv + ivOffset, ivNewCount);
+            iv[ivOffset] = ivSave | (iv[ivOffset] & ivMask);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return rv;
+            }
+            break;
+    }
+    context->ivCounter++;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 v2.40 did not have a message interface. If our module can't
+ * do the message interface use the old method of doing AEAD */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_AEADSimulateOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen,
+                    const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+                    unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+                    int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+    unsigned int length = maxout;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    unsigned char *saveOut = out;
+    unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * first we need to convert the single shot (v2.40) parameters into
+     * the message version of the parameters. This usually involves
+     * copying the Nonce or IV, setting the AAD from our parameter list
+     * and handling the tag differences */
+    CK_GCM_PARAMS_V3 gcm;
+    CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *gcm_message;
+    CK_CCM_PARAMS ccm;
+    CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *ccm_message;
+    CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_PARAMS chacha_poly;
+    CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *chacha_poly_message;
+    CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS nss_chacha_poly;
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = context->simulate_mechanism;
+    SECItem sim_params = { 0, NULL, 0 };
+    unsigned char *tag = NULL;
+    unsigned int taglen;
+    PRBool encrypt;
+
+    *outlen = 0;
+    /* figure out if we are encrypting or decrypting, as tags are
+     * handled differently in both */
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            encrypt = PR_TRUE;
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+            encrypt = PR_FALSE;
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    switch (mechanism) {
+        case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+        case CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305:
+            if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            chacha_poly_message =
+                (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params;
+            chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce;
+            chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen;
+            chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+            chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+            tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag;
+            taglen = 16;
+            sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&chacha_poly;
+            sim_params.len = sizeof(chacha_poly);
+            /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv
+         * internally, don't simulate it either */
+            break;
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            chacha_poly_message =
+                (CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS *)params;
+            tag = chacha_poly_message->pTag;
+            taglen = 16;
+            nss_chacha_poly.pNonce = chacha_poly_message->pNonce;
+            nss_chacha_poly.ulNonceLen = chacha_poly_message->ulNonceLen;
+            nss_chacha_poly.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+            nss_chacha_poly.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+            nss_chacha_poly.ulTagLen = taglen;
+            sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&nss_chacha_poly;
+            sim_params.len = sizeof(nss_chacha_poly);
+            /* CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 does not generate the iv
+             * internally, don't simulate it either */
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_CCM:
+            if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            ccm_message = (CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+            ccm.ulDataLen = ccm_message->ulDataLen;
+            ccm.pNonce = ccm_message->pNonce;
+            ccm.ulNonceLen = ccm_message->ulNonceLen;
+            ccm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+            ccm.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+            ccm.ulMACLen = ccm_message->ulMACLen;
+            tag = ccm_message->pMAC;
+            taglen = ccm_message->ulMACLen;
+            sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&ccm;
+            sim_params.len = sizeof(ccm);
+            if (encrypt) {
+                /* simulate generating the IV */
+                rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ccm_message->nonceGenerator,
+                                     ccm_message->ulNonceFixedBits,
+                                     ccm_message->pNonce,
+                                     ccm_message->ulNonceLen);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    return rv;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_GCM:
+            if (paramslen != sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+            gcm.pIv = gcm_message->pIv;
+            gcm.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen;
+            gcm.ulIvBits = gcm.ulIvLen * PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+            gcm.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+            gcm.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+            gcm.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits;
+            tag = gcm_message->pTag;
+            taglen = (gcm_message->ulTagBits + (PR_BITS_PER_BYTE - 1)) / PR_BITS_PER_BYTE;
+            sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm;
+            sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm);
+            if (encrypt) {
+                /* simulate generating the IV */
+                rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, gcm_message->ivGenerator,
+                                     gcm_message->ulIvFixedBits,
+                                     gcm_message->pIv, gcm_message->ulIvLen);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    return rv;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+            return SECFailure;
+    }
+    /* now handle the tag. The message interface separates the tag from
+     * the data, while the single shot gets and puts the tag at the end of
+     * the encrypted data. */
+    if (!encrypt) {
+        /* In the decrypt case, if the tag is already at the end of the
+         * input buffer we are golden, otherwise we'll need a new input
+         * buffer and copy the tag at the end of it */
+        if (tag != in + inlen) {
+            allocOut = PORT_Alloc(inlen + taglen);
+            if (allocOut == NULL) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            PORT_Memcpy(allocOut, in, inlen);
+            PORT_Memcpy(allocOut + inlen, tag, taglen);
+            in = allocOut;
+        }
+        inlen = inlen + taglen;
+    } else {
+        /* if we end up allocating, we don't want to overrun this buffer,
+         * so we fail early here */
+        if (maxout < inlen) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        /* in the encrypt case, we are fine if maxout is big enough to hold
+         * the tag. We'll copy the tag after the operation */
+        if (maxout < inlen + taglen) {
+            allocOut = PORT_Alloc(inlen + taglen);
+            if (allocOut == NULL) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            out = allocOut;
+            length = maxout = inlen + taglen;
+        }
+    }
+    /* now do the operation */
+    if (encrypt) {
+        rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length,
+                          maxout, in, inlen);
+    } else {
+        rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out, &length,
+                          maxout, in, inlen);
+    }
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        /* If the mechanism was CKM_AES_GCM, the module may have been
+         * following the same error as old versions of NSS. Retry with
+         * the CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS */
+        if ((mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) &&
+            (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA)) {
+            CK_NSS_GCM_PARAMS gcm_nss;
+            gcm_message = (CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS *)params;
+            gcm_nss.pIv = gcm_message->pIv;
+            gcm_nss.ulIvLen = gcm_message->ulIvLen;
+            gcm_nss.pAAD = (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad;
+            gcm_nss.ulAADLen = aadlen;
+            gcm_nss.ulTagBits = gcm_message->ulTagBits;
+            sim_params.data = (unsigned char *)&gcm_nss;
+            sim_params.len = sizeof(gcm_nss);
+            if (encrypt) {
+                rv = PK11_Encrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out,
+                                  &length, maxout, in, inlen);
+            } else {
+                rv = PK11_Decrypt(context->key, mechanism, &sim_params, out,
+                                  &length, maxout, in, inlen);
+            }
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto fail;
+            }
+        } else {
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* on encrypt, separate the output buffer from the tag */
+    if (encrypt) {
+        if ((length < taglen) || (length > inlen + taglen)) {
+            /* PKCS #11 module should not return a length smaller than
+             * taglen, or bigger than inlen+taglen */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+            rv = SECFailure;
+            goto fail;
+        }
+        length = length - taglen;
+        if (allocOut) {
+            /*
+             * If we used a temporary buffer, copy it out to the original
+             * buffer.
+             */
+            PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
+        }
+        /* if the tag isn't in the right place, copy it out */
+        if (tag != out + length) {
+            PORT_Memcpy(tag, out + length, taglen);
+        }
+    }
+    *outlen = length;
+    rv = SECSuccess;
+fail:
+    if (allocOut) {
+        PORT_Free(allocOut);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do an AEAD operation. This function optionally returns
+ * and IV on Encrypt for all mechanism. NSS knows which mechanisms
+ * generate IV's in the token and which don't. This allows the
+ * applications to make a single call without special handling for
+ * each AEAD mechanism (the special handling is all contained here.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_AEADOp(PK11Context *context, CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivgen,
+            int fixedbits, unsigned char *iv, int ivlen,
+            const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+            unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+            int maxout, unsigned char *tag, int taglen,
+            const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+    CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcm_message;
+    CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS ccm_message;
+    CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS chacha_poly_message;
+    void *params;
+    int paramslen;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    switch (context->simulate_mechanism) {
+        case CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+        case CKM_SALSA20_POLY1305:
+        case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
+            chacha_poly_message.pNonce = iv;
+            chacha_poly_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen;
+            chacha_poly_message.pTag = tag;
+            params = &chacha_poly_message;
+            paramslen = sizeof(CK_SALSA20_CHACHA20_POLY1305_MSG_PARAMS);
+            /* SALSA20_POLY1305 and CHACHA20_POLY1305 do not generate the iv
+         * internally, Do it here. */
+            if (context->operation == (CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT)) {
+                /* simulate generating the IV */
+                rv = pk11_GenerateIV(context, ivgen, fixedbits, iv, ivlen);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    return rv;
+                }
+            }
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_GCM:
+            gcm_message.pIv = iv;
+            gcm_message.ulIvLen = ivlen;
+            gcm_message.ivGenerator = ivgen;
+            gcm_message.ulIvFixedBits = fixedbits;
+            gcm_message.pTag = tag;
+            gcm_message.ulTagBits = taglen * 8;
+            params = &gcm_message;
+            paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS);
+            /* GCM generates IV internally */
+            break;
+        case CKM_AES_CCM:
+            ccm_message.ulDataLen = inlen;
+            ccm_message.pNonce = iv;
+            ccm_message.ulNonceLen = ivlen;
+            ccm_message.nonceGenerator = ivgen;
+            ccm_message.ulNonceFixedBits = fixedbits;
+            ccm_message.pMAC = tag;
+            ccm_message.ulMACLen = taglen;
+            params = &ccm_message;
+            paramslen = sizeof(CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS);
+            /* CCM generates IV internally */
+            break;
+
+        default:
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+            return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return PK11_AEADRawOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen, out, outlen,
+                          maxout, in, inlen);
+}
+
+/* Do and AED operation. The application builds the params on it's own
+ * and passes them in. This allows applications direct access to the params
+ * so they can use mechanisms not yet understood by, NSS, or get semantics
+ * not suppied by PK11_AEAD. */
+SECStatus
+PK11_AEADRawOp(PK11Context *context, void *params, int paramslen,
+               const unsigned char *aad, int aadlen,
+               unsigned char *out, int *outlen,
+               int maxout, const unsigned char *in, int inlen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    CK_ULONG length = maxout;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    PORT_Assert(outlen != NULL);
+    *outlen = 0;
+    if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) != CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The PKCS 11 module does not support the message interface, fall
+     * back to using single shot operation */
+    if (context->simulate_message) {
+        return pk11_AEADSimulateOp(context, params, paramslen, aad, aadlen,
+                                   out, outlen, maxout, in, inlen);
+    }
+
+    /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+     * state.
+     */
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                 context->savedLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            length = maxout;
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+            length = maxout;
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)aad, aadlen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+            length = maxout;
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out, &length);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+            length = maxout; /* sig length */
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyMessage(context->session, params, paramslen, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen, out /* sig */, length);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    } else {
+        *outlen = length;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+     */
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                              &context->savedLength);
+        if (context->savedData == NULL)
+            rv = SECFailure;
+
+        /* clear out out session for others to use */
+        pk11_Finalize(context);
+    }
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * execute a digest/signature operation
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char *in, unsigned inLen)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+
+    if (inLen == 0) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    if (!in) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+     * state.
+     */
+    context->init = PR_FALSE;
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                 context->savedLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        /* also for MAC'ing */
+        case CKA_SIGN:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+            break;
+        case CKA_VERIFY:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DIGEST:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, (unsigned char *)in, inLen);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+     */
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                              &context->savedLength);
+        if (context->savedData == NULL)
+            rv = SECFailure;
+
+        /* clear out out session for others to use */
+        pk11_Finalize(context);
+    }
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Digest a key if possible./
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
+    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+    PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+
+    if (!context || !key) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+     * state.
+     */
+    if (context->slot != key->slot) {
+        newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, CKA_SIGN, key);
+    } else {
+        newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key);
+    }
+
+    context->init = PR_FALSE;
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                 context->savedLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (newKey == NULL) {
+        crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
+        if (key->data.data) {
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session, key->data.data, key->data.len);
+        }
+    } else {
+        crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session, newKey->objectID);
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        rv = SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
+     */
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                              &context->savedLength);
+        if (context->savedData == NULL)
+            rv = SECFailure;
+
+        /* clear out out session for others to use */
+        pk11_Finalize(context);
+    }
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    if (newKey)
+        PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize().
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    rv = pk11_Finalize(context);
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by
+ * someone new.
+ */
+SECStatus
+pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
+{
+    CK_ULONG count = 0;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    unsigned char stackBuf[256];
+    unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
+
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+finalize:
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DECRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+            break;
+        case CKA_SIGN:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+            break;
+        case CKA_VERIFY:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, buffer, count);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DIGEST:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, buffer, &count);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageEncryptFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageDecryptFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_SIGN:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageSignFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        case CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_VERIFY:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_MessageVerifyFinal(context->session);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+            PORT_Free(buffer);
+        }
+        if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED) {
+            /* if there's no operation, it is finalized */
+            return SECSuccess;
+        }
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Message interface does not need to allocate a final buffer */
+    if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* try to finalize the session with a buffer */
+    if (buffer == NULL) {
+        if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) {
+            buffer = stackBuf;
+        } else {
+            buffer = PORT_Alloc(count);
+            if (buffer == NULL) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+        }
+        goto finalize;
+    }
+    if (buffer != stackBuf) {
+        PORT_Free(buffer);
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Return the final digested or signed data...
+ *  this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data
+ *  either out of an arena or out of the standard heap.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *data,
+                 unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length)
+{
+    CK_ULONG len;
+    CK_RV crv;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* message interface returns no data on Final, Should not use DigestFinal
+     * in this case */
+    if (((context->operation) & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
+     * state.
+     */
+    PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
+    if (!context->ownSession) {
+        rv = pk11_restoreContext(context, context->savedData,
+                                 context->savedLength);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+            return rv;
+        }
+    }
+
+    len = length;
+    switch (context->operation) {
+        case CKA_SIGN:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+            break;
+        case CKA_VERIFY:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session, data, len);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DIGEST:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+            break;
+        case CKA_ENCRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+            break;
+        case CKA_DECRYPT:
+            crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session, data, &len);
+            break;
+        default:
+            crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
+            break;
+    }
+    PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
+
+    context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */
+
+    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+        PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    *outLen = (unsigned int)len;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+PRBool
+PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(PK11Context *context)
+{
+    if (context->slot == NULL) {
+        return PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    return pk11slot_GetFIPSStatus(context->slot, context->session,
+                                  CK_INVALID_HANDLE, context->init ? CKT_NSS_SESSION_CHECK : CKT_NSS_SESSION_LAST_CHECK);
+}