Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1087 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6eeafa5029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@
+/*
+ * This file contains prototypes for experimental SSL functions.
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef __sslexp_h_
+#define __sslexp_h_
+
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+#include "pk11hpke.h"
+
+SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
+
+/* The functions in this header file are not guaranteed to remain available in
+ * future NSS versions. Code that uses these functions needs to safeguard
+ * against the function not being available. */
+
+#define SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(name, arglist, args)                   \
+    (SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name)                                   \
+         ? ((SECStatus(*) arglist)SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name))args \
+         : SECFailure)
+#define SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API \
+    (PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API, 0), SECFailure)
+
+/*
+ * SSL_GetExtensionSupport() returns whether NSS supports a particular TLS
+ * extension.
+ *
+ * - ssl_ext_none indicates that NSS does not support the extension and
+ *   extension hooks can be installed.
+ *
+ * - ssl_ext_native indicates that NSS supports the extension natively, but
+ *   allows an application to override that support and install its own
+ *   extension hooks.
+ *
+ * - ssl_ext_native_only indicates that NSS supports the extension natively
+ *   and does not permit custom extension hooks to be installed.  These
+ *   extensions are critical to the functioning of NSS.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    ssl_ext_none,
+    ssl_ext_native,
+    ssl_ext_native_only
+} SSLExtensionSupport;
+
+#define SSL_GetExtensionSupport(extension, support)        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetExtensionSupport",        \
+                         (PRUint16 _extension,             \
+                          SSLExtensionSupport * _support), \
+                         (extension, support))
+
+/*
+ * Custom extension hooks.
+ *
+ * The SSL_InstallExtensionHooks() registers two callback functions for use
+ * with the identified extension type.
+ *
+ * Installing extension hooks disables the checks in TLS 1.3 that ensure that
+ * extensions are only added to the correct messages.  The application is
+ * responsible for ensuring that extensions are only sent with the right message
+ * or messages.
+ *
+ * Installing an extension handler does not disable checks for whether an
+ * extension can be used in a message that is a response to an extension in
+ * another message.  Extensions in ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions and the
+ * server Certificate messages are rejected unless the client sends an extension
+ * in the ClientHello.  Similarly, a client Certificate message cannot contain
+ * extensions that don't appear in a CertificateRequest (in TLS 1.3).
+ *
+ * Setting both |writer| and |handler| to NULL removes any existing hooks for
+ * that extension.
+ *
+ * == SSLExtensionWriter
+ *
+ * An SSLExtensionWriter function is responsible for constructing the contents
+ * of an extension.  This function is called during the construction of all
+ * handshake messages where an extension might be included.
+ *
+ * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
+ *
+ * - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type.  The writer will
+ *   be called for every handshake message that NSS sends.  Most extensions
+ *   should only be sent in a subset of messages.  NSS doesn’t check that
+ *   extension writers don’t violate protocol rules regarding which message an
+ *   extension can be sent in.
+ *
+ * - The |data| argument is a pointer to a buffer that should be written to with
+ *   any data for the extension.
+ *
+ * - The |len| argument is an outparam indicating how many bytes were written to
+ *   |data|.  The value referenced by |len| is initialized to zero, so an
+ *   extension that is empty does not need to write to this value.
+ *
+ * - The |maxLen| indicates the maximum number of bytes that can be written to
+ *   |data|.
+ *
+ * - The |arg| argument is the value of the writerArg that was passed during
+ *   installation.
+ *
+ * An SSLExtensionWriter function returns PR_TRUE if an extension should be
+ * written, and PR_FALSE otherwise.
+ *
+ * If there is an error, return PR_FALSE; if the error is truly fatal, the
+ * application can mark the connection as failed. However, recursively calling
+ * functions that alter the file descriptor in the callback - such as PR_Close()
+ * - should be avoided.
+ *
+ * Note: The ClientHello message can be sent twice in TLS 1.3.  An
+ * SSLExtensionWriter will be called twice with the same arguments in that case;
+ * NSS does not distinguish between a first and second ClientHello.  It is up to
+ * the application to track this if it needs to act differently each time.  In
+ * most cases the correct behaviour is to provide an identical extension on each
+ * invocation.
+ *
+ * == SSLExtensionHandler
+ *
+ * An SSLExtensionHandler function consumes a handshake message.  This function
+ * is called when an extension is present.
+ *
+ * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
+ *
+ * - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type. This can be used
+ *   to validate that the extension was included in the correct handshake
+ *   message.
+ *
+ * - The |data| argument points to the contents of the extension.
+ *
+ * - The |len| argument contains the length of the extension.
+ *
+ * - The |alert| argument is an outparam that allows an application to choose
+ *   which alert is sent in the case of a fatal error.
+ *
+ * - The |arg| argument is the value of the handlerArg that was passed during
+ *   installation.
+ *
+ * An SSLExtensionHandler function returns SECSuccess when the extension is
+ * process successfully.  It can return SECFailure to cause the handshake to
+ * fail.  If the value of alert is written to, NSS will generate a fatal alert
+ * using the provided alert code.  The value of |alert| is otherwise not used.
+ */
+typedef PRBool(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionWriter)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message,
+    PRUint8 *data, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxLen, void *arg);
+
+typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionHandler)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message,
+    const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len,
+    SSLAlertDescription *alert, void *arg);
+
+#define SSL_InstallExtensionHooks(fd, extension, writer, writerArg,         \
+                                  handler, handlerArg)                      \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_InstallExtensionHooks",                       \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _extension,            \
+                          SSLExtensionWriter _writer, void *_writerArg,     \
+                          SSLExtensionHandler _handler, void *_handlerArg), \
+                         (fd, extension, writer, writerArg,                 \
+                          handler, handlerArg))
+
+/*
+ * Create an anti-replay context for supporting 0-RTT in TLS 1.3 on servers.
+ *
+ * To use 0-RTT on a server, you must create an anti-replay context using
+ * SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext and set that on the socket with
+ * SSL_SetAntiReplayContext.  Failing to set a context on the server will result
+ * in all 0-RTT being rejected.  Connections will complete, but early data will
+ * be rejected.
+ *
+ * Anti-replay contexts are reference counted and are released with
+ * SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext.
+ *
+ * NSS uses a Bloom filter to track the ClientHello messages that it receives
+ * (specifically, it uses the PSK binder).  This function initializes a pair of
+ * Bloom filters.  The two filters are alternated over time, with new
+ * ClientHello messages recorded in the current filter and, if they are not
+ * already present, being checked against the previous filter.  If the
+ * ClientHello is found, then early data is rejected, but the handshake is
+ * allowed to proceed.
+ *
+ * The false-positive probability of Bloom filters means that some valid
+ * handshakes will be marked as potential replays.  Early data will be rejected
+ * for a false positive.  To minimize this and to allow a trade-off of space
+ * against accuracy, the size of the Bloom filter can be set by this function.
+ *
+ * The first tuning parameter to consider is |window|, which determines the
+ * window over which ClientHello messages will be tracked.  This also causes
+ * early data to be rejected if a ClientHello contains a ticket age parameter
+ * that is outside of this window (see Section 8.3 of RFC 8446 for details).
+ * Set |window| to account for any potential sources of clock error.  |window|
+ * is the entire width of the window, which is symmetrical.  Therefore to allow
+ * 5 seconds of clock error in both directions, set the value to 10 seconds
+ * (i.e., 10 * PR_USEC_PER_SEC).
+ *
+ * After calling this function, early data will be rejected until |window|
+ * elapses.  This prevents replay across crashes and restarts.  Only call this
+ * function once to avoid inadvertently disabling 0-RTT (use PR_CallOnce() to
+ * avoid this problem).
+ *
+ * The primary tuning parameter is |bits| which determines the amount of memory
+ * allocated to each Bloom filter.  NSS will allocate two Bloom filters, each
+ * |2^(bits - 3)| octets in size.  The value of |bits| is primarily driven by
+ * the number of connections that are expected in any time window.  Note that
+ * this needs to account for there being two filters both of which have
+ * (presumably) independent false positive rates.  The following formulae can be
+ * used to find a value of |bits| and |k| given a chosen false positive
+ * probability |p| and the number of requests expected in a given window |n|:
+ *
+ *   bits = log2(n) + log2(-ln(1 - sqrt(1 - p))) + 1.0575327458897952
+ *   k = -log2(p)
+ *
+ * ... where log2 and ln are base 2 and e logarithms respectively.  For a target
+ * false positive rate of 1% and 1000 handshake attempts, this produces bits=14
+ * and k=7.  This results in two Bloom filters that are 2kB each in size.  Note
+ * that rounding |k| and |bits| up causes the false positive probability for
+ * these values to be a much lower 0.123%.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: This anti-replay scheme has several weaknesses.  See the TLS 1.3
+ * specification for the details of the generic problems with this technique.
+ *
+ * In addition to the generic anti-replay weaknesses, the state that the server
+ * maintains is in local memory only.  Servers that operate in a cluster, even
+ * those that use shared memory for tickets, will not share anti-replay state.
+ * Early data can be replayed at least once with every server instance that will
+ * accept tickets that are encrypted with the same key.
+ */
+typedef struct SSLAntiReplayContextStr SSLAntiReplayContext;
+#define SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext(now, window, k, bits, ctx) \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext",        \
+                         (PRTime _now, PRTime _window,         \
+                          unsigned int _k, unsigned int _bits, \
+                          SSLAntiReplayContext **_ctx),        \
+                         (now, window, k, bits, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_SetAntiReplayContext(fd, ctx)                                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetAntiReplayContext",                      \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx), \
+                         (fd, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ctx)                \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext", \
+                         (SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx),  \
+                         (ctx))
+
+/*
+ * This function allows a server application to generate a session ticket that
+ * will embed the provided token.
+ *
+ * This function will cause a NewSessionTicket message to be sent by a server.
+ * This happens even if SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS is disabled.  This allows a
+ * server to suppress the usually automatic generation of a session ticket at
+ * the completion of the handshake - which do not include any token - and to
+ * control when session tickets are transmitted.
+ *
+ * This function will fail unless the socket has an active TLS 1.3 session.
+ * Earlier versions of TLS do not support the spontaneous sending of the
+ * NewSessionTicket message. It will also fail when external PSK
+ * authentication has been negotiated.
+ */
+#define SSL_SendSessionTicket(fd, appToken, appTokenLen)              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SendSessionTicket",                     \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_appToken, \
+                          unsigned int _appTokenLen),                 \
+                         (fd, appToken, appTokenLen))
+
+/*
+ * A stateless retry handler gives an application some control over NSS handling
+ * of ClientHello messages.
+ *
+ * SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback() installs a callback that allows an
+ * application to control how NSS sends HelloRetryRequest messages.  This
+ * handler is only used on servers and will only be called if the server selects
+ * TLS 1.3.  Support for older TLS versions could be added in other releases.
+ *
+ * The SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback is invoked during the processing of a
+ * TLS 1.3 ClientHello message.  It takes the following arguments:
+ *
+ * - |firstHello| indicates if the NSS believes that this is an initial
+ *   ClientHello.  An initial ClientHello will never include a cookie extension,
+ *   though it may contain a session ticket.
+ *
+ * - |clientToken| includes a token previously provided by the application.  If
+ *   |clientTokenLen| is 0, then |clientToken| may be NULL.
+ *
+ *   - If |firstHello| is PR_FALSE, the value that was provided in the
+ *     |retryToken| outparam of previous invocations of this callback will be
+ *     present here.
+ *
+ *   - If |firstHello| is PR_TRUE, and the handshake is resuming a session, then
+ *     this will contain any value that was passed in the |token| parameter of
+ *     SSL_SendNewSessionTicket() method (see below).  If this is not resuming a
+ *     session, then the token will be empty (and this value could be NULL).
+ *
+ * - |clientTokenLen| is the length of |clientToken|.
+ *
+ * - |retryToken| is an item that callback can write to.  This provides NSS with
+ *   a token.  This token is encrypted and integrity protected and embedded in
+ *   the cookie extension of a HelloRetryRequest.  The value of this field is
+ *   only used if the handler returns ssl_stateless_retry_check.  NSS allocates
+ *   space for this value.
+ *
+ * - |retryTokenLen| is an outparam for the length of the token. If this value
+ *   is not set, or set to 0, an empty token will be sent.
+ *
+ * - |retryTokenMax| is the size of the space allocated for retryToken. An
+ *   application cannot write more than this many bytes to retryToken.
+ *
+ * - |arg| is the same value that was passed to
+ *   SSL_InstallStatelessRetryHandler().
+ *
+ * The handler can validate any the value of |clientToken|, query the socket
+ * status (using SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo() for example) and decide how to
+ * proceed:
+ *
+ * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_fail causes the handshake to fail.  This might be
+ *   used if the token is invalid or the application wishes to abort the
+ *   handshake.
+ *
+ * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_accept causes the handshake to proceed.
+ *
+ * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_request causes NSS to send a HelloRetryRequest
+ *   message and request a second ClientHello.  NSS generates a cookie extension
+ *   and embeds the value of |retryToken|.  The value of |retryToken| value may
+ *   be left empty if the application does not require any additional context to
+ *   validate a second ClientHello attempt.  This return code cannot be used to
+ *   reject a second ClientHello (i.e., when firstHello is PR_FALSE); NSS will
+ *   abort the handshake if this value is returned from a second call.
+ *
+ * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt causes NSS to proceed normally, but
+ *   to reject 0-RTT.  Use this if there is something in the token that
+ *   indicates that 0-RTT might be unsafe.
+ *
+ * An application that chooses to perform a stateless retry can discard the
+ * server socket.  All necessary state to continue the TLS handshake will be
+ * included in the cookie extension.  This makes it possible to use a new socket
+ * to handle the remainder of the handshake.  The existing socket can be safely
+ * discarded.
+ *
+ * If the same socket is retained, the information in the cookie will be checked
+ * for consistency against the existing state of the socket.  Any discrepancy
+ * will result in the connection being closed.
+ *
+ * Tokens should be kept as small as possible.  NSS sets a limit on the size of
+ * tokens, which it passes in |retryTokenMax|.  Depending on circumstances,
+ * observing a smaller limit might be desirable or even necessary.  For
+ * instance, having HelloRetryRequest and ClientHello fit in a single packet has
+ * significant performance benefits.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+    ssl_hello_retry_fail,
+    ssl_hello_retry_accept,
+    ssl_hello_retry_request,
+    ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt
+} SSLHelloRetryRequestAction;
+
+typedef SSLHelloRetryRequestAction(PR_CALLBACK *SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback)(
+    PRBool firstHello, const PRUint8 *clientToken, unsigned int clientTokenLen,
+    PRUint8 *retryToken, unsigned int *retryTokenLen, unsigned int retryTokMax,
+    void *arg);
+
+#define SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback(fd, cb, arg)                       \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback",                \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd,                              \
+                          SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback _cb, void *_arg), \
+                         (fd, cb, arg))
+
+/* Update traffic keys (TLS 1.3 only).
+ *
+ * The |requestUpdate| flag determines whether to request an update from the
+ * remote peer.
+ */
+#define SSL_KeyUpdate(fd, requestUpdate)                            \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_KeyUpdate",                           \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _requestUpdate), \
+                         (fd, requestUpdate))
+
+/* This function allows a server application to trigger
+ * re-authentication (TLS 1.3 only) after handshake.
+ *
+ * This function will cause a CertificateRequest message to be sent by
+ * a server.  This can be called once at a time, and is not allowed
+ * until an answer is received.
+ *
+ * This function is not allowed for use with DTLS or when external
+ * PSK authentication has been negotiated. SECFailure is returned
+ * in both cases.
+ *
+ * The AuthCertificateCallback is called when the answer is received.
+ * If the answer is accepted by the server, the value returned by
+ * SSL_PeerCertificate() is replaced.  If you need to remember all the
+ * certificates, you will need to call SSL_PeerCertificate() and save
+ * what you get before calling this.
+ *
+ * If the AuthCertificateCallback returns SECFailure, the connection
+ * is aborted.
+ */
+#define SSL_SendCertificateRequest(fd)                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SendCertificateRequest", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd),           \
+                         (fd))
+
+/*
+ * Session cache API.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Information that can be retrieved about a resumption token.
+ * See SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo for details about how to use this API.
+ * Note that peerCert points to a certificate in the NSS database and must be
+ * copied by the application if it should be used after NSS shutdown or after
+ * calling SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo.
+ */
+typedef struct SSLResumptionTokenInfoStr {
+    PRUint16 length;
+    CERTCertificate *peerCert;
+    PRUint8 *alpnSelection;
+    PRUint32 alpnSelectionLen;
+    PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize;
+    PRTime expirationTime; /* added in NSS 3.41 */
+} SSLResumptionTokenInfo;
+
+/*
+ * Allows applications to retrieve information about a resumption token.
+ * This does not require a TLS session.
+ *
+ * - The |tokenData| argument is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
+ *   of length |tokenLen|.
+ * - The |token| argument is a pointer to a SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct of
+ *   of |len|. The struct gets filled by this function.
+ * See SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo for information about how to manage the
+ * |token| memory.
+ */
+#define SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo(tokenData, tokenLen, token, len)          \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo",                       \
+                         (const PRUint8 *_tokenData, unsigned int _tokenLen, \
+                          SSLResumptionTokenInfo *_token, PRUintn _len),     \
+                         (tokenData, tokenLen, token, len))
+
+/*
+ * SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo allocates memory in order to populate |tokenInfo|.
+ * Any SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct filled with SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo
+ * has to be freed with SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo.
+ */
+#define SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo(tokenInfo) \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(                         \
+        "SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo",         \
+        (SSLResumptionTokenInfo * _tokenInfo),    \
+        (tokenInfo))
+
+/*
+ * This is the function signature for function pointers used as resumption
+ * token callback. The caller has to copy the memory at |resumptionToken| with
+ * length |len| before returning.
+ *
+ * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
+ * - The |resumptionToken| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
+ *   of length |len|.
+ * - The |ctx| is a void pointer to the context set by the application in
+ *   SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback.
+ */
+typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLResumptionTokenCallback)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *resumptionToken, unsigned int len,
+    void *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * This allows setting a callback for external session caches to store
+ * resumption tokens.
+ *
+ * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
+ * - The |cb| is a function pointer to an implementation of
+ *   SSLResumptionTokenCallback.
+ * - The |ctx| is a pointer to some application specific context, which is
+ *   returned when |cb| is called.
+ */
+#define SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback(fd, cb, ctx)                     \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(                                               \
+        "SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback",                               \
+        (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLResumptionTokenCallback _cb, void *_ctx), \
+        (fd, cb, ctx))
+
+/*
+ * This allows setting a resumption token for a session.
+ * The function returns SECSuccess iff the resumption token can be used,
+ * SECFailure in any other case. The caller should remove the |token| from its
+ * cache when the function returns SECFailure.
+ *
+ * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor.
+ * - The |token| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array
+ *   of length |len|.
+ */
+#define SSL_SetResumptionToken(fd, token, len)                              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(                                                   \
+        "SSL_SetResumptionToken",                                           \
+        (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_token, const unsigned int _len), \
+        (fd, token, len))
+
+/* TLS 1.3 allows a server to set a limit on the number of bytes of early data
+ * that can be received. This allows that limit to be set. This function has no
+ * effect on a client. */
+#define SSL_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(fd, size)                    \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetMaxEarlyDataSize",          \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint32 _size), \
+                         (fd, size))
+
+/* Client:
+ * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello,
+ * unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket
+ * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent.
+ *
+ * Server:
+ * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extensions will be sent in every HelloRetryRequest,
+ * provided that the corresponding ClientHello contained an ECH extension. If ECH
+ * is enabled, the real ECH HRR extension takes precedence.
+ */
+#define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled)        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
+
+/*
+ * Client:
+ * When sending a GREASE ECH extension in a ClientHello, pad it as though the
+ * hypothetical ECHConfig had |maximum_name_length| equal to |size|. |size| may
+ * vary between 1 and 255 and defaults to 100.
+ *
+ * Server:
+ * Has no effect.
+ */
+#define SSL_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(fd, size)           \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetTls13GreaseEchSize", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint8 _size), (fd, size))
+
+/* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing an encrypted_client_hello
+ * of type inner will respond with the ECH
+ * acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner
+ * transcript rather than outer. */
+#define SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch(fd, enabled)        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
+
+/* This allows an extension writer to supply different values for inner and
+ * outer ClientHello when using encrypted ClientHello.
+ *
+ * When enabled, each extension writer can be called more than once for the same
+ * message; it must provide the same response when called for the same message
+ * type.  When calling the writer to construct the outer ClientHello, the
+ * function will be called with ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello as the message
+ * type (a value from outside the range of valid TLS handshake messages).
+ *
+ * When disabled, the extension writer is called once for the outer ClientHello
+ * and the value is copied to the inner ClientHello.
+ *
+ * Enabling this affects all extension writers.  The order in which extension
+ * writers are added is also important.  Any extension writer that writes
+ * different values for inner and outer ClientHello will prevent later
+ * extensions from being compressed.
+ */
+#define SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(fd, enabled)        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
+
+/* Called by the client after an initial ECH connection fails with
+ * SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH. Returns compatible ECHConfigs, which
+ * are configured via SetClientEchConfigs for an ECH retry attempt.
+ * These configs MUST NOT be used for more than the single retry
+ * attempt. Subsequent connections MUST use advertised ECHConfigs. */
+#define SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs(fd, out)            \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd,        \
+                          SECItem * _out),         \
+                         (fd, out))
+
+/* Called to remove all ECHConfigs from a socket (fd). */
+#define SSL_RemoveEchConfigs(fd)                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RemoveEchConfigs", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd),     \
+                         (fd))
+
+/* Set the ECHConfig and key pair on a socket (server side)
+ *
+ * fd -- the socket
+ * pubKey -- the server's SECKEYPublicKey for HPKE/ECH.
+ * privateKey -- the server's SECKEYPrivateKey for HPKE/ECH.
+ * record/recordLen -- the encoded DNS record (not base64)
+ */
+#define SSL_SetServerEchConfigs(fd, pubKey,                                 \
+                                privKey, record, recordLen)                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetServerEchConfigs",                         \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd,                                 \
+                          const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey,                   \
+                          const SECKEYPrivateKey *_privKey,                 \
+                          const PRUint8 *_record, unsigned int _recordLen), \
+                         (fd, pubKey, privKey,                              \
+                          record, recordLen))
+
+/* Set ECHConfig(s) on a client. The first supported ECHConfig will be used.
+ *
+ * fd -- the socket
+ * echConfigs/echConfigsLen -- the ECHConfigs structure (not base64)
+ */
+#define SSL_SetClientEchConfigs(fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen) \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetClientEchConfigs",            \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd,                    \
+                          const PRUint8 *_echConfigs,          \
+                          unsigned int _echConfigsLen),        \
+                         (fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen))
+
+/*
+ * Generate an encoded ECHConfig structure (presumably server side).
+ *
+ * configId -- an identifier for the configuration.
+ * publicName -- the public_name value to be placed in SNI.
+ * maxNameLen -- the maximum length of protected names
+ * kemId -- the HKPE KEM ID value
+ * pubKey -- the public key for the key pair
+ * hpkeSuites -- the HPKE cipher suites that can be used
+ * hpkeSuitesCount -- the number of suites in hpkeSuites
+ * out/outlen/maxlen -- where to output the data
+ */
+typedef struct HpkeSymmetricSuiteStr {
+    HpkeKdfId kdfId;
+    HpkeAeadId aeadId;
+} HpkeSymmetricSuite;
+#define SSL_EncodeEchConfigId(configId, publicName, maxNameLen,          \
+                              kemId, pubKey, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuiteCount, \
+                              out, outlen, maxlen)                       \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EncodeEchConfigId",                        \
+                         (PRUint8 _configId, const char *_publicName,    \
+                          unsigned int _maxNameLen, HpkeKemId _kemId,    \
+                          const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey,                \
+                          const HpkeSymmetricSuite *_hpkeSuites,         \
+                          unsigned int _hpkeSuiteCount,                  \
+                          PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outlen,          \
+                          unsigned int _maxlen),                         \
+                         (configId, publicName, maxNameLen,              \
+                          kemId, pubKey, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuiteCount,     \
+                          out, outlen, maxlen))
+
+/* SSL_SetSecretCallback installs a callback that TLS calls when it installs new
+ * traffic secrets.
+ *
+ * SSLSecretCallback is called with the current epoch and the corresponding
+ * secret; this matches the epoch used in DTLS 1.3, even if the socket is
+ * operating in stream mode:
+ *
+ * - client_early_traffic_secret corresponds to epoch 1
+ * - {client|server}_handshake_traffic_secret is epoch 2
+ * - {client|server}_application_traffic_secret_{N} is epoch 3+N
+ *
+ * The callback is invoked separately for read secrets (client secrets on the
+ * server; server secrets on the client), and write secrets.
+ *
+ * This callback is only called if (D)TLS 1.3 is negotiated.
+ */
+typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLSecretCallback)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLSecretDirection dir, PK11SymKey *secret,
+    void *arg);
+
+#define SSL_SecretCallback(fd, cb, arg)                                         \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SecretCallback",                                  \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLSecretCallback _cb, void *_arg), \
+                         (fd, cb, arg))
+
+/* SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() is used to replace the TLS record layer.  This
+ * function installs a callback that TLS calls when it would otherwise encrypt
+ * and write a record to the underlying NSPR IO layer.  The application is
+ * responsible for ensuring that these records are encrypted and written.
+ *
+ * Calling this API also disables reads from the underlying NSPR layer.  The
+ * application is expected to push data when it is available using
+ * SSL_RecordLayerData().
+ *
+ * When data would be written, the provided SSLRecordWriteCallback with the
+ * epoch, TLS content type, and the data. The data provided to the callback is
+ * not split into record-sized writes.  If the callback returns SECFailure, the
+ * write will be considered to have failed; in particular, PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR
+ * is not handled specially.
+ *
+ * If TLS 1.3 is in use, the epoch indicates the expected level of protection
+ * that the record would receive, this matches that used in DTLS 1.3:
+ *
+ * - epoch 0 corresponds to no record protection
+ * - epoch 1 corresponds to 0-RTT
+ * - epoch 2 corresponds to TLS handshake
+ * - epoch 3 and higher are application data
+ *
+ * Prior versions of TLS use epoch 1 and higher for application data.
+ *
+ * This API is not supported for DTLS.
+ */
+typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLRecordWriteCallback)(
+    PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLContentType contentType,
+    const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, void *arg);
+
+#define SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback(fd, writeCb, arg)                   \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback",                 \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLRecordWriteCallback _wCb, \
+                          void *_arg),                                   \
+                         (fd, writeCb, arg))
+
+/* SSL_RecordLayerData() is used to provide new data to TLS.  The application
+ * indicates the epoch (see the description of SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback()),
+ * content type, and the data that was received.  The application is responsible
+ * for removing any encryption or other protection before passing data to this
+ * function.
+ *
+ * This returns SECSuccess if the data was successfully processed.  If this
+ * function is used to drive the handshake and the caller needs to know when the
+ * handshake is complete, a call to SSL_ForceHandshake will return SECSuccess
+ * when the handshake is complete.
+ *
+ * This API is not supported for DTLS sockets.
+ */
+#define SSL_RecordLayerData(fd, epoch, ct, data, len)               \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RecordLayerData",                     \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _epoch,        \
+                          SSLContentType _contentType,              \
+                          const PRUint8 *_data, unsigned int _len), \
+                         (fd, epoch, ct, data, len))
+
+/*
+ * SSL_GetCurrentEpoch() returns the read and write epochs that the socket is
+ * currently using.  NULL values for readEpoch or writeEpoch are ignored.
+ *
+ * See SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() for details on epochs.
+ */
+#define SSL_GetCurrentEpoch(fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch)             \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetCurrentEpoch",                    \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _readEpoch, \
+                          PRUint16 * _writeEpoch),                 \
+                         (fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch))
+
+/*
+ * The following AEAD functions expose an AEAD primitive that uses a ciphersuite
+ * to set parameters.  The ciphersuite determines the Hash function used by
+ * HKDF, the AEAD function, and the size of key and IV.  This is only supported
+ * for TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label.  That is
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, labelPrefix + " key" or " iv", "", L).
+ *
+ * The encrypt and decrypt functions use a nonce construction identical to that
+ * used in TLS.  The lower bits of the IV are XORed with the 64-bit counter to
+ * produce the nonce.  Otherwise, this is an AEAD interface similar to that
+ * described in RFC 5116.
+ *
+ * Note: SSL_MakeAead internally calls SSL_MakeVariantAead with a variant of
+ * "stream", behaving as noted above. If "datagram" variant is passed instead,
+ * the Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See
+ * 7.1 of RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
+typedef struct SSLAeadContextStr SSLAeadContext;
+
+#define SSL_MakeAead(version, cipherSuite, secret,                  \
+                     labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx)              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_MakeAead",                            \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
+                          PK11SymKey * _secret,                     \
+                          const char *_labelPrefix,                 \
+                          unsigned int _labelPrefixLen,             \
+                          SSLAeadContext **_ctx),                   \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, secret,             \
+                          labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_MakeVariantAead(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret,  \
+                            labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx)       \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_MakeVariantAead",                     \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
+                          SSLProtocolVariant _variant,              \
+                          PK11SymKey * _secret,                     \
+                          const char *_labelPrefix,                 \
+                          unsigned int _labelPrefixLen,             \
+                          SSLAeadContext **_ctx),                   \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, variant, secret,    \
+                          labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_AeadEncrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen,            \
+                        output, outputLen, maxOutputLen)                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AeadEncrypt",                              \
+                         (const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \
+                          const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen,     \
+                          const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen,       \
+                          PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outLen,          \
+                          unsigned int _maxOut),                         \
+                         (ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen,          \
+                          output, outputLen, maxOutputLen))
+
+#define SSL_AeadDecrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen,            \
+                        output, outputLen, maxOutputLen)                 \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AeadDecrypt",                              \
+                         (const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \
+                          const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen,     \
+                          const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen,       \
+                          PRUint8 *_output, unsigned int *_outLen,       \
+                          unsigned int _maxOut),                         \
+                         (ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen,          \
+                          output, outputLen, maxOutputLen))
+
+#define SSL_DestroyAead(ctx)                      \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DestroyAead",       \
+                         (SSLAeadContext * _ctx), \
+                         (ctx))
+
+/* SSL_HkdfExtract and SSL_HkdfExpandLabel implement the functions from TLS,
+ * using the version and ciphersuite to set parameters. This allows callers to
+ * use these TLS functions as a KDF. This is only supported for TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * SSL_HkdfExtract produces a key with a mechanism that is suitable for input to
+ * SSL_HkdfExpandLabel (and SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech). */
+#define SSL_HkdfExtract(version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp)      \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExtract",                         \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
+                          PK11SymKey * _salt, PK11SymKey * _ikm,    \
+                          PK11SymKey * *_keyp),                     \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp))
+
+/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabel and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel produce a key with a
+ * mechanism that is suitable for input to SSL_HkdfExpandLabel or SSL_MakeAead.
+ *
+ * Note: SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel internally calls SSL_HkdfExpandLabel with
+ * a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the
+ * Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of
+ * RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
+#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk,                     \
+                            hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp)      \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExpandLabel",                            \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite,        \
+                          PK11SymKey * _prk,                               \
+                          const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
+                          const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen,      \
+                          PK11SymKey **_keyp),                             \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, prk,                       \
+                          hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp))
+
+#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk,                   \
+                                   hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant, \
+                                   keyp)                                        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel",                          \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite,             \
+                          PK11SymKey * _prk,                                    \
+                          const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen,      \
+                          const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen,           \
+                          SSLProtocolVariant _variant,                          \
+                          PK11SymKey **_keyp),                                  \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, prk,                            \
+                          hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant,          \
+                          keyp))
+
+/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech use the KDF
+ * from the selected TLS version and cipher suite, as with the other calls, but
+ * the provided mechanism and key size. This allows the key to be used more widely.
+ *
+ * Note: SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech internally calls SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech
+ * with a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the
+ * Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of
+ * RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */
+#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk,             \
+                                    hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen,    \
+                                    mech, keySize, keyp)                   \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech",                    \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite,        \
+                          PK11SymKey * _prk,                               \
+                          const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \
+                          const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen,      \
+                          CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize,  \
+                          PK11SymKey **_keyp),                             \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, prk,                       \
+                          hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen,              \
+                          mech, keySize, keyp))
+
+#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk,          \
+                                           hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \
+                                           mech, keySize, variant, keyp)       \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech",                 \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite,            \
+                          PK11SymKey * _prk,                                   \
+                          const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen,     \
+                          const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen,          \
+                          CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize,      \
+                          SSLProtocolVariant _variant,                         \
+                          PK11SymKey **_keyp),                                 \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, prk,                           \
+                          hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen,                  \
+                          mech, keySize, variant, keyp))
+
+/* SSL_SetTimeFunc overrides the default time function (PR_Now()) and provides
+ * an alternative source of time for the socket. This is used in testing, and in
+ * applications that need better control over how the clock is accessed. Set the
+ * function to NULL to use PR_Now().*/
+typedef PRTime(PR_CALLBACK *SSLTimeFunc)(void *arg);
+
+#define SSL_SetTimeFunc(fd, f, arg)                                      \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetTimeFunc",                              \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLTimeFunc _f, void *_arg), \
+                         (fd, f, arg))
+
+/* Create a delegated credential (DC) for the draft-ietf-tls-subcerts extension
+ * using the given certificate |cert| and its signing key |certPriv| and write
+ * the serialized DC to |out|. The
+ * parameters are:
+ *  - the DC public key |dcPub|;
+ *  - the DC signature scheme |dcCertVerifyAlg|, used to verify the handshake.
+ *  - the DC time-to-live |dcValidFor|, the number of seconds from now for which
+ *    the DC should be valid; and
+ *  - the current time |now|.
+ *
+ *  The signing algorithm used to verify the DC signature is deduced from
+ *  |cert|.
+ *
+ *  It's the caller's responsibility to ensure the input parameters are all
+ *  valid. This procedure is meant primarily for testing; for this purpose it is
+ *  useful to do no validation.
+ */
+#define SSL_DelegateCredential(cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg,        \
+                               dcValidFor, now, out)                          \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DelegateCredential",                            \
+                         (const CERTCertificate *_cert,                       \
+                          const SECKEYPrivateKey *_certPriv,                  \
+                          const SECKEYPublicKey *_dcPub,                      \
+                          SSLSignatureScheme _dcCertVerifyAlg,                \
+                          PRUint32 _dcValidFor,                               \
+                          PRTime _now,                                        \
+                          SECItem *_out),                                     \
+                         (cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg, dcValidFor, \
+                          now, out))
+
+/* New functions created to permit get/set the CipherSuites Order for the
+ * handshake (Client Hello).
+ *
+ * The *Get function puts the current set of active (enabled and policy set as
+ * PR_TRUE) cipher suites in the cipherOrder outparam. Cipher suites that
+ * aren't active aren't included. The paramenters are:
+ *   - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to get information.
+ *   - PRUint16 *cipherOrder = The memory allocated for cipherOrder needs to be
+ *     SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers() * sizeof(PRUint16) or more.
+ *   - PRUint16 numCiphers = The number of active ciphersuites listed in
+ *     *cipherOrder is written here.
+ *
+ * The *Set function permits reorder the CipherSuites list for the Handshake
+ * (Client Hello). The default ordering defined in ssl3con.c is enough in
+ * almost all cases. But, if the client needs some hardening or performance
+ * adjusts related to CipherSuites, this can be done with this function.
+ * The caller has to be aware about the risk of call this function while a
+ * handshake are being processed in this fd/socket. For example, if you disable
+ * a cipher after the handshake and this cipher was choosen for that
+ * connection, something bad will happen.
+ * The parameters are:
+ *   - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to change.
+ *   - const PRUint16 *cipherOrder = Must receive all ciphers to be ordered, in
+ *     the desired order. They will be set in the begin of the list. Only
+ *     suites listed by SSL_ImplementedCiphers() can be included.
+ *   - PRUint16 numCiphers = Must receive the number of items in *cipherOrder.
+ * */
+#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers)         \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet",                  \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _cipherOrder, \
+                          unsigned int *_numCiphers),                \
+                         (fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers))
+
+#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers)              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet",                       \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint16 *_cipherOrder, \
+                          PRUint16 _numCiphers),                          \
+                         (fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers))
+
+/*
+ * The following functions expose a masking primitive that uses ciphersuite and
+ * version information to set paramaters for the masking key and mask generation
+ * logic. This is only supported for TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label.  That is
+ * HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, label, "", L), where |label| is an input to
+ * SSL_CreateMaskingContext.
+ *
+ * The mask generation logic in SSL_CreateMask is determined by the underlying
+ * symmetric cipher:
+ *  - For AES-ECB, mask = AES-ECB(mask_key, sample). |len| must be <= 16 as
+ *    the output is limited to a single block.
+ *  - For CHACHA20, mask = ChaCha20(mask_key, sample[0..3], sample[4..15], {0}.len)
+ *    That is, the low 4 bytes of |sample| used as the counter, the remaining 12 bytes
+ *    the nonce. We encrypt |len| bytes of zeros, returning the raw key stream.
+ *
+ *  The caller must pre-allocate at least |len| bytes for output. If the underlying
+ *  cipher cannot produce the requested amount of data, SECFailure is returned.
+ */
+
+typedef struct SSLMaskingContextStr {
+    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech;
+    PRUint16 version;
+    PRUint16 cipherSuite;
+    PK11SymKey *secret;
+} SSLMaskingContext;
+
+#define SSL_CreateMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, secret,      \
+                                 label, labelLen, ctx)              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateMaskingContext",                \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \
+                          PK11SymKey * _secret,                     \
+                          const char *_label,                       \
+                          unsigned int _labelLen,                   \
+                          SSLMaskingContext **_ctx),                \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, secret, label, labelLen, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, variant, \
+                                        secret, label, labelLen, ctx)  \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext",            \
+                         (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite,    \
+                          SSLProtocolVariant _variant,                 \
+                          PK11SymKey * _secret,                        \
+                          const char *_label,                          \
+                          unsigned int _labelLen,                      \
+                          SSLMaskingContext **_ctx),                   \
+                         (version, cipherSuite, variant, secret,       \
+                          label, labelLen, ctx))
+
+#define SSL_DestroyMaskingContext(ctx)                \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DestroyMaskingContext", \
+                         (SSLMaskingContext * _ctx),  \
+                         (ctx))
+
+#define SSL_CreateMask(ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen)               \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateMask",                                  \
+                         (SSLMaskingContext * _ctx, const PRUint8 *_sample, \
+                          unsigned int _sampleLen, PRUint8 *_mask,          \
+                          unsigned int _maskLen),                           \
+                         (ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen))
+
+#define SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(fd, enabled)        \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround", \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled))
+
+/* SSL_AddExternalPsk() and SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt() can be used to
+ * set an external PSK on a socket. If successful, this PSK will
+ * be used in all subsequent connection attempts for this socket.
+ * This has no effect if the maximum TLS version is < 1.3.
+ *
+ * This API currently only accepts a single PSK, so multiple calls to
+ * either function will fail. An EPSK can be replaced by calling
+ * SSL_RemoveExternalPsk followed by SSL_AddExternalPsk.
+ * For both functions, the label is expected to be a unique identifier
+ * for the external PSK. Should en external PSK have the same label
+ * as a configured resumption PSK identity, the external PSK will
+ * take precedence.
+ *
+ * If you want to enable early data, you need to also provide a
+ * cipher suite for 0-RTT and a limit for the early data using
+ * SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(). If you want to explicitly disallow
+ * certificate authentication, use SSL_AuthCertificateHook to set
+ * a callback that rejects all certificate chains.
+ */
+#define SSL_AddExternalPsk(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash)               \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AddExternalPsk",                                 \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk,                 \
+                          const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \
+                          SSLHashType _hash),                                  \
+                         (fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash))
+
+#define SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash,           \
+                               zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData)                     \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt",                             \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk,                 \
+                          const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \
+                          SSLHashType _hash, PRUint16 _zeroRttSuite,           \
+                          PRUint32 _maxEarlyData),                             \
+                         (fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash,                \
+                          zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData))
+
+/* SSLExp_RemoveExternalPsk() removes an external PSK from socket
+ * configuration. Returns SECSuccess if the PSK was removed
+ * successfully, and SECFailure otherwise. */
+#define SSL_RemoveExternalPsk(fd, identity, identityLen)              \
+    SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RemoveExternalPsk",                     \
+                         (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_identity, \
+                          unsigned int _identityLen),                 \
+                         (fd, identity, identityLen))
+
+/* Deprecated experimental APIs */
+#define SSL_UseAltServerHelloType(fd, enable) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_SetupAntiReplay(a, b, c) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_InitAntiReplay(a, b, c) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_EnableESNI(a, b, c, d) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_EncodeESNIKeys(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_SetESNIKeyPair(a, b, c, d) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+#define SSL_EncodeEchConfig(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API
+
+SEC_END_PROTOS
+
+#endif /* __sslexp_h_ */