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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000 |
| commit | 36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9 (patch) | |
| tree | 105e8c98ddea1c1e4784a60a5a6410fa416be2de /security/nss/lib/ssl | |
| parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
| download | firefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.tar.xz firefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.zip | |
Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/ssl')
84 files changed, 61261 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/Makefile b/security/nss/lib/ssl/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a8b06f4b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +#! gmake +# +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. + +####################################################################### +# (1) Include initial platform-independent assignments (MANDATORY). # +####################################################################### + +include manifest.mn + +####################################################################### +# (2) Include "global" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) # +####################################################################### + +include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/config.mk + +####################################################################### +# (3) Include "component" configuration information. (OPTIONAL) # +###################################################################### +# + + +####################################################################### +# (4) Include "local" platform-dependent assignments (OPTIONAL). # +####################################################################### + +include config.mk + +ifeq (,$(filter-out WIN%,$(OS_TARGET))) +CSRCS += win32err.c +DEFINES += -DIN_LIBSSL +else +ifeq ($(OS_TARGET),OS2) +CSRCS += os2_err.c +else +CSRCS += unix_err.c +endif +endif + +# Enable key logging by default in debug builds, but not opt builds. +# Logging still needs to be enabled at runtime through env vars. +NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE ?= $(if $(BUILD_OPT),0,1) +ifeq (1,$(NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE)) +DEFINES += -DNSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE=1 +endif + +####################################################################### +# (5) Execute "global" rules. (OPTIONAL) # +####################################################################### + +include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/rules.mk + +####################################################################### +# (6) Execute "component" rules. (OPTIONAL) # +####################################################################### + + + +####################################################################### +# (7) Execute "local" rules. (OPTIONAL). # +####################################################################### diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c585c7d4f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/SSLerrs.h @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#define UNUSED_ERROR(x) ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNUSED_##x, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + x), \ + "Unrecognized SSL error_code.") + +/* SSL-specific security error codes */ +/* caller must include "sslerr.h" */ + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 0, + "Unable to communicate securely. Peer does not support high-grade encryption.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_US_ONLY_SERVER, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 1, + "Unable to communicate securely. Peer requires high-grade encryption which is not supported.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 2, + "Cannot communicate securely with peer: no common encryption algorithm(s).") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 3, + "Unable to find the certificate or key necessary for authentication.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 4, + "Unable to communicate securely with peer: peers's certificate was rejected.") + +UNUSED_ERROR(5) + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 6, + "The server has encountered bad data from the client.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 7, + "The client has encountered bad data from the server.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 8, + "Unsupported certificate type.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 9, + "Peer using unsupported version of security protocol.") + +UNUSED_ERROR(10) + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_WRONG_CERTIFICATE, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 11, + "Client authentication failed: private key in key database does not match public key in certificate database.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 12, + "Unable to communicate securely with peer: requested domain name does not match the server's certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_POST_WARNING, SSL_ERROR_BASE + 13, + "Unrecognized SSL error code.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SSL2_DISABLED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 14), + "Peer only supports SSL version 2, which is locally disabled.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 15), + "SSL received a record with an incorrect Message Authentication Code.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 16), + "SSL peer reports incorrect Message Authentication Code.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 17), + "SSL peer cannot verify your certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 18), + "SSL peer rejected your certificate as revoked.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 19), + "SSL peer rejected your certificate as expired.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 20), + "Cannot connect: SSL is disabled.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FORTEZZA_PQG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 21), + "Cannot connect: SSL peer is in another FORTEZZA domain.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 22), + "An unknown SSL cipher suite has been requested.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 23), + "No cipher suites are present and enabled in this program.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 24), + "SSL received a record with bad block padding.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 25), + "SSL received a record that exceeded the maximum permissible length.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 26), + "SSL attempted to send a record that exceeded the maximum permissible length.") + +/* + * Received a malformed (too long or short or invalid content) SSL handshake. + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 27), + "SSL received a malformed Hello Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 28), + "SSL received a malformed Client Hello handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 29), + "SSL received a malformed Server Hello handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 30), + "SSL received a malformed Certificate handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 31), + "SSL received a malformed Server Key Exchange handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 32), + "SSL received a malformed Certificate Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 33), + "SSL received a malformed Server Hello Done handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 34), + "SSL received a malformed Certificate Verify handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 35), + "SSL received a malformed Client Key Exchange handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 36), + "SSL received a malformed Finished handshake message.") + +/* + * Received a malformed (too long or short) SSL record. + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 37), + "SSL received a malformed Change Cipher Spec record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 38), + "SSL received a malformed Alert record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 39), + "SSL received a malformed Handshake record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_APPLICATION_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 40), + "SSL received a malformed Application Data record.") + +/* + * Received an SSL handshake that was inappropriate for the state we're in. + * E.g. Server received message from server, or wrong state in state machine. + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 41), + "SSL received an unexpected Hello Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 42), + "SSL received an unexpected Client Hello handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 43), + "SSL received an unexpected Server Hello handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 44), + "SSL received an unexpected Certificate handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 45), + "SSL received an unexpected Server Key Exchange handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 46), + "SSL received an unexpected Certificate Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 47), + "SSL received an unexpected Server Hello Done handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 48), + "SSL received an unexpected Certificate Verify handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 49), + "SSL received an unexpected Client Key Exchange handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 50), + "SSL received an unexpected Finished handshake message.") + +/* + * Received an SSL record that was inappropriate for the state we're in. + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 51), + "SSL received an unexpected Change Cipher Spec record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 52), + "SSL received an unexpected Alert record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 53), + "SSL received an unexpected Handshake record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 54), + "SSL received an unexpected Application Data record.") + +/* + * Received record/message with unknown discriminant. + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 55), + "SSL received a record with an unknown content type.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 56), + "SSL received a handshake message with an unknown message type.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 57), + "SSL received an alert record with an unknown alert description.") + +/* + * Received an alert reporting what we did wrong. (more alerts above) + */ +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 58), + "SSL peer has closed this connection.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 59), + "SSL peer was not expecting a handshake message it received.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 60), + "SSL peer was unable to successfully decompress an SSL record it received.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 61), + "SSL peer was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 62), + "SSL peer rejected a handshake message for unacceptable content.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 63), + "SSL peer does not support certificates of the type it received.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 64), + "SSL peer had some unspecified issue with the certificate it received.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 65), + "SSL experienced a failure of its random number generator.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 66), + "Unable to digitally sign data required to verify your certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 67), + "SSL was unable to extract the public key from the peer's certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 68), + "Unspecified failure while processing SSL Server Key Exchange handshake.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 69), + "Unspecified failure while processing SSL Client Key Exchange handshake.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 70), + "Bulk data encryption algorithm failed in selected cipher suite.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 71), + "Bulk data decryption algorithm failed in selected cipher suite.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 72), + "Attempt to write encrypted data to underlying socket failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 73), + "MD5 digest function failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 74), + "SHA-1 digest function failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 75), + "MAC computation failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 76), + "Failure to create Symmetric Key context.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 77), + "Failure to unwrap the Symmetric key in Client Key Exchange message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 78), + "SSL Server attempted to use domestic-grade public key with export cipher suite.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 79), + "PKCS11 code failed to translate an IV into a param.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 80), + "Failed to initialize the selected cipher suite.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 81), + "Client failed to generate session keys for SSL session.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 82), + "Server has no key for the attempted key exchange algorithm.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 83), + "PKCS#11 token was inserted or removed while operation was in progress.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 84), + "No PKCS#11 token could be found to do a required operation.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 85), + "Cannot communicate securely with peer: no common compression algorithm(s).") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 86), + "Cannot perform the operation until the handshake is complete.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 87), + "Received incorrect handshakes hash values from peer.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CERT_KEA_MISMATCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 88), + "The certificate provided cannot be used with the selected authentication type.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_SSL_CLIENT_CA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 89), + "No certificate authority is trusted for SSL client authentication.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_NOT_FOUND, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 90), + "Client's SSL session ID not found in server's session cache.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 91), + "Peer was unable to decrypt an SSL record it received.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 92), + "Peer received an SSL record that was longer than is permitted.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 93), + "Peer does not recognize and trust the CA that issued your certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 94), + "Peer received a valid certificate, but access was denied.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 95), + "Peer could not decode an SSL handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 96), + "Peer reports failure of signature verification or key exchange.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 97), + "Peer reports negotiation not in compliance with export regulations.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 98), + "Peer reports incompatible or unsupported protocol version.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 99), + "Server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by client.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 100), + "Peer reports it experienced an internal error.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 101), + "Peer user canceled handshake.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 102), + "Peer does not permit renegotiation of SSL security parameters.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 103), + "SSL server cache not configured and not disabled for this socket.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 104), + "SSL peer does not support requested TLS hello extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 105), + "SSL peer could not obtain your certificate from the supplied URL.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 106), + "SSL peer has no certificate for the requested DNS name.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 107), + "SSL peer was unable to get an OCSP response for its certificate.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 108), + "SSL peer reported bad certificate hash value.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 109), + "SSL received an unexpected New Session Ticket handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 110), + "SSL received a malformed New Session Ticket handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 111), + "SSL received a compressed record that could not be decompressed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 112), + "Renegotiation is not allowed on this SSL socket.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 113), + "Peer attempted old style (potentially vulnerable) handshake.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 114), + "SSL received an unexpected uncompressed record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 115), + "SSL received a weak ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key in Server Key Exchange handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 116), + "SSL received invalid ALPN extension data.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 117), + "SSL feature not supported for SSL 2.0 connections.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 118), + "SSL feature not supported for servers.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_CLIENTS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 119), + "SSL feature not supported for clients.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION_RANGE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 120), + "SSL version range is not valid.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 121), + "SSL peer selected a cipher suite disallowed for the selected protocol version.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 122), + "SSL received a malformed Hello Verify Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 123), + "SSL received an unexpected Hello Verify Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 124), + "SSL feature not supported for the protocol version.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 125), + "SSL received an unexpected Certificate Status handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 126), + "Unsupported hash algorithm used by TLS peer.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 127), + "Digest function failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 128), + "Incorrect signature algorithm specified in a digitally-signed element.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 129), + "The next protocol negotiation extension was enabled, but the callback was cleared prior to being needed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 130), + "The server supports no protocols that the client advertises in the ALPN extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 131), + "The server rejected the handshake because the client downgraded to a lower " + "TLS version than the server supports.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 132), + "The server certificate included a public key that was too weak.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_SHORT_DTLS_READ, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 133), + "Not enough room in buffer for DTLS record.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 134), + "No supported TLS signature algorithm was configured.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 135), + "The peer used an unsupported combination of signature and hash algorithm.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 136), + "The peer tried to resume without a correct extended_master_secret extension") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 137), + "The peer tried to resume with an unexpected extended_master_secret extension") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 138), + "SSL received a malformed Key Share extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 139), + "SSL expected a Key Share extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 140), + "SSL received a malformed ECDHE key share handshake extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 141), + "SSL received a malformed DHE key share handshake extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 142), + "SSL received an unexpected Encrypted Extensions handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 143), + "SSL received a missing_extension alert.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 144), + "SSL had an error performing key exchange.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 145), + "SSL received an extension that is not permitted for this version.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 146), + "SSL received a malformed Encrypted Extensions handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 147), + "SSL received an invalid PreSharedKey extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 148), + "SSL received an invalid EarlyData extension.") + +UNUSED_ERROR(149) + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ALPN_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 150), + "SSL didn't receive an expected ALPN extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 151), + "SSL received an unexpected extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 152), + "SSL expected a supported groups extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 153), + "SSL sent or received too many records with the same symmetric key.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 154), + "SSL received an unexpected Hello Retry Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 155), + "SSL received a malformed Hello Retry Request handshake message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 156), + "SSL received a second Client Hello message without a usable key share.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 157), + "SSL expected a signature algorithms extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 158), + "SSL received a malformed PSK key exchange modes extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 159), + "SSL expected a PSK key exchange modes extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 160), + "SSL got a pre-TLS 1.3 version even though we sent early data.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 161), + "SSL received more early data than permitted.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 162), + "SSL received an unexpected End of Early Data message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 163), + "SSL received a malformed End of Early Data message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 164), + "An experimental API was called, but not supported.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 165), + "SSL handshake aborted by the application.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 166), + "An application callback produced an invalid response.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_NO_TIMERS_ERROR, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 167), + "No timers are currently running.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 168), + "A second ClientHello was received without a cookie extension.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 169), + "SSL received an unexpected key update message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 170), + "SSL received a malformed key update message.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 171), + "SSL attempted too many key updates.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 172), + "SSL handshake has already failed. No more operations possible.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 173), + "SSL received an invalid resumption token.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 174), + "SSL received a malformed DTLS ACK") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 175), + "SSL received a DH key share that's too long (>8192 bit).") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_KEYS, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 176), + "SSL received a malformed ESNI keys structure") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 177), + "SSL received a malformed ESNI extension") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ESNI_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 178), + "SSL did not receive an ESNI extension") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_RECORD_TYPE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 179), + "SSL received an unexpected record type.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXTENSION, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 180), + "SSL cannot send a CertificateRequest because the client doesn't support post-handshake authentication.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_RX_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 181), + "SSL received a certificate_required alert.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 182), + "SSL received a delegated credential with unexpected certificate verification algorithm.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DC_BAD_SIGNATURE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 183), + "SSL received a delegated credential with an invalid signature.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DC_INVALID_KEY_USAGE, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 184), + "SSL received a delegated credential from a certificate with invalid key usage.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DC_EXPIRED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 185), + "SSL received a delegated credential that expired.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_DC_INAPPROPRIATE_VALIDITY_PERIOD, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 186), + "SSL received a delegated credential with excessive TTL.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 187), + "The requested feature is disabled.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 188), + "TLS ECH was rejected, but verification succeeded and compatible retry_configs are available.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITHOUT_ECH, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 189), + "TLS ECH was rejected, but verification succeeded and no compatible retry_configs were found.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ECH_FAILED, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 190), + "TLS ECH was rejected and verification failed.") + +ER3(SSL_ERROR_ECH_REQUIRED_ALERT, (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 191), + "SSL peer reported ECH required.") diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/authcert.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/authcert.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d64173b41 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/authcert.c @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* + * NSS utility functions + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include "prerror.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "prnetdb.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "nspr.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "pk11func.h" /* for PK11_ function calls */ +#include "sslimpl.h" + +/* convert a CERTDistNameStr to an array ascii strings. + * we ignore caNames which we can't convert, so n could be less than nnames + * n is always set, even on failure. + * This function allows us to use the existing CERT_FilterCertListByCANames. */ +static char ** +ssl_DistNamesToStrings(struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, int *n) +{ + char **names; + int i; + SECStatus rv; + PLArenaPool *arena; + + *n = 0; + names = PORT_ZNewArray(char *, caNames->nnames); + if (names == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); + if (arena == NULL) { + PORT_Free(names); + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < caNames->nnames; ++i) { + CERTName dn; + rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &dn, SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_NameTemplate), + caNames->names + i); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + continue; + } + names[*n] = CERT_NameToAscii(&dn); + if (names[*n]) + (*n)++; + } + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return names; +} + +/* free the dist names we allocated in the above function. n must be the + * returned n from that function. */ +static void +ssl_FreeDistNamesStrings(char **strings, int n) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + PORT_Free(strings[i]); + } + PORT_Free(strings); +} + +PRBool +ssl_CertIsUsable(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSLSignatureScheme scheme; + + if ((ss == NULL) || (cert == NULL)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* There are two ways of handling the old style handshake: + * 1) check the actual record we are using and return true, + * if (!ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record && + * ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + * return PR_TRUE; + * 2) assume if ss->ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0 we are using the + * old handshake. + * There is one case where using 2 will be wrong: we somehow call this + * function outside the case where of out GetClientAuthData context. + * In that case we don't know that the 'real' peerScheme list is, so the + * best we can do is either always assume good or always assume bad. + * I think the best results is to always assume good, so we use + * option 2 here to handle that case as well.*/ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL) { + return PR_FALSE; /* should this really be an assert? */ + } + rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, cert, NULL, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen, + &scheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_FilterClientCertListBySSLSocket(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertList *certList) +{ + CERTCertListNode *node; + CERTCertificate *cert; + + if (!certList) { + return SECFailure; + } + + node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); + + while (!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList)) { + cert = node->cert; + if (PR_TRUE != ssl_CertIsUsable(ss, cert)) { + /* cert doesn't match the socket criteria, remove it */ + CERTCertListNode *freenode = node; + node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node); + CERT_RemoveCertListNode(freenode); + } else { + /* this cert is good, go to the next cert */ + node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node); + } + } + + return (SECSuccess); +} + +/* This function can be called by the application's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to filter out any certs in the cert list that doesn't match the negotiated + * requirements of the current SSL connection. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertList *certList) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (ss == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + return ssl_FilterClientCertListBySSLSocket(ss, certList); +} + +/* This function can be called by the application's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to determine if a single certificate matches the negotiated requirements of + * the current SSL connection. + */ +PRBool +SSL_CertIsUsable(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (ss == NULL) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return ssl_CertIsUsable(ss, cert); +} + +/* + * This callback used by SSL to pull client certificate upon + * server request + */ +SECStatus +NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg, + PRFileDesc *fd, + struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, + struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert, + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey) +{ + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + CERTCertList *certList = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL; + char *chosenNickName = (char *)arg; /* CONST */ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + void *pw_arg = SSL_RevealPinArg(fd); + + /* first, handle any token authentication that may be needed */ + if (chosenNickName && pw_arg) { + certList = PK11_FindCertsFromNickname(chosenNickName, pw_arg); + if (certList) { + CERT_FilterCertListForUserCerts(certList); + rv = CERT_FilterCertListByUsage(certList, certUsageSSLClient, + PR_FALSE); + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) { + CERT_DestroyCertList(certList); + certList = NULL; + } + } + } + + /* otherwise look through the cache based on usage + * if chosenNickname is set, we ignore the expiration date */ + if (certList == NULL) { + certList = CERT_FindUserCertsByUsage(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), + certUsageSSLClient, + PR_FALSE, chosenNickName == NULL, + pw_arg); + if (certList == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* filter only the certs that meet the nickname requirements */ + if (chosenNickName) { + rv = CERT_FilterCertListByNickname(certList, chosenNickName, + pw_arg); + } else { + int nnames = 0; + char **names = ssl_DistNamesToStrings(caNames, &nnames); + rv = CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(certList, nnames, names, + certUsageSSLClient); + ssl_FreeDistNamesStrings(names, nnames); + } + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) { + CERT_DestroyCertList(certList); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* now remove any certs that can't meet the connection requirements */ + rv = ssl_FilterClientCertListBySSLSocket(ss, certList); + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) { + // no certs left. + CERT_DestroyCertList(certList); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* now return the top cert in the list. We've strived to make the + * list ordered by the most likely usable cert, so it should be the best + * match. */ + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList)->cert); + CERT_DestroyCertList(certList); + privkey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(cert, pw_arg); + if (privkey == NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); + return SECFailure; + } + *pRetCert = cert; + *pRetKey = privkey; + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/cmpcert.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/cmpcert.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8ab4a7f8d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/cmpcert.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/* + * NSS utility functions + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include "prerror.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "prnetdb.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "nspr.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "nss.h" + +/* + * Look to see if any of the signers in the cert chain for "cert" are found + * in the list of caNames. + * Returns SECSuccess if so, SECFailure if not. + */ +SECStatus +NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames(CERTCertificate *cert, CERTDistNames *caNames) +{ + SECItem *caname; + CERTCertificate *curcert; + CERTCertificate *oldcert; + int j; + int depth; + SECItem issuerName; + + if (!cert || !caNames || !caNames->nnames || !caNames->names || + !caNames->names->data) + return SECFailure; + depth = 0; + curcert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert); + + while (curcert) { + issuerName = curcert->derIssuer; + + for (j = 0; j < caNames->nnames; j++) { + caname = &caNames->names[j]; + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&issuerName, caname) == SECEqual) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(curcert); + return SECSuccess; + } + } + if ((depth <= 20) && + (SECITEM_CompareItem(&curcert->derIssuer, &curcert->derSubject) != + SECEqual)) { + oldcert = curcert; + curcert = CERT_FindCertByName(curcert->dbhandle, + &curcert->derIssuer); + CERT_DestroyCertificate(oldcert); + depth++; + } else { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(curcert); + curcert = NULL; + } + } + return SECFailure; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/config.mk b/security/nss/lib/ssl/config.mk new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..309c5bc177 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/config.mk @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +# +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. + +ifdef NISCC_TEST +DEFINES += -DNISCC_TEST +endif + +ifeq (,$(filter-out WIN%,$(OS_TARGET))) + +ifdef NS_USE_GCC +EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \ + -L$(DIST)/lib \ + -lnss3 \ + -L$(NSSUTIL_LIB_DIR) \ + -lnssutil3 \ + -L$(NSPR_LIB_DIR) \ + -lplc4 \ + -lplds4 \ + -lnspr4 \ + $(NULL) +else # ! NS_USE_GCC +EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \ + $(DIST)/lib/nss3.lib \ + $(DIST)/lib/nssutil3.lib \ + $(NSPR_LIB_DIR)/$(NSPR31_LIB_PREFIX)plc4.lib \ + $(NSPR_LIB_DIR)/$(NSPR31_LIB_PREFIX)plds4.lib \ + $(NSPR_LIB_DIR)/$(NSPR31_LIB_PREFIX)nspr4.lib \ + $(NULL) +endif # NS_USE_GCC + +else + +# $(EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS) come before $(OS_LIBS), except on AIX. +EXTRA_SHARED_LIBS += \ + -L$(DIST)/lib \ + -lnss3 \ + -L$(NSSUTIL_LIB_DIR) \ + -lnssutil3 \ + -L$(NSPR_LIB_DIR) \ + -lplc4 \ + -lplds4 \ + -lnspr4 \ + $(NULL) + +endif + +ifdef NSS_DISABLE_TLS_1_3 +DEFINES += -DNSS_DISABLE_TLS_1_3 +endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dhe-param.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dhe-param.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..32afa35206 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dhe-param.c @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_g2[] = { 2 }; + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_2048_p[] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF +}; + +static const ssl3DHParams ff_dhe_2048_params = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_2048_p, sizeof(ff_dhe_2048_p) }, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_g2, sizeof(ff_dhe_g2) }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_3072_p[] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0x37, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF +}; + +static const ssl3DHParams ff_dhe_3072_params = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_3072_p, sizeof(ff_dhe_3072_p) }, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_g2, sizeof(ff_dhe_g2) }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_4096_p[] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x6A, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF +}; + +static const ssl3DHParams ff_dhe_4096_params = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_4096, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_4096_p, sizeof(ff_dhe_4096_p) }, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_g2, sizeof(ff_dhe_g2) }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_6144_p[] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x65, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF +}; + +static const ssl3DHParams ff_dhe_6144_params = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_6144, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_6144_p, sizeof(ff_dhe_6144_p) }, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_g2, sizeof(ff_dhe_g2) }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ff_dhe_8192_p[] = { + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, + 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, + 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, + 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, + 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, + 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, + 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, + 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, + 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, + 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, + 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, + 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, + 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, + 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, + 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, + 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, + 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, + 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, + 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, + 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, + 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, + 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, + 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, + 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, + 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, + 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, + 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, + 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, + 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, + 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, + 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, + 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, + 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, + 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, + 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, + 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, + 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, + 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, + 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, + 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, + 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, + 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, + 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, + 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, + 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, + 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, + 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, + 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, + 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, + 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, + 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, + 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, + 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, + 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, + 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, + 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, + 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, + 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, + 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, + 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, + 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, + 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, + 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, + 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, + 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, + 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, + 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, + 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, + 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, + 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, + 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, + 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, + 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, + 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, + 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, + 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, + 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, + 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, + 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, + 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, + 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, + 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, + 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, + 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, + 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, + 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, + 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, + 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, + 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, + 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, + 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, + 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, + 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, + 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, + 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0x6A, 0xAA, + 0x36, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x38, + 0x1E, 0x42, 0x5A, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x64, + 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x9D, 0x43, + 0x68, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x69, 0xED, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0x5E, + 0x0B, 0x8C, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0xF6, 0x4B, 0x10, 0xEF, + 0x86, 0xB6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0x88, 0x29, + 0x55, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x26, 0x65, + 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0xC0, 0x1B, 0xD7, 0x02, + 0x29, 0x38, 0x88, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xE4, + 0x54, 0x50, 0x4A, 0xC7, 0x8B, 0x75, 0x82, 0x82, + 0x28, 0x46, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0x35, 0xC3, 0x5F, 0x5C, + 0x59, 0x16, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xFD, 0x82, 0x51, + 0x54, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x22, + 0xBB, 0x70, 0x99, 0x87, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x0E, 0x74, + 0x51, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0x31, 0x09, 0x70, 0x3F, 0xEE, + 0x1C, 0x21, 0x7E, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x26, 0xE5, 0x2C, + 0x51, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x42, 0x3C, 0xFC, + 0x99, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0x16, 0x50, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x7B, + 0x62, 0x48, 0x16, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9A, 0x95, 0xF9, + 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x94, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0xA0, + 0xA1, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x77, 0xE2, 0x31, + 0x83, 0xF8, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0xA4, 0x57, + 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x4F, 0xE8, + 0xB6, 0x85, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x72, 0xB0, 0xA6, 0x6E, + 0xDE, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0xE5, 0x8A, 0x30, + 0xFA, 0xFA, 0xBE, 0x1C, 0x5D, 0x71, 0xA8, 0x7E, + 0x2F, 0x74, 0x1E, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0xFE, 0x86, 0xFE, + 0xA6, 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xE5, 0x30, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x0D, + 0x97, 0xD1, 0x1D, 0x49, 0xF7, 0xA8, 0x44, 0x3D, + 0x08, 0x22, 0xE5, 0x06, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x4E, + 0x01, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x94, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x8C, + 0xD6, 0x8C, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x4C, + 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF +}; + +static const ssl3DHParams ff_dhe_8192_params = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_8192, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_8192_p, sizeof(ff_dhe_8192_p) }, + { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ff_dhe_g2, sizeof(ff_dhe_g2) }, +}; diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a2cf4a8c67 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.c @@ -0,0 +1,608 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* + * DTLS 1.3 Protocol + */ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "pk11func.h" + +/* + * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 + * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + * |0|0|1|C|S|L|E E| + * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + * | Connection ID | Legend: + * | (if any, | + * / length as / C - CID present + * | negotiated) | S - Sequence number length + * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ L - Length present + * | 8 or 16 bit | E - Epoch + * |Sequence Number| + * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + * | 16 bit Length | + * | (if present) | + * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + */ +SECStatus +dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + sslBuffer *wrBuf, PRBool *needsLength) +{ + /* Avoid using short records for the handshake. We pack multiple records + * into the one datagram for the handshake. */ + if (ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader && + cwSpec->epoch > TrafficKeyHandshake) { + *needsLength = PR_FALSE; + /* The short header is comprised of two octets in the form + * 0b001000eessssssss where 'e' is the low two bits of the + * epoch and 's' is the low 8 bits of the sequence number. */ + PRUint8 ct = 0x20 | ((uint64_t)cwSpec->epoch & 0x3); + if (sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, ct, 1) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRUint8 seq = cwSpec->nextSeqNum & 0xff; + return sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, seq, 1); + } + + PRUint8 ct = 0x2c | ((PRUint8)cwSpec->epoch & 0x3); + if (sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, ct, 1) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, + (cwSpec->nextSeqNum & 0xffff), 2) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *needsLength = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* DTLS 1.3 Record map for ACK processing. + * This represents a single fragment, so a record which includes + * multiple fragments will have one entry for each fragment on the + * sender. We use the same structure on the receiver for convenience + * but the only value we actually use is |record|. + */ +typedef struct DTLSHandshakeRecordEntryStr { + PRCList link; + PRUint16 messageSeq; /* The handshake message sequence number. */ + PRUint32 offset; /* The offset into the handshake message. */ + PRUint32 length; /* The length of the fragment. */ + sslSequenceNumber record; /* The record (includes epoch). */ + PRBool acked; /* Has this packet been acked. */ +} DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry; + +/* Combine the epoch and sequence number into a single value. */ +static inline sslSequenceNumber +dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum) +{ + PORT_Assert(seqNum <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); + return ((sslSequenceNumber)epoch << 48) | seqNum; +} + +SECStatus +dtls13_RememberFragment(sslSocket *ss, + PRCList *list, + PRUint32 sequence, + PRUint32 offset, + PRUint32 length, + DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber record) +{ + DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry; + + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + /* We should never send an empty fragment with offset > 0. */ + PORT_Assert(length || !offset); + + if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: %s remembering %s record=%llx msg=%d offset=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + SSL_ROLE(ss), + list == &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake ? "sent" : "received", + dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(epoch, record), sequence, offset)); + + entry = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry)); + if (!entry) { + return SECFailure; + } + + entry->messageSeq = sequence; + entry->offset = offset; + entry->length = length; + entry->record = dtls_CombineSequenceNumber(epoch, record); + entry->acked = PR_FALSE; + + PR_APPEND_LINK(&entry->link, list); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +dtls13_SendAck(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRCList *cursor; + PRInt32 sent; + unsigned int offset; + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Sending ACK", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&buf, 2, &offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor; + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ACK for record=%llx", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, entry->record)); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, entry->record, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(&buf, offset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_ack, + buf.buf, buf.len, 0); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (sent != buf.len) { + rv = SECFailure; + if (sent != -1) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } + } + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); + return rv; +} + +void +dtls13_SendAckCb(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return; + } + (void)dtls13_SendAck(ss); +} + +/* Limits from draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-38; section 4.5.3. */ +PRBool +dtls13_AeadLimitReached(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + switch (spec->cipherDef->calg) { + case ssl_calg_chacha20: + case ssl_calg_aes_gcm: + return spec->deprotectionFailures >= (1ULL << 36); +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + case ssl_calg_null: + return PR_FALSE; +#endif + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + break; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Zero length messages are very simple to check. */ +static PRBool +dtls_IsEmptyMessageAcknowledged(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 msgSeq, PRUint32 offset) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor; + if (!entry->acked || msgSeq != entry->messageSeq) { + continue; + } + /* Empty fragments are always offset 0. */ + if (entry->length == 0) { + PORT_Assert(!entry->offset); + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Take a range starting at |*start| and that start forwards based on the + * contents of the acknowedgement in |entry|. Only move if the acknowledged + * range overlaps |*start|. Return PR_TRUE if it moves. */ +static PRBool +dtls_MoveUnackedStartForward(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry, PRUint32 *start) +{ + /* This entry starts too late. */ + if (*start < entry->offset) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* This entry ends too early. */ + if (*start >= entry->offset + entry->length) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + *start = entry->offset + entry->length; + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Take a range ending at |*end| and move that end backwards based on the + * contents of the acknowedgement in |entry|. Only move if the acknowledged + * range overlaps |*end|. Return PR_TRUE if it moves. */ +static PRBool +dtls_MoveUnackedEndBackward(DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry, PRUint32 *end) +{ + /* This entry ends too early. */ + if (*end > entry->offset + entry->length) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* This entry starts too late. */ + if (*end <= entry->offset) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + *end = entry->offset; + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Get the next contiguous range of unacknowledged bytes from the handshake + * message identified by |msgSeq|. The search starts at the offset in |offset|. + * |len| contains the full length of the message. + * + * Returns PR_TRUE if there is an unacknowledged range. In this case, values at + * |start| and |end| are modified to contain the range. + * + * Returns PR_FALSE if the message is entirely acknowledged from |offset| + * onwards. + */ +PRBool +dtls_NextUnackedRange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 msgSeq, PRUint32 offset, + PRUint32 len, PRUint32 *startOut, PRUint32 *endOut) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + PRBool done = PR_FALSE; + DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry; + PRUint32 start; + PRUint32 end; + + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + + *startOut = offset; + *endOut = len; + if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* The message is empty. Use a simple search. */ + if (!len) { + PORT_Assert(!offset); + return !dtls_IsEmptyMessageAcknowledged(ss, msgSeq, offset); + } + + /* This iterates multiple times over the acknowledgments and only terminates + * when an entire iteration happens without start or end moving. If that + * happens without start and end crossing each other, then there is a range + * of unacknowledged data. If they meet, then the message is fully + * acknowledged. */ + start = offset; + end = len; + while (!done) { + done = PR_TRUE; + for (cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake); + cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake; + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) { + entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cur_p; + if (!entry->acked || msgSeq != entry->messageSeq) { + continue; + } + + if (dtls_MoveUnackedStartForward(entry, &start) || + dtls_MoveUnackedEndBackward(entry, &end)) { + if (start >= end) { + /* The message is all acknowledged. */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* Start over again and keep going until we don't move either + * start or end. */ + done = PR_FALSE; + break; + } + } + } + PORT_Assert(start < end); + + *startOut = start; + *endOut = end; + return PR_TRUE; +} + +SECStatus +dtls13_SetupAcks(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight) { + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake && ss->sec.isServer) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_HandleHandshake, sending ACK", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return dtls13_SendAck(ss); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* We need to send an ACK. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer->cb) { + /* We're not armed, so arm. */ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_HandleHandshake, arming ack timer", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer, + DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS / 4, + dtls13_SendAckCb); + } + /* The ack timer is already armed, so just return. */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Special case processing for out-of-epoch records. + * This can only handle ACKs for now and everything else generates + * an error. In future, may also handle KeyUpdate. + * + * The error checking here is as follows: + * + * - If it's not encrypted, out of epoch stuff is just discarded. + * - If it's encrypted, out of epoch stuff causes an error. + */ +SECStatus +dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSLContentType rType, + sslBuffer *databuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer buf = *databuf; + + databuf->len = 0; /* Discard data whatever happens. */ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + /* Can't happen, but double check. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + tls13_FatalError(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS13[%d]: handle out of epoch record: type=%d", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, rType)); + + if (rType == ssl_ct_ack) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, &buf); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_Assert(databuf->len == 0); + return rv; + } + + switch (spec->epoch) { + case TrafficKeyClearText: + /* Drop. */ + return SECSuccess; + + case TrafficKeyHandshake: + /* Drop out of order handshake messages, but if we are the + * server, we might have processed the client's Finished and + * moved on to application data keys, but the client has + * retransmitted Finished (e.g., because our ACK got lost.) + * We just retransmit the ACK to let the client complete. */ + if (rType == ssl_ct_handshake) { + if ((ss->sec.isServer) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) { + PORT_Assert(dtls_TimerActive(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.hdTimer)); + return dtls13_SendAck(ss); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* This isn't a handshake record, so shouldn't be encrypted + * under the handshake key. */ + break; + + default: + /* Any other epoch is forbidden. */ + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: unexpected out of epoch record type %d", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, rType)); + + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +dtls13_HandleAck(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *databuf) +{ + PRUint8 *b = databuf->buf; + PRUint32 l = databuf->len; + unsigned int length; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Ensure we don't loop. */ + databuf->len = 0; + + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + if (!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Handling ACK", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &b, &l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (length != l) { + goto loser; + } + + while (l > 0) { + PRUint64 seq; + PRCList *cursor; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &seq, 8, &b, &l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + for (cursor = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *entry = (DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry *)cursor; + + if (entry->record == seq) { + SSL_TRC(10, ( + "%d: SSL3[%d]: Marking record=%llx message %d offset %d length=%d as ACKed", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + seq, entry->messageSeq, entry->offset, entry->length)); + entry->acked = PR_TRUE; + } + } + } + + /* Try to flush. */ + rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Reset the retransmit timer. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->cb) { + (void)dtls_RestartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer); + } + + /* If there are no more messages to send, cleanup. */ + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight)) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: No more unacked handshake messages", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer); + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake, NULL); + /* If the handshake is finished, and we're the client then + * also clean up the handshake read cipher spec. Any ACKs + * we receive will be with the application data cipher spec. + * The server needs to keep the handshake cipher spec around + * for the holddown period to process retransmitted Finisheds. + */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) { + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, + TrafficKeyHandshake); + } + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + /* Due to bug 1829391 we may incorrectly send an alert rather than + * ignore an invalid record here. */ + SSL_TRC(11, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Error processing DTLS1.3 ACK.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Clean up the read timer for the handshake cipher suites on the + * server. + * + * In DTLS 1.3, the client speaks last (Finished), and will retransmit + * until the server ACKs that message (using application data cipher + * suites). I.e., + * + * - The client uses the retransmit timer and retransmits using the + * saved write handshake cipher suite. + * - The server keeps the saved read handshake cipher suite around + * for the holddown period in case it needs to read the Finished. + * + * After the holddown period, the server assumes the client is happy + * and discards the handshake read cipher suite. + */ +void +dtls13_HolddownTimerCb(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: holddown timer fired", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, TrafficKeyHandshake); + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake, NULL); +} + +SECStatus +dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRUint8 *hdr, PRUint8 *cipherText, PRUint32 cipherTextLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (spec->maskContext) { +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + /* Use a null mask. */ + PRUint8 mask[2] = { 0 }; +#else + /* "This procedure requires the ciphertext length be at least 16 bytes. + * Receivers MUST reject shorter records as if they had failed + * deprotection, as described in Section 4.5.2." */ + if (cipherTextLen < 16) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRUint8 mask[2]; + SECStatus rv = ssl_CreateMaskInner(spec->maskContext, cipherText, cipherTextLen, mask, sizeof(mask)); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } +#endif + + hdr[1] ^= mask[0]; + if (hdr[0] & 0x08) { + hdr[2] ^= mask[1]; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_SequenceNumberEncryptionMechanism(SSLCipherAlgorithm bulkAlgorithm) +{ + switch (bulkAlgorithm) { + case ssl_calg_aes_gcm: + return CKM_AES_ECB; + case ssl_calg_chacha20: + return CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR; + default: + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + } + return CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bfe8d40204 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtls13con.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __dtls13con_h_ +#define __dtls13con_h_ + +SECStatus dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(const sslSocket *ss, + const ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + sslBuffer *wrBuf, + PRBool *needsLength); +SECStatus dtls13_RememberFragment(sslSocket *ss, PRCList *list, + PRUint32 sequence, PRUint32 offset, + PRUint32 length, DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber record); +PRBool dtls_NextUnackedRange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 msgSeq, PRUint32 offset, + PRUint32 len, PRUint32 *startOut, PRUint32 *endOut); +SECStatus dtls13_SetupAcks(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSLContentType rType, + sslBuffer *databuf); +SECStatus dtls13_HandleAck(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *databuf); + +SECStatus dtls13_SendAck(sslSocket *ss); +void dtls13_SendAckCb(sslSocket *ss); +void dtls13_HolddownTimerCb(sslSocket *ss); +void dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRUint8 *hdr, PRUint8 *cipherText, PRUint32 cipherTextLen); +PRBool dtls13_AeadLimitReached(ssl3CipherSpec *spec); + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE tls13_SequenceNumberEncryptionMechanism(SSLCipherAlgorithm bulkAlgorithm); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a4a7c998c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.c @@ -0,0 +1,1474 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* + * DTLS Protocol + */ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "dtls13con.h" + +#ifndef PR_ARRAY_SIZE +#define PR_ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0])) +#endif + +static SECStatus dtls_StartRetransmitTimer(sslSocket *ss); +static void dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus dtls_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss); +static void dtls_FinishedTimerCb(sslSocket *ss); +static void dtls_CancelAllTimers(sslSocket *ss); + +/* -28 adjusts for the IP/UDP header */ +static const PRUint16 COMMON_MTU_VALUES[] = { + 1500 - 28, /* Ethernet MTU */ + 1280 - 28, /* IPv6 minimum MTU */ + 576 - 28, /* Common assumption */ + 256 - 28 /* We're in serious trouble now */ +}; + +#define DTLS_COOKIE_BYTES 32 +/* Maximum DTLS expansion = header + IV + max CBC padding + + * maximum MAC. */ +#define DTLS_MAX_EXPANSION (DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + 16 + 16 + 32) + +/* List copied from ssl3con.c:cipherSuites */ +static const ssl3CipherSuite nonDTLSSuites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* End of list marker */ +}; + +/* Map back and forth between TLS and DTLS versions in wire format. + * Mapping table is: + * + * TLS DTLS + * 1.1 (0302) 1.0 (feff) + * 1.2 (0303) 1.2 (fefd) + * 1.3 (0304) 1.3 (0304) + */ +SSL3ProtocolVersion +dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion tlsv) +{ + if (tlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE; + } + if (tlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE; + } + if (tlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_3_WIRE; + } + + /* Anything else is an error, so return + * the invalid version 0xffff. */ + return 0xffff; +} + +/* Map known DTLS versions to known TLS versions. + * - Invalid versions (< 1.0) return a version of 0 + * - Versions > known return a version one higher than we know of + * to accomodate a theoretically newer version */ +SSL3ProtocolVersion +dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion dtlsv) +{ + if (MSB(dtlsv) == 0xff) { + return 0; + } + + if (dtlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1; + } + /* Handle the skipped version of DTLS 1.1 by returning + * an error. */ + if (dtlsv == ((~0x0101) & 0xffff)) { + return 0; + } + if (dtlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + } + if (dtlsv == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_3_WIRE) { + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + } + + /* Return a fictional higher version than we know of */ + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED + 1; +} + +/* On this socket, Disable non-DTLS cipher suites in the argument's list */ +SECStatus +ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuite *suite; + + for (suite = nonDTLSSuites; *suite; ++suite) { + PORT_CheckSuccess(ssl3_CipherPrefSet(ss, *suite, PR_FALSE)); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Allocate a DTLSQueuedMessage. + * + * Called from dtls_QueueMessage() + */ +static DTLSQueuedMessage * +dtls_AllocQueuedMessage(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSLContentType ct, + const unsigned char *data, PRUint32 len) +{ + DTLSQueuedMessage *msg; + + msg = PORT_ZNew(DTLSQueuedMessage); + if (!msg) + return NULL; + + msg->data = PORT_Alloc(len); + if (!msg->data) { + PORT_Free(msg); + return NULL; + } + PORT_Memcpy(msg->data, data, len); + + msg->len = len; + msg->cwSpec = cwSpec; + msg->type = ct; + /* Safe if we are < 1.3, since the refct is + * already very high. */ + ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(cwSpec); + + return msg; +} + +/* + * Free a handshake message + * + * Called from dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages() + */ +void +dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage(DTLSQueuedMessage *msg) +{ + if (!msg) + return; + + /* Safe if we are < 1.3, since the refct is + * already very high. */ + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(msg->cwSpec); + PORT_ZFree(msg->data, msg->len); + PORT_Free(msg); +} + +/* + * Free a list of handshake messages + * + * Called from: + * dtls_HandleHandshake() + * ssl3_DestroySSL3Info() + */ +void +dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage((DTLSQueuedMessage *)cur_p); + } +} + +/* Called by dtls_HandleHandshake() and dtls_MaybeRetransmitHandshake() if a + * handshake message retransmission is detected. */ +static SECStatus +dtls_RetransmitDetected(sslSocket *ss) +{ + dtlsTimer *timer = ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (timer->cb == dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb) { + /* Check to see if we retransmitted recently. If so, + * suppress the triggered retransmit. This avoids + * retransmit wars after packet loss. + * This is not in RFC 5346 but it should be. + */ + if ((PR_IntervalNow() - timer->started) > + (timer->timeout / 4)) { + SSL_TRC(30, + ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Shortcutting retransmit timer", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Cancel the timer and call the CB, + * which re-arms the timer */ + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer); + dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(ss); + } else { + SSL_TRC(30, + ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Ignoring retransmission: " + "last retransmission %dms ago, suppressed for %dms", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_IntervalNow() - timer->started, + timer->timeout / 4)); + } + + } else if (timer->cb == dtls_FinishedTimerCb) { + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Retransmit detected in holddown", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + /* Retransmit the messages and re-arm the timer + * Note that we are not backing off the timer here. + * The spec isn't clear and my reasoning is that this + * may be a re-ordered packet rather than slowness, + * so let's be aggressive. */ + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer); + rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); + } + + } else { + PORT_Assert(timer->cb == NULL); + /* ... and ignore it. */ + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +dtls_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *data, PRBool last) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; + + return ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, data, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + last); +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) DTLS record. + * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content and is expected to contain + * complete handshake records + * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. + * + * Note that this code uses msg_len for two purposes: + * + * (1) To pass the length to ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() + * (2) To carry the length of a message currently being reassembled + * + * However, unlike ssl3_HandleHandshake(), it is not used to carry + * the state of reassembly (i.e., whether one is in progress). That + * is carried in recvdHighWater and recvdFragments. + */ +#define OFFSET_BYTE(o) (o / 8) +#define OFFSET_MASK(o) (1 << (o % 8)) + +SECStatus +dtls_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + sslBuffer buf = *origBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool discarded = PR_FALSE; + + ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight = PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + while (buf.len > 0) { + PRUint8 type; + PRUint32 message_length; + PRUint16 message_seq; + PRUint32 fragment_offset; + PRUint32 fragment_length; + PRUint32 offset; + + if (buf.len < 12) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Parse the header */ + type = buf.buf[0]; + message_length = (buf.buf[1] << 16) | (buf.buf[2] << 8) | buf.buf[3]; + message_seq = (buf.buf[4] << 8) | buf.buf[5]; + fragment_offset = (buf.buf[6] << 16) | (buf.buf[7] << 8) | buf.buf[8]; + fragment_length = (buf.buf[9] << 16) | (buf.buf[10] << 8) | buf.buf[11]; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (message_length > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } +#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN + + buf.buf += 12; + buf.len -= 12; + + /* This fragment must be complete */ + if (buf.len < fragment_length) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Sanity check the packet contents */ + if ((fragment_length + fragment_offset) > message_length) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* If we're a server and we receive what appears to be a retried + * ClientHello, and we are expecting a ClientHello, move the receive + * sequence number forward. This allows for a retried ClientHello if we + * send a stateless HelloRetryRequest. */ + if (message_seq > ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq && + message_seq == 1 && + fragment_offset == 0 && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello && + (SSLHandshakeType)type == ssl_hs_client_hello) { + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Received apparent 2nd ClientHello", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 1; + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + } + + /* There are three ways we could not be ready for this packet. + * + * 1. It's a partial next message. + * 2. It's a partial or complete message beyond the next + * 3. It's a message we've already seen + * + * If it's the complete next message we accept it right away. + * This is the common case for short messages + */ + if ((message_seq == ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq) && + (fragment_offset == 0) && + (fragment_length == message_length)) { + /* Complete next message. Process immediately */ + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)type; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = message_length; + + rv = dtls_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf.buf, + buf.len == fragment_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + if (message_seq < ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq) { + /* Case 3: we do an immediate retransmit if we're + * in a waiting state. */ + rv = dtls_RetransmitDetected(ss); + goto loser; + } else if (message_seq > ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq) { + /* Case 2 + * + * Ignore this message. This means we don't handle out of + * order complete messages that well, but we're still + * compliant and this probably does not happen often + * + * XXX OK for now. Maybe do something smarter at some point? + */ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_HandleHandshake, discarding handshake message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + discarded = PR_TRUE; + } else { + PRInt32 end = fragment_offset + fragment_length; + + /* Case 1 + * + * Buffer the fragment for reassembly + */ + /* Make room for the message */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater == -1) { + PRUint32 map_length = OFFSET_BYTE(message_length) + 1; + + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, message_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + /* Make room for the fragment map */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments, + map_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Reset the reassembly map */ + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = 0; + PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf, 0, + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.space); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)type; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = message_length; + } + + /* If we have a message length mismatch, abandon the reassembly + * in progress and hope that the next retransmit will give us + * something sane + */ + if (message_length != ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + /* Now copy this fragment into the buffer. */ + if (end > ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater) { + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + fragment_offset, + buf.buf, fragment_length); + } + + /* This logic is a bit tricky. We have two values for + * reassembly state: + * + * - recvdHighWater contains the highest contiguous number of + * bytes received + * - recvdFragments contains a bitmask of packets received + * above recvdHighWater + * + * This avoids having to fill in the bitmask in the common + * case of adjacent fragments received in sequence + */ + if (fragment_offset <= (unsigned int)ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater) { + /* Either this is the adjacent fragment or an overlapping + * fragment */ + if (end > ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater) { + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = end; + } + } else { + for (offset = fragment_offset; offset < end; offset++) { + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf[OFFSET_BYTE(offset)] |= + OFFSET_MASK(offset); + } + } + + /* Now figure out the new high water mark if appropriate */ + for (offset = ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater; + offset < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; offset++) { + /* Note that this loop is not efficient, since it counts + * bit by bit. If we have a lot of out-of-order packets, + * we should optimize this */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf[OFFSET_BYTE(offset)] & + OFFSET_MASK(offset)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater++; + } else { + break; + } + } + + /* If we have all the bytes, then we are good to go */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + rv = dtls_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, + buf.len == fragment_length); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + } + } + + buf.buf += fragment_length; + buf.len -= fragment_length; + } + + // This should never happen, but belt and suspenders. + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + + /* If we processed all the fragments in this message, then mark it as remembered. + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Store out of order messages for DTLS 1.3 so ACKs work + * better. Bug 1392620.*/ + if (!discarded && tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + rv = dtls13_RememberFragment(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake, + 0, 0, 0, epoch, seqNum); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = dtls13_SetupAcks(ss); + +loser: + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + return rv; +} + +/* Enqueue a message (either handshake or CCS) + * + * Called from: + * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage() + * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs() + */ +SECStatus +dtls_QueueMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType ct, + const PRUint8 *pIn, PRInt32 nIn) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + DTLSQueuedMessage *msg = NULL; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + msg = dtls_AllocQueuedMessage(spec, ct, pIn, nIn); + + if (!msg) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + PR_APPEND_LINK(&msg->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + } + + return rv; +} + +/* Add DTLS handshake message to the pending queue + * Empty the sendBuf buffer. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader() + * dtls_FlushHandshake() + */ +SECStatus +dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* This function is sometimes called when no data is actually to + * be staged, so just return SECSuccess. */ + if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) + return rv; + + rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, ssl_ct_handshake, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); + + /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; + return rv; +} + +/* Enqueue the handshake message in sendBuf (if any) and then + * transmit the resulting flight of handshake messages. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_FlushHandshake() + */ +SECStatus +dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)) { + rv = dtls_StartRetransmitTimer(ss); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + } + } + + return rv; +} + +/* The callback for when the retransmit timer expires + * + * Called from: + * dtls_CheckTimer() + * dtls_HandleHandshake() + */ +static void +dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + dtlsTimer *timer = ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries++; + + if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries % 3)) { + /* If one of the messages was potentially greater than > MTU, + * then downgrade. Do this every time we have retransmitted a + * message twice, per RFC 6347 Sec. 4.1.1 */ + dtls_SetMTU(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent - 1); + } + + rv = dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* Re-arm the timer */ + timer->timeout *= 2; + if (timer->timeout > DTLS_RETRANSMIT_MAX_MS) { + timer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_MAX_MS; + } + + timer->started = PR_IntervalNow(); + timer->cb = dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb; + + SSL_TRC(30, + ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Retransmit #%d, next in %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries, timer->timeout)); + } + /* else: OK for now. In future maybe signal the stack that we couldn't + * transmit. For now, let the read handle any real network errors */ +} + +#define DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN 12 +#define DTLS_MIN_FRAGMENT (DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN + 1 + DTLS_MAX_EXPANSION) + +/* Encrypt and encode a handshake message fragment. Flush the data out to the + * network if there is insufficient space for any fragment. */ +static SECStatus +dtls_SendFragment(sslSocket *ss, DTLSQueuedMessage *msg, PRUint8 *data, + unsigned int len) +{ + PRInt32 sent; + SECStatus rv; + + PRINT_BUF(40, (ss, "dtls_SendFragment", data, len)); + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, msg->cwSpec, msg->type, data, len, + ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent != len) { + if (sent != -1) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If another fragment won't fit, flush. */ + if (ss->ssl3.mtu < ss->pendingBuf.len + DTLS_MIN_FRAGMENT) { + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: dtls_SendFragment: flush", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = dtls_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Fragment a handshake message into multiple records and send them. */ +static SECStatus +dtls_FragmentHandshake(sslSocket *ss, DTLSQueuedMessage *msg) +{ + PRBool fragmentWritten = PR_FALSE; + PRUint16 msgSeq; + PRUint8 *fragment; + PRUint32 fragmentOffset = 0; + PRUint32 fragmentLen; + const PRUint8 *content = msg->data + DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN; + PRUint32 contentLen = msg->len - DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN; + SECStatus rv; + + /* The headers consume 12 bytes so the smallest possible message (i.e., an + * empty one) is 12 bytes. */ + PORT_Assert(msg->len >= DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN); + + /* DTLS only supports fragmenting handshaking messages. */ + PORT_Assert(msg->type == ssl_ct_handshake); + + msgSeq = (msg->data[4] << 8) | msg->data[5]; + + /* do {} while() so that empty messages are sent at least once. */ + do { + PRUint8 buf[DTLS_MAX_MTU]; /* >= than largest plausible MTU */ + PRBool hasUnackedRange; + PRUint32 end; + + hasUnackedRange = dtls_NextUnackedRange(ss, msgSeq, + fragmentOffset, contentLen, + &fragmentOffset, &end); + if (!hasUnackedRange) { + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: FragmentHandshake %d: all acknowledged", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, msgSeq)); + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: FragmentHandshake %d: unacked=%u-%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, msgSeq, fragmentOffset, end)); + + /* Cut down to the data we have available. */ + PORT_Assert(fragmentOffset <= contentLen); + PORT_Assert(fragmentOffset <= end); + PORT_Assert(end <= contentLen); + fragmentLen = PR_MIN(end, contentLen) - fragmentOffset; + + /* Limit further by the record size limit. Account for the header. */ + fragmentLen = PR_MIN(fragmentLen, + msg->cwSpec->recordSizeLimit - DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN); + + /* Reduce to the space remaining in the MTU. */ + fragmentLen = PR_MIN(fragmentLen, + ss->ssl3.mtu - /* MTU estimate. */ + ss->pendingBuf.len - /* Less any unsent records. */ + DTLS_MAX_EXPANSION - /* Allow for expansion. */ + DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN); /* And the handshake header. */ + PORT_Assert(fragmentLen > 0 || fragmentOffset == 0); + + /* Make totally sure that we will fit in the buffer. This should be + * impossible; DTLS_MAX_MTU should always be more than ss->ssl3.mtu. */ + if (fragmentLen >= (DTLS_MAX_MTU - DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN)) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (fragmentLen == contentLen) { + fragment = msg->data; + } else { + sslBuffer tmp = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + /* Construct an appropriate-sized fragment */ + /* Type, length, sequence */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&tmp, msg->data, 6); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Offset. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&tmp, fragmentOffset, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&tmp, fragmentLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Data. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&tmp, content + fragmentOffset, fragmentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + fragment = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&tmp); + } + + /* Record that we are sending first, because encrypting + * increments the sequence number. */ + rv = dtls13_RememberFragment(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake, + msgSeq, fragmentOffset, fragmentLen, + msg->cwSpec->epoch, + msg->cwSpec->nextSeqNum); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = dtls_SendFragment(ss, msg, fragment, + fragmentLen + DTLS_HS_HDR_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + fragmentWritten = PR_TRUE; + fragmentOffset += fragmentLen; + } while (fragmentOffset < contentLen); + + if (!fragmentWritten) { + /* Nothing was written if we got here, so the whole message must have + * been acknowledged. Discard it. */ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: FragmentHandshake %d: removed", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, msgSeq)); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&msg->link); + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage(msg); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Transmit a flight of handshake messages, stuffing them + * into as few records as seems reasonable. + * + * TODO: Space separate UDP packets out a little. + * + * Called from: + * dtls_FlushHandshake() + * dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb() + */ +SECStatus +dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRCList *msg_p; + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_TransmitMessageFlight", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + + /* DTLS does not buffer its handshake messages in ss->pendingBuf, but rather + * in the lastMessageFlight structure. This is just a sanity check that some + * programming error hasn't inadvertantly stuffed something in + * ss->pendingBuf. This function uses ss->pendingBuf temporarily and it + * needs to be empty to start. + */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->pendingBuf.len); + + for (msg_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + msg_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight;) { + DTLSQueuedMessage *msg = (DTLSQueuedMessage *)msg_p; + + /* Move the pointer forward so that the functions below are free to + * remove messages from the list. */ + msg_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(msg_p); + + /* Note: This function fragments messages so that each record is close + * to full. This produces fewer records, but it means that messages can + * be quite fragmented. Adding an extra flush here would push new + * messages into new records and reduce fragmentation. */ + + if (msg->type == ssl_ct_handshake) { + rv = dtls_FragmentHandshake(ss, msg); + } else { + PORT_Assert(!tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)); + rv = dtls_SendFragment(ss, msg, msg->data, msg->len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + break; + } + } + + /* Finally, flush any data that wasn't flushed already. */ + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = dtls_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + } + + /* Give up the locks */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* Flush the data in the pendingBuf and update the max message sent + * so we can adjust the MTU estimate if we need to. + * Wrapper for ssl_SendSavedWriteData. + * + * Called from dtls_TransmitMessageFlight() + */ +static SECStatus +dtls_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRInt32 sent; + + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0) + return SECFailure; + + /* We should always have complete writes b/c datagram sockets + * don't really block */ + if (ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Update the largest message sent so we can adjust the MTU + * estimate if necessary */ + if (sent > ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent) + ss->ssl3.hs.maxMessageSent = sent; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +dtls_InitTimers(sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int i; + dtlsTimer **timers[PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ss->ssl3.hs.timers)] = { + &ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer, + &ss->ssl3.hs.ackTimer, + &ss->ssl3.hs.hdTimer + }; + static const char *timerLabels[] = { + "retransmit", "ack", "holddown" + }; + + PORT_Assert(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(timers) == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(timerLabels)); + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ss->ssl3.hs.timers); ++i) { + *timers[i] = &ss->ssl3.hs.timers[i]; + ss->ssl3.hs.timers[i].label = timerLabels[i]; + } +} + +SECStatus +dtls_StartTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer, PRUint32 time, DTLSTimerCb cb) +{ + PORT_Assert(timer->cb == NULL); + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: %s dtls_StartTimer %s timeout=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), timer->label, time)); + + timer->started = PR_IntervalNow(); + timer->timeout = time; + timer->cb = cb; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +dtls_RestartTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer) +{ + timer->started = PR_IntervalNow(); + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +dtls_TimerActive(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer) +{ + return timer->cb != NULL; +} +/* Start a timer for retransmission. */ +static SECStatus +dtls_StartRetransmitTimer(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; + return dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer, + DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS, + dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb); +} + +/* Start a timer for holding an old cipher spec. */ +SECStatus +dtls_StartHolddownTimer(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; + return dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer, + DTLS_RETRANSMIT_FINISHED_MS, + dtls_FinishedTimerCb); +} + +/* Cancel a pending timer + * + * Called from: + * dtls_HandleHandshake() + * dtls_CheckTimer() + */ +void +dtls_CancelTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer) +{ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: %s dtls_CancelTimer %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + timer->label)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + timer->cb = NULL; +} + +static void +dtls_CancelAllTimers(sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ss->ssl3.hs.timers); ++i) { + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.timers[i]); + } +} + +/* Check the pending timer and fire the callback if it expired + * + * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake() + */ +void +dtls_CheckTimer(sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int i; + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_CheckTimer (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client")); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ss->ssl3.hs.timers); ++i) { + dtlsTimer *timer = &ss->ssl3.hs.timers[i]; + if (!timer->cb) { + continue; + } + + if ((PR_IntervalNow() - timer->started) >= + PR_MillisecondsToInterval(timer->timeout)) { + /* Timer has expired */ + DTLSTimerCb cb = timer->cb; + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: %s firing timer %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + timer->label)); + + /* Cancel the timer so that we can call the CB safely */ + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, timer); + + /* Now call the CB */ + cb(ss); + } + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); +} + +/* The callback to fire when the holddown timer for the Finished + * message expires and we can delete it + * + * Called from dtls_CheckTimer() + */ +static void +dtls_FinishedTimerCb(sslSocket *ss) +{ + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); +} + +/* Cancel the Finished hold-down timer and destroy the + * pending cipher spec. Note that this means that + * successive rehandshakes will fail if the Finished is + * lost. + * + * XXX OK for now. Figure out how to handle the combination + * of Finished lost and rehandshake + */ +void +dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* Skip this if we are handling a second ClientHello. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + return; + } + PORT_Assert((ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)); + dtls_CancelAllTimers(ss); + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; +} + +/* Set the MTU to the next step less than or equal to the + * advertised value. Also used to downgrade the MTU by + * doing dtls_SetMTU(ss, biggest packet set). + * + * Passing 0 means set this to the largest MTU known + * (effectively resetting the PMTU backoff value). + * + * Called by: + * ssl3_InitState() + * dtls_RetransmitTimerExpiredCb() + */ +void +dtls_SetMTU(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 advertised) +{ + int i; + + if (advertised == 0) { + ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[0]; + SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu)); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(COMMON_MTU_VALUES); i++) { + if (COMMON_MTU_VALUES[i] <= advertised) { + ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[i]; + SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu)); + return; + } + } + + /* Fallback */ + ss->ssl3.mtu = COMMON_MTU_VALUES[PR_ARRAY_SIZE(COMMON_MTU_VALUES) - 1]; + SSL_TRC(30, ("Resetting MTU to %d", ss->ssl3.mtu)); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * DTLS hello_verify_request + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +SECStatus +dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_verify_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + + /* The version. + * + * RFC 4347 required that you verify that the server versions + * match (Section 4.2.1) in the HelloVerifyRequest and the + * ServerHello. + * + * RFC 6347 suggests (SHOULD) that servers always use 1.0 in + * HelloVerifyRequest and allows the versions not to match, + * especially when 1.2 is being negotiated. + * + * Therefore we do not do anything to enforce a match, just + * read and check that this value is sane. + */ + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &temp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + /* Read the cookie. + * IMPORTANT: The value of ss->ssl3.hs.cookie is only valid while the + * HelloVerifyRequest message remains valid. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.cookie, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len > DTLS_COOKIE_BYTES) { + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + /* Now re-send the client hello */ + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_retransmit); + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (rv == SECSuccess) + return rv; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Initialize the DTLS anti-replay window + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec() + * ssl3_InitCipherSpec() + */ +void +dtls_InitRecvdRecords(DTLSRecvdRecords *records) +{ + PORT_Memset(records->data, 0, sizeof(records->data)); + records->left = 0; + records->right = DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW - 1; +} + +/* + * Has this DTLS record been received? Return values are: + * -1 -- out of range to the left + * 0 -- not received yet + * 1 -- replay + * + * Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord() + */ +int +dtls_RecordGetRecvd(const DTLSRecvdRecords *records, sslSequenceNumber seq) +{ + PRUint64 offset; + + /* Out of range to the left */ + if (seq < records->left) { + return -1; + } + + /* Out of range to the right; since we advance the window on + * receipt, that means that this packet has not been received + * yet */ + if (seq > records->right) + return 0; + + offset = seq % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW; + + return !!(records->data[offset / 8] & (1 << (offset % 8))); +} + +/* Update the DTLS anti-replay window + * + * Called from ssl3_HandleRecord() + */ +void +dtls_RecordSetRecvd(DTLSRecvdRecords *records, sslSequenceNumber seq) +{ + PRUint64 offset; + + if (seq < records->left) + return; + + if (seq > records->right) { + sslSequenceNumber new_left; + sslSequenceNumber new_right; + sslSequenceNumber right; + + /* Slide to the right; this is the tricky part + * + * 1. new_top is set to have room for seq, on the + * next byte boundary by setting the right 8 + * bits of seq + * 2. new_left is set to compensate. + * 3. Zero all bits between top and new_top. Since + * this is a ring, this zeroes everything as-yet + * unseen. Because we always operate on byte + * boundaries, we can zero one byte at a time + */ + new_right = seq | 0x07; + new_left = (new_right - DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW) + 1; + + if (new_right > records->right + DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW) { + PORT_Memset(records->data, 0, sizeof(records->data)); + } else { + for (right = records->right + 8; right <= new_right; right += 8) { + offset = right % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW; + records->data[offset / 8] = 0; + } + } + + records->right = new_right; + records->left = new_left; + } + + offset = seq % DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW; + + records->data[offset / 8] |= (1 << (offset % 8)); +} + +SECStatus +DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket, PRIntervalTime *timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss = NULL; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + PRIntervalTime now = PR_IntervalNow(); + PRIntervalTime to; + unsigned int i; + + *timeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(socket); + + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ss->ssl3.hs.timers); ++i) { + PRIntervalTime elapsed; + PRIntervalTime desired; + dtlsTimer *timer = &ss->ssl3.hs.timers[i]; + + if (!timer->cb) { + continue; + } + found = PR_TRUE; + + elapsed = now - timer->started; + desired = PR_MillisecondsToInterval(timer->timeout); + if (elapsed > desired) { + /* Timer expired */ + *timeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT; + return SECSuccess; + } else { + to = desired - elapsed; + } + + if (*timeout > to) { + *timeout = to; + } + } + + if (!found) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_TIMERS_FOUND); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +dtls_IsLongHeader(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet) +{ +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + return version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + firstOctet == ssl_ct_handshake || + firstOctet == ssl_ct_ack || + firstOctet == ssl_ct_alert; +#else + return PR_TRUE; +#endif +} + +PRBool +dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet) +{ + // Allow no version in case we haven't negotiated one yet. + return (version == 0 || version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (firstOctet & 0xe0) == 0x20; +} + +DTLSEpoch +dtls_ReadEpoch(const ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec, const PRUint8 *hdr) +{ + DTLSEpoch epoch; + DTLSEpoch maxEpoch; + DTLSEpoch partial; + + if (dtls_IsLongHeader(crSpec->version, hdr[0])) { + return ((DTLSEpoch)hdr[3] << 8) | hdr[4]; + } + + /* A lot of how we recover the epoch here will depend on how we plan to + * manage KeyUpdate. In the case that we decide to install a new read spec + * as a KeyUpdate is handled, crSpec will always be the highest epoch we can + * possibly receive. That makes this easier to manage. + */ + if (dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(crSpec->version, hdr[0])) { + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com: do something with the two-bit epoch. */ + /* Use crSpec->epoch, or crSpec->epoch - 1 if the last bit differs. */ + return crSpec->epoch - ((hdr[0] ^ crSpec->epoch) & 0x3); + } + + /* dtls_GatherData should ensure that this works. */ + PORT_Assert(hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data); + + /* This uses the same method as is used to recover the sequence number in + * dtls_ReadSequenceNumber, except that the maximum value is set to the + * current epoch. */ + partial = hdr[1] >> 6; + maxEpoch = PR_MAX(crSpec->epoch, 3); + epoch = (maxEpoch & 0xfffc) | partial; + if (partial > (maxEpoch & 0x03)) { + epoch -= 4; + } + return epoch; +} + +static sslSequenceNumber +dtls_ReadSequenceNumber(const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, const PRUint8 *hdr) +{ + sslSequenceNumber cap; + sslSequenceNumber partial; + sslSequenceNumber seqNum; + sslSequenceNumber mask; + + if (dtls_IsLongHeader(spec->version, hdr[0])) { + static const unsigned int seqNumOffset = 5; /* type, version, epoch */ + static const unsigned int seqNumLength = 6; + sslReader r = SSL_READER(hdr + seqNumOffset, seqNumLength); + (void)sslRead_ReadNumber(&r, seqNumLength, &seqNum); + return seqNum; + } + + /* Only the least significant bits of the sequence number is available here. + * This recovers the value based on the next expected sequence number. + * + * This works by determining the maximum possible sequence number, which is + * half the range of possible values above the expected next value (the + * expected next value is in |spec->seqNum|). Then, the last part of the + * sequence number is replaced. If that causes the value to exceed the + * maximum, subtract an entire range. + */ + if (hdr[0] & 0x08) { + cap = spec->nextSeqNum + (1ULL << 15); + partial = (((sslSequenceNumber)hdr[1]) << 8) | + (sslSequenceNumber)hdr[2]; + mask = (1ULL << 16) - 1; + } else { + cap = spec->nextSeqNum + (1ULL << 7); + partial = (sslSequenceNumber)hdr[1]; + mask = (1ULL << 8) - 1; + } + seqNum = (cap & ~mask) | partial; + /* The second check prevents the value from underflowing if we get a large + * gap at the start of a connection, where this subtraction would cause the + * sequence number to wrap to near UINT64_MAX. */ + if ((partial > (cap & mask)) && (seqNum > mask)) { + seqNum -= mask + 1; + } + return seqNum; +} + +/* + * DTLS relevance checks: + * Note that this code currently ignores all out-of-epoch packets, + * which means we lose some in the case of rehandshake + + * loss/reordering. Since DTLS is explicitly unreliable, this + * seems like a good tradeoff for implementation effort and is + * consistent with the guidance of RFC 6347 Sections 4.1 and 4.2.4.1. + * + * If the packet is not relevant, this function returns PR_FALSE. If the packet + * is relevant, this function returns PR_TRUE and sets |*seqNumOut| to the + * packet sequence number (removing the epoch). + */ +PRBool +dtls_IsRelevant(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const SSL3Ciphertext *cText, + sslSequenceNumber *seqNumOut) +{ + sslSequenceNumber seqNum = dtls_ReadSequenceNumber(spec, cText->hdr); + if (dtls_RecordGetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, seqNum) != 0) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls_IsRelevant, rejecting " + "potentially replayed packet", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return PR_FALSE; + } + + *seqNumOut = seqNum; + return PR_TRUE; +} + +void +dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) + return; + + /* At this point we are advancing our state machine, so we can free our last + * flight of messages. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* We need to keep our last flight around in DTLS 1.2 and below, + * so we can retransmit it in response to other people's + * retransmits. */ + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + + /* Reset the timer to the initial value if the retry counter + * is 0, per RFC 6347, Sec. 4.2.4.1 */ + dtls_CancelTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries == 0) { + ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; + } + } + + /* Empty the ACK queue (TLS 1.3 only). */ + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake, NULL); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9d10aa248d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/dtlscon.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __dtlscon_h_ +#define __dtlscon_h_ + +extern void dtls_FreeHandshakeMessage(DTLSQueuedMessage *msg); +extern void dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(PRCList *lst); +SECStatus dtls_TransmitMessageFlight(sslSocket *ss); +void dtls_InitTimers(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus dtls_StartTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer, + PRUint32 time, DTLSTimerCb cb); +SECStatus dtls_RestartTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer); +PRBool dtls_TimerActive(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer); +extern SECStatus dtls_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + sslBuffer *origBuf); +extern SECStatus dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +extern SECStatus dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus dtls_QueueMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, PRInt32 nIn); +extern SECStatus dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +SECStatus ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus dtls_StartHolddownTimer(sslSocket *ss); +extern void dtls_CheckTimer(sslSocket *ss); +extern void dtls_CancelTimer(sslSocket *ss, dtlsTimer *timer); +extern void dtls_SetMTU(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 advertised); +extern void dtls_InitRecvdRecords(DTLSRecvdRecords *records); +extern int dtls_RecordGetRecvd(const DTLSRecvdRecords *records, + sslSequenceNumber seq); +extern void dtls_RecordSetRecvd(DTLSRecvdRecords *records, + sslSequenceNumber seq); +extern void dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(sslSocket *ss); +extern SSL3ProtocolVersion +dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion tlsv); +extern SSL3ProtocolVersion +dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion dtlsv); +DTLSEpoch dtls_ReadEpoch(const ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec, const PRUint8 *hdr); +extern PRBool dtls_IsRelevant(sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const SSL3Ciphertext *cText, + sslSequenceNumber *seqNum); +void dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(sslSocket *ss); +PRBool dtls_IsLongHeader(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet); +PRBool dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, PRUint8 firstOctet); +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/exports.gyp b/security/nss/lib/ssl/exports.gyp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c3b34c6cc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/exports.gyp @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +{ + 'includes': [ + '../../coreconf/config.gypi' + ], + 'targets': [ + { + 'target_name': 'lib_ssl_exports', + 'type': 'none', + 'copies': [ + { + 'files': [ + 'preenc.h', + 'ssl.h', + 'sslerr.h', + 'sslexp.h', + 'sslproto.h', + 'sslt.h' + ], + 'destination': '<(nss_public_dist_dir)/<(module)' + } + ] + } + ], + 'variables': { + 'module': 'nss' + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/manifest.mn b/security/nss/lib/ssl/manifest.mn new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fedc42b4e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/manifest.mn @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +CORE_DEPTH = ../.. + +# DEFINES = -DTRACE + +ifdef ZLIB_INCLUDE_DIR +INCLUDES += -I$(ZLIB_INCLUDE_DIR) +endif + +EXPORTS = \ + ssl.h \ + sslt.h \ + sslerr.h \ + sslexp.h \ + sslproto.h \ + preenc.h \ + $(NULL) + +MODULE = nss + +CSRCS = \ + authcert.c \ + cmpcert.c \ + dtls13con.c \ + dtlscon.c \ + prelib.c \ + selfencrypt.c \ + ssl3con.c \ + ssl3ecc.c \ + ssl3ext.c \ + ssl3exthandle.c \ + ssl3gthr.c \ + sslauth.c \ + sslbloom.c \ + sslcert.c \ + sslcon.c \ + ssldef.c \ + sslencode.c \ + sslenum.c \ + sslerr.c \ + sslerrstrs.c \ + sslgrp.c \ + sslinfo.c \ + sslinit.c \ + sslmutex.c \ + sslnonce.c \ + sslprimitive.c \ + sslreveal.c \ + sslsecur.c \ + sslsnce.c \ + sslsock.c \ + sslspec.c \ + ssltrace.c \ + sslver.c \ + tls13con.c \ + tls13ech.c \ + tls13echv.c \ + tls13exthandle.c \ + tls13hashstate.c \ + tls13hkdf.c \ + tls13psk.c \ + tls13replay.c \ + tls13subcerts.c \ + $(NULL) + +LIBRARY_NAME = ssl +LIBRARY_VERSION = 3 +MAPFILE = $(OBJDIR)/$(LIBRARY_NAME).def + +# This part of the code, including all sub-dirs, can be optimized for size +export ALLOW_OPT_CODE_SIZE = 1 diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/notes.txt b/security/nss/lib/ssl/notes.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7a8998a85c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/notes.txt @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. + +SSL's Buffers: enumerated and explained. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +incoming: + +gs = ss->gather +hs = ss->ssl3->hs + +gs->inbuf incoming (encrypted) ssl records are placed here, + and then decrypted (or copied) to gs->buf. + +gs->buf ssl3_HandleHandshake puts decrypted ssl records here. + +hs.msg_body When an incoming handshake message spans more + than one ssl record, the first part(s) of it are accumulated + here until it all arrives. + +hs.msgState an alternative set of pointers/lengths for gs->buf. + Used only when a handleHandshake function returns SECWouldBlock. + ssl3_HandleHandshake remembers how far it previously got by + using these pointers instead of gs->buf when it is called + after a previous SECWouldBlock return. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- +outgoing: + +sec = ss->sec +ci = ss->sec->ci /* connect info */ + +ci->sendBuf Outgoing handshake messages are appended to this buffer. + This buffer will then be sent as a single SSL record. + +sec->writeBuf outgoing ssl records are constructed here and encrypted in + place before being written or copied to pendingBuf. + +ss->pendingBuf contains outgoing ciphertext that was saved after a write + attempt to the socket failed, e.g. EWouldBlock. + Generally empty with blocking sockets (should be no incomplete + writes). + +ss->saveBuf Used only by socks code. Intended to be used to buffer + outgoing data until a socks handshake completes. However, + this buffer is always empty. There is no code to put + anything into it. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +SECWouldBlock means that the function cannot make progress because it is +waiting for some event OTHER THAN socket I/O completion (e.g. waiting for +user dialog to finish). It is not the same as EWOULDBLOCK. + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Rank (order) of locks + +recvLock ->\ firstHandshake -> recvbuf -> ssl3Handshake -> xmitbuf -> "spec" +sendLock ->/ + +crypto and hash Data that must be protected while turning plaintext into +ciphertext: + +SSl3: (in ssl3_SendPlainText) + ss->ssl3 (the pointer) + ss->ssl3->current_write* (the pointer and the data in the spec + and any data referenced by the spec. + + ss->sec->isServer + ss->sec->writebuf* (ptr & content) locked by xmitBufLock + "buf" locked by xmitBufLock + +crypto and hash data that must be protected while turning ciphertext into +plaintext: + +SSL3: (in ssl3_HandleRecord ) + ssl3->current_read* (the pointer and all data refernced) + ss->sec->isServer + + +Data that must be protected while being used by a "writer": + +ss->pendingBuf.* +ss->saveBuf.* (which is dead) + +in ssl3_sendPlainText + +ss->ssl3->current_write-> (spec) +ss->sec->writeBuf.* +ss->sec->isServer + +in SendBlock + +ss->sec->writeBuf.* +ss->pendingBuf + +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Data variables (not const) protected by the "sslGlobalDataLock". +Note, this really should be a reader/writer lock. + +cipherSuites[] ssl3con.c diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6e3d423f49 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.c @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * this code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "prerror.h" +#include "prlog.h" +#include <errno.h> + +/* + * Based on win32err.c + * OS2TODO Stub everything for now to build. HCT + */ + +/* forward declaration. */ +void nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(PRInt32 err); + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_opendir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_closedir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_readdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_delete_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* The error code for stat() is in errno. */ +void +nss_MD_os2_map_stat_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_fstat_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_rename_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* The error code for access() is in errno. */ +void +nss_MD_os2_map_access_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_mkdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_rmdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_read_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_transmitfile_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_write_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_lseek_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_fsync_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* + * For both CloseHandle() and closesocket(). + */ +void +nss_MD_os2_map_close_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_socket_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + // PR_ASSERT(err != WSANOTINITIALISED); + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_recv_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_recvfrom_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_send_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEMSGSIZE: prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_sendto_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEMSGSIZE: prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_accept_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; break; + // case WSAEINVAL: prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_acceptex_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_connect_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: prError = PR_IN_PROGRESS_ERROR; break; + // case WSAEINVAL: prError = PR_ALREADY_INITIATED_ERROR; break; + // case WSAETIMEDOUT: prError = PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_bind_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEINVAL: prError = PR_SOCKET_ADDRESS_IS_BOUND_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_listen_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; break; + // case WSAEINVAL: prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_shutdown_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_getsockname_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAEINVAL: prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_getpeername_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_getsockopt_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_setsockopt_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_open_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_gethostname_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* Win32 select() only works on sockets. So in this +** context, WSAENOTSOCK is equivalent to EBADF on Unix. +*/ +void +nss_MD_os2_map_select_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + // case WSAENOTSOCK: prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; break; + default: + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_lockf_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { +// case ENOENT: prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED: prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS: prError = PR_FILE_EXISTS_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_DISK_CORRUPT: prError = PR_IO_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_DISK_FULL: prError = PR_NO_DEVICE_SPACE_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_DISK_OPERATION_FAILED: prError = PR_IO_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_DRIVE_LOCKED: prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_FILENAME_EXCED_RANGE: prError = PR_NAME_TOO_LONG_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_FILE_CORRUPT: prError = PR_IO_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_FILE_EXISTS: prError = PR_FILE_EXISTS_ERROR; break; +// case ERROR_FILE_INVALID: prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; break; +#if ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND != ENOENT +// case ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; break; +#endif + default: + prError = PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; + break; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..15e47411a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/os2_err.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * This code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* NSPR doesn't make these functions public, so we have to duplicate +** them in NSS. +*/ + +//HCT Based on Win32err.h +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_accept_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_acceptex_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_access_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_bind_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_close_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_closedir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_connect_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_default_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_delete_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_fstat_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_fsync_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_gethostname_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_getpeername_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_getsockname_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_getsockopt_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_listen_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_lockf_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_lseek_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_mkdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_open_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_opendir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_read_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_readdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_recv_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_recvfrom_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_rename_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_rmdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_select_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_send_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_sendto_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_setsockopt_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_shutdown_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_socket_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_stat_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_transmitfile_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_os2_map_write_error(PRInt32 err); diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/preenc.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/preenc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bebff89e22 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/preenc.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ + +/* + * Fortezza support is removed. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* Fortezza support is removed. + * This file remains so that old programs will continue to compile, + * But this functionality is no longer supported or implemented. + */ + +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "prio.h" + +typedef struct PEHeaderStr PEHeader; + +#define PE_MIME_TYPE "application/pre-encrypted" + +typedef struct PEFortezzaHeaderStr PEFortezzaHeader; +typedef struct PEFortezzaGeneratedHeaderStr PEFortezzaGeneratedHeader; +typedef struct PEFixedKeyHeaderStr PEFixedKeyHeader; +typedef struct PERSAKeyHeaderStr PERSAKeyHeader; + +struct PEFortezzaHeaderStr { + unsigned char key[12]; + unsigned char iv[24]; + unsigned char hash[20]; + unsigned char serial[8]; +}; + +struct PEFortezzaGeneratedHeaderStr { + unsigned char key[12]; + unsigned char iv[24]; + unsigned char hash[20]; + unsigned char Ra[128]; + unsigned char Y[128]; +}; + +struct PEFixedKeyHeaderStr { + unsigned char pkcs11Mech[4]; + unsigned char labelLen[2]; + unsigned char keyIDLen[2]; + unsigned char ivLen[2]; + unsigned char keyLen[2]; + unsigned char data[1]; +}; + +struct PERSAKeyHeaderStr { + unsigned char pkcs11Mech[4]; + unsigned char issuerLen[2]; + unsigned char serialLen[2]; + unsigned char ivLen[2]; + unsigned char keyLen[2]; + unsigned char data[1]; +}; + +#define PEFIXED_Label(header) (header->data) +#define PEFIXED_KeyID(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->labelLen)]) +#define PEFIXED_IV(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->labelLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->keyIDLen)]) +#define PEFIXED_Key(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->labelLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->keyIDLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->keyLen)]) +#define PERSA_Issuer(header) (header->data) +#define PERSA_Serial(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->issuerLen)]) +#define PERSA_IV(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->issuerLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->serialLen)]) +#define PERSA_Key(header) (&header->data[GetInt2(header->issuerLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->serialLen) + \ + GetInt2(header->keyLen)]) +struct PEHeaderStr { + unsigned char magic[2]; + unsigned char len[2]; + unsigned char type[2]; + unsigned char version[2]; + union { + PEFortezzaHeader fortezza; + PEFortezzaGeneratedHeader g_fortezza; + PEFixedKeyHeader fixed; + PERSAKeyHeader rsa; + } u; +}; + +#define PE_CRYPT_INTRO_LEN 8 +#define PE_INTRO_LEN 4 +#define PE_BASE_HEADER_LEN 8 + +#define PRE_BLOCK_SIZE 8 + +#define GetInt2(c) ((c[0] << 8) | c[1]) +#define GetInt4(c) (((unsigned long)c[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)c[1] << 16) | \ + ((unsigned long)c[2] << 8) | ((unsigned long)c[3])) +#define PutInt2(c, i) ((c[1] = (i)&0xff), (c[0] = ((i) >> 8) & 0xff)) +#define PutInt4(c, i) ((c[0] = ((i) >> 24) & 0xff), (c[1] = ((i) >> 16) & 0xff), \ + (c[2] = ((i) >> 8) & 0xff), (c[3] = (i)&0xff)) + +#define PRE_MAGIC 0xc0de +#define PRE_VERSION 0x1010 +#define PRE_FORTEZZA_FILE 0x00ff +#define PRE_FORTEZZA_STREAM 0x00f5 +#define PRE_FORTEZZA_GEN_STREAM 0x00f6 +#define PRE_FIXED_FILE 0x000f +#define PRE_RSA_FILE 0x001f +#define PRE_FIXED_STREAM 0x0005 + +PEHeader *SSL_PreencryptedStreamToFile(PRFileDesc *fd, PEHeader *, + int *headerSize); + +PEHeader *SSL_PreencryptedFileToStream(PRFileDesc *fd, PEHeader *, + int *headerSize); diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/prelib.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/prelib.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4db9ffe699 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/prelib.c @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ + +/* + * Functions used by https servers to send (download) pre-encrypted files + * over SSL connections that use Fortezza ciphersuites. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "pkcs11t.h" +#include "preenc.h" +#include "pk11func.h" + +PEHeader * +SSL_PreencryptedStreamToFile(PRFileDesc *fd, PEHeader *inHeader, + int *headerSize) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return NULL; +} + +PEHeader * +SSL_PreencryptedFileToStream(PRFileDesc *fd, PEHeader *header, + int *headerSize) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return NULL; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1c70f76353 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "blapit.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslt.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "selfencrypt.h" + +static SECStatus +ssl_MacBuffer(PK11SymKey *key, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int len, + unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *macLen, unsigned int maxMacLen) +{ + PK11Context *ctx; + SECItem macParam = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int computedLen; + SECStatus rv; + + ctx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, key, &macParam); + if (!ctx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, in, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, mac, &computedLen, maxMacLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + *macLen = maxMacLen; + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; +} + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptProtectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, + const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + if (inLen > maxOutLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(out, in, inLen); + *outLen = inLen; + + return 0; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + if (inLen > maxOutLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(out, in, inLen); + *outLen = inLen; + + return 0; +} + +#else +/* + * Structure is. + * + * struct { + * opaque keyName[16]; + * opaque iv[16]; + * opaque ciphertext<16..2^16-1>; + * opaque mac[32]; + * } SelfEncrypted; + * + * We are using AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA256 in Encrypt-then-MAC mode for + * two reasons: + * + * 1. It's what we already used for tickets. + * 2. We don't have to worry about nonce collisions as much + * (the chance is lower because we have a random 128-bit nonce + * and they are less serious than with AES-GCM). + */ +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptProtectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, + const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + unsigned int len; + unsigned int lenOffset; + unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + SECItem ivItem = { siBuffer, iv, sizeof(iv) }; + /* Write directly to out. */ + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(out, maxOutLen); + SECStatus rv; + + /* Generate a random IV */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Add header. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, keyName, SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, iv, sizeof(iv)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Leave space for the length of the ciphertext. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&buf, 2, &lenOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Encode the ciphertext in place. */ + rv = PK11_Encrypt(encKey, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, &ivItem, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(&buf), &len, + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(&buf), in, inLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&buf, len, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(&buf, lenOffset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* MAC the entire output buffer into the output. */ + PORT_Assert(buf.space - buf.len >= SHA256_LENGTH); + rv = ssl_MacBuffer(macKey, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), /* input */ + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(&buf), &len, /* output */ + SHA256_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&buf, len, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *outLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + sslReader reader = SSL_READER(in, inLen); + + sslReadBuffer encodedKeyNameBuffer = { 0 }; + SECStatus rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN, + &encodedKeyNameBuffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + sslReadBuffer ivBuffer = { 0 }; + rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &ivBuffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PRUint64 cipherTextLen = 0; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &cipherTextLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + sslReadBuffer cipherTextBuffer = { 0 }; + rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, (unsigned int)cipherTextLen, &cipherTextBuffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + unsigned int bytesToMac = reader.offset; + + sslReadBuffer encodedMacBuffer = { 0 }; + rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, SHA256_LENGTH, &encodedMacBuffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Make sure we're at the end of the block. */ + if (reader.offset != reader.buf.len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now that everything is decoded, we can make progress. */ + /* 1. Check that we have the right key. */ + if (PORT_Memcmp(keyName, encodedKeyNameBuffer.buf, SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* 2. Check the MAC */ + unsigned char computedMac[SHA256_LENGTH]; + unsigned int computedMacLen = 0; + rv = ssl_MacBuffer(macKey, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, in, bytesToMac, + computedMac, &computedMacLen, sizeof(computedMac)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(computedMacLen == SHA256_LENGTH); + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computedMac, encodedMacBuffer.buf, computedMacLen) != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* 3. OK, it verifies, now decrypt. */ + SECItem ivItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)ivBuffer.buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE }; + rv = PK11_Decrypt(encKey, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, &ivItem, + out, outLen, maxOutLen, cipherTextBuffer.buf, cipherTextLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} +#endif + +/* Predict the size of the encrypted data, including padding */ +unsigned int +ssl_SelfEncryptGetProtectedSize(unsigned int inLen) +{ + return SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN + + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + + 2 + + ((inLen / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) + 1) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE + /* Padded */ + SHA256_LENGTH; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptProtect( + sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + PRUint8 keyName[SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN]; + PK11SymKey *encKey; + PK11SymKey *macKey; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Get session ticket keys. */ + rv = ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeys(ss, keyName, &encKey, &macKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate self-encrypt keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + return ssl_SelfEncryptProtectInt(encKey, macKey, keyName, + in, inLen, out, outLen, maxOutLen); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotect( + sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen) +{ + PRUint8 keyName[SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN]; + PK11SymKey *encKey; + PK11SymKey *macKey; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Get session ticket keys. */ + rv = ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeys(ss, keyName, &encKey, &macKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate self-encrypt keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + return ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotectInt(encKey, macKey, keyName, + in, inLen, out, outLen, maxOutLen); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5415ac09f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/selfencrypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __selfencrypt_h_ +#define __selfencrypt_h_ + +#include "secmodt.h" + +unsigned int ssl_SelfEncryptGetProtectedSize(unsigned int inLen); +SECStatus ssl_SelfEncryptProtect( + sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen); +SECStatus ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotect( + sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen); + +/* Exported for use in unit tests.*/ +SECStatus ssl_SelfEncryptProtectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen); +SECStatus ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotectInt( + PK11SymKey *encKey, PK11SymKey *macKey, const unsigned char *keyName, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOutLen); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..75c37f2bed --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.def @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +;+# +;+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +;+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +;+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +;+# +;+# OK, this file is meant to support SUN, LINUX, AIX and WINDOWS +;+# 1. For all unix platforms, the string ";-" means "remove this line" +;+# 2. For all unix platforms, the string " DATA " will be removed from any +;+# line on which it occurs. +;+# 3. Lines containing ";+" will have ";+" removed on SUN and LINUX. +;+# On AIX, lines containing ";+" will be removed. +;+# 4. For all unix platforms, the string ";;" will thave the ";;" removed. +;+# 5. For all unix platforms, after the above processing has taken place, +;+# all characters after the first ";" on the line will be removed. +;+# And for AIX, the first ";" will also be removed. +;+# This file is passed directly to windows. Since ';' is a comment, all UNIX +;+# directives are hidden behind ";", ";+", and ";-" +;+ +;+NSS_3.2 { # NSS 3.2 release +;+ global: +LIBRARY ssl3 ;- +EXPORTS ;- +SSL_ImplementedCiphers DATA ; +SSL_NumImplementedCiphers DATA ; +NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames; +NSS_FindCertKEAType; +NSS_GetClientAuthData; +NSS_SetDomesticPolicy; +NSS_SetExportPolicy; +NSS_SetFrancePolicy; +SSL_AuthCertificate; +SSL_AuthCertificateHook; +SSL_BadCertHook; +SSL_CertDBHandleSet; +SSL_CipherPolicyGet; +SSL_CipherPolicySet; +SSL_CipherPrefGet; +SSL_CipherPrefGetDefault; +SSL_CipherPrefSet; +SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault; +SSL_ClearSessionCache; +SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache; +SSL_ConfigSecureServer; +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache; +SSL_DataPending; +SSL_ForceHandshake; +SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook; +SSL_GetSessionID; +SSL_GetStatistics; +SSL_HandshakeCallback; +SSL_ImportFD; +SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache; +SSL_InvalidateSession; +SSL_OptionGet; +SSL_OptionGetDefault; +SSL_OptionSet; +SSL_OptionSetDefault; +SSL_PeerCertificate; +SSL_PreencryptedFileToStream; +SSL_PreencryptedStreamToFile; +SSL_ReHandshake; +SSL_ResetHandshake; +SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq; +SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert; +SSL_RevealCert; +SSL_RevealPinArg; +SSL_RevealURL; +SSL_SecurityStatus; +SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg; +SSL_SetSockPeerID; +SSL_SetURL; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.2.1 { # NSS 3.2.1 release +;+ global: +NSSSSL_VersionCheck; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.4 { # NSS 3.4 release +;+ global: +SSL_GetChannelInfo; +SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo; +SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks; +SSL_LocalCertificate; +SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.7.4 { # NSS 3.7.4 release +;+ global: +SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCache; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.11.4 { # NSS 3.11.4 release +;+ global: +SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout; +SSL_ReHandshakeWithTimeout; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.11.8 { # NSS 3.11.8 release +;+ global: +SSL_CanBypass; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.12.6 { # NSS 3.12.6 release +;+ global: +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt; +SSL_GetImplementedCiphers; +SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo; +SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers; +SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension; +SSL_ReconfigFD; +SSL_SetTrustAnchors; +SSL_SNISocketConfigHook; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.12.10 { # NSS 3.12.10 release +;+ global: +SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.13 { # NSS 3.13 release +;+ global: +NSSSSL_GetVersion; +;+ local: +;+ *; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.13.2 { # NSS 3.13.2 release +;+ global: +SSL_SetNextProtoCallback; +SSL_SetNextProtoNego; +SSL_GetNextProto; +SSL_AuthCertificateComplete; +;+ local: +;+ *; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.14 { # NSS 3.14 release +;+ global: +DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout; +DTLS_ImportFD; +SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial; +SSL_VersionRangeGet; +SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault; +SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported; +SSL_VersionRangeSet; +SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault; +SSL_GetSRTPCipher; +SSL_SetSRTPCiphers; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.15 { # NSS 3.15 release +;+ global: +SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses; +SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.15.4 { # NSS 3.15.4 release +;+ global: +SSL_PeerCertificateChain; +SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart; +SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.20 { # NSS 3.20 release +;+ global: +SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet; +SSL_EnableWeakDHEPrimeGroup; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.21 { # NSS 3.21 release +;+ global: +SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo; +SSL_SignaturePrefSet; +SSL_SignaturePrefGet; +SSL_SignatureMaxCount; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.22 { # NSS 3.22 release +;+ global: +SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps; +SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.23 { # NSS 3.23 release +;+ global: +SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.24 { # NSS 3.24 release +;+ global: +SSL_ConfigServerCert; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.27 { # NSS 3.27 release +;+ global: +SSL_NamedGroupConfig; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.28 { # NSS 3.28 release +;+ global: +SSL_ExportEarlyKeyingMaterial; +SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares; +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet; +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.30 { # NSS 3.30 release +;+ global: +SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.30.0.1 { # Additional symbols for NSS 3.30 release +;+ global: +SSL_AlertReceivedCallback; +SSL_AlertSentCallback; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.33 { # NSS 3.33 release +;+ global: +SSL_GetExperimentalAPI; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.77 { # NSS 3.77 release +;+ global: +SSL_CertIsUsable; +SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; +;+NSS_3.80 { # NSS 3.80 release +;+ global: +SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete; +;+ local: +;+*; +;+}; diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.gyp b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.gyp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2aa35cc963 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.gyp @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public +# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this +# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. +{ + 'includes': [ + '../../coreconf/config.gypi' + ], + 'targets': [ + { + 'target_name': 'ssl', + 'type': 'static_library', + 'sources': [ + 'authcert.c', + 'cmpcert.c', + 'dtlscon.c', + 'dtls13con.c', + 'prelib.c', + 'selfencrypt.c', + 'ssl3con.c', + 'ssl3ecc.c', + 'ssl3ext.c', + 'ssl3exthandle.c', + 'ssl3gthr.c', + 'sslauth.c', + 'sslbloom.c', + 'sslcert.c', + 'sslcon.c', + 'ssldef.c', + 'sslencode.c', + 'sslenum.c', + 'sslerr.c', + 'sslerrstrs.c', + 'sslgrp.c', + 'sslinfo.c', + 'sslinit.c', + 'sslmutex.c', + 'sslnonce.c', + 'sslprimitive.c', + 'sslreveal.c', + 'sslsecur.c', + 'sslsnce.c', + 'sslsock.c', + 'sslspec.c', + 'ssltrace.c', + 'sslver.c', + 'tls13con.c', + 'tls13ech.c', + 'tls13echv.c', + 'tls13exthandle.c', + 'tls13hashstate.c', + 'tls13hkdf.c', + 'tls13psk.c', + 'tls13replay.c', + 'tls13subcerts.c', + ], + 'conditions': [ + [ 'OS=="win"', { + 'sources': [ + 'win32err.c', + ], + 'defines': [ + 'IN_LIBSSL', + ], + }, { + # Not Windows. + 'sources': [ + 'unix_err.c' + ], + }], + [ 'fuzz_tls==1', { + 'defines': [ + 'UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE', + ], + }], + [ 'enable_sslkeylogfile==1', { + 'defines': [ + 'NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE', + ], + }], + ], + 'dependencies': [ + '<(DEPTH)/exports.gyp:nss_exports', + ], + }, + { + 'target_name': 'ssl3', + 'type': 'shared_library', + 'dependencies': [ + 'ssl', + '<(DEPTH)/lib/nss/nss.gyp:nss3', + '<(DEPTH)/lib/util/util.gyp:nssutil3', + '<(DEPTH)/lib/freebl/freebl.gyp:freebl', + ], + 'variables': { + 'mapfile': 'ssl.def' + } + } + ], + 'variables': { + 'module': 'nss' + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc817a781e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1608 @@ +/* + * This file contains prototypes for the public SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __ssl_h_ +#define __ssl_h_ + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "prio.h" +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "keythi.h" + +#include "sslt.h" /* public ssl data types */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(IN_LIBSSL) && !defined(NSS_USE_STATIC_LIBS) +#define SSL_IMPORT extern __declspec(dllimport) +#else +#define SSL_IMPORT extern +#endif + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +/* constant table enumerating all implemented cipher suites. */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[]; + +/* the same as the above, but is a function */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 *SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void); + +/* number of entries in the above table. */ +SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; + +/* the same as the above, but is a function */ +SSL_IMPORT PRUint16 SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void); + +/* Macro to tell which ciphers in table are SSL2 vs SSL3/TLS. */ +#define SSL_IS_SSL2_CIPHER(which) (((which)&0xfff0) == 0xff00) + +/* +** Imports fd into SSL, returning a new socket. Copies SSL configuration +** from model. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Imports fd into DTLS, returning a new socket. Copies DTLS configuration +** from model. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Enable/disable an ssl mode +** +** SSL_SECURITY: +** enable/disable use of SSL security protocol before connect +** +** SSL_SOCKS: +** enable/disable use of socks before connect +** (No longer supported). +** +** SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: +** require a certificate during secure connect +*/ +/* options */ +#define SSL_SECURITY 1 /* (on by default) */ +#define SSL_SOCKS 2 /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 3 /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT 5 /* force accept to hs as client */ + /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER 6 /* force connect to hs as server */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 is obsolete and may be removed soon. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL2 7 /* enable ssl v2 (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a +** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_SSL3. +*/ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL3 8 /* enable ssl v3 (on by default) */ + +#define SSL_NO_CACHE 9 /* don't use the session cache */ + /* (off by default) */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE 10 /* (SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE */ + /* by default) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_FDX 11 /* permit simultaneous read/write */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 compatible hellos are not accepted by some TLS servers +** and cannot negotiate extensions. SSL v2 is obsolete. This option may be +** removed soon. +*/ +#define SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO 12 /* send v3 client hello in v2 fmt */ + /* (off by default) */ + +/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a +** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_TLS. +*/ +#define SSL_ENABLE_TLS 13 /* enable TLS (on by default) */ + +#define SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION 14 /* for compatibility, default: on */ +#define SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN 15 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11 16 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_NO_LOCKS 17 /* Don't use locks for protection */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS 18 /* Enable TLS SessionTicket */ + /* extension (off by default) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE 19 /* (unsupported, deprecated, off) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION 20 /* Values below (default: never) */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION 21 /* Peer must send Signaling */ + /* Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) or */ + /* Renegotiation Info (RI) */ + /* extension in ALL handshakes. */ + /* default: off */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START 22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */ + /* default, applies only to */ + /* clients). False start is a */ +/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before + * verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up + * sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and + * only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the + * cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that + * it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a + * full handshake. + * + * In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a + * callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function. + */ + +/* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks + * on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting + * non-empty application_data records into two records; the first record has + * only the first byte of plaintext, and the second has the rest. + * + * This only prevents the attack in the sending direction; the connection may + * still be vulnerable to such attacks if the peer does not implement a similar + * countermeasure. + * + * This protection mechanism is on by default; the default can be overridden by + * setting NSS_SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV=0 in the environment prior to execution, + * and/or by the application setting the option SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV to PR_FALSE. + * + * The per-record IV in TLS 1.1 and later adds one block of overhead per + * record, whereas this hack will add at least two blocks of overhead per + * record, so TLS 1.1+ will always be more efficient. + * + * Other implementations (e.g. some versions of OpenSSL, in some + * configurations) prevent the same attack by prepending an empty + * application_data record to every application_data record they send; we do + * not do that because some implementations cannot handle empty + * application_data records. Also, we only split application_data records and + * not other types of records, because some implementations will not accept + * fragmented records of some other types (e.g. some versions of NSS do not + * accept fragmented alerts). + */ +#define SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV 23 +#define SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING 24 /* Request OCSP stapling (client) */ + +/* SSL_ENABLE_NPN is defunct and defaults to false. + * Using this option will not have any effect but won't produce an error. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_NPN 25 + +/* SSL_ENABLE_ALPN controls whether the ALPN extension is enabled for the + * initial handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used. + * SSL_SetNextProtoNego or SSL_SetNextProtoCallback can be used to control + * the application layer protocol negotiation; + * ALPN is not negotiated for renegotiation handshakes, even though the ALPN + * specification defines a way to use ALPN during renegotiations. + * SSL_ENABLE_ALPN is currently enabled by default, but this may change in + * future versions. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_ALPN 26 + +/* SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY controls whether the ECDHE server key is + * reused for multiple handshakes or generated each time. + * SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY is currently disabled by default. + * This socket option is for ECDHE, only. It is unrelated to DHE. + */ +#define SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY 27 + +#define SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV 28 /* Send fallback SCSV in \ + * handshakes. */ + +/* SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE controls whether DHE is enabled for the server socket. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE 29 + +/* Use draft-ietf-tls-session-hash. Controls whether we offer the + * extended_master_secret extension which, when accepted, hashes + * the handshake transcript into the master secret. This option is + * enabled by default. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 30 + +/* Request Signed Certificate Timestamps via TLS extension (client) */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS 31 + +/* Ordinarily, when negotiating a TLS_DHE_* cipher suite the server picks the + * group. draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe changes this to use supported_groups + * (formerly supported_curves) to signal which pre-defined groups are OK. + * + * This option causes an NSS client to use this extension and demand that those + * groups be used. A client will signal any enabled DHE groups in the + * supported_groups extension and reject groups that don't match what it has + * enabled. A server will only negotiate TLS_DHE_* cipher suites if the + * client includes the extension. + * + * See SSL_NamedGroupConfig() for how to control which groups are enabled. + * + * This option cannot be enabled if NSS is not compiled with ECC support. + */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_DH_NAMED_GROUPS 32 + +/* Allow 0-RTT data (for TLS 1.3). + * + * When this option is set, the server's session tickets will contain + * a flag indicating that it accepts 0-RTT. When resuming such a + * session, PR_Write() on the client will be allowed immediately after + * starting the handshake and PR_Read() on the server will be allowed + * on the server to read that data. Calls to + * SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo() and SSL_GetNextProto() + * can be made used during this period to learn about the channel + * parameters. + * + * The transition between the 0-RTT and 1-RTT modes is marked by the + * handshake callback. However, it is possible to force the completion + * of the handshake (and cause the handshake callback to be called) + * prior to reading all 0-RTT data using SSL_ForceHandshake(). To + * ensure that all early data is read before the handshake callback, any + * time that SSL_ForceHandshake() returns a PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, use + * PR_Read() to read all available data. If PR_Read() is called + * multiple times, this will result in the handshake completing, but the + * handshake callback will occur after early data has all been read. + * + * WARNING: 0-RTT data has different anti-replay and PFS properties than + * the rest of the TLS data. See [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 8] + * for more details. + * + * Note: when DTLS 1.3 is in use, any 0-RTT data received after EndOfEarlyData + * (e.g., because of reordering) is discarded. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA 33 + +/* Sets a limit to the size of encrypted records (see + * draft-ietf-tls-record-limit). This is the value that is advertised to peers, + * not a limit on the size of records that will be created. Setting this value + * reduces the size of records that will be received (not sent). + * + * This limit applies to the plaintext, but the records that appear on the wire + * will be bigger. This doesn't include record headers, IVs, block cipher + * padding, and authentication tags or MACs. + * + * NSS always advertises the record size limit extension. If this option is not + * set, the extension will contain the maximum allowed size for the selected TLS + * version (currently this is 16384 or 2^14 for TLS 1.2 and lower and 16385 for + * TLS 1.3). + * + * By default, NSS creates records that are the maximum size possible, using all + * the data that was written by the application. Writes larger than the maximum + * are split into maximum sized records, and any remainder (unless + * SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV is enabled and active). If a peer advertises a record size + * limit then that value is used instead. + */ +#define SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 34 + +/* Enables TLS 1.3 compatibility mode. In this mode, the client includes a fake + * session ID in the handshake and sends a ChangeCipherSpec. A server will + * always use the setting chosen by the client, so the value of this option has + * no effect for a server. This setting is ignored for DTLS. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE 35 + +/* Enables the sending of DTLS records using the short (two octet) record + * header. Only do this if there are 2^10 or fewer packets in flight at a time; + * using this with a larger number of packets in flight could mean that packets + * are dropped if there is reordering. + * + * This applies to TLS 1.3 only. This is not a parameter that is negotiated + * during the TLS handshake. Unlike other socket options, this option can be + * changed after a handshake is complete. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER 36 + +/* + * Enables the processing of the downgrade sentinel that can be added to the + * ServerHello.random by a server that supports Section 4.1.3 of TLS 1.3 + * [RFC8446]. This sentinel will always be generated by a server that + * negotiates a version lower than its maximum, this only controls whether a + * client will treat receipt of a value that indicates a downgrade as an error. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK 37 + +/* Enables the SSLv2-compatible ClientHello for servers. NSS does not support + * SSLv2 and will never send an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello as a client. An + * NSS server with this option enabled will accept a ClientHello that is + * v2-compatible as defined in Appendix E.1 of RFC 6101. + * + * This is disabled by default and will be removed in a future version. */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO 38 + +/* Enables the post-handshake authentication in TLS 1.3. If it is set + * to PR_TRUE, the client will send the "post_handshake_auth" + * extension to indicate that it will process CertificateRequest + * messages after handshake. + * + * This option applies only to clients. For a server, the + * SSL_SendCertificateRequest can be used to request post-handshake + * authentication. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 39 + +/* Enables the delegated credentials extension (draft-ietf-tls-subcerts). When + * enabled, a client that supports TLS 1.3 will indicate willingness to + * negotiate a delegated credential (DC). Note that client-delegated credentials + * are not currently supported. + * + * If support is indicated, the peer may use a DC to authenticate itself. The DC + * is sent as an extension to the peer's end-entity certificate; the end-entity + * certificate is used to verify the DC, which in turn is used to verify the + * handshake. DCs effectively extend the certificate chain by one, but only + * within the context of TLS. Once issued, DCs can't be revoked; in order to + * mitigate the damage in case the secret key is compromised, the DC is only + * valid for a short time (days, hours, or even minutes). + * + * This library implements draft-07 of the protocol spec. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS 40 + +/* Causes TLS (>=1.3) to suppress the EndOfEarlyData message in stream mode. + * + * This is not advisable in general, but the message only exists to delineate + * early data in a streamed connection. DTLS does not use this message as a + * result. The integration of TLS with QUIC, which uses a record/packet + * protection layer that is unreliable, also does not use this message. + * + * On the server, this requires that SSL_RecordLayerData be used. + * EndOfEarlyData is otherwise needed to drive key changes. Additionally, + * servers that use this API must check that handshake messages (Certificate, + * CertificateVerify, and Finished in particular) are only received in epoch 2 + * (Handshake). SSL_RecordLayerData will accept these handshake messages if + * they are passed as epoch 1 (Early Data) in a single call. + * + * Using this option will cause connections to fail if early data is attempted + * and the peer expects this message. + */ +#define SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 41 + +/* Enables TLS GREASE (specified in RFC8701, following Chrome 55 implementation + * decisions). + * + * If enabled and the client's ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 or + * the server's ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, this adds random + * GREASE values to: + * - ClientHello (Client): + * - A cipher_suite value to the cipher_suites field. + * - An empty and a 1B zeroed payload extension. + * - A named group value to the supported_groups extension and a + * KeyShareEntry value for the added named group. + * - A signature algorithm value to the signature_algorithms extension. + * - A version value to the supported_versions extension. + * - A PskKeyExchangeMode value to the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + * - A alpn value to the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension. + * + * - CertificateRequest (Server): + * - An empty extension. + * - A signature algorithm value to the signature_algorithms extension. + * + * - NewSessionTicket (Server): + * - An empty extension. + * + * GREASE values MUST nerver be negotiated but ignored. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_GREASE 42 + +/* Enables TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation. + * + * On a TLS ClientHello all extensions but the Psk extension + * (which MUST be last) will be sent in randomly shuffeld order. + */ +#define SSL_ENABLE_CH_EXTENSION_PERMUTATION 43 + +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* Old deprecated function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_Enable(PRFileDesc *fd, int option, PRIntn on); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableDefault(int option, PRIntn on); +#endif + +/* Set (and get) options for sockets and defaults for newly created sockets. + * + * While the |val| parameter of these methods is PRIntn, options only support + * two values by default: PR_TRUE or PR_FALSE. The documentation of specific + * options will explain if other values are permitted. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRIntn val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRIntn *val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRIntn *val); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CertDBHandleSet(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle); + +/* SSLNextProtoCallback is called during the handshake for the server, when an + * Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension has been received + * from the client. |protos| and |protosLen| define a buffer which contains the + * client's advertisement. + * |protoOut| is a buffer provided by the caller, of length 255 (the maximum + * allowed by the protocol). On successful return, the protocol to be announced + * to the server will be in |protoOut| and its length in |*protoOutLen|. + * + * The callback must return SECFailure or SECSuccess (not SECWouldBlock). + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLNextProtoCallback)( + void *arg, + PRFileDesc *fd, + const unsigned char *protos, + unsigned int protosLen, + unsigned char *protoOut, + unsigned int *protoOutLen, + unsigned int protoMaxOut); + +/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback sets a callback function to handle ALPN Negotiation. + * It causes a client to advertise ALPN. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLNextProtoCallback callback, + void *arg); + +/* SSL_SetNextProtoNego can be used as an alternative to + * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. + * + * Using this function allows client and server to transparently support ALPN. + * The same set of protocols will be advertised via ALPN and, if the server + * uses ALPN to select a protocol, SSL_GetNextProto will return + * SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED as the state. + * + * Because the predecessor to ALPN, NPN, used the first protocol as the fallback + * protocol, when sending an ALPN extension, the first protocol is moved to the + * end of the list. This indicates that the fallback protocol is the least + * preferred. The other protocols should be in preference order. + * + * The supported protocols are specified in |data| in wire-format (8-bit + * length-prefixed). For example: "\010http/1.1\006spdy/2". + * + * An empty value (i.e., where |length| is 0 and |data| is any value, + * including NULL) forcibly disables ALPN. In this mode, the server will + * reject any ClientHello that includes the ALPN extension. + * + * Calling this function overrides the callback previously set by + * SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd, + const unsigned char *data, + unsigned int length); + +typedef enum SSLNextProtoState { + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT = 0, /* No peer support */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED = 1, /* Mutual agreement */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP = 2, /* No protocol overlap found */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED = 3, /* Server selected proto (ALPN) */ + SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE = 4 /* We are in 0-RTT using this value. */ +} SSLNextProtoState; + +/* SSL_GetNextProto can be used in the HandshakeCallback or any time after + * a handshake to retrieve the result of the Next Protocol negotiation. + * + * The length of the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into *bufLen. + * If the negotiated protocol is longer than bufLenMax, then SECFailure is + * returned. Otherwise, the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into buf, + * and SECSuccess is returned. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetNextProto(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLNextProtoState *state, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *bufLen, + unsigned int bufLenMax); + +/* +** Control ciphers that SSL uses. If on is non-zero then the named cipher +** is enabled, otherwise it is disabled. +** The "cipher" values are defined in sslproto.h (the SSL_EN_* values). +** EnableCipher records user preferences. +** SetPolicy sets the policy according to the policy module. +*/ +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* Old deprecated function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableCipher(long which, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPolicy(long which, int policy); +#endif + +/* New function names */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 policy); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicyGet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 *policy); + +/* +** Control for TLS signature schemes for TLS 1.2 and 1.3. +** +** This governs what signature schemes (or algorithms) are sent by a client in +** the signature_algorithms extension. A client will not accept a signature +** from a server unless it uses an enabled algorithm. +** +** This also governs what the server sends in the supported_signature_algorithms +** field of a CertificateRequest. +** +** This changes what the server uses to sign ServerKeyExchange and +** CertificateVerify messages. An endpoint uses the first entry from this list +** that is compatible with both its certificate and its peer's supported +** values. +** +** This configuration affects TLS 1.2, but the combination of EC group and hash +** algorithm is interpreted loosely to be compatible with other implementations. +** For TLS 1.2, NSS will ignore the curve group when generating or verifying +** ECDSA signatures. For example, a P-384 ECDSA certificate is used with +** SHA-256 if ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 is enabled. +** +** Omitting SHA-256 schemes from this list might be foolish. Support is +** mandatory in TLS 1.2 and 1.3 and there might be interoperability issues. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet( + PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, unsigned int count); + +/* Deprecated, use SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet() instead. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignaturePrefSet( + PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int count); + +/* +** Get the currently configured signature schemes. +** +** The schemes are written to |schemes| but not if there are more than +** |maxCount| values configured. The number of schemes that are in use are +** written to |count|. This fails if |maxCount| is insufficiently large. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *algorithms, unsigned int *count, + unsigned int maxCount); + +/* Deprecated, use SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet() instead. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SignaturePrefGet( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, unsigned int *count, + unsigned int maxCount); + +/* +** Returns the maximum number of signature algorithms that are supported and +** can be set or retrieved using SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet or +** SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT unsigned int SSL_SignatureMaxCount(void); + +/* +** Define custom priorities for EC and FF groups used in DH key exchange and EC +** groups for ECDSA. This only changes the order of enabled lists (and thus +** their priorities) and enables all groups in |groups| while disabling all other +** groups. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_NamedGroupConfig(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLNamedGroup *groups, + unsigned int num_groups); + +/* +** Configure the socket to configure additional key shares. Normally when a TLS +** 1.3 ClientHello is sent, just one key share is included using the first +** preference group (as set by SSL_NamedGroupConfig). If the server decides to +** pick a different group for key exchange, it is forced to send a +** HelloRetryRequest, which adds an entire round trip of latency. +** +** This function can be used to configure libssl to generate additional key +** shares when sending a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. If |count| is set to a non-zero +** value, then additional key shares are generated. Shares are added in the +** preference order set in SSL_NamedGroupConfig. |count| can be set to any +** value; NSS limits the number of shares to the number of supported groups. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, + unsigned int count); + +/* Deprecated: use SSL_NamedGroupConfig() instead. +** SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet is used to configure the set of allowed/enabled DHE group +** parameters that can be used by NSS for the given server socket. +** The first item in the array is used as the default group, if no other +** selection criteria can be used by NSS. +** The set is provided as an array of identifiers as defined by SSLDHEGroupType. +** If more than one group identifier is provided, NSS will select the one to use. +** For example, a TLS extension sent by the client might indicate a preference. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLDHEGroupType *groups, + PRUint16 num_groups); + +/* Enable the use of a DHE group that's smaller than the library default, +** for backwards compatibility reasons. The DH parameters will be created +** at the time this function is called, which might take a very long time. +** The function will block until generation is completed. +** The intention is to enforce that fresh and safe parameters are generated +** each time a process is started. +** At the time this API was initially implemented, the API will enable the +** use of 1024 bit DHE parameters. This value might get increased in future +** versions of NSS. +** +** It is allowed to call this API will a NULL value for parameter fd, +** which will prepare the global parameters that NSS will reuse for the remainder +** of the process lifetime. This can be used early after startup of a process, +** to avoid a delay when handling incoming client connections. +** This preparation with a NULL for parameter fd will NOT enable the weak group +** on sockets. The function needs to be called again for every socket that +** should use the weak group. +** +** It is allowed to use this API in combination with the SSL_NamedGroupConfig API. +** If both APIs have been called, the weakest group will be used, unless it is +** certain that the client supports larger group parameters. The weak group will +** be used as the default group for TLS <= 1.2, overriding the preference for +** the first group potentially set with a call to SSL_NamedGroupConfig. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableWeakDHEPrimeGroup(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); + +/* SSL Version Range API +** +** This API should be used to control SSL 3.0 & TLS support instead of the +** older SSL_Option* API; however, the SSL_Option* API MUST still be used to +** control SSL 2.0 support. In this version of libssl, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are +** enabled by default. Future versions of libssl may change which versions of +** the protocol are enabled by default. +** +** The SSLProtocolVariant enum indicates whether the protocol is of type +** stream or datagram. This must be provided to the functions that do not +** take an fd. Functions which take an fd will get the variant from the fd, +** which is typed. +** +** Using the new version range API in conjunction with the older +** SSL_OptionSet-based API for controlling the enabled protocol versions may +** cause unexpected results. Going forward, we guarantee only the following: +** +** SSL_OptionGet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS) will return PR_TRUE if *ANY* versions of TLS +** are enabled. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_FALSE) will disable *ALL* versions of TLS, +** including TLS 1.0 and later. +** +** The above two properties provide compatibility for applications that use +** SSL_OptionSet to implement the insecure fallback from TLS 1.x to SSL 3.0. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) will enable TLS 1.0, and may also +** enable some later versions of TLS, if it is necessary to do so in order to +** keep the set of enabled versions contiguous. For example, if TLS 1.2 is +** enabled, then after SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE), TLS 1.0, +** TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 will be enabled, and the call will have no effect on +** whether SSL 3.0 is enabled. If no later versions of TLS are enabled at the +** time SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) is called, then no later +** versions of TLS will be enabled by the call. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE) will disable SSL 3.0, and will not +** change the set of TLS versions that are enabled. +** +** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_TRUE) will enable SSL 3.0, and may also +** enable some versions of TLS if TLS 1.1 or later is enabled at the time of +** the call, the same way SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) works, in +** order to keep the set of enabled versions contiguous. +*/ + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions supported for the +** given protocol variant by the version of libssl linked-to at runtime. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions enabled by default +** for the given protocol variant. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the range of enabled-by-default SSL3/TLS versions for the given +** protocol variant to |*vrange|. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, const SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd|. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGet(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd| to |*vrange|. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSet(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +/* Sets the version to check the server random against for the + * fallback check defined in [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11 Section 6.3.1.1]. + * This function is provided to allow for detection of forced downgrade + * attacks against client-side reconnect-and-fallback outside of TLS + * by setting |version| to be that of the original connection, rather + * than that of the new connection. + * + * The default, which can also be enabled by setting |version| to + * zero, is just to check against the max version in the + * version range (see SSL_VersionRangeSet). */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRUint16 version); + +/* Values for "policy" argument to SSL_CipherPolicySet */ +/* Values returned by SSL_CipherPolicyGet. */ +#define SSL_NOT_ALLOWED 0 /* or invalid or unimplemented */ +#define SSL_ALLOWED 1 +#define SSL_RESTRICTED 2 /* only with "Step-Up" certs. */ + +/* Values for "on" with SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE. */ +#define SSL_REQUIRE_NEVER ((PRBool)0) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS ((PRBool)1) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE ((PRBool)2) +#define SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR ((PRBool)3) + +/* Values for "on" with SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION */ +/* Never renegotiate at all. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER ((PRBool)0) +/* Renegotiate without restriction, whether or not the peer's client hello */ +/* bears the renegotiation info extension. Vulnerable, as in the past. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED ((PRBool)1) +/* Only renegotiate if the peer's hello bears the TLS renegotiation_info */ +/* extension. This is safe renegotiation. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ((PRBool)2) +/* Disallow unsafe renegotiation in server sockets only, but allow clients */ +/* to continue to renegotiate with vulnerable servers. */ +/* This value should only be used during the transition period when few */ +/* servers have been upgraded. */ +#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL ((PRBool)3) + +/* +** Reset the handshake state for fd. This will make the complete SSL +** handshake protocol execute from the ground up on the next i/o +** operation. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool asServer); + +/* +** Force the handshake for fd to complete immediately. This blocks until +** the complete SSL handshake protocol is finished. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRIntervalTime timeout); + +/* +** Query security status of socket. *on is set to one if security is +** enabled. *keySize will contain the stream key size used. *issuer will +** contain the RFC1485 verison of the name of the issuer of the +** certificate at the other end of the connection. For a client, this is +** the issuer of the server's certificate; for a server, this is the +** issuer of the client's certificate (if any). Subject is the subject of +** the other end's certificate. The pointers can be zero if the desired +** data is not needed. All strings returned by this function are owned +** by the caller, and need to be freed with PORT_Free. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *on, char **cipher, + int *keySize, int *secretKeySize, + char **issuer, char **subject); + +/* Values for "on" */ +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_NOOPT -1 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF 0 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_HIGH 1 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_LOW 2 +#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_FORTEZZA 3 /* NO LONGER SUPPORTED */ + +/* +** Return the certificate for our SSL peer. If the client calls this +** it will always return the server's certificate. If the server calls +** this, it may return NULL if client authentication is not enabled or +** if the client had no certificate when asked. +** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_PeerCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Return the certificates presented by the SSL peer. If the SSL peer +** did not present certificates, return NULL with the +** SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE error. On failure, return NULL with an error +** code other than SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE. +** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertList *SSL_PeerCertificateChain(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns the OCSP responses that were provided + * by the TLS server. The return value is a pointer to an internal SECItemArray + * that contains the returned OCSP responses; it is only valid until the + * callback function that calls SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns. + * + * If no OCSP responses were given by the server then the result will be empty. + * If there was an error, then the result will be NULL. + * + * You must set the SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING option to enable OCSP stapling. + * to be provided by a server. + * + * libssl does not do any validation of the OCSP response itself; the + * authenticate certificate hook is responsible for doing so. The default + * authenticate certificate hook, SSL_AuthCertificate, does not implement + * any OCSP stapling funtionality, but this may change in future versions. + */ +SSL_IMPORT const SECItemArray *SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps returns the signed_certificate_timestamp + * extension data provided by the TLS server. The return value is a pointer + * to an internal SECItem that contains the returned response (as a serialized + * SignedCertificateTimestampList, see RFC 6962). The returned pointer is only + * valid until the callback function that calls SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps + * (e.g. the authenticate certificate hook, or the handshake callback) returns. + * + * If no Signed Certificate Timestamps were given by the server then the result + * will be empty. If there was an error, then the result will be NULL. + * + * You must set the SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS option to indicate support + * for Signed Certificate Timestamps to a server. + * + * libssl does not do any parsing or validation of the response itself. + */ +SSL_IMPORT const SECItem *SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses stores an array of one or multiple OCSP responses + * in the fd's data, which may be sent as part of a server side cert_status + * handshake message. Parameter |responses| is for the server certificate of + * the key exchange type |kea|. + * The function will duplicate the responses array. + * + * Deprecated: see SSL_ConfigSecureServer for details. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItemArray *responses, + SSLKEAType kea); + +/* + * SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps stores serialized signed_certificate_timestamp + * extension data in the fd. The signed_certificate_timestamp data is sent + * during the handshake (if requested by the client). Parameter |scts| + * is for the server certificate of the key exchange type |kea|. + * The function will duplicate the provided data item. To clear previously + * set data for a given key exchange type |kea|, pass NULL to |scts|. + * + * Deprecated: see SSL_ConfigSecureServer for details. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItem *scts, + SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** Authenticate certificate hook. Called when a certificate comes in +** (because of SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE in SSL_Enable) to authenticate the +** certificate. +** +** The authenticate certificate hook must return SECSuccess to indicate the +** certificate is valid, SECFailure to indicate the certificate is invalid, +** or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate the certificate +** asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for non-blocking sockets. +** +** If the authenticate certificate hook returns SECFailure, then the bad cert +** hook will be called. The bad cert handler is NEVER called if the +** authenticate certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock. If the application +** needs to handle and/or override a bad cert, it should do so before it +** calls SSL_AuthCertificateComplete (modifying the error it passes to +** SSL_AuthCertificateComplete as needed). +** +** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information +** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the authenticate +** certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock. +** +** RFC 6066 says that clients should send the bad_certificate_status_response +** alert when they encounter an error processing the stapled OCSP response. +** libssl does not provide a way for the authenticate certificate hook to +** indicate that an OCSP error (SEC_ERROR_OCSP_*) that it returns is an error +** in the stapled OCSP response or an error in some other OCSP response. +** Further, NSS does not provide a convenient way to control or determine +** which OCSP response(s) were used to validate a certificate chain. +** Consequently, the current version of libssl does not ever send the +** bad_certificate_status_response alert. This may change in future releases. +*/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLAuthCertificate)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool checkSig, + PRBool isServer); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLAuthCertificate f, + void *arg); + +/* An implementation of the certificate authentication hook */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificate(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer); + +/* + * Prototype for SSL callback to get client auth data from the application. + * arg - application passed argument + * caNames - pointer to distinguished names of CAs that the server likes + * pRetCert - pointer to pointer to cert, for return of cert + * pRetKey - pointer to key pointer, for return of key + * Return value can be one of {SECSuccess, SECFailure, SECWouldBlock} + * + * If SECSuccess, pRetCert and pRetKey should be set to the selected + * client cert and private key respectively. If SECFailure or SECWouldBlock + * they should not be changed. + * + * Ownership of pRetCert and pRetKey passes to NSS. The application must not + * mutate or free the structures after passing them to NSS. + * + * Returning SECWouldBlock will block the handshake until SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete + * is called. Note that references to *caNames should not be kept after SSLGetClientAuthData + * returns. Instead, take a copy of the data. + * + * See also the comments for SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete. + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLGetClientAuthData)(void *arg, + PRFileDesc *fd, + CERTDistNames *caNames, + CERTCertificate **pRetCert, /*return */ + SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey); /* return */ + +/* + * Set the client side callback for SSL to retrieve user's private key + * and certificate. + * fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question + * f - the application's callback that delivers the key and cert + * a - application specific data + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLGetClientAuthData f, void *a); + +/* +** SNI extension processing callback function. +** It is called when SSL socket receives SNI extension in ClientHello message. +** Upon this callback invocation, application is responsible to reconfigure the +** socket with the data for a particular server name. +** There are three potential outcomes of this function invocation: +** * application does not recognize the name or the type and wants the +** "unrecognized_name" alert be sent to the client. In this case the callback +** function must return SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT status. +** * application does not recognize the name, but wants to continue with +** the handshake using the current socket configuration. In this case, +** no socket reconfiguration is needed and the function should return +** SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED. +** * application recognizes the name and reconfigures the socket with +** appropriate certs, key, etc. There are many ways to reconfigure. NSS +** provides SSL_ReconfigFD function that can be used to update the socket +** data from model socket. To continue with the rest of the handshake, the +** implementation function should return an index of a name it has chosen. +** LibSSL will ignore any SNI extension received in a ClientHello message +** if application does not register a SSLSNISocketConfig callback. +** Each type field of SECItem indicates the name type. +** NOTE: currently RFC3546 defines only one name type: sni_host_name. +** Client is allowed to send only one name per known type. LibSSL will +** send an "unrecognized_name" alert if SNI extension name list contains more +** then one name of a type. +*/ +typedef PRInt32(PR_CALLBACK *SSLSNISocketConfig)(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SECItem *srvNameArr, + PRUint32 srvNameArrSize, + void *arg); + +/* +** SSLSNISocketConfig should return an index within 0 and srvNameArrSize-1 +** when it has reconfigured the socket fd to use certs and keys, etc +** for a specific name. There are two other allowed return values. One +** tells libSSL to use the default cert and key. The other tells libSSL +** to send the "unrecognized_name" alert. These values are: +**/ +#define SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED -1 +#define SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT -2 + +/* +** Set application implemented SNISocketConfig callback. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SNISocketConfigHook(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLSNISocketConfig f, + void *arg); + +/* +** Reconfigure fd SSL socket with model socket parameters. Sets +** server certs and keys, list of trust anchor, socket options +** and all SSL socket call backs and parameters. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ReconfigFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* + * Set the client side argument for SSL to retrieve PKCS #11 pin. + * fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question + * a - pkcs11 application specific data + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(PRFileDesc *fd, void *a); + +/* +** These are callbacks for dealing with SSL alerts. + */ + +typedef PRUint8 SSLAlertLevel; +typedef PRUint8 SSLAlertDescription; + +typedef struct { + SSLAlertLevel level; + SSLAlertDescription description; +} SSLAlert; + +typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLAlertCallback)(const PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, + const SSLAlert *alert); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AlertReceivedCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, + void *arg); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AlertSentCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, + void *arg); +/* +** This is a callback for dealing with server certs that are not authenticated +** by the client. The client app can decide that it actually likes the +** cert by some external means and restart the connection. +** +** The bad cert hook must return SECSuccess to override the result of the +** authenticate certificate hook, SECFailure if the certificate should still be +** considered invalid, or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate +** the certificate asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for +** non-blocking sockets. +** +** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information +** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the bad cert hook returns +** SECWouldBlock. +*/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLBadCertHandler)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_BadCertHook(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLBadCertHandler f, + void *arg); + +/* +** Configure SSL socket for running a secure server. Needs the +** certificate for the server and the servers private key. The arguments +** are copied. +** +** This method should be used in preference to SSL_ConfigSecureServer, +** SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain, SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses, and +** SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps. +** +** The authentication method is determined from the certificate and private key +** based on how libssl authenticates peers. Primarily, this uses the value of +** the SSLAuthType enum and is derived from the type of public key in the +** certificate. For example, different RSA certificates might be saved for +** signing (ssl_auth_rsa_sign) and key encipherment +** (ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt). Unique to RSA, the same certificate can be used for +** both usages. Additional information about the authentication method is also +** used: EC keys with different curves are separately stored. +** +** Only one certificate is stored for each authentication method. +** +** The optional |data| argument contains additional information about the +** certificate: +** +** - |authType| (with a value other than ssl_auth_null) limits the +** authentication method; this is primarily useful in limiting the use of an +** RSA certificate to one particular key usage (either signing or key +** encipherment) when its key usages indicate support for both. +** +** - |certChain| provides an explicit certificate chain, rather than relying on +** NSS functions for finding a certificate chain. +** +** - |stapledOCSPResponses| provides a response for OCSP stapling. +** +** - |signedCertTimestamps| provides a value for the +** signed_certificate_timestamp extension used in certificate transparency. +** +** The |data_len| argument provides the length of the data. This should be set +** to |sizeof(data)|. +** +** This function allows an application to provide certificates with narrow key +** usages attached to them. For instance, RSA keys can be provided that are +** limited to signing or decryption only. Multiple EC certificates with keys on +** different named curves can be provided. +** +** Unlike SSL_ConfigSecureServer(WithCertChain), this function does not accept +** NULL for the |cert| and |key| arguments. It will replace certificates that +** have the same type, but it cannot be used to remove certificates that have +** already been configured. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerCert( + PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + const SSLExtraServerCertData *data, unsigned int data_len); + +/* +** Deprecated variant of SSL_ConfigServerCert. +** +** This uses values from the SSLKEAType to identify the type of |key| that the +** |cert| contains. This is incorrect, since key exchange and authentication +** are separated in some cipher suites (in particular, ECDHE_RSA_* suites). +** +** Providing a |kea| parameter of ssl_kea_ecdh (or kt_ecdh) is interpreted as +** providing both ECDH and ECDSA certificates. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigSecureServer( + PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** Deprecated variant of SSL_ConfigSecureServerCert. The |data| argument to +** SSL_ConfigSecureServerCert can be used to pass a certificate chain. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + const CERTCertificateList *certChainOpt, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea); + +/* +** SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair configures an asymmetric key pair for use in +** wrapping session ticket keys, used by the server. This function currently +** only accepts an RSA public/private key pair. +** +** Prior to the existence of this function, NSS used an RSA private key +** associated with a configured certificate to perform session ticket +** encryption. If this function isn't used, the keys provided with a configured +** RSA certificate are used for wrapping session ticket keys. +** +** NOTE: This key is used for all self-encryption but is named for +** session tickets for historical reasons. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey); + +/* +** Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Define the maximum number +** of entries in the cache, the longevity of the entires, and the directory +** where the cache files will be placed. These values can be zero, and +** if so, the implementation will choose defaults. +** This version of the function is for use in applications that have only one +** process that uses the cache (even if that process has multiple threads). +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory); + +/* Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Depends on value of + * enableMPCache, configures malti-proc or single proc cache. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt( + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, + int maxCacheEntries, + int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries, + PRBool enableMPCache); + +/* +** Like SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache, with one important difference. +** If the application will run multiple processes (as opposed to, or in +** addition to multiple threads), then it must call this function, instead +** of calling SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(). +** This has nothing to do with the number of processORs, only processEs. +** This function sets up a Server Session ID (SID) cache that is safe for +** access by multiple processes on the same system. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory); + +/* Get and set the configured maximum number of mutexes used for the +** server's store of SSL sessions. This value is used by the server +** session ID cache initialization functions shown above. Note that on +** some platforms, these mutexes are actually implemented with POSIX +** semaphores, or with unnamed pipes. The default value varies by platform. +** An attempt to set a too-low maximum will return an error and the +** configured value will not be changed. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT PRUint32 SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks(void); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks); + +/* environment variable set by SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache, and queried by + * SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache when envString is NULL. + */ +#define SSL_ENV_VAR_NAME "SSL_INHERITANCE" + +/* called in child to inherit SID Cache variables. + * If envString is NULL, this function will use the value of the environment + * variable "SSL_INHERITANCE", otherwise the string value passed in will be + * used. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char *envString); + +/* +** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The +** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and +** before processing incoming application data. +** +** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see +** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent +** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the +** callback will get called before any application data is sent. +*/ +typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd, + void *client_data); +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data); + +/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback +** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular +** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the +** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false +** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the +** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by +** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart. +** +** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be +** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled. +**/ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)( + PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart); + +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg); + +/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for +** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend +** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the +** certifciates/keys used on the connection. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool *canFalseStart); + +/* +** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new +** handshake. If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be +** flushed first, ensuring that a full SSL handshake will be done. +** If flushCache is zero, and an SSL connection is established, it will +** do the much faster session restart handshake. This will change the +** session keys without doing another private key operation. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool flushCache); + +/* +** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool flushCache, + PRIntervalTime timeout); + +#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION +/* deprecated! +** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new +** handshake. Flushes SSL3 session cache entry first, ensuring that a +** full handshake will be done. +** This call is equivalent to SSL_ReHandshake(fd, PR_TRUE) +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RedoHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd); +#endif + +/* + * Allow the application to pass a URL or hostname into the SSL library. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetURL(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *url); + +/* + * Allow an application to define a set of trust anchors for peer + * cert validation. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetTrustAnchors(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertList *list); + +/* +** Return the number of bytes that SSL has waiting in internal buffers. +** Return 0 if security is not enabled. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT int SSL_DataPending(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Invalidate the SSL session associated with fd. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InvalidateSession(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Return a SECItem containing the SSL session ID associated with the fd. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetSessionID(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* +** Clear out the client's SSL session cache, not the server's session cache. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT void SSL_ClearSessionCache(void); + +/* +** Close the server's SSL session cache. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCache(void); + +/* +** Set peer information so we can correctly look up SSL session later. +** You only have to do this if you're tunneling through a proxy. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSockPeerID(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *peerID); + +/* +** Reveal the security information for the peer. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_RevealCert(PRFileDesc *socket); +SSL_IMPORT void *SSL_RevealPinArg(PRFileDesc *socket); +SSL_IMPORT char *SSL_RevealURL(PRFileDesc *socket); + +/* This callback may be passed to the SSL library via a call to + * SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook() for each SSL client socket. + * It will be invoked when SSL needs to know what certificate and private key + * (if any) to use to respond to a request for client authentication. + * If arg is non-NULL, it is a pointer to a NULL-terminated string containing + * the nickname of the cert/key pair to use. + * If arg is NULL, this function will search the cert and key databases for + * a suitable match and send it if one is found. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +NSS_GetClientAuthData(void *arg, + PRFileDesc *socket, + struct CERTDistNamesStr *caNames, + struct CERTCertificateStr **pRetCert, + struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey); + +/* This function can be called by the appliation's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to filter out any certs in the cert list that doesn't match the negotiated + * requirements of the current SSL connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket(PRFileDesc *socket, CERTCertList *certlist); + +/* This function can be called by the application's custom GetClientAuthHook + * to determine if a single certificate matches the negotiated requirements of + * the current SSL connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT PRBool +SSL_CertIsUsable(PRFileDesc *socket, CERTCertificate *cert); + +/* +** Configure DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) cipher suite preferences. +** Input is a list of ciphers in descending preference order and a length +** of the list. As a side effect, this causes the use_srtp extension to be +** negotiated. +** +** Invalid or unimplemented cipher suites in |ciphers| are ignored. If at +** least one cipher suite in |ciphers| is implemented, returns SECSuccess. +** Otherwise returns SECFailure. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSRTPCiphers(PRFileDesc *fd, + const PRUint16 *ciphers, + unsigned int numCiphers); + +/* +** Get the selected DTLS-SRTP cipher suite (if any). +** To be called after the handshake completes. +** Returns SECFailure if not negotiated. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetSRTPCipher(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRUint16 *cipher); + +/* + * Look to see if any of the signers in the cert chain for "cert" are found + * in the list of caNames. + * Returns SECSuccess if so, SECFailure if not. + * Used by NSS_GetClientAuthData. May be used by other callback functions. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames(CERTCertificate *cert, + CERTDistNames *caNames); + +/* Deprecated. This reports a misleading value for certificates that might + * be used for signing rather than key exchange. + * Returns key exchange type of the keys in an SSL server certificate. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SSLKEAType NSS_FindCertKEAType(CERTCertificate *cert); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Domestic (U.S.A.) policy. + * This essentially allows all supported ciphers. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(void); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA + * according to present U.S. policies as we understand them. + * It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetExportPolicy(void); + +/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA + * according to present U.S. policies as we understand them, and that the + * nation of France will permit to be imported into their country. + * It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetFrancePolicy(void); + +SSL_IMPORT SSL3Statistics *SSL_GetStatistics(void); + +/* Report more information than SSL_SecurityStatus. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLChannelInfo) as the |len| argument. + * + * The information here will be zeroed prior to details being confirmed. The + * details are confirmed either when a Finished message is received, or - for a + * client - when the second flight of messages have been sent. This function + * therefore produces unreliable results prior to receiving the + * SSLHandshakeCallback or the SSLCanFalseStartCallback. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, + PRUintn len); +/* Get preliminary information about a channel. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo) as the |len| argument. + * + * This function can be called prior to handshake details being confirmed (see + * SSL_GetChannelInfo above for what that means). Thus, information provided by + * this function is available to SSLAuthCertificate, SSLGetClientAuthData, + * SSLSNISocketConfig, and other callbacks that might be called during the + * processing of the first flight of client of server handshake messages. + * Values are marked as being unavailable when renegotiation is initiated. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo *info, + PRUintn len); +/* Get information about cipher suite with id of |cipherSuite|. + * Caller supplies the info struct. This function fills it in. Caller should + * pass sizeof(SSLCipherSuiteInfo) as the |len| argument. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLCipherSuiteInfo *info, PRUintn len); + +/* Returnes negotiated through SNI host info. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* Export keying material according to RFC 5705. +** fd must correspond to a TLS 1.0 or higher socket and out must +** already be allocated. If hasContext is false, it uses the no-context +** construction from the RFC and ignores the context and contextLen +** arguments. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + PRBool hasContext, + const unsigned char *context, + unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned int outLen); + +/* Early exporters are used if 0-RTT is enabled. This is TLS 1.3 only. Note + * that in TLS 1.3, an empty context is equivalent to an absent context. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ExportEarlyKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *context, + unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned int outLen); + +/* +** Return a new reference to the certificate that was most recently sent +** to the peer on this SSL/TLS connection, or NULL if none has been sent. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd); + +#define SSL_CBP_SSL3 0x0001 /* (deprecated) */ +#define SSL_CBP_TLS1_0 0x0002 /* (deprecated) */ + +/* DEPRECATED: The PKCS#11 bypass has been removed. +** This function will now always return false. */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CanBypass(CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + PRUint32 protocolmask, + PRUint16 *ciphers, int nciphers, + PRBool *pcanbypass, void *pwArg); + +/* +** Did the handshake with the peer negotiate the given extension? +** Output parameter valid only if function returns SECSuccess +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc *socket, + SSLExtensionType extId, + PRBool *yes); + +/* +** How long should we wait before retransmitting the next flight of +** the DTLS handshake? Returns SECFailure if not DTLS or not in a +** handshake. +*/ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket, + PRIntervalTime *timeout); + +/* + * Return a boolean that indicates whether the underlying library + * will perform as the caller expects. + * + * The only argument is a string, which should be the version + * identifier of the NSS library. That string will be compared + * against a string that represents the actual build version of + * the SSL library. + */ +extern PRBool NSSSSL_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion); + +/* + * Returns a const string of the SSL library version. + */ +extern const char *NSSSSL_GetVersion(void); + +/* Restart an SSL connection that was paused to do asynchronous certificate + * chain validation (when the auth certificate hook or bad cert handler + * returned SECWouldBlock). + * + * This function only works for non-blocking sockets; Do not use it for + * blocking sockets. Currently, this function works only for the client role of + * a connection; it does not work for the server role. + * + * The application must call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with 0 as the value of + * the error parameter after it has successfully validated the peer's + * certificate, in order to continue the SSL handshake. + * + * The application may call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with a non-zero value + * for error (e.g. SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) when certificate validation + * fails, before it closes the connection. If the application does so, an + * alert corresponding to the error (e.g. certificate_revoked) will be sent to + * the peer. See the source code of the internal function + * ssl3_SendAlertForCertError for the current mapping of error to alert. This + * mapping may change in future versions of libssl. + * + * This function will not complete the entire handshake. The application must + * call SSL_ForceHandshake, PR_Recv, PR_Send, etc. after calling this function + * to force the handshake to complete. + * + * On the first handshake of a connection, libssl will wait for the peer's + * certificate to be authenticated before calling the handshake callback, + * sending a client certificate, sending any application data, or returning + * any application data to the application. On subsequent (renegotiation) + * handshakes, libssl will block the handshake unconditionally while the + * certificate is being validated. + * + * libssl may send and receive handshake messages while waiting for the + * application to call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete, and it may call other + * callbacks (e.g, the client auth data hook) before + * SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called. + * + * An application that uses this asynchronous mechanism will usually have lower + * handshake latency if it has to do public key operations on the certificate + * chain and/or CRL/OCSP/cert fetching during the authentication, especially if + * it does so in parallel on another thread. However, if the application can + * authenticate the peer's certificate quickly then it may be more efficient + * to use the synchronous mechanism (i.e. returning SECFailure/SECSuccess + * instead of SECWouldBlock from the authenticate certificate hook). + * + * Be careful about converting an application from synchronous cert validation + * to asynchronous certificate validation. A naive conversion is likely to + * result in deadlocks; e.g. the application will wait in PR_Poll for network + * I/O on the connection while all network I/O on the connection is blocked + * waiting for this function to be called. + * + * Returns SECFailure on failure, SECSuccess on success. Never returns + * SECWouldBlock. Note that SSL_AuthCertificateComplete will (usually) return + * SECSuccess; do not interpret the return value of SSL_AuthCertificateComplete + * as an indicator of whether it is OK to continue using the connection. For + * example, SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(fd, SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) will + * return SECSuccess (normally), but that does not mean that the application + * should continue using the connection. If the application passes a non-zero + * value for second argument (error), or if SSL_AuthCertificateComplete returns + * anything other than SECSuccess, then the application should close the + * connection. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRErrorCode error); + +/* Restart an SSL connection which was paused to do asynchronous client + * certificate selection (when the client certificate hook returned SECWouldBlock). + * + * This function only works for non-blocking sockets; Do not use it for + * blocking sockets. This function works only for the client role of + * a connection; it does not work for the server role. + * + * If a certificate has been sucessfully selected, the application must call + * SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete with: + * - SECSuccess (0) as the value of outcome + * - a valid SECKEYPrivateKey located at *clientPrivateKey + * - a valid CERTCertificate located at *clientCertificate + * The ownership of these latter structures will pass to NSS and the application + * MUST not retain any references to them or invalidate them. + * + * If a certificate has not been selected, the application must call + * SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete with: + * - SECFailure (-1) as the value of outcome + * - *clientPrivateKey set to NULL. + * - *clientCertificate set to NULL + * + * Once the application has returned SECWouldBlock to getClientAuthData + * the handshake will not proceed until this function is called. It is an + * error to call this function when the handshake is not waiting on client + * certificate selection, or to call this function more than once. + + * This function will not complete the entire handshake. The application must + * call SSL_ForceHandshake, PR_Recv, PR_Send, etc. after calling this function + * to force the handshake to complete. + * + * Be careful about converting an application from synchronous cert selection + * to asynchronous certificate selection. A naive conversion is likely to + * result in deadlocks; e.g. the application will wait in PR_Poll for network + * I/O on the connection while all network I/O on the connection is blocked + * waiting for this function to be called. + * + * Note that SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete will (usually) return + * SECSuccess; SECFailure indicates that the function was invoked incorrectly or + * an error whilst processing the handshake. The return code does not indicate + * whether or not the provided private key and certificate were sucessfully loaded + * or accepted by the server. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate); + +/* + * This is used to access experimental APIs. Don't call this directly. This is + * used to enable the experimental APIs that are defined in "sslexp.h". + */ +SSL_IMPORT void *SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(const char *name); + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +#endif /* __ssl_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.rc b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.rc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..809a07e5ff --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.rc @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include <winver.h> + +#define MY_LIBNAME "ssl" +#define MY_FILEDESCRIPTION "NSS SSL Library" + +#define STRINGIZE(x) #x +#define STRINGIZE2(x) STRINGIZE(x) +#define NSS_VMAJOR_STR STRINGIZE2(NSS_VMAJOR) + +#ifdef _DEBUG +#define MY_DEBUG_STR " (debug)" +#define MY_FILEFLAGS_1 VS_FF_DEBUG +#else +#define MY_DEBUG_STR "" +#define MY_FILEFLAGS_1 0x0L +#endif +#if NSS_BETA +#define MY_FILEFLAGS_2 MY_FILEFLAGS_1|VS_FF_PRERELEASE +#else +#define MY_FILEFLAGS_2 MY_FILEFLAGS_1 +#endif + +#ifdef WINNT +#define MY_FILEOS VOS_NT_WINDOWS32 +#else +#define MY_FILEOS VOS__WINDOWS32 +#endif + +#define MY_INTERNAL_NAME MY_LIBNAME NSS_VMAJOR_STR + +///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// +// Version-information resource +// + +VS_VERSION_INFO VERSIONINFO + FILEVERSION NSS_VMAJOR,NSS_VMINOR,NSS_VPATCH,NSS_VBUILD + PRODUCTVERSION NSS_VMAJOR,NSS_VMINOR,NSS_VPATCH,NSS_VBUILD + FILEFLAGSMASK VS_FFI_FILEFLAGSMASK + FILEFLAGS MY_FILEFLAGS_2 + FILEOS MY_FILEOS + FILETYPE VFT_DLL + FILESUBTYPE 0x0L // not used + +BEGIN + BLOCK "StringFileInfo" + BEGIN + BLOCK "040904B0" // Lang=US English, CharSet=Unicode + BEGIN + VALUE "CompanyName", "Mozilla Foundation\0" + VALUE "FileDescription", MY_FILEDESCRIPTION MY_DEBUG_STR "\0" + VALUE "FileVersion", NSS_VERSION "\0" + VALUE "InternalName", MY_INTERNAL_NAME "\0" + VALUE "OriginalFilename", MY_INTERNAL_NAME ".dll\0" + VALUE "ProductName", "Network Security Services\0" + VALUE "ProductVersion", NSS_VERSION "\0" + END + END + BLOCK "VarFileInfo" + BEGIN + VALUE "Translation", 0x409, 1200 + END +END diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84246954a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c @@ -0,0 +1,14318 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* TODO(ekr): Implement HelloVerifyRequest on server side. OK for now. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "sechash.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "nssoptions.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "blapi.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +static PK11SymKey *ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot); +static SECStatus ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp); +static SECStatus ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SymKey *masterSecret); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode); +static SECStatus ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType); +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash); +PRBool ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +PRBool ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +PRBool ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +PRBool ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +static SECStatus ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l); +const PRUint32 kSSLSigSchemePolicy = + NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE; + +const PRUint8 ssl_hello_retry_random[] = { + 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, + 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, + 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, + 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_hello_retry_random) == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + +/* This list of SSL3 cipher suites is sorted in descending order of + * precedence (desirability). It only includes cipher suites we implement. + * This table is modified by SSL3_SetPolicy(). The ordering of cipher suites + * in this table must match the ordering in SSL_ImplementedCiphers (sslenum.c) + * + * Important: See bug 946147 before enabling, reordering, or adding any cipher + * suites to this list. + */ +/* clang-format off */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = { + /* cipher_suite policy enabled isPresent */ + /* Special TLS 1.3 suites. */ + { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around + * bug 946147. + */ + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,SSL_ALLOWED,PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* RSA */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */ + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + + /* ciphersuites with no encryption */ + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE}, +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +/* This is the default supported set of signature schemes. The order of the + * hashes here is all that is important, since that will (sometimes) determine + * which hash we use. The key pair (i.e., cert) is the primary thing that + * determines what we use and this doesn't affect how we select key pairs. The + * order of signature types is based on the same rules for ordering we use for + * cipher suites just for consistency. + */ +static const SSLSignatureScheme defaultSignatureSchemes[] = { + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha256, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha384, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha512, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha1 +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes) <= + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); + +/* Verify that SSL_ImplementedCiphers and cipherSuites are in consistent order. + */ +#ifdef DEBUG +void +ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency() +{ + unsigned int i; + + PORT_Assert(SSL_NumImplementedCiphers == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites)); + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherSuites); ++i) { + PORT_Assert(SSL_ImplementedCiphers[i] == cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite); + } +} +#endif + +static const /*SSL3ClientCertificateType */ PRUint8 certificate_types[] = { + ct_RSA_sign, + ct_ECDSA_sign, + ct_DSS_sign, +}; + +static SSL3Statistics ssl3stats; + +static const ssl3KEADef kea_defs[] = { + /* indexed by SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm */ + /* kea exchKeyType signKeyType authKeyType ephemeral oid */ + { kea_null, ssl_kea_null, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_FALSE, 0 }, + { kea_rsa, ssl_kea_rsa, nullKey, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_RSA }, + { kea_dh_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS }, + { kea_dh_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA }, + { kea_dhe_dss, ssl_kea_dh, dsaKey, ssl_auth_dsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS }, + { kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_kea_dh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA }, + { kea_dh_anon, ssl_kea_dh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DH_ANON }, + { kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA }, + { kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, ecKey, ssl_auth_ecdsa, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA }, + { kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, PR_FALSE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA }, + { kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_kea_ecdh, rsaKey, ssl_auth_rsa_sign, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA }, + { kea_ecdh_anon, ssl_kea_ecdh, nullKey, ssl_auth_null, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ANON }, + { kea_ecdhe_psk, ssl_kea_ecdh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_PSK }, + { kea_dhe_psk, ssl_kea_dh_psk, nullKey, ssl_auth_psk, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_PSK }, + { kea_tls13_any, ssl_kea_tls13_any, nullKey, ssl_auth_tls13_any, PR_TRUE, SEC_OID_TLS13_KEA_ANY }, +}; + +/* must use ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef to access */ +static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] = { + /* cipher_suite bulk_cipher_alg mac_alg key_exchange_alg prf_hash */ + /* Note that the prf_hash_alg is the hash function used by the PRF, see sslimpl.h. */ + + { TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, cipher_null, ssl_mac_null, kea_null, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, cipher_null, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, cipher_null, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_md5, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, cipher_des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + /* New TLS cipher suites */ + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, cipher_seed, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + cipher_camellia_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha384, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_256, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_dss, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_rsa, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdh_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, cipher_null, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, cipher_rc4, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, cipher_3des, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_128, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, cipher_aes_128, ssl_hmac_sha256, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, cipher_aes_256, ssl_mac_sha, kea_ecdhe_rsa, ssl_hash_none }, + + { TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, cipher_chacha20, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_mac_aead, kea_tls13_any, ssl_hash_sha384 }, +}; + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE auth_alg_defs[] = { + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt */ + CKM_DSA, /* ? _SHA1 */ /* ssl_auth_dsa */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_auth_kea (unused) */ + CKM_ECDSA, /* ssl_auth_ecdsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_sign */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, /* ssl_auth_rsa_pss */ + CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256, /* ssl_auth_psk (just check for HKDF) */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM /* ssl_auth_tls13_any */ +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(auth_alg_defs) == ssl_auth_size); + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kea_alg_defs[] = { + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_null */ + CKM_RSA_PKCS, /* ssl_kea_rsa */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_fortezza (unused) */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh */ + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_ecdh_psk */ + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, /* ssl_kea_dh_psk */ + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, /* ssl_kea_tls13_any */ +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kea_alg_defs) == ssl_kea_size); + +typedef struct SSLCipher2MechStr { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cmech; +} SSLCipher2Mech; + +/* indexed by type SSLCipherAlgorithm */ +static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = { + /* calg, cmech */ + { ssl_calg_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM }, + { ssl_calg_rc4, CKM_RC4 }, + { ssl_calg_rc2, CKM_RC2_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_des, CKM_DES_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_3des, CKM_DES3_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_idea, CKM_IDEA_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_fortezza, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 }, + { ssl_calg_aes, CKM_AES_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_camellia, CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_seed, CKM_SEED_CBC }, + { ssl_calg_aes_gcm, CKM_AES_GCM }, + { ssl_calg_chacha20, CKM_CHACHA20_POLY1305 }, +}; + +const PRUint8 tls12_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; +const PRUint8 tls1_downgrade_random[] = { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, + 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random) == + sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random)); + +/* The ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure defines how various pieces of + * information are laid out within wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey + * for ECDH key exchange. Since wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is + * a 512-byte buffer (see sslimpl.h), the variable length field + * in ECCWrappedKeyInfo can be at most (512 - 8) = 504 bytes. + * + * XXX For now, NSS only supports named elliptic curves of size 571 bits + * or smaller. The public value will fit within 145 bytes and EC params + * will fit within 12 bytes. We'll need to revisit this when NSS + * supports arbitrary curves. + */ +#define MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN 504 + +typedef struct ECCWrappedKeyInfoStr { + PRUint16 size; /* EC public key size in bits */ + PRUint16 encodedParamLen; /* length (in bytes) of DER encoded EC params */ + PRUint16 pubValueLen; /* length (in bytes) of EC public value */ + PRUint16 wrappedKeyLen; /* length (in bytes) of the wrapped key */ + PRUint8 var[MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN]; /* this buffer contains the */ + /* EC public-key params, the EC public value and the wrapped key */ +} ECCWrappedKeyInfo; + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg) +{ + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + return alg2Mech[calg].cmech; +} + +#if defined(TRACE) + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(int msgType) +{ + char *rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch (msgType) { + case ssl_hs_hello_request: + rv = "hello_request (0)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + rv = "client_hello (1)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + rv = "server_hello (2)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: + rv = "hello_verify_request (3)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: + rv = "new_session_ticket (4)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data: + rv = "end_of_early_data (5)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request: + rv = "hello_retry_request (6)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: + rv = "encrypted_extensions (8)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate: + rv = "certificate (11)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: + rv = "server_key_exchange (12)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: + rv = "certificate_request (13)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: + rv = "server_hello_done (14)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: + rv = "certificate_verify (15)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: + rv = "client_key_exchange (16)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_finished: + rv = "finished (20)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_status: + rv = "certificate_status (22)"; + break; + case ssl_hs_key_update: + rv = "key_update (24)"; + break; + default: + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* handshake type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +static char * +ssl3_DecodeContentType(int msgType) +{ + char *rv; + static char line[40]; + + switch (msgType) { + case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec: + rv = "change_cipher_spec (20)"; + break; + case ssl_ct_alert: + rv = "alert (21)"; + break; + case ssl_ct_handshake: + rv = "handshake (22)"; + break; + case ssl_ct_application_data: + rv = "application_data (23)"; + break; + case ssl_ct_ack: + rv = "ack (26)"; + break; + default: + snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "*UNKNOWN* record type! (%d)", msgType); + rv = line; + } + return rv; +} + +#endif + +SSL3Statistics * +SSL_GetStatistics(void) +{ + return &ssl3stats; +} + +typedef struct tooLongStr { +#if defined(IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) + PRInt32 low; + PRInt32 high; +#else + PRInt32 high; + PRInt32 low; +#endif +} tooLong; + +void +SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x) +{ + if ((sizeof *x) == sizeof(PRInt32)) { + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT((PRInt32 *)x); + } else { + tooLong *tl = (tooLong *)x; + if (PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->low) == 0) + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&tl->high); + } +} + +PRBool +ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + switch (cipherSuite) { + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256: + case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* RFC 4492: ECC cipher suites need TLS extensions to negotiate curves and + * point formats.*/ + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA: + case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 && + vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: + case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: + case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: + return vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + default: + return vrange->min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + } +} + +/* return pointer to ssl3CipherSuiteDef for suite, or NULL */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +const ssl3CipherSuiteDef * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + int cipher_suite_def_len = + sizeof(cipher_suite_defs) / sizeof(cipher_suite_defs[0]); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < cipher_suite_def_len; i++) { + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); /* We should never get here. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the cipher configuration struct associate with suite */ +/* XXX This does a linear search. A binary search would be better. */ +static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(ssl3CipherSuite suite, + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + if (suites[i].cipher_suite == suite) + return &suites[i]; + } + /* return NULL and let the caller handle it. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE); + return NULL; +} + +const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg * +ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites) +{ + return ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(suite, + CONST_CAST(ssl3CipherSuiteCfg, suites)); +} + +static PRBool +ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == keaType) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_KEAEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + switch (keaType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + case ssl_kea_dh_psk: { + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ss->opt.enableServerDhe) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* If the server requires named FFDHE groups, then the client + * must have included an FFDHE group. peerSupportsFfdheGroups + * is set to true in ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(). */ + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* We can use the weak DH group if all of these are true: + * 1. We don't require named groups. + * 2. The peer doesn't support named groups. + * 3. This isn't TLS 1.3. + * 4. The weak group is enabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } else { + if (ss->vrange.min < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* The client enables DHE cipher suites even if no DHE groups + * are enabled. Only if this isn't TLS 1.3 and named groups + * are not required. */ + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_dh); + } + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + case ssl_kea_ecdh_psk: + return ssl_NamedGroupTypeEnabled(ss, ssl_kea_ecdh); + + case ssl_kea_tls13_any: + return PR_TRUE; + + case ssl_kea_fortezza: + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_HasCert(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 maxVersion, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + if (authType == ssl_auth_null || authType == ssl_auth_psk || authType == ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (!cert->serverKeyPair || + !cert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !cert->serverCertChain || + !SSL_CERT_IS(cert, authType)) { + continue; + } + /* When called from ssl3_config_match_init(), all the EC curves will be + * enabled, so this will essentially do nothing (unless we implement + * curve configuration). However, once we have seen the + * supported_groups extension and this is called from config_match(), + * this will filter out certificates with an unsupported curve. + * + * If we might negotiate TLS 1.3, skip this test as group configuration + * doesn't affect choices in TLS 1.3. + */ + if (maxVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) { + return ssl_HasCert(ss, maxVersion, ssl_auth_rsa_pss); + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* return true if the scheme is allowed by policy, This prevents + * failures later when our actual signatures are rejected by + * policy by either ssl code, or lower level NSS code */ +static PRBool +ssl_SchemePolicyOK(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRUint32 require) +{ + /* Hash policy. */ + PRUint32 policy; + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme)); + SECOidTag sigOID; + + /* policy bits needed to enable a SignatureScheme */ + SECStatus rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && + (policy & require) != require) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType reports rsa for rsa_pss_rsae, but we + * actually implement pss signatures when we sign, so just use RSA_PSS + * for all RSA PSS Siganture schemes */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + sigOID = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE; + } else { + sigOID = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme)); + } + /* Signature Policy. */ + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(sigOID, &policy); + if (rv == SECSuccess && + (policy & require) != require) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Check that a signature scheme is accepted. + * Both by policy and by having a token that supports it. */ +static PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(PRUint16 minVersion, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + PRBool forCert) +{ + /* Disable RSA-PSS schemes if there are no tokens to verify them. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss])) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } else if (!forCert && ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) { + /* Disable PKCS#1 signatures if we are limited to TLS 1.3. + * We still need to advertise PKCS#1 signatures in CH and CR + * for certificate signatures. + */ + if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } else if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + /* DSA: not in TLS 1.3, and check policy. */ + if (minVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } + + return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* If this is a server using TLS 1.3, we just need to have one signature + * scheme for which we have a usable certificate. + * + * Note: Certificates for earlier TLS versions are checked along with the + * cipher suite in ssl3_config_match_init. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PRBool foundCert = PR_FALSE; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + SSLAuthType authType = + ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]); + if (ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType)) { + foundCert = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (!foundCert) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Ensure that there is a signature scheme that can be accepted.*/ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->vrange.min, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], + PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* For a server, check that a signature scheme that can be used with the + * provided authType is both enabled and usable. */ +static PRBool +ssl_HasSignatureScheme(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_version); + PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_null); + PORT_Assert(authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 || + authType == ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + SSLAuthType schemeAuthType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); + PRBool acceptable = authType == schemeAuthType || + (schemeAuthType == ssl_auth_rsa_pss && + authType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign); + if (acceptable && ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(ss->version, scheme, PR_FALSE /* forCert */)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Initialize the suite->isPresent value for config_match + * Returns count of enabled ciphers supported by extant tokens, + * regardless of policy or user preference. + * If this returns zero, the user cannot do SSL v3. + */ +unsigned int +ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + SSLCipherAlgorithm cipher_alg; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipher_mech; + SSLAuthType authType; + SSLKEAType keaType; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int numPresent = 0; + unsigned int numEnabled = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + return 0; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->psk && + PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->serverCerts) && + (ss->opt.requestCertificate || ss->opt.requireCertificate)) { + /* PSK and certificate auth cannot be combined. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return 0; + } + if (ssl_CheckSignatureSchemes(ss) != SECSuccess) { + return 0; /* Code already set. */ + } + + ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(ss); + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite->enabled) { + ++numEnabled; + /* We need the cipher defs to see if we have a token that can handle + * this cipher. It isn't part of the static definition. + */ + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + if (!cipher_def) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + continue; + } + cipher_alg = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(cipher_def)->calg; + cipher_mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher_alg); + + /* Mark the suites that are backed by real tokens, certs and keys */ + suite->isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + authType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].authKeyType; + if (authType != ssl_auth_null && authType != ssl_auth_tls13_any) { + if (ss->sec.isServer && + !(ssl_HasCert(ss, ss->vrange.max, authType) && + ssl_HasSignatureScheme(ss, authType))) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } else if (!PK11_TokenExists(auth_alg_defs[authType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + keaType = kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg].exchKeyType; + if (keaType != ssl_kea_null && + keaType != ssl_kea_tls13_any && + !PK11_TokenExists(kea_alg_defs[keaType])) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (cipher_alg != ssl_calg_null && + !PK11_TokenExists(cipher_mech)) { + suite->isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (suite->isPresent) { + ++numPresent; + } + } + } + PORT_AssertArg(numPresent > 0 || numEnabled == 0); + if (numPresent == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + } + return numPresent; +} + +/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy, + * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is + * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */ +PRBool +ssl3_config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, PRUint8 policy, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + + if (!suite) { + PORT_Assert(suite); + return PR_FALSE; + } + + PORT_Assert(policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + if (policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) + return PR_FALSE; + + if (!suite->enabled || !suite->isPresent) + return PR_FALSE; + + if ((suite->policy == SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) || + (suite->policy > policy)) + return PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); + cipher_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite->cipher_suite); + PORT_Assert(cipher_def != NULL); + kea_def = &kea_defs[cipher_def->key_exchange_alg]; + PORT_Assert(kea_def != NULL); + if (!ssl_KEAEnabled(ss, kea_def->exchKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer && !ssl_HasCert(ss, vrange->max, kea_def->authKeyType)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* If a PSK is selected, disable suites that use a different hash than + * the PSK. We advertise non-PSK-compatible suites in the CH, as we could + * fallback to certificate auth. The client handler will check hash + * compatibility before committing to use the PSK. */ + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash != cipher_def->prf_hash) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } + + return ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite->cipher_suite, vrange); +} + +/* For TLS 1.3, when resuming, check for a ciphersuite that is both compatible + * with the identified ciphersuite and enabled. */ +static PRBool +tls13_ResumptionCompatible(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + SSLVersionRange vrange = { SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 }; + SSLHashType hash = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(suite); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); i++) { + if (cipher_suite_defs[i].prf_hash == hash) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(cipher_suite_defs[i].cipher_suite, + ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite && ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* + * Null compression, mac and encryption functions + */ +SECStatus +Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) +{ + if (inputLen > maxOutputLen) { + *outputLen = 0; /* Match PK11_CipherOp in setting outputLen */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + *outputLen = inputLen; + if (inputLen > 0 && input != output) { + PORT_Memcpy(output, input, inputLen); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * SSL3 Utility functions + */ + +static void +ssl_SetSpecVersions(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + spec->version = ss->version; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec); + } else if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->recordVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->version); + } else { + spec->recordVersion = ss->version; + } +} + +/* allowLargerPeerVersion controls whether the function will select the + * highest enabled SSL version or fail when peerVersion is greater than the + * highest enabled version. + * + * If allowLargerPeerVersion is true, peerVersion is the peer's highest + * enabled version rather than the peer's selected version. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, + PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion negotiated; + + /* Prevent negotiating to a lower version in response to a TLS 1.3 HRR. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (peerVersion < ss->vrange.min || + (peerVersion > ss->vrange.max && !allowLargerPeerVersion)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + negotiated = PR_MIN(peerVersion, ss->vrange.max); + PORT_Assert(ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, negotiated)); + if (ss->firstHsDone && ss->version != negotiated) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->version = negotiated; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Used by the client when the server produces a version number. + * This reads, validates, and normalizes the value. */ +SECStatus +ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, unsigned int *len, + SSL3ProtocolVersion *version) +{ + SSL3ProtocolVersion v; + PRUint32 temp; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, b, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* alert has been sent */ + } + v = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + v = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(v); + /* Check for failure. */ + if (!v || v > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* You can't negotiate TLS 1.3 this way. */ + if (v >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + *version = v; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random random) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, PRBool isTls, SECItem *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE; + PRBool useRsaPss = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); + SECItem hashItem; + + buf->data = NULL; + + switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + break; + case dsaKey: + doDerEncode = isTls; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + case ecKey: + doDerEncode = PR_TRUE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + if (useRsaPss || hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + int signatureLen = PK11_SignatureLen(key); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; + + if (signatureLen <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + goto done; + } + + buf->len = (unsigned)signatureLen; + buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen); + if (!buf->data) + goto done; /* error code was set. */ + + if (useRsaPss) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } + + rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem); + } else { + SECOidTag hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); + rv = SGN_Digest(key, hashOID, buf, &hashItem); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE); + } else if (doDerEncode) { + SECItem derSig = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */ + rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */ + *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */ + } else if (derSig.data) { + PORT_Free(derSig.data); + } + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", (unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len)); +done: + if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) { + PORT_Free(buf->data); + buf->data = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called by ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange and ssl3_SendCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + SECItem *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme; + + rv = ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(hash, key, scheme, isTLS, buf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; + ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_VerifySignedHashes and tls13_HandleCertificateVerify. */ +SECStatus +ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *key, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + SSL3Hashes *hash, SECItem *buf) +{ + SECItem *signature = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem hashItem; + SECOidTag encAlg; + SECOidTag hashAlg; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + PRBool isRsaPssScheme = ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "check signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len)); + + hashAlg = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg); + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key)) { + case rsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case dsaKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + /* Allow DER encoded DSA signatures in SSL 3.0 */ + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 || + buf->len != SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)) { + signature = DSAU_DecodeDerSigToLen(buf, SECKEY_SignatureLen(key)); + if (!signature) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + goto loser; + } + buf = signature; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + } + break; + + case ecKey: + encAlg = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + /* ssl_hash_none is used to specify the MD5/SHA1 concatenated hash. + * In that case, we use just the SHA1 part. + * ECDSA signatures always encode the integers r and s using ASN.1 + * (unlike DSA where ASN.1 encoding is used with TLS but not with + * SSL3). So we can use VFY_VerifyDigestDirect for ECDSA. + */ + if (hash->hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + hashAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; + hashItem.data = hash->u.s.sha; + hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->u.s.sha); + } else { + hashItem.data = hash->u.raw; + hashItem.len = hash->len; + } + if (scheme == ssl_sig_none) { + scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + } + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be verified", + hashItem.data, hashItem.len)); + + if (isRsaPssScheme || + hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(key) == dsaKey) { + /* VFY_VerifyDigestDirect requires DSA signatures to be DER-encoded. + * DSA signatures are DER-encoded in TLS but not in SSL3 and the code + * above always removes the DER encoding of DSA signatures when + * present. Thus DSA signatures are always verified with PK11_Verify. + */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + + SECItem *params = NULL; + CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS pssParams; + SECItem pssParamsItem = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)&pssParams, + sizeof(pssParams) }; + + if (isRsaPssScheme) { + pssParams.hashAlg = ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.mgf = ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(hash->hashAlg); + pssParams.sLen = hashItem.len; + params = &pssParamsItem; + mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS; + } + + rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(key, mech, params, buf, &hashItem, pwArg); + } else { + rv = VFY_VerifyDigestDirect(&hashItem, key, buf, encAlg, hashAlg, + pwArg); + } + if (signature) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(signature, PR_TRUE); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + } + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.signatureScheme = scheme; + ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme); + } + +loser: +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = SECSuccess; + PORT_SetError(0); +#endif + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange, ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify */ +SECStatus +ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECItem *buf) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = + SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(&ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + SECStatus rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, scheme, + hash, buf); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash + * which are called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. + * + * hashAlg: ssl_hash_none indicates the pre-1.2, MD5/SHA1 combination hash. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, + PRUint8 *hashBuf, unsigned int bufLen, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECOidTag hashOID; + PRUint32 policy; + + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_SHA1, &policy) == SECSuccess) && + !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_MD5, hashes->u.s.md5, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, hashes->u.s.sha, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + } else { + hashOID = ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg); + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashOID, &policy) == SECSuccess) && + !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + hashes->len = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOID); + if (hashes->len == 0 || hashes->len > sizeof(hashes->u.raw)) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_HashBuf(hashOID, hashes->u.raw, hashBuf, bufLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(sslSocket *ss, SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes, + SECItem dh_p, SECItem dh_g, SECItem dh_Ys, PRBool padY) +{ + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int yLen; + unsigned int i; + + PORT_Assert(dh_p.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_g.data); + PORT_Assert(dh_Ys.data); + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* p */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_p.data, dh_p.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* g */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&buf, dh_g.data, dh_g.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* y - complicated by padding */ + yLen = padY ? dh_p.len : dh_Ys.len; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, yLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* If we're padding Y, dh_Ys can't be longer than dh_p. */ + PORT_Assert(!padY || dh_p.len >= dh_Ys.len); + for (i = dh_Ys.len; i < yLen; ++i) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: ", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf))); + if (hashAlg == ssl_hash_none) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + } else { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "DHkey hash: result", + hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&buf); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction, + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef, + ssl3CipherSpec **specp) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + const ssl3CipherSpec *prev; + + prev = (direction == ssl_secret_write) ? ss->ssl3.cwSpec : ss->ssl3.crSpec; + if (prev->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + + spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction); + if (!spec) { + return SECFailure; + } + + spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef); + spec->macDef = ssl_GetMacDef(ss, suiteDef); + + spec->epoch = prev->epoch + 1; + spec->nextSeqNum = 0; + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && direction == ssl_secret_read) { + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); + } + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, spec); + + ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); + *specp = spec; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Fill in the pending cipher spec with info from the selected ciphersuite. +** This is as much initialization as we can do without having key material. +** Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello(), ssl3_SendServerHello() +** Caller must hold the ssl3 handshake lock. +** Acquires & releases SpecWriteLock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + /* This hack provides maximal interoperability with SSL 3 servers. */ + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = ss->version; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Set XXX Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + + suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + if (suiteDef == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Double-check that we did not pick an RC4 suite */ + PORT_Assert(suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg != cipher_rc4); + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = suiteDef; + + kea = suiteDef->key_exchange_alg; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[kea]; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea); + + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read, suiteDef, + &ss->ssl3.prSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write, suiteDef, + &ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.prSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, + ss->opt.recordSizeLimit); + ss->ssl3.pwSpec->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, + ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit); + } + + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader writes the SSL/TLS pseudo-header (the data which + * is included in the MAC or AEAD additional data) to |buf|. See + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-6.2.3.3 for the definition of the + * AEAD additional data. + * + * TLS pseudo-header includes the record's version field, SSL's doesn't. Which + * pseudo-header definition to use should be decided based on the version of + * the protocol that was negotiated when the cipher spec became current, NOT + * based on the version value in the record itself, and the decision is passed + * to this function as the |includesVersion| argument. But, the |version| + * argument should be the record's version value. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader(DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + SSLContentType ct, + PRBool includesVersion, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + PRBool isDTLS, + int length, + sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (isDTLS) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, epoch, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 6); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, seqNum, 8); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ct, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* SSL3 MAC doesn't include the record's version field. */ + if (includesVersion) { + /* TLS MAC and AEAD additional data include version. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, length, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Initialize encryption and MAC contexts for pending spec. + * Master Secret already is derived. + * Caller holds Spec write lock. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingContexts(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism; + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode; + SECItem macParam; + CK_ULONG macLength; + SECItem iv; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + + calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; + PORT_Assert(alg2Mech[calg].calg == calg); + + if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) { + macLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; + + /* + ** Now setup the MAC contexts, + ** crypto contexts are setup below. + */ + macParam.data = (unsigned char *)&macLength; + macParam.len = sizeof(macLength); + macParam.type = siBuffer; + + spec->keyMaterial.macContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey( + spec->macDef->mmech, CKA_SIGN, spec->keyMaterial.macKey, &macParam); + if (!spec->keyMaterial.macContext) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* + ** Now setup the crypto contexts. + */ + if (calg == ssl_calg_null) { + spec->cipher = Null_Cipher; + return SECSuccess; + } + + encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + encMode = (spec->direction == ssl_secret_write) ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT; + if (spec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { + encMode |= CKA_NSS_MESSAGE; + iv.data = NULL; + iv.len = 0; + } else { + spec->cipher = (SSLCipher)PK11_CipherOp; + iv.data = spec->keyMaterial.iv; + iv.len = spec->cipherDef->iv_size; + } + + /* + * build the context + */ + spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode, + spec->keyMaterial.key, + &iv); + if (!spec->cipherContext) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Complete the initialization of all keys, ciphers, MACs and their contexts + * for the pending Cipher Spec. + * Called from: ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Sets error code, but caller probably should override to disambiguate. + * + * If |secret| is a master secret from a previous connection is reused, |derive| + * is PR_FALSE. If the secret is a pre-master secret, then |derive| is PR_TRUE + * and the master secret is derived from |secret|. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, PRBool derive) +{ + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(secret); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch); + prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + /* The problem here is that we have rehandshaked too many + * times (you are not allowed to wrap the epoch). The + * spec says you should be discarding the connection + * and start over, so not much we can do here. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + if (derive) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, secret, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + masterSecret = secret; + } + + PORT_Assert(masterSecret); + rv = ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(ss, masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (derive) { + /* masterSecret was created here. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(masterSecret); + } + goto loser; + } + + /* Both cipher specs maintain a reference to the master secret, since each + * is managed and freed independently. */ + prSpec->masterSecret = masterSecret; + pwSpec->masterSecret = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(masterSecret); + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingContexts(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************************/ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. + */ +static const unsigned char mac_pad_1[60] = { + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, + 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 +}; +static const unsigned char mac_pad_2[60] = { + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, + 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c +}; + +/* Called from: ssl3_SendRecord() +** Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const unsigned char *header, + unsigned int headerLen, + const PRUint8 *input, + int inputLen, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLen) +{ + PK11Context *context; + int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; + SECStatus rv; + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: header", header, headerLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash1: input", input, inputLen)); + + if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { + *outLen = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + context = spec->keyMaterial.macContext; + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, header, headerLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(context, input, inputLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(context, outbuf, outLen, macSize); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || *outLen == (unsigned)macSize); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "frag hash2: result", outbuf, *outLen)); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleRecord() + * Caller must already hold the SpecReadLock. (wish we could assert that!) + * + * On entry: + * originalLen >= inputLen >= MAC size +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const unsigned char *header, + unsigned int headerLen, + const PRUint8 *input, + int inputLen, + int originalLen, + unsigned char *outbuf, + unsigned int *outLen) +{ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macType; + CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS params; + SECItem param, inputItem, outputItem; + int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(inputLen >= spec->macDef->mac_size); + PORT_Assert(originalLen >= inputLen); + + if (spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { + *outLen = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + macType = CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME; + if (spec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + macType = CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME; + } + + params.macAlg = spec->macDef->mmech; + params.ulBodyTotalLen = originalLen; + params.pHeader = (unsigned char *)header; /* const cast */ + params.ulHeaderLen = headerLen; + + param.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; + param.len = sizeof(params); + param.type = 0; + + inputItem.data = (unsigned char *)input; + inputItem.len = inputLen; + inputItem.type = 0; + + outputItem.data = outbuf; + outputItem.len = *outLen; + outputItem.type = 0; + + rv = PK11_SignWithSymKey(spec->keyMaterial.macKey, macType, ¶m, + &outputItem, &inputItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM) { + /* ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC() expects the MAC to have been removed + * from the input length already. */ + return ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(spec, header, headerLen, + input, inputLen - macSize, + outbuf, outLen); + } + + *outLen = 0; + rv = SECFailure; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + PORT_Assert(outputItem.len == (unsigned)macSize); + *outLen = outputItem.len; + + return rv; +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PRBool isPresent = PR_TRUE; + + /* we only care if we are doing client auth */ + if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* get the slot */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID); + if (slot == NULL || + !PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries != PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID != PK11_GetSlotID(slot) || + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID != PK11_GetModuleID(slot) || + (PK11_NeedLogin(slot) && !PK11_IsLoggedIn(slot, NULL))) { + isPresent = PR_FALSE; + } + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + return isPresent; +} + +/* Caller must hold the spec read lock. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + PRBool isServer, + PRBool isDTLS, + SSLContentType ct, + const PRUint8 *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 macLen = 0; + PRUint32 fragLen; + PRUint32 p1Len, p2Len, oddLen = 0; + unsigned int ivLen = 0; + unsigned char pseudoHeaderBuf[13]; + sslBuffer pseudoHeader = SSL_BUFFER(pseudoHeaderBuf); + unsigned int len; + + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block && + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Prepend the per-record explicit IV using technique 2b from + * RFC 4346 section 6.2.3.2: The IV is a cryptographically + * strong random number XORed with the CBC residue from the previous + * record. + */ + ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size; + if (ivLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */ + &len, /* outlen */ + ivLen, /* max outlen */ + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* input */ + ivLen); /* input len */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || len != ivLen) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, ct, + cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, cwSpec->recordVersion, + isDTLS, contentLen, &pseudoHeader); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_aead) { + const unsigned int nonceLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size; + const unsigned int tagLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->tag_size; + unsigned int ivOffset = 0; + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION gen; + /* ivOut includes the iv and the nonce and is the internal iv/nonce + * for the AEAD function. On Encrypt, this is an in/out parameter */ + unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + ivLen = cwSpec->cipherDef->iv_size; + + PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) <= MAX_IV_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert((ivLen + nonceLen) >= sizeof(sslSequenceNumber)); + + if (nonceLen + contentLen + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (nonceLen == 0) { + ivOffset = ivLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber); + gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR; + } else { + ivOffset = ivLen; + gen = CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER; + } + ivOffset = tls13_SetupAeadIv(isDTLS, ivOut, cwSpec->keyMaterial.iv, + ivOffset, ivLen, cwSpec->epoch); + rv = tls13_AEAD(cwSpec->cipherContext, + PR_FALSE, + gen, ivOffset * BPB, /* iv generator params */ + ivOut, /* iv in */ + ivOut, /* iv out */ + ivLen + nonceLen, /* full iv length */ + NULL, 0, /* nonce is generated*/ + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), /* aad */ + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), /* aadlen */ + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + nonceLen, /* output */ + &len, /* out len */ + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf) - nonceLen, /* max out */ + tagLen, + pIn, contentLen); /* input */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + len += nonceLen; /* include the nonce at the beginning */ + /* copy out the generated iv if we are using explict nonces */ + if (nonceLen) { + PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), ivOut + ivLen, nonceLen); + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ + } else { + int blockSize = cwSpec->cipherDef->block_size; + + /* + * Add the MAC + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(cwSpec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&pseudoHeader), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&pseudoHeader), + pIn, contentLen, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen, &macLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + p1Len = contentLen; + p2Len = macLen; + fragLen = contentLen + macLen; /* needs to be encrypted */ + PORT_Assert(fragLen <= MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1024); + + /* + * Pad the text (if we're doing a block cipher) + * then Encrypt it + */ + if (cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { + unsigned char *pBuf; + int padding_length; + int i; + + oddLen = contentLen % blockSize; + /* Assume blockSize is a power of two */ + padding_length = blockSize - 1 - ((fragLen) & (blockSize - 1)); + fragLen += padding_length + 1; + PORT_Assert((fragLen % blockSize) == 0); + + /* Pad according to TLS rules (also acceptable to SSL3). */ + pBuf = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + fragLen - 1; + for (i = padding_length + 1; i > 0; --i) { + *pBuf-- = padding_length; + } + /* now, if contentLen is not a multiple of block size, fix it */ + p2Len = fragLen - p1Len; + } + if (p1Len < 256) { + oddLen = p1Len; + p1Len = 0; + } else { + p1Len -= oddLen; + } + if (oddLen) { + p2Len += oddLen; + PORT_Assert((blockSize < 2) || + (p2Len % blockSize) == 0); + memmove(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + p1Len, pIn + p1Len, oddLen); + } + if (p1Len > 0) { + unsigned int cipherBytesPart1 = 0; + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */ + &cipherBytesPart1, /* actual outlen */ + p1Len, /* max outlen */ + pIn, + p1Len); /* input, and inputlen */ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart1 == p1Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart1 != p1Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p1Len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + } + if (p2Len > 0) { + unsigned int cipherBytesPart2 = 0; + rv = cwSpec->cipher(cwSpec->cipherContext, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), + &cipherBytesPart2, /* output and actual outLen */ + p2Len, /* max outlen */ + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), + p2Len); /* input and inputLen*/ + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess && cipherBytesPart2 == p2Len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || cipherBytesPart2 != p2Len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, p2Len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Note: though this can report failure, it shouldn't. */ +SECStatus +ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSLContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf, + PRBool *needsLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + cwSpec->epoch > TrafficKeyClearText) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return dtls13_InsertCipherTextHeader(ss, cwSpec, wrBuf, + needsLength); + } + contentType = ssl_ct_application_data; + } +#endif + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, contentType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->recordVersion, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->epoch, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(wrBuf, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, 6); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + *needsLength = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, SSLContentType ct, + const PRUint8 *pIn, PRUint32 contentLen, sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + PRBool needsLength; + unsigned int lenOffset; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write); + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records <= RECORD_SEQ_MAX); + + if (cwSpec->nextSeqNum >= cwSpec->cipherDef->max_records) { + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[-]: write sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), cwSpec->nextSeqNum)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, ct, wrBuf, &needsLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (needsLength) { + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, 2, &lenOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + { + unsigned int len; + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), &len, + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error was set */ + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* Can't fail. */ + } +#else + if (cwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PRUint8 *cipherText = SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf); + unsigned int bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf); + rv = tls13_ProtectRecord(ss, cwSpec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + bufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - bufLen; + rv = dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, cwSpec, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), + cipherText, bufLen); + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_MACEncryptRecord(cwSpec, ss->sec.isServer, IS_DTLS(ss), ct, + pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + } +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error was set */ + } + + if (needsLength) { + /* Insert the length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(wrBuf, lenOffset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Can't fail. */ + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ++cwSpec->nextSeqNum; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ProtectNextRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, SSLContentType ct, + const PRUint8 *pIn, unsigned int nIn, + unsigned int *written) +{ + sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + unsigned int contentLen; + unsigned int spaceNeeded; + SECStatus rv; + + contentLen = PR_MIN(nIn, spec->recordSizeLimit); + spaceNeeded = contentLen + SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE; + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + spec->cipherDef->type == type_block) { + spaceNeeded += spec->cipherDef->iv_size; + } + if (spaceNeeded > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(wrBuf, spaceNeeded); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: failed to expand write buffer to %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spaceNeeded)); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = ssl_ProtectRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, contentLen, wrBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "send (encrypted) record data:", + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf))); + *written = contentLen; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Process the plain text before sending it. + * Returns the number of bytes of plaintext that were successfully sent + * plus the number of bytes of plaintext that were copied into the + * output (write) buffer. + * Returns -1 on an error. PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR is set if the error is blocking + * and not terminal. + * + * Notes on the use of the private ssl flags: + * (no private SSL flags) + * Attempt to make and send SSL records for all plaintext + * If non-blocking and a send gets WOULD_BLOCK, + * or if the pending (ciphertext) buffer is not empty, + * then buffer remaining bytes of ciphertext into pending buf, + * and continue to do that for all succssive records until all + * bytes are used. + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER + * As above, except this suppresses all write attempts, and forces + * all ciphertext into the pending ciphertext buffer. + * ssl_SEND_FLAG_USE_EPOCH (for DTLS) + * Forces the use of the provided epoch + */ +PRInt32 +ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, /* non-NULL for DTLS retransmits */ + SSLContentType ct, + const PRUint8 *pIn, /* input buffer */ + PRInt32 nIn, /* bytes of input */ + PRInt32 flags) +{ + sslBuffer *wrBuf = &ss->sec.writeBuf; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + SECStatus rv; + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] SendRecord type: %s nIn=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeContentType(ct), + nIn)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Send record (plain text)", pIn, nIn)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) == 0); + + if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Suppress write, fatal alert already sent", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + if (ct != ssl_ct_alert) { + /* If we are sending an alert, then we already have an + * error, so don't overwrite. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED); + } + return -1; + } + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return -1; + } + + if (ss->recordWriteCallback) { + PRUint16 epoch; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + epoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = ss->recordWriteCallback(ss->fd, epoch, ct, pIn, nIn, + ss->recordWriteCallbackArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return -1; + } + return nIn; + } + + if (cwSpec) { + /* cwSpec can only be set for retransmissions of the DTLS handshake. */ + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && + (ct == ssl_ct_handshake || + ct == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec)); + spec = cwSpec; + } else { + spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + } + + while (nIn > 0) { + unsigned int written = 0; + PRInt32 sent; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = ssl_ProtectNextRecord(ss, spec, ct, pIn, nIn, &written); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(written > 0); + /* DTLS should not fragment non-application data here. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ct != ssl_ct_application_data) { + PORT_Assert(written == nIn); + } + + pIn += written; + nIn -= written; + PORT_Assert(nIn >= 0); + + /* If there's still some previously saved ciphertext, + * or the caller doesn't want us to send the data yet, + * then add all our new ciphertext to the amount previously saved. + */ + if ((ss->pendingBuf.len > 0) || + (flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + goto loser; + } + + if (!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER)) { + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0 && PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > 0); + ss->handshakeBegun = 1; + sent = ssl_DefSend(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf), + flags & ~ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK); + if (sent < 0) { + if (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + /* we got PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, which means none was sent. */ + sent = 0; + } + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) > (unsigned int)sent) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* DTLS just says no in this case. No buffering */ + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + goto loser; + } + /* now take all the remaining unsent new ciphertext and + * append it to the buffer of previously unsent ciphertext. + */ + rv = ssl_SaveWriteData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(wrBuf) + sent, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(wrBuf) - sent); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* presumably a memory error, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY */ + goto loser; + } + } + } + wrBuf->len = 0; + totalSent += written; + } + return totalSent; + +loser: + /* Don't leave bits of buffer lying around. */ + wrBuf->len = 0; + return -1; +} + +#define SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER 1024 + +/* Attempt to send the content of "in" in an SSL application_data record. + * Returns "len" or -1 on failure. + */ +int +ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *in, + PRInt32 len, PRInt32 flags) +{ + PRInt32 totalSent = 0; + PRInt32 discarded = 0; + PRBool splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + /* These flags for internal use only */ + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT)); + if (len < 0 || !in) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (ss->pendingBuf.len > SSL3_PENDING_HIGH_WATER && + !ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (ss->appDataBuffered && len) { + PORT_Assert(in[0] == (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)); + if (in[0] != (unsigned char)(ss->appDataBuffered)) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return -1; + } + in++; + len--; + discarded = 1; + } + + /* We will split the first byte of the record into its own record, as + * explained in the documentation for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV in ssl.h. + */ + if (len > 1 && ss->opt.cbcRandomIV && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->type == type_block /* CBC */) { + splitNeeded = PR_TRUE; + } + + while (len > totalSent) { + PRInt32 sent, toSend; + + if (totalSent > 0) { + /* + * The thread yield is intended to give the reader thread a + * chance to get some cycles while the writer thread is in + * the middle of a large application data write. (See + * Bugzilla bug 127740, comment #1.) + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PR_Sleep(PR_INTERVAL_NO_WAIT); /* PR_Yield(); */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + if (splitNeeded) { + toSend = 1; + splitNeeded = PR_FALSE; + } else { + toSend = PR_MIN(len - totalSent, MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); + } + + /* + * Note that the 0 epoch is OK because flags will never require + * its use, as guaranteed by the PORT_Assert above. + */ + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_application_data, + in + totalSent, toSend, flags); + if (sent < 0) { + if (totalSent > 0 && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + return -1; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + totalSent += sent; + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* must be a non-blocking socket */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->lastWriteBlocked); + break; + } + } + if (ss->pendingBuf.len) { + /* Must be non-blocking. */ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)); + if (totalSent > 0) { + ss->appDataBuffered = 0x100 | in[totalSent - 1]; + } + + totalSent = totalSent + discarded - 1; + if (totalSent <= 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + totalSent = SECFailure; + } + return totalSent; + } + ss->appDataBuffered = 0; + return totalSent + discarded; +} + +/* Attempt to send buffered handshake messages. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Depending on whether we are doing DTLS or not, this either calls + * + * - ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages if non-DTLS + * - dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages if DTLS + * + * Called from SSL3_SendAlert(), ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(), + * ssl3_AppendHandshake(), ssl3_SendClientHello(), + * ssl3_SendHelloRequest(), ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(), + * ssl3_SendFinished(), + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return dtls_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); + } + return ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(ss, flags); +} + +/* Attempt to send the content of sendBuf buffer in an SSL handshake record. + * Always set sendBuf.len to 0, even when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called from ssl3_FlushHandshake + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_FlushHandshakeMessages(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + static const PRInt32 allowedFlags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + PRInt32 count = -1; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf || !ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) + return SECSuccess; + + /* only these flags are allowed */ + PORT_Assert(!(flags & ~allowedFlags)); + if ((flags & ~allowedFlags) != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + count = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_handshake, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf, + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, flags); + if (count < 0) { + int err = PORT_GetError(); + PORT_Assert(err != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + } + rv = SECFailure; + } else if ((unsigned int)count < ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len) { + /* short write should never happen */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)count >= ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + /* Whether we succeeded or failed, toss the old handshake data. */ + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len = 0; + return rv; +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleAlert and from ssl3_HandleCertificate when + * the remote client sends a negative response to our certificate request. + * Returns SECFailure if the application has required client auth. + * SECSuccess otherwise. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + /* If the server has required client-auth blindly but doesn't + * actually look at the certificate it won't know that no + * certificate was presented so we shutdown the socket to ensure + * an error. We only do this if we haven't already completed the + * first handshake because if we're redoing the handshake we + * know the server is paying attention to the certificate. + */ + if ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (!ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE))) { + PRFileDesc *lower; + + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, certificate_required); + } else { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, bad_certificate); + } + + lower = ss->fd->lower; +#ifdef _WIN32 + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND); +#else + lower->methods->shutdown(lower, PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH); +#endif + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************ + * Alerts + */ + +/* +** Acquires both handshake and XmitBuf locks. +** Called from: ssl3_IllegalParameter <- +** ssl3_HandshakeFailure <- +** ssl3_HandleAlert <- ssl3_HandleRecord. +** ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs <- ssl3_HandleRecord +** ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable <- +** ssl3_HandleHelloRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHello <- +** ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest <- +** ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone <- +** ssl3_HandleClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify <- +** ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange <- +** ssl3_HandleCertificate <- +** ssl3_HandleFinished <- +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage <- +** ssl3_HandleRecord <- +** +*/ +SECStatus +SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + PRUint8 bytes[2]; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool needHsLock = !ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* Check that if I need the HS lock I also need the Xmit lock */ + PORT_Assert(!needHsLock || !ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send alert record, level=%d desc=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + bytes[0] = level; + bytes[1] = desc; + + if (needHsLock) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + } + } + + rv = tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (needHsLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + return rv; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_alert, bytes, 2, + (desc == no_certificate) ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); + rv = (sent >= 0) ? SECSuccess : (SECStatus)sent; + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent = PR_TRUE; + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (needHsLock) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess && ss->alertSentCallback) { + SSLAlert alert = { level, desc }; + ss->alertSentCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertSentCallbackArg, &alert); + } + return rv; /* error set by ssl3_FlushHandshake or ssl3_SendRecord */ +} + +/* + * Send illegal_parameter alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_IllegalParameter(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Send handshake_Failure alert. Set generic error number. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandshakeFailure(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +void +ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode) +{ + SSL3AlertDescription desc = bad_certificate; + PRBool isTLS = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS; + + switch (errCode) { + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: + desc = unsupported_certificate; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_expired; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE: + desc = certificate_revoked; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: + case SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE: + desc = certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT: + desc = isTLS ? access_denied : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER: + case SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_unknown; + break; + case SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE: + desc = isTLS ? unknown_ca : certificate_expired; + break; + + case SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE: + case SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: + default: + desc = bad_certificate; + break; + } + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: peer certificate is no good: error=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, errCode)); + + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +} + +/* + * Send decode_error alert. Set generic error number. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? decode_error + : illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(ss->sec.isServer ? SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT + : SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleAlert(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSL3AlertLevel level; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int error; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle alert record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (buf->len != 2) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + } + level = (SSL3AlertLevel)buf->buf[0]; + desc = (SSL3AlertDescription)buf->buf[1]; + buf->len = 0; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL3[%d] received alert, level = %d, description = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, level, desc)); + + if (ss->alertReceivedCallback) { + SSLAlert alert = { level, desc }; + ss->alertReceivedCallback(ss->fd, ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg, &alert); + } + + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: + ss->recvdCloseNotify = 1; + error = SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT; + break; + case unexpected_message: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_record_mac: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT; + break; + case decryption_failed_RESERVED: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT; + break; + case record_overflow: + error = SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT; + break; + case decompression_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case handshake_failure: + error = SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT; + break; + case no_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE; + break; + case certificate_required: + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_certificate: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_revoked: + error = SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_expired: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unknown: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + case illegal_parameter: + error = SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT; + break; + case inappropriate_fallback: + error = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + break; + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + case unknown_ca: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT; + break; + case access_denied: + error = SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT; + break; + case decode_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case decrypt_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case export_restriction: + error = SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT; + break; + case protocol_version: + error = SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT; + break; + case insufficient_security: + error = SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT; + break; + case internal_error: + error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + break; + case user_canceled: + error = SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT; + break; + case no_renegotiation: + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT; + break; + + /* Alerts for TLS client hello extensions */ + case missing_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case unsupported_extension: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT; + break; + case certificate_unobtainable: + error = SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT; + break; + case unrecognized_name: + error = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_status_response: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT; + break; + case bad_certificate_hash_value: + error = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT; + break; + case no_application_protocol: + error = SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL; + break; + case ech_required: + error = SSL_ERROR_ECH_REQUIRED_ALERT; + break; + default: + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT; + break; + } + if ((ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello)) { + /* TLS 1.3 requires all but "end of data" alerts to be + * treated as fatal. */ + switch (desc) { + case close_notify: + case user_canceled: + break; + default: + level = alert_fatal; + } + } + if (level == alert_fatal) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) && + (desc == handshake_failure)) { + /* XXX This is a hack. We're assuming that any handshake failure + * XXX on the client hello is a failure to match ciphers. + */ + error = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + } + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((desc == no_certificate) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_cert)) { + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Change Cipher Specs + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone, + * ssl3_HandleClientHello, + * and ssl3_HandleFinished + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. + */ + +SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRUint8 change = change_cipher_spec_choice; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PRInt32 sent; + sent = ssl3_SendRecord(ss, NULL, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec, + &change, 1, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (sent < 0) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_SendRecord */ + } + } else { + rv = dtls_QueueMessage(ss, ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec, &change, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* Error code set. */ + } + + /* swap the pending and current write specs. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Write Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* With DTLS, we need to set a holddown timer in case the final + * message got lost */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch) { + rv = dtls_StartHolddownTimer(ss); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleRecord. +** Caller must hold both RecvBuf and Handshake locks. + * + * Acquires and releases spec write lock, to protect switching the current + * and pending write spec pointers. +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice change; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle change_cipher_spec record", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* For DTLS: Ignore this if we aren't expecting it. Don't kill a connection + * as a result of receiving trash. + * For TLS: Maybe ignore, but only after checking format. */ + if (ws != wait_change_cipher && IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Ignore this because it's out of order. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: discard out of order " + "DTLS change_cipher_spec", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + buf->len = 0; + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Handshake messages should not span ChangeCipherSpec. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + if (buf->len != 1) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + change = (SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice)buf->buf[0]; + if (change != change_cipher_spec_choice) { + /* illegal_parameter is correct here for both SSL3 and TLS. */ + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + + buf->len = 0; + if (ws != wait_change_cipher) { + /* Ignore a CCS for TLS 1.3. This only happens if the server sends a + * HelloRetryRequest. In other cases, the CCS will fail decryption and + * will be discarded by ssl3_HandleRecord(). */ + if (ws == wait_server_hello && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Note: For a server, we can't test ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry or + * ss->version because the server might be stateless (and so it won't + * have set either value yet). Set a flag so that at least we will + * guarantee that the server will treat any ClientHello properly. */ + if (ws == wait_client_hello && + ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Set Current Read Cipher Suite to Pending", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec); + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.crSpec); + ss->ssl3.crSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_finished; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetMgfMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKG_MGF1_SHA512; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKG_MGF1_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return CKM_SHA512; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + case ssl_hash_none: + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + return CKM_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return CKM_SHA_1; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_SHA256; +} + +/* Function valid for >= TLS 1.2, only. */ +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl3_GetHashMechanismByHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash); +} + +static SSLHashType +ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) { + return ssl_hash_sha256; + } + return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; +} + +/* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS. +** +** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error. +** +** 2. Check the version if |pms_version| is non-zero and if wrong, +** return an error. +** +** 3. If |msp| is nonzero, return MS in |*msp|. + +** Called from: +** ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt +** tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(sslSocket *ss, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive, + CK_VERSION *pms_version, + SECItem *params, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, + PK11SymKey *pms, PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + PK11SymKey *ms = NULL; + + ms = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(pms, master_derive, + params, key_derive, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, keyFlags); + if (!ms) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (pms_version && ss->opt.detectRollBack) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion client_version; + client_version = pms_version->major << 8 | pms_version->minor; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + client_version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(client_version); + } + + if (client_version != ss->clientHelloVersion) { + /* Destroy MS. Version roll-back detected. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (msp) { + *msp = ms; + } else { + PK11_FreeSymKey(ms); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Compute the ordinary (pre draft-ietf-tls-session-hash) master + ** secret and return it in |*msp|. + ** + ** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + /* + * Whenever isDH is true, we need to use CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH + * which, unlike CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, converts arbitrary size + * data into a 48-byte value, and does not expect to return the version. + */ + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + SECItem params; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; + /* master_params may be used as a CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS */ + CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS master_params; + unsigned int master_params_len; + + if (isTLS12) { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else if (isTLS) { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } else { + if (isDH) + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + master_derive = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + keyFlags = 0; + } + + if (!isDH) { + pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; + } + + master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; + master_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + if (isTLS12) { + master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); + } else { + /* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */ + master_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS); + } + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&master_params; + params.len = master_params_len; + + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, + pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, + keyFlags, pms, msp); +} + +/* Compute the draft-ietf-tls-session-hash master +** secret and return it in |*msp|. +** +** Called from: ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret +*/ +static SECStatus +tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS extended_master_params; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + /* + * Determine whether to use the DH/ECDH or RSA derivation modes. + */ + /* + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Verify that the slot can handle this key expansion + * mode. Bug 1198298 */ + PRBool isDH = (PRBool)((ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_dh) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType == ssl_kea_ecdh)); + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE master_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + SECItem params; + const CK_FLAGS keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + CK_VERSION pms_version; + CK_VERSION *pms_version_ptr = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (isDH) { + master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + master_derive = CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE; + pms_version_ptr = &pms_version; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + /* TLS 1.2+ */ + extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } else { + /* TLS < 1.2 */ + extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + } + + extended_master_params.pVersion = pms_version_ptr; + extended_master_params.pSessionHash = hashes.u.raw; + extended_master_params.ulSessionHashLen = hashes.len; + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&extended_master_params; + params.len = sizeof extended_master_params; + + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretFinish(ss, master_derive, key_derive, + pms_version_ptr, ¶ms, + keyFlags, pms, msp); +} + +/* Wrapper method to compute the master secret and return it in |*msp|. +** +** Called from ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret +*/ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms, + PK11SymKey **msp) +{ + PORT_Assert(pms != NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + return tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); + } else { + return ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(ss, pms, msp); + } +} + +/* + * Derive encryption and MAC Keys (and IVs) from master secret + * Sets a useful error code when returning SECFailure. + * + * Called only from ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(), + * which in turn is called from + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange (for Full handshake) + * ssl3_HandleServerHello (for session restart) + * ssl3_HandleClientHello (for session restart) + * Caller MUST hold the specWriteLock, and SSL3HandshakeLock. + * ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec does that. + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *masterSecret) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec = ss->ssl3.pwSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *clientSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *serverSpec; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + PRBool isTLS12 = + (PRBool)(isTLS && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = pwSpec->cipherDef; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *derivedKeyHandle = NULL; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + int keySize; + CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS key_material_params; /* may be used as a + * CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS */ + unsigned int key_material_params_len; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT returnedKeys; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE key_derive; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulk_mechanism; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + SECItem params; + PRBool skipKeysAndIVs = (PRBool)(cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(masterSecret); + + /* These functions operate in terms of who is writing specs. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + clientSpec = prSpec; + serverSpec = pwSpec; + } else { + clientSpec = pwSpec; + serverSpec = prSpec; + } + + /* + * generate the key material + */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Block ciphers in >= TLS 1.1 use a per-record, explicit IV. */ + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + PORT_Memset(clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + PORT_Memset(serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv, 0, cipher_def->iv_size); + } + + key_material_params.bIsExport = PR_FALSE; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pClientRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + key_material_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + key_material_params.pReturnedKeyMaterial = &returnedKeys; + + if (skipKeysAndIVs) { + keySize = 0; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = NULL; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = NULL; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = 0; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = 0; + } else { + keySize = cipher_def->key_size; + returnedKeys.pIVClient = clientSpec->keyMaterial.iv; + returnedKeys.pIVServer = serverSpec->keyMaterial.iv; + key_material_params.ulKeySizeInBits = cipher_def->secret_key_size * BPB; + key_material_params.ulIVSizeInBits = cipher_def->iv_size * BPB; + } + key_material_params.ulMacSizeInBits = pwSpec->macDef->mac_size * BPB; + + calg = cipher_def->calg; + bulk_mechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + + if (isTLS12) { + key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } else if (isTLS) { + key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } else { + key_derive = CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE; + key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS); + } + + params.data = (unsigned char *)&key_material_params; + params.len = key_material_params_len; + + /* CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE is defined to set ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, and + * DERIVE by DEFAULT */ + derivedKeyHandle = PK11_Derive(masterSecret, key_derive, ¶ms, + bulk_mechanism, CKA_ENCRYPT, keySize); + if (!derivedKeyHandle) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* we really should use the actual mac'ing mechanism here, but we + * don't because these types are used to map keytype anyway and both + * mac's map to the same keytype. + */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(derivedKeyHandle); + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); /* slot is held until the key is freed */ + clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hClientMacSecret, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, returnedKeys.hServerMacSecret, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.macKey == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + if (!skipKeysAndIVs) { + clientSpec->keyMaterial.key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hClientKey, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (clientSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + serverSpec->keyMaterial.key = + PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, derivedKeyHandle, PK11_OriginDerive, + bulk_mechanism, returnedKeys.hServerKey, + PR_TRUE, pwArg); + if (serverSpec->keyMaterial.key == NULL) { + goto loser; /* loser sets err */ + } + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedKeyHandle); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +void +ssl3_CoalesceEchHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* |sha| contains the CHOuter transcript, which is the singular + * transcript if not doing ECH. If the server responded with 1.2, + * contexts are not yet initialized. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner); + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner; + ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; + } + } else { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes creates handshake hash contexts and hashes in + * buffered messages in ss->ssl3.hs.messages. Called from + * ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(), tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(), + * and ssl3_HandleServerHello. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: start handshake hashes", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_record; + } else { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.md5 && !ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + /* + * note: We should probably lookup an SSL3 slot for these + * handshake hashes in hopes that we wind up with the same slots + * that the master secret will wind up in ... + */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* determine the hash from the prf */ + const SECOidData *hash_oid = + SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss)); + + /* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash) + * Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our + * PK11Context */ + PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL); + if (hash_oid == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single; + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Transcript hash used on ECH client. */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } else { + /* Both ss->ssl3.hs.md5 and ss->ssl3.hs.sha should be NULL or + * created successfully. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_MD5); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5 == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_combo; + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.md5) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record && + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > 0) { + /* When doing ECH, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes will store outer messages + * into the both the outer and inner transcripts. + * ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes uses the default context which is + * the outer when doing client ECH. For ECH shared-mode or backend + * servers only the hs.messages buffer is used. */ + if (ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* When doing ECH, deriving the accept_confirmation value requires all + * messages up to and including the ServerHello + * (see draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.2). + * + * Don't free the transcript buffer until confirmation calculation. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + } + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner && + ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len > 0) { + if (PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: reset handshake hashes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_unknown; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len = 0; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.md5 = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.sha = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL; + } +} + +/* Add the provided bytes to the handshake hash context. When doing + * TLS 1.3 ECH, |target| may be provided to specify only the inner/outer + * transcript, else the input is added to both contexts. This happens + * only on the client. On the server, only the default context is used. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l, sslBuffer *target) +{ + + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool explicit = (target != NULL); + PRBool appendToEchInner = !ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && + !explicit; + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(target != &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages || + !ss->sec.isServer); + + if (target == NULL) { + /* Default context. */ + target = &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; + } + /* With TLS 1.3, and versions TLS.1.1 and older, we keep the hash(es) + * always up to date. However, we must initially buffer the handshake + * messages, until we know what to do. + * If ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_unknown, + * it means we know what to do. We calculate (hash our input), + * and we stop appending to the buffer. + * + * With TLS 1.2, we always append all handshake messages, + * and never update the hash, because the hash function we must use for + * certificate_verify might be different from the hash function we use + * when signing other handshake hashes. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = sslBuffer_Append(target, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (appendToEchInner) { + return sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages, b, l); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "handshake hash input:", b, l)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + if (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.messages) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner && + (target == &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages || !explicit)) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_combo) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l) +{ + return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, + &ss->ssl3.hs.messages); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l) +{ + return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, + &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); +} + +/* + * Handshake messages + */ +/* Called from ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes() +** ssl3_AppendHandshake() +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() +** ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() +** Caller must hold the ssl3Handshake lock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) +{ + return ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, b, l, NULL); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, unsigned int l) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PRINT_BUF(90, (ss, "post handshake hash input:", b, l)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, b, l); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + } + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType t, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it. + * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call + * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. + */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: append handshake header: type %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(t))); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, t, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the + * transmission code, if necessary */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; + + /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + + /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, length, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ + } + } + + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake, if applicable. */ +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Consume Handshake functions. + * + * All data used in these functions is protected by two locks, + * the RecvBufLock and the SSL3HandshakeLock + **************************************************************************/ + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long). Copy them into buffer "v". + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * If this function returns SECFailure, it has already sent an alert, + * and has set a generic error code. The caller should probably + * override the generic error code by setting another. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if ((PRUint32)bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PORT_Memcpy(v, *b, bytes); + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Read up the next "bytes" number of bytes from the (decrypted) input + * stream "b" (which is *length bytes long), and interpret them as an + * integer in network byte order. Sets *num to the received value. + * Reduces *length by bytes. Advances *b by bytes. + * + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 *num, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRUint8 *buf = *b; + PRUint32 i; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + *num = 0; + if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (bytes > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "consume bytes:", *b, bytes)); + + for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + *num = (*num << 8) + buf[i]; + } + *b += bytes; + *length -= bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRUint64 num64; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof(*num)); + if (bytes > sizeof(*num)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &num64, bytes, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *num = num64 & 0xffffffff; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Read in two values from the incoming decrypted byte stream "b", which is + * *length bytes long. The first value is a number whose size is "bytes" + * bytes long. The second value is a byte-string whose size is the value + * of the first number received. The latter byte-string, and its length, + * is returned in the SECItem i. + * + * Returns SECFailure (-1) on failure. + * On error, an alert has been sent, and a generic error code has been set. + * + * RADICAL CHANGE for NSS 3.11. All callers of this function make copies + * of the data returned in the SECItem *i, so making a copy of it here + * is simply wasteful. So, This function now just sets SECItem *i to + * point to the values in the buffer **b. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + PRUint32 count; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= 3); + i->len = 0; + i->data = NULL; + i->type = siBuffer; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, bytes, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (count > 0) { + if (count > *length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + i->data = *b; + i->len = count; + *b += count; + *length -= count; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID converts a TLS hash identifier into an OID value. + * If the hash is not recognised, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN is returned. + * + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +SECOidTag +ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha1: + return SEC_OID_SHA1; + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return SEC_OID_SHA256; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return SEC_OID_SHA384; + case ssl_hash_sha512: + return SEC_OID_SHA512; + default: + break; + } + return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; +} + +SECOidTag +ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(SSLAuthType authType) +{ + switch (authType) { + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: + return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; + case ssl_auth_rsa_pss: + return SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE; + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + return SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + case ssl_auth_dsa: + return SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; + default: + break; + } + /* shouldn't ever get there */ + PORT_Assert(0); + return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; +} + +SSLHashType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ssl_hash_sha1; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + return ssl_hash_sha256; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + return ssl_hash_sha384; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + return ssl_hash_sha512; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + return ssl_hash_none; /* Special for TLS 1.0/1.1. */ + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return ssl_hash_none; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid) +{ + SECOidTag authOid = ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(scheme)); + + if (spkiOid == authOid) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if ((authOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) && + (spkiOid == SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Validate that the signature scheme works for the given key type. */ +PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid, + PRBool isTls13) +{ + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* if we are purposefully passed SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, it means + * we not checking the scheme against a potential key, so skip + * the call */ + if ((spkiOid != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) && + !ssl_SignatureSchemeMatchesSpkiOid(scheme, spkiOid)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (isTls13) { + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme) == ssl_hash_sha1) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(scheme)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* With TLS 1.3, EC keys should have been selected based on calling + * ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(), reject them otherwise. */ + return spkiOid != SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, + SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) +{ + SECKEYRSAPSSParams pssParam = { 0 }; + PORTCheapArenaPool arena; + SECStatus rv; + + /* The key doesn't have parameters, boo. */ + if (!spki->algorithm.parameters.len) { + *scheme = ssl_sig_none; + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(&arena.arena, &pssParam, + SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_RSAPSSParamsTemplate), + &spki->algorithm.parameters); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Not having hashAlg means SHA-1 and we don't accept that. */ + if (!pssParam.hashAlg) { + goto loser; + } + switch (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(pssParam.hashAlg)) { + case SEC_OID_SHA256: + *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256; + break; + case SEC_OID_SHA384: + *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384; + break; + case SEC_OID_SHA512: + *scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512; + break; + default: + goto loser; + } + + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, + SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) +{ + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; + SECKEYPublicKey *key; + + key = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki); + if (!key) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(key); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(key); + if (!group) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + switch (group->name) { + case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1: + *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; + return SECSuccess; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1: + *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; + return SECSuccess; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1: + *scheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512; + return SECSuccess; + default: + break; + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Newer signature schemes are designed so that a single SPKI can be used with + * that scheme. This determines that scheme from the SPKI. If the SPKI doesn't + * have a single scheme, |*scheme| is set to ssl_sig_none. */ +SECStatus +ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, + PRBool isTls13, SSLSignatureScheme *scheme) +{ + SECOidTag spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm); + + if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE) { + return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromPssSpki(spki, scheme); + } + + /* Only do this lookup for TLS 1.3, where the scheme can be determined from + * the SPKI alone because the ECDSA key size determines the hash. Earlier + * TLS versions allow the same EC key to be used with different hashes. */ + if (isTls13 && spkiOid == SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY) { + return ssl_SignatureSchemeFromEcSpki(spki, scheme); + } + + *scheme = ssl_sig_none; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Check that a signature scheme is enabled by configuration. */ +PRBool +ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (scheme == ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(const ssl3KEADef *keaDef, SECOidTag spkiOid) +{ + switch (spkiOid) { + case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE: + return keaDef->signKeyType == rsaKey; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: + return keaDef->signKeyType == dsaKey; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: + return keaDef->signKeyType == ecKey; + default: + break; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* ssl3_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency checks that the signature algorithm + * identifier in |scheme| is consistent with the public key in |spki|. It also + * checks the hash algorithm against the configured signature algorithms. If + * all the tests pass, SECSuccess is returned. Otherwise, PORT_SetError is + * called and SECFailure is returned. */ +SECStatus +ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki) +{ + SSLSignatureScheme spkiScheme; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECOidTag spkiOid; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(spki, isTLS13, &spkiScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (spkiScheme != ssl_sig_none) { + /* The SPKI in the certificate can only be used for a single scheme. */ + if (spkiScheme != scheme || + !ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&spki->algorithm); + + /* If we're a client, check that the signature algorithm matches the signing + * key type of the cipher suite. */ + if (!isTLS13 && !ss->sec.isServer) { + if (!ssl_SignatureKeyMatchesSpkiOid(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def, spkiOid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Verify that the signature scheme matches the signing key. */ + if ((spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) || + !ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy); + break; + + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + case ssl_sig_none: + case ssl_sig_ed25519: + case ssl_sig_ed448: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: + return PR_TRUE; + + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + return PR_TRUE; + + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsRsaPkcs1SignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + return PR_TRUE; + + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsDsaSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + return PR_TRUE; + + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +SSLAuthType +ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme) +{ + switch (scheme) { + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512: + /* We report based on the key type for PSS signatures. */ + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + return ssl_auth_rsa_sign; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: + return ssl_auth_rsa_pss; + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512: + case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1: + return ssl_auth_ecdsa; + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha1: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha256: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha384: + case ssl_sig_dsa_sha512: + return ssl_auth_dsa; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return ssl_auth_null; +} + +/* ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme reads a SSLSignatureScheme (formerly + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm) structure from |b| and puts the resulting value + * into |out|. |b| and |length| are updated accordingly. + * + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +SECStatus +ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out) +{ + PRUint32 tmp; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Alert sent, Error code set already. */ + } + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + *out = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Consume Handshake functions. + **************************************************************************/ + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, + SSLHashType hashAlg, SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PK11Context *hashContext = PK11_CreateDigestContext( + ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashAlg)); + + if (!hashContext) { + return rv; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hashContext); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hashContext, buf, len); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hashContext, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + } + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hashes->hashAlg = hashAlg; + } + PK11_DestroyContext(hashContext, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + +/* Extract the hashes of handshake messages to this point. + * Called from ssl3_SendCertificateVerify + * ssl3_SendFinished + * ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage + * + * Caller must hold the SSL3HandshakeLock. + * Caller must hold a read or write lock on the Spec R/W lock. + * (There is presently no way to assert on a Read lock.) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, /* uses ->master_secret */ + SSL3Hashes *hashes, /* output goes here. */ + PRUint32 sender) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + unsigned int outLength; + PRUint8 md5_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + PRUint8 sha_inner[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + PK11Context *h; + unsigned int stateLen; + unsigned char stackBuf[1024]; + unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL; + + h = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + stateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(h, stackBuf, + sizeof(stackBuf), &stateLen); + if (stateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto tls12_loser; + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(h, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto tls12_loser; + } + + hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss); + + tls12_loser: + if (stateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(h, stateBuf, stateLen) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (stateBuf != stackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(stateBuf, stateLen); + } + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss), + hashes); + } else { + PK11Context *md5; + PK11Context *sha = NULL; + unsigned char *md5StateBuf = NULL; + unsigned char *shaStateBuf = NULL; + unsigned int md5StateLen, shaStateLen; + unsigned char md5StackBuf[256]; + unsigned char shaStackBuf[512]; + const int md5Pad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_md5)->pad_size; + const int shaPad = ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(ssl_mac_sha)->pad_size; + + md5StateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StackBuf, + sizeof md5StackBuf, &md5StateLen); + if (md5StateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + md5 = ss->ssl3.hs.md5; + + shaStateBuf = PK11_SaveContextAlloc(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStackBuf, + sizeof shaStackBuf, &shaStateLen); + if (shaStateBuf == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + sha = ss->ssl3.hs.sha; + + if (!isTLS) { + /* compute hashes for SSL3. */ + unsigned char s[4]; + + if (!spec->masterSecret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + s[0] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 24); + s[1] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 16); + s[2] = (unsigned char)(sender >> 8); + s[3] = (unsigned char)sender; + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, md5Pad)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_1, md5Pad); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, md5_inner, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 inner: result", md5_inner, outLength)); + + if (sender != 0) { + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, s, 4); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: sender", s, 4)); + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: MAC Pad 1", mac_pad_1, shaPad)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_1, shaPad); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, sha_inner, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA inner: result", sha_inner, outLength)); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, md5Pad)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "MD5 outer: MD5 inner", md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(md5); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(md5, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, mac_pad_2, md5Pad); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(md5, md5_inner, MD5_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(md5, hashes->u.s.md5, &outLength, MD5_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == MD5_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "MD5 outer: result", hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + + if (!isTLS) { + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: MAC Pad 2", mac_pad_2, shaPad)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "SHA outer: SHA inner", sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(sha); + rv |= PK11_DigestKey(sha, spec->masterSecret); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, mac_pad_2, shaPad); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(sha, sha_inner, SHA1_LENGTH); + } + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(sha, hashes->u.s.sha, &outLength, SHA1_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || outLength == SHA1_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "SHA outer: result", hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + hashes->len = MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH; + + loser: + if (md5StateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, md5StateBuf, md5StateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (md5StateBuf != md5StackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(md5StateBuf, md5StateLen); + } + } + if (shaStateBuf) { + if (PK11_RestoreContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, shaStateBuf, shaStateLen) != + SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (shaStateBuf != shaStackBuf) { + PORT_ZFree(shaStateBuf, shaStateLen); + } + } + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * end of Handshake Hash functions. + * Begin Send and Handle functions for handshakes. + **************************************************************************/ + +#ifdef TRACE +#define CHTYPE(t) \ + case client_hello_##t: \ + return #t; + +static const char * +ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(sslClientHelloType type) +{ + switch (type) { + CHTYPE(initial); + CHTYPE(retry); + CHTYPE(retransmit); /* DTLS only */ + CHTYPE(renegotiation); /* TLS <= 1.2 only */ + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; +} +#undef CHTYPE +#endif + +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); +static void +ssl_MakeFakeSid(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf) +{ + PRUint8 x = 0x5a; + int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; ++i) { + x += ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[i]; + buf[i] = x; + } +} + +/* Set the version fields of the cipher spec for a ClientHello. */ +static void +ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null); + /* This is - a best guess - but it doesn't matter here. */ + spec->version = ss->vrange.max; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE; + } else { + /* For new connections, cap the record layer version number of TLS + * ClientHello to { 3, 1 } (TLS 1.0). Some TLS 1.0 servers (which seem + * to use F5 BIG-IP) ignore ClientHello.client_version and use the + * record layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) instead when + * negotiating protocol versions. In addition, if the record layer + * version number of ClientHello is { 3, 2 } (TLS 1.1) or higher, these + * servers reset the TCP connections. Lastly, some F5 BIG-IP servers + * hang if a record containing a ClientHello has a version greater than + * { 3, 1 } and a length greater than 255. Set this flag to work around + * such servers. + * + * The final version is set when a version is negotiated. + */ + spec->recordVersion = PR_MIN(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0, + ss->vrange.max); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(const sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *preamble, const sslBuffer *extensions) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int msgLen = preamble->len; + msgLen += extensions->len ? (2 + extensions->len) : 0; + unsigned int headerLen = IS_DTLS(ss) ? 12 : 4; + + /* Record the message length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, 1, msgLen - headerLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code set */ + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Record the (unfragmented) fragment length. */ + unsigned int offset = 1 /* ch */ + 3 /* len */ + + 2 /* seq */ + 3 /* fragment offset */; + rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(preamble, offset, msgLen - headerLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code set */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(sslSocket *ss, PRBool fallbackSCSV, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int offset; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int saveLen; + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + /* Add the actual SCSV */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + if (fallbackSCSV) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + saveLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf); + /* CipherSuites are appended to Hello message here */ + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &ss->vrange, ss)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, suite->cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + /* GREASE CipherSuites: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE cipher suite values and advertise + * them in the "cipher_suites" field [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_cipher], + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange) || + (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf) - saveLen) == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, offset, 2); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid, + PRBool realSid, PRUint16 version, PRBool isEchInner, + const sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *preamble) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer constructed = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + const PRUint8 *client_random = isEchInner ? ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random : ss->ssl3.hs.client_random; + PORT_Assert(sid); + PRBool fallbackSCSV = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV && !isEchInner && + (!realSid || version < sid->version); + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_hs_client_hello, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Note that we make an unfragmented message here. We fragment in the + * transmission code, if necessary */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq++; + + /* 0 is the fragment offset, because it's not fragmented yet */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Fragment length -- set to the packet length because not fragmented */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&constructed, 3, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* The client hello version must stay unchanged to work around + * the Windows SChannel bug described in ssl3_SendClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(version == ss->clientHelloVersion); + } + + ss->clientHelloVersion = PR_MIN(version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PRUint16 dtlsVersion = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, dtlsVersion, 2); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ss->clientHelloVersion, 2); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&constructed, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && !isEchInner) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* We're faking session resumption, so rather than create new + * randomness, just mix up the client random a little. */ + PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, buf, SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 0, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* This cookieLen applies to the cookie that appears in the DTLS + * ClientHello, which isn't used in DTLS 1.3. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&constructed, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry ? 0 : ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendCipherSuites(ss, fallbackSCSV, &constructed); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Compression methods: count is always 1, null compression. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, 1, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&constructed, ssl_compression_null, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &constructed, extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + *preamble = constructed; + return SECSuccess; +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&constructed); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(), + * ssl3_RedoHandshake() + * ssl_BeginClientHandshake (when resuming ssl3 session) + * dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(with resending=PR_TRUE) + * + * The |type| argument indicates what is going on here: + * - client_hello_initial is set for the very first ClientHello + * - client_hello_retry indicates that this is a second attempt after receiving + * a HelloRetryRequest (in TLS 1.3) + * - client_hello_retransmit is used in DTLS when resending + * - client_hello_renegotiation is used to renegotiate (in TLS <1.3) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool requestingResume = PR_FALSE; + PRBool unlockNeeded = PR_FALSE; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + PRUint16 version = ss->vrange.max; + PRInt32 flags; + sslBuffer chBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send %s ClientHello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl_ClientHelloTypeName(type))); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* shouldn't get here if SSL3 is disabled, but ... */ + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("No versions of SSL 3.0 or later are enabled"); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If we are responding to a HelloRetryRequest, don't reinitialize. We need + * to maintain the handshake hashes. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + } + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || type == client_hello_retry); + + if (type == client_hello_initial) { + ssl_SetClientHelloSpecVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + } + /* These must be reset every handshake. */ + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) || type != client_hello_retransmit); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + + /* How many suites does our PKCS11 support (regardless of policy)? */ + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + return SECFailure; /* ssl3_config_match_init has set error code. */ + } + + /* + * During a renegotiation, ss->clientHelloVersion will be used again to + * work around a Windows SChannel bug. Ensure that it is still enabled. + */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + PORT_Assert(type != client_hello_initial); + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->clientHelloVersion < ss->vrange.min || + ss->clientHelloVersion > ss->vrange.max) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Check if we have a ss->sec.ci.sid. + * Check that it's not expired. + * If we have an sid and it comes from an external cache, we use it. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: using external resumption token in ClientHello", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->statelessResume && type == client_hello_retry) { + /* If we are sending a second ClientHello, reuse the same SID + * as the original one. */ + sid = ssl_ReferenceSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } else if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + /* We ignore ss->sec.ci.sid here, and use ssl_Lookup because Lookup + * handles expired entries and other details. + * XXX If we've been called from ssl_BeginClientHandshake, then + * this lookup is duplicative and wasteful. + */ + sid = ssl_LookupSID(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer, + ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + } else { + sid = NULL; + } + + /* We can't resume based on a different token. If the sid exists, + * make sure the token that holds the master secret still exists ... + * If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that holds + * the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been removed, etc. + */ + if (sid) { + PRBool sidOK = PR_TRUE; + + if (sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (!tls13_ResumptionCompatible(ss, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } else { + /* Check that the cipher suite we need is enabled. */ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, + ss->cipherSuites); + SSLVersionRange vrange = { sid->version, sid->version }; + if (!suite || !ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + /* Check that no (valid) ECHConfigs are setup in combination with a + * (resumable) TLS < 1.3 session id. */ + if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) { + /* If there are ECH configs, the client must not resume but + * offer ECH. */ + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + /* Check that we can recover the master secret. */ + if (sidOK) { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + if (sid->u.ssl3.masterValid) { + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + } + if (slot == NULL) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } else { + PK11SymKey *wrapKey = NULL; + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot) || + ((wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) == NULL)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + if (wrapKey) + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = NULL; + } + } + /* If we previously did client-auth, make sure that the token that + ** holds the private key still exists, is logged in, hasn't been + ** removed, etc. + */ + if (sidOK && !ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(sid)) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sidOK) { + /* Set version based on the sid. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + * + * The client_version of the initial ClientHello is still + * available in ss->clientHelloVersion. Ensure that + * sid->version is bounded within + * [ss->vrange.min, ss->clientHelloVersion], otherwise we + * can't use sid. + */ + if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && + sid->version <= ss->clientHelloVersion) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } else { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } else { + /* + * Check sid->version is OK first. + * Previously, we would cap the version based on sid->version, + * but that prevents negotiation of a higher version if the + * previous session was reduced (e.g., with version fallback) + */ + if (sid->version < ss->vrange.min || + sid->version > ss->vrange.max) { + sidOK = PR_FALSE; + } + } + } + + if (!sidOK) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + + if (sid) { + requestingResume = PR_TRUE; + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_hits); + + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "client, found session-id:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + ss->ssl3.policy = sid->u.ssl3.policy; + } else { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* + * Windows SChannel compares the client_version inside the RSA + * EncryptedPreMasterSecret of a renegotiation with the + * client_version of the initial ClientHello rather than the + * ClientHello in the renegotiation. To work around this bug, we + * continue to use the client_version used in the initial + * ClientHello when renegotiating. + */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + version = ss->clientHelloVersion; + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; /* memory error is set */ + } + /* ss->version isn't set yet, but the sid needs a sane value. */ + sid->version = version; + } + + isTLS = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null) { + /* SSL records are not being MACed. */ + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version = version; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); /* release the old sid */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + /* HACK for SCSV in SSL 3.0. On initial handshake, prepend SCSV, + * only if TLS is disabled. + */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isTLS) { + /* Must set this before calling Hello Extension Senders, + * to suppress sending of empty RI extension. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_TRUE; + } + + /* When we attempt session resumption (only), we must lock the sid to + * prevent races with other resumption connections that receive a + * NewSessionTicket that will cause the ticket in the sid to be replaced. + * Once we've copied the session ticket into our ClientHello message, it + * is OK for the ticket to change, so we just need to make sure we hold + * the lock across the calls to ssl_ConstructExtensions. + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + unlockNeeded = PR_TRUE; + PR_RWLock_Rlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + /* Generate a new random if this is the first attempt or renegotiation. */ + if (type == client_hello_initial || + type == client_hello_renegotiation) { + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by GetNewRandom. */ + } + } + + if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_SetupClientHello(ss, type); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Setup TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation? */ + if (type == client_hello_initial && + ss->vrange.max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + ss->opt.enableChXtnPermutation) { + rv = tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationSetup(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + if (isTLS || (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) { + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_client_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + } + + rv = ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(ss, sid, requestingResume, version, + PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &chBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble. */ + } + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + if (extensionBuf.len) { + rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by tls13_MaybeGreaseEch. */ + } + rv = ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(ss, chBuf.len, &extensionBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl_InsertPaddingExtension. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize. */ + } + + /* If we are sending a PSK binder, replace the dummy value. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + rv = tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(ss, &extensionBuf, &chBuf); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&chBuf, extensionBuf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(&chBuf, &extensionBuf); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by sslBuffer_Append*. */ + } + } + + /* If we already have a message in place, we need to enqueue it. + * This empties the buffer. This is a convenient place to call + * dtls_StageHandshakeMessage to mark the message boundary. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); + } else { + rv = tls13_ConstructClientHelloWithEch(ss, sid, !requestingResume, &chBuf, &extensionBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + rv = ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = dtls_StageHandshakeMessage(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + /* By default, all messagess are added to both the inner and + * outer transcripts. For CH (or CH2 if HRR), that's problematic. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(ss, chBuf.buf, chBuf.len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (unlockNeeded) { + /* Note: goto loser can't be used past this point. */ + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.sch_sid_stateless_resumes); + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + /* Since we sent the SCSV, pretend we sent empty RI extension. */ + TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; + } + + flags = 0; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set already. */ + } + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_hello; + sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (unlockNeeded) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&chBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 Hello Request. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle hello_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_renegotiation); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static const CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapMechanismList[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS] = { + CKM_DES3_ECB, + CKM_CAST5_ECB, + CKM_DES_ECB, + CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS, + CKM_IDEA_ECB, + CKM_CAST3_ECB, + CKM_CAST_ECB, + CKM_RC5_ECB, + CKM_RC2_ECB, + CKM_CDMF_ECB, + CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, + CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, + CKM_AES_ECB, + CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB, + CKM_SEED_ECB +}; + +static SECStatus +ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int *wrapMechIndex) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { + if (wrapMechanismList[i] == mech) { + *wrapMechIndex = i; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Each process sharing the server session ID cache has its own array of SymKey + * pointers for the symmetric wrapping keys that are used to wrap the master + * secrets. There is one key for each authentication type. These Symkeys + * correspond to the wrapped SymKeys kept in the server session cache. + */ +const SSLAuthType ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS] = { + ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt, + ssl_auth_rsa_sign, + ssl_auth_rsa_pss, + ssl_auth_ecdsa, + ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa, + ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa +}; + +static SECStatus +ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(const sslServerCert *serverCert, unsigned int *wrapKeyIndex) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++i) { + if (SSL_CERT_IS(serverCert, ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[i])) { + *wrapKeyIndex = i; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + /* Can't assert here because we still get people using DSA certificates. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PK11SymKey * +ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey( + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pWswk, + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey, + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + SECItem wrappedKey; + PK11SymKey *Ks; + SECKEYPublicKey pubWrapKey; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; + + /* found the wrapping key on disk. */ + PORT_Assert(pWswk->symWrapMechanism == masterWrapMech); + PORT_Assert(pWswk->wrapKeyIndex == wrapKeyIndex); + if (pWswk->symWrapMechanism != masterWrapMech || + pWswk->wrapKeyIndex != wrapKeyIndex) { + goto loser; + } + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.data = pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + wrappedKey.len = pWswk->wrappedSymKeyLen; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + + switch (ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex]) { + + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + masterWrapMech, CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + break; + + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * For ssl_auth_ecd*, we first create an EC public key based on + * data stored with the wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey. Next, + * we do an ECDH computation involving this public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated the same way as Fortezza's Ks, i.e., + * it is used to recover the symmetric wrapping key. + * + * The data in wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey is laid out as defined + * in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)pWswk->wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen <= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + + if (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen + + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen > + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + pubWrapKey.keyType = ecKey; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.size = ecWrapped->size; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = ecWrapped->var; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.len = ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + pubWrapKey.u.ec.publicValue.data = ecWrapped->var + + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen; + + wrappedKey.len = ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen; + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, &pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Use Ks to unwrap the wrapping key */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(Ks, masterWrapMech, NULL, + &wrappedKey, masterWrapMech, + CKA_UNWRAP, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } +loser: + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +typedef struct { + PK11SymKey *symWrapKey[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS]; +} ssl3SymWrapKey; + +static PZLock *symWrapKeysLock = NULL; +static ssl3SymWrapKey symWrapKeys[SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; + +SECStatus +ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + if (symWrapKeysLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(symWrapKeysLock); + symWrapKeysLock = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void) +{ + int i, j; + + if (!symWrapKeysLock) + return SECSuccess; /* lock was never initialized */ + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + /* get rid of all symWrapKeys */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; ++i) { + for (j = 0; j < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS; ++j) { + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[i].symWrapKey[j]; + if (*pSymWrapKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(*pSymWrapKey); + *pSymWrapKey = NULL; + } + } + } + + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void) +{ + symWrapKeysLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther); + return symWrapKeysLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +/* Try to get wrapping key for mechanism from in-memory array. + * If that fails, look for one on disk. + * If that fails, generate a new one, put the new one on disk, + * Put the new key in the in-memory array. + * + * Note that this function performs some fairly inadvisable functions with + * certificate private keys. ECDSA keys are used with ECDH; similarly, RSA + * signing keys are used to encrypt. Bug 1248320. + */ +PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg) +{ + SSLAuthType authType; + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey *unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SymKey **pSymWrapKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + int length; + unsigned int wrapMechIndex; + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem wrappedKey; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey wswk; + PK11SymKey *Ks = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubWrapKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privWrapKey = NULL; + ECCWrappedKeyInfo *ecWrapped; + const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + + PORT_Assert(serverCert); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey); + PORT_Assert(serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + if (!serverCert || !serverCert->serverKeyPair || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey || + !serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return NULL; /* hmm */ + } + + rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapKey(serverCert, &wrapKeyIndex); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return NULL; /* unusable wrapping key. */ + + rv = ssl_FindIndexByWrapMechanism(masterWrapMech, &wrapMechIndex); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return NULL; /* invalid masterWrapMech. */ + + authType = ssl_wrap_key_auth_type[wrapKeyIndex]; + svrPrivKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + pSymWrapKey = &symWrapKeys[wrapMechIndex].symWrapKey[wrapKeyIndex]; + + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); + + PZ_Lock(symWrapKeysLock); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = *pSymWrapKey; + if (unwrappedWrappingKey != NULL) { + if (PK11_VerifyKeyOK(unwrappedWrappingKey)) { + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + goto done; + } + /* slot series has changed, so this key is no good any more. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + *pSymWrapKey = unwrappedWrappingKey = NULL; + } + + /* Try to get wrapped SymWrapping key out of the (disk) cache. */ + /* Following call fills in wswk on success. */ + rv = ssl_GetWrappingKey(wrapMechIndex, wrapKeyIndex, &wswk); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* found the wrapped sym wrapping key on disk. */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto install; + } + } + + if (!masterSecretSlot) /* caller doesn't want to create a new one. */ + goto loser; + + length = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + unwrappedWrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(masterSecretSlot, masterWrapMech, NULL, + length, pwArg); + if (!unwrappedWrappingKey) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Prepare the buffer to receive the wrappedWrappingKey, + * the symmetric wrapping key wrapped using the server's pub key. + */ + PORT_Memset(&wswk, 0, sizeof wswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + + svrPubKey = serverCert->serverKeyPair->pubKey; + wrappedKey.type = siBuffer; + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + wrappedKey.data = wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey; + + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey) + goto loser; + + /* wrap symmetric wrapping key in server's public key. */ + switch (authType) { + case ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt: + case ssl_auth_rsa_sign: /* bad: see Bug 1248320 */ + case ssl_auth_rsa_pss: + asymWrapMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(asymWrapMechanism, svrPubKey, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + break; + + case ssl_auth_ecdsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa: + case ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa: + /* + * We generate an ephemeral EC key pair. Perform an ECDH + * computation involving this ephemeral EC public key and + * the SSL server's (long-term) EC private key. The resulting + * shared secret is treated in the same way as Fortezza's Ks, + * i.e., it is used to wrap the wrapping key. To facilitate + * unwrapping in ssl_UnwrapWrappingKey, we also store all + * relevant info about the ephemeral EC public key in + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey and lay it out as + * described in the ECCWrappedKeyInfo structure. + */ + PORT_Assert(SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) == ecKey); + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != ecKey) { + /* something is wrong in sslsecur.c if this isn't an ecKey */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + privWrapKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey( + &svrPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams, &pubWrapKey, NULL); + if ((privWrapKey == NULL) || (pubWrapKey == NULL)) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Set the key size in bits */ + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.size == 0) { + pubWrapKey->u.ec.size = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); + } + + PORT_Assert(pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len < + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN); + if (pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len + + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len >= + MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Derive Ks using ECDH */ + Ks = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(svrPrivKey, pubWrapKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, + NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, masterWrapMech, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (Ks == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + ecWrapped = (ECCWrappedKeyInfo *)(wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey); + ecWrapped->size = pubWrapKey->u.ec.size; + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var, pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen = pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; + PORT_Memcpy(ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubWrapKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); + + wrappedKey.len = MAX_EC_WRAPPED_KEY_BUFLEN - + (ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + ecWrapped->pubValueLen); + wrappedKey.data = ecWrapped->var + ecWrapped->encodedParamLen + + ecWrapped->pubValueLen; + + /* wrap symmetricWrapping key with the local Ks */ + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(masterWrapMech, NULL, Ks, + unwrappedWrappingKey, &wrappedKey); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto ec_cleanup; + } + + /* Write down the length of wrapped key in the buffer + * wswk.wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey at the appropriate offset + */ + ecWrapped->wrappedKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + ec_cleanup: + if (privWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privWrapKey); + if (pubWrapKey) + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubWrapKey); + if (Ks) + PK11_FreeSymKey(Ks); + asymWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + break; + + default: + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(asymWrapMechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM); + + wswk.symWrapMechanism = masterWrapMech; + wswk.asymWrapMechanism = asymWrapMechanism; + wswk.wrapMechIndex = wrapMechIndex; + wswk.wrapKeyIndex = wrapKeyIndex; + wswk.wrappedSymKeyLen = wrappedKey.len; + + /* put it on disk. */ + /* If the wrapping key for this KEA type has already been set, + * then abandon the value we just computed and + * use the one we got from the disk. + */ + rv = ssl_SetWrappingKey(&wswk); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* somebody beat us to it. The original contents of our wswk + * has been replaced with the content on disk. Now, discard + * the key we just created and unwrap this new one. + */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + + unwrappedWrappingKey = + ssl_UnwrapSymWrappingKey(&wswk, svrPrivKey, wrapKeyIndex, + masterWrapMech, pwArg); + } + +install: + if (unwrappedWrappingKey) { + *pSymWrapKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(unwrappedWrappingKey); + } + +loser: +done: + PZ_Unlock(symWrapKeysLock); + return unwrappedWrappingKey; +} + +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE +/* hexEncode hex encodes |length| bytes from |in| and writes it as |length*2| + * bytes to |out|. */ +static void +hexEncode(char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int length) +{ + static const char hextable[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] >> 4]; + *(out++) = hextable[in[i] & 15]; + } +} +#endif + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem enc_pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + pms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, NULL); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Get the wrapped (encrypted) pre-master secret, enc_pms */ + unsigned int svrPubKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(svrPubKey); + enc_pms.len = (svrPubKeyBits + 7) / 8; + /* Check that the RSA key isn't larger than 8k bit. */ + if (svrPubKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + enc_pms.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(enc_pms.len); + if (enc_pms.data == NULL) { + goto loser; /* err set by PORT_Alloc */ + } + + /* Wrap pre-master secret in server's public key. */ + rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, pms, &enc_pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 100) { + SECStatus extractRV = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(pms); + if (extractRV == SECSuccess) { + SECItem *keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(pms); + if (keyData && keyData->data && keyData->len) { + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, "Pre-Master Secret", + keyData->data, keyData->len); + } + } + } +#endif + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, + isTLS ? enc_pms.len + 2 + : enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + if (isTLS) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len, 2); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, enc_pms.data, enc_pms.len); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + pms = NULL; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (enc_pms.data != NULL) { + PORT_Free(enc_pms.data); + } + if (pms != NULL) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + } + return rv; +} + +/* DH shares need to be padded to the size of their prime. Some implementations + * require this. TLS 1.3 also requires this. */ +SECStatus +ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(sslBuffer *buf, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + PRBool appendLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int pad = pubKey->u.dh.prime.len - pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; + + if (appendLength) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + while (pad) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + --pad; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + ssl3DHParams customParams; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + static const sslNamedGroupDef customGroupDef = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, 0, ssl_kea_dh, SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_FALSE + }; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + PRUint8 dhData[SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS / 8 + 2]; + sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER(dhData); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* Copy DH parameters from server key */ + + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(svrPubKey) != dhKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Work out the parameters. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &svrPubKey->u.dh.prime, + &svrPubKey->u.dh.base, + &groupDef, ¶ms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* If we require named groups, we will have already validated the group + * in ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange() */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups); + + customParams.name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom; + customParams.prime.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + customParams.prime.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + customParams.base.data = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.data; + customParams.base.len = svrPubKey->u.dh.base.len; + params = &customParams; + groupDef = &customGroupDef; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + goto loser; + } + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDerive(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, + target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* Note: send the DH share padded to avoid triggering bugs. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, + params->prime.len + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (pms) + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (keyPair) + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *serverKey = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.peerKey == NULL) { + serverKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (serverKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + serverKey = ss->sec.peerKey; + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; /* we're done with it now */ + } + + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKey); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_SendDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, serverKey); + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: DONE sending client_key_exchange", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(serverKey); + return rv; /* err code already set. */ +} + +/* Used by ssl_PickSignatureScheme(). */ +PRBool +ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1, + PRBool slotDoesPss) +{ + SSLHashType hashType; + unsigned int i; + + /* Skip RSA-PSS schemes when the certificate's private key slot does + * not support this signature mechanism. */ + if (ssl_IsRsaPssSignatureScheme(scheme) && !slotDoesPss) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + hashType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme); + if (requireSha1 && (hashType != ssl_hash_sha1)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (!ssl_SchemePolicyOK(scheme, kSSLSigSchemePolicy)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < peerSchemeCount; i++) { + if (peerSchemes[i] == scheme) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, CERTCertificate *cert, + void *pwarg, PRBool *supportsRsaPss) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + if (privKey) { + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + } else { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certID = PK11_FindObjectForCert(cert, pwarg, &slot); + if (certID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + *supportsRsaPss = PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, auth_alg_defs[ssl_auth_rsa_pss]); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, + CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1, + SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRBool doesRsaPss; + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECStatus rv; + SSLSignatureScheme scheme; + SECOidTag spkiOid; + + /* We can't require SHA-1 in TLS 1.3. */ + PORT_Assert(!(requireSha1 && isTLS13)); + if (!pubKey || !cert) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(privKey, cert, ss->pkcs11PinArg, + &doesRsaPss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If the certificate SPKI indicates a single scheme, don't search. */ + rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo, + isTLS13, &scheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (scheme != ssl_sig_none) { + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme) || + !ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount, + requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + *schemePtr = scheme; + return SECSuccess; + } + + spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm); + if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now we have to search based on the key type. Go through our preferred + * schemes in order and find the first that can be used. */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + scheme = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, isTLS13) && + ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, peerSchemes, peerSchemeCount, + requireSha1, doesRsaPss)) { + *schemePtr = scheme; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) { + case rsaKey: + if (isTLS12) { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5; + } + break; + case ecKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1; + break; + case dsaKey: + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_dsa_sha1; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme selects a signature scheme for signing the + * handshake. Most of this is determined by the key pair we are using. + * Prior to TLS 1.2, the MD5/SHA1 combination is always used. With TLS 1.2, a + * client may advertise its support for signature and hash combinations. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert; + PRBool isTLS12 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + + if (!isTLS12 || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { + /* If the client didn't provide any signature_algorithms extension then + * we can assume that they support SHA-1: RFC5246, Section 7.4.1.4.1. */ + return ssl_PickFallbackSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + } + + /* Sets error code, if needed. */ + return ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, cert->serverCert, + cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey, + cert->serverKeyPair->privKey, + ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, + &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int numSchemes, + SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isTLS13 = (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(clientCertificate); + + PORT_Assert(pubKey); + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + /* We should have already checked that a signature scheme was + * listed in the request. */ + PORT_Assert(schemes && numSchemes > 0); + } + + if (!isTLS13 && + (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == rsaKey || + SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) == dsaKey) && + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey) <= 1024) { + /* If the key is a 1024-bit RSA or DSA key, assume conservatively that + * it may be unable to sign SHA-256 hashes. This is the case for older + * Estonian ID cards that have 1024-bit RSA keys. In FIPS 186-2 and + * older, DSA key size is at most 1024 bits and the hash function must + * be SHA-1. + */ + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate, + pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_TRUE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return SECSuccess; + } + /* If this fails, that's because the peer doesn't advertise SHA-1, + * so fall back to the full negotiation. */ + } + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, clientCertificate, + pubKey, privKey, schemes, numSchemes, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, schemePtr); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS12; + SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record && + hashAlg != ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + hashAlg, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, &hashes, 0); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(es) */ + } + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + PORT_Assert(ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, privKey, &buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + ** Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + ** These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + len = buf.len + 2 + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary + * information is properly set. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes) +{ + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg]; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite; + + if (!initHashes) { + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Now we have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */ + return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + ssl3CipherSuite suite, PRBool initHashes) +{ + unsigned int i; + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suite == suiteCfg->cipher_suite) { + SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; + if (!ssl3_config_match(suiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + /* config_match already checks whether the cipher suite is + * acceptable for the version, but the check is repeated here + * in order to give a more precise error code. */ + if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(suite, &vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + } else { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + } + return SECFailure; + } + break; + } + } + if (i >= ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Don't let the server change its mind. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && suite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)suite; + return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); +} + +/* Check that session ID we received from the server, if any, matches our + * expectations, depending on whether we're in compat mode and whether we + * negotiated TLS 1.3+ or TLS 1.2-. + */ +static PRBool +ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *sidBytes) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PRBool sidMatch = PR_FALSE; + PRBool sentFakeSid = PR_FALSE; + PRBool sentRealSid = sid && sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* If attempting to resume a TLS 1.2 connection, the session ID won't be a + * fake. Check for the real value. */ + if (sentRealSid) { + sidMatch = (sidBytes->len == sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength) && + (!sidBytes->len || PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0); + } else { + /* Otherwise, the session ID was a fake if TLS 1.3 compat mode is + * enabled. If so, check for the fake value. */ + sentFakeSid = ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss); + if (sentFakeSid && sidBytes->len == SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + PRUint8 buf[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + ssl_MakeFakeSid(ss, buf); + sidMatch = PORT_Memcmp(buf, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len) == 0; + } + } + + /* TLS 1.2: Session ID shouldn't match if we sent a fake. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sentFakeSid) { + return !sidMatch; + } + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) { + return sidMatch; + } + + /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */ + return sidBytes->len == 0; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_CheckServerRandom(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* Check the ServerHello.random per [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3]. + * + * TLS 1.3 clients receiving a ServerHello indicating TLS 1.2 or below + * MUST check that the last 8 bytes are not equal to either of these + * values. TLS 1.2 clients SHOULD also check that the last 8 bytes are + * not equal to the second value if the ServerHello indicates TLS 1.1 or + * below. If a match is found, the client MUST abort the handshake with + * an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + SSL3ProtocolVersion checkVersion = + ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion ? ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion + : ss->vrange.max; + + if (checkVersion >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 && + checkVersion > ss->version) { + /* Both sections use the same sentinel region. */ + PRUint8 *downgrade_sentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random); + + if (!PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)) || + !PORT_Memcmp(downgrade_sentinel, + tls1_downgrade_random, + sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random))) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 ServerHello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRUint32 cipher; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + PRUint32 compression; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRBool isHelloRetry; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLength = length; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_hello) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO; + desc = unexpected_message; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + // TODO(djackson) - Bob removed this. Why? + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) { + PR_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; + } + + /* Note that if the server selects TLS 1.3, this will set the version to TLS + * 1.2. We will amend that once all other fields have been read. */ + rv = ssl_ClientReadVersion(ss, &b, &length, &ss->version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + isHelloRetry = !PORT_Memcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + ssl_hello_retry_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &sidBytes, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (sidBytes.len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Read the cipher suite. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &cipher, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + + /* Compression method. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &compression, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert has been sent */ + } + if (compression != ssl_compression_null) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Parse extensions. */ + if (length != 0) { + PRUint32 extensionLength; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extensionLength != length) { + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + /* Read supported_versions if present. */ + rv = tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(!SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)); + /* Check that the version is within the configured range. */ + if (ss->vrange.min > ss->version || ss->vrange.max < ss->version) { + desc = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) + ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (isHelloRetry && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: received a second hello_retry_request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* There are three situations in which the server must pick + * TLS 1.3. + * + * 1. We received HRR + * 2. We sent early app data + * 3. ECH was accepted (checked in MaybeHandleEchSignal) + * + * If we offered ECH and the server negotiated a lower version, + * authenticate to the public name for secure disablement. + * + */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (isHelloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */ + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + /* SSL3_SendAlert() will uncache the SID. */ + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* Check that the server negotiated the same version as it did + * in the first handshake. This isn't really the best place for + * us to be getting this version number, but it's what we have. + * (1294697). */ + if (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->version != ss->ssl3.crSpec->version)) { + desc = protocol_version; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->opt.enableHelloDowngradeCheck +#ifdef DTLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + /* Disable this check while we are on draft DTLS 1.3 versions. */ + && !IS_DTLS(ss) +#endif + ) { + rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* Finally, now all the version-related checks have passed. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + /* Update the write cipher spec to match the version. But not after + * HelloRetryRequest, because cwSpec might be a 0-RTT cipher spec, + * in which case this is a no-op. */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone && !isHelloRetry) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + /* Check that the session ID is as expected. */ + if (!ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(ss, &sidBytes)) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Only initialize hashes if this isn't a Hello Retry. */ + rv = ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(ss, ss->version, cipher, + !isHelloRetry); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + + if (isHelloRetry) { + rv = tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(ss, savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(ss, &sidBytes, &errCode); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + /* Clean up the temporary pointer to the handshake buffer. */ + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + SECItem wrappedMS = { + siBuffer, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len + }; + + /* unwrap master secret */ + slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (slot == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!PK11_IsPresent(slot)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECFailure; + } + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (wrapKey == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + *ms = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!*ms) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, + int *retErrCode) +{ + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sid_match; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + (ss->firstHsDone && (ss->peerRequestedProtection || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == + SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN))) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = ss->firstHsDone ? SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED + : SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Any errors after this point are not "malformed" errors. */ + desc = handshake_failure; + + /* we need to call ssl3_SetupPendingCipherSpec here so we can check the + * key exchange algorithm. */ + rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We may or may not have sent a session id, we may get one back or + * not and if so it may match the one we sent. + * Attempt to restore the master secret to see if this is so... + * Don't consider failure to find a matching SID an error. + */ + sid_match = (PRBool)(sidBytes->len > 0 && + sidBytes->len == + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength && + !PORT_Memcmp(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len)); + + if (sid_match) { + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + do { + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; + + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ServerHello contains the extension, the + * client MUST abort the handshake. + */ + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * o If the original session used an extended master secret but the new + * ServerHello does not contain the "extended_master_secret" + * extension, the client SHOULD abort the handshake. + * + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Add option to refuse to resume when EMS is not + * used at all (bug 1176526). + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); + ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; + + rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretClient(ss, sid, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + break; /* not considered an error */ + } + + /* Got a Match */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_hits); + + /* If we sent a session ticket, then this is a stateless resume. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + /* copy the peer cert from the SID */ + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; /* err code was set */ + } + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + } + + if (sid_match) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_not_ok); + else + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hsh_sid_cache_misses); + + /* We tried to resume a 1.3 session but the server negotiated 1.2. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(sid->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + + /* Reset resumption state, only used by 1.3 code. */ + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + + /* Clear TLS 1.3 early data traffic key. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + } + + /* throw the old one away */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + + /* get a new sid */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + goto alert_loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes->len; + if (sidBytes->len > 0) { + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes->data, sidBytes->len); + } + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + + /* Copy Signed Certificate Timestamps, if any. */ + if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, + &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_null) { + /* All current cipher suites other than those with ssl_auth_null (i.e., + * (EC)DH_anon_* suites) require a certificate, so use that signal. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_cert; + } else { + /* All the remaining cipher suites must be (EC)DH_anon_* and so + * must be ephemeral. Note, if we ever add PSK this might + * change. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + *retErrCode = errCode; + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + PRBool isTLS = ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + SECItem dh_p = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_g = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem dh_Ys = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned dh_p_bits; + unsigned dh_g_bits; + PRInt32 minDH = 0; + PRInt32 optval; + + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_p, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval); + if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG)) { + (void)NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); + } + + if (minDH <= 0) { + minDH = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + dh_p_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_p); + if (dh_p_bits < (unsigned)minDH) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (dh_p_bits > SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG; + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_g, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + /* Abort if dh_g is 0, 1, or obviously too big. */ + dh_g_bits = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(&dh_g); + if (dh_g_bits > dh_p_bits || dh_g_bits <= 1) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + /* If we're doing named groups, make sure it's good. */ + rv = ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(ss, &dh_p, &dh_g, NULL, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &dh_Ys, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&dh_p, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) { + desc = decode_error; + } + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dh_p.data, dh_p.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dh_g.data, dh_g.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH Ys", dh_Ys.data, dh_Ys.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * Check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy. + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, + dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys, PR_FALSE /* padY */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* + * we really need to build a new key here because we can no longer + * ignore calling SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey. Using the key may allocate + * pkcs11 slots and ID's. + */ + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey->arena = arena; + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, &dh_p) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, &dh_g) || + SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, &dh_Ys)) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_SetError(ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode)); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a + * complete ssl3 ServerKeyExchange message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl_HandleDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + + default: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + } + /* All Handle*ServerKeyExchange functions set the error code. */ + return rv; +} + +typedef struct dnameNode { + struct dnameNode *next; + SECItem name; +} dnameNode; + +/* + * Parse the ca_list structure in a CertificateRequest. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest + * tls13_HandleCertificateRequest + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, + CERTDistNames *ca_list) +{ + PRUint32 remaining; + int nnames = 0; + dnameNode *node; + SECStatus rv; + int i; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + if (remaining > *length) + goto alert_loser; + + ca_list->head = node = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + while (remaining > 0) { + PRUint32 len; + + if (remaining < 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + if (len == 0 || remaining < len + 2) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + remaining -= 2; + if (SECITEM_MakeItem(ca_list->arena, &node->name, *b, len) != SECSuccess) { + goto no_mem; + } + node->name.len = len; + *b += len; + *length -= len; + remaining -= len; + nnames++; + if (remaining <= 0) + break; /* success */ + + node->next = PORT_ArenaZNew(ca_list->arena, dnameNode); + node = node->next; + if (node == NULL) + goto no_mem; + } + + ca_list->nnames = nnames; + ca_list->names = PORT_ArenaNewArray(ca_list->arena, SECItem, nnames); + if (nnames > 0 && ca_list->names == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + for (i = 0, node = (dnameNode *)ca_list->head; + i < nnames; + i++, node = node->next) { + ca_list->names[i] = node->name; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +no_mem: + return SECFailure; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 ? illegal_parameter + : decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena, + SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut, + unsigned int *numSchemesOut, + unsigned char **b, unsigned int *len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem buf; + SSLSignatureScheme *schemes = NULL; + unsigned int numSupported = 0; + unsigned int numRemaining = 0; + unsigned int max; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &buf, 2, b, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* An odd-length value is invalid. */ + if ((buf.len & 1) != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Let the caller decide whether to alert here. */ + if (buf.len == 0) { + goto done; + } + + /* Limit the number of schemes we read. */ + numRemaining = buf.len / 2; + max = PR_MIN(numRemaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES); + + if (arena) { + schemes = PORT_ArenaZNewArray(arena, SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } else { + schemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, max); + } + if (!schemes) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (; numRemaining && numSupported < MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; --numRemaining) { + PRUint32 tmp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &buf.data, &buf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid((SSLSignatureScheme)tmp, SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, + (PRBool)ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + ; + schemes[numSupported++] = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmp; + } + } + + if (!numSupported) { + if (!arena) { + PORT_Free(schemes); + } + schemes = NULL; + } + +done: + *schemesOut = schemes; + *numSchemesOut = numSupported; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Request message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; + PRBool isTLS12 = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECItem cert_types = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes = NULL; + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount = 0; + CERTDistNames ca_list; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_request) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_types, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + + arena = ca_list.arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) + goto no_mem; + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, arena, + &signatureSchemes, + &signatureSchemeCount, + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + goto loser; /* malformed, alert has been sent */ + } + if (signatureSchemeCount == 0) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &b, &length, &ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto done; /* alert sent in ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs */ + + if (length != 0) + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_hello_done; + + rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(ss, signatureSchemes, + signatureSchemeCount, &ca_list); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto done; + +no_mem: + rv = SECFailure; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto done; + +alert_loser: + if (isTLS && desc == illegal_parameter) + desc = decode_error; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + rv = SECFailure; +done: + if (arena != NULL) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return rv; +} + +static void +ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome) +{ + SECStatus rv; + switch (outcome) { + case SECSuccess: + /* check what the callback function returned */ + if ((!ss->ssl3.clientCertificate) || (!ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey)) { + /* we are missing either the key or cert */ + goto send_no_certificate; + } + /* Setting ssl3.clientCertChain non-NULL will cause + * ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone to call SendCertificate. + */ + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = CERT_CertChainFromCert( + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + certUsageSSLClient, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL) { + goto send_no_certificate; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record || + ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single) { + rv = ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(ss, + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen, + &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* This should only happen if our schemes changed or + * if an RSA-PSS cert was selected, but the token + * does not support PSS schemes. + */ + goto send_no_certificate; + } + } + break; + + case SECFailure: + default: + send_no_certificate: + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_TRUE; + } else { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, no_certificate); + } + break; + } + + /* Release the cached parameters */ + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, + const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes, + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount, + CERTDistNames *ca_list) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); + + /* Should not send a client cert when (non-GREASE) ECH is rejected. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); + rv = SECFailure; + } else if (ss->getClientAuthData != NULL) { + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); + + /* Previously cached parameters should be empty */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0); + /* + * Peer signatures are only available while in the context of + * of a getClientAuthData callback. It is required for proper + * functioning of SSL_CertIsUsable and SSL_FilterClientCertListBySocket + * Calling these functions outside the context of a getClientAuthData + * callback will result in no filtering.*/ + + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, signatureSchemeCount); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes, signatureSchemes, signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = signatureSchemeCount; + + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->getClientAuthData)(ss->getClientAuthDataArg, + ss->fd, ca_list, + &ss->ssl3.clientCertificate, + &ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + } else { + rv = SECFailure; /* force it to send a no_certificate alert */ + } + + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + /* getClientAuthData needs more time (e.g. for user interaction) */ + + /* The out parameters should not have changed. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + + /* Mark the handshake as blocked */ + ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; + + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + /* getClientAuthData returned SECSuccess or SECFailure immediately, handle accordingly */ + ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, rv); + rv = SECSuccess; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Invoked by the application when client certificate selection is complete */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientCertCallbackComplete(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; + + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = clientCertificate; + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = clientPrivateKey; + + ssl3_ClientAuthCallbackOutcome(ss, outcome); + + /* Continue the handshake */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; + return target(ss); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_CheckFalseStart(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + + if (!ss->canFalseStartCallback) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start callback so no false start", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else { + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl_CheckServerRandom(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to possible downgrade", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_false_start; + } + + /* An attacker can control the selected ciphersuite so we only wish to + * do False Start in the case that the selected ciphersuite is + * sufficiently strong that the attack can gain no advantage. + * Therefore we always require an 80-bit cipher. */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + PRBool weakCipher = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->cipherDef->secret_key_size < 10; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (weakCipher) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to weak cipher", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_false_start; + } + + if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: no false start due to lower version after ECH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto no_false_start; + } + + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + rv = (ss->canFalseStartCallback)(ss->fd, + ss->canFalseStartCallbackData, + &ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback returned %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart ? "TRUE" + : "FALSE")); + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: false start callback failed (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_ErrorToName(PR_GetError()))); + } + return rv; + } + +no_false_start: + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool result; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { + case wait_new_session_ticket: + case wait_change_cipher: + case wait_finished: + result = PR_TRUE; + break; + default: + result = PR_FALSE; + break; + } + + return result; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Server Hello Done message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3WaitState ws = ss->ssl3.hs.ws; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Skipping CertificateRequest is always permitted. */ + if (ws != wait_hello_done && + ws != wait_cert_request) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone and ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool sendClientCert; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; + + /* We must wait for the server's certificate to be authenticated before + * sending the client certificate in order to disclosing the client + * certificate to an attacker that does not have a valid cert for the + * domain we are connecting to. + * + * During the initial handshake on a connection, we never send/receive + * application data until we have authenticated the server's certificate; + * i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake before using the cipher + * specs agreed upon for that handshake. During a renegotiation, we may + * continue sending and receiving application data during the handshake + * interleaved with the handshake records. If we were to send the client's + * second round for a renegotiation before the server's certificate was + * authenticated, then the application data sent/received after this point + * would be using cipher spec that hadn't been authenticated. By waiting + * until the server's certificate has been authenticated during + * renegotiations, we ensure that renegotiations have the same property + * as initial handshakes; i.e. we have fully authenticated the handshake + * before using the cipher specs agreed upon for that handshake for + * application data. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check whether waiting for client certificate selection OR + waiting on server certificate verification AND + going to send client cert */ + if ((ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) || + (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending && (sendClientCert || ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert || ss->firstHsDone))) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring ssl3_SendClientSecondRound because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_SendClientSecondRound; + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else if (sendClientCert) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + + if (sendClientCert) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + /* This must be done after we've set ss->ssl3.cwSpec in + * ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs because SSL_GetChannelInfo uses information + * from cwSpec. This must be done before we call ssl3_CheckFalseStart + * because the false start callback (if any) may need the information from + * the functions that depend on this being set. + */ + ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart) { + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + /* When we fix bug 589047, we will need to know whether we are + * false starting before we try to flush the client second + * round to the network. With that in mind, we purposefully + * call ssl3_CheckFalseStart before calling ssl3_SendFinished, + * which includes a call to ssl3_FlushHandshake, so that + * no application develops a reliance on such flushing being + * done before its false start callback is called. + */ + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + /* The certificate authentication and the server's Finished + * message are racing each other. If the certificate + * authentication wins, then we will try to false start in + * ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete. + */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: deferring false start check because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn)) + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_new_session_ticket; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + + PORT_Assert(ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)); + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Routines used by servers + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendHelloRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send hello_request handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_hello_request, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + */ +static SECComparison +ssl3_ServerNameCompare(const SECItem *name1, const SECItem *name2) +{ + if (!name1 != !name2) { + return SECLessThan; + } + if (!name1) { + return SECEqual; + } + if (name1->type != name2->type) { + return SECLessThan; + } + return SECITEM_CompareItem(name1, name2); +} + +/* Sets memory error when returning NULL. + * Called from: + * ssl3_SendClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleServerHello() + * ssl3_HandleClientHello() + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello() + */ +sslSessionID * +ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + + sid = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); + if (sid == NULL) + return sid; + + if (is_server) { + const SECItem *srvName; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /********************************/ + srvName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (srvName->len && srvName->data) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, srvName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(sid); + return NULL; + } + } + sid->peerID = (ss->peerID == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->peerID); + sid->urlSvrName = (ss->url == NULL) ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(ss->url); + sid->addr = ss->sec.ci.peer; + sid->port = ss->sec.ci.port; + sid->references = 1; + sid->cached = never_cached; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = PR_FALSE; + + if (is_server) { + SECStatus rv; + int pid = SSL_GETPID(); + + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[0] = (pid >> 8) & 0xff; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID[1] = pid & 0xff; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID + 2, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES - 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + } + return sid; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello, ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + /* We have to do this after the call to ssl3_SendServerHello, + * because kea_def is set up by ssl3_SendServerHello(). + */ + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + rv = ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + rv = ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->opt.requestCertificate) ? wait_client_cert + : wait_client_key; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* An empty TLS Renegotiation Info (RI) extension */ +static const PRUint8 emptyRIext[5] = { 0xff, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00 }; + +static PRBool +ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(const ssl3KEADef *kea_def) +{ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == dsaKey) { + /* TODO: Fix session tickets for DSS. The server code rejects the + * session ticket received from the client. Bug 1174677 */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PR_TRUE; +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(const SECItem *peerSuites, uint16_t suite) +{ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i + 1 < peerSuites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (peerSuites->data[i] << 8) | peerSuites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRUint16 version, PRUint16 *suitep) +{ + unsigned int i; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; + + /* If we negotiated an External PSK and that PSK has a ciphersuite + * configured, we need to constrain our choice. If the client does + * not support it, negotiate a certificate auth suite and fall back. + */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk && + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type == ssl_psk_external && + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { + PRUint16 pskSuite = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite; + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *pskSuiteCfg = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(pskSuite, + ss->cipherSuites); + if (ssl3_config_match(pskSuiteCfg, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss) && + ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, pskSuite)) { + *suitep = pskSuite; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + if (!ssl3_PeerSupportsCipherSuite(suites, suite->cipher_suite)) { + continue; + } + *suitep = suite->cipher_suite; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Select a cipher suite. +** +** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in +** ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(). +** +** If TLS 1.0 is enabled, we could handle the case where the client +** offered TLS 1.1 but offered only export cipher suites by choosing TLS +** 1.0 and selecting one of those export cipher suites. However, a secure +** TLS 1.1 client should not have export cipher suites enabled at all, +** and a TLS 1.1 client should definitely not be offering *only* export +** cipher suites. Therefore, we refuse to negotiate export cipher suites +** with any client that indicates support for TLS 1.1 or higher when we +** (the server) have TLS 1.1 support enabled. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRBool initHashes) +{ + PRUint16 selected; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Ensure that only valid cipher suites are enabled. */ + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + /* No configured cipher is both supported by PK11 and allowed. + * This is a configuration error, so report handshake failure.*/ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(ss, suites, ss->version, &selected); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = selected; + return ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, initHashes); +} + +/* + * Call the SNI config hook. + * + * Called from: + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + int ret = 0; + +#ifdef SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS +#error("No longer allowed to set SSL_SNI_ALLOW_NAME_CHANGE_2HS") +#endif + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + /* Check that we don't have the name is current spec + * if this extension was not negotiated on the 2d hs. */ + PRBool passed = PR_TRUE; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName.data) { + passed = PR_FALSE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (!passed) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->sniSocketConfig) + do { /* not a loop */ + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + /* If extension is negotiated, the len of names should > 0. */ + if (ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Calling client callback to reconfigure the socket. */ + ret = (SECStatus)(*ss->sniSocketConfig)(ss->fd, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArr, + ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize, + ss->sniSocketConfigArg); + } + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* Application does not know the name or was not able to + * properly reconfigure the socket. */ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = unrecognized_name; + break; + } else if (ret == SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED) { + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SECItem pwsNameBuf = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem *pwsName = &pwsNameBuf; + SECItem *cwsName; + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(pwsName, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + if (cwsName->data) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, cwsName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /**************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } else if ((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize) { + /* Application has configured new socket info. Lets check it + * and save the name. */ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *name = &ss->xtnData.sniNameArr[ret]; + SECItem *pwsName; + + /* get rid of the old name and save the newly picked. */ + /* This code is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); /*******************************/ + /* not allow name change on the 2d HS */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + SECItem *cwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (ssl3_ServerNameCompare(name, cwsName)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /******************/ + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT; + desc = handshake_failure; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } + pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, name); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); /***************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + /* Need to tell the client that application has picked + * the name from the offered list and reconfigured the socket. + */ + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_server_name_xtn, + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); + } else { + /* Callback returned index outside of the boundary. */ + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)ret < ss->xtnData.sniNameArrSize); + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + desc = internal_error; + ret = SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT; + break; + } + } while (0); + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + if (ret <= SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT) { + /* desc and errCode should be set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + PRCList *cursor; + SECStatus rv; + + /* If the client didn't include the supported groups extension, assume just + * P-256 support and disable all the other ECDHE groups. This also affects + * ECDHE group selection, but this function is called first. */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->name != ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + } + } + } + + /* This picks the first certificate that has: + * a) the right authentication method, and + * b) the right named curve (EC only) + * + * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all + * based on what order they are configured in. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_rsa_sign) { + /* We consider PSS certificates here as well for TLS 1.2. */ + if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_sign) && + (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_pss) || + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2)) { + continue; + } + } else { + if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, kea_def->authKeyType)) { + continue; + } + if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(cert) && + !ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) { + continue; + } + } + + /* Found one. */ + ss->sec.serverCert = cert; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; + + /* Don't pick a signature scheme if we aren't going to use it. */ + if (kea_def->signKeyType == nullKey) { + ss->sec.authType = kea_def->authKeyType; + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = ssl3_PickServerSignatureScheme(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.authType = + ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_GenerateServerRandom(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 *downgradeSentinel; + + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.server_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version == ss->vrange.max) { + return SECSuccess; + } +#ifdef DTLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } +#endif + + /* + * [RFC 8446 Section 4.1.3]. + * + * TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in response to a + * ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random value specially in + * their ServerHello. + * + * If negotiating TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 servers MUST set the last 8 bytes of + * their Random value to the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 01 + * + * If negotiating TLS 1.1 or below, TLS 1.3 servers MUST, and TLS 1.2 + * servers SHOULD, set the last 8 bytes of their ServerHello.Random value to + * the bytes: + * + * 44 4F 57 4E 47 52 44 00 + */ + downgradeSentinel = + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random); + if (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + switch (ss->version) { + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + /* vrange.max > 1.2, since we didn't early exit above. */ + PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel, + tls12_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls12_downgrade_random)); + break; + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0: + PORT_Memcpy(downgradeSentinel, + tls1_downgrade_random, sizeof(tls1_downgrade_random)); + break; + default: + /* Do not change random. */ + break; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, SECItem *sidBytes, + SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem *comps) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 tmp; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed, alert already sent */ + } + + /* Translate the version. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ss->clientHelloVersion = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion((SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp); + } else { + ss->clientHelloVersion = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)tmp; + } + + /* Grab the client random data. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the client's SID, if present. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, sidBytes, 1, b, length); + /* Check that the SID has the format: opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>, as + * specified in RFC8446, Section 4.1.2. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || sidBytes->len > SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the client's cookie, if present. It is checked after version negotiation. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, cookieBytes, 1, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + } + + /* Grab the list of cipher suites. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, suites, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Grab the list of compression methods. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, comps, 1, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const SECItem *comps, + const SECItem *cookieBytes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sidBytes->len > 0 && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, sidBytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */ + if (comps->len != 1 || comps->data[0] != ssl_compression_null) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs && !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* A DTLS 1.3-only client MUST set the legacy_cookie field to zero length. + * If a DTLS 1.3 ClientHello is received with any other value in this field, + * the server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + /* ECH not possible here. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + + /* HRR and ECH are TLS1.3-only. We ignore the Cookie extension here. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* receivedCcs is only valid if we sent an HRR. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedCcs) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* TLS versions prior to 1.3 must include null somewhere. */ + if (comps->len < 1 || + !memchr(comps->data, ssl_compression_null, comps->len)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We never send cookies in DTLS 1.2. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && cookieBytes->len != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * ssl3 Client Hello message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + unsigned int i; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 extensionLength; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3AlertLevel level = alert_fatal; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + SECItem sidBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem cookieBytes = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem suites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem comps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem *echInner = NULL; + PRBool isTLS13; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLen = length; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_hello handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer || + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) { + /* Refuse re-handshake when we have already negotiated TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* We should always be in a fresh state. */ + SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss); + + /* Get peer name of client */ + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code is set. */ + } + + /* We might be starting session renegotiation in which case we should + * clear previous state. + */ + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(ss, &b, &length, &sidBytes, + &cookieBytes, &suites, &comps); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* Handle TLS hello extensions for SSL3 & TLS. We do not know if + * we are restarting a previous session until extensions have been + * parsed, since we might have received a SessionTicket extension. + * Note: we allow extensions even when negotiating SSL3 for the sake + * of interoperability (and backwards compatibility). + */ + if (length) { + /* Get length of hello extensions */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extensionLength, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (extensionLength != length) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + } + + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (versionExtension) { + rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = (errCode == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION) ? protocol_version : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + } else { + /* The PR_MIN here ensures that we never negotiate 1.3 if the + * peer didn't offer "supported_versions". */ + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, + PR_MIN(ss->clientHelloVersion, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2), + PR_TRUE); + /* Send protocol version alert if the ClientHello.legacy_version is not + * supported by the server. + * + * If the "supported_versions" extension is absent and the server only + * supports versions greater than ClientHello.legacy_version, the + * server MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert + * [RFC8446, Appendix D.2]. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = protocol_version; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + + /* Update the write spec to match the selected version. */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + if (isTLS13) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* If there is a cookie, then this is a second ClientHello (TLS 1.3). */ + if (ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + } + + rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEch(ss, savedMsg, savedLen, &sidBytes, + &comps, &cookieBytes, &suites, &echInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ValidatePreambleWithVersion(ss, &sidBytes, &comps, &cookieBytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + + /* Now parse the rest of the extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + } + goto loser; /* malformed */ + } + + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->version) { + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i != TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) + continue; + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + /* If we didn't receive an RI extension, look for the SCSV, + * and if found, treat it just like an empty RI extension + * by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. + */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); + break; + } + } + } + + /* The check for renegotiation in TLS 1.3 is earlier. */ + if (!isTLS13) { + if (ss->firstHsDone && + (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN || + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = no_renegotiation; + level = alert_warning; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED; + goto alert_loser; + } + if ((ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation || + (ss->firstHsDone && ss->peerRequestedProtection)) && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* We do stateful resumes only if we are in TLS < 1.3 and + * either of the following conditions are satisfied: + * (1) the client does not support the session ticket extension, or + * (2) the client support the session ticket extension, but sent an + * empty ticket. + */ + if (!isTLS13 && + (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) || + ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket)) { + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && !ss->opt.noCache) { + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server, lookup client session-id for 0x%08x%08x%08x%08x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[0], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[1], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[2], + ss->sec.ci.peer.pr_s6_addr32[3])); + if (ssl_sid_lookup) { + sid = (*ssl_sid_lookup)(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer, + sidBytes.data, sidBytes.len, ss->dbHandle); + } else { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED; + goto loser; + } + } + } else if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* Fill in the client's session ID if doing a stateless resume. + * (When doing stateless resumes, server echos client's SessionID.) + * This branch also handles TLS 1.3 resumption-PSK. + */ + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid != NULL); /* Should have already been filled in.*/ + + if (sidBytes.len > 0 && sidBytes.len <= SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES) { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidBytes.data, + sidBytes.len); + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = sidBytes.len; + } else { + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = 0; + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + /* Free a potentially leftover session ID from a previous handshake. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + if (sid != NULL) { + /* We've found a session cache entry for this client. + * Now, if we're going to require a client-auth cert, + * and we don't already have this client's cert in the session cache, + * and this is the first handshake on this connection (not a redo), + * then drop this old cache entry and start a new session. + */ + if ((sid->peerCert == NULL) && ss->opt.requestCertificate && + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS) || + (ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR) || + ((ss->opt.requireCertificate == SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE) && + !ss->firstHsDone))) { + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl3_DisableNonDTLSSuites(ss); + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->data : savedMsg, + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? echInner->len : savedLen); + SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE); + echInner = NULL; + } else { + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(ss, &suites, sid, + savedMsg, savedLen); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, level, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + SECITEM_FreeItem(echInner, PR_TRUE); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* unwrap helper function to handle the case where the wrapKey doesn't wind + * up in the correct token for the master secret */ +PK11SymKey * +ssl_unwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrapKey, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, + SECItem *wrappedKey, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, + int keySize, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, void *pinArg) +{ + PK11SymKey *unwrappedKey; + + /* unwrap the master secret. */ + unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(wrapKey, wrapType, param, + wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, + keyFlags); + if (!unwrappedKey) { + PK11SlotInfo *targetSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, pinArg); + PK11SymKey *newWrapKey; + + /* it's possible that we failed to unwrap because the wrapKey is in + * a slot that can't handle target. Move the wrapKey to a slot that + * can handle this mechanism and retry the operation */ + if (targetSlot == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + newWrapKey = PK11_MoveSymKey(targetSlot, CKA_UNWRAP, 0, + PR_FALSE, wrapKey); + PK11_FreeSlot(targetSlot); + if (newWrapKey == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + unwrappedKey = PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(newWrapKey, wrapType, param, + wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize, + keyFlags); + PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrapKey); + } + return unwrappedKey; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey **ms) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; + CK_FLAGS keyFlags = 0; + SECItem wrappedMS = { + siBuffer, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len + }; + + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!wrapKey) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + keyFlags = CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY; + } + + *ms = ssl_unwrapSymKey(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, NULL, + &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH, + keyFlags, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!*ms) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: server wrapping key found, but couldn't unwrap MasterSecret. wrapMech=0x%0lx", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech)); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + SECItem *suites, + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len) +{ + PRBool haveXmitBufLock = PR_FALSE; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* If we already have a session for this client, be sure to pick the same + ** cipher suite we picked before. This is not a loop, despite appearances. + */ + if (sid) + do { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + + suite = ss->cipherSuites; + /* Find the entry for the cipher suite used in the cached session. */ + for (j = ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j > 0; --j, ++suite) { + if (suite->cipher_suite == sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) + break; + } + PORT_Assert(j > 0); + if (j == 0) + break; + + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is still enabled, + * implemented, and allowed by policy. Might have been disabled. + */ + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) + break; + + /* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's + * list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */ + for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites->len; i += 2) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites->data[i] << 8) | suites->data[i + 1]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; + rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + + goto cipher_found; + } + } + } while (0); + /* START A NEW SESSION */ + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + +cipher_found: + suites->data = NULL; + + /* If there are any failures while processing the old sid, + * we don't consider them to be errors. Instead, We just behave + * as if the client had sent us no sid to begin with, and make a new one. + * The exception here is attempts to resume extended_master_secret + * sessions without the extension, which causes an alert. + */ + if (sid != NULL) + do { + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; + + if (sid->version != ss->version || + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + + /* server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, + ** but they do remember the slot we originally used, so we + ** can locate it again, provided that the current ssl socket + ** has had its server certs configured the same as the previous one. + */ + ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve); + if (!ss->sec.serverCert || !ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert) { + /* A compatible certificate must not have been configured. It + * might not be the same certificate, but we only find that out + * when the ticket fails to decrypt. */ + break; + } + + /* [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06; Section 5.3] + * o If the original session did not use the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello contains the extension, then the + * server MUST NOT perform the abbreviated handshake. Instead, it + * SHOULD continue with a full handshake (as described in + * Section 5.2) to negotiate a new session. + * + * o If the original session used the "extended_master_secret" + * extension but the new ClientHello does not contain the extension, + * the server MUST abort the abbreviated handshake. + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn)) { + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + } else { + if (sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) { + /* Note: we do not destroy the session */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid != sid); /* should be impossible, but ... */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + /* we need to resurrect the master secret.... */ + rv = ssl3_UnwrapMasterSecretServer(ss, sid, &masterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + break; /* not an error */ + } + + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + /* + * Old SID passed all tests, so resume this old session. + */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_hits); + if (ss->statelessResume) + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_stateless_resumes); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_TRUE; + + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.keaType = sid->keaType; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = sid->keaKeyBits; + ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); + ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; + + ss->sec.localCert = + CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + + /* Copy cached name in to pending spec */ + if (sid != NULL && + sid->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len && sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { + /* Set server name from sid */ + SECItem *sidName = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; + SECItem *pwsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (pwsName->data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pwsName, PR_FALSE); + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, pwsName, sidName); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + /* Clean up sni name array */ + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + haveXmitBufLock = PR_TRUE; + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + /* We are re-using the old MS, so no need to derive again. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, masterSecret, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, 0); + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; + } while (0); + + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); + + /* We only send a session ticket extension if the client supports + * the extension and we are unable to resume. + * + * TODO: send a session ticket if performing a stateful + * resumption. (As per RFC4507, a server may issue a session + * ticket while doing a (stateless or stateful) session resume, + * but OpenSSL-0.9.8g does not accept session tickets while + * resuming.) + */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); + } + + rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* The alert has already been sent. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn); + ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming = PR_FALSE; + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +/* FALLTHRU */ +loser: + if (sid && sid != ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + + if (haveXmitBufLock) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello is used when a V2 formatted hello comes + * in asking to use the V3 handshake. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length, + PRUint8 padding) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + unsigned char *suites; + unsigned char *random; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int sid_length; + unsigned int suite_length; + unsigned int rand_length; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + unsigned int total = SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle v2 client_hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + version = (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; + if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + goto loser; + } + + ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + total += suite_length = (buffer[3] << 8) | buffer[4]; + total += sid_length = (buffer[5] << 8) | buffer[6]; + total += rand_length = (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + total += padding; + ss->clientHelloVersion = version; + + if (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* [draft-ietf-tls-tls-11; C.3] forbids sending a TLS 1.3 + * ClientHello using the backwards-compatible format. */ + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_NegotiateVersion(ss, version, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* send back which ever alert client will understand. */ + desc = (version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) ? protocol_version + : handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* ECH not possible here. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version; + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_SetSpecVersions(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + /* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */ + if (length != total) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bad v2 client hello message, len=%d should=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, length, total)); + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + suites = buffer + SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES; + random = suites + suite_length + sid_length; + + if (rand_length < SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES || + rand_length > SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES) { + desc = illegal_parameter; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES == SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + PORT_Memset(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Memcpy(&ss->ssl3.hs.client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - rand_length], + random, rand_length); + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "client random:", ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); + + if (ssl3_config_match_init(ss) == 0) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); /* error code is already set. */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Select a cipher suite. + ** + ** NOTE: This suite selection algorithm should be the same as the one in + ** ssl3_HandleClientHello(). + */ + for (j = 0; j < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; j++) { + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite = &ss->cipherSuites[j]; + SSLVersionRange vrange = { ss->version, ss->version }; + if (!ssl3_config_match(suite, ss->ssl3.policy, &vrange, ss)) { + continue; + } + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) { + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite_i; + rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + desc = internal_error; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + goto suite_found; + } + } + } + errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP; + goto alert_loser; + +suite_found: + + /* If the ClientHello version is less than our maximum version, check for a + * TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV and reject the connection if found. */ + if (ss->vrange.max > ss->clientHelloVersion) { + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint16 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) { + desc = inappropriate_fallback; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + } + + /* Look for the SCSV, and if found, treat it just like an empty RI + * extension by processing a local copy of an empty RI extension. + */ + for (i = 0; i + 2 < suite_length; i += 3) { + PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16) | (suites[i + 1] << 8) | suites[i + 2]; + if (suite_i == TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) { + PRUint8 *b2 = (PRUint8 *)emptyRIext; + PRUint32 L2 = sizeof emptyRIext; + (void)ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &b2, &L2, ssl_hs_client_hello); + break; + } + } + + if (ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation && + !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn)) { + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* we don't even search for a cache hit here. It's just a miss. */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats.hch_sid_cache_misses); + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; /* memory error is set. */ + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + /* do not worry about memory leak of sid since it now belongs to ci */ + + /* We have to update the handshake hashes before we can send stuff */ + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, buffer, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry, + const sslBuffer *extensionBuf, sslBuffer *messageBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + const PRUint8 *random; + + version = PR_MIN(ss->version, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + version = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(version); + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (helloRetry) { + random = ssl_hello_retry_random; + } else { + rv = ssl_GenerateServerRandom(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + random = ss->ssl3.hs.server_random; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(messageBuf, random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + if (sid) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, 0, 1); + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.data, + ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(messageBuf, ssl_compression_null, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(extensionBuf)) { + /* Directly copy the extensions */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(messageBuf, extensionBuf, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) { + /* Signal ECH acceptance if we handled handled both CHOuter/CHInner (i.e. + * in shared mode), or if we received a CHInner in split/backend mode. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) { + if (helloRetry) { + return tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf)); + } else { + return tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(messageBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(messageBuf)); + } + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* The negotiated version number has been already placed in ss->version. +** +** Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello (resuming session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleClientHello (new session), +** ssl3_SendServerHelloSequence <- ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello (new session) +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello handshake", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(MSB(ss->version) == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); + if (MSB(ss->version) != MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_server_hello); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_FALSE, &extensionBuf, &messageBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_SetupBothPendingCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set */ + } + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams *params, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) +{ + SECKEYDHParams dhParam; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; /* Ephemeral DH key */ + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + dhParam.prime.data = params->prime.data; + dhParam.prime.len = params->prime.len; + dhParam.base.data = params->base.data; + dhParam.base.len = params->base.len; + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH p", dhParam.prime.data, + dhParam.prime.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server DH g", dhParam.base.data, + dhParam.base.len)); + + /* Generate ephemeral DH keypair */ + privKey = SECKEY_CreateDHPrivateKey(&dhParam, &pubKey, NULL); + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + + pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(groupDef, privKey, pubKey); + if (!pair) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + + return SECFailure; + } + + *keyPair = pair; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + + const ssl3DHParams *params; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECKEYPrivateKey *certPrivateKey; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + /* Do this on the heap, this could be over 2k long. */ + sslBuffer dhBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + if (kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_dss && kea_def->kea != kea_dhe_rsa) { + /* TODO: Support DH_anon. It might be sufficient to drop the signature. + See bug 1170510. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_SelectDHEGroup(ss, &groupDef); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, &keyPair); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "DH public value:", + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len)); + rv = ssl3_ComputeDHKeyHash(ss, hashAlg, &hashes, + pubKey->u.dh.prime, + pubKey->u.dh.base, + pubKey->u.dh.publicValue, + PR_TRUE /* padY */); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + certPrivateKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, certPrivateKey, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + + length = 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.base.len + + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len + + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + length += 2; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.prime.data, + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.dh.base.data, + pubKey->u.dh.base.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(&dhBuf, pubKey, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendPaddedDHKeyShare. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &dhBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (signed_hash.data) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dhBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_dh: { + return ssl3_SendDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: { + return ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(ss); + } + + case ssl_kea_rsa: + case ssl_kea_null: + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool forCert, + PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 }; + unsigned int filteredCount = 0; + + SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, minVersion, PR_FALSE, forCert, + PR_ARRAY_SIZE(filtered), + filtered, &filteredCount); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + return ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount, grease, buf); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + PRUint32 numSchemes, PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + if (!numSchemes) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + + unsigned int lengthOffset; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < numSchemes; ++i) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, schemes[i], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* GREASE SignatureAlgorithms: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE signature algorithm values and + * advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or + * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. + * + * When sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as + * follows: [...] A server MAY select one or more GREASE signature + * algorithm values and advertise them in the "signature_algorithms" or + * "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions, if present + * [RFC8701, Section 4.1]. */ + if (grease && + ((!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) || + (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3))) { + PRUint16 value; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(&value); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + value = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_sigalg]; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, value, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2); +} + +/* + * In TLS 1.3 we are permitted to advertise support for PKCS#1 + * schemes. This doesn't affect the signatures in TLS itself, just + * those on certificates. Not advertising PKCS#1 signatures creates a + * serious compatibility risk as it excludes many certificate chains + * that include PKCS#1. Hence, forCert is used to enable advertising + * PKCS#1 support. Note that we include these in signature_algorithms + * because we don't yet support signature_algorithms_cert. TLS 1.3 + * requires that PKCS#1 schemes are placed last in the list if they + * are present. This sorting can be removed once we support + * signature_algorithms_cert. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool disableRsae, + PRBool forCert, + unsigned int maxSchemes, SSLSignatureScheme *filteredSchemes, + unsigned int *numFilteredSchemes) +{ + PORT_Assert(filteredSchemes); + PORT_Assert(numFilteredSchemes); + PORT_Assert(maxSchemes >= ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount); + if (maxSchemes < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *numFilteredSchemes = 0; + PRBool allowUnsortedPkcs1 = forCert && minVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) { + continue; + } + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], + allowUnsortedPkcs1)) { + filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + } + } + if (forCert && !allowUnsortedPkcs1) { + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + if (disableRsae && ssl_IsRsaeSignatureScheme(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i])) { + continue; + } + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], + PR_FALSE) && + ssl_SignatureSchemeAccepted(minVersion, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i], + PR_TRUE)) { + filteredSchemes[(*numFilteredSchemes)++] = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i]; + } + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRBool isTLS12; + const PRUint8 *certTypes; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 length; + const SECItem *names; + unsigned int calen; + unsigned int nnames; + const SECItem *name; + unsigned int i; + int certTypesLength; + PRUint8 sigAlgs[2 + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES * 2]; + sslBuffer sigAlgsBuf = SSL_BUFFER(sigAlgs); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate_request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &names, &nnames); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + certTypes = certificate_types; + certTypesLength = sizeof certificate_types; + + length = 1 + certTypesLength + 2 + calen; + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, ss->version, PR_TRUE /* forCert */, + PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, &sigAlgsBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + length += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf); + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certTypes, certTypesLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&sigAlgsBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sigAlgsBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + for (i = 0, name = names; i < nnames; i++, name++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendServerHelloDone(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send server_hello_done handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello_done, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate Verify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = handshake_failure; + PRBool isTLS; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + const PRUint8 *savedMsg = b; + const PRUint32 savedLen = length; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_cert_verify) { + desc = unexpected_message; + errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY; + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* TLS 1.3 is handled by tls13_HandleCertificateVerify */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_record); + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (PORT_GetError() == SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM; + } + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHash(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme), + &hashes); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType != handshake_hash_record); + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, &hashes, 0); + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE; + desc = decrypt_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* XXX verify that the key & kea match */ + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + signed_hash.data = NULL; + + if (length != 0) { + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed */ + } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, + savedMsg, savedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* find a slot that is able to generate a PMS and wrap it with RSA. + * Then generate and return the PMS. + * If the serverKeySlot parameter is non-null, this function will use + * that slot to do the job, otherwise it will find a slot. + * + * Called from ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeys() (above) + * ssl3_SendRSAClientKeyExchange() (above) + * ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange() (below) + * Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock, the SSL3HandshakeLock + */ +static PK11SymKey * +ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PK11SlotInfo *serverKeySlot) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = serverKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECItem param; + CK_VERSION version; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism_array[3]; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (slot == NULL) { + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + /* The specReadLock would suffice here, but we cannot assert on + ** read locks. Also, all the callers who call with a non-null + ** slot already hold the SpecWriteLock. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); + + calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; + + /* First get an appropriate slot. */ + mechanism_array[0] = CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN; + mechanism_array[1] = CKM_RSA_PKCS; + mechanism_array[2] = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 3, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + /* can't find a slot with all three, find a slot with the minimum */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanism_array, 2, pwArg); + if (slot == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND); + return pms; /* which is NULL */ + } + } + } + + /* Generate the pre-master secret ... */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion temp; + + temp = dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.major = MSB(temp); + version.minor = LSB(temp); + } else { + version.major = MSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + version.minor = LSB(ss->clientHelloVersion); + } + + param.data = (unsigned char *)&version; + param.len = sizeof version; + + pms = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ¶m, 0, pwArg); + if (!serverKeySlot) + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + } + return pms; +} + +static void +ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(PK11SymKey **x, PK11SymKey **y, PRBool c) +{ + uintptr_t mask = (uintptr_t)c; + unsigned int i; + for (i = 1; i < sizeof(uintptr_t) * 8; i <<= 1) { + mask |= mask << i; + } + uintptr_t x_ptr = (uintptr_t)*x; + uintptr_t y_ptr = (uintptr_t)*y; + uintptr_t tmp = (x_ptr ^ y_ptr) & mask; + x_ptr = x_ptr ^ tmp; + y_ptr = y_ptr ^ tmp; + *x = (PK11SymKey *)x_ptr; + *y = (PK11SymKey *)y_ptr; +} + +/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER + * return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message, + * where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message. + * This function must not return SECFailure for any reason that is directly + * or indirectly caused by the content of the client's encrypted PMS. + * We must not send an alert and also not drop the connection. + * Instead, we generate a random PMS. This will cause a failure + * in the processing the finished message, which is exactly where + * the failure must occur. + * + * Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem enc_pms; + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + PK11SymKey *fauxPms = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->epoch == ss->ssl3.pwSpec->epoch); + + enc_pms.data = b; + enc_pms.len = length; + + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* isTLS */ + PRUint32 kLen; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &kLen, 2, &enc_pms.data, &enc_pms.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((unsigned)kLen < enc_pms.len) { + enc_pms.len = kLen; + } + } + + /* + * Get as close to algorithm 2 from RFC 5246; Section 7.4.7.1 + * as we can within the constraints of the PKCS#11 interface. + * + * 1. Unconditionally generate a bogus PMS (what RFC 5246 + * calls R). + * 2. Attempt the RSA decryption to recover the PMS (what + * RFC 5246 calls M). + * 3. Set PMS = (M == NULL) ? R : M + * 4. Use ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) to attempt to derive + * the MS from PMS. This includes performing the version + * check and length check. + * 5. If either the initial RSA decryption failed or + * ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(PMS) failed, then discard + * M and set PMS = R. Else, discard R and set PMS = M. + * + * We do two derivations here because we can't rely on having + * a function that only performs the PMS version and length + * check. The only redundant cost is that this runs the PRF, + * which isn't necessary here. + */ + + /* Generate the bogus PMS (R) */ + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(serverKeyPair->privKey); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE)) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + fauxPms = ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(ss, ss->ssl3.prSpec, slot); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + if (fauxPms == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * unwrap pms out of the incoming buffer + * Note: CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE is NOT the mechanism used to do + * the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the + * unwrapped pms will be used. + */ + pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKeyPair->privKey, &enc_pms, + CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0); + /* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */ + ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, pms == NULL); + + /* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to + * check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we + * then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this + * operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS + * since it is correctly formatted. */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, NULL); + + /* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS, else select the FPMS. */ + ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, (rv != SECSuccess) & (fauxPms != NULL)); + + /* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */ + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + + /* Clear both PMS. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + PK11_FreeSymKey(fauxPms); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + clntPubKey.keyType = dhKey; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.prime.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime.data; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.len = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.len; + clntPubKey.u.dh.base.data = serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.base.data; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue, + 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.dh.prime, + &clntPubKey.u.dh.publicValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + if (isTLS) + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + else + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDerive(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, NULL); + if (pms == NULL) { + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 ClientKeyExchange message from the remote client + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle client_key_exchange handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_key) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + + kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + + if (kea_def->ephemeral) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + /* There should be exactly one pair. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + serverKeyPair = keyPair->keys; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = + SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + } else { + serverKeyPair = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair; + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyBits; + } + + if (!serverKeyPair) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Assert(serverKeyPair->privKey); + + ss->sec.keaType = kea_def->exchKeyType; + + switch (kea_def->exchKeyType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + rv = ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = ssl3_HandleDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length, serverKeyPair); + break; + + default: + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = ss->sec.peerCert ? wait_cert_verify : wait_change_cipher; + } else { + /* PORT_SetError has been called by all the Handle*ClientKeyExchange + * functions above. However, not all error paths result in an alert, so + * this ensures that the server knows about the error. Note that if an + * alert was already sent, SSL3_SendAlert() is a noop. */ + PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + } + return rv; +} + +/* This is TLS's equivalent of sending a no_certificate alert. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int len = 0; + PRBool isTLS13 = PR_FALSE; + const SECItem *context; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + context = &ss->xtnData.certReqContext; + len = context->len + 1; + isTLS13 = PR_TRUE; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, len + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context->data, context->len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 3); +} + +/* + * NewSessionTicket + * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECItem ticket = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket nticket = { 0 }; + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &nticket, NULL, 0, + ss->ssl3.pwSpec->masterSecret, &ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Serialize the handshake message. Length = + * lifetime (4) + ticket length (2) + ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket, + 4 + 2 + ticket.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This is a fixed value. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_ticket_lifetime, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Encode the ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticket.data, ticket.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ticket.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket, PR_FALSE); + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ticketData; + PRUint32 temp; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle session_ticket handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_new_session_ticket) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* RFC5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid + * until it has verified the server's Finished message." See the comment in + * ssl3_FinishHandshake for more details. + */ + ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(ss); + if (length < 4) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = temp; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticketData, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length != 0) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; /* malformed */ + } + /* If the server sent a zero-length ticket, ignore it and keep the + * existing ticket. */ + if (ticketData.len != 0) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, + &ticketData); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_change_cipher; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST +static PRInt32 connNum = 0; + +static SECStatus +get_fake_cert(SECItem *pCertItem, int *pIndex) +{ + PRFileDesc *cf; + char *testdir; + char *startat; + char *stopat; + const char *extension; + int fileNum; + PRInt32 numBytes = 0; + PRStatus prStatus; + PRFileInfo info; + char cfn[100]; + + pCertItem->data = 0; + if ((testdir = PR_GetEnvSecure("NISCC_TEST")) == NULL) { + return SECSuccess; + } + *pIndex = (NULL != strstr(testdir, "root")); + extension = (strstr(testdir, "simple") ? "" : ".der"); + fileNum = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&connNum) - 1; + if ((startat = PR_GetEnvSecure("START_AT")) != NULL) { + fileNum += atoi(startat); + } + if ((stopat = PR_GetEnvSecure("STOP_AT")) != NULL && + fileNum >= atoi(stopat)) { + *pIndex = -1; + return SECSuccess; + } + snprintf(cfn, sizeof(cfn), "%s/%08d%s", testdir, fileNum, extension); + cf = PR_Open(cfn, PR_RDONLY, 0); + if (!cf) { + goto loser; + } + prStatus = PR_GetOpenFileInfo(cf, &info); + if (prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) { + PR_Close(cf); + goto loser; + } + pCertItem = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, pCertItem, info.size); + if (pCertItem) { + numBytes = PR_Read(cf, pCertItem->data, info.size); + } + PR_Close(cf); + if (numBytes != info.size) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(pCertItem, PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_IO); + goto loser; + } + fprintf(stderr, "using %s\n", cfn); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + fprintf(stderr, "failed to use %s\n", cfn); + *pIndex = -1; + return SECFailure; +} +#endif + +/* + * Used by both client and server. + * Called from HandleServerHelloDone and from SendServerHelloSequence. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int certChainLen = 0; + int i; +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + SECItem fakeCert; + int ndex = -1; +#endif + PRBool isTLS13 = ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int contextLen = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); + + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* A server certificate is selected in ssl3_HandleClientHello. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + } else { + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + } + +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + rv = get_fake_cert(&fakeCert, &ndex); +#endif + + if (isTLS13) { + contextLen = 1; /* Size of the context length */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext; + contextLen += context.len; + } + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + certChainLen += fakeCert.len + 3; + } else { + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; + } +#else + certChainLen += certChain->certs[i].len + 3; +#endif + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, + contextLen + certChainLen + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS13) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, + context.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { +#ifdef NISCC_TEST + if (fakeCert.len > 0 && i == ndex) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, fakeCert.data, + fakeCert.len, 3); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&fakeCert, PR_FALSE); + } else { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + } +#else + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); +#endif + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Used by server only. + * single-stapling, send only a single cert status + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int len = 0; + SECItemArray *statusToSend = NULL; + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send certificate status handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) + return SECSuccess; + + /* Use certStatus based on the cert being used. */ + serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + if (serverCert->certStatusArray && serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { + statusToSend = serverCert->certStatusArray; + } + if (!statusToSend) + return SECSuccess; + + /* Use the array's first item only (single stapling) */ + len = 1 + statusToSend->items[0].len + 3; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_status, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, + statusToSend->items[0].data, + statusToSend->items[0].len, + 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is used to delete the CA certificates in the peer certificate chain + * from the cert database after they've been validated. + */ +void +ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = ss->ssl3.peerCertArena; + ssl3CertNode *certs = (ssl3CertNode *)ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; + + for (; certs; certs = certs->next) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(certs->cert); + } + if (arena) + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = NULL; + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = NULL; + + if (ss->sec.peerCert != NULL) { + if (ss->sec.peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->sec.peerKey); + ss->sec.peerKey = NULL; + } + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + ss->sec.peerCert = NULL; + } +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 CertificateStatus message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_certificate_status) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + + return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PRUint32 status, len; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + + /* Consume the CertificateStatusType enum */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &status, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || status != 1 /* ocsp */) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &len, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || len != length) { + return ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + } + +#define MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (length > MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN) { + ssl3_DecodeError(ss); /* sets error code */ + return SECFailure; + } +#undef MAX_CERTSTATUS_LEN + + /* Array size 1, because we currently implement single-stapling only */ + SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, 1); + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items) + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data = PORT_Alloc(length); + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(&ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, b, length); + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len = length; + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].type = siBuffer; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if ((ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_cert) || + (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_server_cert)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + return ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(ss, b, length); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleCertificate + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + ssl3CertNode *c; + ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; + PRUint32 remaining = 0; + PRUint32 size; + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3AlertDescription desc; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE; + SECItem certItem; + + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + /* It is reported that some TLS client sends a Certificate message + ** with a zero-length message body. We'll treat that case like a + ** normal no_certificates message to maximize interoperability. + */ + if (length) { + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &remaining, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if (remaining > length) + goto decode_loser; + } + + if (!remaining) { + if (!(isTLS && isServer)) { + desc = bad_certificate; + goto alert_loser; + } + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + /* First get the peer cert. */ + if (remaining < 3) + goto decode_loser; + + remaining -= 3; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if (size == 0 || remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (ss->sec.peerCert == NULL) { + /* We should report an alert if the cert was bad, but not if the + * problem was just some local problem, like memory error. + */ + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + /* Now get all of the CA certs. */ + while (remaining > 0) { + if (remaining < 3) + goto decode_loser; + + remaining -= 3; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &size, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; /* fatal alert already sent by ConsumeHandshake. */ + if (size == 0 || remaining < size) + goto decode_loser; + + certItem.data = b; + certItem.len = size; + b += size; + length -= size; + remaining -= size; + + c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, ssl3CertNode); + if (c == NULL) { + goto loser; /* don't send alerts on memory errors */ + } + + c->cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certItem, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (c->cert == NULL) { + goto ambiguous_err; + } + + c->next = NULL; + if (lastCert) { + lastCert->next = c; + } else { + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; + } + lastCert = c; + } + + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!isServer && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_certificate_status; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ + } + + return rv; + +ambiguous_err: + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + if (isTLS) { + desc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + goto loser; + } + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + goto loser; + +decode_loser: + desc = isTLS ? decode_error : bad_certificate; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + +loser: + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 minKey = 0; + PRInt32 optval; + PRBool usePolicyLength = PR_TRUE; + + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS, &optval); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + usePolicyLength = (PRBool)((optval & NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG) == NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG); + } + + ss->sec.authKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(pubKey); + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey)) { + case rsaKey: + case rsaPssKey: + case rsaOaepKey: + rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) + : SECFailure; + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS; + } + break; + + case dsaKey: + rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) + : SECFailure; + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_DSA_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + + case dhKey: + rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) + : SECFailure; + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + minKey = SSL_DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + break; + + case ecKey: + rv = usePolicyLength ? NSS_OptionGet(NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &optval) + : SECFailure; + if (rv == SECSuccess && optval > 0) { + minKey = (PRUint32)optval; + } else { + /* Don't check EC strength here on the understanding that we + * only support curves we like. */ + minKey = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + } + break; + + default: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Too small: not good enough. Send a fatal alert. */ + if (ss->sec.authKeyBits < minKey) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY, + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 + ? insufficient_security + : illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* PreliminaryChannelInfo.authKeyBits, scheme, and peerDelegCred are now valid. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_peer_auth; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerSpki(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred; + pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(dc->spki); + if (!pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Because we have only a single authType (ssl_auth_tls13_any) + * for TLS 1.3 at this point, set the scheme so that the + * callback can interpret |authKeyBits| correctly. + */ + ss->sec.signatureScheme = dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg; + } else { + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (!pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + SECStatus rv = ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(ss, pubKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* Alert sent and code set. */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + int errCode; + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; + + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Set the |spki| used to verify the handshake. When verifying with a + * delegated credential (DC), this corresponds to the DC public key; + * otherwise it correspond to the public key of the peer's end-entity + * certificate. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleServerSpki(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Alert sent and code set (if not SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE). + * In either case, we're done here. */ + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType; + ss->sec.keaType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; + } + } + + /* + * Ask caller-supplied callback function to validate cert chain. + */ + rv = (SECStatus)(*ss->authCertificate)(ss->authCertificateArg, ss->fd, + PR_TRUE, isServer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + if (errCode == 0) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + if (rv != SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->handleBadCert) { + rv = (*ss->handleBadCert)(ss->badCertArg, ss->fd); + } + } + + if (rv == SECWouldBlock) { + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + errCode = SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS; + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_TRUE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + goto loser; + } + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); + } + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } else { + /* Ephemeral suites require ServerKeyExchange. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->ephemeral) { + /* require server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_server_key; + } else { + /* disallow server_key_exchange */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_cert_request; + /* This is static RSA key exchange so set the key exchange + * details to compensate for that. */ + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + ss->sec.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->sec.keaGroup = NULL; + } + } + } else { + /* Server */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_key; + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_verify); + } + } + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; + goto loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + (void)ssl_MapLowLevelError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AlwaysFail(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* The caller should have cleared the callback. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Caller must hold 1stHandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending = PR_FALSE; + + if (error != 0) { + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_AlwaysFail; + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, error); + rv = SECSuccess; + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) { + sslRestartTarget target = ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; + + if (target == ssl3_FinishHandshake) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication lost the race" + " with peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + + rv = target(ss); + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%p]: certificate authentication won the race with" + " peer's finished message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake); + + if (ss->opt.enableFalseStart && + !ss->firstHsDone && + !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) { + /* ssl3_SendClientSecondRound deferred the false start check because + * certificate authentication was pending, so we do it now if we still + * haven't received all of the server's second round yet. + */ + rv = ssl3_CheckFalseStart(ss); + } else { + rv = SECSuccess; + } + } + +done: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + PRBool isServer, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + TLSFinished *tlsFinished) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS tls_mac_params; + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + + PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); + if (!spec->masterSecret) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF; + } else { + tls_mac_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss); + } + tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12; + tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2; + param.data = (unsigned char *)&tls_mac_params; + param.len = sizeof(tls_mac_params); + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CKM_TLS_MAC, CKA_SIGN, + spec->masterSecret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, tlsFinished->verify_data, &retLen, + sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == sizeof tlsFinished->verify_data); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + + return rv; +} + +/* The calling function must acquire and release the appropriate + * lock (e.g., ssl_GetSpecReadLock / ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock for + * ss->ssl3.crSpec). + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) +{ + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech = CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL; + PK11Context *prf_context; + unsigned int retLen; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!spec->masterSecret) { + PORT_Assert(spec->masterSecret); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + /* Bug 1312976 non-SHA256 exporters are broken. */ + if (ssl3_GetPrfHashMechanism(ss) != CKM_SHA256) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + mech = CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256; + } + prf_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, CKA_SIGN, + spec->masterSecret, ¶m); + if (!prf_context) + return SECFailure; + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(prf_context); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, (unsigned char *)label, labelLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(prf_context, val, valLen); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(prf_context, out, &retLen, outLen); + PORT_Assert(rv != SECSuccess || retLen == outLen); + + PK11_DestroyContext(prf_context, PR_TRUE); + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendNextProto(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + int padding_len; + static const unsigned char padding[32] = { 0 }; + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0 || + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + padding_len = 32 - ((ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2) % 32); + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_next_proto, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len + 2 + padding_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshakeHeader */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data, + ss->xtnData.nextProto.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, padding, padding_len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + return rv; +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendFinished and tls13_DeriveSecret. + * + * This function is simply a debugging aid and therefore does not return a + * SECStatus. */ +void +ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss, const char *label, PK11SymKey *secret) +{ +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *keyData; + /* Longest label is "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", master secret is 48 + * bytes which happens to be the largest in TLS 1.3 as well (SHA384). + * Maximum line length: "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" (31) + " " (1) + + * client_random (32*2) + " " (1) + + * traffic_secret (48*2) + "\n" (1) = 194. */ + char buf[200]; + unsigned int offset, len; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!ssl_keylog_iob) + return; + + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return; + + /* keyData does not need to be freed. */ + keyData = PK11_GetKeyData(secret); + if (!keyData || !keyData->data) + return; + + len = strlen(label) + 1 + /* label + space */ + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2 + 1 + /* client random (hex) + space */ + keyData->len * 2 + 1; /* secret (hex) + newline */ + PORT_Assert(len <= sizeof(buf)); + if (len > sizeof(buf)) + return; + + /* https://developer.mozilla.org/en/NSS_Key_Log_Format */ + + /* There could be multiple, concurrent writers to the + * keylog, so we have to do everything in a single call to + * fwrite. */ + + strcpy(buf, label); + offset = strlen(label); + buf[offset++] += ' '; + hexEncode(buf + offset, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + offset += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; + buf[offset++] = ' '; + hexEncode(buf + offset, keyData->data, keyData->len); + offset += keyData->len * 2; + buf[offset++] = '\n'; + + PORT_Assert(offset == len); + + PZ_Lock(ssl_keylog_lock); + if (fwrite(buf, len, 1, ssl_keylog_iob) == 1) + fflush(ssl_keylog_iob); + PZ_Unlock(ssl_keylog_lock); +#endif +} + +/* called from ssl3_SendClientSecondRound + * ssl3_HandleClientHello + * ssl3_HandleFinished + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; + PRBool isTLS; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Sender sender = isServer ? sender_server : sender_client; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + cwSpec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender); + if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* err code was set by ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes */ + } + + if (isTLS) { + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof tlsFinished; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &tlsFinished, sizeof tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } else { + if (isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, &hashes.u.s, sizeof hashes.u.s); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto fail; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto fail; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + + ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, "CLIENT_RANDOM", ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret); + + return SECSuccess; + +fail: + return rv; +} + +/* wrap the master secret, and put it into the SID. + * Caller holds the Spec read lock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + PK11SymKey *secret) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrappingKey = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *symKeySlot; + void *pwArg = ss->pkcs11PinArg; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; + + symKeySlot = PK11_GetSlotFromKey(secret); + if (!isServer) { + int wrapKeyIndex; + int incarnation; + + /* these next few functions are mere accessors and don't fail. */ + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = wrapKeyIndex = + PK11_GetCurrentWrapIndex(symKeySlot); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex == 0); /* array has only one entry! */ + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = incarnation = + PK11_GetSlotSeries(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(symKeySlot); + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + /* Get the default wrapping key, for wrapping the master secret before + * placing it in the SID cache entry. */ + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, + pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } else { + int keyLength; + /* if the wrappingKey doesn't exist, attempt to create it. + * Note: we intentionally ignore errors here. If we cannot + * generate a wrapping key, it is not fatal to this SSL connection, + * but we will not be able to restart this session. + */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + keyLength = PK11_GetBestKeyLength(symKeySlot, mechanism); + /* Zero length means fixed key length algorithm, or error. + * It's ambiguous. + */ + wrappingKey = PK11_KeyGen(symKeySlot, mechanism, NULL, + keyLength, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + /* The thread safety characteristics of PK11_[SG]etWrapKey is + * abominable. This protects against races in calling + * PK11_SetWrapKey by dropping and re-acquiring the canonical + * value once it is set. The mutex in PK11_[SG]etWrapKey will + * ensure that races produce the same value in the end. */ + PK11_SetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, wrappingKey); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + wrappingKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(symKeySlot, wrapKeyIndex, + CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, incarnation, pwArg); + if (!wrappingKey) { + PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + } else { + /* server socket using session cache. */ + mechanism = PK11_GetBestWrapMechanism(symKeySlot); + if (mechanism != CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + wrappingKey = + ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, symKeySlot, mechanism, pwArg); + if (wrappingKey) { + mechanism = PK11_GetMechanism(wrappingKey); /* can't fail. */ + } + } + } + + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = mechanism; + PK11_FreeSlot(symKeySlot); + + if (wrappingKey) { + SECItem wmsItem; + + wmsItem.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wmsItem.len = sizeof sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + rv = PK11_WrapSymKey(mechanism, NULL, wrappingKey, + secret, &wmsItem); + /* rv is examined below. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = wmsItem.len; + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrappingKey); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered + * a complete ssl3 Finished message from the peer. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool isServer = ss->sec.isServer; + PRBool isTLS; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_finished) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->opt.requestCertificate) { + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, &hashes, + isServer ? sender_client : sender_server); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.crSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + if (isTLS) { + TLSFinished tlsFinished; + + if (length != sizeof(tlsFinished)) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer, + &hashes, &tlsFinished); + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[0] = tlsFinished; + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof(tlsFinished); + if (rv != SECSuccess || + 0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&tlsFinished, b, + PR_MIN(length, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes))) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decrypt_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + } else { + if (length != sizeof(SSL3Finished)) { + (void)ssl3_IllegalParameter(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!isServer) + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[1] = hashes.u.s; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.sFinished[0] = hashes.u.s; + PORT_Assert(hashes.len == sizeof hashes.u.s); + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes = sizeof hashes.u.s; + if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(&hashes.u.s, b, length)) { + (void)ssl3_HandshakeFailure(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + + if ((isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming) || + (!isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming)) { + PRInt32 flags = 0; + + /* Send a NewSessionTicket message if the client sent us + * either an empty session ticket, or one that did not verify. + * (Note that if either of these conditions was met, then the + * server has sent a SessionTicket extension in the + * ServerHello message.) + */ + if (isServer && !ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming && + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn) && + ssl3_KEASupportsTickets(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def)) { + /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "In the case of a full handshake, the + * server MUST verify the client's Finished message before sending + * the ticket." Presumably, this also means that the client's + * certificate, if any, must be verified beforehand too. + */ + rv = ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecs(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + /* If this thread is in SSL_SecureSend (trying to write some data) + ** then set the ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER flag, so that the + ** last two handshake messages (change cipher spec and finished) + ** will be sent in the same send/write call as the application data. + */ + if (ss->writerThread == PR_GetCurrentThread()) { + flags = ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER; + } + + if (!isServer && !ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_SendNextProto(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + flags |= ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT; + } + + rv = ssl3_SendFinished(ss, flags); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto xmit_loser; /* err is set. */ + } + } + +xmit_loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*************************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("ssl3_HandleFinished: unexpected restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = ssl3_FinishHandshake; + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_FinishHandshake(ss); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, PK11SymKey *secret) +{ + PORT_Assert(secret); + + /* fill in the sid */ + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + sid->u.ssl3.policy = ss->ssl3.policy; + sid->version = ss->version; + sid->authType = ss->sec.authType; + sid->authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + if (ss->sec.keaGroup) { + sid->keaGroup = ss->sec.keaGroup->name; + } else { + sid->keaGroup = ssl_grp_none; + } + sid->sigScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme; + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss); + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (ssl_ticket_lifetime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + sid->localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + sid->namedCurve = ss->sec.serverCert->namedCurve; + } + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT && + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE); + if (SECITEM_CopyItem( + NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, &ss->xtnData.nextProto) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ + } + } + + /* Copy the master secret (wrapped or unwrapped) into the sid */ + return ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret); +} + +/* The return type is SECStatus instead of void because this function needs + * to have type sslRestartTarget. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus sidRv = SECFailure; + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + + if (sid->cached == never_cached && !ss->opt.noCache) { + /* If the wrap fails, don't cache the sid. The connection proceeds + * normally, so the rv is only used to determine whether we cache. */ + sidRv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, sid, ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret); + } + + /* RFC 5077 Section 3.3: "The client MUST NOT treat the ticket as valid + * until it has verified the server's Finished message." When the server + * sends a NewSessionTicket in a resumption handshake, we must wait until + * the handshake is finished (we have verified the server's Finished + * AND the server's certificate) before we update the ticket in the sid. + * + * This must be done before we call ssl_CacheSessionID(ss) + * because CacheSID requires the session ticket to already be set, and also + * because of the lazy lock creation scheme used by CacheSID and + * ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + if (sidRv == SECSuccess) { + /* The sid takes over the ticket data */ + ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, + &ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, + PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket.data); + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + } + if (sidRv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == never_cached); + ssl_CacheSessionID(ss); + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; /* False Start phase is complete */ + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = idle_handshake; + + return ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, + PRUint32 dtlsSeq, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + sslUpdateHandshakeHashes updateHashes) +{ + PRUint8 hdr[4]; + PRUint8 dtlsData[8]; + SECStatus rv; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Hash handshake message:", b, length)); + + hdr[0] = (PRUint8)ct; + hdr[1] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + hdr[2] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + hdr[3] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)hdr, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + + /* Extra data to simulate a complete DTLS handshake fragment */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Sequence number */ + dtlsData[0] = MSB(dtlsSeq); + dtlsData[1] = LSB(dtlsSeq); + + /* Fragment offset */ + dtlsData[2] = 0; + dtlsData[3] = 0; + dtlsData[4] = 0; + + /* Fragment length */ + dtlsData[5] = (PRUint8)(length >> 16); + dtlsData[6] = (PRUint8)(length >> 8); + dtlsData[7] = (PRUint8)(length); + + rv = updateHashes(ss, (unsigned char *)dtlsData, sizeof(dtlsData)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + } + + /* The message body */ + rv = updateHashes(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; /* err code already set. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, + b, length, ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, + b, length, ssl3_UpdateDefaultHandshakeHashes); +} +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, + b, length, ssl3_UpdateInnerHandshakeHashes); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType ct, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + return ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ct, ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq, + b, length, ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_HandleHandshake() when it has gathered a complete ssl3 + * handshake message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + PRBool endOfRecord) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRUint16 epoch; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle handshake message: %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ssl3_DecodeHandshakeType(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type))); + + /* Start new handshake hashes when we start a new handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type == ssl_hs_client_hello) { + ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + } + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case ssl_hs_hello_request: + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: + /* We don't include hello_request and hello_verify_request messages + * in the handshake hashes */ + break; + + /* Defer hashing of these messages until the message handlers. */ + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: + case ssl_hs_finished: + break; + + default: + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + PORT_SetError(0); /* each message starts with no error. */ + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_certificate_status && + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_certificate_status) { + /* If we negotiated the certificate_status extension then we deferred + * certificate validation until we get the CertificateStatus messsage. + * But the CertificateStatus message is optional. If the server did + * not send it then we need to validate the certificate now. If the + * server does send the CertificateStatus message then we will + * authenticate the certificate in ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus. + */ + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* This can't block. */ + PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHello(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHello(ss, b, length); + break; + default: + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); + } else { + rv = tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(ss, b, length); + } + break; + } + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (epoch != ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) && !endOfRecord) { + /* If we changed read cipher states, there must not be any + * data in the input queue. */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* We consider the record to have been handled if SECSuccess or else WOULD_BLOCK is set + * Whoever set WOULD_BLOCK must handle any remaining actions required to finsih processing the record. + * e.g. by setting restartTarget. + */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (rv == SECSuccess || (rv == SECFailure && PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR))) { + /* Increment the expected sequence number */ + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq++; + } + + /* Taint the message so that it's easier to detect UAFs. */ + PORT_Memset(b, 'N', length); + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case ssl_hs_hello_request: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleHelloRequest(ss); + break; + + case ssl_hs_hello_verify_request: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = dtls_HandleHelloVerifyRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_status: + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateStatus(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_server_key_exchange: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_server_hello_done: + if (length != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(ss); + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_client_key_exchange: + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl3_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + break; + case ssl_hs_finished: + rv = ssl3_HandleFinished(ss, b, length); + break; + default: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + return rv; +} + +/* Called only from ssl3_HandleRecord, for each (deciphered) ssl3 record. + * origBuf is the decrypted ssl record content. + * Caller must hold the handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_HandleHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + sslBuffer buf = *origBuf; /* Work from a copy. */ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + while (buf.len > 0) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) { + PRUint8 t; + t = *(buf.buf++); + buf.len--; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes++ == 0) + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type = (SSLHandshakeType)t; + else + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len << 8) + t; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes < 4) + continue; + +#define MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN 0x1ffff /* 128k - 1 */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + goto loser; + } +#undef MAX_HANDSHAKE_MSG_LEN + + /* If msg_len is zero, be sure we fall through, + ** even if buf.len is zero. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len > 0) + continue; + } + + /* + * Header has been gathered and there is at least one byte of new + * data available for this message. If it can be done right out + * of the original buffer, then use it from there. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == 0 && buf.len >= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + /* handle it from input buffer */ + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(ss, buf.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + buf.buf += ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + buf.len -= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + /* must be copied to msg_body and dealt with from there */ + unsigned int bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len < ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + bytes = PR_MIN(buf.len, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len - ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len); + + /* Grow the buffer if needed */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* sslBuffer_Grow has set a memory error code. */ + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len, + buf.buf, bytes); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len += bytes; + buf.buf += bytes; + buf.len -= bytes; + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len <= ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len); + + /* if we have a whole message, do it */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len == ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage( + ss, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf, ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len, + buf.len == 0); + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.msg_len = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.header_bytes = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(buf.len == 0); + break; + } + } + } /* end loop */ + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + return SECSuccess; + +loser : { + /* Make sure to remove any data that was consumed. */ + unsigned int consumed = origBuf->len - buf.len; + PORT_Assert(consumed == buf.buf - origBuf->buf); + if (consumed > 0) { + memmove(origBuf->buf, origBuf->buf + consumed, buf.len); + origBuf->len = buf.len; + } +} + return SECFailure; +} + +/* SECStatusToMask returns, in constant time, a mask value of all ones if + * rv == SECSuccess. Otherwise it returns zero. */ +static unsigned int +SECStatusToMask(SECStatus rv) +{ + return PORT_CT_EQ(rv, SECSuccess); +} + +/* ssl_ConstantTimeGE returns 0xffffffff if a>=b and 0x00 otherwise. */ +static unsigned char +ssl_ConstantTimeGE(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) +{ + return PORT_CT_GE(a, b); +} + +/* ssl_ConstantTimeEQ returns 0xffffffff if a==b and 0x00 otherwise. */ +static unsigned char +ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(unsigned char a, unsigned char b) +{ + return PORT_CT_EQ(a, b); +} + +/* ssl_constantTimeSelect return a if mask is 0xFF and b if mask is 0x00 */ +static unsigned char +ssl_constantTimeSelect(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) +{ + return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, + unsigned int blockSize, + unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned int paddingLength, good; + const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; + + /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant + * time. */ + if (overhead > plaintext->len) { + return SECFailure; + } + + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + /* SSLv3 padding bytes are random and cannot be checked. */ + good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead); + /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ + good &= PORT_CT_GE(blockSize, paddingLength + 1); + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); + return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned int paddingLength, good, toCheck, i; + const unsigned int overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + macSize; + + /* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant + * time. */ + if (overhead > plaintext->len) { + return SECFailure; + } + + paddingLength = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + good = PORT_CT_GE(plaintext->len, paddingLength + overhead); + + /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and then + * that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length byte. + * Thus, with the length byte included, there are paddingLength+1 bytes of + * padding. + * + * We can't check just |paddingLength+1| bytes because that leaks + * decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the maximum + * amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record is + * public information so we can use it.) */ + toCheck = 256; /* maximum amount of padding + 1. */ + if (toCheck > plaintext->len) { + toCheck = plaintext->len; + } + + for (i = 0; i < toCheck; i++) { + /* If i <= paddingLength then the MSB of t is zero and mask is + * 0xff. Otherwise, mask is 0. */ + unsigned char mask = PORT_CT_LE(i, paddingLength); + unsigned char b = plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1 - i]; + /* The final |paddingLength+1| bytes should all have the value + * |paddingLength|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ + good &= ~(mask & (paddingLength ^ b)); + } + + /* If any of the final |paddingLength+1| bytes had the wrong value, + * one or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. We + * AND the bottom 8 bits together and duplicate the result to all the + * bits. */ + good &= good >> 4; + good &= good >> 2; + good &= good >> 1; + good <<= sizeof(good) * 8 - 1; + good = PORT_CT_DUPLICATE_MSB_TO_ALL(good); + + plaintext->len -= good & (paddingLength + 1); + return (good & SECSuccess) | (~good & SECFailure); +} + +/* On entry: + * originalLength >= macSize + * macSize <= MAX_MAC_LENGTH + * plaintext->len >= macSize + */ +static void +ssl_CBCExtractMAC(sslBuffer *plaintext, + unsigned int originalLength, + PRUint8 *out, + unsigned int macSize) +{ + unsigned char rotatedMac[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + /* macEnd is the index of |plaintext->buf| just after the end of the + * MAC. */ + unsigned macEnd = plaintext->len; + unsigned macStart = macEnd - macSize; + /* scanStart contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because + * the MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ + unsigned scanStart = 0; + unsigned i, j; + unsigned char rotateOffset; + + if (originalLength > macSize + 255 + 1) { + scanStart = originalLength - (macSize + 255 + 1); + } + + /* We want to compute + * rotateOffset = (macStart - scanStart) % macSize + * But the time to compute this varies based on the amount of padding. Thus + * we explicitely handle all mac sizes with (hopefully) constant time modulo + * using Barrett reduction: + * q := (rotateOffset * m) >> k + * rotateOffset -= q * n + * if (n <= rotateOffset) rotateOffset -= n + */ + rotateOffset = macStart - scanStart; + /* rotateOffset < 255 + 1 + 48 = 304 */ + if (macSize == 16) { + rotateOffset &= 15; + } else if (macSize == 20) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/20 - 25/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset <= 853 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 25) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 20; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 20), + 20, 0); + } else if (macSize == 32) { + rotateOffset &= 31; + } else if (macSize == 48) { + /* + * Correctness: rotateOffset * ( 1/48 - 10/2^9 ) < 1 + * with rotateOffset < 768 + */ + unsigned q = (rotateOffset * 10) >> 9; + rotateOffset -= q * 48; + rotateOffset -= ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, 48), + 48, 0); + } else { + /* + * SHA384 (macSize == 48) is the largest we support. We should never + * get here. + */ + PORT_Assert(0); + rotateOffset = rotateOffset % macSize; + } + + memset(rotatedMac, 0, macSize); + for (i = scanStart; i < originalLength;) { + for (j = 0; j < macSize && i < originalLength; i++, j++) { + unsigned char macStarted = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macStart); + unsigned char macEnded = ssl_ConstantTimeGE(i, macEnd); + unsigned char b = 0; + b = plaintext->buf[i]; + rotatedMac[j] |= b & macStarted & ~macEnded; + } + } + + /* Now rotate the MAC. If we knew that the MAC fit into a CPU cache line + * we could line-align |rotatedMac| and rotate in place. */ + memset(out, 0, macSize); + rotateOffset = macSize - rotateOffset; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); + for (i = 0; i < macSize; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < macSize; j++) { + out[j] |= rotatedMac[i] & ssl_ConstantTimeEQ(j, rotateOffset); + } + rotateOffset++; + rotateOffset = ssl_constantTimeSelect(ssl_ConstantTimeGE(rotateOffset, macSize), + 0, rotateOffset); + } +} + +/* MAX_EXPANSION is the amount by which a record might plausibly be expanded + * when protected. It's the worst case estimate, so the sum of block cipher + * padding (up to 256 octets), HMAC (48 octets for SHA-384), and IV (16 + * octets for AES). */ +#define MAX_EXPANSION (256 + 48 + 16) + +/* Unprotect an SSL3 record and leave the result in plaintext. + * + * If SECFailure is returned, we: + * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. + * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. + * + * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. + * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). + * + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef; + PRBool isTLS; + unsigned int good; + unsigned int ivLen = 0; + SSLContentType rType; + SSL3ProtocolVersion rVersion; + unsigned int minLength; + unsigned int originalLen = 0; + PRUint8 headerBuf[13]; + sslBuffer header = SSL_BUFFER(headerBuf); + PRUint8 hash[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + PRUint8 givenHashBuf[MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; + PRUint8 *givenHash; + unsigned int hashBytes = MAX_MAC_LENGTH + 1; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(spec->direction == ssl_secret_read); + + good = ~0U; + minLength = spec->macDef->mac_size; + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + /* CBC records have a padding length byte at the end. */ + minLength++; + if (spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* With >= TLS 1.1, CBC records have an explicit IV. */ + minLength += cipher_def->iv_size; + } + } else if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + minLength = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size + cipher_def->tag_size; + } + + /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total + * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ + if (cText->buf->len < minLength) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + spec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1) { + /* Consume the per-record explicit IV. RFC 4346 Section 6.2.3.2 states + * "The receiver decrypts the entire GenericBlockCipher structure and + * then discards the first cipher block corresponding to the IV + * component." Instead, we decrypt the first cipher block and then + * discard it before decrypting the rest. + */ + PRUint8 iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned int decoded; + + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + if (ivLen < 8 || ivLen > sizeof(iv)) { + *alert = internal_error; + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "IV (ciphertext):", cText->buf->buf, ivLen)); + + /* The decryption result is garbage, but since we just throw away + * the block it doesn't matter. The decryption of the next block + * depends only on the ciphertext of the IV block. + */ + rv = spec->cipher(spec->cipherContext, iv, &decoded, + sizeof(iv), cText->buf->buf, ivLen); + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "ciphertext:", cText->buf->buf + ivLen, + cText->buf->len - ivLen)); + + /* Check if the ciphertext can be valid if we assume maximum plaintext and + * add the maximum possible ciphersuite expansion. + * This way we detect overlong plaintexts/padding before decryption. + * This check enforces size limitations more strict than the RFC. + * [RFC5246, Section 6.2.3] */ + if (cText->buf->len > (spec->recordSizeLimit + MAX_EXPANSION)) { + *alert = record_overflow; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + rType = (SSLContentType)cText->hdr[0]; + rVersion = ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) | + (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2]; + if (cipher_def->type == type_aead) { + /* XXX For many AEAD ciphers, the plaintext is shorter than the + * ciphertext by a fixed byte count, but it is not true in general. + * Each AEAD cipher should provide a function that returns the + * plaintext length for a given ciphertext. */ + const unsigned int explicitNonceLen = cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; + const unsigned int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + unsigned int nonceLen = explicitNonceLen; + unsigned int decryptedLen = cText->buf->len - nonceLen - tagLen; + /* even though read doesn't return and IV, we still need a space to put + * the combined iv/nonce n the gcm 1.2 case*/ + unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *iv = NULL; + unsigned char *nonce = NULL; + + ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size; + + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, + rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), decryptedLen, &header); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + + /* build the iv */ + if (explicitNonceLen == 0) { + nonceLen = sizeof(cText->seqNum); + iv = spec->keyMaterial.iv; + nonce = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header); + } else { + PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, spec->keyMaterial.iv, ivLen); + PORT_Memset(ivOut + ivLen, 0, explicitNonceLen); + iv = ivOut; + nonce = cText->buf->buf; + nonceLen = explicitNonceLen; + } + rv = tls13_AEAD(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE, + CKG_NO_GENERATE, 0, /* iv generator params + * (not used in decrypt)*/ + iv, /* iv in */ + NULL, /* iv out */ + ivLen + explicitNonceLen, /* full iv length */ + nonce, nonceLen, /* nonce in */ + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), /* aad */ + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), /* aadlen */ + plaintext->buf, /* output */ + &plaintext->len, /* out len */ + plaintext->space, /* max out */ + tagLen, + cText->buf->buf + explicitNonceLen, /* input */ + cText->buf->len - explicitNonceLen); /* input len */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + good = 0; + } + } else { + if (cipher_def->type == type_block && + ((cText->buf->len - ivLen) % cipher_def->block_size) != 0) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + /* decrypt from cText buf to plaintext. */ + rv = spec->cipher( + spec->cipherContext, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf + ivLen, cText->buf->len - ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto decrypt_loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(80, (ss, "cleartext:", plaintext->buf, plaintext->len)); + + originalLen = plaintext->len; + + /* If it's a block cipher, check and strip the padding. */ + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + const unsigned int blockSize = cipher_def->block_size; + const unsigned int macSize = spec->macDef->mac_size; + + if (!isTLS) { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveSSLv3CBCPadding( + plaintext, blockSize, macSize)); + } else { + good &= SECStatusToMask(ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding( + plaintext, macSize)); + } + } + + /* compute the MAC */ + rv = ssl3_BuildRecordPseudoHeader( + spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, + rType, isTLS, rVersion, IS_DTLS(ss), + plaintext->len - spec->macDef->mac_size, &header); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + if (cipher_def->type == type_block) { + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMACConstantTime( + spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, originalLen, + hash, &hashBytes); + + ssl_CBCExtractMAC(plaintext, originalLen, givenHashBuf, + spec->macDef->mac_size); + givenHash = givenHashBuf; + + /* plaintext->len will always have enough space to remove the MAC + * because in ssl_Remove{SSLv3|TLS}CBCPadding we only adjust + * plaintext->len if the result has enough space for the MAC and we + * tested the unadjusted size against minLength, above. */ + plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; + } else { + /* This is safe because we checked the minLength above. */ + plaintext->len -= spec->macDef->mac_size; + + rv = ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC( + spec, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&header), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&header), + plaintext->buf, plaintext->len, hash, &hashBytes); + + /* We can read the MAC directly from the record because its location + * is public when a stream cipher is used. */ + givenHash = plaintext->buf + plaintext->len; + } + + good &= SECStatusToMask(rv); + + if (hashBytes != (unsigned)spec->macDef->mac_size || + NSS_SecureMemcmp(givenHash, hash, spec->macDef->mac_size) != 0) { + /* We're allowed to leak whether or not the MAC check was correct */ + good = 0; + } + } + + if (good == 0) { + decrypt_loser: + /* always log mac error, in case attacker can read server logs. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + *alert = bad_record_mac; + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType rType, + DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + sslBuffer *databuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* All the functions called in this switch MUST set error code if + ** they return SECFailure. + */ + switch (rType) { + case ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec: + rv = ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(ss, databuf); + break; + case ssl_ct_alert: + rv = ssl3_HandleAlert(ss, databuf); + break; + case ssl_ct_handshake: + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = ssl3_HandleHandshake(ss, databuf); + } else { + rv = dtls_HandleHandshake(ss, epoch, seqNum, databuf); + } + break; + case ssl_ct_ack: + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && tls13_MaybeTls13(ss)) { + rv = dtls13_HandleAck(ss, databuf); + break; + } + /* Fall through. */ + default: + /* If a TLS implementation receives an unexpected record type, + * it MUST terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" + * alert [RFC8446, Section 5]. + * + * For TLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in + * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotectRecord(), + * For DTLS 1.3 the outer content type is checked before in + * ssl3gthr.c/dtls_GatherData. + * The inner content types will be checked here. + * + * In DTLS generally invalid records SHOULD be silently discarded, + * no alert is sent [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. + */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: bogus content type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rType)); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Find the cipher spec to use for a given record. For TLS, this + * is the current cipherspec. For DTLS, we look up by epoch. + * In DTLS < 1.3 this just means the current epoch or nothing, + * but in DTLS >= 1.3, we keep multiple reading cipherspecs. + * Returns NULL if no appropriate cipher spec is found. + */ +static ssl3CipherSpec * +ssl3_GetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec = NULL; + DTLSEpoch epoch; + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return crSpec; + } + epoch = dtls_ReadEpoch(crSpec, cText->hdr); + if (crSpec->epoch == epoch) { + return crSpec; + } + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* Try to find the cipher spec. */ + newSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, + epoch); + if (newSpec != NULL) { + return newSpec; + } + } + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Couldn't find cipherspec from epoch %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, epoch)); + return NULL; +} + +/* if cText is non-null, then decipher and check the MAC of the + * SSL record from cText->buf (typically gs->inbuf) + * into databuf (typically gs->buf), and any previous contents of databuf + * is lost. Then handle databuf according to its SSL record type, + * unless it's an application record. + * + * If cText is NULL, then the ciphertext has previously been deciphered and + * checked, and is already sitting in databuf. It is processed as an SSL + * Handshake message. + * + * DOES NOT process the decrypted application data. + * On return, databuf contains the decrypted record. + * + * Called from ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq + * + * Caller must hold the RecvBufLock. + * + * This function aquires and releases the SSL3Handshake Lock, holding the + * lock around any calls to functions that handle records other than + * Application Data records. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cText) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS13; + DTLSEpoch epoch; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL; + PRUint16 recordSizeLimit, cTextSizeLimit; + PRBool outOfOrderSpec = PR_FALSE; + SSLContentType rType; + sslBuffer *plaintext = &ss->gs.buf; + SSL3AlertDescription alert = internal_error; + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + /* check for Token Presence */ + if (!ssl3_ClientAuthTokenPresent(ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Clear out the buffer in case this exits early. Any data then won't be + * processed twice. */ + plaintext->len = 0; + + /* We're waiting for another ClientHello, which will appear unencrypted. + * Use the content type to tell whether this should be discarded. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr && + cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello); + return SECSuccess; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /******************************************/ + spec = ssl3_GetCipherSpec(ss, cText); + if (!spec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + return SECSuccess; + } + if (spec != ss->ssl3.crSpec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss)); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: DTLS[%d]: Handling out-of-epoch record from epoch=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec->epoch)); + outOfOrderSpec = PR_TRUE; + } + isTLS = (PRBool)(spec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + if (dtls13_MaskSequenceNumber(ss, spec, cText->hdr, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(cText->buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(cText->buf)) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + /* code already set. */ + return SECFailure; + } + if (!dtls_IsRelevant(ss, spec, cText, &cText->seqNum)) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + return SECSuccess; + } + } else { + cText->seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum; + } + if (cText->seqNum >= spec->cipherDef->max_records) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: read sequence number at limit 0x%0llx", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->seqNum)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS13 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + recordSizeLimit = spec->recordSizeLimit; + cTextSizeLimit = recordSizeLimit; + cTextSizeLimit += (isTLS13) ? TLS_1_3_MAX_EXPANSION : TLS_1_2_MAX_EXPANSION; + + /* Check if the specified recordSizeLimit and the RFC8446 specified max + * expansion are respected. recordSizeLimit is probably at the default for + * the first (hello) handshake message and then set to a smaller size by + * the Record Size Limit Extension. + * Stricter expansion size checks dependent on implemented cipher suites + * are performed in ssl3con.c/ssl3_UnprotectRecord() OR + * tls13con.c/tls13_UnprotextRecord(). + * After Decryption the plaintext size is checked (l. 13424). This also + * applies to unencrypted records. */ + if (cText->buf->len > cTextSizeLimit) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************/ + /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* In debug builds the gather buffers are freed after the handling of each + * record for advanced ASAN coverage. Allocate the buffer again to the + * maximum possibly needed size as on gather initialization in + * ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). */ + PR_ASSERT(sslBuffer_Grow(plaintext, TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH) == SECSuccess); +#endif + /* This replaces a dynamic plaintext buffer size check, since the buffer is + * allocated to the maximum size in ssl3gthr.c/ssl3_InitGather(). The buffer + * was always grown to the maximum size at first record gathering before. */ + PR_ASSERT(plaintext->space >= cTextSizeLimit); + + /* Most record types aside from protected TLS 1.3 records carry the content + * type in the first octet. TLS 1.3 will override this value later. */ + rType = cText->hdr[0]; + /* Encrypted application data records could arrive before the handshake + * completes in DTLS 1.3. These can look like valid TLS 1.2 application_data + * records in epoch 0, which is never valid. Pretend they didn't decrypt. */ + if (spec->epoch == 0 && ((IS_DTLS(ss) && + dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(0, rType)) || + rType == ssl_ct_application_data)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); + alert = unexpected_message; + rv = SECFailure; + } else { +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = Null_Cipher(NULL, plaintext->buf, &plaintext->len, + plaintext->space, cText->buf->buf, cText->buf->len); +#else + /* IMPORTANT: + * Unprotect functions MUST NOT send alerts + * because we still hold the spec read lock. Instead, if they + * return SECFailure, they set *alert to the alert to be sent. + * Additionaly, this is used to silently drop DTLS encryption/record + * errors/alerts using the error handling below as suggested in the + * DTLS specification [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. */ + if (spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null && cText->buf->len == 0) { + /* Handle a zero-length unprotected record + * In this case, we treat it as a no-op and let later functions decide + * whether to ignore or alert accordingly. */ + PR_ASSERT(plaintext->len == 0); + rv = SECSuccess; + } else if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || spec->epoch == 0) { + rv = ssl3_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &alert); + } else { + rv = tls13_UnprotectRecord(ss, spec, cText, plaintext, &rType, + &alert); + } +#endif + } + + /* Error/Alert handling for ssl3/tls13_UnprotectRecord */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /***************************/ + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: decryption failed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Ensure that we don't process this data again. */ + plaintext->len = 0; + + /* Ignore a CCS if compatibility mode is negotiated. Note that this + * will fail if the server fails to negotiate compatibility mode in a + * 0-RTT session that is resumed from a session that did negotiate it. + * We don't care about that corner case right now. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake && + cText->buf->len == 1 && + cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) { + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs) { + /* Allow only the first CCS. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } else { + alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER); + } + } + + /* All errors/alerts that might occur during unprotection are related + * to invalid records (e.g. invalid formatting, length, MAC, ...). + * Following the DTLS specification such errors/alerts SHOULD be + * dropped silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. + * This is done below. */ + if ((IS_DTLS(ss) && !dtls13_AeadLimitReached(spec)) || + (!IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial)) { + /* Silently drop the packet unless we set ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent. + * (Manually or by using functions like + * SSL3_SendAlert(.., alert_fatal,..)) + * This is not currently used in the unprotection functions since + * all TLS and DTLS errors are propagated to this handler. */ + if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + int errCode = PORT_GetError(); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert); + /* Reset the error code in case SSL3_SendAlert called + * PORT_SetError(). */ + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* SECSuccess */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RecordSetRecvd(&spec->recvdRecords, cText->seqNum); + spec->nextSeqNum = PR_MAX(spec->nextSeqNum, cText->seqNum + 1); + } else { + ++spec->nextSeqNum; + } + epoch = spec->epoch; + + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*****************************************/ + + /* + * The decrypted data is now in plaintext. + */ + + /* IMPORTANT: We are in DTLS 1.3 mode and we have processed something + * from the wrong epoch. Divert to a divert processing function to make + * sure we don't accidentally use the data unsafely. */ + if (outOfOrderSpec) { + PORT_Assert(IS_DTLS(ss) && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + return dtls13_HandleOutOfEpochRecord(ss, spec, rType, plaintext); + } + + /* Check the length of the plaintext. */ + if (isTLS && plaintext->len > recordSizeLimit) { + plaintext->len = 0; + /* Drop DTLS Record Errors silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7] */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Application data records are processed by the caller of this + ** function, not by this function. + */ + if (rType == ssl_ct_application_data) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, plaintext); + } + plaintext->len = 0; + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unexpected_message); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, rType, epoch, cText->seqNum, + plaintext); + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* In Debug builds free and zero gather plaintext buffer after its content + * has been used/copied for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization. + * This frees buffer for non application data records, for application data + * records it is freed in sslsecur.c/DoRecv(). */ + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.buf); +#endif + + return rv; +} + +/* + * Initialization functions + */ + +void +ssl_InitSecState(sslSecurityInfo *sec) +{ + sec->authType = ssl_auth_null; + sec->authKeyBits = 0; + sec->signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + sec->keaType = ssl_kea_null; + sec->keaKeyBits = 0; + sec->keaGroup = NULL; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + ss->ssl3.policy = SSL_ALLOWED; + + ssl_InitSecState(&ss->sec); + + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + rv = ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_read); + rv |= ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(ss, ssl_secret_write); + ss->ssl3.pwSpec = ss->ssl3.prSpec = NULL; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Rely on ssl_CreateNullCipherSpec() to set error code. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = (ss->sec.isServer) ? wait_client_hello : idle_handshake; + + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtTimer->timeout = DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS; + ss->ssl3.hs.rtRetries = 0; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvdHighWater = -1; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + dtls_SetMTU(ss, 0); /* Set the MTU to the highest plateau */ + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = 100; + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_FALSE; + + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf && !ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space); + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.space = 0; + + ss->ssl3.hs.receivedNewSessionTicket = PR_FALSE; + PORT_Memset(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket, 0, + sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket)); + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* record the export policy for this cipher suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, int policy) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->policy = policy; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRInt32 policy; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + policy = suite->policy; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + policy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *oPolicy = policy; + return rv; +} + +/* record the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* return the user preference for this suite */ +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool enabled) +{ + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfgMutable(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite == NULL) { + return SECFailure; /* err code was set by ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg */ + } + suite->enabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite; + PRBool pref; + SECStatus rv; + + suite = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(which, ss->cipherSuites); + if (suite) { + pref = suite->enabled; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + pref = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECFailure; /* err code was set by Lookup. */ + } + *enabled = pref; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int count) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned int i; + unsigned int supported = 0; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!count) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + if (ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + ++supported; + } + } + /* We don't check for duplicates, so it's possible to get too many. */ + if (supported > MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = 0; + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + if (!ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(schemes[i])) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid signature scheme %d ignored", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, schemes[i])); + continue; + } + + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount++] = schemes[i]; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignaturePrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int count) +{ + SSLSignatureScheme schemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES]; + unsigned int i; + + count = PR_MIN(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(schemes), count); + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + schemes[i] = (algorithms[i].hashAlg << 8) | algorithms[i].sigAlg; + } + return SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(fd, schemes, count); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignatureSchemePrefGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!schemes || !count || + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(schemes, ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount * sizeof(SSLSignatureScheme)); + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SignaturePrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *algorithms, + unsigned int *count, unsigned int maxCount) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned int i; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SignaturePrefGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!algorithms || !count || + maxCount < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; ++i) { + algorithms[i].hashAlg = (ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] >> 8) & 0xff; + algorithms[i].sigAlg = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[i] & 0xff; + } + *count = ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + return SECSuccess; +} + +unsigned int +SSL_SignatureMaxCount(void) +{ + return MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES; +} + +/* copy global default policy into socket. */ +void +ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, cipherSuites, sizeof(cipherSuites)); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, defaultSignatureSchemes, + sizeof(defaultSignatureSchemes)); + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(defaultSignatureSchemes); +} + +/* +** If ssl3 socket has completed the first handshake, and is in idle state, +** then start a new handshake. +** If flushCache is true, the SID cache will be flushed first, forcing a +** "Full" handshake (not a session restart handshake), to be done. +** +** called from SSL_RedoHandshake(), which already holds the handshake locks. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->firstHsDone || (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_RehandshakeCleanup(ss); + } + + if (ss->opt.enableRenegotiation == SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER || + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->version > ss->vrange.max || ss->version < ss->vrange.min) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid && flushCache) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); /* remove it from whichever cache it's in. */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); /* dec ref count and free if zero. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + + /* start off a new handshake. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_SendHelloRequest(ss); + } else { + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_renegotiation); + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /**************************************/ + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl_DestroySocketContents() in sslsock.c */ +void +ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss) +{ + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena != NULL) + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); + } + + /* clean up handshake */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.md5) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.md5, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaEchInner, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + } + + /* free the SSL3Buffer (msg_body) */ + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.msg_body.buf); + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.newSessionTicket.ticket, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); + + /* Destroy the DTLS data */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_FreeHandshakeMessages(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.recvdFragments.buf); + } + } + + /* Destroy remote extensions */ + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); + ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(&ss->xtnData); + + /* Destroy cipher specs */ + ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 keys */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret) + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 buffered early data. */ + tls13_DestroyEarlyData(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + + /* Destroy TLS 1.3 PSKs. */ + tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + /* TLS 1.3 ECH state. */ + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); + PORT_Free((void *)ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); /* CONST */ + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE (client) state. */ + tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(ss); + + /* TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation state. */ + tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(ss); +} + +/* check if the current cipher spec is FIPS. We only need to + * check the contexts here, if the kea, prf or keys were not FIPS, + * that status would have been rolled up in the create context + * call */ +static PRBool +ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + if (!spec || !spec->cipherDef) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (spec->cipherDef->type != type_aead) { + if (spec->keyMaterial.macContext == NULL) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->keyMaterial.macContext)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } + if (!spec->cipherContext) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return PK11_ContextGetFIPSStatus(spec->cipherContext); +} + +/* return true if the current operation is running in FIPS mode */ +PRBool +ssl_isFIPS(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.crSpec)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return ssl_cipherSpecIsFips(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); +} + +/* + * parse the policy value for a single algorithm in a cipher_suite, + * return TRUE if we disallow by the cipher suite by policy + * (we don't have to parse any more algorithm policies on this cipher suite), + * otherwise return FALSE. + * 1. If we don't have the required policy, disable by default, disallow by + * policy and return TRUE (no more processing needed). + * 2. If we have the required policy, and we are disabled, return FALSE, + * (if we are disabled, we only need to parse policy, not default). + * 3. If we have the required policy, and we aren't adjusting the defaults + * return FALSE. (only parsing the policy, not default). + * 4. We have the required policy and we are adjusting the defaults. + * If we are setting default = FALSE, set isDisabled to true so that + * we don't try to re-enable the cipher suite based on a different + * algorithm. + */ +PRBool +ssl_HandlePolicy(int cipher_suite, SECOidTag policyOid, + PRUint32 requiredPolicy, PRBool *isDisabled) +{ + PRUint32 policy; + SECStatus rv; + + /* first fetch the policy for this algorithm */ + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(policyOid, &policy); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FALSE; /* no policy value, continue to the next algorithm */ + } + /* first, are we allowed by policy, if not turn off allow and disable */ + if (!(policy & requiredPolicy)) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + ssl_CipherPolicySet(cipher_suite, SSL_NOT_ALLOWED); + return PR_TRUE; + } + /* If we are already disabled, or the policy isn't setting a default + * we are done processing this algorithm */ + if (*isDisabled || (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_NOT_VALID)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* set the default value for the cipher suite. If we disable the cipher + * suite, remember that so we don't process the next default. This has + * the effect of disabling the whole cipher suite if any of the + * algorithms it uses are disabled by default. We still have to + * process the upper level because the cipher suite is still allowed + * by policy, and we may still have to disallow it based on other + * algorithms in the cipher suite. */ + if (policy & NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE) { + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_TRUE); + } else { + *isDisabled = PR_TRUE; + ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(cipher_suite, PR_FALSE); + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +#define MAP_NULL(x) (((x) != 0) ? (x) : SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER) + +SECStatus +ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void) +{ + unsigned i; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 policy = 0; + + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !(policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { + return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */ + } + + /* disable every ciphersuite */ + for (i = 1; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipher_suite_defs); ++i) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite = &cipher_suite_defs[i]; + SECOidTag policyOid; + PRBool isDisabled = PR_FALSE; + + /* if we haven't explicitly disabled it below enable by policy */ + ssl_CipherPolicySet(suite->cipher_suite, SSL_ALLOWED); + + /* now check the various key exchange, ciphers and macs and + * if we ever disallow by policy, we are done, go to the next cipher + */ + policyOid = MAP_NULL(kea_defs[suite->key_exchange_alg].oid); + if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, + NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX, &isDisabled)) { + continue; + } + + policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->oid); + if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, + NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) { + continue; + } + + if (ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suite)->type != type_aead) { + policyOid = MAP_NULL(ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(suite->mac_alg)->oid); + if (ssl_HandlePolicy(suite->cipher_suite, policyOid, + NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL, &isDisabled)) { + continue; + } + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(); + + return rv; +} + +/* End of ssl3con.c */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..168ec59bf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,965 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* ECC code moved here from ssl3con.c */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for DSAU_ stuff */ +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "prinrval.h" +#include "prerror.h" +#include "pratom.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "prinit.h" + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secmod.h" + +#include <stdio.h> + +SECStatus +ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(PLArenaPool *arena, const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + SECKEYECParams *params) +{ + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + + if (!params) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ecGroup || ecGroup->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh || + (oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(ecGroup->oidTag)) == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, params, (2 + oidData->oid.len)) == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing the named curve. The actual OID is in + * oidData->oid.data so we simply prepend 0x06 and OID length + */ + params->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID; + params->data[1] = oidData->oid.len; + memcpy(params->data + 2, oidData->oid.data, oidData->oid.len); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECItem oid = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECOidData *oidData = NULL; + PRUint32 policyFlags = 0; + unsigned int i; + const SECKEYECParams *params; + + if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; + } + + params = &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams; + + /* + * params->data needs to contain the ASN encoding of an object ID (OID) + * representing a named curve. Here, we strip away everything + * before the actual OID and use the OID to look up a named curve. + */ + if (params->data[0] != SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID) + return NULL; + oid.len = params->len - 2; + oid.data = params->data + 2; + if ((oidData = SECOID_FindOID(&oid)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(oidData->offset, &policyFlags) == + SECSuccess) && + !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ssl_named_groups[i].oidTag == oidData->offset) { + return &ssl_named_groups[i]; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* Caller must set hiLevel error code. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, + SECItem ec_params, SECItem server_ecpoint, + PRUint8 *client_rand, PRUint8 *server_rand, + SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + PRUint8 *hashBuf; + PRUint8 *pBuf; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + unsigned int bufLen; + /* + * We only support named curves (the appropriate checks are made before this + * method is called) so ec_params takes up only two bytes. ECPoint needs to + * fit in 256 bytes because the spec says the length must fit in one byte. + */ + PRUint8 buf[2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 256]; + + bufLen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH + ec_params.len + 1 + server_ecpoint.len; + if (bufLen <= sizeof buf) { + hashBuf = buf; + } else { + hashBuf = PORT_Alloc(bufLen); + if (!hashBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + memcpy(hashBuf, client_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf = hashBuf + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, server_rand, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + pBuf += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + memcpy(pBuf, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + pBuf += ec_params.len; + pBuf[0] = (PRUint8)(server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += 1; + memcpy(pBuf, server_ecpoint.data, server_ecpoint.len); + pBuf += server_ecpoint.len; + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)(pBuf - hashBuf) == bufLen); + + rv = ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(hashAlg, hashBuf, bufLen, hashes); + + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: ", hashBuf, bufLen)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: MD5 result", + hashes->u.s.md5, MD5_LENGTH)); + PRINT_BUF(95, (NULL, "ECDHkey hash: SHA1 result", + hashes->u.s.sha, SHA1_LENGTH)); + + if (hashBuf != buf) + PORT_Free(hashBuf); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from ssl3_SendClientKeyExchange(). */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms = NULL; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + /* Generate ephemeral EC keypair */ + if (svrPubKey->keyType != ecKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + groupDef = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(svrPubKey); + if (!groupDef) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); + goto loser; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = groupDef; + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + goto loser; + } + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "ECDH public value:", + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len)); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(keyPair->keys->privKey, svrPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, + CKA_DERIVE, 0, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_client_key_exchange, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by ssl3_AppendHandshake* */ + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (pms) + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (keyPair) + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* +** Called from ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange() +*/ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair) +{ + PK11SymKey *pms; + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey clntPubKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target; + PRBool isTLS, isTLS12; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + clntPubKey.keyType = ecKey; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len = + serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len; + clntPubKey.u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data = + serverKeyPair->pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data; + clntPubKey.u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &clntPubKey.u.ec.publicValue, + 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* we have to catch the case when the client's public key has length 0. */ + if (!clntPubKey.u.ec.publicValue.len) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + if (isTLS12) { + target = CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else if (isTLS) { + target = CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } else { + target = CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH; + } + + /* Determine the PMS */ + pms = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(serverKeyPair->privKey, &clntPubKey, + PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, target, CKA_DERIVE, 0, + CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + + if (pms == NULL) { + /* last gasp. */ + errCode = ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(ss, pms, PR_TRUE); + PK11_FreeSymKey(pms); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */ + return SECFailure; + } + ss->sec.keaGroup = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(&clntPubKey); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* +** Take an encoded key share and make a public key out of it. +*/ +SECStatus +ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ecPoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + if (!length) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Fail if the ec point uses compressed representation */ + if (b[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED && + ecGroup->name != ssl_grp_ec_curve25519) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM); + return SECFailure; + } + + peerKey->keyType = ecKey; + /* Set up the encoded params */ + rv = ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(peerKey->arena, ecGroup, + &peerKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + peerKey->u.ec.encoding = ECPoint_Undefined; + + /* copy publicValue in peerKey */ + ecPoint.data = b; + ecPoint.len = length; + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.ec.publicValue, &ecPoint); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_GetECGroupWithStrength(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int requiredECCbits) +{ + int i; + + PORT_Assert(ss); + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (group && group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && + group->bits >= requiredECCbits) { + return group; + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return NULL; +} + +/* Find the "weakest link". Get the strength of the signature and symmetric + * keys and choose a curve based on the weakest of those two. */ +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_GetECGroupForServerSocket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert; + unsigned int certKeySize; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *bulkCipher; + unsigned int requiredECCbits; + + PORT_Assert(cert); + if (!cert || !cert->serverKeyPair || !cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return NULL; + } + + if (SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_sign) || + SSL_CERT_IS(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_pss)) { + certKeySize = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey); + certKeySize = SSL_RSASTRENGTH_TO_ECSTRENGTH(certKeySize); + } else if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(cert)) { + /* We won't select a certificate unless the named curve has been + * negotiated (or supported_curves was absent), double check that. */ + PORT_Assert(cert->namedCurve->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh); + PORT_Assert(ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)); + if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, cert->namedCurve)) { + return NULL; + } + certKeySize = cert->namedCurve->bits; + } else { + PORT_Assert(0); + return NULL; + } + bulkCipher = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + requiredECCbits = bulkCipher->key_size * BPB * 2; + PORT_Assert(requiredECCbits || + ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->bulk_cipher_alg == cipher_null); + if (requiredECCbits > certKeySize) { + requiredECCbits = certKeySize; + } + + return ssl_GetECGroupWithStrength(ss, requiredECCbits); +} + +/* Create an ECDHE key pair for a given curve */ +SECStatus +ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(const sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; + SECKEYECParams ecParams = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + if (ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(NULL, ecGroup, &ecParams) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + privKey = SECKEY_CreateECPrivateKey(&ecParams, &pubKey, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ecParams, PR_FALSE); + + if (!privKey || !pubKey || + !(pair = ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(ecGroup, privKey, pubKey))) { + if (privKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); + } + if (pubKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + } + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + + *keyPair = pair; + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: SSL[%d]: Create ECDH ephemeral key %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss ? ss->fd : NULL, ecGroup->name)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Public Key", pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len)); +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 50) { + SECItem d = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, privKey, + CKA_VALUE, &d); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Private Key", d.data, d.len)); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&d, PR_FALSE); + } else { + SSL_TRC(50, ("Error extracting private key")); + } + } +#endif + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey = NULL; + PRBool isTLS; + SECStatus rv; + int errCode = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH; + SSL3AlertDescription desc = illegal_parameter; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECItem signature = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + SECItem ec_params = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem ec_point = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup; + + isTLS = (PRBool)(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0); + + ec_params.len = sizeof paramBuf; + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Fail if the curve is not a named curve */ + if (ec_params.data[0] != ec_type_named) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + ecGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(ec_params.data[1] << 8 | ec_params.data[2]); + if (!ecGroup || ecGroup->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ec_point, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + /* Fail if the provided point has length 0. */ + if (!ec_point.len) { + /* desc and errCode are initialized already */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Fail if the ec point is not uncompressed for any curve that's not 25519. */ + if (ecGroup->name != ssl_grp_ec_curve25519 && + ec_point.data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM; + desc = handshake_failure; + goto alert_loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.prSpec->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + if (ss->ssl3.prSpec->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; /* malformed or unsupported. */ + } + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + ss, sigScheme, &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + sigScheme = ssl_sig_none; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signature, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + if (length != 0) { + if (isTLS) + desc = decode_error; + goto alert_loser; /* malformed. */ + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC params", ec_params.data, ec_params.len)); + PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "Server EC point", ec_point.data, ec_point.len)); + + /* failures after this point are not malformed handshakes. */ + /* TLS: send decrypt_error if signature failed. */ + desc = isTLS ? decrypt_error : handshake_failure; + + /* + * check to make sure the hash is signed by right guy + */ + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(hashAlg, ec_params, ec_point, + ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + rv = ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(ss, sigScheme, &hashes, &signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + errCode = + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto alert_loser; + } + + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (arena == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + errCode = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + goto loser; + } + peerKey->arena = arena; + + /* create public key from point data */ + rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(peerKey, ec_point.data, ec_point.len, + ecGroup); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* error code is set */ + desc = handshake_failure; + errCode = PORT_GetError(); + goto alert_loser; + } + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + ss->sec.peerKey = peerKey; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); +loser: + if (arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_SetError(errCode); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + int length; + PRBool isTLS12; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SECItem ec_params = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned char paramBuf[3]; + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + + /* Generate ephemeral ECDH key pair and send the public key */ + ecGroup = ssl_GetECGroupForServerSocket(ss); + if (!ecGroup) { + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + if (ss->opt.reuseServerECDHEKey) { + rv = ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKey(ss, ecGroup); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } else { + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, ecGroup, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } + + PORT_Assert(keyPair); + if (!keyPair) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ec_params.len = sizeof(paramBuf); + ec_params.data = paramBuf; + PORT_Assert(keyPair->group); + PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh); + ec_params.data[0] = ec_type_named; + ec_params.data[1] = keyPair->group->name >> 8; + ec_params.data[2] = keyPair->group->name & 0xff; + + pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey; + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + } else { + /* Use ssl_hash_none to represent the MD5+SHA1 combo. */ + hashAlg = ssl_hash_none; + } + rv = ssl3_ComputeECDHKeyHash(hashAlg, ec_params, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue, + ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, + ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, + &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + isTLS12 = (PRBool)(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2); + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &hashes, + ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* ssl3_SignHashes has set err. */ + } + + length = ec_params.len + + 1 + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len + + (isTLS12 ? 2 : 0) + 2 + signed_hash.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_key_exchange, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, ec_params.data, ec_params.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (isTLS12) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signed_hash.data, + signed_hash.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (signed_hash.data != NULL) + PORT_Free(signed_hash.data); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* List of all ECC cipher suites */ +static const ssl3CipherSuite ssl_all_ec_suites[] = { + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + 0 /* end of list marker */ +}; + +static const ssl3CipherSuite ssl_dhe_suites[] = { + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + 0 +}; + +/* Order(N^2). Yuk. */ +static PRBool +ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuite *list) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuite *suite; + + for (suite = list; *suite; ++suite) { + PRBool enabled = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv = ssl3_CipherPrefGet(ss, *suite, &enabled); + + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); /* else is coding error */ + if (rv == SECSuccess && enabled) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Ask: is ANY ECC cipher suite enabled on this socket? */ +PRBool +ssl_IsECCEnabled(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + + /* make sure we can do ECC */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + if (!slot) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + + /* make sure an ECC cipher is enabled */ + return ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(ss, ssl_all_ec_suites); +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsDHEEnabled(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl_IsSuiteEnabled(ss, ssl_dhe_suites); +} + +/* Send our Supported Groups extension. */ +SECStatus +ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRBool ec; + PRBool ff = PR_FALSE; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int lengthOffset; + + /* We only send FF supported groups if we require DH named groups + * or if TLS 1.3 is a possibility. */ + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ec = ssl_IsECCEnabled(ss); + if (ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups) { + ff = ssl_IsDHEEnabled(ss); + } + if (!ec && !ff) { + return SECSuccess; + } + } else { + ec = ff = PR_TRUE; + } + + /* Mark the location of the length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (!group) { + continue; + } + if (group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh && !ec) { + continue; + } + if (group->keaType == ssl_kea_dh && !ff) { + continue; + } + + found = PR_TRUE; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, group->name, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* GREASE SupportedGroups: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE named group values and advertise + * them in the "supported_groups" extension, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. + */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && + ss->opt.enableGrease && + ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_group], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + found = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (!found) { + /* We added nothing, don't send the extension. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Send our "canned" (precompiled) Supported Point Formats extension, + * which says that we only support uncompressed points. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* No point in doing this unless we have a socket that supports ECC. + * Similarly, no point if we are going to do TLS 1.3 only or we have already + * picked TLS 1.3 (server) given that it doesn't use point formats. */ + if (!ss || !ssl_IsECCEnabled(ss) || + ss->vrange.min >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1, 1); /* length */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); /* uncompressed type only */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..194e6d0c8c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.c @@ -0,0 +1,1181 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* TLS extension code moved here from ssl3ecc.c */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13err.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" + +/* Callback function that handles a received extension. */ +typedef SECStatus (*ssl3ExtensionHandlerFunc)(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); + +/* Row in a table of hello extension handlers. */ +typedef struct { + SSLExtensionType ex_type; + ssl3ExtensionHandlerFunc ex_handler; +} ssl3ExtensionHandler; + +/* Table of handlers for received TLS hello extensions, one per extension. + * In the second generation, this table will be dynamic, and functions + * will be registered here. + */ +/* This table is used by the server, to handle client hello extensions. */ +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, + { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, &ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSigAlgsXtn }, + { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, &ssl3_HandleExtendedMasterSecretXtn }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn }, + { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn, &tls13_ServerHandlePostHandshakeAuthXtn }, + { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* These two tables are used by the client, to handle server hello + * extensions. */ +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, + /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */ + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, &ssl3_HandleExtendedMasterSecretXtn }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn }, + { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler helloRetryRequestHandlers[] = { + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie }, + { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersSSL3[] = { + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler newSessionTicketHandlers[] = { + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, + &tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* This table is used by the client to handle server certificates in TLS 1.3 */ +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler serverCertificateHandlers[] = { + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, &tls13_ClientHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const ssl3ExtensionHandler certificateRequestHandlers[] = { + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSigAlgsXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, + &tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* Tables of functions to format TLS hello extensions, one function per + * extension. + * These static tables are for the formatting of client hello extensions. + * The server's table of hello senders is dynamic, in the socket struct, + * and sender functions are registered there. + * NB: the order of these extensions can have an impact on compatibility. Some + * servers (e.g. Tomcat) will terminate the connection if the last extension in + * the client hello is empty (for example, the extended master secret + * extension, if it were listed last). See bug 1243641. + */ +static const sslExtensionBuilder clientHelloSendersTLS[] = { + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE extensions - empty. */ + { ssl_tls13_grease_xtn, &tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn }, + { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendServerNameXtn }, + { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, &ssl3_SendExtendedMasterSecretXtn }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, &ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSessionTicketXtn }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendUseSRTPXtn }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn }, + { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn }, + /* Some servers (e.g. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 and Tomcat) will + * time out or terminate the connection if the last extension in the + * client hello is empty. They are not intolerant of TLS 1.2, so list + * signature_algorithms at the end. See bug 1243641. */ + { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_SendSigAlgsXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn }, + { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, &ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn }, + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE extensions - 1 zero byte. */ + { ssl_tls13_grease_xtn, &tls13_SendGreaseXtn }, + /* The pre_shared_key extension MUST be last. */ + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, &tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const sslExtensionBuilder clientHelloSendersSSL3[] = { + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const sslExtensionBuilder tls13_cert_req_senders[] = { + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_SendSigAlgsXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, &tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn }, + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE extension. */ + { ssl_tls13_grease_xtn, &tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const sslExtensionBuilder tls13_hrr_senders[] = { + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, &tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, &tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, &tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn }, + { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, &tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +static const struct { + SSLExtensionType type; + SSLExtensionSupport support; +} ssl_supported_extensions[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_padding_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_ticket_early_data_info_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, + { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, ssl_ext_native }, + { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, ssl_ext_native_only }, +}; + +static SSLExtensionSupport +ssl_GetExtensionSupport(PRUint16 type) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_supported_extensions); ++i) { + if (type == ssl_supported_extensions[i].type) { + return ssl_supported_extensions[i].support; + } + } + return ssl_ext_none; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_GetExtensionSupport(PRUint16 type, SSLExtensionSupport *support) +{ + *support = ssl_GetExtensionSupport(type); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_InstallExtensionHooks(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 extension, + SSLExtensionWriter writer, void *writerArg, + SSLExtensionHandler handler, void *handlerArg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PRCList *cursor; + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook; + + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + /* Need to specify both or neither, but not just one. */ + if ((writer && !handler) || (!writer && handler)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ssl_GetExtensionSupport(extension) == ssl_ext_native_only) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone || ((ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.ws != wait_client_hello))) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Remove any old handler. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks); + cursor != &ss->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + hook = (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + if (hook->type == extension) { + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&hook->link); + PORT_Free(hook); + break; + } + } + + if (!writer && !handler) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + hook = PORT_ZNew(sslCustomExtensionHooks); + if (!hook) { + return SECFailure; /* This removed the old one, oh well. */ + } + + hook->type = extension; + hook->writer = writer; + hook->writerArg = writerArg; + hook->handler = handler; + hook->handlerArg = handlerArg; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&hook->link, &ss->extensionHooks); + return SECSuccess; +} + +sslCustomExtensionHooks * +ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 extension) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks); + cursor != &ss->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook = (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + if (hook->type == extension) { + return hook; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +static PRBool +arrayContainsExtension(const PRUint16 *array, PRUint32 len, PRUint16 ex_type) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (ex_type == array[i]) + return PR_TRUE; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) +{ + const TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->negotiated, + xtnData->numNegotiated, ex_type); +} + +/* This checks for whether an extension was advertised. On the client, this + * covers extensions that are sent in ClientHello; on the server, extensions + * sent in CertificateRequest (TLS 1.3 only). */ +PRBool +ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) +{ + const TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->advertised, + xtnData->numAdvertised, ex_type); +} + +PRBool +ssl3_ExtensionAdvertisedClientHelloInner(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) +{ + const TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; + return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->echAdvertised, + xtnData->echNumAdvertised, ex_type); +} + +/* Go through hello extensions in |b| and deserialize + * them into the list in |ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions|. + * The only checking we do in this point is for duplicates. + * + * IMPORTANT: This list just contains pointers to the incoming + * buffer so they can only be used during ClientHello processing. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ParseExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + /* Clean out the extensions list. */ + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + + while (*length) { + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 extension_type; + SECItem extension_data = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + TLSExtension *extension; + PRCList *cursor; + + /* Get the extension's type field */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &extension_type, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ + } + + /* Check whether an extension has been sent multiple times. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + if (((TLSExtension *)cursor)->type == extension_type) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Get the data for this extension, so we can pass it or skip it. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extension_data, 2, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* alert already sent */ + } + + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: parsed extension %d len=%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, extension_type, extension_data.len)); + + extension = PORT_ZNew(TLSExtension); + if (!extension) { + return SECFailure; + } + + extension->type = (PRUint16)extension_type; + extension->data = extension_data; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&extension->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +TLSExtension * +ssl3_FindExtension(sslSocket *ss, SSLExtensionType extension_type) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + TLSExtension *extension = (TLSExtension *)cursor; + + if (extension->type == extension_type) { + return extension; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_CallExtensionHandler(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType handshakeMessage, + TLSExtension *extension, + const ssl3ExtensionHandler *handler) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSLAlertDescription alert = handshake_failure; + sslCustomExtensionHooks *customHooks; + + customHooks = ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(ss, extension->type); + if (customHooks) { + if (customHooks->handler) { + rv = customHooks->handler(ss->fd, handshakeMessage, + extension->data.data, + extension->data.len, + &alert, customHooks->handlerArg); + } + } else { + /* Find extension_type in table of Hello Extension Handlers. */ + for (; handler->ex_handler != NULL; ++handler) { + if (handler->ex_type == extension->type) { + SECItem tmp = extension->data; + + rv = (*handler->ex_handler)(ss, &ss->xtnData, &tmp); + break; + } + } + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (!ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { + /* Send an alert if the handler didn't already. */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, alert); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Go through the hello extensions in |ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions|. + * For each one, find the extension handler in the table, and + * if present, invoke that handler. + * Servers ignore any extensions with unknown extension types. + * Clients reject any extensions with unadvertised extension types + * + * In TLS >= 1.3, the client checks that extensions appear in the + * right phase. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType message) +{ + const ssl3ExtensionHandler *handlers; + /* HelloRetryRequest doesn't set ss->version. It might be safe to + * do so, but we weren't entirely sure. TODO(ekr@rtfm.com). */ + PRBool isTLS13 = (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) || + (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request); + /* The following messages can include extensions that were not included in + * the original ClientHello. */ + PRBool allowNotOffered = (message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || + (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request) || + (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket); + PRCList *cursor; + + switch (message) { + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + handlers = clientHelloHandlers; + break; + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + handlers = newSessionTicketHandlers; + break; + case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request: + handlers = helloRetryRequestHandlers; + break; + case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + /* fall through */ + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + handlers = serverHelloHandlersTLS; + } else { + handlers = serverHelloHandlersSSL3; + } + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate: + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + handlers = serverCertificateHandlers; + break; + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + handlers = certificateRequestHandlers; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + cursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + TLSExtension *extension = (TLSExtension *)cursor; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Check whether the server sent an extension which was not advertised + * in the ClientHello. + * + * Note that a TLS 1.3 server should check if CertificateRequest + * extensions were sent. But the extensions used for CertificateRequest + * do not have any response, so we rely on + * ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised to return false on the server. That + * results in the server only rejecting any extension. */ + if (!allowNotOffered && (extension->type != ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn)) { + if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, extension->type)) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("Server sent xtn type=%d which is invalid for the CHO", extension->type)); + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + /* If we offered ECH, we also check whether the extension is compatible with + * the Client Hello Inner. We don't yet know whether the server accepted ECH, + * so we only store this for now. If we later accept, we check this boolean + * and reject with an unsupported_extension alert if it is set. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ssl3_ExtensionAdvertisedClientHelloInner(ss, extension->type)) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("Server sent xtn type=%d which is invalid for the CHI", extension->type)); + ss->ssl3.hs.echInvalidExtension = PR_TRUE; + } + } + + /* Check that this is a legal extension in TLS 1.3 */ + if (isTLS13 && + !ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(ss, extension->type)) { + switch (tls13_ExtensionStatus(extension->type, message)) { + case tls13_extension_allowed: + break; + case tls13_extension_unknown: + if (allowNotOffered) { + continue; /* Skip over unknown extensions. */ + } + /* RFC8446 Section 4.2 - Implementations MUST NOT send extension responses if + * the remote endpoint did not send the corresponding extension request ... + * Upon receiving such an extension, an endpoint MUST abort the handshake with + * an "unsupported_extension" alert. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13: unknown extension %d in message %d", + SSL_GETPID(), extension, message)); + tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION, + unsupported_extension); + return SECFailure; + case tls13_extension_disallowed: + /* RFC8446 Section 4.2 - If an implementation receives an extension which it + * recognizes and which is not specified for the message in which it appears, + * it MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13: disallowed extension %d in message %d", + SSL_GETPID(), extension, message)); + tls13_FatalError(ss, SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Special check for this being the last extension if it's + * PreSharedKey */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && isTLS13 && + (extension->type == ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn) && + (PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor) != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions)) { + tls13_FatalError(ss, + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_CallExtensionHandler(ss, message, extension, handlers); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Syntactic sugar around ssl3_ParseExtensions and + * ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleExtensions(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, + SSLHandshakeType handshakeMessage) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, handshakeMessage); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Add a callback function to the table of senders of server hello extensions. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + PRUint16 ex_type, + sslExtensionBuilderFunc cb) +{ + int i; + sslExtensionBuilder *sender; + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + sender = &xtnData->serverHelloSenders[0]; + } else { + if (tls13_ExtensionStatus(ex_type, ssl_hs_server_hello) == + tls13_extension_allowed) { + PORT_Assert(tls13_ExtensionStatus(ex_type, + ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) == + tls13_extension_disallowed); + sender = &xtnData->serverHelloSenders[0]; + } else if (tls13_ExtensionStatus(ex_type, + ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) == + tls13_extension_allowed) { + sender = &xtnData->encryptedExtensionsSenders[0]; + } else if (tls13_ExtensionStatus(ex_type, ssl_hs_certificate) == + tls13_extension_allowed) { + sender = &xtnData->certificateSenders[0]; + } else { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) { + if (!sender->ex_sender) { + sender->ex_type = ex_type; + sender->ex_sender = cb; + return SECSuccess; + } + /* detect duplicate senders */ + PORT_Assert(sender->ex_type != ex_type); + if (sender->ex_type == ex_type) { + /* duplicate */ + break; + } + } + PORT_Assert(i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS); /* table needs to grow */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CallCustomExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, + SSLHandshakeType message) +{ + sslBuffer tail = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECStatus rv; + PRCList *cursor; + + /* Save any extensions that want to be last. */ + if (ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset) { + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&tail, buf->buf + ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset, + buf->len - ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + buf->len = ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset; + } + + /* Reserve the maximum amount of space possible. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(buf, 65535); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks); + cursor != &ss->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook = + (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + PRBool append = PR_FALSE; + unsigned int len = 0; + + if (hook->writer) { + /* The writer writes directly into |buf|. Provide space that allows + * for the existing extensions, any tail, plus type and length. */ + unsigned int space = buf->space - (buf->len + tail.len + 4); + append = (*hook->writer)(ss->fd, message, + buf->buf + buf->len + 4, &len, space, + hook->writerArg); + if (len > space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_APPLICATION_CALLBACK_ERROR); + goto loser; + } + } + if (!append) { + continue; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, hook->type, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + buf->len += len; + + if (message == ssl_hs_client_hello || + message == ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello || + message == ssl_hs_certificate_request) { + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = hook->type; + } + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, tail.buf, tail.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&tail); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&tail); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Call extension handlers for the given message. */ +SECStatus +ssl_ConstructExtensions(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, SSLHandshakeType message) +{ + const sslExtensionBuilder *sender; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(buf->len == 0); + + /* Clear out any extensions previously advertised */ + ss->xtnData.numAdvertised = 0; + ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised = 0; + + switch (message) { + case ssl_hs_client_hello: + if (ss->vrange.max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + /* Use TLS ClientHello Extension Permutation? */ + if (ss->opt.enableChXtnPermutation) { + sender = ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation; + } else { + sender = clientHelloSendersTLS; + } + } else { + sender = clientHelloSendersSSL3; + } + break; + + case ssl_hs_server_hello: + sender = ss->xtnData.serverHelloSenders; + break; + + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + sender = tls13_cert_req_senders; + break; + + case ssl_hs_certificate: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + sender = ss->xtnData.certificateSenders; + break; + + case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + sender = ss->xtnData.encryptedExtensionsSenders; + break; + + case ssl_hs_hello_retry_request: + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + sender = tls13_hrr_senders; + break; + + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + for (; sender->ex_sender != NULL; ++sender) { + PRUint16 ex_type = sender->ex_type; + PRBool append = PR_FALSE; + unsigned int start = buf->len; + unsigned int length; + + if (ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(ss, sender->ex_type)) { + continue; + } + + /* Save space for the extension type and length. Note that we don't grow + * the buffer now; rely on sslBuffer_Append* to do that. */ + buf->len += 4; + rv = (*sender->ex_sender)(ss, &ss->xtnData, buf, &append); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Save the length and go back to the start. */ + length = buf->len - start - 4; + buf->len = start; + if (!append) { + continue; + } + + /* If TLS 1.3 GREASE is enabled, replace ssl_tls13_grease_xtn dummy + * GREASE extension types with randomly generated GREASE value. */ + rv = tls13_MaybeGreaseExtensionType(ss, message, &ex_type); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ex_type, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, length, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + /* Skip over the extension body. */ + buf->len += length; + + if (message == ssl_hs_client_hello || + message == ssl_hs_certificate_request) { + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = + ex_type; + } + } + + if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->extensionHooks)) { + if (message == ssl_hs_client_hello && ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner) { + message = ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello; + } + rv = ssl_CallCustomExtensionSenders(ss, buf, message); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + if (buf->len > 0xffff) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + goto loser; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(buf); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This extension sender can be used anywhere that an always empty extension is + * needed. Mostly that is for ServerHello where sender registration is dynamic; + * ClientHello senders are usually conditional in some way. */ +SECStatus +ssl_SendEmptyExtension(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append) +{ + *append = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Takes the size of the ClientHello, less the record header, and determines how + * much padding is required. */ +static unsigned int +ssl_CalculatePaddingExtLen(const sslSocket *ss, unsigned int clientHelloLength) +{ + unsigned int extensionLen; + + /* Don't pad for DTLS, for SSLv3, or for renegotiation. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) || + ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 || + ss->firstHsDone) { + return 0; + } + + /* A padding extension may be included to ensure that the record containing + * the ClientHello doesn't have a length between 256 and 511 bytes + * (inclusive). Initial ClientHello records with such lengths trigger bugs + * in F5 devices. */ + if (clientHelloLength < 256 || clientHelloLength >= 512) { + return 0; + } + + extensionLen = 512 - clientHelloLength; + /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include at least + * one byte of data if we are padding. Some servers will time out or + * terminate the connection if the last ClientHello extension is empty. */ + if (extensionLen < 5) { + extensionLen = 5; + } + + return extensionLen - 4; +} + +/* Manually insert an extension, retaining the position of the PSK + * extension, if present. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_EmplaceExtension(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, PRUint16 exType, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, PRBool advertise) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int tailLen; + + /* Move the tail if there is one. This only happens if we are sending the + * TLS 1.3 PSK extension, which needs to be at the end. */ + if (ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset) { + PORT_Assert(buf->len > ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset); + tailLen = buf->len - ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset; + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(buf, buf->len + 4 + len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memmove(buf->buf + ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset + 4 + len, + buf->buf + ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset, + tailLen); + buf->len = ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset; + } else { + tailLen = 0; + } + if (exType == ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn) { + ss->xtnData.echXtnOffset = buf->len; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, exType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, data, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + if (ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset) { + ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset += 4 + len; + } + + buf->len += tailLen; + + /* False only to retain behavior with padding_xtn. Maybe + * we can just mark that advertised as well? TODO */ + if (advertise) { + ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = exType; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_SendPaddingExtension possibly adds an extension which ensures that a + * ClientHello record is either < 256 bytes or is >= 512 bytes. This ensures + * that we don't trigger bugs in F5 products. + * + * This takes an existing extension buffer, |buf|, and the length of the + * remainder of the ClientHello, |prefixLen|. It modifies the extension buffer + * to insert padding at the right place. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int prefixLen, + sslBuffer *buf) +{ + static unsigned char padding[252] = { 0 }; + unsigned int paddingLen; + /* Exit early if an application-provided extension hook + * already added padding. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_padding_xtn)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Account for the size of the header, the length field of the extensions + * block and the size of the existing extensions. */ + paddingLen = ssl_CalculatePaddingExtLen(ss, prefixLen + 2 + buf->len); + if (!paddingLen) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + return ssl3_EmplaceExtension(ss, buf, ssl_padding_xtn, padding, paddingLen, PR_FALSE); +} + +void +ssl3_MoveRemoteExtensions(PRCList *dst, PRCList *src) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(src)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(src); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + PR_INSERT_LINK(cur_p, dst); + } +} + +void +ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + PORT_Free(cur_p); + } +} + +/* Initialize the extension data block. */ +void +ssl3_InitExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData, const sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int advertisedMax; + PRCList *cursor; + + /* Set things up to the right starting state. */ + PORT_Memset(xtnData, 0, sizeof(*xtnData)); + xtnData->peerSupportsFfdheGroups = PR_FALSE; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares); + + /* Allocate enough to allow for native extensions, plus any custom ones. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + advertisedMax = PR_MAX(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(certificateRequestHandlers), + PR_ARRAY_SIZE(tls13_cert_req_senders)); + } else { + advertisedMax = PR_MAX(PR_ARRAY_SIZE(clientHelloHandlers), + PR_ARRAY_SIZE(clientHelloSendersTLS)); + ++advertisedMax; /* For the RI SCSV, which we also track. */ + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks); + cursor != &ss->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + ++advertisedMax; + } + xtnData->advertised = PORT_ZNewArray(PRUint16, advertisedMax); + xtnData->echAdvertised = PORT_ZNewArray(PRUint16, advertisedMax); + + xtnData->peerDelegCred = NULL; + xtnData->peerRequestedDelegCred = PR_FALSE; + xtnData->sendingDelegCredToPeer = PR_FALSE; + xtnData->selectedPsk = NULL; +} + +void +ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData) +{ + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(xtnData); + PORT_Free(xtnData->sigSchemes); + PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes); + PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE); + tls13_DestroyKeyShares(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->certReqContext, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->applicationToken, PR_FALSE); + if (xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena, PR_FALSE); + xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL; + } + PORT_Free(xtnData->advertised); + PORT_Free(xtnData->echAdvertised); + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(xtnData->peerDelegCred); + + tls13_DestroyEchXtnState(xtnData->ech); + xtnData->ech = NULL; +} + +/* Free everything that has been allocated and then reset back to + * the starting state. */ +void +ssl3_ResetExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData, const sslSocket *ss) +{ + ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(xtnData); + ssl3_InitExtensionData(xtnData, ss); +} + +/* Thunks to let extension handlers operate on const sslSocket* objects. */ +void +ssl3_ExtSendAlert(const sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, + SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert((sslSocket *)ss, level, desc); +} + +void +ssl3_ExtDecodeError(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + (void)ssl3_DecodeError((sslSocket *)ss); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(const sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + return ssl3_ConsumeHandshake((sslSocket *)ss, v, bytes, b, length); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length) +{ + return ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber((sslSocket *)ss, num, bytes, b, length); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(const sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length) +{ + return ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable((sslSocket *)ss, i, bytes, b, length); +} + +SECStatus +tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationSetup(sslSocket *ss) +{ + size_t buildersLen = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(clientHelloSendersTLS); + const size_t buildersSize = (sizeof(sslExtensionBuilder) * buildersLen); + /* Psk Extension and then NULL entry MUST be last. */ + const size_t permutationLen = buildersLen - 2; + + /* There shouldn't already be a stored permutation. */ + PR_ASSERT(!ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation); + + /* This shuffle handles up to 256 extensions. */ + PR_ASSERT(buildersLen < 256); + uint8_t permutation[256] = { 0 }; + + sslExtensionBuilder *builders = PORT_ZAlloc(buildersSize); + if (!builders) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get a working copy of default builders. */ + PORT_Memcpy(builders, clientHelloSendersTLS, buildersSize); + + /* Get permutation randoms. */ + if (PK11_GenerateRandom(permutation, permutationLen) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(builders); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Fisher-Yates Shuffle */ + for (size_t i = permutationLen - 1; i > 0; i--) { + size_t idx = permutation[i - 1] % (i + 1); + sslExtensionBuilder tmp = builders[i]; + builders[i] = builders[idx]; + builders[idx] = tmp; + } + + /* Make sure that Psk extension is penultimate (before NULL entry). */ + PR_ASSERT(builders[buildersLen - 2].ex_type == ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn); + PR_ASSERT(builders[buildersLen - 2].ex_sender == clientHelloSendersTLS[buildersLen - 2].ex_sender); + + ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation = builders; + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation); + ss->ssl3.hs.chExtensionPermutation = NULL; + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d582e2b2c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ext.h @@ -0,0 +1,212 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __ssl3ext_h_ +#define __ssl3ext_h_ + +#include "pk11hpke.h" +#include "sslencode.h" + +typedef enum { + sni_nametype_hostname +} SNINameType; +typedef struct TLSExtensionDataStr TLSExtensionData; + +/* Registerable callback function that either appends extension to buffer + * or returns length of data that it would have appended. + */ +typedef SECStatus (*sslExtensionBuilderFunc)(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); + +/* row in a table of hello extension senders */ +typedef struct { + PRInt32 ex_type; + sslExtensionBuilderFunc ex_sender; +} sslExtensionBuilder; + +struct TLSExtensionDataStr { + /* registered callbacks that send server hello extensions */ + sslExtensionBuilder serverHelloSenders[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS]; + sslExtensionBuilder encryptedExtensionsSenders[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS]; + sslExtensionBuilder certificateSenders[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS]; + + /* Keep track of the extensions that are advertised or negotiated. */ + PRUint16 numAdvertised; + PRUint16 *advertised; /* Allocated dynamically. */ + PRUint16 echNumAdvertised; /* Tracks Xtns offered in ClientHelloInner. */ + PRUint16 *echAdvertised; + PRUint16 numNegotiated; + PRUint16 negotiated[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS]; + + /* SessionTicket Extension related data. */ + PRBool ticketTimestampVerified; + PRBool emptySessionTicket; + PRBool sentSessionTicketInClientHello; + SECItem psk_ke_modes; + PRUint32 max_early_data_size; + + /* SNI Extension related data + * Names data is not coppied from the input buffer. It can not be + * used outside the scope where input buffer is defined and that + * is beyond ssl3_HandleClientHello function. */ + SECItem *sniNameArr; + PRUint32 sniNameArrSize; + + /* Signed Certificate Timestamps extracted from the TLS extension. + * (client only). + * This container holds a temporary pointer to the extension data, + * until a session structure (the sec.ci.sid of an sslSocket) is setup + * that can hold a permanent copy of the data + * (in sec.ci.sid.u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps). + * The data pointed to by this structure is neither explicitly allocated + * nor copied: the pointer points to the handshake message buffer and is + * only valid in the scope of ssl3_HandleServerHello. + */ + SECItem signedCertTimestamps; + + PRBool peerSupportsFfdheGroups; /* if the peer supports named ffdhe groups */ + + /* clientSigAndHash contains the contents of the signature_algorithms + * extension (if any) the other side supports. This is only valid for TLS + * 1.2 or later. In TLS 1.3, it is also used for CertificateRequest. */ + SSLSignatureScheme *sigSchemes; + unsigned int numSigSchemes; + + /* Keep track of signature schemes that the remote peer supports for + * Delegated Credentials signatures, as well was those we have + * advertised (for purposes of validating any received DC). + * This list may not be the same as those supported for certificates. + * Only valid for TLS 1.3. */ + SSLSignatureScheme *delegCredSigSchemes; + unsigned int numDelegCredSigSchemes; + SSLSignatureScheme *delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; + unsigned int numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; + + SECItem certReqContext; + CERTDistNames certReqAuthorities; + + /* In a client: if the server supports Next Protocol Negotiation, then + * this is the protocol that was negotiated. + */ + SECItem nextProto; + SSLNextProtoState nextProtoState; + + PRUint16 dtlsSRTPCipherSuite; /* 0 if not selected */ + + unsigned int echXtnOffset; /* The start of the ECH Xtn (if any) */ + unsigned int lastXtnOffset; /* Where to insert any other extensions. + * 0 = end, otherwise base of PSK xtn. */ + PRCList remoteKeyShares; /* The other side's public keys (TLS 1.3) */ + + /* The following are used by a TLS 1.3 server. */ + SECItem pskBinder; /* The binder for the first PSK. */ + unsigned int pskBindersLen; /* The length of the binders. */ + PRUint32 ticketAge; /* Used to accept early data. */ + SECItem cookie; /* HRR Cookie. */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup; /* For HRR. */ + /* The application token contains a value that was passed to the client via + * a session ticket, or the cookie in a HelloRetryRequest. */ + SECItem applicationToken; + + /* The record size limit set by the peer. Our value is kept in ss->opt. */ + PRUint16 recordSizeLimit; + + /* Delegated credentials. + * + * The delegated credential sent by the peer. Set by + * |tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential|. + */ + sslDelegatedCredential *peerDelegCred; + /* Whether the peer requested a delegated credential. */ + PRBool peerRequestedDelegCred; + /* Whether the host is committed to using a delegated credential. Set by + * |tls13_MaybeSetDelegatedCredential|. + */ + PRBool sendingDelegCredToPeer; + + /* A non-owning reference to the selected PSKs. MUST NOT be freed directly, + * rather through tls13_DestoryPskList(). */ + sslPsk *selectedPsk; + + /* ECH working state. Non-null when a valid Encrypted Client Hello extension + * was received. */ + sslEchXtnState *ech; +}; + +typedef struct TLSExtensionStr { + PRCList link; /* The linked list link */ + PRUint16 type; /* Extension type */ + SECItem data; /* Pointers into the handshake data. */ +} TLSExtension; + +typedef struct sslCustomExtensionHooks { + PRCList link; + PRUint16 type; + SSLExtensionWriter writer; + void *writerArg; + SSLExtensionHandler handler; + void *handlerArg; +} sslCustomExtensionHooks; + +SECStatus ssl3_HandleExtensions(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, + SSLHandshakeType handshakeMessage); +SECStatus ssl3_ParseExtensions(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, + SSLHandshakeType handshakeMessage); +TLSExtension *ssl3_FindExtension(sslSocket *ss, + SSLExtensionType extension_type); +void ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(PRCList *list); +void ssl3_MoveRemoteExtensions(PRCList *dst, PRCList *src); +void ssl3_InitExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData, const sslSocket *ss); +void ssl3_DestroyExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData); +void ssl3_ResetExtensionData(TLSExtensionData *xtnData, const sslSocket *ss); + +PRBool ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type); +PRBool ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type); + +SECStatus ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + PRUint16 ex_type, + sslExtensionBuilderFunc cb); +SECStatus ssl_ConstructExtensions(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, + SSLHandshakeType message); +SECStatus ssl_SendEmptyExtension(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus ssl3_EmplaceExtension(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, PRUint16 exType, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, PRBool advertise); +SECStatus ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int prefixLen, + sslBuffer *buf); + +/* Thunks to let us operate on const sslSocket* objects. */ +void ssl3_ExtSendAlert(const sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, + SSL3AlertDescription desc); +void ssl3_ExtDecodeError(const sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(const sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length); +SECStatus ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length); +SECStatus ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(const sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length); + +SECStatus SSLExp_GetExtensionSupport(PRUint16 type, + SSLExtensionSupport *support); +SECStatus SSLExp_InstallExtensionHooks( + PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 extension, SSLExtensionWriter writer, + void *writerArg, SSLExtensionHandler handler, void *handlerArg); +sslCustomExtensionHooks *ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 extension); +SECStatus ssl_CallCustomExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, + SSLHandshakeType message); +SECStatus tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationSetup(sslSocket *ss); +void tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(sslSocket *ss); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cafddd81fd --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.c @@ -0,0 +1,2004 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "blapit.h" +#include "prinit.h" +#include "selfencrypt.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" /* For tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn. */ + +PRBool +ssl_ShouldSendSNIExtension(const sslSocket *ss, const char *url) +{ + PRNetAddr netAddr; + + /* must have a hostname */ + if (!url || !url[0]) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */ + if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(url, &netAddr)) { + /* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL, + * unless that name is a dotted decimal string. + * Used by client and server. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientFormatServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, const char *url, + unsigned int len, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* length of server_name_list */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, len + 3, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* HostName (length and value) */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (const PRUint8 *)url, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + const char *url = ss->url; + + if (!ssl_ShouldSendSNIExtension(ss, url)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* If ECH, write the public name. The real server name + * is emplaced while constructing CHInner extensions. */ + sslEchConfig *cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs); + const char *sniContents = PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs) ? url : cfg->contents.publicName; + rv = ssl3_ClientFormatServerNameXtn(ss, sniContents, strlen(sniContents), xtnData, buf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECItem *names = NULL; + PRUint32 listLenBytes = 0; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + return SECSuccess; /* ignore extension */ + } + + /* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */ + /* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */ + if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* length of server_name_list */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &listLenBytes, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* alert already sent */ + } + if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Read ServerNameList. */ + while (data->len > 0) { + SECItem tmp; + PRUint32 type; + + /* Read Name Type. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &type, 1, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* alert sent in ConsumeHandshakeNumber */ + goto loser; + } + + /* Read ServerName (length and value). */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Record the value for host_name(0). */ + if (type == sni_nametype_hostname) { + /* Fail if we encounter a second host_name entry. */ + if (names) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* Create an array for the only supported NameType. */ + names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, 1); + if (!names) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Copy ServerName into the array. */ + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &names[0], &tmp) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Even if we don't support NameTypes other than host_name at the + * moment, we continue parsing the whole list to check its validity. + * We do not check for duplicate entries with NameType != host_name(0). + */ + } + if (names) { + /* Free old and set the new data. */ + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(xtnData); + xtnData->sniNameArr = names; + xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 1; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn; + } + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); +loser: + if (names) { + PORT_Free(names); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Frees a given xtnData->sniNameArr and its elements. */ +void +ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(TLSExtensionData *xtnData) +{ + PRUint32 i; + + if (!xtnData->sniNameArr) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < xtnData->sniNameArrSize; i++) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->sniNameArr[i], PR_FALSE); + } + + PORT_Free(xtnData->sniNameArr); + xtnData->sniNameArr = NULL; + xtnData->sniNameArrSize = 0; +} + +/* Called by both clients and servers. + * Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise + * sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + + /* Never send an extension with a ticket for TLS 1.3, but + * OK to send the empty one in case the server does 1.2. */ + if ((sid->cached == in_client_cache || sid->cached == in_external_cache) && + sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Send a session ticket if one is available. + * + * The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot + * just acquire and release the lock within this function because the + * caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be + * consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller + * will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're + * attempting to resume an existing session. + */ + session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + if (session_ticket->ticket.data && + (xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified || + ssl_TicketTimeValid(ss, session_ticket))) { + + xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, session_ticket->ticket.data, + session_ticket->ticket.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(const sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *tag) +{ + const unsigned char *data = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data; + unsigned int length = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; + unsigned int offset = 0; + + if (!tag->len) + return PR_TRUE; + + while (offset < length) { + unsigned int taglen = (unsigned int)data[offset]; + if ((taglen == tag->len) && + !PORT_Memcmp(data + offset + 1, tag->data, tag->len)) + return PR_TRUE; + offset += 1 + taglen; + } + + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol checks that the given block of data is valid: none + * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of + * the block. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int length) +{ + unsigned int offset = 0; + + while (offset < length) { + unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int)data[offset]; + /* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that + * store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings. + */ + if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + offset = newOffset; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Protocol selection handler for ALPN. */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + PRUint16 extension, SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned char resultBuffer[255]; + SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 }; + + rv = ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(data->data, data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback); + /* Neither the cipher suite nor ECH are selected yet Note that extensions + * sometimes affect what cipher suite is selected, e.g., for ECC. */ + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & + ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite & ~ssl_preinfo_ech) == + (ssl_preinfo_all & ~ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite & ~ssl_preinfo_ech)); + /* The callback has to make sure that either rv != SECSuccess or that result + * is not set if there is no common protocol. */ + rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len, + result.data, &result.len, sizeof(resultBuffer)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Expect callback to call PORT_SetError() */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our + * stack. */ + if (result.len > sizeof(resultBuffer)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE); + + if (result.len < 1 || !result.data) { + /* Check that we actually got a result. */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL); + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = extension; + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &result); +} + +/* handle an incoming ALPN extension at the server */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PRUint32 count; + SECStatus rv; + + /* We expressly don't want to allow ALPN on renegotiation, + * despite it being permitted by the spec. */ + if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len == 0) { + /* Clients MUST send a non-empty ALPN extension. */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* ALPN has extra redundant length information so that + * the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &count, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || count != data->len) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) { + /* we're not configured for it */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, xtnData, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + /* prepare to send back a response, if we negotiated */ + if (xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) { + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, + ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, + ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 list_len; + SECItem protocol_name; + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The extension data from the server has the following format: + * uint16 name_list_len; + * uint8 len; // where len >= 1 + * uint8 protocol_name[len]; */ + if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &list_len, 2, &data->data, + &data->len); + /* The list has to be the entire extension. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || list_len != data->len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &protocol_name, 1, + &data->data, &data->len); + /* The list must have exactly one value. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess || data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(ss, &protocol_name)) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&xtnData->nextProto, PR_FALSE); + xtnData->nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn; + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->nextProto, &protocol_name); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len || ss->firstHsDone) { + PR_ASSERT(!ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data); + return SECSuccess; + } + PRBool addGrease = ss->opt.enableGrease && ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + + /* The list of protocol strings is prefixed with a 2-byte length */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len + (addGrease ? 3 : 0), 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* The list of protocol strings */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* A client MAY select one or more GREASE ALPN identifiers and advertise + * them in the "application_layer_protocol_negotiation" extension, if sent + * [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ + if (addGrease) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_alpn], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* We're in over our heads if any of these fail */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableALPN); + PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.data); + PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProto.len > 0); + PORT_Assert(xtnData->nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED); + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->nextProto.len + 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, xtnData->nextProto.data, + xtnData->nextProto.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + sslExtensionBuilderFunc sender; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + + /* remember that we got this extension. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn; + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + sender = tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn; + } else { + sender = ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn; + } + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ssl_cert_status_xtn, sender); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + + if (!serverCert->certStatusArray || + !serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the + * client side. See RFC 6066 section 8. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are + * implicitly known to the server. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions. + * Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This + * means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + /* In TLS 1.3, the extension carries the OCSP response. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), + data->data, data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + } else if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#define TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION (0x010a) + +/* + * Called from ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket, tls13_SendNewSessionTicket + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket, + const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen, + PK11SymKey *secret, SECItem *ticket_data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer plaintext = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECItem ticket_buf = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + sslSessionID sid; + unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH]; + SECItem ms_item = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + PRTime now; + SECItem *srvName = NULL; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech; + SECItem *alpnSelection = NULL; + PRUint32 ticketAgeBaseline; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Extract the master secret wrapped. */ + + PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID)); + + PORT_Assert(secret); + rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(ss, &sid, secret); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms)) + goto loser; + memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len); + ms_item.data = wrapped_ms; + ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech; + } else { + /* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */ + goto loser; + } + /* Prep to send negotiated name */ + srvName = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.srvName; + + /* ticket version */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION, + sizeof(PRUint16)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* ssl_version */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->version, + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* ciphersuite */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* cipher spec parameters */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.authType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + if (ss->sec.keaGroup) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaGroup->name, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } else { + /* No kea group. Write 0 as invalid value. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, 0, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->sec.signatureScheme, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* certificate type */ + PORT_Assert(SSL_CERT_IS(ss->sec.serverCert, ss->sec.authType)); + if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(ss->sec.serverCert)) { + const sslServerCert *cert = ss->sec.serverCert; + PORT_Assert(cert->namedCurve); + /* EC curves only use the second of the two bytes. */ + PORT_Assert(cert->namedCurve->name < 256); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, cert->namedCurve->name, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, 0, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* master_secret */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* client identity */ + if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&plaintext, + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data, + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + /* timestamp */ + now = ssl_Time(ss); + PORT_Assert(sizeof(now) == 8); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, now, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* HostName (length and value) */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* extendedMasterSecretUsed */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber( + &plaintext, ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Flags */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ticket->flags, + sizeof(ticket->flags)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* ALPN value. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED || + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED || + ss->xtnData.nextProto.len == 0); + alpnSelection = &ss->xtnData.nextProto; + PORT_Assert(alpnSelection->len < 256); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&plaintext, alpnSelection->data, + alpnSelection->len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ss->opt.maxEarlyDataSize, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* + * We store this in the ticket: + * ticket_age_baseline = 1rtt - ticket_age_add + * + * When the client resumes, it will provide: + * obfuscated_age = ticket_age_client + ticket_age_add + * + * We expect to receive the ticket at: + * ticket_create + 1rtt + ticket_age_server + * + * We calculate the client's estimate of this as: + * ticket_create + ticket_age_baseline + obfuscated_age + * = ticket_create + 1rtt + ticket_age_client + * + * This is compared to the expected time, which should differ only as a + * result of clock errors or errors in the RTT estimate. + */ + ticketAgeBaseline = ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC; + ticketAgeBaseline -= ticket->ticket_age_add; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&plaintext, ticketAgeBaseline, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Application token */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&plaintext, appToken, appTokenLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This really only happens if appTokenLen is too much, and that always + * comes from the using application. */ + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&plaintext) > 0xffff) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + ticket_buf.len = ssl_SelfEncryptGetProtectedSize(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&plaintext)); + PORT_Assert(ticket_buf.len > 0); + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ticket_buf, ticket_buf.len) == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Finally, encrypt the ticket. */ + rv = ssl_SelfEncryptProtect(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&plaintext), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&plaintext), + ticket_buf.data, &ticket_buf.len, ticket_buf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Give ownership of memory to caller. */ + *ticket_data = ticket_buf; + + sslBuffer_Clear(&plaintext); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&plaintext); + if (ticket_buf.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_buf, PR_FALSE); + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +/* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket + * message is expected during the handshake. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (data->len != 0) { + return SECSuccess; /* Ignore the extension. */ + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_session_ticket_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +} + +PR_STATIC_ASSERT((TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION >> 8) == 1); + +static SECStatus +ssl_ParseSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *decryptedTicket, + SessionTicket *parsedTicket) +{ + PRUint32 temp; + SECStatus rv; + + PRUint8 *buffer = decryptedTicket->data; + unsigned int len = decryptedTicket->len; + + PORT_Memset(parsedTicket, 0, sizeof(*parsedTicket)); + parsedTicket->valid = PR_FALSE; + + /* If the decrypted ticket is empty, then report success, but leave the + * ticket marked as invalid. */ + if (decryptedTicket->len == 0) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Read ticket version. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* All ticket versions start with 0x01, so check to see if this + * is a ticket or some other self-encrypted thing. */ + if ((temp >> 8) != 1) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Skip the ticket if the version is wrong. This won't result in a + * handshake failure, just a failure to resume. */ + if (temp != TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Read SSLVersion. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; + if (!ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, + parsedTicket->ssl_version)) { + /* This socket doesn't support the version from the ticket. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Read cipher_suite. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; + + /* Read cipher spec parameters. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + PORT_Assert(temp < ssl_auth_size); +#else + temp %= (8 * sizeof(SSLAuthType)) - 1; +#endif + + parsedTicket->authType = (SSLAuthType)temp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->authKeyBits = temp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->keaKeyBits = temp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->originalKeaGroup = temp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->signatureScheme = (SSLSignatureScheme)temp; + + /* Read the optional named curve. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (parsedTicket->authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + parsedTicket->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + parsedTicket->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = + ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)temp); + if (!group || group->keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->namedCurve = group; + } + + /* Read the master secret (and how it is wrapped). */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (temp == 0 || temp > sizeof(parsedTicket->master_secret)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp; + + /* Read the master secret. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, parsedTicket->master_secret, + parsedTicket->ms_length, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Read client identity */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->client_auth_type = (ClientAuthenticationType)temp; + switch (parsedTicket->client_auth_type) { + case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS: + break; + case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE: + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &parsedTicket->peer_cert, 2, + &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Read timestamp. This is a 64-bit value and + * ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber only reads 32-bits at a time. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Cast to avoid undefined behavior if the top bit is set. */ + parsedTicket->timestamp = (PRTime)((PRUint64)temp << 32); + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->timestamp |= (PRTime)temp; + + /* Read server name */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &parsedTicket->srvName, 2, + &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Read extendedMasterSecretUsed */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 1, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + /* A well-behaving server should only write 0 or 1. */ + PORT_Assert(temp == PR_TRUE || temp == PR_FALSE); +#endif + parsedTicket->extendedMasterSecretUsed = temp ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->flags = PR_ntohl(temp); + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &parsedTicket->alpnSelection, 1, + &buffer, &len); + PORT_Assert(parsedTicket->alpnSelection.len < 256); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->maxEarlyData = temp; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 4, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedTicket->ticketAgeBaseline = temp; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &parsedTicket->applicationToken, + 2, &buffer, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + /* Done parsing. Check that all bytes have been consumed. */ + if (len != 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } +#endif + + parsedTicket->valid = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_CreateSIDFromTicket(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *rawTicket, + SessionTicket *parsedTicket, sslSessionID **out) +{ + sslSessionID *sid; + SECStatus rv; + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (sid == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Copy over parameters. */ + sid->version = parsedTicket->ssl_version; + sid->creationTime = parsedTicket->timestamp; + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsedTicket->cipher_suite; + sid->authType = parsedTicket->authType; + sid->authKeyBits = parsedTicket->authKeyBits; + sid->keaType = parsedTicket->keaType; + sid->keaKeyBits = parsedTicket->keaKeyBits; + sid->keaGroup = parsedTicket->originalKeaGroup; + sid->namedCurve = parsedTicket->namedCurve; + sid->sigScheme = parsedTicket->signatureScheme; + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket, + rawTicket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags = parsedTicket->flags; + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size = + parsedTicket->maxEarlyData; + + if (parsedTicket->ms_length > + sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret)) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + parsedTicket->master_secret, parsedTicket->ms_length); + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = parsedTicket->ms_length; + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsedTicket->msWrapMech; + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = parsedTicket->extendedMasterSecretUsed; + + /* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */ + if (parsedTicket->peer_cert.data != NULL) { + PORT_Assert(!sid->peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, + &parsedTicket->peer_cert, + NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (!sid->peerCert) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Transfer ownership of the remaining items. */ + if (parsedTicket->srvName.data != NULL) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.srvName, + &parsedTicket->srvName); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + if (parsedTicket->alpnSelection.data != NULL) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, + &parsedTicket->alpnSelection); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + *out = sid; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Generic ticket processing code, common to all TLS versions. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *ticket, + SECItem *appToken) +{ + SECItem decryptedTicket = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SessionTicket parsedTicket; + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + if (!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &decryptedTicket, ticket->len)) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Decrypt the ticket. */ + rv = ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotect(ss, ticket->data, ticket->len, + decryptedTicket.data, + &decryptedTicket.len, + decryptedTicket.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Ignore decryption failure if we are doing TLS 1.3; that + * means the server rejects the client's resumption + * attempt. In TLS 1.2, however, it's a hard failure, unless + * it's just because we're not the recipient of the ticket. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT) { + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&decryptedTicket, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl_ParseSessionTicket(ss, &decryptedTicket, &parsedTicket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats; + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures); + goto loser; /* code already set */ + } + + /* Use the ticket if it is valid and unexpired. */ + PRTime end = parsedTicket.timestamp + (ssl_ticket_lifetime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + if (end > ssl_Time(ss)) { + + rv = ssl_CreateSIDFromTicket(ss, ticket, &parsedTicket, &sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code already set */ + } + if (appToken && parsedTicket.applicationToken.len) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, appToken, + &parsedTicket.applicationToken); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code already set */ + } + } + + ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE; + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + /* We have the baseline value for the obfuscated ticket age here. Save + * that in xtnData temporarily. This value is updated in + * tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn with the final estimate. */ + ss->xtnData.ticketAge = parsedTicket.ticketAgeBaseline; + } + + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&decryptedTicket, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Memset(&parsedTicket, 0, sizeof(parsedTicket)); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&decryptedTicket, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Memset(&parsedTicket, 0, sizeof(parsedTicket)); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* If we are doing TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_session_ticket_xtn; + + /* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client. We are + * lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake + * instead of terminating the current connection. + */ + if (data->len == 0) { + xtnData->emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + + return ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), data, + NULL); +} + +/* Extension format: + * Extension number: 2 bytes + * Extension length: 2 bytes + * Verify Data Length: 1 byte + * Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server) + * Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server) + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + PRInt32 len = 0; + SECStatus rv; + + /* In RFC 5746, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send both the SCSV and the empty + * RI, so when we send SCSV in the initial handshake, we don't also send RI. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) { + return 0; + } + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2 + : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes; + } + + /* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function runs in both the client and server. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRUint32 len = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes + : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2; + } + if (data->len != 1 + len || data->data[0] != len) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + if (len && NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, + data->data + 1, len)) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); + return SECFailure; + } + /* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */ + CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss) + ->peerRequestedProtection = 1; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */ + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, + ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn); + } + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + unsigned int i; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) { + return SECSuccess; /* Not relevant */ + } + + /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* The SRTP ciphers */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + /* Empty MKI value */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* The selected cipher */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Empty MKI value */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ciphers = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRUint16 i; + PRUint16 cipher = 0; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + SECItem litem; + + if (!data->data || !data->len) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* fatal alert already sent */ + } + /* Now check that the server has picked just 1 (i.e., len = 2) */ + if (ciphers.len != 2) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the selected cipher */ + cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1]; + + /* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */ + for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the srtp_mki value */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ + } + + /* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */ + if (litem.len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* extra trailing bytes */ + if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* OK, this looks fine. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; + xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem ciphers = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PRUint16 i; + unsigned int j; + PRUint16 cipher = 0; + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + SECItem litem; + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) { + /* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP + * preferences have been set. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (!data->data || data->len < 5) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the cipher list */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ + } + /* Check that the list is even length */ + if (ciphers.len % 2) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our + * ciphers, if any */ + for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { + for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) { + cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1]; + if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + } + + /* Get the srtp_mki value */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); /* trailing bytes */ + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now figure out what to do */ + if (!found) { + /* No matching ciphers, pretend we don't support use_srtp */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */ + xtnData->dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; + + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, + ssl_use_srtp_xtn, + ssl3_ServerSendUseSRTPXtn); +} + +/* ssl3_HandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension from a + * client. In TLS 1.3, the client uses this to parse CertificateRequest + * extensions. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (xtnData->sigSchemes) { + PORT_Free(xtnData->sigSchemes); + xtnData->sigSchemes = NULL; + } + rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, NULL, + &xtnData->sigSchemes, + &xtnData->numSigSchemes, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + if (xtnData->numSigSchemes == 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check for trailing data. */ + if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS + * 1.2 ClientHellos. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_SendSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PRUint16 minVersion; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + minVersion = ss->version; /* CertificateRequest */ + } else { + minVersion = ss->vrange.min; /* ClientHello */ + } + + SECStatus rv = ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(ss, minVersion, PR_TRUE /* forCert */, + ss->opt.enableGrease, buf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_SendExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (!ss->opt.enableExtendedMS) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Always send the extension in this function, since the + * client always sends it and this function is only called on + * the server if we negotiated the extension. */ + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (!ss->opt.enableExtendedMS) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (data->len != 0) { + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Bogus extended master secret extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Negotiated extended master secret extension.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn; + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, + ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn, + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn sends the signed_certificate_timestamp + * extension for TLS ClientHellos. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + /* Only send the extension if processing is enabled. */ + if (!ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + /* We do not yet know whether we'll be resuming a session or creating + * a new one, so we keep a pointer to the data in the TLSExtensionData + * structure. This pointer is only valid in the scope of + * ssl3_HandleServerHello, and, if not resuming a session, the data is + * copied once a new session structure has been set up. + * All parsing is currently left to the application and we accept + * everything, including empty data. + */ + SECItem *scts = &xtnData->signedCertTimestamps; + PORT_Assert(!scts->data && !scts->len); + + if (!data->len) { + /* Empty extension data: RFC 6962 mandates non-empty contents. */ + return SECFailure; + } + *scts = *data; + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + const SECItem *scts = &ss->sec.serverCert->signedCertTimestamps; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!scts->len) { + /* No timestamps to send */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, scts->data, scts->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_ServerHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, + ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, + ssl3_ServerSendSignedCertTimestampXtn); +} + +/* Just make sure that the remote client supports uncompressed points, + * Since that is all we support. Disable ECC cipher suites if it doesn't. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + int i; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (data->len < 2 || data->len > 255 || !data->data || + data->len != (unsigned int)data->data[0] + 1) { + ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + for (i = data->len; --i > 0;) { + if (data->data[i] == 0) { + /* indicate that we should send a reply */ + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender( + ss, xtnData, ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, + &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn); + } + } + + /* Poor client doesn't support uncompressed points. + * + * If the client sends the extension and the extension does not contain the + * uncompressed point format, and the client has used the Supported Groups + * extension to indicate support for any of the curves defined in this + * specification, then the server MUST abort the handshake and return an + * illegal_parameter alert. [RFC8422, Section 5.1.2] */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_UpdateSupportedGroups(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 list_len; + unsigned int i; + const sslNamedGroupDef *enabled[SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT] = { 0 }; + PORT_Assert(SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(enabled)); + + if (!data->data || data->len < 4) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* get the length of elliptic_curve_list */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &list_len, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess || data->len != list_len || (data->len % 2) != 0) { + (void)ssl3_DecodeError(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* disable all groups and remember the enabled groups */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + enabled[i] = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + } + + /* Read groups from data and enable if in |enabled| */ + while (data->len) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; + PRUint32 curve_name; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &curve_name, 2, &data->data, + &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* fatal alert already sent */ + } + group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(curve_name); + if (group) { + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (enabled[i] && group == enabled[i]) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = enabled[i]; + break; + } + } + } + + /* "Codepoints in the NamedCurve registry with a high byte of 0x01 (that + * is, between 256 and 511 inclusive) are set aside for FFDHE groups," + * -- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe-10 + */ + if ((curve_name & 0xff00) == 0x0100) { + ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups = PR_TRUE; + } + } + + /* Note: if ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups is set, we disable DHE cipher + * suites, but we do that in ssl3_config_match(). */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups && !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups) { + /* If we don't require that DHE use named groups, and no FFDHE was + * included, we pretend that they support all the FFDHE groups we do. */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (enabled[i] && enabled[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_dh) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = enabled[i]; + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Ensure that the curve in our server cert is one of the ones supported + * by the remote client, and disable all ECC cipher suites if not. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl_UpdateSupportedGroups(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* TLS 1.3 permits the server to send this extension so make it so. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ssl_supported_groups_xtn, + &ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ + } + } + + /* Remember that we negotiated this extension. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_supported_groups_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 limit; + PRUint32 maxLimit = (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1) + : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &limit, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (data->len != 0 || limit < 64) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, + &ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error already set. */ + } + } else if (limit > maxLimit) { + /* The client can sensibly check the maximum. */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We can't enforce the maximum on a server. But we do need to ensure + * that we don't apply a limit that is too large. */ + xtnData->recordSizeLimit = PR_MIN(maxLimit, limit); + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_record_size_limit_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + PRUint32 maxLimit; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + maxLimit = (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1) + : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + } else { + maxLimit = (ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) + ? (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1) + : MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + } + PRUint32 limit = PR_MIN(ss->opt.recordSizeLimit, maxLimit); + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, limit, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..654b90de8c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3exthandle.h @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __ssl3exthandle_h_ +#define __ssl3exthandle_h_ + +#include "sslencode.h" + +SECStatus ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleUseSRTPXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_SendSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleSigAlgsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); + +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendPaddingExtension(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); + +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerSendSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSignedCertTimestampXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_SendExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleExtendedMasterSecretXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *ticket, + /* out */ SECItem *appToken); +PRBool ssl_ShouldSendSNIExtension(const sslSocket *ss, const char *url); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientFormatServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, const char *url, + unsigned int len, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl_HandleSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl3_ClientSendSessionTicketXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); + +SECStatus ssl_SendSupportedGroupsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus ssl_HandleRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus ssl_SendRecordSizeLimitXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..674ea89da9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3gthr.c @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * Gather (Read) entire SSL3 records from socket into buffer. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "ssl3prot.h" + +struct ssl2GatherStr { + /* true when ssl3_GatherData encounters an SSLv2 handshake */ + PRBool isV2; + + /* number of bytes of padding appended to the message content */ + PRUint8 padding; +}; + +typedef struct ssl2GatherStr ssl2Gather; + +/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */ +SECStatus +ssl3_InitGather(sslGather *gs) +{ + gs->state = GS_INIT; + gs->writeOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + gs->rejectV2Records = PR_FALSE; + /* Allocate plaintext buffer to maximum possibly needed size. It needs to + * be larger than recordSizeLimit for TLS 1.0 and 1.1 compatability. + * The TLS 1.2 ciphertext is larger than the TLS 1.3 ciphertext. */ + return sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH); +} + +/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */ +void +ssl3_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs) +{ + if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */ + PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space); + PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf); + PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf); + } +} + +/* Checks whether a given buffer is likely an SSLv3 record header. */ +PRBool +ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(const unsigned char *buf) +{ + /* Even if this was a V2 record header we couldn't possibly parse it + * correctly as the second bit denotes a vaguely-defined security escape. */ + if (buf[0] & 0x40) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* Check for a typical V3 record header. */ + return (PRBool)(buf[0] >= ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec && + buf[0] <= ssl_ct_application_data && + buf[1] == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)); +} + +/* + * Attempt to read in an entire SSL3 record. + * Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with + * PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block. + * + * returns 1 if received a complete SSL3 record. + * returns 0 if recv returns EOF + * returns -1 if recv returns < 0 + * (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + * + * Caller must hold the recv buf lock. + * + * The Gather state machine has 3 states: GS_INIT, GS_HEADER, GS_DATA. + * GS_HEADER: waiting for the 5-byte SSL3 record header to come in. + * GS_DATA: waiting for the body of the SSL3 record to come in. + * + * This loop returns when either + * (a) an error or EOF occurs, + * (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, + * (c) data (entire SSL3 record) has been received. + */ +static int +ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs) +{ + unsigned char *bp; + unsigned char *lbp; + int nb; + int err; + int rv = 1; + PRUint8 v2HdrLength = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + if (gs->state == GS_INIT) { + gs->state = GS_HEADER; + gs->remainder = 5; + gs->offset = 0; + gs->writeOffset = 0; + gs->readOffset = 0; + gs->inbuf.len = 0; + } + + lbp = gs->inbuf.buf; + for (;;) { + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder)); + bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? lbp : gs->hdr) + gs->offset; + nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags); + + if (nb > 0) { + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb)); + } else if (nb == 0) { + /* EOF */ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = 0; + break; + } else /* if (nb < 0) */ { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_GetError())); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + PORT_Assert((unsigned int)nb <= gs->remainder); + if ((unsigned int)nb > gs->remainder) { + /* ssl_DefRecv is misbehaving! this error is fatal to SSL. */ + gs->state = GS_INIT; /* so we don't crash next time */ + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + + gs->offset += nb; + gs->remainder -= nb; + if (gs->state == GS_DATA) + gs->inbuf.len += nb; + + /* if there's more to go, read some more. */ + if (gs->remainder > 0) { + continue; + } + + /* have received entire record header, or entire record. */ + switch (gs->state) { + case GS_HEADER: + /* Check for SSLv2 handshakes. Always assume SSLv3 on clients, + * support SSLv2 handshakes only when ssl2gs != NULL. + * Always assume v3 after we received the first record. */ + if (!ssl2gs || + ss->gs.rejectV2Records || + ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(gs->hdr)) { + /* Should have a non-SSLv2 record header in gs->hdr. Extract + * the length of the following encrypted data, and then + * read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */ + gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4]; + gs->hdrLen = SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + /* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any + * security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get + * here if one was set. See ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(). */ + gs->remainder = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1]; + ssl2gs->isV2 = PR_TRUE; + v2HdrLength = 2; + + /* Is it a 3-byte header with padding? */ + if (!(gs->hdr[0] & 0x80)) { + ssl2gs->padding = gs->hdr[2]; + v2HdrLength++; + } + } + + /* If it is NOT an SSLv2 header */ + if (!v2HdrLength) { + /* Check if default RFC specified max ciphertext/record + * limits are respected. Checks for used record size limit + * extension boundaries are done in + * ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleRecord() for tls and dtls records. + * + * -> For TLS 1.2 records MUST NOT be longer than + * 2^14 + 2048 bytes. + * -> For TLS 1.3 records MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes. + * -> For older versions this MAY be enforced, we do it. + * [RFC8446 Section 5.2, RFC5246 Section 6.2.3]. */ + if (gs->remainder > TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH || + (gs->remainder > TLS_1_3_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow); + gs->state = GS_INIT; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + gs->state = GS_DATA; + gs->offset = 0; + gs->inbuf.len = 0; + + if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) { + err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder); + if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */ + return err; + } + lbp = gs->inbuf.buf; + } + + /* When we encounter an SSLv2 hello we've read 2 or 3 bytes too + * many into the gs->hdr[] buffer. Copy them over into inbuf so + * that we can properly process the hello record later. */ + if (v2HdrLength) { + /* Reject v2 records that don't even carry enough data to + * resemble a valid ClientHello header. */ + if (gs->remainder < SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(lbp); + gs->inbuf.len = 5 - v2HdrLength; + PORT_Memcpy(lbp, gs->hdr + v2HdrLength, gs->inbuf.len); + gs->remainder -= gs->inbuf.len; + lbp += gs->inbuf.len; + } + + if (gs->remainder > 0) { + break; /* End this case. Continue around the loop. */ + } + + /* FALL THROUGH if (gs->remainder == 0) as we just received + * an empty record and there's really no point in calling + * ssl_DefRecv() with buf=NULL and len=0. */ + + case GS_DATA: + /* + ** SSL3 record has been completely received. + */ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got record of %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->inbuf.len)); + + /* reject any v2 records from now on */ + ss->gs.rejectV2Records = PR_TRUE; + + gs->state = GS_INIT; + return 1; + } + } + + return rv; +} + +/* + * Read in an entire DTLS record. + * + * Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with + * PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block. + * + * This is simpler than SSL because we are reading on a datagram socket + * and datagrams must contain >=1 complete records. + * + * returns 1 if received a complete DTLS record. + * returns 0 if recv returns EOF + * returns -1 if recv returns < 0 + * (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) + * + * Caller must hold the recv buf lock. + * + * This loop returns when either + * (a) an error or EOF occurs, + * (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, + * (c) data (entire DTLS record) has been received. + */ +static int +dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags) +{ + int nb; + PRUint8 contentType; + unsigned int headerLen; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool dtlsLengthPresent = PR_TRUE; + + SSL_TRC(30, ("dtls_GatherData")); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + gs->state = GS_HEADER; + gs->offset = 0; + + if (gs->dtlsPacketOffset == gs->dtlsPacket.len) { /* No data left */ + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + + /* Resize to the maximum possible size so we can fit a full datagram. + * This leads to record_overflow errors if records/ciphertexts greater + * than the buffer (= maximum record) size are to be received. + * DTLS Record errors are dropped silently. [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. + * Checks for record size limit extension boundaries are performed in + * ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleRecord() for tls and dtls records. + * + * -> For TLS 1.2 records MUST NOT be longer than 2^14 + 2048 bytes. + * -> For TLS 1.3 records MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes. + * -> For older versions this MAY be enforced, we do it. + * [RFC8446 Section 5.2, RFC5246 Section 6.2.3]. */ + if (ss->version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { + if (gs->dtlsPacket.space < DTLS_1_2_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket, DTLS_1_2_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH); + } + } else { /* version >= TLS 1.3 */ + if (gs->dtlsPacket.space != DTLS_1_3_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH) { + /* During Hello and version negotiation older DTLS versions with + * greater possible packets are used. The buffer must therefore + * be "truncated" by clearing and reallocating it */ + sslBuffer_Clear(&gs->dtlsPacket); + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket, DTLS_1_3_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH); + } + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return -1; /* Code already set. */ + } + + /* recv() needs to read a full datagram at a time */ + nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, gs->dtlsPacket.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.space, flags); + if (nb > 0) { + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", gs->dtlsPacket.buf, nb)); + } else if (nb == 0) { + /* EOF */ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return 0; + } else /* if (nb < 0) */ { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + PR_GetError())); + /* DTLS Record Errors, including overlong records, are silently + * dropped [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. */ + return -1; + } + + gs->dtlsPacket.len = nb; + } + + contentType = gs->dtlsPacket.buf[gs->dtlsPacketOffset]; + if (dtls_IsLongHeader(ss->version, contentType)) { + headerLen = 13; + } else if (contentType == ssl_ct_application_data) { + headerLen = 7; + } else if (dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(ss->version, contentType)) { + /* We don't support CIDs. + * + * This condition is met on all invalid outer content types. + * For lower DTLS versions as well as the inner content types, + * this is checked in ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(). + * + * In DTLS generally invalid records SHOULD be silently discarded, + * no alert is sent [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. + */ + if (contentType & 0x10) { + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + return -1; + } + + dtlsLengthPresent = (contentType & 0x04) == 0x04; + PRUint8 dtlsSeqNoSize = (contentType & 0x08) ? 2 : 1; + PRUint8 dtlsLengthBytes = dtlsLengthPresent ? 2 : 0; + headerLen = 1 + dtlsSeqNoSize + dtlsLengthBytes; + } else { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: invalid first octet (%d) for DTLS", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE); + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + return -1; + } + + /* At this point we should have >=1 complete records lined up in + * dtlsPacket. Read off the header. + */ + if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < headerLen) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet " + "too short to contain header", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + return -1; + } + memcpy(gs->hdr, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, + headerLen); + gs->hdrLen = headerLen; + gs->dtlsPacketOffset += headerLen; + + /* Have received SSL3 record header in gs->hdr. */ + if (dtlsLengthPresent) { + gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[headerLen - 2] << 8) | + gs->hdr[headerLen - 1]; + } else { + gs->remainder = gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset; + } + + if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < gs->remainder) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet too short " + "to contain rest of body", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0; + gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0; + return -1; + } + + /* OK, we have at least one complete packet, copy into inbuf */ + gs->inbuf.len = 0; + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&gs->inbuf, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&gs->dtlsPacket) + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, + gs->remainder); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return -1; /* code already set. */ + } + gs->offset = gs->remainder; + gs->dtlsPacketOffset += gs->remainder; + gs->state = GS_INIT; + + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: dtls gathered record type=%d len=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, contentType, gs->inbuf.len)); + return 1; +} + +/* Gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record. + * Repeat this until the handshake is complete, + * or until application data is available. + * + * Returns 1 when the handshake is completed without error, or + * application data is available. + * Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF. + * Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error. + * + * Called from ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c, + * and from SSL_ForceHandshake in sslsecur.c + * and from ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord below (<- DoRecv in sslsecur.c). + * + * Caller must hold the recv buf lock. + */ +int +ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags) +{ + int rv; + SSL3Ciphertext cText; + PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE; + + if (ss->ssl3.fatalAlertSent) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d] Cannot gather data; fatal alert already sent", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED); + return -1; + } + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake, + * which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the + * RecvBufLock. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + do { + PRBool processingEarlyData; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + processingEarlyData = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted; + + /* Without this, we may end up wrongly reporting + * SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_* errors if we receive any records from the + * peer while we are waiting to be restarted. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* If we have a detached record layer, don't ever gather. */ + if (ss->recordWriteCallback) { + PRBool done = ss->firstHsDone; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (done) { + return 1; + } + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + /* State for SSLv2 client hello support. */ + ssl2Gather ssl2gs = { PR_FALSE, 0 }; + ssl2Gather *ssl2gs_ptr = NULL; + + /* If we're a server and waiting for a client hello, accept v2. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->opt.enableV2CompatibleHello && + ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello) { + ssl2gs_ptr = &ssl2gs; + } + + /* bring in the next sslv3 record. */ + if (ss->recvdCloseNotify) { + /* RFC 5246 Section 7.2.1: + * Any data received after a closure alert is ignored. + */ + return 0; + } + + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* If we're a server waiting for a ClientHello then pass + * ssl2gs to support SSLv2 ClientHello messages. */ + rv = ssl3_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags, ssl2gs_ptr); + } else { + rv = dtls_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags); + + /* If we got a would block error, that means that no data was + * available, so we check the timer to see if it's time to + * retransmit */ + if (rv == SECFailure && + (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) { + dtls_CheckTimer(ss); + /* Restore the error in case something succeeded */ + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + } + } + + if (rv <= 0) { + return rv; + } + + if (ssl2gs.isV2) { + rv = ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(ss, ss->gs.inbuf.buf, + ss->gs.inbuf.len, + ssl2gs.padding); + if (rv < 0) { + return rv; + } + } else { + /* decipher it, and handle it if it's a handshake. + * If it's application data, ss->gs.buf will not be empty upon return. + * If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message, + * ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess. + * + * cText only needs to be valid for this next function call, so + * it can borrow gs.hdr. + */ + cText.hdr = ss->gs.hdr; + cText.hdrLen = ss->gs.hdrLen; + cText.buf = &ss->gs.inbuf; + rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* In Debug builds free gather ciphertext buffer after each decryption + * for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization. The buffer content has been + * used at this point, ssl3_HandleRecord() and thereby the decryption + * functions are only called from this point of the implementation. */ + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.inbuf); +#endif + + if (rv < 0) { + return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv; + } + if (ss->gs.buf.len > 0) { + /* We have application data to return to the application. This + * prioritizes returning application data to the application over + * completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone); + break; + } + + PORT_Assert(keepGoing); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) { + /* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to + * handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone + * instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead, + * we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending + * application data. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart); + keepGoing = PR_FALSE; + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) { + /* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete + * the handshake if we're false starting. + * + * If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead + * of here, then this function would become be a no-op after + * receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we + * would never complete the handshake. + */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + + if (ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) { + keepGoing = PR_FALSE; + } else { + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; + } + } else if (processingEarlyData && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_done && + !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) { + /* If we were processing early data and we are no longer, then force + * the handshake to block. This ensures that early data is + * delivered to the application before the handshake completes. */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return -1; + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } while (keepGoing); + + /* Service the DTLS timer so that the post-handshake timers + * fire. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake)) { + dtls_CheckTimer(ss); + } + ss->gs.readOffset = 0; + ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len; + return 1; +} + +/* Repeatedly gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record. + * Repeat this until some application data is received. + * + * Returns 1 when application data is available. + * Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF. + * Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error. + * + * Called from DoRecv in sslsecur.c + * Caller must hold the recv buf lock. + */ +int +ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags) +{ + int rv; + + /* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + + do { + rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags); + } while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0); + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + sslBuffer buf = { CONST_CAST(PRUint8, data), len, len, PR_TRUE }; + return tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(ss, &buf); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) { + /* We're ignoring 0-RTT so drop this record quietly. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Ensure that application data in the wrong epoch is blocked. */ +static PRBool +ssl_IsApplicationDataPermitted(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch) +{ + /* Epoch 0 is never OK. */ + if (epoch == 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return ss->firstHsDone; + } + /* TLS 1.3 application data. */ + if (epoch >= TrafficKeyApplicationData) { + return ss->firstHsDone; + } + /* TLS 1.3 early data is server only. Further checks aren't needed + * as those are handled in ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData. */ + if (epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) { + return ss->sec.isServer; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_RecordLayerData(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, + SSLContentType contentType, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss) || data == NULL || len == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Run any handshake function. If SSL_RecordLayerData is the only way that + * the handshake is driven, then this is necessary to ensure that + * ssl_BeginClientHandshake or ssl_BeginServerHandshake is called. Note that + * the other function that might be set to ss->handshake, + * ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake, does nothing when this function is used. */ + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + goto early_loser; /* Rely on the existing code. */ + } + + if (contentType == ssl_ct_application_data && + !ssl_IsApplicationDataPermitted(ss, epoch)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto early_loser; + } + + /* Then we can validate the epoch. */ + PRErrorCode epochError; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + if (epoch < ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) { + epochError = SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; /* Too c/old. */ + } else if (epoch > ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch) { + /* If a TLS 1.3 server is not expecting EndOfEarlyData, + * moving from 1 to 2 is a signal to execute the code + * as though that message had been received. Let that pass. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData && + ss->sec.isServer && + ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData && + epoch == TrafficKeyHandshake) { + epochError = 0; + } else { + epochError = PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR; /* Too warm/new. */ + } + } else { + epochError = 0; /* Just right. */ + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (epochError) { + PORT_SetError(epochError); + goto early_loser; + } + + /* If the handshake is still running, we need to run that. */ + rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + goto early_loser; + } + + /* 0-RTT needs its own special handling here. */ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData && + contentType == ssl_ct_application_data) { + rv = ssl_HandleZeroRttRecordData(ss, data, len); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; + } + + /* Finally, save the data... */ + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->gs.buf, data, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* ...and process it. Just saving application data is enough for it to be + * available to PR_Read(). */ + if (contentType != ssl_ct_application_data) { + rv = ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(ss, contentType, 0, 0, &ss->gs.buf); + /* This occasionally blocks, but that's OK here. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + goto loser; + } + } + + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + /* Make sure that any data is not used again. */ + ss->gs.buf.len = 0; + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); +early_loser: + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_GetCurrentEpoch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 *readEpoch, + PRUint16 *writeEpoch) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + if (readEpoch) { + *readEpoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; + } + if (writeEpoch) { + *writeEpoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9eeb5a3028 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3prot.h @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* Private header file of libSSL. + * Various and sundry protocol constants. DON'T CHANGE THESE. These + * values are defined by the SSL 3.0 protocol specification. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __ssl3proto_h_ +#define __ssl3proto_h_ + +typedef PRUint16 SSL3ProtocolVersion; +/* version numbers are defined in sslproto.h */ + +/* DTLS 1.3 is still a draft. */ +#define DTLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION 43 + +typedef PRUint16 ssl3CipherSuite; +/* The cipher suites are defined in sslproto.h */ + +#define MAX_CERT_TYPES 10 +#define MAX_MAC_LENGTH 64 +#define MAX_PADDING_LENGTH 64 +#define MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 +#define EXPORT_KEY_LENGTH 5 +#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32 + +#define SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH 5 + +/* SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + epoch/sequence_number */ +#define DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH 13 + +/* Max values for TLS records/ciphertexts + * For TLS 1.2 records MUST NOT be longer than 2^14 + 2048 + * For TLS 1.3 records MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes. + * [RFC8446 Section 5.2, RFC5246 Section 6.2.3]. */ +#define MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 16384 +#define TLS_1_2_MAX_EXPANSION 2048 +#define TLS_1_3_MAX_EXPANSION (255 + 1) +#define TLS_1_3_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH ((MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (TLS_1_3_MAX_EXPANSION)) +#define TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH ((MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (TLS_1_2_MAX_EXPANSION)) + +/* DTLS_X_X_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH = TLS_X_X_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH + HEADER_LENGTH, + * used for DTLS datagram buffer size setting. We do not support DTLS CID! */ +#define DTLS_1_3_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH ((TLS_1_3_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH) + (SSL3_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH)) +#define DTLS_1_2_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH ((TLS_1_2_MAX_CTEXT_LENGTH) + (DTLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH)) + +typedef enum { change_cipher_spec_choice = 1 } SSL3ChangeCipherSpecChoice; + +typedef enum { alert_warning = 1, + alert_fatal = 2 } SSL3AlertLevel; + +typedef enum { + close_notify = 0, + unexpected_message = 10, + bad_record_mac = 20, + decryption_failed_RESERVED = 21, /* do not send; see RFC 5246 */ + record_overflow = 22, /* TLS only */ + decompression_failure = 30, + handshake_failure = 40, + no_certificate = 41, /* SSL3 only, NOT TLS */ + bad_certificate = 42, + unsupported_certificate = 43, + certificate_revoked = 44, + certificate_expired = 45, + certificate_unknown = 46, + illegal_parameter = 47, + + /* All alerts below are TLS only. */ + unknown_ca = 48, + access_denied = 49, + decode_error = 50, + decrypt_error = 51, + export_restriction = 60, + protocol_version = 70, + insufficient_security = 71, + internal_error = 80, + inappropriate_fallback = 86, /* could also be sent for SSLv3 */ + user_canceled = 90, + no_renegotiation = 100, + + /* Alerts for client hello extensions */ + missing_extension = 109, + unsupported_extension = 110, + certificate_unobtainable = 111, + unrecognized_name = 112, + bad_certificate_status_response = 113, + bad_certificate_hash_value = 114, + certificate_required = 116, + no_application_protocol = 120, + ech_required = 121, + + /* invalid alert */ + no_alert = 256 +} SSL3AlertDescription; + +typedef PRUint8 SSL3Random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH]; + +typedef struct { + PRUint8 id[32]; + PRUint8 length; +} SSL3SessionID; + +/* SSL3SignType moved to ssl.h */ + +/* The SSL key exchange method used */ +typedef enum { + kea_null, + kea_rsa, + kea_dh_dss, + kea_dh_rsa, + kea_dhe_dss, + kea_dhe_rsa, + kea_dh_anon, + kea_ecdh_ecdsa, + kea_ecdhe_ecdsa, + kea_ecdh_rsa, + kea_ecdhe_rsa, + kea_ecdh_anon, + kea_ecdhe_psk, + kea_dhe_psk, + kea_tls13_any, +} SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm; + +/* SSL3HashesIndividually contains a combination MD5/SHA1 hash, as used in TLS + * prior to 1.2. */ +typedef struct { + PRUint8 md5[16]; + PRUint8 sha[20]; +} SSL3HashesIndividually; + +/* SSL3Hashes contains an SSL hash value. The digest is contained in |u.raw| + * which, if |hashAlg==ssl_hash_none| is also a SSL3HashesIndividually + * struct. */ +typedef struct { + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + union { + PRUint8 raw[64]; + SSL3HashesIndividually s; + } u; +} SSL3Hashes; + +typedef enum { + ct_RSA_sign = 1, + ct_DSS_sign = 2, + ct_RSA_fixed_DH = 3, + ct_DSS_fixed_DH = 4, + ct_RSA_ephemeral_DH = 5, + ct_DSS_ephemeral_DH = 6, + ct_ECDSA_sign = 64, + ct_RSA_fixed_ECDH = 65, + ct_ECDSA_fixed_ECDH = 66 +} SSL3ClientCertificateType; + +typedef enum { + sender_client = 0x434c4e54, + sender_server = 0x53525652 +} SSL3Sender; + +typedef SSL3HashesIndividually SSL3Finished; + +typedef struct { + PRUint8 verify_data[12]; +} TLSFinished; + +/* + * TLS extension related data structures and constants. + */ + +/* SessionTicket extension related data structures. */ + +/* NewSessionTicket handshake message. */ +typedef struct { + PRTime received_timestamp; + PRUint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + PRUint32 flags; + PRUint32 ticket_age_add; + PRUint32 max_early_data_size; + SECItem ticket; +} NewSessionTicket; + +typedef enum { + tls13_psk_ke = 0, + tls13_psk_dh_ke = 1 +} TLS13PskKEModes; + +typedef enum { + CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS = 0, + CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE = 1 +} ClientAuthenticationType; + +#define SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN 16 +#define SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_PREFIX "NSS!" +#define SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN 4 +#define SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN 12 + +#endif /* __ssl3proto_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f4c3642513 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "cert.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ocsp.h" + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertificate * +SSL_PeerCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificate", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return 0; + } + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->sec.peerCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + } + return 0; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertList * +SSL_PeerCertificateChain(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + CERTCertList *chain = NULL; + CERTCertificate *cert; + ssl3CertNode *cur; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificateChain", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity || !ss->sec.peerCert) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return NULL; + } + chain = CERT_NewCertList(); + if (!chain) { + return NULL; + } + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(chain, cert) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + for (cur = ss->ssl3.peerCertChain; cur; cur = cur->next) { + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cur->cert); + if (CERT_AddCertToListTail(chain, cert) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + return chain; + +loser: + CERT_DestroyCertList(chain); + return NULL; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +CERTCertificate * +SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in PeerCertificate", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + if (ss->opt.useSecurity) { + if (ss->sec.localCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + } + if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert) { + return CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->localCert); + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *op, char **cp, int *kp0, int *kp1, + char **ip, char **sp) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SecurityStatus", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (cp) + *cp = 0; + if (kp0) + *kp0 = 0; + if (kp1) + *kp1 = 0; + if (ip) + *ip = 0; + if (sp) + *sp = 0; + if (op) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF; + } + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) { + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *bulkCipherDef; + PRBool isDes = PR_FALSE; + + bulkCipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + if (cp) { + *cp = PORT_Strdup(bulkCipherDef->short_name); + } + if (PORT_Strstr(bulkCipherDef->short_name, "DES")) { + isDes = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (kp0) { + *kp0 = bulkCipherDef->key_size * 8; + if (isDes) + *kp0 = (*kp0 * 7) / 8; + } + if (kp1) { + *kp1 = bulkCipherDef->secret_key_size * 8; + if (isDes) + *kp1 = (*kp1 * 7) / 8; + } + if (op) { + if (bulkCipherDef->key_size == 0) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF; + } else if (bulkCipherDef->secret_key_size * 8 < 90) { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_LOW; + } else { + *op = SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_HIGH; + } + } + + if (ip || sp) { + CERTCertificate *cert; + + cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + if (cert) { + if (ip) { + *ip = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->issuer); + } + if (sp) { + *sp = CERT_NameToAscii(&cert->subject); + } + } else { + if (ip) { + *ip = PORT_Strdup("no certificate"); + } + if (sp) { + *sp = PORT_Strdup("no certificate"); + } + } + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *s, SSLAuthCertificate func, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in AuthCertificateHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->authCertificate = func; + ss->authCertificateArg = arg; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(PRFileDesc *s, SSLGetClientAuthData func, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in GetClientAuthDataHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->getClientAuthData = func; + ss->getClientAuthDataArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* NEED LOCKS IN HERE. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(PRFileDesc *s, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in GetClientAuthDataHook", + SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->pkcs11PinArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is the "default" authCert callback function. It is called when a + * certificate message is received from the peer and the local application + * has not registered an authCert callback function. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_AuthCertificate(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertDBHandle *handle; + sslSocket *ss; + SECCertUsage certUsage; + const char *hostname = NULL; + SECItemArray *certStatusArray; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PORT_Assert(ss != NULL); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + handle = (CERTCertDBHandle *)arg; + certStatusArray = &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus; + + PRTime now = ssl_Time(ss); + if (certStatusArray->len) { + PORT_SetError(0); + if (CERT_CacheOCSPResponseFromSideChannel(handle, ss->sec.peerCert, now, + &certStatusArray->items[0], + ss->pkcs11PinArg) != + SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(PR_GetError() != 0); + } + } + + /* this may seem backwards, but isn't. */ + certUsage = isServer ? certUsageSSLClient : certUsageSSLServer; + + rv = CERT_VerifyCert(handle, ss->sec.peerCert, checkSig, certUsage, + now, ss->pkcs11PinArg, NULL); + + if (rv != SECSuccess || isServer) + return rv; + + /* cert is OK. This is the client side of an SSL connection. + * Now check the name field in the cert against the desired hostname. + * NB: This is our only defense against Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks! + */ + hostname = ss->url; + if (hostname && hostname[0]) + rv = CERT_VerifyCertName(ss->sec.peerCert, hostname); + else + rv = SECFailure; + if (rv != SECSuccess) + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN); + + return rv; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d5f9d1f17 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * A bloom filter. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "sslbloom.h" +#include "prnetdb.h" +#include "secport.h" + +static inline unsigned int +sslBloom_Size(unsigned int bits) +{ + return (bits >= 3) ? (1 << (bits - 3)) : 1; +} + +SECStatus +sslBloom_Init(sslBloomFilter *filter, unsigned int k, unsigned int bits) +{ + PORT_Assert(filter); + PORT_Assert(bits > 0); + PORT_Assert(bits <= sizeof(PRUint32) * 8); + PORT_Assert(k > 0); + + filter->filter = PORT_ZNewArray(PRUint8, sslBloom_Size(bits)); + if (!filter->filter) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + filter->k = k; + filter->bits = bits; + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +sslBloom_Zero(sslBloomFilter *filter) +{ + PORT_Memset(filter->filter, 0, sslBloom_Size(filter->bits)); +} + +void +sslBloom_Fill(sslBloomFilter *filter) +{ + PORT_Memset(filter->filter, 0xff, sslBloom_Size(filter->bits)); +} + +static PRBool +sslBloom_AddOrCheck(sslBloomFilter *filter, const PRUint8 *hashes, PRBool add) +{ + unsigned int iteration; + unsigned int bitIndex; + PRUint32 tmp = 0; + PRUint8 mask; + unsigned int bytes = (filter->bits + 7) / 8; + unsigned int shift = (bytes * 8) - filter->bits; + PRBool found = PR_TRUE; + + PORT_Assert(bytes <= sizeof(unsigned int)); + + for (iteration = 0; iteration < filter->k; ++iteration) { + PORT_Memcpy(((PRUint8 *)&tmp) + (sizeof(tmp) - bytes), + hashes, bytes); + hashes += bytes; + bitIndex = PR_ntohl(tmp) >> shift; + + mask = 1 << (bitIndex % 8); + found = found && filter->filter[bitIndex / 8] & mask; + if (add) { + filter->filter[bitIndex / 8] |= mask; + } + } + return found; +} + +PRBool +sslBloom_Add(sslBloomFilter *filter, const PRUint8 *hashes) +{ + return sslBloom_AddOrCheck(filter, hashes, PR_TRUE); +} + +PRBool +sslBloom_Check(sslBloomFilter *filter, const PRUint8 *hashes) +{ + return sslBloom_AddOrCheck(filter, hashes, PR_FALSE); +} + +void +sslBloom_Destroy(sslBloomFilter *filter) +{ + PORT_Free(filter->filter); + PORT_Memset(filter, 0, sizeof(*filter)); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..032c94b0f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslbloom.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * A bloom filter. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslbloom_h_ +#define __sslbloom_h_ + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "seccomon.h" + +typedef struct sslBloomFilterStr { + unsigned int k; /* The number of hashes. */ + unsigned int bits; /* The number of bits in each hash: bits = log2(m) */ + PRUint8 *filter; /* The filter itself. */ +} sslBloomFilter; + +SECStatus sslBloom_Init(sslBloomFilter *filter, unsigned int k, unsigned int bits); +void sslBloom_Zero(sslBloomFilter *filter); +void sslBloom_Fill(sslBloomFilter *filter); +/* Add the given hashes to the filter. It's the caller's responsibility to + * ensure that there is at least |ceil(k*bits/8)| bytes of data available in + * |hashes|. Returns PR_TRUE if the entry was already present or it was likely + * to be present. */ +PRBool sslBloom_Add(sslBloomFilter *filter, const PRUint8 *hashes); +PRBool sslBloom_Check(sslBloomFilter *filter, const PRUint8 *hashes); +void sslBloom_Destroy(sslBloomFilter *filter); + +#endif /* __sslbloom_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0fa6ca3538 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.c @@ -0,0 +1,1016 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL server certificate configuration functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "secoid.h" /* for SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag */ +#include "pk11func.h" /* for PK11_ReferenceSlot */ +#include "nss.h" /* for NSS_RegisterShutdown */ +#include "prinit.h" /* for PR_CallOnceWithArg */ +#include "tls13subcerts.h" /* for tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential */ + +/* This global item is used only in servers. It is is initialized by + * SSL_ConfigSecureServer(), and is used in ssl3_SendCertificateRequest(). + */ +static struct { + PRCallOnceType setup; + CERTDistNames *names; +} ssl_server_ca_list; + +static SECStatus +ssl_ServerCAListShutdown(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + PORT_Assert(ssl_server_ca_list.names); + if (ssl_server_ca_list.names) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ssl_server_ca_list.names); + } + PORT_Memset(&ssl_server_ca_list, 0, sizeof(ssl_server_ca_list)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +ssl_SetupCAListOnce(void *arg) +{ + CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle = (CERTCertDBHandle *)arg; + SECStatus rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_ServerCAListShutdown, NULL); + PORT_Assert(SECSuccess == rv); + if (SECSuccess == rv) { + ssl_server_ca_list.names = CERT_GetSSLCACerts(dbHandle); + return PR_SUCCESS; + } + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_SetupCAList(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (PR_SUCCESS != PR_CallOnceWithArg(&ssl_server_ca_list.setup, + &ssl_SetupCAListOnce, + (void *)(ss->dbHandle))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(const sslSocket *ss, unsigned int *calen, + const SECItem **names, unsigned int *nnames) +{ + const SECItem *name; + const CERTDistNames *ca_list; + unsigned int i; + + *calen = 0; + *names = NULL; + *nnames = 0; + + /* ssl3.ca_list is initialized to NULL, and never changed. */ + ca_list = ss->ssl3.ca_list; + if (!ca_list) { + if (ssl_SetupCAList(ss) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ca_list = ssl_server_ca_list.names; + } + + if (ca_list != NULL) { + *names = ca_list->names; + *nnames = ca_list->nnames; + } + + for (i = 0, name = *names; i < *nnames; i++, name++) { + *calen += 2 + name->len; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +sslServerCert * +ssl_NewServerCert() +{ + sslServerCert *sc = PORT_ZNew(sslServerCert); + if (!sc) { + return NULL; + } + sc->authTypes = 0; + sc->namedCurve = NULL; + sc->serverCert = NULL; + sc->serverCertChain = NULL; + sc->certStatusArray = NULL; + sc->signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + sc->delegCred.len = 0; + sc->delegCredKeyPair = NULL; + return sc; +} + +sslServerCert * +ssl_CopyServerCert(const sslServerCert *oc) +{ + sslServerCert *sc; + + sc = ssl_NewServerCert(); + if (!sc) { + return NULL; + } + + sc->authTypes = oc->authTypes; + sc->namedCurve = oc->namedCurve; + + if (oc->serverCert && oc->serverCertChain) { + sc->serverCert = CERT_DupCertificate(oc->serverCert); + if (!sc->serverCert) + goto loser; + sc->serverCertChain = CERT_DupCertList(oc->serverCertChain); + if (!sc->serverCertChain) + goto loser; + } else { + sc->serverCert = NULL; + sc->serverCertChain = NULL; + } + + if (oc->serverKeyPair) { + sc->serverKeyPair = ssl_GetKeyPairRef(oc->serverKeyPair); + if (!sc->serverKeyPair) + goto loser; + } else { + sc->serverKeyPair = NULL; + } + sc->serverKeyBits = oc->serverKeyBits; + + if (oc->certStatusArray) { + sc->certStatusArray = SECITEM_DupArray(NULL, oc->certStatusArray); + if (!sc->certStatusArray) + goto loser; + } else { + sc->certStatusArray = NULL; + } + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sc->signedCertTimestamps, + &oc->signedCertTimestamps) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sc->delegCred, &oc->delegCred) != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (oc->delegCredKeyPair) { + sc->delegCredKeyPair = ssl_GetKeyPairRef(oc->delegCredKeyPair); + } + + return sc; +loser: + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + return NULL; +} + +void +ssl_FreeServerCert(sslServerCert *sc) +{ + if (!sc) { + return; + } + + if (sc->serverCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sc->serverCert); + } + if (sc->serverCertChain) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(sc->serverCertChain); + } + if (sc->serverKeyPair) { + ssl_FreeKeyPair(sc->serverKeyPair); + } + if (sc->certStatusArray) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(sc->certStatusArray, PR_TRUE); + } + if (sc->signedCertTimestamps.len) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sc->signedCertTimestamps, PR_FALSE); + } + if (sc->delegCred.len) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sc->delegCred, PR_FALSE); + } + if (sc->delegCredKeyPair) { + ssl_FreeKeyPair(sc->delegCredKeyPair); + } + PORT_ZFree(sc, sizeof(*sc)); +} + +const sslServerCert * +ssl_FindServerCert(const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType, + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + /* Bug 1749475: avoid UB while fuzzing session tickets */ + if ((unsigned)authType >= ssl_auth_size) { + return NULL; + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (!SSL_CERT_IS(cert, authType)) { + continue; + } + if (SSL_CERT_IS_EC(cert)) { + /* Note: For deprecated APIs, we need to be able to find and + match a slot with any named curve. */ + if (namedCurve && cert->namedCurve != namedCurve) { + continue; + } + } + return cert; + } + return NULL; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PopulateServerCert(sslServerCert *sc, CERTCertificate *cert, + const CERTCertificateList *certChain) +{ + if (sc->serverCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sc->serverCert); + } + if (sc->serverCertChain) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(sc->serverCertChain); + } + + if (!cert) { + sc->serverCert = NULL; + sc->serverCertChain = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + + sc->serverCert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert); + if (certChain) { + sc->serverCertChain = CERT_DupCertList(certChain); + } else { + sc->serverCertChain = + CERT_CertChainFromCert(sc->serverCert, certUsageSSLServer, + PR_TRUE); + } + return sc->serverCertChain ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PopulateKeyPair(sslServerCert *sc, sslKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + if (sc->serverKeyPair) { + ssl_FreeKeyPair(sc->serverKeyPair); + sc->serverKeyPair = NULL; + } + if (keyPair) { + KeyType keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(keyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Assert(keyType == SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(keyPair->privKey)); + + if (keyType == ecKey) { + sc->namedCurve = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(keyPair->pubKey); + if (!sc->namedCurve) { + /* Unsupported curve. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Get the size of the cert's public key, and remember it. */ + sc->serverKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->pubKey); + if (sc->serverKeyBits == 0 || + (keyType == rsaKey && sc->serverKeyBits > SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECKEY_CacheStaticFlags(keyPair->privKey); + sc->serverKeyPair = ssl_GetKeyPairRef(keyPair); + + if (SSL_CERT_IS(sc, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt)) { + /* This will update the global session ticket key pair with this + * key, if a value hasn't been set already. */ + if (ssl_MaybeSetSelfEncryptKeyPair(keyPair) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + } else { + sc->serverKeyPair = NULL; + sc->namedCurve = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PopulateOCSPResponses(sslServerCert *sc, + const SECItemArray *stapledOCSPResponses) +{ + if (sc->certStatusArray) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(sc->certStatusArray, PR_TRUE); + } + if (stapledOCSPResponses) { + sc->certStatusArray = SECITEM_DupArray(NULL, stapledOCSPResponses); + return sc->certStatusArray ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; + } else { + sc->certStatusArray = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_PopulateSignedCertTimestamps(sslServerCert *sc, + const SECItem *signedCertTimestamps) +{ + if (sc->signedCertTimestamps.len) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sc->signedCertTimestamps, PR_FALSE); + } + if (signedCertTimestamps && signedCertTimestamps->len) { + return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sc->signedCertTimestamps, + signedCertTimestamps); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Installs the given delegated credential (DC) and DC private key into the + * certificate. + * + * It's the caller's responsibility to ensure that the DC is well-formed and + * that the DC public key matches the DC private key. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl_PopulateDelegatedCredential(sslServerCert *sc, + const SECItem *delegCred, + const SECKEYPrivateKey *delegCredPrivKey) +{ + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL; + + if (sc->delegCred.len) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sc->delegCred, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (sc->delegCredKeyPair) { + ssl_FreeKeyPair(sc->delegCredKeyPair); + sc->delegCredKeyPair = NULL; + } + + /* Both the DC and its private are present. */ + if (delegCred && delegCredPrivKey) { + SECStatus rv; + SECKEYPublicKey *pub; + SECKEYPrivateKey *priv; + + if (!delegCred->data || delegCred->len == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + /* Parse the DC. */ + rv = tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(delegCred->data, delegCred->len, &dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Make a copy of the DC. */ + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sc->delegCred, delegCred); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Make a copy of the DC private key. */ + priv = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(delegCredPrivKey); + if (!priv) { + goto loser; + } + + /* parse public key from the DC. */ + pub = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(dc->spki); + if (!pub) { + goto loser; + } + + sc->delegCredKeyPair = ssl_NewKeyPair(priv, pub); + + /* Attempting to configure either the DC or DC private key, but not both. */ + } else if (delegCred || delegCredPrivKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Find any existing certificates that overlap with the new certificate and + * either remove any supported authentication types that overlap with the new + * certificate or - if they have no types left - remove them entirely. */ +static void +ssl_ClearMatchingCerts(sslSocket *ss, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes, + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve) +{ + PRCList *cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + + while (cursor != &ss->serverCerts) { + sslServerCert *sc = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor); + if ((sc->authTypes & authTypes) == 0) { + continue; + } + /* namedCurve will be NULL only for legacy functions. */ + if (namedCurve != NULL && sc->namedCurve != namedCurve) { + continue; + } + + sc->authTypes &= ~authTypes; + if (sc->authTypes == 0) { + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&sc->link); + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + } + } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_ConfigCert(sslSocket *ss, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes, + CERTCertificate *cert, sslKeyPair *keyPair, + const SSLExtraServerCertData *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslServerCert *sc = NULL; + int error_code = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + + PORT_Assert(cert); + PORT_Assert(keyPair); + PORT_Assert(data); + PORT_Assert(authTypes); + + if (!cert || !keyPair || !data || !authTypes) { + error_code = SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; + goto loser; + } + + sc = ssl_NewServerCert(); + if (!sc) { + goto loser; + } + + sc->authTypes = authTypes; + rv = ssl_PopulateServerCert(sc, cert, data->certChain); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_PopulateKeyPair(sc, keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + error_code = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_PopulateOCSPResponses(sc, data->stapledOCSPResponses); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_PopulateSignedCertTimestamps(sc, data->signedCertTimestamps); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_PopulateDelegatedCredential(sc, data->delegCred, + data->delegCredPrivKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + error_code = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + ssl_ClearMatchingCerts(ss, sc->authTypes, sc->namedCurve); + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + PORT_SetError(error_code); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SSLAuthType +ssl_GetEcdhAuthType(CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + SECOidTag sigTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->signature); + switch (sigTag) { + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD2_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD4_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA224_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + return ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA1_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_RECOMMENDED_DIGEST: + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIED_DIGEST: + return ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa; + default: + return ssl_auth_null; + } +} + +/* This function examines the type of certificate and its key usage and + * chooses which authTypes apply. For some certificates + * this can mean that multiple authTypes. + * + * If the targetAuthType is not ssl_auth_null, then only that type will be used. + * If that choice is invalid, then this function will fail. */ +static sslAuthTypeMask +ssl_GetCertificateAuthTypes(CERTCertificate *cert, SSLAuthType targetAuthType) +{ + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes = 0; + SECOidTag tag; + + tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm); + switch (tag) { + case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) { + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_auth_rsa_sign; + } + + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) { + /* If ku_sig=true we configure signature and encryption slots with the + * same cert. This is bad form, but there are enough dual-usage RSA + * certs that we can't really break by limiting this to one type. */ + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt; + } + break; + + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE: + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) { + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_auth_rsa_pss; + } + break; + + case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) { + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_auth_dsa; + } + break; + + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) { + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_auth_ecdsa; + } + /* Again, bad form to have dual usage and we don't prevent it. */ + if (cert->keyUsage & KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT) { + authTypes |= 1 << ssl_GetEcdhAuthType(cert); + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + /* Check that we successfully picked an authType */ + if (targetAuthType != ssl_auth_null) { + authTypes &= 1 << targetAuthType; + } + return authTypes; +} + +/* This function adopts pubKey and destroys it if things go wrong. */ +static sslKeyPair * +ssl_MakeKeyPairForCert(SECKEYPrivateKey *key, CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + sslKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKeyCopy = NULL; + PK11SlotInfo *bestSlot; + + pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert); + if (!pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return NULL; + } + + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) != SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(key)) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return NULL; + } + + if (key->pkcs11Slot) { + bestSlot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(key->pkcs11Slot); + if (bestSlot) { + privKeyCopy = PK11_CopyTokenPrivKeyToSessionPrivKey(bestSlot, key); + PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot); + } + } + if (!privKeyCopy) { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyMech = PK11_MapSignKeyType(key->keyType); + /* XXX Maybe should be bestSlotMultiple? */ + bestSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(keyMech, NULL /* wincx */); + if (bestSlot) { + privKeyCopy = PK11_CopyTokenPrivKeyToSessionPrivKey(bestSlot, key); + PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot); + } + } + if (!privKeyCopy) { + privKeyCopy = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(key); + } + if (privKeyCopy) { + keyPair = ssl_NewKeyPair(privKeyCopy, pubKey); + } + if (!keyPair) { + if (privKeyCopy) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKeyCopy); + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + } + return keyPair; +} + +/* Configure a certificate and private key. + * + * This function examines the certificate and key to determine the type (or + * types) of authentication the certificate supports. As long as certificates + * are different (different authTypes and maybe keys in different ec groups), + * then this function can be called multiple times. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigServerCert(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + const SSLExtraServerCertData *data, unsigned int data_len) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + sslKeyPair *keyPair; + SECStatus rv; + SSLExtraServerCertData dataCopy = { + ssl_auth_null, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL + }; + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!cert || !key) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data) { + if (data_len > sizeof(dataCopy)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(&dataCopy, data, data_len); + } + + authTypes = ssl_GetCertificateAuthTypes(cert, dataCopy.authType); + if (!authTypes) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + keyPair = ssl_MakeKeyPairForCert(key, cert); + if (!keyPair) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_ConfigCert(ss, authTypes, cert, keyPair, &dataCopy); + ssl_FreeKeyPair(keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/*******************************************************************/ +/* Deprecated functions. + * + * The remainder of this file contains deprecated functions for server + * certificate configuration. These configure certificates incorrectly, but in + * a way that allows old code to continue working without change. All these + * functions create certificate slots based on SSLKEAType values. Some values + * of SSLKEAType cause multiple certificates to be configured. + */ + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigSecureServer(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea) +{ + return SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(fd, cert, NULL, key, kea); +} + +/* This implements a limited check that is consistent with the checks performed + * by older versions of NSS. This is less rigorous than the checks in + * ssl_ConfigCertByUsage(), only checking against the type of key and ignoring + * things like usage. */ +static PRBool +ssl_CertSuitableForAuthType(CERTCertificate *cert, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes) +{ + SECOidTag tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm); + sslAuthTypeMask mask = 0; + switch (tag) { + case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt; + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_rsa_sign; + break; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_dsa; + break; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_ecdsa; + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa; + mask |= 1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa; + break; + default: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(authTypes); + /* Simply test that no inappropriate auth types are set. */ + return (authTypes & ~mask) == 0; +} + +/* Lookup a cert for the legacy configuration functions. An exact match on + * authTypes and ignoring namedCurve will ensure that values configured using + * legacy functions are overwritten by other legacy functions. */ +static sslServerCert * +ssl_FindCertWithMask(sslSocket *ss, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + if (cert->authTypes == authTypes) { + return cert; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +/* This finds an existing server cert in a matching slot that can be reused. + * Failing that, it removes any other certs that might conflict and makes a new + * server cert slot of the right type. */ +static sslServerCert * +ssl_FindOrMakeCert(sslSocket *ss, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes) +{ + sslServerCert *sc; + + /* Reuse a perfect match. Note that there is a problem here with use of + * multiple EC certificates that have keys on different curves: these + * deprecated functions will match the first found and overwrite that + * certificate, potentially leaving the other values with a duplicate curve. + * Configuring multiple EC certificates are only possible with the new + * functions, so this is not something that is worth fixing. */ + sc = ssl_FindCertWithMask(ss, authTypes); + if (sc) { + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&sc->link); + return sc; + } + + /* Ignore the namedCurve parameter. Like above, this means that legacy + * functions will clobber values set with the new functions blindly. */ + ssl_ClearMatchingCerts(ss, authTypes, NULL); + + sc = ssl_NewServerCert(); + if (sc) { + sc->authTypes = authTypes; + } + return sc; +} + +static sslAuthTypeMask +ssl_KeaTypeToAuthTypeMask(SSLKEAType keaType) +{ + switch (keaType) { + case ssl_kea_rsa: + return (1 << ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt) | + (1 << ssl_auth_rsa_sign); + + case ssl_kea_dh: + return 1 << ssl_auth_dsa; + + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + return (1 << ssl_auth_ecdsa) | + (1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) | + (1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa); + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + } + return 0; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_AddCertChain(sslSocket *ss, CERTCertificate *cert, + const CERTCertificateList *certChainOpt, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, sslAuthTypeMask authTypes) +{ + sslServerCert *sc; + sslKeyPair *keyPair; + SECStatus rv; + PRErrorCode err = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + + if (!ssl_CertSuitableForAuthType(cert, authTypes)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + sc = ssl_FindOrMakeCert(ss, authTypes); + if (!sc) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl_PopulateServerCert(sc, cert, certChainOpt); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + keyPair = ssl_MakeKeyPairForCert(key, cert); + if (!keyPair) { + /* Error code is set by ssl_MakeKeyPairForCert */ + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_PopulateKeyPair(sc, keyPair); + ssl_FreeKeyPair(keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + err = PORT_GetError(); + goto loser; + } + + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + PORT_SetError(err); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Public deprecated function */ +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert, + const CERTCertificateList *certChainOpt, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType certType) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!cert != !key) { /* Configure both, or neither */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + authTypes = ssl_KeaTypeToAuthTypeMask(certType); + if (!authTypes) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!cert) { + sslServerCert *sc = ssl_FindCertWithMask(ss, authTypes); + if (sc) { + (void)ssl_PopulateServerCert(sc, NULL, NULL); + (void)ssl_PopulateKeyPair(sc, NULL); + /* Leave the entry linked here because the old API expects that. + * There might be OCSP stapling values or signed certificate + * timestamps still present that will subsequently be used. */ + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + return ssl_AddCertChain(ss, cert, certChainOpt, key, authTypes); +} + +/* Public deprecated function */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItemArray *responses, + SSLKEAType certType) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + sslServerCert *sc; + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes; + SECStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + authTypes = ssl_KeaTypeToAuthTypeMask(certType); + if (!authTypes) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid cert type in SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!responses) { + sc = ssl_FindCertWithMask(ss, authTypes); + if (sc) { + (void)ssl_PopulateOCSPResponses(sc, NULL); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + sc = ssl_FindOrMakeCert(ss, authTypes); + if (!sc) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_PopulateOCSPResponses(sc, responses); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + } else { + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Public deprecated function */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItem *scts, + SSLKEAType certType) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + sslServerCert *sc; + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes; + SECStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + authTypes = ssl_KeaTypeToAuthTypeMask(certType); + if (!authTypes) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid cert type in SSL_SetSignedCertTimestamps", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!scts) { + sc = ssl_FindCertWithMask(ss, authTypes); + if (sc) { + (void)ssl_PopulateSignedCertTimestamps(sc, NULL); + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + sc = ssl_FindOrMakeCert(ss, authTypes); + if (!sc) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_PopulateSignedCertTimestamps(sc, scts); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + } else { + ssl_FreeServerCert(sc); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Public deprecated function. */ +SSLKEAType +NSS_FindCertKEAType(CERTCertificate *cert) +{ + int tag; + + if (!cert) + return ssl_kea_null; + + tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm)); + switch (tag) { + case SEC_OID_X500_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: + return ssl_kea_rsa; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: /* hah, signature, not a key? */ + case SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY: + return ssl_kea_dh; + case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: + return ssl_kea_ecdh; + default: + return ssl_kea_null; + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8c2dadae46 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcert.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslcert_h_ +#define __sslcert_h_ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "keyhi.h" + +/* This type is a bitvector that is indexed by SSLAuthType values. Note that + * the bit for ssl_auth_null(0) - the least significant bit - isn't used. */ +typedef PRUint16 sslAuthTypeMask; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(sslAuthTypeMask) * 8 >= ssl_auth_size); + +typedef struct sslServerCertStr { + PRCList link; /* The linked list link */ + + /* The auth types that this certificate provides. */ + sslAuthTypeMask authTypes; + /* For ssl_auth_ecdsa and ssl_auth_ecdh_*. This is only the named curve + * of the end-entity certificate key. The keys in other certificates in + * the chain aren't directly relevant to the operation of TLS (though it + * might make certificate validation difficult, libssl doesn't care). */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve; + + /* Configuration state for server sockets */ + CERTCertificate *serverCert; + CERTCertificateList *serverCertChain; + sslKeyPair *serverKeyPair; + unsigned int serverKeyBits; + /* Each certificate needs its own status. */ + SECItemArray *certStatusArray; + /* Serialized signed certificate timestamps to be sent to the client + ** in a TLS extension (server only). Each certificate needs its own + ** timestamps item. + */ + SECItem signedCertTimestamps; + + /* The delegated credential (DC) to send to clients who indicate support for + * the ietf-draft-tls-subcerts extension. + */ + SECItem delegCred; + /* The key pair used to sign the handshake when serving a DC. */ + sslKeyPair *delegCredKeyPair; +} sslServerCert; + +#define SSL_CERT_IS(c, t) ((c)->authTypes & (1 << (t))) +#define SSL_CERT_IS_ONLY(c, t) ((c)->authTypes == (1 << (t))) +#define SSL_CERT_IS_EC(c) \ + ((c)->authTypes & ((1 << ssl_auth_ecdsa) | \ + (1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa) | \ + (1 << ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa))) + +extern sslServerCert *ssl_NewServerCert(); +extern sslServerCert *ssl_CopyServerCert(const sslServerCert *oc); +extern const sslServerCert *ssl_FindServerCert( + const sslSocket *ss, SSLAuthType authType, + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve); +extern void ssl_FreeServerCert(sslServerCert *sc); + +#endif /* __sslcert_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcon.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6ef2a4a34 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslcon.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* + * Basic SSL handshake functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "sechash.h" +#include "cryptohi.h" /* for SGN_ funcs */ +#include "keyhi.h" /* for SECKEY_ high level functions. */ +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "ssl3prot.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "prinit.h" + +/* +** Put a string tag in the library so that we can examine an executable +** and see what kind of security it supports. +*/ +const char *ssl_version = "SECURITY_VERSION:" + " +us" + " +export" +#ifdef TRACE + " +trace" +#endif +#ifdef DEBUG + " +debug" +#endif + ; + +/*********************************************************************** + * Gathers in and handles records/messages until either the handshake is + * complete or application data is available. + * + * Called from ssl_Do1stHandshake() via function pointer ss->handshake. + * Caller must hold handshake lock. + * This function acquires and releases the RecvBufLock. + * + * returns SECSuccess for success. + * returns SECFailure on error, setting PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR if only blocked. + * + * The gather functions called by ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake are expected + * to return values interpreted as follows: + * 1 : the function completed without error. + * 0 : the function read EOF. + * -1 : read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error. + * + * This code is similar to, and easily confused with, DoRecv() in sslsecur.c + * + * This function is called from ssl_Do1stHandshake(). + * The following functions put ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake into ss->handshake: + * ssl_BeginClientHandshake + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq + * ssl3_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert + * ssl_BeginServerHandshake + */ +SECStatus +ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + + /* Wait for handshake to complete, or application data to arrive. */ + rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, 0); + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake gathering, rv=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv)); + + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + + if (rv <= 0) { + if (rv == 0) { + /* EOF. Loser */ + PORT_SetError(PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR); + } + if (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake blocked (need %d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->gs.remainder)); + } + return SECFailure; /* rv is < 0 here. */ + } + + ss->handshake = NULL; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function is called at the beginning of a handshake to ensure that at + * least one SSL/TLS version is enabled. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_CheckConfigSanity(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(&ss->vrange)) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Can't handshake! all versions disabled.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Sends out the initial client Hello message on the connection. + * Acquires and releases the socket's xmitBufLock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_BeginClientHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + + ss->sec.isServer = PR_FALSE; + + rv = ssl_CheckConfigSanity(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Get peer name of server */ + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv < 0) { +#ifdef HPUX11 + /* + * On some HP-UX B.11.00 systems, getpeername() occasionally + * fails with ENOTCONN after a successful completion of + * non-blocking connect. I found that if we do a write() + * and then retry getpeername(), it will work. + */ + if (PR_GetError() == PR_NOT_CONNECTED_ERROR) { + char dummy; + (void)PR_Write(ss->fd->lower, &dummy, 0); + rv = ssl_GetPeerInfo(ss); + if (rv < 0) { + goto loser; + } + } +#else + goto loser; +#endif + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending client-hello", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* If there's an sid set from an external cache, use it. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid && ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) { + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: using external token", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } else if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + /* Try to find server in our session-id cache */ + sid = ssl_LookupSID(ssl_Time(ss), &ss->sec.ci.peer, + ss->sec.ci.port, ss->peerID, ss->url); + } + + if (sid) { + if (sid->version >= ss->vrange.min && sid->version <= ss->vrange.max) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.localCert); + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->localCert); + } else { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + } + if (!sid) { + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + goto loser; + } + /* This session is a dummy, which we don't want to resume. */ + sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_FALSE; + } + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ss->gs.state = GS_INIT; + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + + /* ssl3_SendClientHello will override this if it succeeds. */ + ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_initial); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_BeginServerHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + ss->sec.isServer = PR_TRUE; + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = wait_client_hello; + + rv = ssl_CheckConfigSanity(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + ss->handshake = ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This function doesn't really belong in this file. +** It's here to keep AIX compilers from optimizing it away, +** and not including it in the DSO. +*/ + +#include "nss.h" +extern const char __nss_ssl_version[]; + +PRBool +NSSSSL_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion) +{ +#define NSS_VERSION_VARIABLE __nss_ssl_version +#include "verref.h" + + /* + * This is the secret handshake algorithm. + * + * This release has a simple version compatibility + * check algorithm. This release is not backward + * compatible with previous major releases. It is + * not compatible with future major, minor, or + * patch releases. + */ + return NSS_VersionCheck(importedVersion); +} + +const char * +NSSSSL_GetVersion(void) +{ + return NSS_VERSION; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssldef.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssldef.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ed1979507 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssldef.c @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +/* + * "Default" SSLSocket methods, used by sockets that do neither SSL nor socks. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +#if defined(WIN32) +#define MAP_ERROR(from, to) \ + if (err == from) { \ + PORT_SetError(to); \ + } +#define DEFINE_ERROR PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); +#else +#define MAP_ERROR(from, to) +#define DEFINE_ERROR +#endif + +int +ssl_DefConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *sa) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->connect(lower, sa, ss->cTimeout); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefBind(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->bind(lower, addr); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefListen(sslSocket *ss, int backlog) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->listen(lower, backlog); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefShutdown(sslSocket *ss, int how) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->shutdown(lower, how); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + PORT_Assert(buf && len > 0); + + rv = lower->methods->recv(lower, (void *)buf, len, flags, ss->rTimeout); + if (rv < 0) { + DEFINE_ERROR + MAP_ERROR(PR_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_ERROR, PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR) + } else if (rv > len) { + PORT_Assert(rv <= len); + PORT_SetError(PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Default (unencrypted) send. + * For blocking sockets, always returns len or SECFailure, no short writes. + * For non-blocking sockets: + * Returns positive count if any data was written, else returns SECFailure. + * Short writes may occur. + */ +int +ssl_DefSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int sent = 0; + +#if NSS_DISABLE_NAGLE_DELAYS + /* Although this is overkill, we disable Nagle delays completely for + ** SSL sockets. + */ + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && !ss->delayDisabled) { + ssl_EnableNagleDelay(ss, PR_FALSE); /* ignore error */ + ss->delayDisabled = 1; + } +#endif + do { + int rv = lower->methods->send(lower, (const void *)(buf + sent), + len - sent, flags, ss->wTimeout); + if (rv < 0) { + PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 1; + return sent ? sent : SECFailure; + } + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 0; + MAP_ERROR(PR_CONNECT_ABORTED_ERROR, PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR) + /* Loser */ + return rv; + } + sent += rv; + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (len > sent)) { + /* We got a partial write so just return it */ + return sent; + } + } while (len > sent); + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 0; + return sent; +} + +int +ssl_DefRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->read(lower, (void *)buf, len); + if (rv < 0) { + DEFINE_ERROR + MAP_ERROR(PR_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_ERROR, PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR) + } + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefWrite(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int sent = 0; + + do { + int rv = lower->methods->write(lower, (const void *)(buf + sent), + len - sent); + if (rv < 0) { + PRErrorCode err = PR_GetError(); + if (err == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 1; + return sent ? sent : SECFailure; + } + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 0; + MAP_ERROR(PR_CONNECT_ABORTED_ERROR, PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR) + /* Loser */ + return rv; + } + sent += rv; + } while (len > sent); + ss->lastWriteBlocked = 0; + return sent; +} + +int +ssl_DefGetpeername(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *name) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->getpeername(lower, name); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefGetsockname(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *name) +{ + PRFileDesc *lower = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + rv = lower->methods->getsockname(lower, name); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_DefClose(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRFileDesc *fd; + PRFileDesc *popped; + int rv; + + fd = ss->fd; + + /* First, remove the SSL layer PRFileDesc from the socket's stack, + ** then invoke the SSL layer's PRFileDesc destructor. + ** This must happen before the next layer down is closed. + */ + PORT_Assert(fd->higher == NULL); + if (fd->higher) { + PORT_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->fd = NULL; + + /* PR_PopIOLayer will swap the contents of the top two PRFileDescs on + ** the stack, and then remove the second one. This way, the address + ** of the PRFileDesc on the top of the stack doesn't change. + */ + popped = PR_PopIOLayer(fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER); + popped->dtor(popped); + + /* fd is now the PRFileDesc for the next layer down. + ** Now close the underlying socket. + */ + rv = fd->methods->close(fd); + + ssl_FreeSocket(ss); + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: closing, rv=%d errno=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, rv, PORT_GetError())); + return rv; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fcd90227d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.c @@ -0,0 +1,383 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "prnetdb.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" + +/* Helper function to encode an unsigned integer into a buffer. */ +static void +ssl_EncodeUintX(PRUint8 *to, PRUint64 value, unsigned int bytes) +{ + PRUint64 encoded; + + PORT_Assert(bytes > 0 && bytes <= sizeof(encoded)); + + encoded = PR_htonll(value); + PORT_Memcpy(to, ((unsigned char *)(&encoded)) + (sizeof(encoded) - bytes), + bytes); +} + +/* Grow a buffer to hold newLen bytes of data. When used for recv/xmit buffers, + * the caller must hold xmitBufLock or recvBufLock, as appropriate. */ +SECStatus +sslBuffer_Grow(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int newLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(b); + if (b->fixed) { + PORT_Assert(newLen <= b->space); + if (newLen > b->space) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* If buf is non-NULL, space must be non-zero; + * if buf is NULL, space must be zero. */ + PORT_Assert((b->buf && b->space) || (!b->buf && !b->space)); + newLen = PR_MAX(newLen, b->len + 1024); + if (newLen > b->space) { + unsigned char *newBuf; + if (b->buf) { + newBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Realloc(b->buf, newLen); + } else { + newBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(newLen); + } + if (!newBuf) { + return SECFailure; + } + b->buf = newBuf; + b->space = newLen; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Appends len copies of c to b */ +SECStatus +sslBuffer_Fill(sslBuffer *b, PRUint8 c, size_t len) +{ + PORT_Assert(b); + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (len > 0) { + memset(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), c, len); + } + b->len += len; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_Append(sslBuffer *b, const void *data, unsigned int len) +{ + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + if (len > 0) { + PORT_Assert(data); + PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), data, len); + } + b->len += len; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_AppendNumber(sslBuffer *b, PRUint64 v, unsigned int size) +{ + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + size); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_EncodeUintX(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), v, size); + b->len += size; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_AppendVariable(sslBuffer *b, const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, + unsigned int size) +{ + PORT_Assert(size <= 4 && size > 0); + PORT_Assert(b); + if (len >= (1ULL << (8 * size))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + len + size) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_EncodeUintX(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), len, size); + b->len += size; + if (len != 0) { + PORT_Assert(data); + /* We sometimes pass NULL, 0 and memcpy() doesn't want NULL. */ + PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b), data, len); + } + b->len += len; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(sslBuffer *b, const sslBuffer *append) +{ + return sslBuffer_Append(b, append->buf, append->len); +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(sslBuffer *b, const sslBuffer *append, + unsigned int size) +{ + return sslBuffer_AppendVariable(b, append->buf, append->len, size); +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_Skip(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int size, unsigned int *savedOffset) +{ + if (sslBuffer_Grow(b, b->len + size) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (savedOffset) { + *savedOffset = b->len; + } + b->len += size; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* A common problem is that a buffer is used to construct a variable length + * structure of unknown length. The length field for that structure is then + * populated afterwards. This function makes this process a little easier. + * + * To use this, before encoding the variable length structure, skip the spot + * where the length would be using sslBuffer_Skip(). After encoding the + * structure, and before encoding anything else, call this function passing the + * value returned from sslBuffer_Skip() as |at| to have the length inserted. + */ +SECStatus +sslBuffer_InsertLength(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int at, unsigned int size) +{ + unsigned int len; + + PORT_Assert(b->len >= at + size); + PORT_Assert(b->space >= at + size); + len = b->len - (at + size); + + PORT_Assert(size <= 4 && size > 0); + if (len >= (1ULL << (8 * size))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_EncodeUintX(SSL_BUFFER_BASE(b) + at, len, size); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslBuffer_InsertNumber(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int at, + PRUint64 v, unsigned int size) +{ + PORT_Assert(b->len >= at + size); + PORT_Assert(b->space >= at + size); + + PORT_Assert(size <= 4 && size > 0); + if (v >= (1ULL << (8 * size))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_EncodeUintX(SSL_BUFFER_BASE(b) + at, v, size); + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +sslBuffer_Clear(sslBuffer *b) +{ + if (!b->fixed) { + if (b->buf) { + PORT_Free(b->buf); + b->buf = NULL; + } + b->space = 0; + } + b->len = 0; +} + +SECStatus +sslRead_Read(sslReader *reader, unsigned int count, sslReadBuffer *out) +{ + if (!reader || !out) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (reader->buf.len < reader->offset || + count > SSL_READER_REMAINING(reader)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + out->buf = SSL_READER_CURRENT(reader); + out->len = count; + reader->offset += count; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslRead_ReadVariable(sslReader *reader, unsigned int sizeLen, sslReadBuffer *out) +{ + PRUint64 variableLen = 0; + SECStatus rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(reader, sizeLen, &variableLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!variableLen) { + // It is ok to have an empty variable. + out->len = variableLen; + return SECSuccess; + } + return sslRead_Read(reader, variableLen, out); +} + +SECStatus +sslRead_ReadNumber(sslReader *reader, unsigned int bytes, PRUint64 *num) +{ + if (!reader || !num) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (reader->buf.len < reader->offset || + bytes > SSL_READER_REMAINING(reader) || + bytes > 8) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + unsigned int i; + PRUint64 number = 0; + for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { + number = (number << 8) + reader->buf.buf[i + reader->offset]; + } + + reader->offset = reader->offset + bytes; + *num = number; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/************************************************************************** + * Append Handshake functions. + * All these functions set appropriate error codes. + * Most rely on ssl3_AppendHandshake to set the error code. + **************************************************************************/ +#define MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 32000 /* watch for 16-bit integer overflow */ +#define MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH 4000 + +static SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeInternal(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, unsigned int bytes, PRBool suppressHash) +{ + unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)void_src; + int room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); /* protects sendBuf. */ + + if (!bytes) + return SECSuccess; + if (ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space < MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH && room < bytes) { + rv = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf, PR_MAX(MIN_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, + PR_MIN(MAX_SEND_BUF_LENGTH, ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len + bytes))); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* sslBuffer_Grow sets a memory error code. */ + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space - ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len; + } + + PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "Append to Handshake", (unsigned char *)void_src, bytes)); + // TODO: Move firstHsDone and version check into callers as a suppression. + if (!suppressHash && (!ss->firstHsDone || ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(ss, src, bytes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes */ + } + + while (bytes > room) { + if (room > 0) + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, + room); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += room; + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + bytes -= room; + src += room; + room = ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.space; + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len == 0); + } + PORT_Memcpy(ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.buf + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len, src, bytes); + ss->sec.ci.sendBuf.len += bytes; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, unsigned int bytes) +{ + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeInternal(ss, void_src, bytes, PR_TRUE); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, unsigned int bytes) +{ + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeInternal(ss, void_src, bytes, PR_FALSE); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 num, unsigned int lenSize) +{ + PRUint8 b[sizeof(num)]; + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: number:", SSL_GETPID())); + ssl_EncodeUintX(b, num, lenSize); + return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, b, lenSize); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, unsigned int lenSize) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert((bytes < (1 << 8) && lenSize == 1) || + (bytes < (1L << 16) && lenSize == 2) || + (bytes < (1L << 24) && lenSize == 3)); + + SSL_TRC(60, ("%d: append variable:", SSL_GETPID())); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, bytes, lenSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + SSL_TRC(60, ("data:")); + return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, src, bytes); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + return ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, buf->buf, buf->len); +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, + unsigned int lenSize) +{ + return ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf->buf, buf->len, lenSize); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..011034aa19 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslencode.h @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslencode_h_ +#define __sslencode_h_ + +/* A buffer object, used for assembling messages. */ +typedef struct sslBufferStr { + PRUint8 *buf; + unsigned int len; + unsigned int space; + /* Set to true if the storage for the buffer is fixed, such as a stack + * variable or a view on another buffer. Growing a fixed buffer fails. */ + PRBool fixed; +} sslBuffer; + +#define SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY \ + { \ + NULL, 0, 0, PR_FALSE \ + } +#define SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(b, maxlen) \ + { \ + b, 0, maxlen, PR_TRUE \ + } +#define SSL_BUFFER_FIXED_LEN(b, len) \ + { \ + b, len, 0, PR_TRUE \ + } +#define SSL_BUFFER(b) SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(b, sizeof(b)) +#define SSL_BUFFER_BASE(b) ((b)->buf) +#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN(b) ((b)->len) +#define SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(b) ((b)->buf + (b)->len) +#define SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(b) ((b)->space - (b)->len) + +SECStatus sslBuffer_Grow(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int newLen); +SECStatus sslBuffer_Fill(sslBuffer *b, PRUint8 c, size_t len); +SECStatus sslBuffer_Append(sslBuffer *b, const void *data, unsigned int len); +SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendNumber(sslBuffer *b, PRUint64 v, unsigned int size); +SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendVariable(sslBuffer *b, const PRUint8 *data, + unsigned int len, unsigned int size); +SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(sslBuffer *b, const sslBuffer *append); +SECStatus sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(sslBuffer *b, const sslBuffer *append, + unsigned int size); +SECStatus sslBuffer_Skip(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int size, + unsigned int *savedOffset); +SECStatus sslBuffer_InsertLength(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int at, + unsigned int size); +SECStatus sslBuffer_InsertNumber(sslBuffer *b, unsigned int at, + PRUint64 v, unsigned int size); +void sslBuffer_Clear(sslBuffer *b); + +SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshake(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, + unsigned int bytes); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshakeSuppressHash(sslSocket *ss, const void *void_src, + unsigned int bytes); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(sslSocket *ss, + SSLHandshakeType t, unsigned int length); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 num, + unsigned int lenSize); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, unsigned int lenSize); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf); +SECStatus ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf, + unsigned int lenSize); + +typedef struct { + const PRUint8 *buf; + unsigned int len; +} sslReadBuffer; +typedef struct { + sslReadBuffer buf; + unsigned int offset; +} sslReader; +#define SSL_READER(b, l) \ + { \ + { b, l }, 0 \ + } +#define SSL_READER_CURRENT(r) \ + ((r)->buf.buf + (r)->offset) +#define SSL_READER_REMAINING(r) \ + ((r)->buf.len - (r)->offset) +SECStatus sslRead_Read(sslReader *reader, unsigned int count, + sslReadBuffer *out); +SECStatus sslRead_ReadVariable(sslReader *reader, unsigned int sizeLen, + sslReadBuffer *out); +SECStatus sslRead_ReadNumber(sslReader *reader, unsigned int bytes, + PRUint64 *val); + +#endif /* __sslencode_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b5272d4a85 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * Table enumerating all implemented cipher suites + * Part of public API. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" + +/* + * The ordering of cipher suites in this table must match the ordering in + * the cipherSuites table in ssl3con.c. + * + * If new ECC cipher suites are added, also update the ssl3CipherSuite arrays + * in ssl3ecc.c. + * + * Finally, update the ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED macro in sslimpl.h. + * + * The ordering is as follows: + * * No-encryption cipher suites last + * * Export/weak/obsolete cipher suites before no-encryption cipher suites + * * Order by key exchange algorithm: ECDHE, then DHE, then ECDH, RSA. + * * Within key agreement sections, prefer AEAD over non-AEAD cipher suites. + * * Within AEAD sections, order by symmetric encryption algorithm which + * integrates message authentication algorithm: AES-128-GCM, then + * ChaCha20-Poly1305, then AES-256-GCM, + * * Within non-AEAD sections, order by symmetric encryption algorithm: + * AES-128, then Camellia-128, then AES-256, then Camellia-256, then SEED, + * then FIPS-3DES, then 3DES, then RC4. AES is commonly accepted as a + * strong cipher internationally, and is often hardware-accelerated. + * Camellia also has wide international support across standards + * organizations. SEED is only recommended by the Korean government. 3DES + * only provides 112 bits of security. RC4 is now deprecated or forbidden + * by many standards organizations. + * * Within non-AEAD symmetric algorithm sections, order by message + * authentication algorithm: HMAC-SHA256, then HMAC-SHA384, then HMAC-SHA1, + * then HMAC-MD5. + * * Within symmetric algorithm sections, order by message authentication + * algorithm: GCM, then HMAC-SHA1, then HMAC-SHA256, then HMAC-MD5. + * * Within message authentication algorithm sections, order by asymmetric + * signature algorithm: ECDSA, then RSA, then DSS. + * * As a special case, the PSK ciphers, which are only enabled when + * TLS 1.3 PSK-resumption is in use, come first. + * + * Exception: Because some servers ignore the high-order byte of the cipher + * suite ID, we must be careful about adding cipher suites with IDs larger + * than 0x00ff; see bug 946147. For these broken servers, the first three + * cipher suites, with the MSB zeroed, look like: + * TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x2F } + * TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x0A } + * TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA { 0x00,0x09 } + * The broken server only supports the third and fourth ones and will select + * the third one. + */ +const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[] = { + TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + /* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA must appear before + * TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA to work around bug 946147. + */ + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, + + /* 56-bit DES "domestic" cipher suites */ + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, + + /* ciphersuites with no encryption */ + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, + + 0 +}; + +const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers = + (sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers) / (sizeof SSL_ImplementedCiphers[0]) - 1; + +const PRUint16* +SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void) +{ + return SSL_ImplementedCiphers; +} + +PRUint16 +SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void) +{ + return SSL_NumImplementedCiphers; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..edb941257d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.c @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* + * Function to set error code only when meaningful error has not already + * been set. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "prerror.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "seccomon.h" + +/* look at the current value of PR_GetError, and evaluate it to see + * if it is meaningful or meaningless (out of context). + * If it is meaningless, replace it with the hiLevelError. + * Returns the chosen error value. + */ +int +ssl_MapLowLevelError(int hiLevelError) +{ + int oldErr = PORT_GetError(); + + switch (oldErr) { + + case 0: + case PR_IO_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_IO: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: + case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: + case SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT: + case SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER: + case SSL_ERROR_SESSION_NOT_FOUND: + PORT_SetError(hiLevelError); + return hiLevelError; + + default: /* leave the majority of error codes alone. */ + return oldErr; + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..837fca7ba1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerr.h @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +/* + * Enumeration of all SSL-specific error codes. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#ifndef __SSL_ERR_H_ +#define __SSL_ERR_H_ + +/* clang-format off */ + +#define SSL_ERROR_BASE (-0x3000) +#define SSL_ERROR_LIMIT (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 1000) + +#define IS_SSL_ERROR(code) \ + (((code) >= SSL_ERROR_BASE) && ((code) < SSL_ERROR_LIMIT)) + +#ifndef NO_SECURITY_ERROR_ENUM +typedef enum { + SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_ONLY_SERVER = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 0), + /* error 0 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_US_ONLY_SERVER = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 1), + /* error 1 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 2), + /* + * Received an alert reporting what we did wrong. (more alerts below) + */ + SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE /*_ALERT */ = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 3), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 4), + /* error 4 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_UNUSED_5 = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 5), + /* error 5 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CLIENT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 6), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_SERVER = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 7), + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 8), + /* error 8 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 9), + SSL_ERROR_UNUSED_10 = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 10), + /* error 10 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_WRONG_CERTIFICATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 11), + /* error 11 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 12), + SSL_ERROR_POST_WARNING = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 13), + /* error 13 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_SSL2_DISABLED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 14), + /* error 14 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 15), + /* + * Received an alert reporting what we did wrong. + * (two more alerts above, and many more below) + */ + SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 16), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 17), + SSL_ERROR_REVOKED_CERT_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 18), + SSL_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERT_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 19), + + SSL_ERROR_SSL_DISABLED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 20), + SSL_ERROR_FORTEZZA_PQG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 21), + /* error 21 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 22), + SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 23), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 24), + SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 25), + SSL_ERROR_TX_RECORD_TOO_LONG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 26), + /* + * Received a malformed (too long or short) SSL handshake. + */ + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 27), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 28), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 29), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 30), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 31), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 32), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_DONE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 33), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 34), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 35), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 36), + /* + * Received a malformed (too long or short) SSL record. + */ + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 37), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 38), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 39), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_APPLICATION_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 40), + /* + * Received an SSL handshake that was inappropriate for the state we're in. + * E.g. Server received message from server, or wrong state in state machine. + */ + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 41), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_HELLO = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 42), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_HELLO = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 43), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 44), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_SERVER_KEY_EXCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 45), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 46), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_DONE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 47), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 48), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CLIENT_KEY_EXCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 49), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 50), + /* + * Received an SSL record that was inappropriate for the state we're in. + */ + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CHANGE_CIPHER = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 51), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 52), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HANDSHAKE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 53), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_APPLICATION_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 54), + /* + * Received record/message with unknown discriminant. + */ + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_RECORD_TYPE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 55), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 56), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 57), + /* + * Received an alert reporting what we did wrong. (more alerts above) + */ + SSL_ERROR_CLOSE_NOTIFY_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 58), + SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 59), + SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 60), + SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 61), + SSL_ERROR_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 62), + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERT_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 63), + SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 64), + + SSL_ERROR_GENERATE_RANDOM_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 65), + SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 66), + SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 67), + SSL_ERROR_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 68), + SSL_ERROR_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 69), + + SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 70), + SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 71), + /* error 71 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 72), + + SSL_ERROR_MD5_DIGEST_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 73), + SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 74), + SSL_ERROR_MAC_COMPUTATION_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 75), + SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 76), + SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_UNWRAP_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 77), + SSL_ERROR_PUB_KEY_SIZE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 78), + /* error 78 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_IV_PARAM_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 79), + SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 80), + SSL_ERROR_SESSION_KEY_GEN_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 81), + SSL_ERROR_NO_SERVER_KEY_FOR_ALG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 82), + SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_INSERTION_REMOVAL = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 83), + SSL_ERROR_TOKEN_SLOT_NOT_FOUND = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 84), + SSL_ERROR_NO_COMPRESSION_OVERLAP = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 85), + SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 86), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 87), + SSL_ERROR_CERT_KEA_MISMATCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 88), + SSL_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_SSL_CLIENT_CA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 89), + /* error 89 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_SESSION_NOT_FOUND = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 90), + + SSL_ERROR_DECRYPTION_FAILED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 91), + SSL_ERROR_RECORD_OVERFLOW_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 92), + SSL_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CA_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 93), + SSL_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 94), + SSL_ERROR_DECODE_ERROR_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 95), + SSL_ERROR_DECRYPT_ERROR_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 96), + SSL_ERROR_EXPORT_RESTRICTION_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 97), + SSL_ERROR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 98), + SSL_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 99), + SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 100), + SSL_ERROR_USER_CANCELED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 101), + SSL_ERROR_NO_RENEGOTIATION_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 102), + + SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 103), + + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 104), + SSL_ERROR_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 105), + SSL_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 106), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_STATUS_RESPONSE_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 107), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_HASH_VALUE_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 108), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 109), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 110), + + SSL_ERROR_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 111), + SSL_ERROR_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ALLOWED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 112), + SSL_ERROR_UNSAFE_NEGOTIATION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 113), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_UNCOMPRESSED_RECORD = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 114), + + SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_EPHEMERAL_DH_KEY = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 115), + + SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 116), + + SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SSL2 = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 117), + /* error 117 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_SERVERS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 118), + SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_CLIENTS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 119), + + SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION_RANGE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 120), + SSL_ERROR_CIPHER_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 121), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 122), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 123), + + SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 124), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_STATUS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 125), + + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 126), + SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 127), + SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 128), + + SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 129), + SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 130), + + SSL_ERROR_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 131), + + SSL_ERROR_WEAK_SERVER_CERT_KEY = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 132), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_SHORT_DTLS_READ = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 133), + + SSL_ERROR_NO_SUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 134), + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 135), + + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 136), + SSL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 137), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 138), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 139), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECDHE_KEY_SHARE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 140), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 141), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 142), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_EXTENSION_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 143), + + SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 144), + SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 145), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 146), + SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 147), + SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 148), + SSL_ERROR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 149), + /* error 149 is obsolete */ + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ALPN_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 150), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 151), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 152), + SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_RECORDS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 153), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 154), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 155), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 156), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 157), + SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 158), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 159), + SSL_ERROR_DOWNGRADE_WITH_EARLY_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 160), + SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 161), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 162), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 163), + + SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 164), + + SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 165), + SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 166), + SSL_ERROR_NO_TIMERS_FOUND = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 167), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 168), + + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 169), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 170), + SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 171), + SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_FAILED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 172), + SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 173), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DTLS_ACK = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 174), + SSL_ERROR_DH_KEY_TOO_LONG = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 175), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_KEYS = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 176), + SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 177), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ESNI_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 178), + SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_RECORD_TYPE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 179), + SSL_ERROR_MISSING_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXTENSION = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 180), + SSL_ERROR_RX_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 181), + SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 182), + SSL_ERROR_DC_BAD_SIGNATURE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 183), + SSL_ERROR_DC_INVALID_KEY_USAGE = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 184), + SSL_ERROR_DC_EXPIRED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 185), + SSL_ERROR_DC_INAPPROPRIATE_VALIDITY_PERIOD = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 186), + SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 187), + /* ECH rejected, public name authentication succeeded, + * and at least one of the retry_configs is compatible. */ + SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 188), + /* ECH rejected, public name authentication succeeded, + * but none of the retry_configs are compatible. */ + SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITHOUT_ECH = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 189), + /* ECH rejected and public name authentication failed. */ + SSL_ERROR_ECH_FAILED = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 190), + SSL_ERROR_ECH_REQUIRED_ALERT = (SSL_ERROR_BASE + 191), + SSL_ERROR_END_OF_LIST /* let the c compiler determine the value of this. */ +} SSLErrorCodes; + +#define SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_KEYS +#define SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_EXTENSION +#define SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ECH_EXTENSION SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ESNI_EXTENSION +#endif /* NO_SECURITY_ERROR_ENUM */ + +/* clang-format on */ + +#endif /* __SSL_ERR_H_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerrstrs.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerrstrs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4e3db6d73c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslerrstrs.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "prerror.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "prinit.h" +#include "nssutil.h" +#include "ssl.h" + +#define ER3(name, value, str) { #name, str }, + +static const struct PRErrorMessage ssltext[] = { +#include "SSLerrs.h" + { 0, 0 } +}; + +static const struct PRErrorTable ssl_et = { + ssltext, "sslerr", SSL_ERROR_BASE, + (sizeof ssltext) / (sizeof ssltext[0]) +}; + +static PRStatus +ssl_InitializePRErrorTableOnce(void) +{ + return PR_ErrorInstallTable(&ssl_et); +} + +static PRCallOnceType once; + +SECStatus +ssl_InitializePRErrorTable(void) +{ + return (PR_SUCCESS == PR_CallOnce(&once, ssl_InitializePRErrorTableOnce)) + ? SECSuccess + : SECFailure; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6eeafa5029 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslexp.h @@ -0,0 +1,1087 @@ +/* + * This file contains prototypes for experimental SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslexp_h_ +#define __sslexp_h_ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "pk11hpke.h" + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +/* The functions in this header file are not guaranteed to remain available in + * future NSS versions. Code that uses these functions needs to safeguard + * against the function not being available. */ + +#define SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API(name, arglist, args) \ + (SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name) \ + ? ((SECStatus(*) arglist)SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(name))args \ + : SECFailure) +#define SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API \ + (PR_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API, 0), SECFailure) + +/* + * SSL_GetExtensionSupport() returns whether NSS supports a particular TLS + * extension. + * + * - ssl_ext_none indicates that NSS does not support the extension and + * extension hooks can be installed. + * + * - ssl_ext_native indicates that NSS supports the extension natively, but + * allows an application to override that support and install its own + * extension hooks. + * + * - ssl_ext_native_only indicates that NSS supports the extension natively + * and does not permit custom extension hooks to be installed. These + * extensions are critical to the functioning of NSS. + */ +typedef enum { + ssl_ext_none, + ssl_ext_native, + ssl_ext_native_only +} SSLExtensionSupport; + +#define SSL_GetExtensionSupport(extension, support) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetExtensionSupport", \ + (PRUint16 _extension, \ + SSLExtensionSupport * _support), \ + (extension, support)) + +/* + * Custom extension hooks. + * + * The SSL_InstallExtensionHooks() registers two callback functions for use + * with the identified extension type. + * + * Installing extension hooks disables the checks in TLS 1.3 that ensure that + * extensions are only added to the correct messages. The application is + * responsible for ensuring that extensions are only sent with the right message + * or messages. + * + * Installing an extension handler does not disable checks for whether an + * extension can be used in a message that is a response to an extension in + * another message. Extensions in ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions and the + * server Certificate messages are rejected unless the client sends an extension + * in the ClientHello. Similarly, a client Certificate message cannot contain + * extensions that don't appear in a CertificateRequest (in TLS 1.3). + * + * Setting both |writer| and |handler| to NULL removes any existing hooks for + * that extension. + * + * == SSLExtensionWriter + * + * An SSLExtensionWriter function is responsible for constructing the contents + * of an extension. This function is called during the construction of all + * handshake messages where an extension might be included. + * + * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor. + * + * - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type. The writer will + * be called for every handshake message that NSS sends. Most extensions + * should only be sent in a subset of messages. NSS doesn’t check that + * extension writers don’t violate protocol rules regarding which message an + * extension can be sent in. + * + * - The |data| argument is a pointer to a buffer that should be written to with + * any data for the extension. + * + * - The |len| argument is an outparam indicating how many bytes were written to + * |data|. The value referenced by |len| is initialized to zero, so an + * extension that is empty does not need to write to this value. + * + * - The |maxLen| indicates the maximum number of bytes that can be written to + * |data|. + * + * - The |arg| argument is the value of the writerArg that was passed during + * installation. + * + * An SSLExtensionWriter function returns PR_TRUE if an extension should be + * written, and PR_FALSE otherwise. + * + * If there is an error, return PR_FALSE; if the error is truly fatal, the + * application can mark the connection as failed. However, recursively calling + * functions that alter the file descriptor in the callback - such as PR_Close() + * - should be avoided. + * + * Note: The ClientHello message can be sent twice in TLS 1.3. An + * SSLExtensionWriter will be called twice with the same arguments in that case; + * NSS does not distinguish between a first and second ClientHello. It is up to + * the application to track this if it needs to act differently each time. In + * most cases the correct behaviour is to provide an identical extension on each + * invocation. + * + * == SSLExtensionHandler + * + * An SSLExtensionHandler function consumes a handshake message. This function + * is called when an extension is present. + * + * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor. + * + * - The |message| argument is the TLS handshake message type. This can be used + * to validate that the extension was included in the correct handshake + * message. + * + * - The |data| argument points to the contents of the extension. + * + * - The |len| argument contains the length of the extension. + * + * - The |alert| argument is an outparam that allows an application to choose + * which alert is sent in the case of a fatal error. + * + * - The |arg| argument is the value of the handlerArg that was passed during + * installation. + * + * An SSLExtensionHandler function returns SECSuccess when the extension is + * process successfully. It can return SECFailure to cause the handshake to + * fail. If the value of alert is written to, NSS will generate a fatal alert + * using the provided alert code. The value of |alert| is otherwise not used. + */ +typedef PRBool(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionWriter)( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message, + PRUint8 *data, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxLen, void *arg); + +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLExtensionHandler)( + PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeType message, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, + SSLAlertDescription *alert, void *arg); + +#define SSL_InstallExtensionHooks(fd, extension, writer, writerArg, \ + handler, handlerArg) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_InstallExtensionHooks", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _extension, \ + SSLExtensionWriter _writer, void *_writerArg, \ + SSLExtensionHandler _handler, void *_handlerArg), \ + (fd, extension, writer, writerArg, \ + handler, handlerArg)) + +/* + * Create an anti-replay context for supporting 0-RTT in TLS 1.3 on servers. + * + * To use 0-RTT on a server, you must create an anti-replay context using + * SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext and set that on the socket with + * SSL_SetAntiReplayContext. Failing to set a context on the server will result + * in all 0-RTT being rejected. Connections will complete, but early data will + * be rejected. + * + * Anti-replay contexts are reference counted and are released with + * SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext. + * + * NSS uses a Bloom filter to track the ClientHello messages that it receives + * (specifically, it uses the PSK binder). This function initializes a pair of + * Bloom filters. The two filters are alternated over time, with new + * ClientHello messages recorded in the current filter and, if they are not + * already present, being checked against the previous filter. If the + * ClientHello is found, then early data is rejected, but the handshake is + * allowed to proceed. + * + * The false-positive probability of Bloom filters means that some valid + * handshakes will be marked as potential replays. Early data will be rejected + * for a false positive. To minimize this and to allow a trade-off of space + * against accuracy, the size of the Bloom filter can be set by this function. + * + * The first tuning parameter to consider is |window|, which determines the + * window over which ClientHello messages will be tracked. This also causes + * early data to be rejected if a ClientHello contains a ticket age parameter + * that is outside of this window (see Section 8.3 of RFC 8446 for details). + * Set |window| to account for any potential sources of clock error. |window| + * is the entire width of the window, which is symmetrical. Therefore to allow + * 5 seconds of clock error in both directions, set the value to 10 seconds + * (i.e., 10 * PR_USEC_PER_SEC). + * + * After calling this function, early data will be rejected until |window| + * elapses. This prevents replay across crashes and restarts. Only call this + * function once to avoid inadvertently disabling 0-RTT (use PR_CallOnce() to + * avoid this problem). + * + * The primary tuning parameter is |bits| which determines the amount of memory + * allocated to each Bloom filter. NSS will allocate two Bloom filters, each + * |2^(bits - 3)| octets in size. The value of |bits| is primarily driven by + * the number of connections that are expected in any time window. Note that + * this needs to account for there being two filters both of which have + * (presumably) independent false positive rates. The following formulae can be + * used to find a value of |bits| and |k| given a chosen false positive + * probability |p| and the number of requests expected in a given window |n|: + * + * bits = log2(n) + log2(-ln(1 - sqrt(1 - p))) + 1.0575327458897952 + * k = -log2(p) + * + * ... where log2 and ln are base 2 and e logarithms respectively. For a target + * false positive rate of 1% and 1000 handshake attempts, this produces bits=14 + * and k=7. This results in two Bloom filters that are 2kB each in size. Note + * that rounding |k| and |bits| up causes the false positive probability for + * these values to be a much lower 0.123%. + * + * IMPORTANT: This anti-replay scheme has several weaknesses. See the TLS 1.3 + * specification for the details of the generic problems with this technique. + * + * In addition to the generic anti-replay weaknesses, the state that the server + * maintains is in local memory only. Servers that operate in a cluster, even + * those that use shared memory for tickets, will not share anti-replay state. + * Early data can be replayed at least once with every server instance that will + * accept tickets that are encrypted with the same key. + */ +typedef struct SSLAntiReplayContextStr SSLAntiReplayContext; +#define SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext(now, window, k, bits, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateAntiReplayContext", \ + (PRTime _now, PRTime _window, \ + unsigned int _k, unsigned int _bits, \ + SSLAntiReplayContext **_ctx), \ + (now, window, k, bits, ctx)) + +#define SSL_SetAntiReplayContext(fd, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetAntiReplayContext", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx), \ + (fd, ctx)) + +#define SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_ReleaseAntiReplayContext", \ + (SSLAntiReplayContext * _ctx), \ + (ctx)) + +/* + * This function allows a server application to generate a session ticket that + * will embed the provided token. + * + * This function will cause a NewSessionTicket message to be sent by a server. + * This happens even if SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS is disabled. This allows a + * server to suppress the usually automatic generation of a session ticket at + * the completion of the handshake - which do not include any token - and to + * control when session tickets are transmitted. + * + * This function will fail unless the socket has an active TLS 1.3 session. + * Earlier versions of TLS do not support the spontaneous sending of the + * NewSessionTicket message. It will also fail when external PSK + * authentication has been negotiated. + */ +#define SSL_SendSessionTicket(fd, appToken, appTokenLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SendSessionTicket", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_appToken, \ + unsigned int _appTokenLen), \ + (fd, appToken, appTokenLen)) + +/* + * A stateless retry handler gives an application some control over NSS handling + * of ClientHello messages. + * + * SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback() installs a callback that allows an + * application to control how NSS sends HelloRetryRequest messages. This + * handler is only used on servers and will only be called if the server selects + * TLS 1.3. Support for older TLS versions could be added in other releases. + * + * The SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback is invoked during the processing of a + * TLS 1.3 ClientHello message. It takes the following arguments: + * + * - |firstHello| indicates if the NSS believes that this is an initial + * ClientHello. An initial ClientHello will never include a cookie extension, + * though it may contain a session ticket. + * + * - |clientToken| includes a token previously provided by the application. If + * |clientTokenLen| is 0, then |clientToken| may be NULL. + * + * - If |firstHello| is PR_FALSE, the value that was provided in the + * |retryToken| outparam of previous invocations of this callback will be + * present here. + * + * - If |firstHello| is PR_TRUE, and the handshake is resuming a session, then + * this will contain any value that was passed in the |token| parameter of + * SSL_SendNewSessionTicket() method (see below). If this is not resuming a + * session, then the token will be empty (and this value could be NULL). + * + * - |clientTokenLen| is the length of |clientToken|. + * + * - |retryToken| is an item that callback can write to. This provides NSS with + * a token. This token is encrypted and integrity protected and embedded in + * the cookie extension of a HelloRetryRequest. The value of this field is + * only used if the handler returns ssl_stateless_retry_check. NSS allocates + * space for this value. + * + * - |retryTokenLen| is an outparam for the length of the token. If this value + * is not set, or set to 0, an empty token will be sent. + * + * - |retryTokenMax| is the size of the space allocated for retryToken. An + * application cannot write more than this many bytes to retryToken. + * + * - |arg| is the same value that was passed to + * SSL_InstallStatelessRetryHandler(). + * + * The handler can validate any the value of |clientToken|, query the socket + * status (using SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo() for example) and decide how to + * proceed: + * + * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_fail causes the handshake to fail. This might be + * used if the token is invalid or the application wishes to abort the + * handshake. + * + * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_accept causes the handshake to proceed. + * + * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_request causes NSS to send a HelloRetryRequest + * message and request a second ClientHello. NSS generates a cookie extension + * and embeds the value of |retryToken|. The value of |retryToken| value may + * be left empty if the application does not require any additional context to + * validate a second ClientHello attempt. This return code cannot be used to + * reject a second ClientHello (i.e., when firstHello is PR_FALSE); NSS will + * abort the handshake if this value is returned from a second call. + * + * - Returning ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt causes NSS to proceed normally, but + * to reject 0-RTT. Use this if there is something in the token that + * indicates that 0-RTT might be unsafe. + * + * An application that chooses to perform a stateless retry can discard the + * server socket. All necessary state to continue the TLS handshake will be + * included in the cookie extension. This makes it possible to use a new socket + * to handle the remainder of the handshake. The existing socket can be safely + * discarded. + * + * If the same socket is retained, the information in the cookie will be checked + * for consistency against the existing state of the socket. Any discrepancy + * will result in the connection being closed. + * + * Tokens should be kept as small as possible. NSS sets a limit on the size of + * tokens, which it passes in |retryTokenMax|. Depending on circumstances, + * observing a smaller limit might be desirable or even necessary. For + * instance, having HelloRetryRequest and ClientHello fit in a single packet has + * significant performance benefits. + */ +typedef enum { + ssl_hello_retry_fail, + ssl_hello_retry_accept, + ssl_hello_retry_request, + ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt +} SSLHelloRetryRequestAction; + +typedef SSLHelloRetryRequestAction(PR_CALLBACK *SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback)( + PRBool firstHello, const PRUint8 *clientToken, unsigned int clientTokenLen, + PRUint8 *retryToken, unsigned int *retryTokenLen, unsigned int retryTokMax, + void *arg); + +#define SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback(fd, cb, arg) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HelloRetryRequestCallback", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, \ + SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback _cb, void *_arg), \ + (fd, cb, arg)) + +/* Update traffic keys (TLS 1.3 only). + * + * The |requestUpdate| flag determines whether to request an update from the + * remote peer. + */ +#define SSL_KeyUpdate(fd, requestUpdate) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_KeyUpdate", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _requestUpdate), \ + (fd, requestUpdate)) + +/* This function allows a server application to trigger + * re-authentication (TLS 1.3 only) after handshake. + * + * This function will cause a CertificateRequest message to be sent by + * a server. This can be called once at a time, and is not allowed + * until an answer is received. + * + * This function is not allowed for use with DTLS or when external + * PSK authentication has been negotiated. SECFailure is returned + * in both cases. + * + * The AuthCertificateCallback is called when the answer is received. + * If the answer is accepted by the server, the value returned by + * SSL_PeerCertificate() is replaced. If you need to remember all the + * certificates, you will need to call SSL_PeerCertificate() and save + * what you get before calling this. + * + * If the AuthCertificateCallback returns SECFailure, the connection + * is aborted. + */ +#define SSL_SendCertificateRequest(fd) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SendCertificateRequest", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd), \ + (fd)) + +/* + * Session cache API. + */ + +/* + * Information that can be retrieved about a resumption token. + * See SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo for details about how to use this API. + * Note that peerCert points to a certificate in the NSS database and must be + * copied by the application if it should be used after NSS shutdown or after + * calling SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo. + */ +typedef struct SSLResumptionTokenInfoStr { + PRUint16 length; + CERTCertificate *peerCert; + PRUint8 *alpnSelection; + PRUint32 alpnSelectionLen; + PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize; + PRTime expirationTime; /* added in NSS 3.41 */ +} SSLResumptionTokenInfo; + +/* + * Allows applications to retrieve information about a resumption token. + * This does not require a TLS session. + * + * - The |tokenData| argument is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array + * of length |tokenLen|. + * - The |token| argument is a pointer to a SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct of + * of |len|. The struct gets filled by this function. + * See SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo for information about how to manage the + * |token| memory. + */ +#define SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo(tokenData, tokenLen, token, len) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo", \ + (const PRUint8 *_tokenData, unsigned int _tokenLen, \ + SSLResumptionTokenInfo *_token, PRUintn _len), \ + (tokenData, tokenLen, token, len)) + +/* + * SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo allocates memory in order to populate |tokenInfo|. + * Any SSLResumptionTokenInfo struct filled with SSL_GetResumptionTokenInfo + * has to be freed with SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo. + */ +#define SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo(tokenInfo) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API( \ + "SSL_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo", \ + (SSLResumptionTokenInfo * _tokenInfo), \ + (tokenInfo)) + +/* + * This is the function signature for function pointers used as resumption + * token callback. The caller has to copy the memory at |resumptionToken| with + * length |len| before returning. + * + * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor. + * - The |resumptionToken| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array + * of length |len|. + * - The |ctx| is a void pointer to the context set by the application in + * SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback. + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLResumptionTokenCallback)( + PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *resumptionToken, unsigned int len, + void *ctx); + +/* + * This allows setting a callback for external session caches to store + * resumption tokens. + * + * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor. + * - The |cb| is a function pointer to an implementation of + * SSLResumptionTokenCallback. + * - The |ctx| is a pointer to some application specific context, which is + * returned when |cb| is called. + */ +#define SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback(fd, cb, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API( \ + "SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLResumptionTokenCallback _cb, void *_ctx), \ + (fd, cb, ctx)) + +/* + * This allows setting a resumption token for a session. + * The function returns SECSuccess iff the resumption token can be used, + * SECFailure in any other case. The caller should remove the |token| from its + * cache when the function returns SECFailure. + * + * - The |fd| argument is the socket file descriptor. + * - The |token| is a pointer to the resumption token as byte array + * of length |len|. + */ +#define SSL_SetResumptionToken(fd, token, len) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API( \ + "SSL_SetResumptionToken", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_token, const unsigned int _len), \ + (fd, token, len)) + +/* TLS 1.3 allows a server to set a limit on the number of bytes of early data + * that can be received. This allows that limit to be set. This function has no + * effect on a client. */ +#define SSL_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(fd, size) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetMaxEarlyDataSize", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint32 _size), \ + (fd, size)) + +/* Client: + * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extension will be sent in every ClientHello, + * unless a valid and supported ECHConfig is configured to the socket + * (in which case real ECH takes precedence). If |!enabled|, it is not sent. + * + * Server: + * If |enabled|, a GREASE ECH extensions will be sent in every HelloRetryRequest, + * provided that the corresponding ClientHello contained an ECH extension. If ECH + * is enabled, the real ECH HRR extension takes precedence. + */ +#define SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch(fd, enabled) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13GreaseEch", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled)) + +/* + * Client: + * When sending a GREASE ECH extension in a ClientHello, pad it as though the + * hypothetical ECHConfig had |maximum_name_length| equal to |size|. |size| may + * vary between 1 and 255 and defaults to 100. + * + * Server: + * Has no effect. + */ +#define SSL_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(fd, size) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetTls13GreaseEchSize", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint8 _size), (fd, size)) + +/* If |enabled|, a server receiving a Client Hello containing an encrypted_client_hello + * of type inner will respond with the ECH + * acceptance signal. This signals the client to continue with the inner + * transcript rather than outer. */ +#define SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch(fd, enabled) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EnableTls13BackendEch", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled)) + +/* This allows an extension writer to supply different values for inner and + * outer ClientHello when using encrypted ClientHello. + * + * When enabled, each extension writer can be called more than once for the same + * message; it must provide the same response when called for the same message + * type. When calling the writer to construct the outer ClientHello, the + * function will be called with ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello as the message + * type (a value from outside the range of valid TLS handshake messages). + * + * When disabled, the extension writer is called once for the outer ClientHello + * and the value is copied to the inner ClientHello. + * + * Enabling this affects all extension writers. The order in which extension + * writers are added is also important. Any extension writer that writes + * different values for inner and outer ClientHello will prevent later + * extensions from being compressed. + */ +#define SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(fd, enabled) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled)) + +/* Called by the client after an initial ECH connection fails with + * SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH. Returns compatible ECHConfigs, which + * are configured via SetClientEchConfigs for an ECH retry attempt. + * These configs MUST NOT be used for more than the single retry + * attempt. Subsequent connections MUST use advertised ECHConfigs. */ +#define SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs(fd, out) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetEchRetryConfigs", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, \ + SECItem * _out), \ + (fd, out)) + +/* Called to remove all ECHConfigs from a socket (fd). */ +#define SSL_RemoveEchConfigs(fd) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RemoveEchConfigs", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd), \ + (fd)) + +/* Set the ECHConfig and key pair on a socket (server side) + * + * fd -- the socket + * pubKey -- the server's SECKEYPublicKey for HPKE/ECH. + * privateKey -- the server's SECKEYPrivateKey for HPKE/ECH. + * record/recordLen -- the encoded DNS record (not base64) + */ +#define SSL_SetServerEchConfigs(fd, pubKey, \ + privKey, record, recordLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetServerEchConfigs", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, \ + const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey, \ + const SECKEYPrivateKey *_privKey, \ + const PRUint8 *_record, unsigned int _recordLen), \ + (fd, pubKey, privKey, \ + record, recordLen)) + +/* Set ECHConfig(s) on a client. The first supported ECHConfig will be used. + * + * fd -- the socket + * echConfigs/echConfigsLen -- the ECHConfigs structure (not base64) + */ +#define SSL_SetClientEchConfigs(fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetClientEchConfigs", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, \ + const PRUint8 *_echConfigs, \ + unsigned int _echConfigsLen), \ + (fd, echConfigs, echConfigsLen)) + +/* + * Generate an encoded ECHConfig structure (presumably server side). + * + * configId -- an identifier for the configuration. + * publicName -- the public_name value to be placed in SNI. + * maxNameLen -- the maximum length of protected names + * kemId -- the HKPE KEM ID value + * pubKey -- the public key for the key pair + * hpkeSuites -- the HPKE cipher suites that can be used + * hpkeSuitesCount -- the number of suites in hpkeSuites + * out/outlen/maxlen -- where to output the data + */ +typedef struct HpkeSymmetricSuiteStr { + HpkeKdfId kdfId; + HpkeAeadId aeadId; +} HpkeSymmetricSuite; +#define SSL_EncodeEchConfigId(configId, publicName, maxNameLen, \ + kemId, pubKey, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuiteCount, \ + out, outlen, maxlen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_EncodeEchConfigId", \ + (PRUint8 _configId, const char *_publicName, \ + unsigned int _maxNameLen, HpkeKemId _kemId, \ + const SECKEYPublicKey *_pubKey, \ + const HpkeSymmetricSuite *_hpkeSuites, \ + unsigned int _hpkeSuiteCount, \ + PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outlen, \ + unsigned int _maxlen), \ + (configId, publicName, maxNameLen, \ + kemId, pubKey, hpkeSuites, hpkeSuiteCount, \ + out, outlen, maxlen)) + +/* SSL_SetSecretCallback installs a callback that TLS calls when it installs new + * traffic secrets. + * + * SSLSecretCallback is called with the current epoch and the corresponding + * secret; this matches the epoch used in DTLS 1.3, even if the socket is + * operating in stream mode: + * + * - client_early_traffic_secret corresponds to epoch 1 + * - {client|server}_handshake_traffic_secret is epoch 2 + * - {client|server}_application_traffic_secret_{N} is epoch 3+N + * + * The callback is invoked separately for read secrets (client secrets on the + * server; server secrets on the client), and write secrets. + * + * This callback is only called if (D)TLS 1.3 is negotiated. + */ +typedef void(PR_CALLBACK *SSLSecretCallback)( + PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLSecretDirection dir, PK11SymKey *secret, + void *arg); + +#define SSL_SecretCallback(fd, cb, arg) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SecretCallback", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLSecretCallback _cb, void *_arg), \ + (fd, cb, arg)) + +/* SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() is used to replace the TLS record layer. This + * function installs a callback that TLS calls when it would otherwise encrypt + * and write a record to the underlying NSPR IO layer. The application is + * responsible for ensuring that these records are encrypted and written. + * + * Calling this API also disables reads from the underlying NSPR layer. The + * application is expected to push data when it is available using + * SSL_RecordLayerData(). + * + * When data would be written, the provided SSLRecordWriteCallback with the + * epoch, TLS content type, and the data. The data provided to the callback is + * not split into record-sized writes. If the callback returns SECFailure, the + * write will be considered to have failed; in particular, PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR + * is not handled specially. + * + * If TLS 1.3 is in use, the epoch indicates the expected level of protection + * that the record would receive, this matches that used in DTLS 1.3: + * + * - epoch 0 corresponds to no record protection + * - epoch 1 corresponds to 0-RTT + * - epoch 2 corresponds to TLS handshake + * - epoch 3 and higher are application data + * + * Prior versions of TLS use epoch 1 and higher for application data. + * + * This API is not supported for DTLS. + */ +typedef SECStatus(PR_CALLBACK *SSLRecordWriteCallback)( + PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, SSLContentType contentType, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len, void *arg); + +#define SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback(fd, writeCb, arg) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLRecordWriteCallback _wCb, \ + void *_arg), \ + (fd, writeCb, arg)) + +/* SSL_RecordLayerData() is used to provide new data to TLS. The application + * indicates the epoch (see the description of SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback()), + * content type, and the data that was received. The application is responsible + * for removing any encryption or other protection before passing data to this + * function. + * + * This returns SECSuccess if the data was successfully processed. If this + * function is used to drive the handshake and the caller needs to know when the + * handshake is complete, a call to SSL_ForceHandshake will return SECSuccess + * when the handshake is complete. + * + * This API is not supported for DTLS sockets. + */ +#define SSL_RecordLayerData(fd, epoch, ct, data, len) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RecordLayerData", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 _epoch, \ + SSLContentType _contentType, \ + const PRUint8 *_data, unsigned int _len), \ + (fd, epoch, ct, data, len)) + +/* + * SSL_GetCurrentEpoch() returns the read and write epochs that the socket is + * currently using. NULL values for readEpoch or writeEpoch are ignored. + * + * See SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback() for details on epochs. + */ +#define SSL_GetCurrentEpoch(fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_GetCurrentEpoch", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _readEpoch, \ + PRUint16 * _writeEpoch), \ + (fd, readEpoch, writeEpoch)) + +/* + * The following AEAD functions expose an AEAD primitive that uses a ciphersuite + * to set parameters. The ciphersuite determines the Hash function used by + * HKDF, the AEAD function, and the size of key and IV. This is only supported + * for TLS 1.3. + * + * The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label. That is + * HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, labelPrefix + " key" or " iv", "", L). + * + * The encrypt and decrypt functions use a nonce construction identical to that + * used in TLS. The lower bits of the IV are XORed with the 64-bit counter to + * produce the nonce. Otherwise, this is an AEAD interface similar to that + * described in RFC 5116. + * + * Note: SSL_MakeAead internally calls SSL_MakeVariantAead with a variant of + * "stream", behaving as noted above. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, + * the Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See + * 7.1 of RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */ +typedef struct SSLAeadContextStr SSLAeadContext; + +#define SSL_MakeAead(version, cipherSuite, secret, \ + labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_MakeAead", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _secret, \ + const char *_labelPrefix, \ + unsigned int _labelPrefixLen, \ + SSLAeadContext **_ctx), \ + (version, cipherSuite, secret, \ + labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx)) + +#define SSL_MakeVariantAead(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \ + labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_MakeVariantAead", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \ + PK11SymKey * _secret, \ + const char *_labelPrefix, \ + unsigned int _labelPrefixLen, \ + SSLAeadContext **_ctx), \ + (version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \ + labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx)) + +#define SSL_AeadEncrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \ + output, outputLen, maxOutputLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AeadEncrypt", \ + (const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \ + const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen, \ + const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen, \ + PRUint8 *_out, unsigned int *_outLen, \ + unsigned int _maxOut), \ + (ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \ + output, outputLen, maxOutputLen)) + +#define SSL_AeadDecrypt(ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \ + output, outputLen, maxOutputLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AeadDecrypt", \ + (const SSLAeadContext *_ctx, PRUint64 _counter, \ + const PRUint8 *_aad, unsigned int _aadLen, \ + const PRUint8 *_in, unsigned int _inLen, \ + PRUint8 *_output, unsigned int *_outLen, \ + unsigned int _maxOut), \ + (ctx, counter, aad, aadLen, in, inLen, \ + output, outputLen, maxOutputLen)) + +#define SSL_DestroyAead(ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DestroyAead", \ + (SSLAeadContext * _ctx), \ + (ctx)) + +/* SSL_HkdfExtract and SSL_HkdfExpandLabel implement the functions from TLS, + * using the version and ciphersuite to set parameters. This allows callers to + * use these TLS functions as a KDF. This is only supported for TLS 1.3. + * + * SSL_HkdfExtract produces a key with a mechanism that is suitable for input to + * SSL_HkdfExpandLabel (and SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech). */ +#define SSL_HkdfExtract(version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExtract", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _salt, PK11SymKey * _ikm, \ + PK11SymKey * *_keyp), \ + (version, cipherSuite, salt, ikm, keyp)) + +/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabel and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel produce a key with a + * mechanism that is suitable for input to SSL_HkdfExpandLabel or SSL_MakeAead. + * + * Note: SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel internally calls SSL_HkdfExpandLabel with + * a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the + * Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of + * RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */ +#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExpandLabel", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _prk, \ + const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \ + const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \ + PK11SymKey **_keyp), \ + (version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, keyp)) + +#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant, \ + keyp) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabel", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _prk, \ + const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \ + const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \ + SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \ + PK11SymKey **_keyp), \ + (version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, variant, \ + keyp)) + +/* SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech and SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech use the KDF + * from the selected TLS version and cipher suite, as with the other calls, but + * the provided mechanism and key size. This allows the key to be used more widely. + * + * Note: SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech internally calls SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech + * with a default "stream" variant. If "datagram" variant is passed instead, the + * Label prefix used in HKDF-Expand is "dtls13" instead of "tls13 ". See 7.1 of + * RFC 8446 and draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-34. */ +#define SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \ + mech, keySize, keyp) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _prk, \ + const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \ + const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize, \ + PK11SymKey **_keyp), \ + (version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \ + mech, keySize, keyp)) + +#define SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \ + mech, keySize, variant, keyp) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _prk, \ + const PRUint8 *_hsHash, unsigned int _hsHashLen, \ + const char *_label, unsigned int _labelLen, \ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE _mech, unsigned int _keySize, \ + SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \ + PK11SymKey **_keyp), \ + (version, cipherSuite, prk, \ + hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, \ + mech, keySize, variant, keyp)) + +/* SSL_SetTimeFunc overrides the default time function (PR_Now()) and provides + * an alternative source of time for the socket. This is used in testing, and in + * applications that need better control over how the clock is accessed. Set the + * function to NULL to use PR_Now().*/ +typedef PRTime(PR_CALLBACK *SSLTimeFunc)(void *arg); + +#define SSL_SetTimeFunc(fd, f, arg) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetTimeFunc", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, SSLTimeFunc _f, void *_arg), \ + (fd, f, arg)) + +/* Create a delegated credential (DC) for the draft-ietf-tls-subcerts extension + * using the given certificate |cert| and its signing key |certPriv| and write + * the serialized DC to |out|. The + * parameters are: + * - the DC public key |dcPub|; + * - the DC signature scheme |dcCertVerifyAlg|, used to verify the handshake. + * - the DC time-to-live |dcValidFor|, the number of seconds from now for which + * the DC should be valid; and + * - the current time |now|. + * + * The signing algorithm used to verify the DC signature is deduced from + * |cert|. + * + * It's the caller's responsibility to ensure the input parameters are all + * valid. This procedure is meant primarily for testing; for this purpose it is + * useful to do no validation. + */ +#define SSL_DelegateCredential(cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg, \ + dcValidFor, now, out) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DelegateCredential", \ + (const CERTCertificate *_cert, \ + const SECKEYPrivateKey *_certPriv, \ + const SECKEYPublicKey *_dcPub, \ + SSLSignatureScheme _dcCertVerifyAlg, \ + PRUint32 _dcValidFor, \ + PRTime _now, \ + SECItem *_out), \ + (cert, certPriv, dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg, dcValidFor, \ + now, out)) + +/* New functions created to permit get/set the CipherSuites Order for the + * handshake (Client Hello). + * + * The *Get function puts the current set of active (enabled and policy set as + * PR_TRUE) cipher suites in the cipherOrder outparam. Cipher suites that + * aren't active aren't included. The paramenters are: + * - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to get information. + * - PRUint16 *cipherOrder = The memory allocated for cipherOrder needs to be + * SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers() * sizeof(PRUint16) or more. + * - PRUint16 numCiphers = The number of active ciphersuites listed in + * *cipherOrder is written here. + * + * The *Set function permits reorder the CipherSuites list for the Handshake + * (Client Hello). The default ordering defined in ssl3con.c is enough in + * almost all cases. But, if the client needs some hardening or performance + * adjusts related to CipherSuites, this can be done with this function. + * The caller has to be aware about the risk of call this function while a + * handshake are being processed in this fd/socket. For example, if you disable + * a cipher after the handshake and this cipher was choosen for that + * connection, something bad will happen. + * The parameters are: + * - PRFileDesc *fd = FileDescriptor to change. + * - const PRUint16 *cipherOrder = Must receive all ciphers to be ordered, in + * the desired order. They will be set in the begin of the list. Only + * suites listed by SSL_ImplementedCiphers() can be included. + * - PRUint16 numCiphers = Must receive the number of items in *cipherOrder. + * */ +#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CipherSuiteOrderGet", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRUint16 * _cipherOrder, \ + unsigned int *_numCiphers), \ + (fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers)) + +#define SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet(fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CipherSuiteOrderSet", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint16 *_cipherOrder, \ + PRUint16 _numCiphers), \ + (fd, cipherOrder, numCiphers)) + +/* + * The following functions expose a masking primitive that uses ciphersuite and + * version information to set paramaters for the masking key and mask generation + * logic. This is only supported for TLS 1.3. + * + * The key and IV are generated using the TLS KDF with a custom label. That is + * HKDF-Expand-Label(secret, label, "", L), where |label| is an input to + * SSL_CreateMaskingContext. + * + * The mask generation logic in SSL_CreateMask is determined by the underlying + * symmetric cipher: + * - For AES-ECB, mask = AES-ECB(mask_key, sample). |len| must be <= 16 as + * the output is limited to a single block. + * - For CHACHA20, mask = ChaCha20(mask_key, sample[0..3], sample[4..15], {0}.len) + * That is, the low 4 bytes of |sample| used as the counter, the remaining 12 bytes + * the nonce. We encrypt |len| bytes of zeros, returning the raw key stream. + * + * The caller must pre-allocate at least |len| bytes for output. If the underlying + * cipher cannot produce the requested amount of data, SECFailure is returned. + */ + +typedef struct SSLMaskingContextStr { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech; + PRUint16 version; + PRUint16 cipherSuite; + PK11SymKey *secret; +} SSLMaskingContext; + +#define SSL_CreateMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, secret, \ + label, labelLen, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateMaskingContext", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + PK11SymKey * _secret, \ + const char *_label, \ + unsigned int _labelLen, \ + SSLMaskingContext **_ctx), \ + (version, cipherSuite, secret, label, labelLen, ctx)) + +#define SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext(version, cipherSuite, variant, \ + secret, label, labelLen, ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateVariantMaskingContext", \ + (PRUint16 _version, PRUint16 _cipherSuite, \ + SSLProtocolVariant _variant, \ + PK11SymKey * _secret, \ + const char *_label, \ + unsigned int _labelLen, \ + SSLMaskingContext **_ctx), \ + (version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, \ + label, labelLen, ctx)) + +#define SSL_DestroyMaskingContext(ctx) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_DestroyMaskingContext", \ + (SSLMaskingContext * _ctx), \ + (ctx)) + +#define SSL_CreateMask(ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_CreateMask", \ + (SSLMaskingContext * _ctx, const PRUint8 *_sample, \ + unsigned int _sampleLen, PRUint8 *_mask, \ + unsigned int _maskLen), \ + (ctx, sample, sampleLen, mask, maskLen)) + +#define SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(fd, enabled) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PRBool _enabled), (fd, enabled)) + +/* SSL_AddExternalPsk() and SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt() can be used to + * set an external PSK on a socket. If successful, this PSK will + * be used in all subsequent connection attempts for this socket. + * This has no effect if the maximum TLS version is < 1.3. + * + * This API currently only accepts a single PSK, so multiple calls to + * either function will fail. An EPSK can be replaced by calling + * SSL_RemoveExternalPsk followed by SSL_AddExternalPsk. + * For both functions, the label is expected to be a unique identifier + * for the external PSK. Should en external PSK have the same label + * as a configured resumption PSK identity, the external PSK will + * take precedence. + * + * If you want to enable early data, you need to also provide a + * cipher suite for 0-RTT and a limit for the early data using + * SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(). If you want to explicitly disallow + * certificate authentication, use SSL_AuthCertificateHook to set + * a callback that rejects all certificate chains. + */ +#define SSL_AddExternalPsk(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AddExternalPsk", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk, \ + const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \ + SSLHashType _hash), \ + (fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash)) + +#define SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash, \ + zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_AddExternalPsk0Rtt", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, PK11SymKey * _psk, \ + const PRUint8 *_identity, unsigned int _identityLen, \ + SSLHashType _hash, PRUint16 _zeroRttSuite, \ + PRUint32 _maxEarlyData), \ + (fd, psk, identity, identityLen, hash, \ + zeroRttSuite, maxEarlyData)) + +/* SSLExp_RemoveExternalPsk() removes an external PSK from socket + * configuration. Returns SECSuccess if the PSK was removed + * successfully, and SECFailure otherwise. */ +#define SSL_RemoveExternalPsk(fd, identity, identityLen) \ + SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API("SSL_RemoveExternalPsk", \ + (PRFileDesc * _fd, const PRUint8 *_identity, \ + unsigned int _identityLen), \ + (fd, identity, identityLen)) + +/* Deprecated experimental APIs */ +#define SSL_UseAltServerHelloType(fd, enable) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_SetupAntiReplay(a, b, c) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_InitAntiReplay(a, b, c) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_EnableESNI(a, b, c, d) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_EncodeESNIKeys(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_SetESNIKeyPair(a, b, c, d) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API +#define SSL_EncodeEchConfig(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i) SSL_DEPRECATED_EXPERIMENTAL_API + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +#endif /* __sslexp_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslgrp.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslgrp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb53ad381c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslgrp.c @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file contains prototypes for the public SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +struct { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + PRCallOnceType once; +} gECDHEKeyPairs[SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT]; + +typedef struct sslSocketAndGroupArgStr { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; + const sslSocket *ss; +} sslSocketAndGroupArg; + +/* Function to clear out the ECDHE keys. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_CleanupECDHEKeys(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; i++) { + if (gECDHEKeyPairs[i].keyPair) { + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(gECDHEKeyPairs[i].keyPair); + } + } + memset(gECDHEKeyPairs, 0, sizeof(gECDHEKeyPairs)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Only run the cleanup once. */ +static PRCallOnceType cleanupECDHEKeysOnce; +static PRStatus +ssl_SetupCleanupECDHEKeysOnce(void) +{ + SECStatus rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_CleanupECDHEKeys, NULL); + return (rv != SECSuccess) ? PR_FAILURE : PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* This creates a key pair for each of the supported EC groups. If that works, + * we assume that the token supports that group. Since this is relatively + * expensive, this is only done for the first socket that is used. That means + * that if tokens are added or removed, then this will not pick up any changes. + */ +static PRStatus +ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKeyPair(void *arg) +{ + const sslSocketAndGroupArg *typed_arg = (sslSocketAndGroupArg *)arg; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = typed_arg->group; + const sslSocket *ss = typed_arg->ss; + unsigned int i = group - ssl_named_groups; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(group->keaType == ssl_kea_ecdh); + PORT_Assert(i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT); + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, group, + &gECDHEKeyPairs[i].keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + gECDHEKeyPairs[i].keyPair = NULL; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[-]: disabling group %d", + SSL_GETPID(), group->name)); + } + + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +void +ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(sslSocket *ss) +{ + unsigned int i; + PRStatus prv; + sslSocketAndGroupArg arg = { NULL, ss }; + + prv = PR_CallOnce(&cleanupECDHEKeysOnce, ssl_SetupCleanupECDHEKeysOnce); + PORT_Assert(prv == PR_SUCCESS); + if (prv != PR_SUCCESS) { + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + PRUint32 policy; + SECStatus srv; + unsigned int index; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (!group) { + continue; + } + + srv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(group->oidTag, &policy); + if (srv == SECSuccess && !(policy & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + continue; + } + + if (group->assumeSupported) { + continue; + } + + /* For EC groups, we have to test that a key pair can be created. This + * is gross, and expensive, so only do it once. */ + index = group - ssl_named_groups; + PORT_Assert(index < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT); + + arg.group = group; + prv = PR_CallOnceWithArg(&gECDHEKeyPairs[index].once, + ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKeyPair, + (void *)&arg); + PORT_Assert(prv == PR_SUCCESS); + if (prv != PR_SUCCESS) { + continue; + } + + if (!gECDHEKeyPairs[index].keyPair) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* + * Creates the static "ephemeral" public and private ECDH keys used by server in + * ECDHE_RSA and ECDHE_ECDSA handshakes when we reuse the same key. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKey(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup) +{ + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + /* We index gECDHEKeyPairs by the named group. Pointer arithmetic! */ + unsigned int index = ecGroup - ssl_named_groups; + PRStatus prv; + sslSocketAndGroupArg arg = { ecGroup, ss }; + + prv = PR_CallOnceWithArg(&gECDHEKeyPairs[index].once, + ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKeyPair, + (void *)&arg); + PORT_Assert(prv == PR_SUCCESS); + if (prv != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + keyPair = gECDHEKeyPairs[index].keyPair; + if (!keyPair) { + /* Attempting to use a key pair for an unsupported group. */ + PORT_Assert(keyPair); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + keyPair = ssl_CopyEphemeralKeyPair(keyPair); + if (!keyPair) + return SECFailure; + + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4486d0df5f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h @@ -0,0 +1,2020 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL and should be the first thing included by + * any SSL implementation file. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslimpl_h_ +#define __sslimpl_h_ + +#ifdef DEBUG +#undef NDEBUG +#else +#undef NDEBUG +#define NDEBUG +#endif +#include "secport.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "ssl3prot.h" +#include "hasht.h" +#include "nssilock.h" +#include "pkcs11t.h" +#if defined(XP_UNIX) +#include "unistd.h" +#endif +#include "nssrwlk.h" +#include "prthread.h" +#include "prclist.h" +#include "private/pprthred.h" + +#include "sslt.h" /* for some formerly private types, now public */ + +typedef struct sslSocketStr sslSocket; +typedef struct sslNamedGroupDefStr sslNamedGroupDef; +typedef struct sslEchConfigStr sslEchConfig; +typedef struct sslEchConfigContentsStr sslEchConfigContents; +typedef struct sslEchCookieDataStr sslEchCookieData; +typedef struct sslEchXtnStateStr sslEchXtnState; +typedef struct sslPskStr sslPsk; +typedef struct sslDelegatedCredentialStr sslDelegatedCredential; +typedef struct sslEphemeralKeyPairStr sslEphemeralKeyPair; +typedef struct TLS13KeyShareEntryStr TLS13KeyShareEntry; + +#include "sslencode.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "sslspec.h" + +#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(TRACE) +#ifdef __cplusplus +#define Debug 1 +#else +extern int Debug; +#endif +#else +#undef Debug +#endif + +#if defined(DEBUG) && !defined(TRACE) && !defined(NISCC_TEST) +#define TRACE +#endif + +#ifdef TRACE +#define SSL_TRC(a, b) \ + if (ssl_trace >= (a)) \ + ssl_Trace b +#define PRINT_BUF(a, b) \ + if (ssl_trace >= (a)) \ + ssl_PrintBuf b +#define PRINT_KEY(a, b) \ + if (ssl_trace >= (a)) \ + ssl_PrintKey b +#else +#define SSL_TRC(a, b) +#define PRINT_BUF(a, b) +#define PRINT_KEY(a, b) +#endif + +#ifdef DEBUG +#define SSL_DBG(b) \ + if (ssl_debug) \ + ssl_Trace b +#else +#define SSL_DBG(b) +#endif + +#define LSB(x) ((unsigned char)((x)&0xff)) +#define MSB(x) ((unsigned char)(((unsigned)(x)) >> 8)) + +#define CONST_CAST(T, X) ((T *)(X)) + +/************************************************************************/ + +typedef enum { SSLAppOpRead = 0, + SSLAppOpWrite, + SSLAppOpRDWR, + SSLAppOpPost, + SSLAppOpHeader +} SSLAppOperation; + +#define SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES 32 + +#define SSL_MIN_CHALLENGE_BYTES 16 +#define SSL_MAX_CHALLENGE_BYTES 32 + +#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48 + +/* number of wrap mechanisms potentially used to wrap master secrets. */ +#define SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS 15 +#define SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS 6 + +/* This makes the cert cache entry exactly 4k. */ +#define SSL_MAX_CACHED_CERT_LEN 4060 + +#ifndef BPB +#define BPB 8 /* Bits Per Byte */ +#endif + +/* The default value from RFC 4347 is 1s, which is too slow. */ +#define DTLS_RETRANSMIT_INITIAL_MS 50 +/* The maximum time to wait between retransmissions. */ +#define DTLS_RETRANSMIT_MAX_MS 10000 +/* Time to wait in FINISHED state for retransmissions. */ +#define DTLS_RETRANSMIT_FINISHED_MS 30000 + +/* default number of entries in namedGroupPreferences */ +#define SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT 31 + +/* The maximum DH and RSA bit-length supported. */ +#define SSL_MAX_DH_KEY_BITS 8192 +#define SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS 8192 + +/* Types and names of elliptic curves used in TLS */ +typedef enum { + ec_type_explicitPrime = 1, /* not supported */ + ec_type_explicitChar2Curve = 2, /* not supported */ + ec_type_named = 3 +} ECType; + +typedef enum { + ticket_allow_early_data = 1, + ticket_allow_psk_ke = 2, + ticket_allow_psk_dhe_ke = 4, + ticket_allow_psk_auth = 8, + ticket_allow_psk_sign_auth = 16 +} TLS13SessionTicketFlags; + +typedef enum { + update_not_requested = 0, + update_requested = 1 +} tls13KeyUpdateRequest; + +struct sslNamedGroupDefStr { + /* The name is the value that is encoded on the wire in TLS. */ + SSLNamedGroup name; + /* The number of bits in the group. */ + unsigned int bits; + /* The key exchange algorithm this group provides. */ + SSLKEAType keaType; + /* The OID that identifies the group to PKCS11. This also determines + * whether the group is enabled in policy. */ + SECOidTag oidTag; + /* Assume that the group is always supported. */ + PRBool assumeSupported; +}; + +typedef struct sslConnectInfoStr sslConnectInfo; +typedef struct sslGatherStr sslGather; +typedef struct sslSecurityInfoStr sslSecurityInfo; +typedef struct sslSessionIDStr sslSessionID; +typedef struct sslSocketOpsStr sslSocketOps; + +typedef struct ssl3StateStr ssl3State; +typedef struct ssl3CertNodeStr ssl3CertNode; +typedef struct sslKeyPairStr sslKeyPair; +typedef struct ssl3DHParamsStr ssl3DHParams; + +struct ssl3CertNodeStr { + struct ssl3CertNodeStr *next; + CERTCertificate *cert; +}; + +typedef SECStatus (*sslHandshakeFunc)(sslSocket *ss); + +void ssl_CacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss); +void ssl_UncacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss); +void ssl_ServerCacheSessionID(sslSessionID *sid, PRTime creationTime); +void ssl_ServerUncacheSessionID(sslSessionID *sid); + +typedef sslSessionID *(*sslSessionIDLookupFunc)(PRTime ssl_now, + const PRIPv6Addr *addr, + unsigned char *sid, + unsigned int sidLen, + CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle); + +/* Socket ops */ +struct sslSocketOpsStr { + int (*connect)(sslSocket *, const PRNetAddr *); + PRFileDesc *(*accept)(sslSocket *, PRNetAddr *); + int (*bind)(sslSocket *, const PRNetAddr *); + int (*listen)(sslSocket *, int); + int (*shutdown)(sslSocket *, int); + int (*close)(sslSocket *); + + int (*recv)(sslSocket *, unsigned char *, int, int); + + /* points to the higher-layer send func, e.g. ssl_SecureSend. */ + int (*send)(sslSocket *, const unsigned char *, int, int); + int (*read)(sslSocket *, unsigned char *, int); + int (*write)(sslSocket *, const unsigned char *, int); + + int (*getpeername)(sslSocket *, PRNetAddr *); + int (*getsockname)(sslSocket *, PRNetAddr *); +}; + +/* Flags interpreted by ssl send functions. */ +#define ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER 0x40000000 +#define ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_BUFFER 0x20000000 +#define ssl_SEND_FLAG_NO_RETRANSMIT 0x08000000 /* DTLS only */ +#define ssl_SEND_FLAG_MASK 0x7f000000 + +/* +** SSL3 cipher suite policy and preference struct. +*/ +typedef struct { +#if !defined(_WIN32) + unsigned int cipher_suite : 16; + unsigned int policy : 8; + unsigned int enabled : 1; + unsigned int isPresent : 1; +#else + ssl3CipherSuite cipher_suite; + PRUint8 policy; + unsigned char enabled : 1; + unsigned char isPresent : 1; +#endif +} ssl3CipherSuiteCfg; + +#define ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED 71 + +#define MAX_DTLS_SRTP_CIPHER_SUITES 4 + +/* MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES allows for all the values we support. */ +#define MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES 18 + +typedef struct sslOptionsStr { + /* If SSL_SetNextProtoNego has been called, then this contains the + * list of supported protocols. */ + SECItem nextProtoNego; + PRUint16 recordSizeLimit; + + PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize; + unsigned int useSecurity : 1; + unsigned int useSocks : 1; + unsigned int requestCertificate : 1; + unsigned int requireCertificate : 2; + unsigned int handshakeAsClient : 1; + unsigned int handshakeAsServer : 1; + unsigned int noCache : 1; + unsigned int fdx : 1; + unsigned int detectRollBack : 1; + unsigned int noLocks : 1; + unsigned int enableSessionTickets : 1; + unsigned int enableDeflate : 1; /* Deprecated. */ + unsigned int enableRenegotiation : 2; + unsigned int requireSafeNegotiation : 1; + unsigned int enableFalseStart : 1; + unsigned int cbcRandomIV : 1; + unsigned int enableOCSPStapling : 1; + unsigned int enableALPN : 1; + unsigned int reuseServerECDHEKey : 1; + unsigned int enableFallbackSCSV : 1; + unsigned int enableServerDhe : 1; + unsigned int enableExtendedMS : 1; + unsigned int enableSignedCertTimestamps : 1; + unsigned int requireDHENamedGroups : 1; + unsigned int enable0RttData : 1; + unsigned int enableTls13CompatMode : 1; + unsigned int enableDtlsShortHeader : 1; + unsigned int enableHelloDowngradeCheck : 1; + unsigned int enableV2CompatibleHello : 1; + unsigned int enablePostHandshakeAuth : 1; + unsigned int enableDelegatedCredentials : 1; + unsigned int enableDtls13VersionCompat : 1; + unsigned int suppressEndOfEarlyData : 1; + unsigned int enableTls13GreaseEch : 1; + unsigned int enableTls13BackendEch : 1; + unsigned int callExtensionWriterOnEchInner : 1; + unsigned int enableGrease : 1; + unsigned int enableChXtnPermutation : 1; +} sslOptions; + +typedef enum { sslHandshakingUndetermined = 0, + sslHandshakingAsClient, + sslHandshakingAsServer +} sslHandshakingType; + +#define SSL_LOCK_RANK_SPEC 255 + +/* These are the valid values for shutdownHow. +** These values are each 1 greater than the NSPR values, and the code +** depends on that relation to efficiently convert PR_SHUTDOWN values +** into ssl_SHUTDOWN values. These values use one bit for read, and +** another bit for write, and can be used as bitmasks. +*/ +#define ssl_SHUTDOWN_NONE 0 /* NOT shutdown at all */ +#define ssl_SHUTDOWN_RCV 1 /* PR_SHUTDOWN_RCV +1 */ +#define ssl_SHUTDOWN_SEND 2 /* PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND +1 */ +#define ssl_SHUTDOWN_BOTH 3 /* PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH +1 */ + +/* +** A gather object. Used to read some data until a count has been +** satisfied. Primarily for support of async sockets. +** Everything in here is protected by the recvBufLock. +*/ +struct sslGatherStr { + int state; /* see GS_ values below. */ + + /* "buf" holds received plaintext SSL records, after decrypt and MAC check. + * recv'd ciphertext records are put in inbuf (see below), then decrypted + * into buf. + */ + sslBuffer buf; /*recvBufLock*/ + + /* number of bytes previously read into hdr or inbuf. + ** (offset - writeOffset) is the number of ciphertext bytes read in but + ** not yet deciphered. + */ + unsigned int offset; + + /* number of bytes to read in next call to ssl_DefRecv (recv) */ + unsigned int remainder; + + /* DoRecv uses the next two values to extract application data. + ** The difference between writeOffset and readOffset is the amount of + ** data available to the application. Note that the actual offset of + ** the data in "buf" is recordOffset (above), not readOffset. + ** In the current implementation, this is made available before the + ** MAC is checked!! + */ + unsigned int readOffset; /* Spot where DATA reader (e.g. application + ** or handshake code) will read next. + ** Always zero for SSl3 application data. + */ + /* offset in buf/inbuf/hdr into which new data will be read from socket. */ + unsigned int writeOffset; + + /* Buffer for ssl3 to read (encrypted) data from the socket */ + sslBuffer inbuf; /*recvBufLock*/ + + /* The ssl[23]_GatherData functions read data into this buffer, rather + ** than into buf or inbuf, while in the GS_HEADER state. + ** The portion of the SSL record header put here always comes off the wire + ** as plaintext, never ciphertext. + ** For SSL3/TLS, the plaintext portion is 5 bytes long. For DTLS it + ** varies based on version and header type. + */ + unsigned char hdr[13]; + unsigned int hdrLen; + + /* Buffer for DTLS data read off the wire as a single datagram */ + sslBuffer dtlsPacket; + + /* the start of the buffered DTLS record in dtlsPacket */ + unsigned int dtlsPacketOffset; + + /* tracks whether we've seen a v3-type record before and must reject + * any further v2-type records. */ + PRBool rejectV2Records; +}; + +/* sslGather.state */ +#define GS_INIT 0 +#define GS_HEADER 1 +#define GS_DATA 2 + +#define WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE 48 + +typedef struct { + PRUint8 wrapped_master_secret[WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE]; + PRUint8 wrapped_master_secret_len; + PRUint8 resumable; + PRUint8 extendedMasterSecretUsed; +} ssl3SidKeys; /* 52 bytes */ + +typedef enum { never_cached, + in_client_cache, + in_server_cache, + invalid_cache, /* no longer in any cache. */ + in_external_cache +} Cached; + +#include "sslcert.h" + +struct sslSessionIDStr { + /* The global cache lock must be held when accessing these members when the + * sid is in any cache. + */ + sslSessionID *next; /* chain used for client sockets, only */ + Cached cached; + int references; + PRTime lastAccessTime; + + /* The rest of the members, except for the members of u.ssl3.locked, may + * be modified only when the sid is not in any cache. + */ + + CERTCertificate *peerCert; + SECItemArray peerCertStatus; /* client only */ + const char *peerID; /* client only */ + const char *urlSvrName; /* client only */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve; /* (server) for certificate lookup */ + CERTCertificate *localCert; + + PRIPv6Addr addr; + PRUint16 port; + + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + + PRTime creationTime; + PRTime expirationTime; + + SSLAuthType authType; + PRUint32 authKeyBits; + SSLKEAType keaType; + PRUint32 keaKeyBits; + SSLNamedGroup keaGroup; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + + union { + struct { + /* values that are copied into the server's on-disk SID cache. */ + PRUint8 sessionIDLength; + PRUint8 sessionID[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + + ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite; + PRUint8 policy; + ssl3SidKeys keys; + /* mechanism used to wrap master secret */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech; + + /* The following values pertain to the slot that wrapped the + ** master secret. (used only in client) + */ + SECMODModuleID masterModuleID; + /* what module wrapped the master secret */ + CK_SLOT_ID masterSlotID; + PRUint16 masterWrapIndex; + /* what's the key index for the wrapping key */ + PRUint16 masterWrapSeries; + /* keep track of the slot series, so we don't + * accidently try to use new keys after the + * card gets removed and replaced.*/ + + /* The following values pertain to the slot that did the signature + ** for client auth. (used only in client) + */ + SECMODModuleID clAuthModuleID; + CK_SLOT_ID clAuthSlotID; + PRUint16 clAuthSeries; + + char masterValid; + char clAuthValid; + + SECItem srvName; + + /* Signed certificate timestamps received in a TLS extension. + ** (used only in client). + */ + SECItem signedCertTimestamps; + + /* The ALPN value negotiated in the original connection. + * Used for TLS 1.3. */ + SECItem alpnSelection; + + /* This lock is lazily initialized by CacheSID when a sid is first + * cached. Before then, there is no need to lock anything because + * the sid isn't being shared by anything. + */ + PRRWLock *lock; + + /* The lock must be held while reading or writing these members + * because they change while the sid is cached. + */ + struct { + /* The session ticket, if we have one, is sent as an extension + * in the ClientHello message. This field is used only by + * clients. It is protected by lock when lock is non-null + * (after the sid has been added to the client session cache). + */ + NewSessionTicket sessionTicket; + } locked; + } ssl3; + } u; +}; + +struct ssl3CipherSuiteDefStr { + ssl3CipherSuite cipher_suite; + SSL3BulkCipher bulk_cipher_alg; + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac_alg; + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm key_exchange_alg; + SSLHashType prf_hash; +}; + +/* +** There are tables of these, all const. +*/ +typedef struct { + /* An identifier for this struct. */ + SSL3KeyExchangeAlgorithm kea; + /* The type of key exchange used by the cipher suite. */ + SSLKEAType exchKeyType; + /* If the cipher suite uses a signature, the type of key used in the + * signature. */ + KeyType signKeyType; + /* In most cases, cipher suites depend on their signature type for + * authentication, ECDH certificates being the exception. */ + SSLAuthType authKeyType; + /* True if the key exchange for the suite is ephemeral. Or to be more + * precise: true if the ServerKeyExchange message is always required. */ + PRBool ephemeral; + /* An OID describing the key exchange */ + SECOidTag oid; +} ssl3KEADef; + +typedef enum { + ssl_0rtt_none, /* 0-RTT not present */ + ssl_0rtt_sent, /* 0-RTT sent (no decision yet) */ + ssl_0rtt_accepted, /* 0-RTT sent and accepted */ + ssl_0rtt_ignored, /* 0-RTT sent but rejected/ignored */ + ssl_0rtt_done /* 0-RTT accepted, but finished */ +} sslZeroRttState; + +typedef enum { + ssl_0rtt_ignore_none, /* not ignoring */ + ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial, /* ignoring with trial decryption */ + ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr /* ignoring until ClientHello (due to HRR) */ +} sslZeroRttIgnore; + +typedef enum { + idle_handshake, + wait_client_hello, + wait_end_of_early_data, + wait_client_cert, + wait_client_key, + wait_cert_verify, + wait_change_cipher, + wait_finished, + wait_server_hello, + wait_certificate_status, + wait_server_cert, + wait_server_key, + wait_cert_request, + wait_hello_done, + wait_new_session_ticket, + wait_encrypted_extensions, + wait_invalid /* Invalid value. There is no handshake message "invalid". */ +} SSL3WaitState; + +typedef enum { + client_hello_initial, /* The first attempt. */ + client_hello_retry, /* If we receive HelloRetryRequest. */ + client_hello_retransmit, /* In DTLS, if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ + client_hello_renegotiation /* A renegotiation attempt. */ +} sslClientHelloType; + +typedef struct SessionTicketDataStr SessionTicketData; + +typedef SECStatus (*sslRestartTarget)(sslSocket *); + +/* +** A DTLS queued message (potentially to be retransmitted) +*/ +typedef struct DTLSQueuedMessageStr { + PRCList link; /* The linked list link */ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; /* The cipher spec to use, null for none */ + SSLContentType type; /* The message type */ + unsigned char *data; /* The data */ + PRUint16 len; /* The data length */ +} DTLSQueuedMessage; + +struct TLS13KeyShareEntryStr { + PRCList link; /* The linked list link */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; /* The group for the entry */ + SECItem key_exchange; /* The share itself */ +}; + +typedef struct TLS13EarlyDataStr { + PRCList link; /* The linked list link */ + unsigned int consumed; /* How much has been read. */ + SECItem data; /* The data */ +} TLS13EarlyData; + +typedef enum { + handshake_hash_unknown = 0, + handshake_hash_combo = 1, /* The MD5/SHA-1 combination */ + handshake_hash_single = 2, /* A single hash */ + handshake_hash_record +} SSL3HandshakeHashType; + +// A DTLS Timer. +typedef void (*DTLSTimerCb)(sslSocket *); + +typedef struct { + const char *label; + DTLSTimerCb cb; + PRIntervalTime started; + PRUint32 timeout; +} dtlsTimer; + +/* TLS 1.3 client GREASE entry indices. */ +typedef enum { + grease_cipher, + grease_extension1, + grease_extension2, + grease_group, + grease_sigalg, + grease_version, + grease_alpn, + grease_entries +} tls13ClientGreaseEntry; + +/* TLS 1.3 client GREASE values struct. */ +typedef struct tls13ClientGreaseStr { + PRUint16 idx[grease_entries]; + PRUint8 pskKem; +} tls13ClientGrease; + +/* +** This is the "hs" member of the "ssl3" struct. +** This entire struct is protected by ssl3HandshakeLock +*/ +typedef struct SSL3HandshakeStateStr { + SSL3Random server_random; + SSL3Random client_random; + SSL3Random client_inner_random; /* TLS 1.3 ECH Inner. */ + SSL3WaitState ws; /* May also contain SSL3WaitState | 0x80 for TLS 1.3 */ + + /* This group of members is used for handshake running hashes. */ + SSL3HandshakeHashType hashType; + sslBuffer messages; /* Accumulated handshake messages */ + sslBuffer echInnerMessages; /* Accumulated ECH Inner handshake messages */ + /* PKCS #11 mode: + * SSL 3.0 - TLS 1.1 use both |md5| and |sha|. |md5| is used for MD5 and + * |sha| for SHA-1. + * TLS 1.2 and later use only |sha| variants, for SHA-256. + * Under normal (non-1.3 ECH) handshakes, only |sha| and |shaPostHandshake| + * are used. When doing 1.3 ECH, |sha| contains the transcript hash + * corresponding to the outer Client Hello. To facilitate secure retry and + * disablement, |shaEchInner|, tracks, in parallel, the transcript hash + * corresponding to the inner Client Hello. Once we process the SH + * extensions, coalesce into |sha|. */ + PK11Context *md5; + PK11Context *sha; + PK11Context *shaEchInner; + PK11Context *shaPostHandshake; + SSLSignatureScheme signatureScheme; + const ssl3KEADef *kea_def; + ssl3CipherSuite cipher_suite; + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suite_def; + sslBuffer msg_body; /* protected by recvBufLock */ + /* partial handshake message from record layer */ + unsigned int header_bytes; + /* number of bytes consumed from handshake */ + /* message for message type and header length */ + SSLHandshakeType msg_type; + unsigned long msg_len; + PRBool isResuming; /* we are resuming (not used in TLS 1.3) */ + PRBool sendingSCSV; /* instead of empty RI */ + + /* The session ticket received in a NewSessionTicket message is temporarily + * stored in newSessionTicket until the handshake is finished; then it is + * moved to the sid. + */ + PRBool receivedNewSessionTicket; + NewSessionTicket newSessionTicket; + + PRUint16 finishedBytes; /* size of single finished below */ + union { + TLSFinished tFinished[2]; /* client, then server */ + SSL3Finished sFinished[2]; + PRUint8 data[72]; + } finishedMsgs; + + /* True when handshake is blocked on client certificate selection */ + PRBool clientCertificatePending; + /* Parameters stored whilst waiting for client certificate */ + SSLSignatureScheme *clientAuthSignatureSchemes; + unsigned int clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen; + + PRBool authCertificatePending; + /* Which function should SSL_RestartHandshake* call if we're blocked? + * One of NULL, ssl3_SendClientSecondRound, ssl3_FinishHandshake, + * or ssl3_AlwaysFail */ + sslRestartTarget restartTarget; + + PRBool canFalseStart; /* Can/did we False Start */ + /* Which preliminaryinfo values have been set. */ + PRUint32 preliminaryInfo; + + /* Parsed extensions */ + PRCList remoteExtensions; /* Parsed incoming extensions */ + PRCList echOuterExtensions; /* If ECH, hold CHOuter extensions for decompression. */ + + /* This group of values is used for DTLS */ + PRUint16 sendMessageSeq; /* The sending message sequence + * number */ + PRCList lastMessageFlight; /* The last message flight we + * sent */ + PRUint16 maxMessageSent; /* The largest message we sent */ + PRUint16 recvMessageSeq; /* The receiving message sequence + * number */ + sslBuffer recvdFragments; /* The fragments we have received in + * a bitmask */ + PRInt32 recvdHighWater; /* The high water mark for fragments + * received. -1 means no reassembly + * in progress. */ + SECItem cookie; /* The Hello(Retry|Verify)Request cookie. */ + dtlsTimer timers[3]; /* Holder for timers. */ + dtlsTimer *rtTimer; /* Retransmit timer. */ + dtlsTimer *ackTimer; /* Ack timer (DTLS 1.3 only). */ + dtlsTimer *hdTimer; /* Read cipher holddown timer (DLTS 1.3 only) */ + PRUint32 rtRetries; /* The retry counter */ + SECItem srvVirtName; /* for server: name that was negotiated + * with a client. For client - is + * always set to NULL.*/ + + /* This group of values is used for TLS 1.3 and above */ + PK11SymKey *currentSecret; /* The secret down the "left hand side" + * of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. */ + PK11SymKey *resumptionMasterSecret; /* The resumption_master_secret. */ + PK11SymKey *dheSecret; /* The (EC)DHE shared secret. */ + PK11SymKey *clientEarlyTrafficSecret; /* The secret we use for 0-RTT. */ + PK11SymKey *clientHsTrafficSecret; /* The source keys for handshake */ + PK11SymKey *serverHsTrafficSecret; /* traffic keys. */ + PK11SymKey *clientTrafficSecret; /* The source keys for application */ + PK11SymKey *serverTrafficSecret; /* traffic keys */ + PK11SymKey *earlyExporterSecret; /* for 0-RTT exporters */ + PK11SymKey *exporterSecret; /* for exporters */ + PRCList cipherSpecs; /* The cipher specs in the sequence they + * will be applied. */ + sslZeroRttState zeroRttState; /* Are we doing a 0-RTT handshake? */ + sslZeroRttIgnore zeroRttIgnore; /* Are we ignoring 0-RTT? */ + ssl3CipherSuite zeroRttSuite; /* The cipher suite we used for 0-RTT. */ + PRCList bufferedEarlyData; /* Buffered TLS 1.3 early data + * on server.*/ + PRBool helloRetry; /* True if HelloRetryRequest has been sent + * or received. */ + PRBool receivedCcs; /* A server received ChangeCipherSpec + * before the handshake started. */ + PRBool rejectCcs; /* Excessive ChangeCipherSpecs are rejected. */ + PRBool clientCertRequested; /* True if CertificateRequest received. */ + PRBool endOfFlight; /* Processed a full flight (DTLS 1.3). */ + ssl3KEADef kea_def_mutable; /* Used to hold the writable kea_def + * we use for TLS 1.3 */ + PRUint16 ticketNonce; /* A counter we use for tickets. */ + SECItem fakeSid; /* ... (server) the SID the client used. */ + PRCList psks; /* A list of PSKs, resumption and/or external. */ + + /* rttEstimate is used to guess the round trip time between server and client. + * When the server sends ServerHello it sets this to the current time. + * Only after it receives a message from the client's second flight does it + * set the value to something resembling an RTT estimate. */ + PRTime rttEstimate; + + /* The following lists contain DTLSHandshakeRecordEntry */ + PRCList dtlsSentHandshake; /* Used to map records to handshake fragments. */ + PRCList dtlsRcvdHandshake; /* Handshake records we have received + * used to generate ACKs. */ + + /* TLS 1.3 ECH state. */ + PRUint8 greaseEchSize; + PRBool echAccepted; /* Client/Server: True if we've commited to using CHInner. */ + PRBool echDecided; + HpkeContext *echHpkeCtx; /* Client/Server: HPKE context for ECH. */ + const char *echPublicName; /* Client: If rejected, the ECHConfig.publicName to + * use for certificate verification. */ + sslBuffer greaseEchBuf; /* Client: Remember GREASE ECH, as advertised, for CH2 (HRR case). + Server: Remember HRR Grease Value, for transcript calculations */ + PRBool echInvalidExtension; /* Client: True if the server offered an invalid extension for the ClientHelloInner */ + + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE state. */ + tls13ClientGrease *grease; + + /* ClientHello Extension Permutation state. */ + sslExtensionBuilder *chExtensionPermutation; +} SSL3HandshakeState; + +#define SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss) \ + do { \ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); \ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len == 0); \ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len == 0); \ + } while (0) + +/* +** This is the "ssl3" struct, as in "ss->ssl3". +** note: +** usually, crSpec == cwSpec and prSpec == pwSpec. +** Sometimes, crSpec == pwSpec and prSpec == cwSpec. +** But there are never more than 2 actual specs. +** No spec must ever be modified if either "current" pointer points to it. +*/ +struct ssl3StateStr { + + /* + ** The following Specs and Spec pointers must be protected using the + ** Spec Lock. + */ + ssl3CipherSpec *crSpec; /* current read spec. */ + ssl3CipherSpec *prSpec; /* pending read spec. */ + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec; /* current write spec. */ + ssl3CipherSpec *pwSpec; /* pending write spec. */ + + /* This is true after the peer requests a key update; false after a key + * update is initiated locally. */ + PRBool peerRequestedKeyUpdate; + + /* This is true if we deferred sending a key update as + * post-handshake auth is in progress. */ + PRBool keyUpdateDeferred; + tls13KeyUpdateRequest deferredKeyUpdateRequest; + + /* This is true after the server requests client certificate; + * false after the client certificate is received. Used by the + * server. */ + PRBool clientCertRequested; + + CERTCertificate *clientCertificate; /* used by client */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey; /* used by client */ + CERTCertificateList *clientCertChain; /* used by client */ + PRBool sendEmptyCert; /* used by client */ + + PRUint8 policy; + /* This says what cipher suites we can do, and should + * be either SSL_ALLOWED or SSL_RESTRICTED + */ + PLArenaPool *peerCertArena; + /* These are used to keep track of the peer CA */ + void *peerCertChain; + /* chain while we are trying to validate it. */ + CERTDistNames *ca_list; + /* used by server. trusted CAs for this socket. */ + SSL3HandshakeState hs; + + PRUint16 mtu; /* Our estimate of the MTU */ + + /* DTLS-SRTP cipher suite preferences (if any) */ + PRUint16 dtlsSRTPCiphers[MAX_DTLS_SRTP_CIPHER_SUITES]; + PRUint16 dtlsSRTPCipherCount; + PRBool fatalAlertSent; + PRBool dheWeakGroupEnabled; /* used by server */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *dhePreferredGroup; + + /* TLS 1.2 introduces separate signature algorithm negotiation. + * TLS 1.3 combined signature and hash into a single enum. + * This is our preference order. */ + SSLSignatureScheme signatureSchemes[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES]; + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount; + + /* The version to check if we fell back from our highest version + * of TLS. Default is 0 in which case we check against the maximum + * configured version for this socket. Used only on the client. */ + SSL3ProtocolVersion downgradeCheckVersion; +}; + +/* Ethernet MTU but without subtracting the headers, + * so slightly larger than expected */ +#define DTLS_MAX_MTU 1500U +#define IS_DTLS(ss) (ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) + +typedef struct { + /* |seqNum| eventually contains the reconstructed sequence number. */ + sslSequenceNumber seqNum; + /* The header of the cipherText. */ + PRUint8 *hdr; + unsigned int hdrLen; + + /* |buf| is the payload of the ciphertext. */ + sslBuffer *buf; +} SSL3Ciphertext; + +struct sslKeyPairStr { + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + PRInt32 refCount; /* use PR_Atomic calls for this. */ +}; + +struct sslEphemeralKeyPairStr { + PRCList link; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; + sslKeyPair *keys; +}; + +struct ssl3DHParamsStr { + SSLNamedGroup name; + SECItem prime; /* p */ + SECItem base; /* g */ +}; + +typedef struct SSLWrappedSymWrappingKeyStr { + PRUint8 wrappedSymmetricWrappingkey[SSL_MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS / 8]; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE symWrapMechanism; + /* unwrapped symmetric wrapping key uses this mechanism */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE asymWrapMechanism; + /* mechanism used to wrap the SymmetricWrappingKey using + * server's public and/or private keys. */ + PRInt16 wrapMechIndex; + PRUint16 wrapKeyIndex; + PRUint16 wrappedSymKeyLen; +} SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey; + +typedef struct SessionTicketStr { + PRBool valid; + SSL3ProtocolVersion ssl_version; + ssl3CipherSuite cipher_suite; + SSLAuthType authType; + PRUint32 authKeyBits; + SSLKEAType keaType; + PRUint32 keaKeyBits; + SSLNamedGroup originalKeaGroup; + SSLSignatureScheme signatureScheme; + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedCurve; /* For certificate lookup. */ + + /* + * msWrapMech contains a meaningful value only if ms_is_wrapped is true. + */ + PRUint8 ms_is_wrapped; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech; + PRUint16 ms_length; + PRUint8 master_secret[48]; + PRBool extendedMasterSecretUsed; + ClientAuthenticationType client_auth_type; + SECItem peer_cert; + PRTime timestamp; + PRUint32 flags; + SECItem srvName; /* negotiated server name */ + SECItem alpnSelection; + PRUint32 maxEarlyData; + PRUint32 ticketAgeBaseline; + SECItem applicationToken; +} SessionTicket; + +/* + * SSL2 buffers used in SSL3. + * writeBuf in the SecurityInfo maintained by sslsecur.c is used + * to hold the data just about to be passed to the kernel + * sendBuf in the ConnectInfo maintained by sslcon.c is used + * to hold handshake messages as they are accumulated + */ + +/* +** This is "ci", as in "ss->sec.ci". +** +** Protection: All the variables in here are protected by +** firstHandshakeLock AND ssl3HandshakeLock +*/ +struct sslConnectInfoStr { + /* outgoing handshakes appended to this. */ + sslBuffer sendBuf; /*xmitBufLock*/ + + PRIPv6Addr peer; + unsigned short port; + + sslSessionID *sid; +}; + +/* Note: The entire content of this struct and whatever it points to gets + * blown away by SSL_ResetHandshake(). This is "sec" as in "ss->sec". + * + * Unless otherwise specified below, the contents of this struct are + * protected by firstHandshakeLock AND ssl3HandshakeLock. + */ +struct sslSecurityInfoStr { + +#define SSL_ROLE(ss) (ss->sec.isServer ? "server" : "client") + + PRBool isServer; + sslBuffer writeBuf; /*xmitBufLock*/ + + CERTCertificate *localCert; + CERTCertificate *peerCert; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey; + + SSLAuthType authType; + PRUint32 authKeyBits; + SSLSignatureScheme signatureScheme; + SSLKEAType keaType; + PRUint32 keaKeyBits; + const sslNamedGroupDef *keaGroup; + const sslNamedGroupDef *originalKeaGroup; + /* The selected certificate (for servers only). */ + const sslServerCert *serverCert; + + /* These are used during a connection handshake */ + sslConnectInfo ci; +}; + +/* +** SSL Socket struct +** +** Protection: XXX +*/ +struct sslSocketStr { + PRFileDesc *fd; + + /* Pointer to operations vector for this socket */ + const sslSocketOps *ops; + + /* SSL socket options */ + sslOptions opt; + /* Enabled version range */ + SSLVersionRange vrange; + + /* A function that returns the current time. */ + SSLTimeFunc now; + void *nowArg; + + /* State flags */ + unsigned long clientAuthRequested; + unsigned long delayDisabled; /* Nagle delay disabled */ + unsigned long firstHsDone; /* first handshake is complete. */ + unsigned long enoughFirstHsDone; /* enough of the first handshake is + * done for callbacks to be able to + * retrieve channel security + * parameters from the SSL socket. */ + unsigned long handshakeBegun; + unsigned long lastWriteBlocked; + unsigned long recvdCloseNotify; /* received SSL EOF. */ + unsigned long TCPconnected; + unsigned long appDataBuffered; + unsigned long peerRequestedProtection; /* from old renegotiation */ + + /* version of the protocol to use */ + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SSL3ProtocolVersion clientHelloVersion; /* version sent in client hello. */ + + sslSecurityInfo sec; /* not a pointer any more */ + + /* protected by firstHandshakeLock AND ssl3HandshakeLock. */ + const char *url; + + sslHandshakeFunc handshake; /*firstHandshakeLock*/ + + /* the following variable is only used with socks or other proxies. */ + char *peerID; /* String uniquely identifies target server. */ + + /* ECDHE and DHE keys: In TLS 1.3, we might have to maintain multiple of + * these on the client side. The server inserts a single value into this + * list for all versions. */ + PRCList /*<sslEphemeralKeyPair>*/ ephemeralKeyPairs; + + /* Callbacks */ + SSLAuthCertificate authCertificate; + void *authCertificateArg; + SSLGetClientAuthData getClientAuthData; + void *getClientAuthDataArg; + SSLSNISocketConfig sniSocketConfig; + void *sniSocketConfigArg; + SSLAlertCallback alertReceivedCallback; + void *alertReceivedCallbackArg; + SSLAlertCallback alertSentCallback; + void *alertSentCallbackArg; + SSLBadCertHandler handleBadCert; + void *badCertArg; + SSLHandshakeCallback handshakeCallback; + void *handshakeCallbackData; + SSLCanFalseStartCallback canFalseStartCallback; + void *canFalseStartCallbackData; + void *pkcs11PinArg; + SSLNextProtoCallback nextProtoCallback; + void *nextProtoArg; + SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback hrrCallback; + void *hrrCallbackArg; + PRCList extensionHooks; + SSLResumptionTokenCallback resumptionTokenCallback; + void *resumptionTokenContext; + SSLSecretCallback secretCallback; + void *secretCallbackArg; + SSLRecordWriteCallback recordWriteCallback; + void *recordWriteCallbackArg; + + PRIntervalTime rTimeout; /* timeout for NSPR I/O */ + PRIntervalTime wTimeout; /* timeout for NSPR I/O */ + PRIntervalTime cTimeout; /* timeout for NSPR I/O */ + + PZLock *recvLock; /* lock against multiple reader threads. */ + PZLock *sendLock; /* lock against multiple sender threads. */ + + PZMonitor *recvBufLock; /* locks low level recv buffers. */ + PZMonitor *xmitBufLock; /* locks low level xmit buffers. */ + + /* Only one thread may operate on the socket until the initial handshake + ** is complete. This Monitor ensures that. Since SSL2 handshake is + ** only done once, this is also effectively the SSL2 handshake lock. + */ + PZMonitor *firstHandshakeLock; + + /* This monitor protects the ssl3 handshake state machine data. + ** Only one thread (reader or writer) may be in the ssl3 handshake state + ** machine at any time. */ + PZMonitor *ssl3HandshakeLock; + + /* reader/writer lock, protects the secret data needed to encrypt and MAC + ** outgoing records, and to decrypt and MAC check incoming ciphertext + ** records. */ + NSSRWLock *specLock; + + /* handle to perm cert db (and implicitly to the temp cert db) used + ** with this socket. + */ + CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle; + + PRThread *writerThread; /* thread holds SSL_LOCK_WRITER lock */ + + PRUint16 shutdownHow; /* See ssl_SHUTDOWN defines below. */ + + sslHandshakingType handshaking; + + /* Gather object used for gathering data */ + sslGather gs; /*recvBufLock*/ + + sslBuffer saveBuf; /*xmitBufLock*/ + sslBuffer pendingBuf; /*xmitBufLock*/ + + /* Configuration state for server sockets */ + /* One server cert and key for each authentication type. */ + PRCList /* <sslServerCert> */ serverCerts; + + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED]; + + /* A list of groups that are sorted according to user preferences pointing + * to entries of ssl_named_groups. By default this list contains pointers + * to all elements in ssl_named_groups in the default order. + * This list also determines which groups are enabled. This + * starts with all being enabled and can be modified either by negotiation + * (in which case groups not supported by a peer are masked off), or by + * calling SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet(). + * Note that renegotiation will ignore groups that were disabled in the + * first handshake. + */ + const sslNamedGroupDef *namedGroupPreferences[SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT]; + /* The number of additional shares to generate for the TLS 1.3 ClientHello */ + unsigned int additionalShares; + + /* SSL3 state info. Formerly was a pointer */ + ssl3State ssl3; + + /* + * TLS extension related data. + */ + /* True when the current session is a stateless resume. */ + PRBool statelessResume; + TLSExtensionData xtnData; + + /* Whether we are doing stream or datagram mode */ + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant; + + /* TLS 1.3 Encrypted Client Hello. */ + PRCList echConfigs; /* Client/server: Must not change while hs + * is in-progress. */ + SECKEYPublicKey *echPubKey; /* Server: The ECH keypair used in HPKE. */ + SECKEYPrivateKey *echPrivKey; /* As above. */ + + /* Anti-replay for TLS 1.3 0-RTT. */ + SSLAntiReplayContext *antiReplay; + + /* An out-of-band PSK. */ + sslPsk *psk; +}; + +struct sslSelfEncryptKeysStr { + PRCallOnceType setup; + PRUint8 keyName[SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_LEN]; + PK11SymKey *encKey; + PK11SymKey *macKey; +}; +typedef struct sslSelfEncryptKeysStr sslSelfEncryptKeys; + +extern char ssl_debug; +extern char ssl_trace; +extern FILE *ssl_trace_iob; +extern FILE *ssl_keylog_iob; +extern PZLock *ssl_keylog_lock; +static const PRUint32 ssl_ticket_lifetime = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 2 days. + +extern const char *const ssl3_cipherName[]; + +extern sslSessionIDLookupFunc ssl_sid_lookup; + +extern const sslNamedGroupDef ssl_named_groups[]; + +/************************************************************************/ + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +/* Internal initialization and installation of the SSL error tables */ +extern SECStatus ssl_Init(void); +extern SECStatus ssl_InitializePRErrorTable(void); + +/* Implementation of ops for default (non socks, non secure) case */ +extern int ssl_DefConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_DefAccept(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *addr); +extern int ssl_DefBind(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern int ssl_DefListen(sslSocket *ss, int backlog); +extern int ssl_DefShutdown(sslSocket *ss, int how); +extern int ssl_DefClose(sslSocket *ss); +extern int ssl_DefRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_DefSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, + int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_DefRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len); +extern int ssl_DefWrite(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len); +extern int ssl_DefGetpeername(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *name); +extern int ssl_DefGetsockname(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *name); +extern int ssl_DefGetsockopt(sslSocket *ss, PRSockOption optname, + void *optval, PRInt32 *optlen); +extern int ssl_DefSetsockopt(sslSocket *ss, PRSockOption optname, + const void *optval, PRInt32 optlen); + +/* Implementation of ops for socks only case */ +extern int ssl_SocksConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_SocksAccept(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *addr); +extern int ssl_SocksBind(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern int ssl_SocksListen(sslSocket *ss, int backlog); +extern int ssl_SocksGetsockname(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *name); +extern int ssl_SocksRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_SocksSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, + int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_SocksRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len); +extern int ssl_SocksWrite(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len); + +/* Implementation of ops for secure only case */ +extern int ssl_SecureConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_SecureAccept(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *addr); +extern int ssl_SecureRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, + int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, + int len, int flags); +extern int ssl_SecureRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len); +extern int ssl_SecureWrite(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len); +extern int ssl_SecureShutdown(sslSocket *ss, int how); +extern int ssl_SecureClose(sslSocket *ss); + +/* Implementation of ops for secure socks case */ +extern int ssl_SecureSocksConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *addr); +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_SecureSocksAccept(sslSocket *ss, PRNetAddr *addr); +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_FindTop(sslSocket *ss); + +/* Gather funcs. */ +extern sslGather *ssl_NewGather(void); +extern SECStatus ssl3_InitGather(sslGather *gs); +extern void ssl3_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs); +extern SECStatus ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl_CreateSecurityInfo(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus ssl_CopySecurityInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSocket *os); +extern void ssl_ResetSecurityInfo(sslSecurityInfo *sec, PRBool doMemset); +extern void ssl_DestroySecurityInfo(sslSecurityInfo *sec); + +extern void ssl_PrintBuf(const sslSocket *ss, const char *msg, const void *cp, + int len); +extern void ssl_PrintKey(const sslSocket *ss, const char *msg, PK11SymKey *key); + +extern int ssl_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus ssl_SaveWriteData(sslSocket *ss, + const void *p, unsigned int l); +extern SECStatus ssl_BeginClientHandshake(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus ssl_BeginServerHandshake(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, + PRBool derive); +extern void ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *keyMaterial); +extern sslSessionID *ssl3_NewSessionID(sslSocket *ss, PRBool is_server); +extern sslSessionID *ssl_LookupSID(PRTime now, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, + PRUint16 port, const char *peerID, + const char *urlSvrName); +extern void ssl_FreeSID(sslSessionID *sid); +extern void ssl_DestroySID(sslSessionID *sid, PRBool freeIt); +extern sslSessionID *ssl_ReferenceSID(sslSessionID *sid); + +extern int ssl3_SendApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *in, + int len, int flags); + +extern PRBool ssl_FdIsBlocking(PRFileDesc *fd); + +extern PRBool ssl_SocketIsBlocking(sslSocket *ss); + +extern void ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl_EnableNagleDelay(sslSocket *ss, PRBool enabled); + +extern SECStatus ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 policy); + +extern SECStatus ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(void); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_InitState(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus Null_Cipher(void *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, + unsigned int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned int inputLen); +extern void ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss); +typedef SECStatus (*sslUpdateHandshakeHashes)(sslSocket *ss, + const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l); +extern SECStatus ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l); +extern SECStatus ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l); +SECStatus +ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + PRUint32 dtlsSeq, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + sslUpdateHandshakeHashes cb); +SECStatus ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +SECStatus ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +SECStatus ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +SECStatus ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType type, + const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); + +/* Returns PR_TRUE if we are still waiting for the server to complete its + * response to our client second round. Once we've received the Finished from + * the server then there is no need to check false start. + */ +extern PRBool ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); + +extern PRInt32 ssl3_SendRecord(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSLContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, PRInt32 nIn, + PRInt32 flags); + +/* Clear any PRCList, optionally calling f on the value. */ +void ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f)(void *)); + +/* + * Make sure there is room in the write buffer for padding and + * cryptographic expansions. + */ +#define SSL3_BUFFER_FUDGE 100 + +#define SSL_LOCK_READER(ss) \ + if (ss->recvLock) \ + PZ_Lock(ss->recvLock) +#define SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss) \ + if (ss->recvLock) \ + PZ_Unlock(ss->recvLock) +#define SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss) \ + if (ss->sendLock) \ + PZ_Lock(ss->sendLock) +#define SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss) \ + if (ss->sendLock) \ + PZ_Unlock(ss->sendLock) + +/* firstHandshakeLock -> recvBufLock */ +#define ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { \ + PORT_Assert(PZ_InMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock) || \ + !ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); \ + PZ_EnterMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock); \ + } \ + } +#define ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock); \ + } +#define ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss) \ + (PZ_InMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock)) + +/* ssl3HandshakeLock -> xmitBufLock */ +#define ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { \ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); \ + PZ_EnterMonitor((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock); \ + } \ + } +#define ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock); \ + } +#define ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss) \ + (PZ_InMonitor((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock)) + +#define ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + NSSRWLock_LockRead((ss)->specLock); \ + } +#define ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + NSSRWLock_UnlockRead((ss)->specLock); \ + } +/* NSSRWLock_HaveReadLock is not exported so there's no + * ssl_HaveSpecReadLock macro. */ + +#define ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + NSSRWLock_LockWrite((ss)->specLock); \ + } +#define ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + NSSRWLock_UnlockWrite((ss)->specLock); \ + } +#define ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss) \ + (NSSRWLock_HaveWriteLock((ss)->specLock)) + +/* recvBufLock -> ssl3HandshakeLock -> xmitBufLock */ +#define ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) { \ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); \ + PORT_Assert(!ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); \ + PZ_EnterMonitor((ss)->recvBufLock); \ + } \ + } +#define ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->recvBufLock); \ + } +#define ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss) \ + (PZ_InMonitor((ss)->recvBufLock)) + +/* xmitBufLock -> specLock */ +#define ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + PZ_EnterMonitor((ss)->xmitBufLock); \ + } +#define ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss) \ + { \ + if (!ss->opt.noLocks) \ + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->xmitBufLock); \ + } +#define ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss) \ + (PZ_InMonitor((ss)->xmitBufLock)) + +/* Placeholder value used in version ranges when SSL 3.0 and all + * versions of TLS are disabled. + */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE 0 + +/* SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED is the minimum version that this version + * of libssl supports. Applications should use SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported at + * runtime to determine which versions are supported by the version of libssl + * in use. + */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_DATAGRAM SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_STREAM SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 + +/* SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED is the maximum version that this version + * of libssl supports. Applications should use SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported at + * runtime to determine which versions are supported by the version of libssl + * in use. + */ +#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_TLS_1_3 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 +#else +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 +#endif + +#define SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(vrange) \ + ((vrange)->min == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE) + +extern PRBool ssl3_VersionIsSupported(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version); + +/* These functions are called from secnav, even though they're "private". */ + +extern int SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(struct sslSocketStr *ss, + CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + CERTCertificateList *certChain); +extern sslSocket *ssl_FindSocket(PRFileDesc *fd); +extern void ssl_FreeSocket(struct sslSocketStr *ssl); +extern SECStatus SSL3_SendAlert(sslSocket *ss, SSL3AlertLevel level, + SSL3AlertDescription desc); +extern SECStatus ssl3_DecodeError(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode error); +extern SECStatus ssl3_ClientCertCallbackComplete(sslSocket *ss, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, CERTCertificate *clientCertificate); + +/* + * for dealing with SSL 3.0 clients sending SSL 2.0 format hellos + */ +extern SECStatus ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello( + sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length, PRUint8 padding); + +SECStatus +ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid, + PRBool realSid, PRUint16 version, PRBool isEchInner, + const sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *preamble); +SECStatus ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(const sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *preamble, const sslBuffer *extensions); +SECStatus ssl3_SendClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type); + +/* + * input into the SSL3 machinery from the actualy network reading code + */ +SECStatus ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Ciphertext *cipher); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleNonApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType rType, + DTLSEpoch epoch, + sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + sslBuffer *databuf); +SECStatus ssl_RemoveTLSCBCPadding(sslBuffer *plaintext, unsigned int macSize); + +int ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags); +int ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags); + +/* Create a new ref counted key pair object from two keys. */ +extern sslKeyPair *ssl_NewKeyPair(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); + +/* get a new reference (bump ref count) to an ssl3KeyPair. */ +extern sslKeyPair *ssl_GetKeyPairRef(sslKeyPair *keyPair); + +/* Decrement keypair's ref count and free if zero. */ +extern void ssl_FreeKeyPair(sslKeyPair *keyPair); + +extern sslEphemeralKeyPair *ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair( + const sslNamedGroupDef *group, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); +extern sslEphemeralKeyPair *ssl_CopyEphemeralKeyPair( + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair); +extern void ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair); +extern sslEphemeralKeyPair *ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair( + sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef); +extern PRBool ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(const sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef); +extern void ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(sslBuffer *buf, + const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + PRBool appendLength); +extern PRBool ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1, + PRBool slotDoesPss); +extern const ssl3DHParams *ssl_GetDHEParams(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef); +extern SECStatus ssl_SelectDHEGroup(sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef **groupDef); +extern SECStatus ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams *params, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair); +extern PRBool ssl_IsValidDHEShare(const SECItem *dh_p, const SECItem *dh_Ys); +extern SECStatus ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *dh_p, + const SECItem *dh_g, + const sslNamedGroupDef **groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams **dhParams); + +extern PRBool ssl_IsECCEnabled(const sslSocket *ss); +extern PRBool ssl_IsDHEEnabled(const sslSocket *ss); + +/* Macro for finding a curve equivalent in strength to RSA key's */ +#define SSL_RSASTRENGTH_TO_ECSTRENGTH(s) \ + ((s <= 1024) ? 160 \ + : ((s <= 2048) ? 224 \ + : ((s <= 3072) ? 256 \ + : ((s <= 7168) ? 384 \ + : 521)))) + +extern const sslNamedGroupDef *ssl_LookupNamedGroup(SSLNamedGroup group); +extern PRBool ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group); +extern SECStatus ssl_NamedGroup2ECParams(PLArenaPool *arena, + const sslNamedGroupDef *curve, + SECKEYECParams *params); +extern const sslNamedGroupDef *ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup( + const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); + +extern const sslNamedGroupDef *ssl_GetECGroupForServerSocket(sslSocket *ss); +extern void ssl_FilterSupportedGroups(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool on); +extern SECStatus ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *on); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_CipherPrefSet(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool on); +extern SECStatus ssl3_CipherPrefGet(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite which, PRBool *on); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_SetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 policy); +extern SECStatus ssl3_GetPolicy(ssl3CipherSuite which, PRInt32 *policy); + +extern void ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_RedoHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRBool flushCache); +extern SECStatus ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length, + PRBool endOfRecord); + +extern void ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(sslSocket *ss); + +extern SECStatus ssl_ClientReadVersion(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length, + SSL3ProtocolVersion *version); +extern SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3ProtocolVersion peerVersion, + PRBool allowLargerPeerVersion); +extern SECStatus ssl_ClientSetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + ssl3CipherSuite suite, + PRBool initHashes); + +extern SECStatus ssl_GetPeerInfo(sslSocket *ss); + +/* ECDH functions */ +extern SECStatus ssl3_SendECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey); +extern SECStatus ssl3_HandleECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +extern SECStatus ssl3_HandleECDHClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + sslKeyPair *serverKeys); +extern SECStatus ssl3_SendECDHServerKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss); +extern SECStatus ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare( + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, const sslNamedGroupDef *curve); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_ComputeCommonKeyHash(SSLHashType hashAlg, + PRUint8 *hashBuf, + unsigned int bufLen, + SSL3Hashes *hashes); +extern SECStatus ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm( + sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *sigAndHash); +extern SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(sslSocket *ss, void *v, PRUint32 bytes, + PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length); +extern SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(sslSocket *ss, PRUint32 *num, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length); +extern SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(sslSocket *ss, PRUint64 *num, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length); +extern SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *i, + PRUint32 bytes, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length); +extern SECStatus ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki, + PRBool isTls13, + SSLSignatureScheme *scheme); +extern PRBool ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +extern PRBool ssl_IsSupportedSignatureScheme(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +extern SECStatus ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency( + sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki); +extern SECStatus ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(const sslSocket *ss, PLArenaPool *arena, + SSLSignatureScheme **schemesOut, + unsigned int *numSchemesOut, + unsigned char **b, + unsigned int *len); +extern SECStatus ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme( + sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, SSLSignatureScheme *out); +extern SECStatus ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + PRBool isTls, + SECItem *buf); +extern SECStatus ssl3_SignHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SECItem *buf); +extern SECStatus ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(sslSocket *ss, + SECKEYPublicKey *spki, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + SSL3Hashes *hash, + SECItem *buf); +extern SECStatus ssl3_VerifySignedHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + SSL3Hashes *hash, SECItem *buf); +extern SECStatus ssl3_CacheWrappedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + PK11SymKey *secret); +extern void ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(TLSExtensionData *xtnData); + +/* Hello Extension related routines. */ +extern void ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(sslSessionID *sid, + /*in/out*/ NewSessionTicket *session_ticket); +SECStatus ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, + const NewSessionTicket *ticket, + const PRUint8 *appToken, + unsigned int appTokenLen, + PK11SymKey *secret, SECItem *ticket_data); +SECStatus SSLExp_SendSessionTicket(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *token, + unsigned int tokenLen); + +SECStatus ssl_MaybeSetSelfEncryptKeyPair(const sslKeyPair *keyPair); +SECStatus ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeys(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *keyName, + PK11SymKey **encKey, PK11SymKey **macKey); +void ssl_ResetSelfEncryptKeys(); + +extern SECStatus ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(const unsigned char *data, + unsigned int length); + +/* Construct a new NSPR socket for the app to use */ +extern PRFileDesc *ssl_NewPRSocket(sslSocket *ss, PRFileDesc *fd); +extern void ssl_FreePRSocket(PRFileDesc *fd); + +/* Internal config function so SSL3 can initialize the present state of + * various ciphers */ +extern unsigned int ssl3_config_match_init(sslSocket *); + +/* Return PR_TRUE if suite is usable. This if the suite is permitted by policy, + * enabled, has a certificate (as needed), has a viable key agreement method, is + * usable with the negotiated TLS version, and is otherwise usable. */ +PRBool ssl3_config_match(const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suite, PRUint8 policy, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange, const sslSocket *ss); + +/* calls for accessing wrapping keys across processes. */ +extern SECStatus +ssl_GetWrappingKey(unsigned int symWrapMechIndex, + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk); + +/* The caller passes in the new value it wants + * to set. This code tests the wrapped sym key entry in the file on disk. + * If it is uninitialized, this function writes the caller's value into + * the disk entry, and returns false. + * Otherwise, it overwrites the caller's wswk with the value obtained from + * the disk, and returns PR_TRUE. + * This is all done while holding the locks/semaphores necessary to make + * the operation atomic. + */ +extern SECStatus +ssl_SetWrappingKey(SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk); + +/* get rid of the symmetric wrapping key references. */ +extern SECStatus SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(void); + +extern SECStatus ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(void); + +extern SECStatus ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(void); + +extern SECStatus ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PRBool lazyInit); + +extern SECStatus ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks(void); + +CK_MECHANISM_TYPE ssl3_Alg2Mech(SSLCipherAlgorithm calg); +SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuiteInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRUint16 version, PRUint16 *suitep); +SECStatus ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *suites, + PRBool initHashes); +SECStatus ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss); +void ssl3_CoalesceEchHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +SECStatus ssl3_CompleteHandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +void ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode errCode); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +void ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_SendCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(sslSocket *ss, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); +SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerSpki(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_AuthCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl_ReadCertificateStatus(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +SECStatus ssl3_EncodeSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool forCert, + PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf); +SECStatus ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, + const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + PRUint32 numSchemes, PRBool grease, sslBuffer *buf); +SECStatus ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(const sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 minVersion, PRBool disableRsae, PRBool forCert, + unsigned int maxSchemes, SSLSignatureScheme *filteredSchemes, + unsigned int *numFilteredSchemes); +SECStatus ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(const sslSocket *ss, + unsigned int *calenp, + const SECItem **namesp, + unsigned int *nnamesp); +SECStatus ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, + PRUint32 *length, CERTDistNames *ca_list); +SECStatus ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest( + sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureScheme *signatureSchemes, + unsigned int signatureSchemeCount, CERTDistNames *ca_list); +SECStatus ssl_ConstructServerHello(sslSocket *ss, PRBool helloRetry, + const sslBuffer *extensionBuf, + sslBuffer *messageBuf); +SECStatus ssl3_SendServerHello(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PRUint32 sender); +SECStatus ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(const sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair); +SECStatus ssl_CreateStaticECDHEKey(sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *ecGroup); +SECStatus ssl3_FlushHandshake(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags); +SECStatus ssl3_GetNewRandom(SSL3Random random); +PK11SymKey *ssl3_GetWrappingKey(sslSocket *ss, + PK11SlotInfo *masterSecretSlot, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE masterWrapMech, + void *pwArg); +SECStatus ssl3_FillInCachedSID(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid, + PK11SymKey *secret); +const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ssl3CipherSuite suite); +const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(ssl3CipherSuite suite, + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suites); +PRBool ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange); + +SECStatus ssl3_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + CERTCertificate *cert, + void *pwArg, + PRBool *supportsRsaPss); +SECStatus ssl_PickSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, + CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *peerSchemes, + unsigned int peerSchemeCount, + PRBool requireSha1, + SSLSignatureScheme *schemPtr); +SECStatus ssl_PickClientSignatureScheme(sslSocket *ss, + CERTCertificate *clientCertificate, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const SSLSignatureScheme *schemes, + unsigned int numSchemes, + SSLSignatureScheme *schemePtr); +SECOidTag ssl3_HashTypeToOID(SSLHashType hashType); +SECOidTag ssl3_AuthTypeToOID(SSLAuthType hashType); +SSLHashType ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); +SSLAuthType ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(SSLSignatureScheme scheme); + +SECStatus ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, PRBool initHashes); +SECStatus ssl_InsertRecordHeader(const sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSLContentType contentType, sslBuffer *wrBuf, + PRBool *needsLength); +PRBool ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(SSLSignatureScheme scheme, SECOidTag spkiOid, + PRBool isTls13); + +/* Pull in DTLS functions */ +#include "dtlscon.h" + +/* Pull in TLS 1.3 functions */ +#include "tls13con.h" +#include "dtls13con.h" + +/********************** misc calls *********************/ + +#ifdef DEBUG +extern void ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency(); +#endif + +extern int ssl_MapLowLevelError(int hiLevelError); + +PRTime ssl_Time(const sslSocket *ss); +PRBool ssl_TicketTimeValid(const sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket); + +extern void SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(long *x); + +SECStatus ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(void); + +extern SECStatus +ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *val, unsigned int valLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen); + +extern void +ssl3_RecordKeyLog(sslSocket *ss, const char *label, PK11SymKey *secret); + +PRBool ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(const sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *tag); + +#ifdef TRACE +#define SSL_TRACE(msg) ssl_Trace msg +#else +#define SSL_TRACE(msg) +#endif + +void ssl_Trace(const char *format, ...); + +void ssl_CacheExternalToken(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, const PRUint8 *encodedTicket, + PRUint32 encodedTicketLen); +PRBool ssl_IsResumptionTokenUsable(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid); + +/* unwrap helper function to handle the case where the wrapKey doesn't wind + * * up in the correct token for the master secret */ +PK11SymKey *ssl_unwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrapKey, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, + SECItem *wrappedKey, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, + int keySize, CK_FLAGS keyFlags, void *pinArg); + +/* determine if the current ssl connection is operating in FIPS mode */ +PRBool ssl_isFIPS(sslSocket *ss); + +/* Experimental APIs. Remove when stable. */ + +SECStatus SSLExp_SetResumptionTokenCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLResumptionTokenCallback cb, + void *ctx); +SECStatus SSLExp_SetResumptionToken(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *token, + unsigned int len); + +SECStatus SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfo(const PRUint8 *tokenData, unsigned int tokenLen, + SSLResumptionTokenInfo *token, unsigned int version); + +SECStatus SSLExp_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo(SSLResumptionTokenInfo *token); + +SECStatus SSLExp_SecretCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSecretCallback cb, + void *arg); +SECStatus SSLExp_RecordLayerWriteCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLRecordWriteCallback write, + void *arg); +SECStatus SSLExp_RecordLayerData(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 epoch, + SSLContentType contentType, + const PRUint8 *data, unsigned int len); +SECStatus SSLExp_GetCurrentEpoch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 *readEpoch, + PRUint16 *writeEpoch); + +#define SSLResumptionTokenVersion 2 + +SECStatus SSLExp_MakeAead(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *labelPrefix, unsigned int labelPrefixLen, + SSLAeadContext **ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_MakeVariantAead(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, const char *labelPrefix, + unsigned int labelPrefixLen, SSLAeadContext **ctx); +SECStatus SSLExp_DestroyAead(SSLAeadContext *ctx); +SECStatus SSLExp_AeadEncrypt(const SSLAeadContext *ctx, PRUint64 counter, + const PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + const PRUint8 *plaintext, unsigned int plaintextLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOut); +SECStatus SSLExp_AeadDecrypt(const SSLAeadContext *ctx, PRUint64 counter, + const PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + const PRUint8 *plaintext, unsigned int plaintextLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOut); + +SECStatus SSLExp_HkdfExtract(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + PK11SymKey *salt, PK11SymKey *ikm, PK11SymKey **keyp); +SECStatus SSLExp_HkdfExpandLabel(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + PK11SymKey **key); +SECStatus SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **key); +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int keySize, + PK11SymKey **keyp); +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int keySize, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp); + +SECStatus SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); + +SECStatus SSLExp_SetTimeFunc(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLTimeFunc f, void *arg); + +extern SECStatus ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx); + +extern SECStatus ssl_CreateMaskInner(SSLMaskingContext *ctx, const PRUint8 *sample, + unsigned int sampleLen, PRUint8 *outMask, + unsigned int maskLen); + +extern SECStatus ssl_DestroyMaskingContextInner(SSLMaskingContext *ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_CreateMaskingContext(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_CreateVariantMaskingContext(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_CreateMask(SSLMaskingContext *ctx, const PRUint8 *sample, + unsigned int sampleLen, PRUint8 *mask, + unsigned int len); + +SECStatus SSLExp_DestroyMaskingContext(SSLMaskingContext *ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); +SECStatus SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size); + +SECStatus SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); +SECStatus SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled); + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_OS2) +#define SSL_GETPID getpid +#elif defined(WIN32) +extern int __cdecl _getpid(void); +#define SSL_GETPID _getpid +#else +#define SSL_GETPID() 0 +#endif + +#endif /* __sslimpl_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fe32565c66 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" + +SECStatus +SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info, PRUintn len) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SSLChannelInfo inf; + sslSessionID *sid; + + /* Check if we can properly return the length of data written and that + * we're not asked to return more information than we know how to provide. + */ + if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length || len > sizeof inf) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetChannelInfo", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + memset(&inf, 0, sizeof inf); + inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof inf, len); + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->enoughFirstHsDone) { + SSLCipherSuiteInfo cinfo; + SECStatus rv; + + sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + inf.protocolVersion = ss->version; + inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + inf.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + /* XXX The cipher suite should be in the specs and this + * function should get it from cwSpec rather than from the "hs". + * See bug 275744 comment 69 and bug 766137. + */ + inf.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + inf.compressionMethod = ssl_compression_null; + inf.compressionMethodName = "NULL"; + + /* Fill in the cipher details from the cipher suite. */ + rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(inf.cipherSuite, + &cinfo, sizeof(cinfo)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + inf.symCipher = cinfo.symCipher; + inf.macAlgorithm = cinfo.macAlgorithm; + /* Get these fromm |ss->sec| because that is accurate + * even with TLS 1.3 disaggregated cipher suites. */ + inf.keaType = ss->sec.keaType; + inf.originalKeaGroup = ss->sec.originalKeaGroup + ? ss->sec.originalKeaGroup->name + : ssl_grp_none; + inf.keaGroup = ss->sec.keaGroup + ? ss->sec.keaGroup->name + : ssl_grp_none; + inf.keaKeyBits = ss->sec.keaKeyBits; + inf.authType = ss->sec.authType; + inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + inf.signatureScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme; + /* If this is a resumed session, signatureScheme isn't set in ss->sec. + * Use the signature scheme from the previous handshake. */ + if (inf.signatureScheme == ssl_sig_none && sid->sigScheme) { + inf.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; + } + inf.resumed = ss->statelessResume || ss->ssl3.hs.isResuming; + if (inf.resumed) { + inf.pskType = ssl_psk_resume; + } else if (inf.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { + inf.pskType = ssl_psk_external; + } else { + inf.pskType = ssl_psk_none; + } + inf.peerDelegCred = tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss); + inf.echAccepted = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted; + + if (sid) { + unsigned int sidLen; + + inf.creationTime = sid->creationTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC; + inf.lastAccessTime = sid->lastAccessTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC; + inf.expirationTime = sid->expirationTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC; + inf.extendedMasterSecretUsed = + (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed) + ? PR_TRUE + : PR_FALSE; + + inf.earlyDataAccepted = + (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_done); + sidLen = sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength; + sidLen = PR_MIN(sidLen, sizeof inf.sessionID); + inf.sessionIDLength = sidLen; + memcpy(inf.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sidLen); + inf.isFIPS = ssl_isFIPS(ss); + } + } + + memcpy(info, &inf, inf.length); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo *info, + PRUintn len) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo inf; + + /* Check if we can properly return the length of data written and that + * we're not asked to return more information than we know how to provide. + */ + if (!info || len < sizeof inf.length || len > sizeof inf) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* All fields MUST be zero initialized! */ + memset(&inf, 0, sizeof(inf)); + inf.length = PR_MIN(sizeof(inf), len); + + inf.valuesSet = ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo; + inf.protocolVersion = ss->version; + inf.cipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + inf.canSendEarlyData = !ss->sec.isServer && + (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted); + /* We shouldn't be able to send early data if the handshake is done. */ + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone || !inf.canSendEarlyData); + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + PRUint32 ticketMaxEarlyData = + ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size; + + /* Resumption token info. */ + inf.ticketSupportsEarlyData = (ticketMaxEarlyData > 0); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + if (ss->statelessResume) { + inf.maxEarlyDataSize = ticketMaxEarlyData; + } else if (ss->psk) { + /* We may have cleared the handshake list, so check the socket. + * This is permissable since we only support one EPSK at a time. */ + inf.maxEarlyDataSize = ss->psk->maxEarlyData; + } + } + } + inf.zeroRttCipherSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite; + + inf.peerDelegCred = tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss); + inf.authKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + inf.signatureScheme = ss->sec.signatureScheme; + inf.echAccepted = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted; + /* Only expose this if the application should use it for verification. */ + inf.echPublicName = (inf.echAccepted == PR_FALSE) ? ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName : NULL; + + memcpy(info, &inf, inf.length); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* name */ +#define CS_(x) x, #x +#define CS(x) CS_(TLS_##x) + +/* legacy values for authAlgorithm */ +#define S_DSA "DSA", ssl_auth_dsa +/* S_RSA is incorrect for signature-based suites */ +/* ECDH suites incorrectly report S_RSA or S_ECDSA */ +#define S_RSA "RSA", ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt +#define S_ECDSA "ECDSA", ssl_auth_ecdsa +#define S_PSK "PSK", ssl_auth_psk +#define S_ANY "TLS 1.3", ssl_auth_tls13_any + +/* real authentication algorithm */ +#define A_DSA ssl_auth_dsa +#define A_RSAD ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt +#define A_RSAS ssl_auth_rsa_sign +#define A_ECDSA ssl_auth_ecdsa +#define A_ECDH_R ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa +#define A_ECDH_E ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa +#define A_PSK ssl_auth_psk +/* Report ssl_auth_null for export suites that can't decide between + * ssl_auth_rsa_sign and ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt. */ +#define A_EXP ssl_auth_null +#define A_ANY ssl_auth_tls13_any + +/* key exchange */ +#define K_DHE "DHE", ssl_kea_dh +#define K_RSA "RSA", ssl_kea_rsa +#define K_KEA "KEA", ssl_kea_kea +#define K_ECDH "ECDH", ssl_kea_ecdh +#define K_ECDHE "ECDHE", ssl_kea_ecdh +#define K_ECDHE_PSK "ECDHE-PSK", ssl_kea_ecdh_psk +#define K_DHE_PSK "DHE-PSK", ssl_kea_dh_psk +#define K_ANY "TLS 1.3", ssl_kea_tls13_any + +/* record protection cipher */ +#define C_SEED "SEED", ssl_calg_seed +#define C_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA", ssl_calg_camellia +#define C_AES "AES", ssl_calg_aes +#define C_RC4 "RC4", ssl_calg_rc4 +#define C_RC2 "RC2", ssl_calg_rc2 +#define C_DES "DES", ssl_calg_des +#define C_3DES "3DES", ssl_calg_3des +#define C_NULL "NULL", ssl_calg_null +#define C_SJ "SKIPJACK", ssl_calg_sj +#define C_AESGCM "AES-GCM", ssl_calg_aes_gcm +#define C_CHACHA20 "CHACHA20POLY1305", ssl_calg_chacha20 + +/* "block cipher" sizes */ +#define B_256 256, 256, 256 +#define B_128 128, 128, 128 +#define B_3DES 192, 156, 112 +#define B_SJ 96, 80, 80 +#define B_DES 64, 56, 56 +#define B_56 128, 56, 56 +#define B_40 128, 40, 40 +#define B_0 0, 0, 0 + +/* "mac algorithm" and size */ +#define M_AEAD_128 "AEAD", ssl_mac_aead, 128 +#define M_SHA384 "SHA384", ssl_hmac_sha384, 384 +#define M_SHA256 "SHA256", ssl_hmac_sha256, 256 +#define M_SHA "SHA1", ssl_mac_sha, 160 +#define M_MD5 "MD5", ssl_mac_md5, 128 +#define M_NULL "NULL", ssl_mac_null, 0 + +/* flags: FIPS, exportable, nonstandard, reserved */ +#define F_FIPS_STD 1, 0, 0, 0 +#define F_FIPS_NSTD 1, 0, 1, 0 +#define F_NFIPS_STD 0, 0, 0, 0 +#define F_NFIPS_NSTD 0, 0, 1, 0 /* i.e., trash */ +#define F_EXPORT 0, 1, 0, 0 /* i.e., trash */ + +// RFC 5705 +#define MAX_CONTEXT_LEN PR_UINT16_MAX - 1 + +static const SSLCipherSuiteInfo suiteInfo[] = { + /* <------ Cipher suite --------------------> <auth> <KEA> <bulk cipher> <MAC> <FIPS> */ + { 0, CS_(TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_ANY, K_ANY, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_ANY, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS_(TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_ANY, K_ANY, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ANY, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS_(TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_ANY, K_ANY, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_ANY, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_256, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_256, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_CAMELLIA, B_256, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_CAMELLIA, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_SEED, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_CAMELLIA, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_RC4, B_128, M_MD5, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_DES, B_DES, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_DES, B_DES, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_DES, B_DES, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA256, F_EXPORT, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_EXPORT, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_NULL, B_0, M_MD5, F_EXPORT, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_none }, + + /* ECC cipher suites */ + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDH, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_E, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDH, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_E, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDH, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_E, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDH, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_E, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDH, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_E, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + + { 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDH, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDH_R, ssl_hash_none }, + + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_NULL, B_0, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_RC4, B_128, M_SHA, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_3DES, B_3DES, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_128, M_SHA256, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_none }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_CHACHA20, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_NFIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha256 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA384, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AES, B_256, M_SHA384, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_ECDSA, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { 0, CS(ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + + { 0, CS(DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_DSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_DSA, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { 0, CS(DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_DHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAS, ssl_hash_sha384 }, + { 0, CS(RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_RSA, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, F_FIPS_STD, A_RSAD, ssl_hash_sha384 }, +}; + +#define NUM_SUITEINFOS ((sizeof suiteInfo) / (sizeof suiteInfo[0])) + +SECStatus +SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLCipherSuiteInfo *info, PRUintn len) +{ + unsigned int i; + + /* Check if we can properly return the length of data written and that + * we're not asked to return more information than we know how to provide. + */ + if (!info || len < sizeof suiteInfo[0].length || + len > sizeof suiteInfo[0]) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + len = PR_MIN(len, sizeof suiteInfo[0]); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_SUITEINFOS; i++) { + if (suiteInfo[i].cipherSuite == cipherSuite) { + memcpy(info, &suiteInfo[i], len); + info->length = len; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECItem * +SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + SECItem *sniName = NULL; + sslSocket *ss; + char *name = NULL; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { /* TLS */ + SECItem *crsName; + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); /*********************************/ + crsName = &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName; + if (crsName->data) { + sniName = SECITEM_DupItem(crsName); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); /*----------------------------*/ + } + return sniName; + } + name = SSL_RevealURL(fd); + if (name) { + sniName = PORT_ZNew(SECItem); + if (!sniName) { + PORT_Free(name); + return NULL; + } + sniName->data = (void *)name; + sniName->len = PORT_Strlen(name); + } + return sniName; +} + +/* + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""), + * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length) + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_Exporter(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *context, unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) +{ + SSL3Hashes contextHash; + PK11SymKey *innerSecret = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + static const char *kExporterInnerLabel = "exporter"; + + if (!secret) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLHashType hashAlg; + /* Early export requires a PSK. As in 0-RTT, default + * to the first PSK if no suite is negotiated yet. */ + if (secret == ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret && !ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + hashAlg = ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->hash; + } else { + hashAlg = tls13_GetHash(ss); + } + + /* Pre-hash the context. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &contextHash, context, contextLen, hashAlg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, secret, label, labelLen, + &innerSecret, hashAlg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(innerSecret, + hashAlg, + contextHash.u.raw, contextHash.len, + kExporterInnerLabel, + strlen(kExporterInnerLabel), + ss->protocolVariant, out, outLen); + PK11_FreeSymKey(innerSecret); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + PRBool hasContext, + const unsigned char *context, unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned char *val = NULL; + unsigned int valLen, i; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in ExportKeyingMaterial", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!label || !labelLen || !out || !outLen || + (hasContext && (!context || !contextLen))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return tls13_Exporter(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret, + label, labelLen, + context, hasContext ? contextLen : 0, + out, outLen); + } + + if (hasContext && contextLen > MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* construct PRF arguments */ + valLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2; + if (hasContext) { + valLen += 2 /* PRUint16 length */ + contextLen; + } + val = PORT_Alloc(valLen); + if (!val) { + return SECFailure; + } + i = 0; + PORT_Memcpy(val + i, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + i += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + PORT_Memcpy(val + i, ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + i += SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH; + if (hasContext) { + val[i++] = contextLen >> 8; + val[i++] = contextLen; + PORT_Memcpy(val + i, context, contextLen); + i += contextLen; + } + PORT_Assert(i == valLen); + + /* Allow TLS keying material to be exported sooner, when the master + * secret is available and we have sent ChangeCipherSpec. + */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + if (!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + rv = ssl3_TLSPRFWithMasterSecret(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec, label, labelLen, + val, valLen, out, outLen); + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + + PORT_ZFree(val, valLen); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ExportEarlyKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + const unsigned char *context, + unsigned int contextLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int outLen) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_ExportEarlyKeyingMaterial", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!label || !labelLen || !out || !outLen || + (!context && contextLen)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + return tls13_Exporter(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret, + label, labelLen, context, contextLen, + out, outLen); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinit.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..07d57ce6ed --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinit.c @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +/* + * NSS utility functions + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "prinit.h" +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" + +static int ssl_isInited = 0; +static PRCallOnceType ssl_init = { 0 }; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(unsigned long) <= sizeof(PRUint64)); + +PRStatus +ssl_InitCallOnce(void *arg) +{ + int *error = (int *)arg; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl_InitializePRErrorTable(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + *error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; + return PR_FAILURE; + } +#ifdef DEBUG + ssl3_CheckCipherSuiteOrderConsistency(); +#endif + + rv = ssl3_ApplyNSSPolicy(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + *error = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_Init(void) +{ + PRStatus nrv; + + /* short circuit test if we are already inited */ + if (!ssl_isInited) { + int error; + /* only do this once at init time, block all others until we are done */ + nrv = PR_CallOnceWithArg(&ssl_init, ssl_InitCallOnce, &error); + if (nrv != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(error); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_isInited = 1; + } + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e3c37f072 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.c @@ -0,0 +1,658 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "seccomon.h" +/* This ifdef should match the one in sslsnce.c */ +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN32) || defined(XP_OS2) + +#include "sslmutex.h" +#include "prerr.h" + +static SECStatus +single_process_sslMutex_Init(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0 && pMutex->u.sslLock == 0); + + pMutex->u.sslLock = PR_NewLock(); + if (!pMutex->u.sslLock) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslLock != 0); + if (!pMutex->u.sslLock) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_DestroyLock(pMutex->u.sslLock); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslLock != 0); + if (!pMutex->u.sslLock) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_Unlock(pMutex->u.sslLock); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +single_process_sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslLock != 0); + if (!pMutex->u.sslLock) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_Lock(pMutex->u.sslLock); + return SECSuccess; +} + +#if defined(LINUX) || defined(AIX) || defined(BSDI) || \ + (defined(NETBSD) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 500000000) || defined(OPENBSD) || defined(__GLIBC__) + +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include "unix_err.h" +#include "pratom.h" + +#define SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC 0xfeedfd +#define NONBLOCKING_POSTS 1 /* maybe this is faster */ + +#if NONBLOCKING_POSTS + +#ifndef FNONBLOCK +#define FNONBLOCK O_NONBLOCK +#endif + +static int +setNonBlocking(int fd, int nonBlocking) +{ + int flags; + int err; + + flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); + if (0 > flags) + return flags; + if (nonBlocking) + flags |= FNONBLOCK; + else + flags &= ~FNONBLOCK; + err = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags); + return err; +} +#endif + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Init(sslMutex* pMutex, int shared) +{ + int err; + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + pMutex->isMultiProcess = (PRBool)(shared != 0); + if (!shared) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Init(pMutex); + } + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.nWaiters = 0; + + err = pipe(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes); + if (err) { + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + return err; + } +#if NONBLOCKING_POSTS + err = setNonBlocking(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1], 1); + if (err) + goto loser; +#endif + + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] = SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC; + +#if defined(LINUX) && defined(i386) + /* Pipe starts out empty */ + return SECSuccess; +#else + /* Pipe starts with one byte. */ + return sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); +#endif + +loser: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + close(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0]); + close(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1]); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex* pMutex, PRBool processLocal) +{ + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(pMutex); + } + if (pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] != SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + close(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0]); + close(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1]); + + if (processLocal) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] = -1; + pMutex->u.pipeStr.nWaiters = 0; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +#if defined(LINUX) && defined(i386) +/* No memory barrier needed for this platform */ + +/* nWaiters includes the holder of the lock (if any) and the number +** threads waiting for it. After incrementing nWaiters, if the count +** is exactly 1, then you have the lock and may proceed. If the +** count is greater than 1, then you must wait on the pipe. +*/ + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PRInt32 newValue; + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); + } + + if (pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] != SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Do Memory Barrier here. */ + newValue = PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&pMutex->u.pipeStr.nWaiters); + if (newValue > 0) { + int cc; + char c = 1; + do { + cc = write(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1], &c, 1); + } while (cc < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)); + if (cc != 1) { + if (cc < 0) + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + else + PORT_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PRInt32 newValue; + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); + } + + if (pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] != SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + newValue = PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&pMutex->u.pipeStr.nWaiters); + /* Do Memory Barrier here. */ + if (newValue > 1) { + int cc; + char c; + do { + cc = read(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0], &c, 1); + } while (cc < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (cc != 1) { + if (cc < 0) + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + else + PORT_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +#else + +/* Using Atomic operations requires the use of a memory barrier instruction +** on PowerPC, Sparc, and Alpha. NSPR's PR_Atomic functions do not perform +** them, and NSPR does not provide a function that does them (e.g. PR_Barrier). +** So, we don't use them on those platforms. +*/ + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + int cc; + char c = 1; + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); + } + + if (pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] != SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + do { + cc = write(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[1], &c, 1); + } while (cc < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)); + if (cc != 1) { + if (cc < 0) + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + else + PORT_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + int cc; + char c; + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); + } + + if (pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[2] != SSL_MUTEX_MAGIC) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + do { + cc = read(pMutex->u.pipeStr.mPipes[0], &c, 1); + } while (cc < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (cc != 1) { + if (cc < 0) + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + else + PORT_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +#endif + +#elif defined(WIN32) + +#include "win32err.h" + +/* on Windows, we need to find the optimal type of locking mechanism to use + for the sslMutex. + + There are 3 cases : + 1) single-process, use a PRLock, as for all other platforms + 2) Win95 multi-process, use a Win32 mutex + 3) on WINNT multi-process, use a PRLock + a Win32 mutex + +*/ + +#ifdef WINNT + +SECStatus +sslMutex_2LevelInit(sslMutex *sem) +{ + /* the following adds a PRLock to sslMutex . This is done in each + process of a multi-process server and is only needed on WINNT, if + using fibers. We can't tell if native threads or fibers are used, so + we always do it on WINNT + */ + PR_ASSERT(sem); + if (sem) { + /* we need to reset the sslLock in the children or the single_process init + function below will assert */ + sem->u.sslLock = NULL; + } + return single_process_sslMutex_Init(sem); +} + +static SECStatus +sslMutex_2LevelDestroy(sslMutex *sem) +{ + return single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(sem); +} + +#endif + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Init(sslMutex *pMutex, int shared) +{ +#ifdef WINNT + SECStatus retvalue; +#endif + HANDLE hMutex; + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES attributes = { sizeof(SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), NULL, TRUE }; + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0 && (pMutex->u.sslMutx == 0 || + pMutex->u.sslMutx == + INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)); + + pMutex->isMultiProcess = (PRBool)(shared != 0); + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Init(pMutex); + } + +#ifdef WINNT + /* we need a lock on WINNT for fibers in the parent process */ + retvalue = sslMutex_2LevelInit(pMutex); + if (SECSuccess != retvalue) + return SECFailure; +#endif + + if (!pMutex || ((hMutex = pMutex->u.sslMutx) != 0 && + hMutex != + INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + attributes.bInheritHandle = (shared ? TRUE : FALSE); + hMutex = CreateMutex(&attributes, FALSE, NULL); + if (hMutex == NULL) { + hMutex = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(GetLastError()); + return SECFailure; + } + pMutex->u.sslMutx = hMutex; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex *pMutex, PRBool processLocal) +{ + HANDLE hMutex; + int rv; + int retvalue = SECSuccess; + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + if (!pMutex) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(pMutex); + } + +/* multi-process mode */ +#ifdef WINNT + /* on NT, get rid of the PRLock used for fibers within a process */ + retvalue = sslMutex_2LevelDestroy(pMutex); +#endif + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslMutx != 0 && + pMutex->u.sslMutx != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); + if ((hMutex = pMutex->u.sslMutx) == 0 || hMutex == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = CloseHandle(hMutex); /* ignore error */ + if (!processLocal && rv) { + pMutex->u.sslMutx = hMutex = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE; + } + if (!rv) { + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(GetLastError()); + retvalue = SECFailure; + } + return retvalue; +} + +int +sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex *pMutex) +{ + BOOL success = FALSE; + HANDLE hMutex; + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + if (!pMutex) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); + } + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslMutx != 0 && + pMutex->u.sslMutx != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); + if ((hMutex = pMutex->u.sslMutx) == 0 || hMutex == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + success = ReleaseMutex(hMutex); + if (!success) { + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(GetLastError()); + return SECFailure; + } +#ifdef WINNT + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); +/* release PRLock for other fibers in the process */ +#else + return SECSuccess; +#endif +} + +int +sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex *pMutex) +{ + HANDLE hMutex; + DWORD event; + DWORD lastError; + SECStatus rv; + SECStatus retvalue = SECSuccess; + + PR_ASSERT(pMutex != 0); + if (!pMutex) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); + } +#ifdef WINNT + /* lock first to preserve from other threads/fibers in the same process */ + retvalue = single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); +#endif + PR_ASSERT(pMutex->u.sslMutx != 0 && + pMutex->u.sslMutx != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); + if ((hMutex = pMutex->u.sslMutx) == 0 || hMutex == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return SECFailure; /* what else ? */ + } + /* acquire the mutex to be the only owner accross all other processes */ + event = WaitForSingleObject(hMutex, INFINITE); + switch (event) { + case WAIT_OBJECT_0: + case WAIT_ABANDONED: + rv = SECSuccess; + break; + + case WAIT_TIMEOUT: +#if defined(WAIT_IO_COMPLETION) + case WAIT_IO_COMPLETION: +#endif + default: /* should never happen. nothing we can do. */ + PR_ASSERT(PR_FALSE && "WaitForSingleObject returned invalid value."); + PORT_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + + case WAIT_FAILED: /* failure returns this */ + rv = SECFailure; + lastError = GetLastError(); /* for debugging */ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(lastError); + break; + } + + if (!(SECSuccess == retvalue && SECSuccess == rv)) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +#elif defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(DARWIN) + +#include <errno.h> +#include "unix_err.h" + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Init(sslMutex* pMutex, int shared) +{ + int rv; + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + pMutex->isMultiProcess = (PRBool)(shared != 0); + if (!shared) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Init(pMutex); + } + do { + rv = sem_init(&pMutex->u.sem, shared, 1); + } while (rv < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (rv < 0) { + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex* pMutex, PRBool processLocal) +{ + int rv; + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(pMutex); + } + + /* semaphores are global resources. See SEM_DESTROY(3) man page */ + if (processLocal) { + return SECSuccess; + } + do { + rv = sem_destroy(&pMutex->u.sem); + } while (rv < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (rv < 0) { + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + int rv; + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); + } + do { + rv = sem_post(&pMutex->u.sem); + } while (rv < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (rv < 0) { + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + int rv; + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); + } + do { + rv = sem_wait(&pMutex->u.sem); + } while (rv < 0 && errno == EINTR); + if (rv < 0) { + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(errno); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +#else + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Init(sslMutex* pMutex, int shared) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + pMutex->isMultiProcess = (PRBool)(shared != 0); + if (!shared) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Init(pMutex); + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE && "sslMutex_Init not implemented for multi-process applications !"); + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex* pMutex, PRBool processLocal) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Destroy(pMutex); + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE && "sslMutex_Destroy not implemented for multi-process applications !"); + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Unlock(pMutex); + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE && "sslMutex_Unlock not implemented for multi-process applications !"); + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex* pMutex) +{ + PR_ASSERT(pMutex); + if (PR_FALSE == pMutex->isMultiProcess) { + return single_process_sslMutex_Lock(pMutex); + } + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE && "sslMutex_Lock not implemented for multi-process applications !"); + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f99b4d0242 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslmutex.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#ifndef __SSLMUTEX_H_ +#define __SSLMUTEX_H_ 1 + +/* What SSL really wants is portable process-shared unnamed mutexes in + * shared memory, that have the property that if the process that holds + * them dies, they are released automatically, and that (unlike fcntl + * record locking) lock to the thread, not to the process. + * NSPR doesn't provide that. + * Windows has mutexes that meet that description, but they're not portable. + * POSIX mutexes are not automatically released when the holder dies, + * and other processes/threads cannot release the mutex on behalf of the + * dead holder. + * POSIX semaphores can be used to accomplish this on systems that implement + * process-shared unnamed POSIX semaphores, because a watchdog thread can + * discover and release semaphores that were held by a dead process. + * On systems that do not support process-shared POSIX unnamed semaphores, + * they can be emulated using pipes. + * The performance cost of doing that is not yet measured. + * + * So, this API looks a lot like POSIX pthread mutexes. + */ + +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "prlock.h" + +#if defined(NETBSD) +#include <sys/param.h> /* for __NetBSD_Version__ */ +#endif + +#if defined(WIN32) + +#include <wtypes.h> + +typedef struct { + PRBool isMultiProcess; +#ifdef WINNT + /* on WINNT we need both the PRLock and the Win32 mutex for fibers */ + struct { +#else + union { +#endif + PRLock *sslLock; + HANDLE sslMutx; + } u; +} sslMutex; + +typedef int sslPID; + +#elif defined(LINUX) || defined(AIX) || defined(BSDI) || \ + (defined(NETBSD) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 500000000) || defined(OPENBSD) || defined(__GLIBC__) + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include "prtypes.h" + +typedef struct { + PRBool isMultiProcess; + union { + PRLock *sslLock; + struct { + int mPipes[3]; + PRInt32 nWaiters; + } pipeStr; + } u; +} sslMutex; +typedef pid_t sslPID; + +/* other types of unix, except OS X */ +#elif defined(XP_UNIX) && !defined(DARWIN) + +#include <sys/types.h> /* for pid_t */ +#include <semaphore.h> /* for sem_t, and sem_* functions */ + +typedef struct { + PRBool isMultiProcess; + union { + PRLock *sslLock; + sem_t sem; + } u; +} sslMutex; + +typedef pid_t sslPID; + +#else /* no support for cross-process locking */ + +/* what platform is this ?? */ + +typedef struct { + PRBool isMultiProcess; + union { + PRLock *sslLock; + /* include cross-process locking mechanism here */ + } u; +} sslMutex; + +#ifdef DARWIN +typedef pid_t sslPID; +#else +typedef int sslPID; +#endif + +#endif + +#include "seccomon.h" + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +extern SECStatus sslMutex_Init(sslMutex *sem, int shared); + +/* If processLocal is set to true, then just free resources which are *only* associated + * with the current process. Leave any shared resources (including the state of + * shared memory) intact. */ +extern SECStatus sslMutex_Destroy(sslMutex *sem, PRBool processLocal); + +extern SECStatus sslMutex_Unlock(sslMutex *sem); + +extern SECStatus sslMutex_Lock(sslMutex *sem); + +#ifdef WINNT + +extern SECStatus sslMutex_2LevelInit(sslMutex *sem); + +#endif + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..35f67a3514 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslnonce.c @@ -0,0 +1,1228 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file implements the CLIENT Session ID cache. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "nss.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "nssilock.h" +#include "sslencode.h" +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN) || defined(_WINDOWS) +#include <time.h> +#endif + +static sslSessionID *cache = NULL; +static PZLock *cacheLock = NULL; + +/* sids can be in one of 5 states: + * + * never_cached, created, but not yet put into cache. + * in_client_cache, in the client cache's linked list. + * in_server_cache, entry came from the server's cache file. + * invalid_cache has been removed from the cache. + * in_external_cache sid comes from an external cache. + */ + +#define LOCK_CACHE lock_cache() +#define UNLOCK_CACHE PZ_Unlock(cacheLock) + +static SECStatus +ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock(void) +{ + cacheLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockCache); + return cacheLock ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock(void) +{ + if (cacheLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(cacheLock); + cacheLock = NULL; + return SECSuccess; + } + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRBool LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE; + +static SECStatus +FreeSessionCacheLocks() +{ + SECStatus rv1, rv2; + rv1 = ssl_FreeSymWrapKeysLock(); + rv2 = ssl_FreeClientSessionCacheLock(); + if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +InitSessionCacheLocks(void) +{ + SECStatus rv1, rv2; + PRErrorCode rc; + rv1 = ssl_InitSymWrapKeysLock(); + rv2 = ssl_InitClientSessionCacheLock(); + if ((SECSuccess == rv1) && (SECSuccess == rv2)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + rc = PORT_GetError(); + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + PORT_SetError(rc); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized early */ +SECStatus +ssl_FreeSessionCacheLocks() +{ + PORT_Assert(PR_TRUE == LocksInitializedEarly); + if (!LocksInitializedEarly) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; + } + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + LocksInitializedEarly = PR_FALSE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRCallOnceType lockOnce; + +/* free the session cache locks if they were initialized lazily */ +static SECStatus +ssl_ShutdownLocks(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE == LocksInitializedEarly); + if (LocksInitializedEarly) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + FreeSessionCacheLocks(); + memset(&lockOnce, 0, sizeof(lockOnce)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +initSessionCacheLocksLazily(void) +{ + SECStatus rv = InitSessionCacheLocks(); + if (SECSuccess != rv) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_ShutdownLocks, NULL); + PORT_Assert(SECSuccess == rv); + if (SECSuccess != rv) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* lazyInit means that the call is not happening during a 1-time + * initialization function, but rather during dynamic, lazy initialization + */ +SECStatus +ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PRBool lazyInit) +{ + if (LocksInitializedEarly) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (lazyInit) { + return (PR_SUCCESS == + PR_CallOnce(&lockOnce, initSessionCacheLocksLazily)) + ? SECSuccess + : SECFailure; + } + + if (SECSuccess == InitSessionCacheLocks()) { + LocksInitializedEarly = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +static void +lock_cache(void) +{ + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_TRUE); + PZ_Lock(cacheLock); +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * If the unreferenced sid is not in the cache, Free sid and its contents. + */ +void +ssl_DestroySID(sslSessionID *sid, PRBool freeIt) +{ + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: destroy sid: sid=0x%x cached=%d", sid, sid->cached)); + PORT_Assert(sid->references == 0); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != in_client_cache); + + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket, + PR_FALSE); + } + if (sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE); + } + if (sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_DestroyRWLock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } + + PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID); + PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName); + + if (sid->peerCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + if (sid->peerCertStatus.items) { + SECITEM_FreeArray(&sid->peerCertStatus, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (sid->localCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->localCert); + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection, PR_FALSE); + + if (freeIt) { + PORT_ZFree(sid, sizeof(sslSessionID)); + } +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * Decrement reference count, and + * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache. + * Does NOT remove from the cache first. + * If the sid is still in the cache, it is left there until next time + * the cache list is traversed. + */ +static void +ssl_FreeLockedSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1); + if (--sid->references == 0) { + ssl_DestroySID(sid, PR_TRUE); + } +} + +/* BEWARE: This function gets called for both client and server SIDs !! + * Decrement reference count, and + * free sid if ref count is zero, and sid is not in the cache. + * Does NOT remove from the cache first. + * These locks are necessary because the sid _might_ be in the cache list. + */ +void +ssl_FreeSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + if (sid) { + LOCK_CACHE; + ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid); + UNLOCK_CACHE; + } +} + +sslSessionID * +ssl_ReferenceSID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + sid->references++; + UNLOCK_CACHE; + return sid; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* +** Lookup sid entry in cache by Address, port, and peerID string. +** If found, Increment reference count, and return pointer to caller. +** If it has timed out or ref count is zero, remove from list and free it. +*/ + +sslSessionID * +ssl_LookupSID(PRTime now, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, PRUint16 port, const char *peerID, + const char *urlSvrName) +{ + sslSessionID **sidp; + sslSessionID *sid; + + if (!urlSvrName) + return NULL; + LOCK_CACHE; + sidp = &cache; + while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) { + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == in_client_cache); + PORT_Assert(sid->references >= 1); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: lookup: sid=0x%x", sid)); + + if (sid->expirationTime < now) { + /* + ** This session-id timed out. + ** Don't even care who it belongs to, blow it out of our cache. + */ + SSL_TRC(7, ("SSL: lookup, throwing sid out, age=%d refs=%d", + now - sid->creationTime, sid->references)); + + *sidp = sid->next; /* delink it from the list. */ + sid->cached = invalid_cache; /* mark not on list. */ + ssl_FreeLockedSID(sid); /* drop ref count, free. */ + } else if (!memcmp(&sid->addr, addr, sizeof(PRIPv6Addr)) && /* server IP addr matches */ + (sid->port == port) && /* server port matches */ + /* proxy (peerID) matches */ + (((peerID == NULL) && (sid->peerID == NULL)) || + ((peerID != NULL) && (sid->peerID != NULL) && + PORT_Strcmp(sid->peerID, peerID) == 0)) && + /* is cacheable */ + (sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) && + /* server hostname matches. */ + (sid->urlSvrName != NULL) && + (0 == PORT_Strcmp(urlSvrName, sid->urlSvrName))) { + /* Hit */ + sid->lastAccessTime = now; + sid->references++; + break; + } else { + sidp = &sid->next; + } + } + UNLOCK_CACHE; + return sid; +} + +/* +** Add an sid to the cache or return a previously cached entry to the cache. +** Although this is static, it is called via ss->sec.cache(). +*/ +static void +CacheSID(sslSessionID *sid, PRTime creationTime) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Cache: sid=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x " + "time=%x cached=%d", + sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime, + sid->cached)); + + if (!sid->urlSvrName) { + /* don't cache this SID because it can never be matched */ + return; + } + + if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0 && + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL) + return; + + /* Client generates the SessionID if this was a stateless resume. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0) { + SECStatus rv; + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return; + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + } + PRINT_BUF(8, (0, "sessionID:", + sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + sid->u.ssl3.lock = PR_NewRWLock(PR_RWLOCK_RANK_NONE, NULL); + if (!sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + return; + } + PORT_Assert(sid->creationTime != 0); + if (!sid->creationTime) { + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = creationTime; + } + PORT_Assert(sid->expirationTime != 0); + if (!sid->expirationTime) { + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) * + PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + } + + /* + * Put sid into the cache. Bump reference count to indicate that + * cache is holding a reference. Uncache will reduce the cache + * reference. + */ + LOCK_CACHE; + sid->references++; + sid->cached = in_client_cache; + sid->next = cache; + cache = sid; + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +/* + * If sid "zap" is in the cache, + * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count. + * Caller must hold cache lock. + */ +static void +UncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap) +{ + sslSessionID **sidp = &cache; + sslSessionID *sid; + + if (zap->cached != in_client_cache) { + return; + } + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL: Uncache: zap=0x%x cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x " + "time=%x cipherSuite=%d", + zap, zap->cached, zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + zap->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], zap->port, zap->creationTime, + zap->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)); + + /* See if it's in the cache, if so nuke it */ + while ((sid = *sidp) != 0) { + if (sid == zap) { + /* + ** Bingo. Reduce reference count by one so that when + ** everyone is done with the sid we can free it up. + */ + *sidp = zap->next; + zap->cached = invalid_cache; + ssl_FreeLockedSID(zap); + return; + } + sidp = &sid->next; + } +} + +/* If sid "zap" is in the cache, + * removes sid from cache, and decrements reference count. + * Although this function is static, it is called externally via + * ssl_UncacheSessionID. + */ +static void +LockAndUncacheSID(sslSessionID *zap) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + UncacheSID(zap); + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +SECStatus +ReadVariableFromBuffer(sslReader *reader, sslReadBuffer *readerBuffer, + uint8_t lenBytes, SECItem *dest) +{ + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, lenBytes, readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer->len) { + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer->buf, + readerBuffer->len }; + SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, dest, &tempItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Fill sid with the values from the encoded resumption token. + * sid has to be allocated. + * We don't care about locks here as this cache entry is externally stored. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, const PRUint8 *encodedToken, + PRUint32 encodedTokenLen) +{ + PORT_Assert(encodedTokenLen); + PORT_Assert(encodedToken); + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid || !encodedToken || !encodedTokenLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (encodedToken[0] != SSLResumptionTokenVersion) { + /* Unknown token format version. */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* These variables are used across macros. Don't use them outside. */ + sslReader reader = SSL_READER(encodedToken, encodedTokenLen); + reader.offset += 1; // We read the version already. Skip the first byte. + sslReadBuffer readerBuffer = { 0 }; + PRUint64 tmpInt = 0; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->lastAccessTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->expirationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp = (PRTime)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(!sid->peerCert); + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */ + &tempItem, + NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (!sid->peerCert) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 2, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + SECITEM_AllocArray(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus, 1); + if (!sid->peerCertStatus.items) { + return SECFailure; + } + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->peerCertStatus.items[0], &tempItem); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + if (sid->peerID) { + PORT_Free((void *)sid->peerID); + } + sid->peerID = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + if (sid->urlSvrName) { + PORT_Free((void *)sid->urlSvrName); + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + sid->urlSvrName = PORT_Strdup((const char *)readerBuffer.buf); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 3, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(!sid->localCert); + SECItem tempItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len }; + sid->localCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(NULL, /* dbHandle */ + &tempItem, + NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0]) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1]) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->port = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->version = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->creationTime = (PRTime)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->authType = (SSLAuthType)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaType = (SSLKEAType)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->keaGroup = (SSLNamedGroup)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 3, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->sigScheme = (SSLSignatureScheme)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (readerBuffer.len) { + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, readerBuffer.buf, readerBuffer.len); + } + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.policy = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 1, &readerBuffer) != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.len == WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); + if (readerBuffer.len != WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(readerBuffer.buf); + PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, readerBuffer.buf, + readerBuffer.len); + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed = (PRUint8)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 8, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = (unsigned long)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 4, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = (PRUint32)tmpInt; + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = (PRUint16)tmpInt; + + if (sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmpInt) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = (char)tmpInt; + + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1, + &sid->u.ssl3.srvName) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2, + &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 1, + &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (ReadVariableFromBuffer(&reader, &readerBuffer, 2, + &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* At this point we must have read everything. */ + PORT_Assert(reader.offset == reader.buf.len); + if (reader.offset != reader.buf.len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl_IsResumptionTokenUsable(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss); + PORT_Assert(sid); + + // Check that the ticket didn't expire. + PRTime endTime = 0; + NewSessionTicket *ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint != 0) { + endTime = ticket->received_timestamp + + (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + if (endTime <= ssl_Time(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } + + // Check that the session entry didn't expire. + if (sid->expirationTime < ssl_Time(ss)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + // Check that the server name (SNI) matches the one set for this session. + // Don't use the token if there's no server name. + if (sid->urlSvrName == NULL || PORT_Strcmp(ss->url, sid->urlSvrName) != 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + // This shouldn't be false, but let's check it anyway. + if (!sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Encode a session ticket into a byte array that can be handed out to a cache. + * Needed memory in encodedToken has to be allocated according to + * *encodedTokenLen. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sslSessionID *sid, sslBuffer *encodedTokenBuf) +{ + PORT_Assert(encodedTokenBuf); + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid || !sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len || + !encodedTokenBuf || !sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable || !sid->urlSvrName) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Encoding format: + * 0-byte: version + * Integers are encoded according to their length. + * SECItems are prepended with a 64-bit length field followed by the bytes. + * Optional bytes are encoded as a 0-length item if not present. + */ + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + SSLResumptionTokenVersion, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->lastAccessTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->expirationTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + // session ticket + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.received_timestamp, + 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_age_add, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size, + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->peerCert->derCert.data, + sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->peerCertStatus.len > 1) { + /* This is not implemented so it shouldn't happen. + * If it gets implemented, this has to change. + */ + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->peerCertStatus.len == 1 && sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].data, + sid->peerCertStatus.items[0].len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + PRUint64 len = sid->peerID ? strlen(sid->peerID) : 0; + if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) { + // This string really shouldn't be that long. + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + (const unsigned char *)sid->peerID, len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + len = sid->urlSvrName ? strlen(sid->urlSvrName) : 0; + if (!len) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (len > PR_UINT8_MAX) { + // This string really shouldn't be that long. + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + (const unsigned char *)sid->urlSvrName, + len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (sid->localCert) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->localCert->derCert.data, + sid->localCert->derCert.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, NULL, 0, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[0], 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr64[1], 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->port, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->version, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->creationTime, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->authKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaKeyBits, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->keaGroup, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->sigScheme, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.policy, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, + WRAPPED_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.keys.extendedMasterSecretUsed, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID, 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.masterValid, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, sid->u.ssl3.srvName.data, + sid->u.ssl3.srvName.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.data, + sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data, + sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len > 1); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(encodedTokenBuf, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.len, + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +ssl_CacheExternalToken(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss); + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(sid->cached == never_cached); + PORT_Assert(ss->resumptionTokenCallback); + + SSL_TRC(8, ("SSL [%d]: Cache External: sid=0x%x cached=%d " + "addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x port=0x%04x time=%x cached=%d", + ss->fd, + sid, sid->cached, sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], sid->port, sid->creationTime, + sid->cached)); + + /* This is only available for stateless resumption. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* Don't export token if the session used client authentication. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid) { + return; + } + + if (!sid->creationTime) { + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = ssl_Time(ss); + } + if (!sid->expirationTime) { + sid->expirationTime = sid->creationTime + (PR_MIN(ssl_ticket_lifetime, + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket_lifetime_hint) * + PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + } + + sslBuffer encodedToken = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + if (ssl_EncodeResumptionToken(sid, &encodedToken) != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("SSL [%d]: encoding resumption token failed", ss->fd)); + return; + } + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken) > 0); + PRINT_BUF(40, (ss, "SSL: encoded resumption token", + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken))); + SECStatus rv = ss->resumptionTokenCallback( + ss->fd, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&encodedToken), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&encodedToken), + ss->resumptionTokenContext); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + sid->cached = in_external_cache; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedToken); +} + +void +ssl_CacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec; + PORT_Assert(sec); + PORT_Assert(sec->ci.sid->cached == never_cached); + + if (sec->ci.sid && !sec->ci.sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable) { + return; + } + + if (!sec->isServer && ss->resumptionTokenCallback) { + ssl_CacheExternalToken(ss); + return; + } + + PORT_Assert(!ss->resumptionTokenCallback); + if (sec->isServer) { + ssl_ServerCacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss)); + return; + } + + CacheSID(sec->ci.sid, ssl_Time(ss)); +} + +void +ssl_UncacheSessionID(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->opt.noCache) { + return; + } + + sslSecurityInfo *sec = &ss->sec; + PORT_Assert(sec); + + if (sec->ci.sid) { + if (sec->isServer) { + ssl_ServerUncacheSessionID(sec->ci.sid); + } else if (!ss->resumptionTokenCallback) { + LockAndUncacheSID(sec->ci.sid); + } + } +} + +/* wipe out the entire client session cache. */ +void +SSL_ClearSessionCache(void) +{ + LOCK_CACHE; + while (cache != NULL) + UncacheSID(cache); + UNLOCK_CACHE; +} + +PRBool +ssl_TicketTimeValid(const sslSocket *ss, const NewSessionTicket *ticket) +{ + PRTime endTime; + + if (ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + endTime = ticket->received_timestamp + + (PRTime)(ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + return endTime > ssl_Time(ss); +} + +void +ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(sslSessionID *sid, + /*in/out*/ NewSessionTicket *newSessionTicket) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.data); + PORT_Assert(newSessionTicket->ticket.len != 0); + + /* If this is in the client cache, we are updating an existing entry that is + * already cached or was once cached, so we need to acquire and release the + * write lock. Otherwise, this is a new session that isn't shared with + * anything yet, so no locking is needed. + */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Wlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + /* Another thread may have evicted, or it may be in external cache. */ + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached); + } + /* If this was in the client cache, then we might have to free the old + * ticket. In TLS 1.3, we might get a replacement ticket if the server + * sends more than one ticket. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data) { + PORT_Assert(sid->cached != never_cached || + sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket, + PR_FALSE); + } + + PORT_Assert(!sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.ticket.data); + + /* Do a shallow copy, moving the ticket data. */ + sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket = *newSessionTicket; + newSessionTicket->ticket.data = NULL; + newSessionTicket->ticket.len = 0; + + if (sid->u.ssl3.lock) { + PR_RWLock_Unlock(sid->u.ssl3.lock); + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslprimitive.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslprimitive.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2afecfb165 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslprimitive.c @@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * SSL Primitives: Public HKDF and AEAD Functions + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "blapit.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "sechash.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "sslproto.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "tls13con.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" + +struct SSLAeadContextStr { + /* sigh, the API creates a single context, but then uses either encrypt + * and decrypt on that context. We should take an encrypt/decrypt + * variable here, but for now create two contexts. */ + PK11Context *encryptContext; + PK11Context *decryptContext; + int tagLen; + int ivLen; + unsigned char iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; +}; + +SECStatus +SSLExp_MakeVariantAead(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, const char *labelPrefix, + unsigned int labelPrefixLen, SSLAeadContext **ctx) +{ + SSLAeadContext *out = NULL; + char label[255]; // Maximum length label. + static const char *const keySuffix = "key"; + static const char *const ivSuffix = "iv"; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech; + SECItem nullParams = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PK11SymKey *key = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(strlen(keySuffix) >= strlen(ivSuffix)); + if (secret == NULL || ctx == NULL || + (labelPrefix == NULL && labelPrefixLen > 0) || + labelPrefixLen + strlen(keySuffix) > sizeof(label)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + SSLHashType hash; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher; + SECStatus rv = tls13_GetHashAndCipher(version, cipherSuite, + &hash, &cipher); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + out = PORT_ZNew(SSLAeadContext); + if (out == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + mech = ssl3_Alg2Mech(cipher->calg); + out->ivLen = cipher->iv_size + cipher->explicit_nonce_size; + out->tagLen = cipher->tag_size; + + memcpy(label, labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen); + memcpy(label + labelPrefixLen, ivSuffix, strlen(ivSuffix)); + unsigned int labelLen = labelPrefixLen + strlen(ivSuffix); + unsigned int ivLen = cipher->iv_size + cipher->explicit_nonce_size; + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(secret, hash, + NULL, 0, // Handshake hash. + label, labelLen, variant, + out->iv, ivLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + memcpy(label + labelPrefixLen, keySuffix, strlen(keySuffix)); + labelLen = labelPrefixLen + strlen(keySuffix); + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(secret, hash, + NULL, 0, // Handshake hash. + label, labelLen, mech, cipher->key_size, + variant, &key); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* We really need to change the API to Create a context for each + * encrypt and decrypt rather than a single call that does both. it's + * almost certain that the underlying application tries to use the same + * context for both. */ + out->encryptContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_ENCRYPT, + key, &nullParams); + if (out->encryptContext == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + out->decryptContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mech, + CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | CKA_DECRYPT, + key, &nullParams); + if (out->decryptContext == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(key); + *ctx = out; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_FreeSymKey(key); + SSLExp_DestroyAead(out); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_MakeAead(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *labelPrefix, unsigned int labelPrefixLen, SSLAeadContext **ctx) +{ + return SSLExp_MakeVariantAead(version, cipherSuite, ssl_variant_stream, secret, + labelPrefix, labelPrefixLen, ctx); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_DestroyAead(SSLAeadContext *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if (ctx->encryptContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->encryptContext, PR_TRUE); + } + if (ctx->decryptContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx->decryptContext, PR_TRUE); + } + + PORT_ZFree(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Bug 1529440 exists to refactor this and the other AEAD uses. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_AeadInner(const SSLAeadContext *ctx, PK11Context *context, + PRBool decrypt, PRUint64 counter, + const PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + const PRUint8 *in, unsigned int inLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOut) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || (aad == NULL && aadLen > 0) || in == NULL || + out == NULL || outLen == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + // Setup the nonce. + PRUint8 nonce[sizeof(counter)] = { 0 }; + sslBuffer nonceBuf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(nonce, sizeof(counter)); + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&nonceBuf, counter, sizeof(counter)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return SECFailure; + } + /* at least on encrypt, we should not be using CKG_NO_GENERATE, but + * the current experimental API has the application tracking the counter + * rather than token. We should look at the QUIC code and see if the + * counter can be moved internally where it belongs. That would + * also get rid of the formatting code above and have the API + * call tls13_AEAD directly in SSLExp_Aead* */ + return tls13_AEAD(context, decrypt, CKG_NO_GENERATE, 0, ctx->iv, NULL, + ctx->ivLen, nonce, sizeof(counter), aad, aadLen, + out, outLen, maxOut, ctx->tagLen, in, inLen); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_AeadEncrypt(const SSLAeadContext *ctx, PRUint64 counter, + const PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + const PRUint8 *plaintext, unsigned int plaintextLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOut) +{ + // false == encrypt + return ssl_AeadInner(ctx, ctx->encryptContext, PR_FALSE, counter, + aad, aadLen, plaintext, plaintextLen, + out, outLen, maxOut); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_AeadDecrypt(const SSLAeadContext *ctx, PRUint64 counter, + const PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + const PRUint8 *ciphertext, unsigned int ciphertextLen, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxOut) +{ + // true == decrypt + return ssl_AeadInner(ctx, ctx->decryptContext, PR_TRUE, counter, + aad, aadLen, ciphertext, ciphertextLen, + out, outLen, maxOut); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfExtract(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + PK11SymKey *salt, PK11SymKey *ikm, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + if (keyp == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLHashType hash; + SECStatus rv = tls13_GetHashAndCipher(version, cipherSuite, + &hash, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + return tls13_HkdfExtract(salt, ikm, hash, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfExpandLabel(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + return SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(version, cipherSuite, prk, hsHash, hsHashLen, + label, labelLen, ssl_variant_stream, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabel(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + if (prk == NULL || keyp == NULL || + label == NULL || labelLen == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLHashType hash; + SECStatus rv = tls13_GetHashAndCipher(version, cipherSuite, + &hash, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + return tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, hash, hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, + CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hash), variant, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfExpandLabelWithMech(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int keySize, + PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + return SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(version, cipherSuite, prk, hsHash, hsHashLen, + label, labelLen, mech, keySize, + ssl_variant_stream, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, PK11SymKey *prk, + const PRUint8 *hsHash, unsigned int hsHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, unsigned int keySize, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + if (prk == NULL || keyp == NULL || + label == NULL || labelLen == 0 || + mech == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM || keySize == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLHashType hash; + SECStatus rv = tls13_GetHashAndCipher(version, cipherSuite, + &hash, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + return tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, hash, hsHash, hsHashLen, label, labelLen, + mech, keySize, variant, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx) +{ + if (!secret || !ctx || (!label && labelLen)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLMaskingContext *out = PORT_ZNew(SSLMaskingContext); + if (out == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + + SSLHashType hash; + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher; + SECStatus rv = tls13_GetHashAndCipher(version, cipherSuite, + &hash, &cipher); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + out->mech = tls13_SequenceNumberEncryptionMechanism(cipher->calg); + if (out->mech == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + // Derive the masking key + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(secret, hash, + NULL, 0, // Handshake hash. + label, labelLen, + out->mech, + cipher->key_size, variant, + &out->secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + out->version = version; + out->cipherSuite = cipherSuite; + + *ctx = out; + return SECSuccess; +loser: + SSLExp_DestroyMaskingContext(out); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CreateMaskInner(SSLMaskingContext *ctx, const PRUint8 *sample, + unsigned int sampleLen, PRUint8 *outMask, + unsigned int maskLen) +{ + if (!ctx || !sample || !sampleLen || !outMask || !maskLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ctx->secret == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + unsigned int outMaskLen = 0; + int paramLen = 0; + + /* Internal output len/buf, for use if the caller allocated and requested + * less than one block of output. |oneBlock| should have size equal to the + * largest block size supported below. */ + PRUint8 oneBlock[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + PRUint8 *outMask_ = outMask; + unsigned int maskLen_ = maskLen; + + switch (ctx->mech) { + case CKM_AES_ECB: + if (sampleLen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (maskLen_ < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + outMask_ = oneBlock; + maskLen_ = sizeof(oneBlock); + } + rv = PK11_Encrypt(ctx->secret, + ctx->mech, + NULL, + outMask_, &outMaskLen, maskLen_, + sample, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + if (rv == SECSuccess && + maskLen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + memcpy(outMask, outMask_, maskLen); + } + break; + case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_CTR: + paramLen = 16; + /* fall through */ + case CKM_CHACHA20: + paramLen = (paramLen) ? paramLen : sizeof(CK_CHACHA20_PARAMS); + if (sampleLen < paramLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECItem param; + param.type = siBuffer; + param.len = paramLen; + param.data = (PRUint8 *)sample; // const-cast :( + unsigned char zeros[128] = { 0 }; + + if (maskLen > sizeof(zeros)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = PK11_Encrypt(ctx->secret, + ctx->mech, + ¶m, + outMask, &outMaskLen, + maskLen, + zeros, maskLen); + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PKCS11_FUNCTION_FAILED); + return SECFailure; + } + + // Ensure we produced at least as much material as requested. + if (outMaskLen < maskLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_DestroyMaskingContextInner(SSLMaskingContext *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(ctx->secret); + PORT_ZFree(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_CreateMask(SSLMaskingContext *ctx, const PRUint8 *sample, + unsigned int sampleLen, PRUint8 *outMask, + unsigned int maskLen) +{ + return ssl_CreateMaskInner(ctx, sample, sampleLen, outMask, maskLen); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_CreateMaskingContext(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx) +{ + return ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(version, cipherSuite, ssl_variant_stream, secret, + label, labelLen, ctx); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_CreateVariantMaskingContext(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, + PK11SymKey *secret, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + SSLMaskingContext **ctx) +{ + return ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(version, cipherSuite, variant, secret, + label, labelLen, ctx); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_DestroyMaskingContext(SSLMaskingContext *ctx) +{ + return ssl_DestroyMaskingContextInner(ctx); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslproto.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslproto.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..beaee5178f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslproto.h @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +/* + * Various and sundry protocol constants. DON'T CHANGE THESE. These values + * are mostly defined by the SSL3 or TLS protocol specifications. + * Cipher kinds and ciphersuites are part of the public API. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslproto_h_ +#define __sslproto_h_ + +/* clang-format off */ + +/* All versions less than 3_0 are treated as SSL version 2 */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_2 0x0002 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 0x0300 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 0x0301 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 0x0302 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 0x0303 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 0x0304 + +/* Note: this is the internal format, not the wire format */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0 SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2 SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_3 SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 + +/* deprecated old name */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_1_TLS SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 + +/* The DTLS versions used in the spec */ +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE ((~0x0100) & 0xffff) +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE ((~0x0102) & 0xffff) +#define SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_3_WIRE ((~0x0103) & 0xffff) + +/* Certificate types */ +#define SSL_CT_X509_CERTIFICATE 0x01 +#if 0 /* XXX Not implemented yet */ +#define SSL_PKCS6_CERTIFICATE 0x02 +#endif +#define SSL_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION 0x01 + +/* Error codes */ +#define SSL_PE_NO_CYPHERS 0x0001 +#define SSL_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE 0x0002 +#define SSL_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE 0x0004 +#define SSL_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x0006 + +/* Deprecated SSL 3.0 & libssl names replaced by IANA-registered TLS names. */ +#ifndef SSL_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_CIPHER_SUITE_NAMES +#define SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_ANON_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 +#define SSL_DH_ANON_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_ANON_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA +#define TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA +#endif + +#define TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL 0x0000 + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x0001 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0002 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0004 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0005 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA 0x0007 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x0009 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000a + +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x000c +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000d +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x000f +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0010 + +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x0012 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0013 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x0015 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0016 + +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0018 +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x001a +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x001b + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0030 +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0031 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0032 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0033 +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0034 + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035 +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0036 +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0037 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0038 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039 +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x003A +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x003B +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003C +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x003D + +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0040 +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0041 +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0042 +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0043 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0044 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0045 +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x0046 + +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0066 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006A +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0084 +#define TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0085 +#define TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0086 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0087 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0088 +#define TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x0089 + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA 0x0096 + +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C +#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009E +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009F +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A2 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A3 + +/* TLS "Signaling Cipher Suite Value" (SCSV). May be requested by client. + * Must NEVER be chosen by server. SSL 3.0 server acknowledges by sending + * back an empty Renegotiation Info (RI) server hello extension. + */ +#define TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV 0x00FF + +/* TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is a signaling cipher suite value that indicates that a + * handshake is the result of TLS version fallback. + */ +#define TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x5600 + +/* Cipher Suite Values starting with 0xC000 are defined in informational + * RFCs. + */ +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 + +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A + +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F + +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 + +#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC015 +#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC016 +#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC017 +#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC018 +#define TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC019 + +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 + +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C +#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 +#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 + +/* draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04 */ +#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 +#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA + +/* Special TLS 1.3 cipher suites that really just specify AEAD */ +#define TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x1301 +#define TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x1302 +#define TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x1303 + +/* PSK cipher suites. NSS doesn't actually support these, but we + * exposed them when TLS 1.3 used them so we need to keep them + * in the API. */ +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xD001 +#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xD002 +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00AA /* RFC 5487 */ +#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00AB /* RFC 5487 */ + +/* DTLS-SRTP cipher suites from RFC 5764 */ +/* If you modify this, also modify MAX_DTLS_SRTP_CIPHER_SUITES in sslimpl.h */ +#define SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 0x0001 +#define SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 0x0002 +#define SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 0x0005 +#define SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 0x0006 + +/* DO NOT USE. (deprecated, will be removed) */ +#define SSL_HL_ERROR_HBYTES 3 +#define SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES 9 +#define SSL_HL_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_HBYTES 10 +#define SSL_HL_CLIENT_FINISHED_HBYTES 1 +#define SSL_HL_SERVER_HELLO_HBYTES 11 +#define SSL_HL_SERVER_VERIFY_HBYTES 1 +#define SSL_HL_SERVER_FINISHED_HBYTES 1 +#define SSL_HL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES 2 +#define SSL_HL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_HBYTES 6 +#define SSL_MT_ERROR 0 +#define SSL_MT_CLIENT_HELLO 1 +#define SSL_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 2 +#define SSL_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED 3 +#define SSL_MT_SERVER_HELLO 4 +#define SSL_MT_SERVER_VERIFY 5 +#define SSL_MT_SERVER_FINISHED 6 +#define SSL_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 7 +#define SSL_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 8 +#define SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 0x01 +#define SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0x02 +#define SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x03 +#define SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0x04 +#define SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x05 +#define SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x06 +#define SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 0x07 +#define SSL_EN_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 0xFF01 +#define SSL_EN_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0xFF02 +#define SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0xFF03 +#define SSL_EN_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 0xFF04 +#define SSL_EN_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 0xFF05 +#define SSL_EN_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 0xFF06 +#define SSL_EN_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 0xFF07 +#define TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 0x0003 +#define TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 0x0006 +#define TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x0008 +#define TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x0062 +#define TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x0064 +#define TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x0014 +#define TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x000e +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x0063 +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x0065 +#define TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x000b +#define TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x0011 +#define TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 0x0017 +#define TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA 0x0019 +#define SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x001c +#define SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA 0x001d +#define SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x001e +#define SSL_RSA_OLDFIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xffe0 +#define SSL_RSA_OLDFIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0xffe1 +#define SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xfeff +#define SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0xfefe +#define SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 +#define SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 +#define SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA +#define SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 + +/* clang-format on */ + +#endif /* __sslproto_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cc16f574db --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslreveal.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* + * Accessor functions for SSLSocket private members. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "certt.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +/* given PRFileDesc, returns a copy of certificate associated with the socket + * the caller should delete the cert when done with SSL_DestroyCertificate + */ +CERTCertificate * +SSL_RevealCert(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + sslSocket *sslsocket = NULL; + + sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + /* CERT_DupCertificate increases reference count and returns pointer to + * the same cert + */ + if (sslsocket && sslsocket->sec.peerCert) + cert = CERT_DupCertificate(sslsocket->sec.peerCert); + + return cert; +} + +/* given PRFileDesc, returns a pointer to PinArg associated with the socket + */ +void * +SSL_RevealPinArg(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *sslsocket = NULL; + void *PinArg = NULL; + + sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + /* is pkcs11PinArg part of the sslSocket or sslSecurityInfo ? */ + if (sslsocket) + PinArg = sslsocket->pkcs11PinArg; + + return PinArg; +} + +/* given PRFileDesc, returns a pointer to the URL associated with the socket + * the caller should free url when done + */ +char * +SSL_RevealURL(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *sslsocket = NULL; + char *url = NULL; + + sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (sslsocket && sslsocket->url) + url = PL_strdup(sslsocket->url); + + return url; +} + +/* given PRFileDesc, returns status information related to extensions + * negotiated with peer during the handshake. + */ + +SECStatus +SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc *socket, + SSLExtensionType extId, + PRBool *pYes) +{ + /* some decisions derived from SSL_GetChannelInfo */ + sslSocket *sslsocket = NULL; + + if (!pYes) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + sslsocket = ssl_FindSocket(socket); + if (!sslsocket) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in HandshakeNegotiatedExtension", + SSL_GETPID(), socket)); + return SECFailure; + } + + *pYes = PR_FALSE; + + /* according to public API SSL_GetChannelInfo, this doesn't need a lock */ + if (sslsocket->opt.useSecurity) { + /* now we know this socket went through ssl3_InitState() and + * ss->xtnData got initialized, which is the only member accessed by + * ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(); + * Member xtnData appears to get accessed in functions that handle + * the handshake (hello messages and extension sending), + * therefore the handshake lock should be sufficient. + */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(sslsocket); + *pYes = ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(sslsocket, extId); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(sslsocket); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4a05637039 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsecur.c @@ -0,0 +1,1385 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * Various SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "cert.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "secoid.h" /* for SECOID_GetALgorithmTag */ +#include "pk11func.h" /* for PK11_GenerateRandom */ +#include "nss.h" /* for NSS_RegisterShutdown */ +#include "prinit.h" /* for PR_CallOnceWithArg */ +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" + +/* Step through the handshake functions. + * + * Called from: SSL_ForceHandshake (below), + * ssl_SecureRecv (below) and + * ssl_SecureSend (below) + * from: WaitForResponse in sslsocks.c + * ssl_SocksRecv in sslsocks.c + * ssl_SocksSend in sslsocks.c + * + * Caller must hold the (write) handshakeLock. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_Do1stHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + while (ss->handshake && rv == SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = (*ss->handshake)(ss); + }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || !ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || + (ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && + ss->xtnData.ech && + ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) == + ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); + + /* If ECH was OFFERED to (echHpkeCtx is set on the client) DISABLED by the + * server through negotiation of a TLS version < 1.3, an 'ech_required' + * alert MUST be sent to inform the server about the intention / possible + * misconfiguration. */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, ech_required); + /* "If [one, none] of the retry_configs contains a supported version, + * the client can regard ECH as securely [replaced, disabled] by the + * server." */ + if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigs.len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITH_ECH); + ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigsValid = PR_TRUE; + } else { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ECH_RETRY_WITHOUT_ECH); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL[%d]: handshake is completed", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + ss->firstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_TRUE; + ss->gs.writeOffset = 0; + ss->gs.readOffset = 0; + + if (ss->handshakeCallback) { + PORT_Assert((ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_all) == + ssl_preinfo_all); + (ss->handshakeCallback)(ss->fd, ss->handshakeCallbackData); + } + + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Handshake function that blocks. Used to force a + * retry on a connection on the next read/write. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_AlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * set the initial handshake state machine to block + */ +void +ssl3_SetAlwaysBlock(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ss->handshake = ssl3_AlwaysBlock; + } +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_SetTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SetTimeout", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + ss->rTimeout = timeout; + if (ss->opt.fdx) { + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + } + ss->wTimeout = timeout; + if (ss->opt.fdx) { + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + } + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Acquires and releases HandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *s, PRBool asServer) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus status; + PRNetAddr addr; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(s); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in ResetHandshake", SSL_GETPID(), s)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Don't waste my time */ + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) + return SECSuccess; + + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + + /* Reset handshake state */ + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + ss->firstHsDone = PR_FALSE; + ss->enoughFirstHsDone = PR_FALSE; + if (asServer) { + ss->handshake = ssl_BeginServerHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer; + } else { + ss->handshake = ssl_BeginClientHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsClient; + } + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + status = ssl3_InitGather(&ss->gs); + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + if (status != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = NULL; + + /* + ** Blow away old security state and get a fresh setup. + */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ResetSecurityInfo(&ss->sec, PR_TRUE); + status = ssl_CreateSecurityInfo(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); + ssl3_ResetExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); + tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); + PORT_Free((void *)ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); /* CONST */ + ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName = NULL; + } + /* Make sure greaseEchBuf is freed in ECH setups without echHpkeCtx. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx || + ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch || + ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + } + + tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(ss); + + tls_ClientHelloExtensionPermutationDestroy(ss); + + if (!ss->TCPconnected) + ss->TCPconnected = (PR_SUCCESS == ssl_DefGetpeername(ss, &addr)); + +loser: + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + + return status; +} + +/* For SSLv2, does nothing but return an error. +** For SSLv3, flushes SID cache entry (if requested), +** and then starts new client hello or hello request. +** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +SSL_ReHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool flushCache) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in RedoHandshake", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) + return SECSuccess; + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_RedoHandshake(ss, flushCache); /* force full handshake. */ + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* +** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_ReHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRBool flushCache, + PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + if (SECSuccess != ssl_SetTimeout(fd, timeout)) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SSL_ReHandshake(fd, flushCache); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_RedoHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + return SSL_ReHandshake(fd, PR_TRUE); +} + +/* Register an application callback to be called when SSL handshake completes. +** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLHandshakeCallback cb, + void *client_data) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in HandshakeCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ss->handshakeCallback = cb; + ss->handshakeCallbackData = client_data; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Register an application callback to be called when false start may happen. +** Acquires and releases HandshakeLock. +*/ +SECStatus +SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback cb, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ss->canFalseStartCallback = cb; + ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = arg; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool *canFalseStart) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + *canFalseStart = PR_FALSE; + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Require a forward-secret key exchange. */ + *canFalseStart = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_dss || + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_dhe_rsa || + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_ecdsa || + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Try to make progress on an SSL handshake by attempting to read the +** next handshake from the peer, and sending any responses. +** For non-blocking sockets, returns PR_ERROR_WOULD_BLOCK if it cannot +** read the next handshake from the underlying socket. +** Returns when handshake is complete, or application data has +** arrived that must be taken by application before handshake can continue, +** or a fatal error occurs. +** Application should use handshake completion callback to tell which. +*/ +SECStatus +SSL_ForceHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in ForceHandshake", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return rv; + } + + /* Don't waste my time */ + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) + return SECSuccess; + + if (!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss)) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + int sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if ((sent < 0) && (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + int gatherResult; + + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + gatherResult = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, 0); + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + if (gatherResult > 0) { + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + if (gatherResult == 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_END_OF_FILE_ERROR); + } + /* We can rely on ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake to set + * PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR as needed here. */ + rv = SECFailure; + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss); + } + + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* + ** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout. + */ +SSL_IMPORT SECStatus +SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd, + PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + if (SECSuccess != ssl_SetTimeout(fd, timeout)) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SSL_ForceHandshake(fd); +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* +** Save away write data that is trying to be written before the security +** handshake has been completed. When the handshake is completed, we will +** flush this data out. +** Caller must hold xmitBufLock +*/ +SECStatus +ssl_SaveWriteData(sslSocket *ss, const void *data, unsigned int len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->pendingBuf, data, len); + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: saving %u bytes of data (%u total saved so far)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len, ss->pendingBuf.len)); + return rv; +} + +/* +** Send saved write data. This will flush out data sent prior to a +** complete security handshake. Hopefully there won't be too much of it. +** Returns count of the bytes sent, NOT a SECStatus. +** Caller must hold xmitBufLock +*/ +int +ssl_SendSavedWriteData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int rv = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + if (ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: sending %d bytes of saved data", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->pendingBuf.len)); + rv = ssl_DefSend(ss, ss->pendingBuf.buf, ss->pendingBuf.len, 0); + if (rv < 0) { + return rv; + } + ss->pendingBuf.len -= rv; + if (ss->pendingBuf.len > 0 && rv > 0) { + /* UGH !! This shifts the whole buffer down by copying it */ + PORT_Memmove(ss->pendingBuf.buf, ss->pendingBuf.buf + rv, + ss->pendingBuf.len); + } + } + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* +** Receive some application data on a socket. Reads SSL records from the input +** stream, decrypts them and then copies them to the output buffer. +** Called from ssl_SecureRecv() below. +** +** Caller does NOT hold 1stHandshakeLock because that handshake is over. +** Caller doesn't call this until initial handshake is complete. +** The call to ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord may encounter handshake +** messages from a subsequent handshake. +** +** This code is similar to, and easily confused with, +** ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake() in sslcon.c +*/ +static int +DoRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *out, int len, int flags) +{ + int rv; + int amount; + int available; + + /* ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord may call ssl_FinishHandshake, which needs the + * 1stHandshakeLock. */ + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + + available = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset; + if (available == 0) { + /* Wait for application data to arrive. */ + rv = ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(ss, 0); + if (rv <= 0) { + if (rv == 0) { + /* EOF */ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl_recv EOF", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto done; + } + if (PR_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + /* Some random error */ + goto done; + } + + /* + ** Gather record is blocked waiting for more record data to + ** arrive. Try to process what we have already received + */ + } else { + /* Gather record has finished getting a complete record */ + } + + /* See if any clear data is now available */ + available = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset; + if (available == 0) { + /* + ** No partial data is available. Force error code to + ** EWOULDBLOCK so that caller will try again later. Note + ** that the error code is probably EWOULDBLOCK already, + ** but if it isn't (for example, if we received a zero + ** length record) then this will force it to be correct. + */ + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: partial data ready, available=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, available)); + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && (len < available)) { + /* DTLS does not allow you to do partial reads */ + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: DTLS short read. len=%d available=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len, available)); + ss->gs.readOffset += available; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_SHORT_DTLS_READ); + rv = SECFailure; + goto done; + } + + /* Dole out clear data to reader */ + amount = PR_MIN(len, available); + PORT_Memcpy(out, ss->gs.buf.buf + ss->gs.readOffset, amount); + if (!(flags & PR_MSG_PEEK)) { + ss->gs.readOffset += amount; + } + PORT_Assert(ss->gs.readOffset <= ss->gs.writeOffset); + rv = amount; + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* In Debug builds free and zero gather plaintext buffer after its content + * has been used/copied for advanced ASAN coverage/utilization. + * This frees the buffer after reception of application data, + * non-application data is freed at the end of + * ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleRecord(). */ + if (ss->gs.writeOffset == ss->gs.readOffset) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->gs.buf); + } +#endif + + SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL[%d]: amount=%d available=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, amount, available)); + PRINT_BUF(4, (ss, "DoRecv receiving plaintext:", out, amount)); + +done: + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +SECStatus +ssl_CreateSecurityInfo(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus status; + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + status = sslBuffer_Grow(&ss->sec.writeBuf, 4096); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + return status; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CopySecurityInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSocket *os) +{ + ss->sec.isServer = os->sec.isServer; + + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(os->sec.peerCert); + if (os->sec.peerCert && !ss->sec.peerCert) + goto loser; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Reset sec back to its initial state. +** Caller holds any relevant locks. +*/ +void +ssl_ResetSecurityInfo(sslSecurityInfo *sec, PRBool doMemset) +{ + if (sec->localCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sec->localCert); + sec->localCert = NULL; + } + if (sec->peerCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(sec->peerCert); + sec->peerCert = NULL; + } + if (sec->peerKey) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(sec->peerKey); + sec->peerKey = NULL; + } + + /* cleanup the ci */ + if (sec->ci.sid != NULL) { + ssl_FreeSID(sec->ci.sid); + } + PORT_ZFree(sec->ci.sendBuf.buf, sec->ci.sendBuf.space); + if (doMemset) { + memset(&sec->ci, 0, sizeof sec->ci); + } +} + +/* +** Called from SSL_ResetHandshake (above), and +** from ssl_FreeSocket in sslsock.c +** Caller should hold relevant locks (e.g. XmitBufLock) +*/ +void +ssl_DestroySecurityInfo(sslSecurityInfo *sec) +{ + ssl_ResetSecurityInfo(sec, PR_FALSE); + + PORT_ZFree(sec->writeBuf.buf, sec->writeBuf.space); + sec->writeBuf.buf = 0; + + memset(sec, 0, sizeof *sec); +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +int +ssl_SecureConnect(sslSocket *ss, const PRNetAddr *sa) +{ + PRFileDesc *osfd = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + + if (ss->opt.handshakeAsServer) { + ss->handshake = ssl_BeginServerHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer; + } else { + ss->handshake = ssl_BeginClientHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsClient; + } + + /* connect to server */ + rv = osfd->methods->connect(osfd, sa, ss->cTimeout); + if (rv == PR_SUCCESS) { + ss->TCPconnected = 1; + } else { + int err = PR_GetError(); + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: connect failed, errno=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, err)); + if (err == PR_IS_CONNECTED_ERROR) { + ss->TCPconnected = 1; + } + } + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: secure connect completed, rv == %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv)); + return rv; +} + +/* + * Also, in the unlikely event that the TCP pipe is full and the peer stops + * reading, the SSL3_SendAlert call in ssl_SecureClose and ssl_SecureShutdown + * may block indefinitely in blocking mode, and may fail (without retrying) + * in non-blocking mode. + */ + +int +ssl_SecureClose(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int rv; + + if (!(ss->shutdownHow & ssl_SHUTDOWN_SEND) && + ss->firstHsDone) { + + /* We don't want the final alert to be Nagle delayed. */ + if (!ss->delayDisabled) { + ssl_EnableNagleDelay(ss, PR_FALSE); + ss->delayDisabled = 1; + } + + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, close_notify); + } + rv = ssl_DefClose(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* Caller handles all locking */ +int +ssl_SecureShutdown(sslSocket *ss, int nsprHow) +{ + PRFileDesc *osfd = ss->fd->lower; + int rv; + PRIntn sslHow = nsprHow + 1; + + if ((unsigned)nsprHow > PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + if ((sslHow & ssl_SHUTDOWN_SEND) != 0 && + !(ss->shutdownHow & ssl_SHUTDOWN_SEND) && + ss->firstHsDone) { + + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_warning, close_notify); + } + + rv = osfd->methods->shutdown(osfd, nsprHow); + + ss->shutdownHow |= sslHow; + + return rv; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +static SECStatus +tls13_CheckKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection dir) +{ + PRBool keyUpdate; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + sslSequenceNumber seqNum; + sslSequenceNumber margin; + tls13KeyUpdateRequest keyUpdateRequest; + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + /* Bug 1413368: enable for DTLS */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* If both sides update at the same number, then this will cause two updates + * to happen at once. The problem is that the KeyUpdate itself consumes a + * sequence number, and that will trigger the reading side to request an + * update. + * + * If we have the writing side update first, the writer will be the one that + * drives the update. An update by the writer doesn't need a response, so + * it is more efficient overall. The margins here are pretty arbitrary, but + * having the write margin larger reduces the number of times that a + * KeyUpdate is sent by a reader. */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + if (dir == ssl_secret_read) { + spec = ss->ssl3.crSpec; + margin = spec->cipherDef->max_records / 8; + } else { + spec = ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + margin = spec->cipherDef->max_records / 4; + } + seqNum = spec->nextSeqNum; + keyUpdate = seqNum > spec->cipherDef->max_records - margin; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (!keyUpdate) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: SSL[%d]: automatic key update at %llx for %s cipher spec", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, seqNum, + (dir == ssl_secret_read) ? "read" : "write")); + keyUpdateRequest = (dir == ssl_secret_read) ? update_requested : update_not_requested; + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + ss->ssl3.keyUpdateDeferred = PR_TRUE; + ss->ssl3.deferredKeyUpdateRequest = keyUpdateRequest; + } else { + rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, keyUpdateRequest, + dir == ssl_secret_write /* buffer */); + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_SecureRecv(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags) +{ + int rv = 0; + + if (ss->shutdownHow & ssl_SHUTDOWN_RCV) { + PORT_SetError(PR_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_ERROR); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + if (flags & ~PR_MSG_PEEK) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + if (!ssl_SocketIsBlocking(ss) && !ss->opt.fdx) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + rv = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if ((rv < 0) && (PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) { + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + } + + rv = 0; + if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + return tls13_Read0RttData(ss, buf, len); + } + + /* If any of these is non-zero, the initial handshake is not done. */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + if (ss->handshake) { + rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss); + } + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + } else { + if (tls13_CheckKeyUpdate(ss, ssl_secret_read) != SECSuccess) { + rv = PR_FAILURE; + } + } + if (rv < 0) { + if (PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR && + !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + return tls13_Read0RttData(ss, buf, len); + } + return rv; + } + + if (len == 0) + return 0; + + rv = DoRecv(ss, (unsigned char *)buf, len, flags); + SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: recving %d bytes securely (errno=%d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv, PORT_GetError())); + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_SecureRead(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + return ssl_SecureRecv(ss, buf, len, 0); +} + +/* Caller holds the SSL Socket's write lock. SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss) */ +int +ssl_SecureSend(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len, int flags) +{ + int rv = 0; + PRBool zeroRtt = PR_FALSE; + + SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: sending %d bytes", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, len)); + + if (ss->shutdownHow & ssl_SHUTDOWN_SEND) { + PORT_SetError(PR_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_ERROR); + rv = PR_FAILURE; + goto done; + } + if (flags) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + rv = PR_FAILURE; + goto done; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + PORT_Assert(ss->pendingBuf.len > 0); + rv = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (rv >= 0 && ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + PORT_Assert(ss->pendingBuf.len > 0); + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv < 0) { + goto done; + } + + if (len > 0) + ss->writerThread = PR_GetCurrentThread(); + + /* Check to see if we can write even though we're not finished. + * + * Case 1: False start + * Case 2: TLS 1.3 0-RTT + */ + if (!ss->firstHsDone) { + PRBool allowEarlySend = PR_FALSE; + PRBool firstClientWrite = PR_FALSE; + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + /* The client can sometimes send before the handshake is fully + * complete. In TLS 1.2: false start; in TLS 1.3: 0-RTT. */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer && + (ss->opt.enableFalseStart || ss->opt.enable0RttData)) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + zeroRtt = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted; + allowEarlySend = ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart || zeroRtt; + firstClientWrite = ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + /* Allow the server to send 0.5 RTT data in TLS 1.3. Requesting a + * certificate implies that the server might condition its sending on + * client authentication, so force servers that do that to wait. + * + * What might not be obvious here is that this allows 0.5 RTT when doing + * PSK-based resumption. As a result, 0.5 RTT is always enabled when + * early data is accepted. + * + * This check might be more conservative than absolutely necessary. + * It's possible that allowing 0.5 RTT data when the server requests, + * but does not require client authentication is safe because we can + * expect the server to check for a client certificate properly. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + allowEarlySend = TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + if (!allowEarlySend && ss->handshake) { + rv = ssl_Do1stHandshake(ss); + } + if (firstClientWrite) { + /* Wait until after sending ClientHello and double-check 0-RTT. */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + zeroRtt = ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + } + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + } + + if (rv < 0) { + ss->writerThread = NULL; + goto done; + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + if (tls13_CheckKeyUpdate(ss, ssl_secret_write) != SECSuccess) { + rv = PR_FAILURE; + goto done; + } + } + + if (zeroRtt) { + /* There's a limit to the number of early data octets we can send. + * + * Note that taking this lock doesn't prevent the cipher specs from + * being changed out between here and when records are ultimately + * encrypted. The only effect of that is to occasionally do an + * unnecessary short write when data is identified as 0-RTT here but + * 1-RTT later. + */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + len = tls13_LimitEarlyData(ss, ssl_ct_application_data, len); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + } + + /* Check for zero length writes after we do housekeeping so we make forward + * progress. + */ + if (len == 0) { + rv = 0; + goto done; + } + PORT_Assert(buf != NULL); + if (!buf) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + rv = PR_FAILURE; + goto done; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendApplicationData(ss, buf, len, flags); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ss->writerThread = NULL; +done: + if (rv < 0) { + SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: returning %d count, error %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv, PORT_GetError())); + } else { + SSL_TRC(2, ("%d: SSL[%d]: SecureSend: returning %d count", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, rv)); + } + return rv; +} + +int +ssl_SecureWrite(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *buf, int len) +{ + return ssl_SecureSend(ss, buf, len, 0); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_RecordLayerWriteCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLRecordWriteCallback cb, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid socket for SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: DTLS socket for SSL_RecordLayerWriteCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* This needs both HS and Xmit locks because this value is checked under + * both locks. HS to disable reading from the underlying IO layer; Xmit to + * prevent writing. */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + ss->recordWriteCallback = cb; + ss->recordWriteCallbackArg = arg; + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_AlertReceivedCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: unable to find socket in SSL_AlertReceivedCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->alertReceivedCallback = cb; + ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg = arg; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_AlertSentCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAlertCallback cb, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: unable to find socket in SSL_AlertSentCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->alertSentCallback = cb; + ss->alertSentCallbackArg = arg; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_BadCertHook(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLBadCertHandler f, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSLBadCertHook", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->handleBadCert = f; + ss->badCertArg = arg; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Allow the application to pass the url or hostname into the SSL library + * so that we can do some checking on it. It will be used for the value in + * SNI extension of client hello message. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetURL(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *url) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSLSetURL", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->url) { + PORT_Free((void *)ss->url); /* CONST */ + } + + ss->url = (const char *)PORT_Strdup(url); + if (ss->url == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +/* + * Allow the application to pass the set of trust anchors + */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetTrustAnchors(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertList *certList) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + CERTDistNames *names = NULL; + + if (!certList) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetTrustAnchors", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + names = CERT_DistNamesFromCertList(certList); + if (names == NULL) { + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); + } + ss->ssl3.ca_list = names; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* +** Returns Negative number on error, zero or greater on success. +** Returns the amount of data immediately available to be read. +*/ +int +SSL_DataPending(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + int rv = 0; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (ss && ss->opt.useSecurity) { + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + rv = ss->gs.writeOffset - ss->gs.readOffset; + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + } + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_InvalidateSession(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + if (ss) { + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + } + return rv; +} + +SECItem * +SSL_GetSessionID(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECItem *item = NULL; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (ss) { + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && ss->firstHsDone && ss->sec.ci.sid) { + item = (SECItem *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SECItem)); + if (item) { + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + item->len = sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength; + item->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(item->len); + PORT_Memcpy(item->data, sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, item->len); + } + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + } + return item; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CertDBHandleSet(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) + return SECFailure; + if (!dbHandle) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->dbHandle = dbHandle; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* DO NOT USE. This function was exported in ssl.def with the wrong signature; + * this implementation exists to maintain link-time compatibility. + */ +int +SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterCertReq(sslSocket *ss, + CERTCertificate *cert, + SECKEYPrivateKey *key, + CERTCertificateList *certChain) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return -1; +} + +/* DO NOT USE. This function was exported in ssl.def with the wrong signature; + * this implementation exists to maintain link-time compatibility. + */ +int +SSL_RestartHandshakeAfterServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR); + return -1; +} + +/* See documentation in ssl.h */ +SECStatus +SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, PRErrorCode error) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_AuthCertificateComplete", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_AuthCertificateComplete(ss, error); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete(PRFileDesc *fd, SECStatus outcome, SECKEYPrivateKey *clientPrivateKey, + CERTCertificate *clientCertificate) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* There exists a codepath which exercises each lock. + * Socket is blocked whilst waiting on this callback anyway. */ + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) { + /* Application invoked callback at wrong time */ + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: socket not waiting for SSL_ClientCertCallbackComplete", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR); + rv = SECFailure; + goto cleanup; + } + + rv = ssl3_ClientCertCallbackComplete(ss, outcome, clientPrivateKey, clientCertificate); + +cleanup: + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* For more info see ssl.h */ +SECStatus +SSL_SNISocketConfigHook(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSNISocketConfig func, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SNISocketConfigHook", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->sniSocketConfig = func; + ss->sniSocketConfigArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsnce.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsnce.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..49f041c972 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsnce.c @@ -0,0 +1,2251 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This file implements the SERVER Session ID cache. + * NOTE: The contents of this file are NOT used by the client. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* Note: ssl_FreeSID() in sslnonce.c gets used for both client and server + * cache sids! + * + * About record locking among different server processes: + * + * All processes that are part of the same conceptual server (serving on + * the same address and port) MUST share a common SSL session cache. + * This code makes the content of the shared cache accessible to all + * processes on the same "server". This code works on Unix and Win32 only. + * + * We use NSPR anonymous shared memory and move data to & from shared memory. + * We must do explicit locking of the records for all reads and writes. + * The set of Cache entries are divided up into "sets" of 128 entries. + * Each set is protected by a lock. There may be one or more sets protected + * by each lock. That is, locks to sets are 1:N. + * There is one lock for the entire cert cache. + * There is one lock for the set of wrapped sym wrap keys. + * + * The anonymous shared memory is laid out as if it were declared like this: + * + * struct { + * cacheDescriptor desc; + * sidCacheLock sidCacheLocks[ numSIDCacheLocks]; + * sidCacheLock keyCacheLock; + * sidCacheLock certCacheLock; + * sidCacheSet sidCacheSets[ numSIDCacheSets ]; + * sidCacheEntry sidCacheData[ numSIDCacheEntries]; + * certCacheEntry certCacheData[numCertCacheEntries]; + * SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey keyCacheData[SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS][SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS]; + * PRUint8 keyNameSuffix[SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN] + * encKeyCacheEntry ticketEncKey; // Wrapped + * encKeyCacheEntry ticketMacKey; // Wrapped + * PRBool ticketKeysValid; + * sidCacheLock srvNameCacheLock; + * srvNameCacheEntry srvNameData[ numSrvNameCacheEntries ]; + * } cacheMemCacheData; + */ +#include "seccomon.h" + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN32) || defined(XP_OS2) + +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "base64.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "blapit.h" +#include "nss.h" /* for NSS_RegisterShutdown */ +#include "sechash.h" +#include "selfencrypt.h" +#include <stdio.h> + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + +#include <syslog.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include "unix_err.h" + +#else + +#ifdef XP_WIN32 +#include <wtypes.h> +#include "win32err.h" +#endif + +#endif +#include <sys/types.h> + +#include "nspr.h" +#include "sslmutex.h" + +/* +** Format of a cache entry in the shared memory. +*/ +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(PRTime) == 8); +struct sidCacheEntryStr { + /* 16 */ PRIPv6Addr addr; /* client's IP address */ + /* 8 */ PRTime creationTime; + /* 8 */ PRTime lastAccessTime; + /* 8 */ PRTime expirationTime; + /* 2 */ PRUint16 version; + /* 1 */ PRUint8 valid; + /* 1 */ PRUint8 sessionIDLength; + /* 32 */ PRUint8 sessionID[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; + /* 2 */ PRUint16 authType; + /* 2 */ PRUint16 authKeyBits; + /* 2 */ PRUint16 keaType; + /* 2 */ PRUint16 keaKeyBits; + /* 4 */ PRUint32 signatureScheme; + /* 4 */ PRUint32 keaGroup; + /* 92 - common header total */ + + union { + struct { + /* 2 */ ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite; + /* 52 */ ssl3SidKeys keys; /* keys, wrapped as needed. */ + + /* 4 */ PRUint32 masterWrapMech; + /* 4 */ PRInt32 certIndex; + /* 4 */ PRInt32 srvNameIndex; + /* 32 */ PRUint8 srvNameHash[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* SHA256 name hash */ + /* 2 */ PRUint16 namedCurve; +/*100 */} ssl3; + +/* force sizeof(sidCacheEntry) to be a multiple of cache line size */ +struct { + /*116 */ PRUint8 filler[116]; /* 92+116==208, a multiple of 16 */ +} forceSize; + } u; +}; +typedef struct sidCacheEntryStr sidCacheEntry; + +/* The length of this struct is supposed to be a power of 2, e.g. 4KB */ +struct certCacheEntryStr { + PRUint16 certLength; /* 2 */ + PRUint16 sessionIDLength; /* 2 */ + PRUint8 sessionID[SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES]; /* 32 */ + PRUint8 cert[SSL_MAX_CACHED_CERT_LEN]; /* 4060 */ +}; /* total 4096 */ +typedef struct certCacheEntryStr certCacheEntry; + +struct sidCacheLockStr { + PRUint32 timeStamp; + sslMutex mutex; + sslPID pid; +}; +typedef struct sidCacheLockStr sidCacheLock; + +struct sidCacheSetStr { + PRIntn next; +}; +typedef struct sidCacheSetStr sidCacheSet; + +struct encKeyCacheEntryStr { + PRUint8 bytes[512]; + PRInt32 length; +}; +typedef struct encKeyCacheEntryStr encKeyCacheEntry; + +#define SSL_MAX_DNS_HOST_NAME 1024 + +struct srvNameCacheEntryStr { + PRUint16 type; /* 2 */ + PRUint16 nameLen; /* 2 */ + PRUint8 name[SSL_MAX_DNS_HOST_NAME + 12]; /* 1034 */ + PRUint8 nameHash[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* 32 */ + /* 1072 */ +}; +typedef struct srvNameCacheEntryStr srvNameCacheEntry; + +struct cacheDescStr { + + PRUint32 cacheMemSize; + + PRUint32 numSIDCacheLocks; + PRUint32 numSIDCacheSets; + PRUint32 numSIDCacheSetsPerLock; + + PRUint32 numSIDCacheEntries; + PRUint32 sidCacheSize; + + PRUint32 numCertCacheEntries; + PRUint32 certCacheSize; + + PRUint32 numKeyCacheEntries; + PRUint32 keyCacheSize; + + PRUint32 numSrvNameCacheEntries; + PRUint32 srvNameCacheSize; + + PRUint32 ssl3Timeout; + + PRUint32 numSIDCacheLocksInitialized; + + /* These values are volatile, and are accessed through sharedCache-> */ + PRUint32 nextCertCacheEntry; /* certCacheLock protects */ + PRBool stopPolling; + PRBool everInherited; + + /* The private copies of these values are pointers into shared mem */ + /* The copies of these values in shared memory are merely offsets */ + sidCacheLock *sidCacheLocks; + sidCacheLock *keyCacheLock; + sidCacheLock *certCacheLock; + sidCacheLock *srvNameCacheLock; + sidCacheSet *sidCacheSets; + sidCacheEntry *sidCacheData; + certCacheEntry *certCacheData; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *keyCacheData; + PRUint8 *ticketKeyNameSuffix; + encKeyCacheEntry *ticketEncKey; + encKeyCacheEntry *ticketMacKey; + PRUint32 *ticketKeysValid; + srvNameCacheEntry *srvNameCacheData; + + /* Only the private copies of these pointers are valid */ + char *cacheMem; + struct cacheDescStr *sharedCache; /* shared copy of this struct */ + PRFileMap *cacheMemMap; + PRThread *poller; + PRUint32 mutexTimeout; + PRBool shared; +}; +typedef struct cacheDescStr cacheDesc; + +static cacheDesc globalCache; + +static const char envVarName[] = { SSL_ENV_VAR_NAME }; + +static PRBool isMultiProcess = PR_FALSE; + +#define DEF_SID_CACHE_ENTRIES 10000 +#define DEF_CERT_CACHE_ENTRIES 250 +#define MIN_CERT_CACHE_ENTRIES 125 /* the effective size in old releases. */ +#define DEF_KEY_CACHE_ENTRIES 250 +#define DEF_NAME_CACHE_ENTRIES 1000 + +#define SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET 128 +#define SID_ALIGNMENT 16 + +#define DEF_SSL3_TIMEOUT 86400L /* 24 hours */ +#define MAX_SSL3_TIMEOUT 86400L /* 24 hours */ +#define MIN_SSL3_TIMEOUT 5 /* seconds */ + +#if defined(AIX) || defined(LINUX) || defined(NETBSD) || defined(OPENBSD) +#define MAX_SID_CACHE_LOCKS 8 /* two FDs per lock */ +#else +#define MAX_SID_CACHE_LOCKS 256 +#endif + +#define SID_HOWMANY(val, size) (((val) + ((size)-1)) / (size)) +#define SID_ROUNDUP(val, size) ((size)*SID_HOWMANY((val), (size))) + +static sslPID myPid; +static PRUint32 ssl_max_sid_cache_locks = MAX_SID_CACHE_LOCKS; + +/* forward static function declarations */ +static PRUint32 SIDindex(cacheDesc *cache, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, PRUint8 *s, + unsigned nl); +#if defined(XP_UNIX) +static SECStatus LaunchLockPoller(cacheDesc *cache); +static SECStatus StopLockPoller(cacheDesc *cache); +#endif + +struct inheritanceStr { + PRUint32 cacheMemSize; + PRUint32 fmStrLen; +}; + +typedef struct inheritanceStr inheritance; + +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(XP_OS2) + +#define DEFAULT_CACHE_DIRECTORY "\\temp" + +#endif /* _win32 */ + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + +#define DEFAULT_CACHE_DIRECTORY "/tmp" + +#endif /* XP_UNIX */ + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* SSL Session Cache has a smaller set of functions to initialize than + * ssl does. some ssl_functions can't be initialized before NSS has been + * initialized, and the cache may be configured before NSS is initialized + * so thus the special init function */ +static SECStatus +ssl_InitSessionCache() +{ + /* currently only one function, which is itself idempotent */ + return ssl_InitializePRErrorTable(); +} + +/* This is used to set locking times for the cache. It is not used to set the + * PRTime attributes of sessions, which are driven by ss->now(). */ +static PRUint32 +ssl_CacheNow() +{ + return PR_Now() / PR_USEC_PER_SEC; +} + +static PRUint32 +LockSidCacheLock(sidCacheLock *lock, PRUint32 now) +{ + SECStatus rv = sslMutex_Lock(&lock->mutex); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return 0; + if (!now) { + now = ssl_CacheNow(); + } + + lock->timeStamp = now; + lock->pid = myPid; + return now; +} + +static SECStatus +UnlockSidCacheLock(sidCacheLock *lock) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + lock->pid = 0; + rv = sslMutex_Unlock(&lock->mutex); + return rv; +} + +/* Returns non-zero |now| or ssl_CacheNow() on success, zero on failure. */ +static PRUint32 +LockSet(cacheDesc *cache, PRUint32 set, PRUint32 now) +{ + PRUint32 lockNum = set % cache->numSIDCacheLocks; + sidCacheLock *lock = cache->sidCacheLocks + lockNum; + + return LockSidCacheLock(lock, now); +} + +static SECStatus +UnlockSet(cacheDesc *cache, PRUint32 set) +{ + PRUint32 lockNum = set % cache->numSIDCacheLocks; + sidCacheLock *lock = cache->sidCacheLocks + lockNum; + + return UnlockSidCacheLock(lock); +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* Put a certificate in the cache. Update the cert index in the sce. +*/ +static PRUint32 +CacheCert(cacheDesc *cache, CERTCertificate *cert, sidCacheEntry *sce) +{ + PRUint32 now; + certCacheEntry cce; + + if ((cert->derCert.len > SSL_MAX_CACHED_CERT_LEN) || + (cert->derCert.len <= 0) || + (cert->derCert.data == NULL)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + + cce.sessionIDLength = sce->sessionIDLength; + PORT_Memcpy(cce.sessionID, sce->sessionID, cce.sessionIDLength); + + cce.certLength = cert->derCert.len; + PORT_Memcpy(cce.cert, cert->derCert.data, cce.certLength); + + /* get lock on cert cache */ + now = LockSidCacheLock(cache->certCacheLock, 0); + if (now) { + + /* Find where to place the next cert cache entry. */ + cacheDesc *sharedCache = cache->sharedCache; + PRUint32 ndx = sharedCache->nextCertCacheEntry; + + /* write the entry */ + cache->certCacheData[ndx] = cce; + + /* remember where we put it. */ + sce->u.ssl3.certIndex = ndx; + + /* update the "next" cache entry index */ + sharedCache->nextCertCacheEntry = + (ndx + 1) % cache->numCertCacheEntries; + + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->certCacheLock); + } + return now; +} + +/* Server configuration hash tables need to account the SECITEM.type + * field as well. These functions accomplish that. */ +static PLHashNumber +Get32BitNameHash(const SECItem *name) +{ + PLHashNumber rv = SECITEM_Hash(name); + + PRUint8 *rvc = (PRUint8 *)&rv; + rvc[name->len % sizeof(rv)] ^= name->type; + + return rv; +} + +/* Put a name in the cache. Update the cert index in the sce. +*/ +static PRUint32 +CacheSrvName(cacheDesc *cache, SECItem *name, sidCacheEntry *sce) +{ + PRUint32 now; + PRUint32 ndx; + srvNameCacheEntry snce; + + if (!name || name->len <= 0 || + name->len > SSL_MAX_DNS_HOST_NAME) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return 0; + } + + snce.type = name->type; + snce.nameLen = name->len; + PORT_Memcpy(snce.name, name->data, snce.nameLen); + HASH_HashBuf(HASH_AlgSHA256, snce.nameHash, name->data, name->len); + + /* get index of the next name */ + ndx = Get32BitNameHash(name); + /* get lock on cert cache */ + now = LockSidCacheLock(cache->srvNameCacheLock, 0); + if (now) { + if (cache->numSrvNameCacheEntries > 0) { + /* Fit the index into array */ + ndx %= cache->numSrvNameCacheEntries; + /* write the entry */ + cache->srvNameCacheData[ndx] = snce; + /* remember where we put it. */ + sce->u.ssl3.srvNameIndex = ndx; + /* Copy hash into sid hash */ + PORT_Memcpy(sce->u.ssl3.srvNameHash, snce.nameHash, SHA256_LENGTH); + } + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->srvNameCacheLock); + } + return now; +} + +/* +** Convert local SID to shared memory one +*/ +static void +ConvertFromSID(sidCacheEntry *to, sslSessionID *from) +{ + to->valid = 1; + to->version = from->version; + to->addr = from->addr; + to->creationTime = from->creationTime; + to->lastAccessTime = from->lastAccessTime; + to->expirationTime = from->expirationTime; + to->authType = from->authType; + to->authKeyBits = from->authKeyBits; + to->keaType = from->keaType; + to->keaKeyBits = from->keaKeyBits; + to->keaGroup = from->keaGroup; + to->signatureScheme = from->sigScheme; + + to->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = from->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; + to->u.ssl3.keys = from->u.ssl3.keys; + to->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = from->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech; + to->sessionIDLength = from->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength; + to->u.ssl3.certIndex = -1; + to->u.ssl3.srvNameIndex = -1; + PORT_Memcpy(to->sessionID, from->u.ssl3.sessionID, + to->sessionIDLength); + to->u.ssl3.namedCurve = 0U; + if (from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { + PORT_Assert(from->namedCurve); + to->u.ssl3.namedCurve = (PRUint16)from->namedCurve->name; + } + + SSL_TRC(8, ("%d: SSL3: ConvertSID: time=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x " + "cipherSuite=%d", + myPid, to->creationTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC, + to->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], to->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], + to->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], to->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], + to->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)); +} + +/* +** Convert shared memory cache-entry to local memory based one +** This is only called from ServerSessionIDLookup(). +*/ +static sslSessionID * +ConvertToSID(sidCacheEntry *from, + certCacheEntry *pcce, + srvNameCacheEntry *psnce, + CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle) +{ + sslSessionID *to; + + to = PORT_ZNew(sslSessionID); + if (!to) { + return 0; + } + + to->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = from->sessionIDLength; + to->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = from->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; + to->u.ssl3.keys = from->u.ssl3.keys; + to->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = from->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech; + if (from->u.ssl3.srvNameIndex != -1 && psnce) { + SECItem name; + SECStatus rv; + name.type = psnce->type; + name.len = psnce->nameLen; + name.data = psnce->name; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &to->u.ssl3.srvName, &name); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + PORT_Memcpy(to->u.ssl3.sessionID, from->sessionID, from->sessionIDLength); + + to->urlSvrName = NULL; + + to->u.ssl3.masterModuleID = (SECMODModuleID)-1; /* invalid value */ + to->u.ssl3.masterSlotID = (CK_SLOT_ID)-1; /* invalid value */ + to->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex = 0; + to->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries = 0; + to->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_FALSE; + + to->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = (SECMODModuleID)-1; /* invalid value */ + to->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = (CK_SLOT_ID)-1; /* invalid value */ + to->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = 0; + to->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_FALSE; + + if (from->u.ssl3.certIndex != -1 && pcce) { + SECItem derCert; + + derCert.len = pcce->certLength; + derCert.data = pcce->cert; + + to->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(dbHandle, &derCert, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + if (to->peerCert == NULL) + goto loser; + } + if (from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdsa || + from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa || + from->authType == ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa) { + to->namedCurve = + ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)from->u.ssl3.namedCurve); + } + + to->version = from->version; + to->creationTime = from->creationTime; + to->lastAccessTime = from->lastAccessTime; + to->expirationTime = from->expirationTime; + to->cached = in_server_cache; + to->addr = from->addr; + to->references = 1; + to->authType = from->authType; + to->authKeyBits = from->authKeyBits; + to->keaType = from->keaType; + to->keaKeyBits = from->keaKeyBits; + to->keaGroup = from->keaGroup; + to->sigScheme = from->signatureScheme; + + return to; + +loser: + if (to) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&to->u.ssl3.srvName, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Free(to); + } + return NULL; +} + +/* +** Perform some mumbo jumbo on the ip-address and the session-id value to +** compute a hash value. +*/ +static PRUint32 +SIDindex(cacheDesc *cache, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, PRUint8 *s, unsigned nl) +{ + PRUint32 rv; + PRUint32 x[8]; + + memset(x, 0, sizeof x); + if (nl > sizeof x) + nl = sizeof x; + memcpy(x, s, nl); + + rv = (addr->pr_s6_addr32[0] ^ addr->pr_s6_addr32[1] ^ + addr->pr_s6_addr32[2] ^ addr->pr_s6_addr32[3] ^ + x[0] ^ x[1] ^ x[2] ^ x[3] ^ x[4] ^ x[5] ^ x[6] ^ x[7]) % + cache->numSIDCacheSets; + return rv; +} + +/* +** Look something up in the cache. This will invalidate old entries +** in the process. Caller has locked the cache set! +** Returns PR_TRUE if found a valid match. PR_FALSE otherwise. +*/ +static sidCacheEntry * +FindSID(cacheDesc *cache, PRUint32 setNum, PRUint32 now, + const PRIPv6Addr *addr, unsigned char *sessionID, + unsigned sessionIDLength) +{ + PRUint32 ndx = cache->sidCacheSets[setNum].next; + int i; + + sidCacheEntry *set = cache->sidCacheData + + (setNum * SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET); + + for (i = SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET; i > 0; --i) { + sidCacheEntry *sce; + + ndx = (ndx - 1) % SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET; + sce = set + ndx; + + if (!sce->valid) + continue; + + if (now > sce->expirationTime) { + /* SessionID has timed out. Invalidate the entry. */ + SSL_TRC(7, ("%d: timed out sid entry addr=%08x%08x%08x%08x now=%x " + "time+=%x", + myPid, sce->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], + sce->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], sce->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], + sce->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], now, + sce->expirationTime)); + sce->valid = 0; + continue; + } + + /* + ** Next, examine specific session-id/addr data to see if the cache + ** entry matches our addr+session-id value + */ + if (sessionIDLength == sce->sessionIDLength && + !memcmp(&sce->addr, addr, sizeof(PRIPv6Addr)) && + !memcmp(sce->sessionID, sessionID, sessionIDLength)) { + /* Found it */ + return sce; + } + } + + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SESSION_NOT_FOUND); + return NULL; +} + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* This is the primary function for finding entries in the server's sid cache. + * Although it is static, this function is called via the global function + * pointer ssl_sid_lookup. + * + * sslNow is the time that the calling socket understands, which might be + * different than what the cache uses to maintain its locks. + */ +static sslSessionID * +ServerSessionIDLookup(PRTime sslNow, const PRIPv6Addr *addr, + unsigned char *sessionID, + unsigned int sessionIDLength, + CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle) +{ + sslSessionID *sid = 0; + sidCacheEntry *psce; + certCacheEntry *pcce = 0; + srvNameCacheEntry *psnce = 0; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + PRUint32 now; + PRUint32 set; + PRInt32 cndx; + sidCacheEntry sce; + certCacheEntry cce; + srvNameCacheEntry snce; + + set = SIDindex(cache, addr, sessionID, sessionIDLength); + now = LockSet(cache, set, 0); + if (!now) + return NULL; + + psce = FindSID(cache, set, now, addr, sessionID, sessionIDLength); + if (psce) { + if ((cndx = psce->u.ssl3.certIndex) != -1) { + PRUint32 gotLock = LockSidCacheLock(cache->certCacheLock, now); + if (gotLock) { + pcce = &cache->certCacheData[cndx]; + + /* See if the cert's session ID matches the sce cache. */ + if ((pcce->sessionIDLength == psce->sessionIDLength) && + !PORT_Memcmp(pcce->sessionID, psce->sessionID, + pcce->sessionIDLength)) { + cce = *pcce; + } else { + /* The cert doesen't match the SID cache entry, + ** so invalidate the SID cache entry. + */ + psce->valid = 0; + psce = 0; + pcce = 0; + } + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->certCacheLock); + } else { + /* what the ??. Didn't get the cert cache lock. + ** Don't invalidate the SID cache entry, but don't find it. + */ + PORT_AssertNotReached("Didn't get cert Cache Lock!"); + psce = 0; + pcce = 0; + } + } + if (psce && ((cndx = psce->u.ssl3.srvNameIndex) != -1)) { + PRUint32 gotLock = LockSidCacheLock(cache->srvNameCacheLock, + now); + if (gotLock) { + psnce = &cache->srvNameCacheData[cndx]; + + if (!PORT_Memcmp(psnce->nameHash, psce->u.ssl3.srvNameHash, + SHA256_LENGTH)) { + snce = *psnce; + } else { + /* The name doesen't match the SID cache entry, + ** so invalidate the SID cache entry. + */ + psce->valid = 0; + psce = 0; + psnce = 0; + } + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->srvNameCacheLock); + } else { + /* what the ??. Didn't get the cert cache lock. + ** Don't invalidate the SID cache entry, but don't find it. + */ + PORT_AssertNotReached("Didn't get name Cache Lock!"); + psce = 0; + psnce = 0; + } + } + if (psce) { + psce->lastAccessTime = sslNow; + sce = *psce; /* grab a copy while holding the lock */ + } + } + UnlockSet(cache, set); + if (psce) { + /* sce conains a copy of the cache entry. + ** Convert shared memory format to local format + */ + sid = ConvertToSID(&sce, pcce ? &cce : 0, psnce ? &snce : 0, dbHandle); + } + return sid; +} + +/* +** Place a sid into the cache, if it isn't already there. +*/ +void +ssl_ServerCacheSessionID(sslSessionID *sid, PRTime creationTime) +{ + PORT_Assert(sid); + + sidCacheEntry sce; + PRUint32 now = 0; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + + if (sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength == 0) { + return; + } + + if (sid->cached == never_cached || sid->cached == invalid_cache) { + PRUint32 set; + SECItem *name; + + PORT_Assert(sid->creationTime != 0); + if (!sid->creationTime) + sid->lastAccessTime = sid->creationTime = creationTime; + /* override caller's expiration time, which uses client timeout + * duration, not server timeout duration. + */ + sid->expirationTime = + sid->creationTime + cache->ssl3Timeout * PR_USEC_PER_SEC; + SSL_TRC(8, ("%d: SSL: CacheMT: cached=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x time=%x " + "cipherSuite=%d", + myPid, sid->cached, + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], + sid->creationTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC, + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)); + PRINT_BUF(8, (0, "sessionID:", sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength)); + + ConvertFromSID(&sce, sid); + + name = &sid->u.ssl3.srvName; + if (name->len && name->data) { + now = CacheSrvName(cache, name, &sce); + } + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + now = CacheCert(cache, sid->peerCert, &sce); + } + + set = SIDindex(cache, &sce.addr, sce.sessionID, sce.sessionIDLength); + now = LockSet(cache, set, now); + if (now) { + PRUint32 next = cache->sidCacheSets[set].next; + PRUint32 ndx = set * SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET + next; + + /* Write out new cache entry */ + cache->sidCacheData[ndx] = sce; + + cache->sidCacheSets[set].next = + (next + 1) % SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET; + + UnlockSet(cache, set); + sid->cached = in_server_cache; + } + } +} + +/* +** Although this is static, it is called from ssl via global function pointer +** ssl_sid_uncache. This invalidates the referenced cache entry. +*/ +void +ssl_ServerUncacheSessionID(sslSessionID *sid) +{ + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + PRUint8 *sessionID; + unsigned int sessionIDLength; + PRErrorCode err; + PRUint32 set; + PRUint32 now; + sidCacheEntry *psce; + + if (sid == NULL) + return; + + /* Uncaching a SID should never change the error code. + ** So save it here and restore it before exiting. + */ + err = PR_GetError(); + + sessionID = sid->u.ssl3.sessionID; + sessionIDLength = sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength; + SSL_TRC(8, ("%d: SSL3: UncacheMT: valid=%d addr=0x%08x%08x%08x%08x time=%x " + "cipherSuite=%d", + myPid, sid->cached, + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[0], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[1], + sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[2], sid->addr.pr_s6_addr32[3], + sid->creationTime / PR_USEC_PER_SEC, + sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)); + PRINT_BUF(8, (0, "sessionID:", sessionID, sessionIDLength)); + set = SIDindex(cache, &sid->addr, sessionID, sessionIDLength); + now = LockSet(cache, set, 0); + if (now) { + psce = FindSID(cache, set, now, &sid->addr, sessionID, sessionIDLength); + if (psce) { + psce->valid = 0; + } + UnlockSet(cache, set); + } + sid->cached = invalid_cache; + PORT_SetError(err); +} + +#ifdef XP_OS2 + +#define INCL_DOSPROCESS +#include <os2.h> + +long +gettid(void) +{ + PTIB ptib; + PPIB ppib; + DosGetInfoBlocks(&ptib, &ppib); + return ((long)ptib->tib_ordinal); /* thread id */ +} +#endif + +static void +CloseCache(cacheDesc *cache) +{ + int locks_initialized = cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized; + + if (cache->cacheMem) { + if (cache->sharedCache) { + sidCacheLock *pLock = cache->sidCacheLocks; + for (; locks_initialized > 0; --locks_initialized, ++pLock) { + /* If everInherited is true, this shared cache was (and may + ** still be) in use by multiple processes. We do not wish to + ** destroy the mutexes while they are still in use, but we do + ** want to free mutex resources associated with this process. + */ + sslMutex_Destroy(&pLock->mutex, + cache->sharedCache->everInherited); + } + } + if (cache->shared) { + PR_MemUnmap(cache->cacheMem, cache->cacheMemSize); + } else { + PORT_Free(cache->cacheMem); + } + cache->cacheMem = NULL; + } + if (cache->cacheMemMap) { + PR_CloseFileMap(cache->cacheMemMap); + cache->cacheMemMap = NULL; + } + memset(cache, 0, sizeof *cache); +} + +static SECStatus +InitCache(cacheDesc *cache, int maxCacheEntries, int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries, PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, PRBool shared) +{ + ptrdiff_t ptr; + sidCacheLock *pLock; + char *cacheMem; + PRFileMap *cacheMemMap; + char *cfn = NULL; /* cache file name */ + int locks_initialized = 0; + int locks_to_initialize = 0; + PRUint32 init_time; + + if ((!cache) || (maxCacheEntries < 0) || (!directory)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (cache->cacheMem) { + /* Already done */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* make sure loser can clean up properly */ + cache->shared = shared; + cache->cacheMem = cacheMem = NULL; + cache->cacheMemMap = cacheMemMap = NULL; + cache->sharedCache = (cacheDesc *)0; + + cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized = 0; + cache->nextCertCacheEntry = 0; + cache->stopPolling = PR_FALSE; + cache->everInherited = PR_FALSE; + cache->poller = NULL; + cache->mutexTimeout = 0; + + cache->numSIDCacheEntries = maxCacheEntries ? maxCacheEntries + : DEF_SID_CACHE_ENTRIES; + cache->numSIDCacheSets = + SID_HOWMANY(cache->numSIDCacheEntries, SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET); + + cache->numSIDCacheEntries = + cache->numSIDCacheSets * SID_CACHE_ENTRIES_PER_SET; + + cache->numSIDCacheLocks = + PR_MIN(cache->numSIDCacheSets, ssl_max_sid_cache_locks); + + cache->numSIDCacheSetsPerLock = + SID_HOWMANY(cache->numSIDCacheSets, cache->numSIDCacheLocks); + + cache->numCertCacheEntries = (maxCertCacheEntries > 0) ? maxCertCacheEntries + : 0; + cache->numSrvNameCacheEntries = (maxSrvNameCacheEntries >= 0) ? maxSrvNameCacheEntries + : DEF_NAME_CACHE_ENTRIES; + + /* compute size of shared memory, and offsets of all pointers */ + ptr = 0; + cache->cacheMem = (char *)ptr; + ptr += SID_ROUNDUP(sizeof(cacheDesc), SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->sidCacheLocks = (sidCacheLock *)ptr; + cache->keyCacheLock = cache->sidCacheLocks + cache->numSIDCacheLocks; + cache->certCacheLock = cache->keyCacheLock + 1; + cache->srvNameCacheLock = cache->certCacheLock + 1; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->srvNameCacheLock + 1); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->sidCacheSets = (sidCacheSet *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->sidCacheSets + cache->numSIDCacheSets); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->sidCacheData = (sidCacheEntry *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->sidCacheData + cache->numSIDCacheEntries); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->certCacheData = (certCacheEntry *)ptr; + cache->sidCacheSize = + (char *)cache->certCacheData - (char *)cache->sidCacheData; + + if (cache->numCertCacheEntries < MIN_CERT_CACHE_ENTRIES) { + /* This is really a poor way to computer this! */ + cache->numCertCacheEntries = cache->sidCacheSize / sizeof(certCacheEntry); + if (cache->numCertCacheEntries < MIN_CERT_CACHE_ENTRIES) + cache->numCertCacheEntries = MIN_CERT_CACHE_ENTRIES; + } + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->certCacheData + cache->numCertCacheEntries); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->keyCacheData = (SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *)ptr; + cache->certCacheSize = + (char *)cache->keyCacheData - (char *)cache->certCacheData; + + cache->numKeyCacheEntries = SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS * SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->keyCacheData + cache->numKeyCacheEntries); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->keyCacheSize = (char *)ptr - (char *)cache->keyCacheData; + + cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix = (PRUint8 *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix + + SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->ticketEncKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->ticketEncKey + 1); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->ticketMacKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->ticketMacKey + 1); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->ticketKeysValid = (PRUint32 *)ptr; + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->ticketKeysValid + 1); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->srvNameCacheData = (srvNameCacheEntry *)ptr; + cache->srvNameCacheSize = + cache->numSrvNameCacheEntries * sizeof(srvNameCacheEntry); + ptr = (ptrdiff_t)(cache->srvNameCacheData + cache->numSrvNameCacheEntries); + ptr = SID_ROUNDUP(ptr, SID_ALIGNMENT); + + cache->cacheMemSize = ptr; + + if (ssl3_timeout) { + if (ssl3_timeout > MAX_SSL3_TIMEOUT) { + ssl3_timeout = MAX_SSL3_TIMEOUT; + } + if (ssl3_timeout < MIN_SSL3_TIMEOUT) { + ssl3_timeout = MIN_SSL3_TIMEOUT; + } + cache->ssl3Timeout = ssl3_timeout; + } else { + cache->ssl3Timeout = DEF_SSL3_TIMEOUT; + } + + if (shared) { +/* Create file names */ +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + /* there's some confusion here about whether PR_OpenAnonFileMap wants + ** a directory name or a file name for its first argument. + cfn = PR_smprintf("%s/.sslsvrcache.%d", directory, myPid); + */ + cfn = PR_smprintf("%s", directory); +#elif defined(XP_WIN32) + cfn = PR_smprintf("%s/svrcache_%d_%x.ssl", directory, myPid, + GetCurrentThreadId()); +#elif defined(XP_OS2) + cfn = PR_smprintf("%s/svrcache_%d_%x.ssl", directory, myPid, + gettid()); +#else +#error "Don't know how to create file name for this platform!" +#endif + if (!cfn) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Create cache */ + cacheMemMap = PR_OpenAnonFileMap(cfn, cache->cacheMemSize, + PR_PROT_READWRITE); + + PR_smprintf_free(cfn); + if (!cacheMemMap) { + goto loser; + } + + cacheMem = PR_MemMap(cacheMemMap, 0, cache->cacheMemSize); + } else { + cacheMem = PORT_Alloc(cache->cacheMemSize); + } + + if (!cacheMem) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Initialize shared memory. This may not be necessary on all platforms */ + memset(cacheMem, 0, cache->cacheMemSize); + + /* Copy cache descriptor header into shared memory */ + memcpy(cacheMem, cache, sizeof *cache); + + /* save private copies of these values */ + cache->cacheMemMap = cacheMemMap; + cache->cacheMem = cacheMem; + cache->sharedCache = (cacheDesc *)cacheMem; + + /* Fix pointers in our private copy of cache descriptor to point to + ** spaces in shared memory + */ + cache->sidCacheLocks = (sidCacheLock *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheLocks); + cache->keyCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->keyCacheLock); + cache->certCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->certCacheLock); + cache->srvNameCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->srvNameCacheLock); + cache->sidCacheSets = (sidCacheSet *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheSets); + cache->sidCacheData = (sidCacheEntry *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheData); + cache->certCacheData = (certCacheEntry *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->certCacheData); + cache->keyCacheData = (SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->keyCacheData); + cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix = (PRUint8 *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix); + cache->ticketEncKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketEncKey); + cache->ticketMacKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketMacKey); + cache->ticketKeysValid = (PRUint32 *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketKeysValid); + cache->srvNameCacheData = (srvNameCacheEntry *)(cache->cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->srvNameCacheData); + + /* initialize the locks */ + init_time = ssl_CacheNow(); + pLock = cache->sidCacheLocks; + for (locks_to_initialize = cache->numSIDCacheLocks + 3; + locks_initialized < locks_to_initialize; + ++locks_initialized, ++pLock) { + + SECStatus err = sslMutex_Init(&pLock->mutex, shared); + if (err) { + cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized = locks_initialized; + goto loser; + } + pLock->timeStamp = init_time; + pLock->pid = 0; + } + cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized = locks_initialized; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + CloseCache(cache); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +PRUint32 +SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks(void) +{ + return ssl_max_sid_cache_locks + 2; + /* The extra two are the cert cache lock and the key cache lock. */ +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks) +{ + /* Minimum is 1 sid cache lock, 1 cert cache lock and 1 key cache lock. + ** We'd like to test for a maximum value, but not all platforms' header + ** files provide a symbol or function or other means of determining + ** the maximum, other than trial and error. + */ + if (maxLocks < 3) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_max_sid_cache_locks = maxLocks - 2; + /* The extra two are the cert cache lock and the key cache lock. */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(sidCacheEntry) % 16 == 0); +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(certCacheEntry) == 4096); +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(srvNameCacheEntry) == 1072); + +static SECStatus +ssl_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstanceWithOpt(cacheDesc *cache, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, + PRBool shared, + int maxCacheEntries, + int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl_InitSessionCache(); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + myPid = SSL_GETPID(); + if (!directory) { + directory = DEFAULT_CACHE_DIRECTORY; + } + rv = InitCache(cache, maxCacheEntries, maxCertCacheEntries, + maxSrvNameCacheEntries, ssl3_timeout, directory, shared); + if (rv) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_sid_lookup = ServerSessionIDLookup; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstance(cacheDesc *cache, + int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, PRBool shared) +{ + return ssl_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstanceWithOpt(cache, + ssl3_timeout, + directory, + shared, + maxCacheEntries, + -1, -1); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory) +{ + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_FALSE); + return SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstance(&globalCache, + maxCacheEntries, ssl2_timeout, ssl3_timeout, directory, PR_FALSE); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCacheInstance(cacheDesc *cache) +{ + CloseCache(cache); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCache(void) +{ +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + /* Stop the thread that polls cache for expired locks on Unix */ + StopLockPoller(&globalCache); +#endif + SSL3_ShutdownServerCache(); + return SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCacheInstance(&globalCache); +} + +/* Use this function, instead of SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache, + * if the cache will be shared by multiple processes. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl_ConfigMPServerSIDCacheWithOpt(PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, + int maxCacheEntries, + int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries) +{ + char *envValue; + char *inhValue; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + PRUint32 fmStrLen; + SECStatus result; + PRStatus prStatus; + SECStatus putEnvFailed; + inheritance inherit; + char fmString[PR_FILEMAP_STRING_BUFSIZE]; + + isMultiProcess = PR_TRUE; + result = ssl_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstanceWithOpt(cache, + ssl3_timeout, directory, PR_TRUE, + maxCacheEntries, maxCacheEntries, maxSrvNameCacheEntries); + if (result != SECSuccess) + return result; + + prStatus = PR_ExportFileMapAsString(cache->cacheMemMap, + sizeof fmString, fmString); + if ((prStatus != PR_SUCCESS) || !(fmStrLen = strlen(fmString))) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + inherit.cacheMemSize = cache->cacheMemSize; + inherit.fmStrLen = fmStrLen; + + inhValue = BTOA_DataToAscii((unsigned char *)&inherit, sizeof inherit); + if (!inhValue || !strlen(inhValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + envValue = PR_smprintf("%s,%s", inhValue, fmString); + if (!envValue || !strlen(envValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Free(inhValue); + + putEnvFailed = (SECStatus)NSS_PutEnv(envVarName, envValue); + PR_smprintf_free(envValue); + if (putEnvFailed) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + result = SECFailure; + } + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + /* Launch thread to poll cache for expired locks on Unix */ + LaunchLockPoller(cache); +#endif + return result; +} + +/* Use this function, instead of SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache, + * if the cache will be shared by multiple processes. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory) +{ + return ssl_ConfigMPServerSIDCacheWithOpt(ssl3_timeout, + directory, + maxCacheEntries, + -1, -1); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt( + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory, + int maxCacheEntries, + int maxCertCacheEntries, + int maxSrvNameCacheEntries, + PRBool enableMPCache) +{ + if (!enableMPCache) { + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_FALSE); + return ssl_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheInstanceWithOpt(&globalCache, + ssl3_timeout, directory, PR_FALSE, + maxCacheEntries, maxCertCacheEntries, maxSrvNameCacheEntries); + } else { + return ssl_ConfigMPServerSIDCacheWithOpt(ssl3_timeout, directory, + maxCacheEntries, maxCertCacheEntries, maxSrvNameCacheEntries); + } +} + +SECStatus +SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCacheInstance(cacheDesc *cache, const char *envString) +{ + unsigned char *decoString = NULL; + char *fmString = NULL; + char *myEnvString = NULL; + unsigned int decoLen; + inheritance inherit; + cacheDesc my; +#ifdef WINNT + sidCacheLock *newLocks; + int locks_initialized = 0; + int locks_to_initialize = 0; +#endif + SECStatus status = ssl_InitSessionCache(); + + if (status != SECSuccess) { + return status; + } + + myPid = SSL_GETPID(); + + /* If this child was created by fork(), and not by exec() on unix, + ** then isMultiProcess will already be set. + ** If not, we'll set it below. + */ + if (isMultiProcess) { + if (cache && cache->sharedCache) { + cache->sharedCache->everInherited = PR_TRUE; + } + return SECSuccess; /* already done. */ + } + + ssl_InitSessionCacheLocks(PR_FALSE); + + ssl_sid_lookup = ServerSessionIDLookup; + + if (!envString) { + envString = PR_GetEnvSecure(envVarName); + if (!envString) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + myEnvString = PORT_Strdup(envString); + if (!myEnvString) + return SECFailure; + fmString = strchr(myEnvString, ','); + if (!fmString) + goto loser; + *fmString++ = 0; + + decoString = ATOB_AsciiToData(myEnvString, &decoLen); + if (!decoString) { + goto loser; + } + if (decoLen != sizeof inherit) { + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(&inherit, decoString, sizeof inherit); + + if (strlen(fmString) != inherit.fmStrLen) { + goto loser; + } + + memset(cache, 0, sizeof *cache); + cache->cacheMemSize = inherit.cacheMemSize; + + /* Create cache */ + cache->cacheMemMap = PR_ImportFileMapFromString(fmString); + if (!cache->cacheMemMap) { + goto loser; + } + cache->cacheMem = PR_MemMap(cache->cacheMemMap, 0, cache->cacheMemSize); + if (!cache->cacheMem) { + goto loser; + } + cache->sharedCache = (cacheDesc *)cache->cacheMem; + + if (cache->sharedCache->cacheMemSize != cache->cacheMemSize) { + goto loser; + } + + /* We're now going to overwrite the local cache instance with the + ** shared copy of the cache struct, then update several values in + ** the local cache using the values for cache->cacheMemMap and + ** cache->cacheMem computed just above. So, we copy cache into + ** the automatic variable "my", to preserve the variables while + ** cache is overwritten. + */ + my = *cache; /* save values computed above. */ + memcpy(cache, cache->sharedCache, sizeof *cache); /* overwrite */ + + /* Fix pointers in our private copy of cache descriptor to point to + ** spaces in shared memory, whose address is now in "my". + */ + cache->sidCacheLocks = (sidCacheLock *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheLocks); + cache->keyCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->keyCacheLock); + cache->certCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->certCacheLock); + cache->srvNameCacheLock = (sidCacheLock *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->srvNameCacheLock); + cache->sidCacheSets = (sidCacheSet *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheSets); + cache->sidCacheData = (sidCacheEntry *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->sidCacheData); + cache->certCacheData = (certCacheEntry *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->certCacheData); + cache->keyCacheData = (SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->keyCacheData); + cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix = (PRUint8 *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix); + cache->ticketEncKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketEncKey); + cache->ticketMacKey = (encKeyCacheEntry *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketMacKey); + cache->ticketKeysValid = (PRUint32 *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->ticketKeysValid); + cache->srvNameCacheData = (srvNameCacheEntry *)(my.cacheMem + (ptrdiff_t)cache->srvNameCacheData); + + cache->cacheMemMap = my.cacheMemMap; + cache->cacheMem = my.cacheMem; + cache->sharedCache = (cacheDesc *)cache->cacheMem; + +#ifdef WINNT + /* On Windows NT we need to "fix" the sidCacheLocks here to support fibers + ** When NT fibers are used in a multi-process server, a second level of + ** locking is needed to prevent a deadlock, in case a fiber acquires the + ** cross-process mutex, yields, and another fiber is later scheduled on + ** the same native thread and tries to acquire the cross-process mutex. + ** We do this by using a PRLock in the sslMutex. However, it is stored in + ** shared memory as part of sidCacheLocks, and we don't want to overwrite + ** the PRLock of the parent process. So we need to make new, private + ** copies of sidCacheLocks before modifying the sslMutex with our own + ** PRLock + */ + + /* note from jpierre : this should be free'd in child processes when + ** a function is added to delete the SSL session cache in the future. + */ + locks_to_initialize = cache->numSIDCacheLocks + 3; + newLocks = PORT_NewArray(sidCacheLock, locks_to_initialize); + if (!newLocks) + goto loser; + /* copy the old locks */ + memcpy(newLocks, cache->sidCacheLocks, + locks_to_initialize * sizeof(sidCacheLock)); + cache->sidCacheLocks = newLocks; + /* fix the locks */ + for (; locks_initialized < locks_to_initialize; ++locks_initialized) { + /* now, make a local PRLock in this sslMutex for this child process */ + SECStatus err; + err = sslMutex_2LevelInit(&newLocks[locks_initialized].mutex); + if (err != SECSuccess) { + cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized = locks_initialized; + goto loser; + } + } + cache->numSIDCacheLocksInitialized = locks_initialized; + + /* also fix the key and cert cache which use the last 2 lock entries */ + cache->keyCacheLock = cache->sidCacheLocks + cache->numSIDCacheLocks; + cache->certCacheLock = cache->keyCacheLock + 1; + cache->srvNameCacheLock = cache->certCacheLock + 1; +#endif + + PORT_Free(myEnvString); + PORT_Free(decoString); + + /* mark that we have inherited this. */ + cache->sharedCache->everInherited = PR_TRUE; + isMultiProcess = PR_TRUE; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_Free(myEnvString); + if (decoString) + PORT_Free(decoString); + CloseCache(cache); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char *envString) +{ + return SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCacheInstance(&globalCache, envString); +} + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) + +#define SID_LOCK_EXPIRATION_TIMEOUT 30 /* seconds */ + +static void +LockPoller(void *arg) +{ + cacheDesc *cache = (cacheDesc *)arg; + cacheDesc *sharedCache = cache->sharedCache; + sidCacheLock *pLock; + PRIntervalTime timeout; + PRUint32 now; + PRUint32 then; + int locks_polled = 0; + int locks_to_poll = cache->numSIDCacheLocks + 2; + PRUint32 expiration = cache->mutexTimeout; + + timeout = PR_SecondsToInterval(expiration); + while (!sharedCache->stopPolling) { + PR_Sleep(timeout); + if (sharedCache->stopPolling) + break; + + now = ssl_CacheNow(); + then = now - expiration; + for (pLock = cache->sidCacheLocks, locks_polled = 0; + locks_to_poll > locks_polled && !sharedCache->stopPolling; + ++locks_polled, ++pLock) { + pid_t pid; + + if (pLock->timeStamp < then && + pLock->timeStamp != 0 && + (pid = pLock->pid) != 0) { + + /* maybe we should try the lock? */ + int result = kill(pid, 0); + if (result < 0 && errno == ESRCH) { + SECStatus rv; + /* No process exists by that pid any more. + ** Treat this mutex as abandoned. + */ + pLock->timeStamp = now; + pLock->pid = 0; + rv = sslMutex_Unlock(&pLock->mutex); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Now what? */ + } + } + } + } /* end of loop over locks */ + } /* end of entire polling loop */ +} + +/* Launch thread to poll cache for expired locks */ +static SECStatus +LaunchLockPoller(cacheDesc *cache) +{ + const char *timeoutString; + PRThread *pollerThread; + + cache->mutexTimeout = SID_LOCK_EXPIRATION_TIMEOUT; + timeoutString = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_SSL_SERVER_CACHE_MUTEX_TIMEOUT"); + if (timeoutString) { + long newTime = strtol(timeoutString, 0, 0); + if (newTime == 0) + return SECSuccess; /* application doesn't want poller thread */ + if (newTime > 0) + cache->mutexTimeout = (PRUint32)newTime; + /* if error (newTime < 0) ignore it and use default */ + } + + pollerThread = + PR_CreateThread(PR_USER_THREAD, LockPoller, cache, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, + PR_GLOBAL_THREAD, PR_JOINABLE_THREAD, 0); + if (!pollerThread) { + return SECFailure; + } + cache->poller = pollerThread; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Stop the thread that polls cache for expired locks */ +static SECStatus +StopLockPoller(cacheDesc *cache) +{ + if (!cache->poller) { + return SECSuccess; + } + cache->sharedCache->stopPolling = PR_TRUE; + if (PR_Interrupt(cache->poller) != PR_SUCCESS) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (PR_JoinThread(cache->poller) != PR_SUCCESS) { + return SECFailure; + } + cache->poller = NULL; + return SECSuccess; +} +#endif + +/************************************************************************ + * Code dealing with shared wrapped symmetric wrapping keys below * + ************************************************************************/ + +/* The asymmetric key we use for wrapping the self-encryption keys. This is a + * global structure that can be initialized without a socket. Access is + * synchronized on the reader-writer lock. This is setup either by calling + * SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair() or by configuring a certificate of the + * ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt type. */ +static struct { + PRCallOnceType setup; + PRRWLock *lock; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey; + PRBool configured; +} ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair; + +/* The symmetric self-encryption keys. This requires a socket to construct + * and requires that the global structure be initialized before use. + */ +static sslSelfEncryptKeys ssl_self_encrypt_keys; + +/* Externalize the self encrypt keys. Purely used for testing. */ +sslSelfEncryptKeys * +ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeysInt() +{ + return &ssl_self_encrypt_keys; +} + +static void +ssl_CleanupSelfEncryptKeyPair() +{ + if (ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey) { + PORT_Assert(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey); + } +} + +void +ssl_ResetSelfEncryptKeys() +{ + if (ssl_self_encrypt_keys.encKey) { + PORT_Assert(ssl_self_encrypt_keys.macKey); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ssl_self_encrypt_keys.encKey); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ssl_self_encrypt_keys.macKey); + } + PORT_Memset(&ssl_self_encrypt_keys, 0, + sizeof(ssl_self_encrypt_keys)); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptShutdown(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + ssl_CleanupSelfEncryptKeyPair(); + PR_DestroyRWLock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + PORT_Memset(&ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair, 0, + sizeof(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair)); + + ssl_ResetSelfEncryptKeys(); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +ssl_SelfEncryptSetup(void) +{ + SECStatus rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl_SelfEncryptShutdown, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock = PR_NewRWLock(PR_RWLOCK_RANK_NONE, NULL); + if (!ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Configure a self encryption key pair. |explicitConfig| is set to true for + * calls to SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair(), false for implicit configuration. + * This assumes that the setup has been run. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_SetSelfEncryptKeyPair(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + PRBool explicitConfig) +{ + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKeyCopy, *oldPubKey; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKeyCopy, *oldPrivKey; + + PORT_Assert(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + pubKeyCopy = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey); + privKeyCopy = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(privKey); + + if (!pubKeyCopy || !privKeyCopy) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKeyCopy); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKeyCopy); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + + PR_RWLock_Wlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + oldPubKey = ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey; + oldPrivKey = ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey; + ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey = pubKeyCopy; + ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey = privKeyCopy; + ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.configured = explicitConfig; + PR_RWLock_Unlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + + if (oldPubKey) { + PORT_Assert(oldPrivKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(oldPubKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(oldPrivKey); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This is really the self-encryption keys but it has the + * wrong name for historical API stability reasons. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) +{ + if (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(pubKey) != rsaKey || + SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(privKey) != rsaKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PR_SUCCESS != PR_CallOnce(&ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.setup, + &ssl_SelfEncryptSetup)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return ssl_SetSelfEncryptKeyPair(pubKey, privKey, PR_TRUE); +} + +/* When configuring a server cert, we should save the RSA key in case it is + * needed for self-encryption. This saves the latest copy, unless there has + * been an explicit call to SSL_SetSessionTicketKeyPair(). */ +SECStatus +ssl_MaybeSetSelfEncryptKeyPair(const sslKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + PRBool configured; + + if (PR_SUCCESS != PR_CallOnce(&ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.setup, + &ssl_SelfEncryptSetup)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PR_RWLock_Rlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + configured = ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.configured; + PR_RWLock_Unlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + if (configured) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return ssl_SetSelfEncryptKeyPair(keyPair->pubKey, + keyPair->privKey, PR_FALSE); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeyPair(SECKEYPublicKey **pubKey, + SECKEYPrivateKey **privKey) +{ + if (PR_SUCCESS != PR_CallOnce(&ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.setup, + &ssl_SelfEncryptSetup)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKeyCopy = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKeyCopy = NULL; + PRBool noKey = PR_FALSE; + + PR_RWLock_Rlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + if (ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey && ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey) { + pubKeyCopy = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.pubKey); + privKeyCopy = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.privKey); + } else { + noKey = PR_TRUE; + } + PR_RWLock_Unlock(ssl_self_encrypt_key_pair.lock); + + if (noKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!pubKeyCopy || !privKeyCopy) { + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKeyCopy); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privKeyCopy); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + + *pubKey = pubKeyCopy; + *privKey = privKeyCopy; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(void *pwArg, PRUint8 *keyName, + PK11SymKey **aesKey, PK11SymKey **macKey); + +static PRStatus +ssl_GenerateSelfEncryptKeysOnce(void *arg) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */ + PORT_Memcpy(ssl_self_encrypt_keys.keyName, + SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_PREFIX, + sizeof(SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_NAME_PREFIX)); + /* This function calls ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeyPair(), which initializes the + * key pair stuff. That allows this to use the same shutdown function. */ + rv = ssl_GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(arg, ssl_self_encrypt_keys.keyName, + &ssl_self_encrypt_keys.encKey, + &ssl_self_encrypt_keys.macKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeys(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *keyName, + PK11SymKey **encKey, PK11SymKey **macKey) +{ + if (PR_SUCCESS != PR_CallOnceWithArg(&ssl_self_encrypt_keys.setup, + &ssl_GenerateSelfEncryptKeysOnce, + ss->pkcs11PinArg)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_self_encrypt_keys.encKey || !ssl_self_encrypt_keys.macKey) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(keyName, ssl_self_encrypt_keys.keyName, + sizeof(ssl_self_encrypt_keys.keyName)); + *encKey = ssl_self_encrypt_keys.encKey; + *macKey = ssl_self_encrypt_keys.macKey; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* If lockTime is zero, it implies that the lock is not held, and must be + * aquired here. + */ +static SECStatus +getSvrWrappingKey(unsigned int symWrapMechIndex, + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk, + cacheDesc *cache, + PRUint32 lockTime) +{ + PRUint32 ndx = (wrapKeyIndex * SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS) + symWrapMechIndex; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *pwswk = cache->keyCacheData + ndx; + PRUint32 now = 0; + PRBool rv = SECFailure; + + if (!cache->cacheMem) { /* cache is uninitialized */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!lockTime) { + now = LockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock, 0); + if (!now) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + if (pwswk->wrapKeyIndex == wrapKeyIndex && + pwswk->wrapMechIndex == symWrapMechIndex && + pwswk->wrappedSymKeyLen != 0) { + *wswk = *pwswk; + rv = SECSuccess; + } + if (now) { + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock); + } + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_GetWrappingKey(unsigned int wrapMechIndex, + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk) +{ + PORT_Assert(wrapMechIndex < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS); + PORT_Assert(wrapKeyIndex < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS); + if (wrapMechIndex >= SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS || + wrapKeyIndex >= SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + return getSvrWrappingKey(wrapMechIndex, wrapKeyIndex, wswk, + &globalCache, 0); +} + +/* Wrap and cache a session ticket key. */ +static SECStatus +WrapSelfEncryptKey(SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey, PK11SymKey *symKey, + const char *keyName, encKeyCacheEntry *cacheEntry) +{ + SECItem wrappedKey = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + wrappedKey.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(svrPubKey); + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof(cacheEntry->bytes)); + if (wrappedKey.len > sizeof(cacheEntry->bytes)) + return PR_FALSE; + wrappedKey.data = cacheEntry->bytes; + + if (PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CKM_RSA_PKCS, svrPubKey, symKey, &wrappedKey) != + SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%s]: Unable to wrap self encrypt key %s.", + SSL_GETPID(), "unknown", keyName)); + return SECFailure; + } + cacheEntry->length = wrappedKey.len; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(void *pwArg, PRUint8 *keyName, PK11SymKey **aesKey, + PK11SymKey **macKey) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismArray[2]; + PK11SymKey *aesKeyTmp = NULL; + PK11SymKey *macKeyTmp = NULL; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + PRUint8 ticketKeyNameSuffixLocal[SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN]; + PRUint8 *ticketKeyNameSuffix; + + if (!cache->cacheMem) { + /* cache is not initalized. Use stack buffer */ + ticketKeyNameSuffix = ticketKeyNameSuffixLocal; + } else { + ticketKeyNameSuffix = cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix; + } + + if (PK11_GenerateRandom(ticketKeyNameSuffix, + SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN) != + SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%s]: Unable to generate random key name bytes.", + SSL_GETPID(), "unknown")); + return SECFailure; + } + + mechanismArray[0] = CKM_AES_CBC; + mechanismArray[1] = CKM_SHA256_HMAC; + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(mechanismArray, 2, pwArg); + if (slot) { + aesKeyTmp = PK11_KeyGen(slot, mechanismArray[0], NULL, + AES_256_KEY_LENGTH, pwArg); + macKeyTmp = PK11_KeyGen(slot, mechanismArray[1], NULL, + SHA256_LENGTH, pwArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + + if (aesKeyTmp == NULL || macKeyTmp == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%s]: Unable to generate session ticket keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), "unknown")); + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(keyName, ticketKeyNameSuffix, SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN); + *aesKey = aesKeyTmp; + *macKey = macKeyTmp; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (aesKeyTmp) + PK11_FreeSymKey(aesKeyTmp); + if (macKeyTmp) + PK11_FreeSymKey(macKeyTmp); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +GenerateAndWrapSelfEncryptKeys(SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey, void *pwArg, + PRUint8 *keyName, PK11SymKey **aesKey, + PK11SymKey **macKey) +{ + PK11SymKey *aesKeyTmp = NULL; + PK11SymKey *macKeyTmp = NULL; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(pwArg, keyName, &aesKeyTmp, &macKeyTmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (cache->cacheMem) { + /* Export the keys to the shared cache in wrapped form. */ + rv = WrapSelfEncryptKey(svrPubKey, aesKeyTmp, "enc key", cache->ticketEncKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = WrapSelfEncryptKey(svrPubKey, macKeyTmp, "mac key", cache->ticketMacKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + *aesKey = aesKeyTmp; + *macKey = macKeyTmp; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_FreeSymKey(aesKeyTmp); + PK11_FreeSymKey(macKeyTmp); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +UnwrapCachedSelfEncryptKeys(SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey, PRUint8 *keyName, + PK11SymKey **aesKey, PK11SymKey **macKey) +{ + SECItem wrappedKey = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + PK11SymKey *aesKeyTmp = NULL; + PK11SymKey *macKeyTmp = NULL; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + + wrappedKey.data = cache->ticketEncKey->bytes; + wrappedKey.len = cache->ticketEncKey->length; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof(cache->ticketEncKey->bytes)); + aesKeyTmp = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + CKM_AES_CBC, CKA_DECRYPT, 0); + + wrappedKey.data = cache->ticketMacKey->bytes; + wrappedKey.len = cache->ticketMacKey->length; + PORT_Assert(wrappedKey.len <= sizeof(cache->ticketMacKey->bytes)); + macKeyTmp = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(svrPrivKey, &wrappedKey, + CKM_SHA256_HMAC, CKA_SIGN, 0); + + if (aesKeyTmp == NULL || macKeyTmp == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%s]: Unable to unwrap session ticket keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), "unknown")); + goto loser; + } + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%s]: Successfully unwrapped session ticket keys.", + SSL_GETPID(), "unknown")); + + PORT_Memcpy(keyName, cache->ticketKeyNameSuffix, + SELF_ENCRYPT_KEY_VAR_NAME_LEN); + *aesKey = aesKeyTmp; + *macKey = macKeyTmp; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (aesKeyTmp) + PK11_FreeSymKey(aesKeyTmp); + if (macKeyTmp) + PK11_FreeSymKey(macKeyTmp); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl_GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(void *pwArg, PRUint8 *keyName, + PK11SymKey **encKey, PK11SymKey **macKey) +{ + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = NULL; + PRUint32 now; + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + + SECStatus rv = ssl_GetSelfEncryptKeyPair(&svrPubKey, &svrPrivKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !cache->cacheMem) { + /* No key pair for wrapping, or the cache is uninitialized. Generate + * keys and return them without caching. */ + rv = GenerateSelfEncryptKeys(pwArg, keyName, encKey, macKey); + } else { + now = LockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock, 0); + if (!now) { + goto loser; + } + + if (*(cache->ticketKeysValid)) { + rv = UnwrapCachedSelfEncryptKeys(svrPrivKey, keyName, encKey, macKey); + } else { + /* Keys do not exist, create them. */ + rv = GenerateAndWrapSelfEncryptKeys(svrPubKey, pwArg, keyName, + encKey, macKey); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + *(cache->ticketKeysValid) = 1; + } + } + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock); + } + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(svrPubKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(svrPrivKey); + return rv; + +loser: + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(svrPubKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(svrPrivKey); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* The caller passes in the new value it wants + * to set. This code tests the wrapped sym key entry in the shared memory. + * If it is uninitialized, this function writes the caller's value into + * the disk entry, and returns false. + * Otherwise, it overwrites the caller's wswk with the value obtained from + * the disk, and returns PR_TRUE. + * This is all done while holding the locks/mutexes necessary to make + * the operation atomic. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_SetWrappingKey(SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk) +{ + cacheDesc *cache = &globalCache; + PRBool rv = SECFailure; + PRUint32 ndx; + PRUint32 now; + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey myWswk; + + if (!cache->cacheMem) { /* cache is uninitialized */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SERVER_CACHE_NOT_CONFIGURED); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(wswk->wrapMechIndex < SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS); + PORT_Assert(wswk->wrapKeyIndex < SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS); + if (wswk->wrapMechIndex >= SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS || + wswk->wrapKeyIndex >= SSL_NUM_WRAP_KEYS) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ndx = (wswk->wrapKeyIndex * SSL_NUM_WRAP_MECHS) + wswk->wrapMechIndex; + PORT_Memset(&myWswk, 0, sizeof myWswk); /* eliminate UMRs. */ + + now = LockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock, 0); + if (!now) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = getSvrWrappingKey(wswk->wrapMechIndex, wswk->wrapKeyIndex, + &myWswk, cache, now); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* we found it on disk, copy it out to the caller. */ + PORT_Memcpy(wswk, &myWswk, sizeof *wswk); + } else { + /* Wasn't on disk, and we're still holding the lock, so write it. */ + cache->keyCacheData[ndx] = *wswk; + } + UnlockSidCacheLock(cache->keyCacheLock); + return rv; +} + +#else /* MAC version or other platform */ + +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(int maxCacheEntries, + PRUint32 ssl2_timeout, + PRUint32 ssl3_timeout, + const char *directory) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char *envString) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +ssl_GetWrappingKey(unsigned int wrapMechIndex, + unsigned int wrapKeyIndex, + SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (ssl_GetWrappingKey)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This is a kind of test-and-set. The caller passes in the new value it wants + * to set. This code tests the wrapped sym key entry in the shared memory. + * If it is uninitialized, this function writes the caller's value into + * the disk entry, and returns false. + * Otherwise, it overwrites the caller's wswk with the value obtained from + * the disk, and returns PR_TRUE. + * This is all done while holding the locks/mutexes necessary to make + * the operation atomic. + */ +SECStatus +ssl_SetWrappingKey(SSLWrappedSymWrappingKey *wswk) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (ssl_SetWrappingKey)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +PRUint32 +SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks(void) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks)"); + return -1; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks) +{ + PR_ASSERT(!"SSL servers are not supported on this platform. (SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks)"); + return SECFailure; +} + +#endif /* XP_UNIX || XP_WIN32 */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9a778218aa --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslsock.c @@ -0,0 +1,4635 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * vtables (and methods that call through them) for the 4 types of + * SSLSockets supported. Only one type is still supported. + * Various other functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include "seccomon.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "nspr.h" +#include "private/pprio.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11pqg.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" + +static const sslSocketOps ssl_default_ops = { /* No SSL. */ + ssl_DefConnect, + NULL, + ssl_DefBind, + ssl_DefListen, + ssl_DefShutdown, + ssl_DefClose, + ssl_DefRecv, + ssl_DefSend, + ssl_DefRead, + ssl_DefWrite, + ssl_DefGetpeername, + ssl_DefGetsockname +}; + +static const sslSocketOps ssl_secure_ops = { /* SSL. */ + ssl_SecureConnect, + NULL, + ssl_DefBind, + ssl_DefListen, + ssl_SecureShutdown, + ssl_SecureClose, + ssl_SecureRecv, + ssl_SecureSend, + ssl_SecureRead, + ssl_SecureWrite, + ssl_DefGetpeername, + ssl_DefGetsockname +}; + +/* +** default settings for socket enables +*/ +static sslOptions ssl_defaults = { + .nextProtoNego = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }, + .maxEarlyDataSize = 1 << 16, + .recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1, + .useSecurity = PR_TRUE, + .useSocks = PR_FALSE, + .requestCertificate = PR_FALSE, + .requireCertificate = SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE, + .handshakeAsClient = PR_FALSE, + .handshakeAsServer = PR_FALSE, + .noCache = PR_FALSE, + .fdx = PR_FALSE, + .detectRollBack = PR_TRUE, + .noLocks = PR_FALSE, + .enableSessionTickets = PR_FALSE, + .enableDeflate = PR_FALSE, + .enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN, + .requireSafeNegotiation = PR_FALSE, + .enableFalseStart = PR_FALSE, + .cbcRandomIV = PR_TRUE, + .enableOCSPStapling = PR_FALSE, + .enableDelegatedCredentials = PR_FALSE, + .enableALPN = PR_TRUE, + .reuseServerECDHEKey = PR_FALSE, + .enableFallbackSCSV = PR_FALSE, + .enableServerDhe = PR_TRUE, + .enableExtendedMS = PR_TRUE, + .enableSignedCertTimestamps = PR_FALSE, + .requireDHENamedGroups = PR_FALSE, + .enable0RttData = PR_FALSE, + .enableTls13CompatMode = PR_FALSE, + .enableDtls13VersionCompat = PR_FALSE, + .enableDtlsShortHeader = PR_FALSE, + .enableHelloDowngradeCheck = PR_TRUE, + .enableV2CompatibleHello = PR_FALSE, + .enablePostHandshakeAuth = PR_FALSE, + .suppressEndOfEarlyData = PR_FALSE, + .enableTls13GreaseEch = PR_FALSE, + .enableTls13BackendEch = PR_FALSE, + .callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = PR_FALSE, + .enableGrease = PR_FALSE, + .enableChXtnPermutation = PR_FALSE +}; + +/* + * default range of enabled SSL/TLS protocols + */ +static SSLVersionRange versions_defaults_stream = { + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 +}; + +static SSLVersionRange versions_defaults_datagram = { + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2 +}; + +#define VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(variant) \ + (variant == ssl_variant_stream ? &versions_defaults_stream : &versions_defaults_datagram) +#define VERSIONS_POLICY_MIN(variant) \ + (variant == ssl_variant_stream ? NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY : NSS_DTLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY) +#define VERSIONS_POLICY_MAX(variant) \ + (variant == ssl_variant_stream ? NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY : NSS_DTLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY) + +sslSessionIDLookupFunc ssl_sid_lookup; + +static PRDescIdentity ssl_layer_id; + +PRBool locksEverDisabled; /* implicitly PR_FALSE */ +PRBool ssl_force_locks; /* implicitly PR_FALSE */ +int ssl_lock_readers = 1; /* default true. */ +char ssl_debug; +char ssl_trace; +FILE *ssl_trace_iob; + +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE +FILE *ssl_keylog_iob; +PZLock *ssl_keylog_lock; +#endif + +char lockStatus[] = "Locks are ENABLED. "; +#define LOCKSTATUS_OFFSET 10 /* offset of ENABLED */ + +/* SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 and SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 are not implemented. */ +static const PRUint16 srtpCiphers[] = { + SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80, + SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32, + 0 +}; + +/* This list is in preference order. Note that while some smaller groups appear + * early in the list, smaller groups are generally ignored when iterating + * through this list. ffdhe_custom must not appear in this list. */ +#define ECGROUP(name, size, oid, assumeSupported) \ + { \ + ssl_grp_ec_##name, size, ssl_kea_ecdh, \ + SEC_OID_SECG_EC_##oid, assumeSupported \ + } +#define FFGROUP(size) \ + { \ + ssl_grp_ffdhe_##size, size, ssl_kea_dh, \ + SEC_OID_TLS_FFDHE_##size, PR_TRUE \ + } + +const sslNamedGroupDef ssl_named_groups[] = { + /* Note that 256 for 25519 is a lie, but we only use it for checking bit + * security and expect 256 bits there (not 255). */ + { ssl_grp_ec_curve25519, 256, ssl_kea_ecdh, SEC_OID_CURVE25519, PR_TRUE }, + ECGROUP(secp256r1, 256, SECP256R1, PR_TRUE), + ECGROUP(secp384r1, 384, SECP384R1, PR_TRUE), + ECGROUP(secp521r1, 521, SECP521R1, PR_TRUE), + FFGROUP(2048), + FFGROUP(3072), + FFGROUP(4096), + FFGROUP(6144), + FFGROUP(8192), + ECGROUP(secp192r1, 192, SECP192R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp160r2, 160, SECP160R2, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp160k1, 160, SECP160K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp160r1, 160, SECP160R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect163k1, 163, SECT163K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect163r1, 163, SECT163R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect163r2, 163, SECT163R2, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp192k1, 192, SECP192K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect193r1, 193, SECT193R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect193r2, 193, SECT193R2, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp224r1, 224, SECP224R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp224k1, 224, SECP224K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect233k1, 233, SECT233K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect233r1, 233, SECT233R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect239k1, 239, SECT239K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(secp256k1, 256, SECP256K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect283k1, 283, SECT283K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect283r1, 283, SECT283R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect409k1, 409, SECT409K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect409r1, 409, SECT409R1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect571k1, 571, SECT571K1, PR_FALSE), + ECGROUP(sect571r1, 571, SECT571R1, PR_FALSE), +}; +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT == PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_named_groups)); + +#undef ECGROUP +#undef FFGROUP + +/* forward declarations. */ +static sslSocket *ssl_NewSocket(PRBool makeLocks, SSLProtocolVariant variant); +static SECStatus ssl_MakeLocks(sslSocket *ss); +static void ssl_SetDefaultsFromEnvironment(void); +static PRStatus ssl_PushIOLayer(sslSocket *ns, PRFileDesc *stack, + PRDescIdentity id); + +/************************************************************************/ + +/* +** Lookup a socket structure from a file descriptor. +** Only functions called through the PRIOMethods table should use this. +** Other app-callable functions should use ssl_FindSocket. +*/ +static sslSocket * +ssl_GetPrivate(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + PORT_Assert(fd != NULL); + PORT_Assert(fd->methods->file_type == PR_DESC_LAYERED); + PORT_Assert(fd->identity == ssl_layer_id); + + if (fd->methods->file_type != PR_DESC_LAYERED || + fd->identity != ssl_layer_id) { + PORT_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ss = (sslSocket *)fd->secret; + /* Set ss->fd lazily. We can't rely on the value of ss->fd set by + * ssl_PushIOLayer because another PR_PushIOLayer call will switch the + * contents of the PRFileDesc pointed by ss->fd and the new layer. + * See bug 807250. + */ + ss->fd = fd; + return ss; +} + +/* This function tries to find the SSL layer in the stack. + * It searches for the first SSL layer at or below the argument fd, + * and failing that, it searches for the nearest SSL layer above the + * argument fd. It returns the private sslSocket from the found layer. + */ +sslSocket * +ssl_FindSocket(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PRFileDesc *layer; + sslSocket *ss; + + PORT_Assert(fd != NULL); + PORT_Assert(ssl_layer_id != 0); + + layer = PR_GetIdentitiesLayer(fd, ssl_layer_id); + if (layer == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ss = (sslSocket *)layer->secret; + /* Set ss->fd lazily. We can't rely on the value of ss->fd set by + * ssl_PushIOLayer because another PR_PushIOLayer call will switch the + * contents of the PRFileDesc pointed by ss->fd and the new layer. + * See bug 807250. + */ + ss->fd = layer; + return ss; +} + +static sslSocket * +ssl_DupSocket(sslSocket *os) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_NewSocket((PRBool)(!os->opt.noLocks), os->protocolVariant); + if (!ss) { + return NULL; + } + + ss->opt = os->opt; + ss->opt.useSocks = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego, &os->opt.nextProtoNego); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + ss->vrange = os->vrange; + ss->now = os->now; + ss->nowArg = os->nowArg; + + ss->peerID = !os->peerID ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(os->peerID); + ss->url = !os->url ? NULL : PORT_Strdup(os->url); + + ss->ops = os->ops; + ss->rTimeout = os->rTimeout; + ss->wTimeout = os->wTimeout; + ss->cTimeout = os->cTimeout; + ss->dbHandle = os->dbHandle; + + /* copy ssl2&3 policy & prefs, even if it's not selected (yet) */ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, os->cipherSuites, sizeof os->cipherSuites); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers, os->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers, + sizeof(PRUint16) * os->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount); + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount = os->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, os->ssl3.signatureSchemes, + sizeof(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[0]) * + os->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount); + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = os->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion = os->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion; + + ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled = os->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled; + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity) { + PRCList *cursor; + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&os->serverCerts); + cursor != &os->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *sc = ssl_CopyServerCert((sslServerCert *)cursor); + if (!sc) + goto loser; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&os->ephemeralKeyPairs); + cursor != &os->ephemeralKeyPairs; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *okp = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *skp = ssl_CopyEphemeralKeyPair(okp); + if (!skp) + goto loser; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&skp->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&os->extensionHooks); + cursor != &os->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslCustomExtensionHooks *oh = (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + sslCustomExtensionHooks *sh = PORT_ZNew(sslCustomExtensionHooks); + if (!sh) { + goto loser; + } + *sh = *oh; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sh->link, &ss->extensionHooks); + } + + /* + * XXX the preceding CERT_ and SECKEY_ functions can fail and return NULL. + * XXX We should detect this, and not just march on with NULL pointers. + */ + ss->authCertificate = os->authCertificate; + ss->authCertificateArg = os->authCertificateArg; + ss->getClientAuthData = os->getClientAuthData; + ss->getClientAuthDataArg = os->getClientAuthDataArg; + ss->sniSocketConfig = os->sniSocketConfig; + ss->sniSocketConfigArg = os->sniSocketConfigArg; + ss->alertReceivedCallback = os->alertReceivedCallback; + ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg = os->alertReceivedCallbackArg; + ss->alertSentCallback = os->alertSentCallback; + ss->alertSentCallbackArg = os->alertSentCallbackArg; + ss->handleBadCert = os->handleBadCert; + ss->badCertArg = os->badCertArg; + ss->handshakeCallback = os->handshakeCallback; + ss->handshakeCallbackData = os->handshakeCallbackData; + ss->canFalseStartCallback = os->canFalseStartCallback; + ss->canFalseStartCallbackData = os->canFalseStartCallbackData; + ss->pkcs11PinArg = os->pkcs11PinArg; + ss->nextProtoCallback = os->nextProtoCallback; + ss->nextProtoArg = os->nextProtoArg; + PORT_Memcpy((void *)ss->namedGroupPreferences, + os->namedGroupPreferences, + sizeof(ss->namedGroupPreferences)); + ss->additionalShares = os->additionalShares; + ss->resumptionTokenCallback = os->resumptionTokenCallback; + ss->resumptionTokenContext = os->resumptionTokenContext; + + rv = tls13_CopyEchConfigs(&os->echConfigs, &ss->echConfigs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (os->echPrivKey && os->echPubKey) { + ss->echPrivKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(os->echPrivKey); + ss->echPubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(os->echPubKey); + if (!ss->echPrivKey || !ss->echPubKey) { + goto loser; + } + } + + if (os->antiReplay) { + ss->antiReplay = tls13_RefAntiReplayContext(os->antiReplay); + PORT_Assert(ss->antiReplay); /* Can't fail. */ + if (!ss->antiReplay) { + goto loser; + } + } + if (os->psk) { + ss->psk = tls13_CopyPsk(os->psk); + if (!ss->psk) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Create security data */ + rv = ssl_CopySecurityInfo(ss, os); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + return ss; + +loser: + ssl_FreeSocket(ss); + return NULL; +} + +static void +ssl_DestroyLocks(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* Destroy locks. */ + if (ss->firstHandshakeLock) { + PZ_DestroyMonitor(ss->firstHandshakeLock); + ss->firstHandshakeLock = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3HandshakeLock) { + PZ_DestroyMonitor(ss->ssl3HandshakeLock); + ss->ssl3HandshakeLock = NULL; + } + if (ss->specLock) { + NSSRWLock_Destroy(ss->specLock); + ss->specLock = NULL; + } + + if (ss->recvLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(ss->recvLock); + ss->recvLock = NULL; + } + if (ss->sendLock) { + PZ_DestroyLock(ss->sendLock); + ss->sendLock = NULL; + } + if (ss->xmitBufLock) { + PZ_DestroyMonitor(ss->xmitBufLock); + ss->xmitBufLock = NULL; + } + if (ss->recvBufLock) { + PZ_DestroyMonitor(ss->recvBufLock); + ss->recvBufLock = NULL; + } +} + +/* Caller holds any relevant locks */ +static void +ssl_DestroySocketContents(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + /* Free up socket */ + ssl_DestroySecurityInfo(&ss->sec); + + ssl3_DestroySSL3Info(ss); + + PORT_Free(ss->saveBuf.buf); + PORT_Free(ss->pendingBuf.buf); + ssl3_DestroyGather(&ss->gs); + + if (ss->peerID != NULL) + PORT_Free(ss->peerID); + if (ss->url != NULL) + PORT_Free((void *)ss->url); /* CONST */ + + /* Clean up server certificates and sundries. */ + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->serverCerts)) { + cursor = PR_LIST_TAIL(&ss->serverCerts); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cursor); + ssl_FreeServerCert((sslServerCert *)cursor); + } + + /* Remove extension handlers. */ + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->extensionHooks, NULL); + + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->opt.nextProtoNego, PR_FALSE); + ssl3_FreeSniNameArray(&ss->xtnData); + + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake, NULL); + ssl_ClearPRCList(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake, NULL); + tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ss->antiReplay); + + tls13_DestroyPsk(ss->psk); + + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&ss->echConfigs); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->echPrivKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->echPubKey); +} + +/* + * free an sslSocket struct, and all the stuff that hangs off of it + */ +void +ssl_FreeSocket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* Get every lock you can imagine! + ** Caller already holds these: + ** SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + ** SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + */ + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + + ssl_DestroySocketContents(ss); + + /* Release all the locks acquired above. */ + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseRecvBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + ssl_DestroyLocks(ss); + +#ifdef DEBUG + PORT_Memset(ss, 0x1f, sizeof *ss); +#endif + PORT_Free(ss); + return; +} + +/************************************************************************/ +SECStatus +ssl_EnableNagleDelay(sslSocket *ss, PRBool enabled) +{ + PRFileDesc *osfd = ss->fd->lower; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + PRSocketOptionData opt; + + opt.option = PR_SockOpt_NoDelay; + opt.value.no_delay = (PRBool)!enabled; + + if (osfd->methods->setsocketoption) { + rv = (SECStatus)osfd->methods->setsocketoption(osfd, &opt); + } else { + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + } + + return rv; +} + +static void +ssl_ChooseOps(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ss->ops = ss->opt.useSecurity ? &ssl_secure_ops : &ssl_default_ops; +} + +/* Called from SSL_Enable (immediately below) */ +static SECStatus +PrepareSocket(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + ssl_ChooseOps(ss); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_Enable(PRFileDesc *fd, int which, PRIntn on) +{ + return SSL_OptionSet(fd, which, on); +} + +static PRBool ssl_VersionIsSupportedByPolicy( + SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSL3ProtocolVersion version); + +/* Implements the semantics for SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, on) described in + * ssl.h in the section "SSL version range setting API". + */ +static void +ssl_EnableTLS(SSLVersionRange *vrange, PRIntn enable) +{ + if (enable) { + /* don't turn it on if tls1.0 disallowed by by policy */ + if (!ssl_VersionIsSupportedByPolicy(ssl_variant_stream, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0)) { + return; + } + } + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(vrange)) { + if (enable) { + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + } /* else don't change anything */ + return; + } + + if (enable) { + /* Expand the range of enabled version to include TLS 1.0 */ + vrange->min = PR_MIN(vrange->min, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0); + vrange->max = PR_MAX(vrange->max, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0); + } else { + /* Disable all TLS versions, leaving only SSL 3.0 if it was enabled */ + if (vrange->min == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + } else { + /* Only TLS was enabled, so now no versions are. */ + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + } + } +} + +/* Implements the semantics for SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, on) described in + * ssl.h in the section "SSL version range setting API". + */ +static void +ssl_EnableSSL3(SSLVersionRange *vrange, PRIntn enable) +{ + if (enable) { + /* don't turn it on if ssl3 disallowed by by policy */ + if (!ssl_VersionIsSupportedByPolicy(ssl_variant_stream, + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0)) { + return; + } + } + if (SSL_ALL_VERSIONS_DISABLED(vrange)) { + if (enable) { + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + } /* else don't change anything */ + return; + } + + if (enable) { + /* Expand the range of enabled versions to include SSL 3.0. We know + * SSL 3.0 or some version of TLS is already enabled at this point, so + * we don't need to change vrange->max. + */ + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + } else { + /* Disable SSL 3.0, leaving TLS unaffected. */ + if (vrange->max > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + vrange->min = PR_MAX(vrange->min, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0); + } else { + /* Only SSL 3.0 was enabled, so now no versions are. */ + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + } + } +} + +SECStatus +SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRIntn val) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRBool holdingLocks; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in Enable", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + holdingLocks = (!ss->opt.noLocks); + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + switch (which) { + case SSL_SOCKS: + ss->opt.useSocks = PR_FALSE; + rv = PrepareSocket(ss); + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + break; + + case SSL_SECURITY: + ss->opt.useSecurity = val; + rv = PrepareSocket(ss); + break; + + case SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + ss->opt.requestCertificate = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE: + ss->opt.requireCertificate = val; + break; + + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT: + if (ss->opt.handshakeAsServer && val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + ss->opt.handshakeAsClient = val; + break; + + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER: + if (ss->opt.handshakeAsClient && val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + ss->opt.handshakeAsServer = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS: + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; /* not allowed */ + } + break; + } + ssl_EnableTLS(&ss->vrange, val); + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL3: + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; /* not allowed */ + } + break; + } + ssl_EnableSSL3(&ss->vrange, val); + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL2: + case SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + /* We no longer support SSL v2. + * However, if an old application requests to disable SSL v2, + * we shouldn't fail. + */ + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + break; + + case SSL_NO_CACHE: + ss->opt.noCache = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FDX: + if (val && ss->opt.noLocks) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + ss->opt.fdx = val; + break; + + case SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION: + ss->opt.detectRollBack = val; + break; + + case SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN: + break; + + case SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11: + break; + + case SSL_NO_LOCKS: + if (val && ss->opt.fdx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + if (val && ssl_force_locks) + val = PR_FALSE; /* silent override */ + ss->opt.noLocks = val; + if (val) { + locksEverDisabled = PR_TRUE; + strcpy(lockStatus + LOCKSTATUS_OFFSET, "DISABLED."); + } else if (!holdingLocks) { + rv = ssl_MakeLocks(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ss->opt.noLocks = PR_TRUE; + } + } + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS: + ss->opt.enableSessionTickets = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE: + ss->opt.enableDeflate = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION: + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && val != SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + break; + } + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION: + ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START: + ss->opt.enableFalseStart = val; + break; + + case SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV: + ss->opt.cbcRandomIV = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING: + ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS: + ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_NPN: + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN: + ss->opt.enableALPN = val; + break; + + case SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY: + ss->opt.reuseServerECDHEKey = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV: + ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE: + ss->opt.enableServerDhe = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + ss->opt.enableExtendedMS = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS: + ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUIRE_DH_NAMED_GROUPS: + ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA: + ss->opt.enable0RttData = val; + break; + + case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + if (val < 64 || val > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + ss->opt.recordSizeLimit = val; + } + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE: + ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER: + ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK: + ss->opt.enableHelloDowngradeCheck = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + ss->opt.enableV2CompatibleHello = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth = val; + break; + + case SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_GREASE: + ss->opt.enableGrease = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_CH_EXTENSION_PERMUTATION: + ss->opt.enableChXtnPermutation = val; + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + /* We can't use the macros for releasing the locks here, + * because ss->opt.noLocks might have changed just above. + * We must release these locks (monitors) here, if we aquired them above, + * regardless of the current value of ss->opt.noLocks. + */ + if (holdingLocks) { + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->ssl3HandshakeLock); + PZ_ExitMonitor((ss)->firstHandshakeLock); + } + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRIntn val = PR_FALSE; + + if (!pVal) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in Enable", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + *pVal = PR_FALSE; + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + switch (which) { + case SSL_SOCKS: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_SECURITY: + val = ss->opt.useSecurity; + break; + case SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + val = ss->opt.requestCertificate; + break; + case SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE: + val = ss->opt.requireCertificate; + break; + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT: + val = ss->opt.handshakeAsClient; + break; + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER: + val = ss->opt.handshakeAsServer; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS: + val = ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL3: + val = ss->vrange.min == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL2: + case SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_NO_CACHE: + val = ss->opt.noCache; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FDX: + val = ss->opt.fdx; + break; + case SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION: + val = ss->opt.detectRollBack; + break; + case SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_NO_LOCKS: + val = ss->opt.noLocks; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS: + val = ss->opt.enableSessionTickets; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE: + val = ss->opt.enableDeflate; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION: + val = ss->opt.enableRenegotiation; + break; + case SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION: + val = ss->opt.requireSafeNegotiation; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START: + val = ss->opt.enableFalseStart; + break; + case SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV: + val = ss->opt.cbcRandomIV; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING: + val = ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS: + val = ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_NPN: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN: + val = ss->opt.enableALPN; + break; + case SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY: + val = ss->opt.reuseServerECDHEKey; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV: + val = ss->opt.enableFallbackSCSV; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE: + val = ss->opt.enableServerDhe; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + val = ss->opt.enableExtendedMS; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS: + val = ss->opt.enableSignedCertTimestamps; + break; + case SSL_REQUIRE_DH_NAMED_GROUPS: + val = ss->opt.requireDHENamedGroups; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA: + val = ss->opt.enable0RttData; + break; + case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + val = ss->opt.recordSizeLimit; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE: + val = ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER: + val = ss->opt.enableDtlsShortHeader; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK: + val = ss->opt.enableHelloDowngradeCheck; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + val = ss->opt.enableV2CompatibleHello; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + val = ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth; + break; + case SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + val = ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + *pVal = val; + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIntn *pVal) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PRIntn val = PR_FALSE; + + if (!pVal) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_SetDefaultsFromEnvironment(); + + switch (which) { + case SSL_SOCKS: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_SECURITY: + val = ssl_defaults.useSecurity; + break; + case SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + val = ssl_defaults.requestCertificate; + break; + case SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE: + val = ssl_defaults.requireCertificate; + break; + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT: + val = ssl_defaults.handshakeAsClient; + break; + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER: + val = ssl_defaults.handshakeAsServer; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS: + val = versions_defaults_stream.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL3: + val = versions_defaults_stream.min == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL2: + case SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_NO_CACHE: + val = ssl_defaults.noCache; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FDX: + val = ssl_defaults.fdx; + break; + case SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION: + val = ssl_defaults.detectRollBack; + break; + case SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_NO_LOCKS: + val = ssl_defaults.noLocks; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS: + val = ssl_defaults.enableSessionTickets; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE: + val = ssl_defaults.enableDeflate; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION: + val = ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation; + break; + case SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION: + val = ssl_defaults.requireSafeNegotiation; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START: + val = ssl_defaults.enableFalseStart; + break; + case SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV: + val = ssl_defaults.cbcRandomIV; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING: + val = ssl_defaults.enableOCSPStapling; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS: + val = ssl_defaults.enableDelegatedCredentials; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_NPN: + val = PR_FALSE; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN: + val = ssl_defaults.enableALPN; + break; + case SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY: + val = ssl_defaults.reuseServerECDHEKey; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV: + val = ssl_defaults.enableFallbackSCSV; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE: + val = ssl_defaults.enableServerDhe; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + val = ssl_defaults.enableExtendedMS; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS: + val = ssl_defaults.enableSignedCertTimestamps; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA: + val = ssl_defaults.enable0RttData; + break; + case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + val = ssl_defaults.recordSizeLimit; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE: + val = ssl_defaults.enableTls13CompatMode; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER: + val = ssl_defaults.enableDtlsShortHeader; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK: + val = ssl_defaults.enableHelloDowngradeCheck; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + val = ssl_defaults.enableV2CompatibleHello; + break; + case SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + val = ssl_defaults.enablePostHandshakeAuth; + break; + case SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + val = ssl_defaults.suppressEndOfEarlyData; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + rv = SECFailure; + } + + *pVal = val; + return rv; +} + +/* XXX Use Global Lock to protect this stuff. */ +SECStatus +SSL_EnableDefault(int which, PRIntn val) +{ + return SSL_OptionSetDefault(which, val); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRIntn val) +{ + SECStatus status = ssl_Init(); + + if (status != SECSuccess) { + return status; + } + + ssl_SetDefaultsFromEnvironment(); + + switch (which) { + case SSL_SOCKS: + ssl_defaults.useSocks = PR_FALSE; + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + break; + + case SSL_SECURITY: + ssl_defaults.useSecurity = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + ssl_defaults.requestCertificate = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE: + ssl_defaults.requireCertificate = val; + break; + + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT: + if (ssl_defaults.handshakeAsServer && val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_defaults.handshakeAsClient = val; + break; + + case SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER: + if (ssl_defaults.handshakeAsClient && val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_defaults.handshakeAsServer = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS: + ssl_EnableTLS(&versions_defaults_stream, val); + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL3: + ssl_EnableSSL3(&versions_defaults_stream, val); + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SSL2: + case SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + /* We no longer support SSL v2. + * However, if an old application requests to disable SSL v2, + * we shouldn't fail. + */ + if (val) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + break; + + case SSL_NO_CACHE: + ssl_defaults.noCache = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FDX: + if (val && ssl_defaults.noLocks) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_defaults.fdx = val; + break; + + case SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION: + ssl_defaults.detectRollBack = val; + break; + + case SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN: + break; + + case SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11: + break; + + case SSL_NO_LOCKS: + if (val && ssl_defaults.fdx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (val && ssl_force_locks) + val = PR_FALSE; /* silent override */ + ssl_defaults.noLocks = val; + if (val) { + locksEverDisabled = PR_TRUE; + strcpy(lockStatus + LOCKSTATUS_OFFSET, "DISABLED."); + } + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS: + ssl_defaults.enableSessionTickets = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE: + ssl_defaults.enableDeflate = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION: + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation = val; + break; + + case SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION: + ssl_defaults.requireSafeNegotiation = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START: + ssl_defaults.enableFalseStart = val; + break; + + case SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV: + ssl_defaults.cbcRandomIV = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING: + ssl_defaults.enableOCSPStapling = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DELEGATED_CREDENTIALS: + ssl_defaults.enableDelegatedCredentials = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_NPN: + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_ALPN: + ssl_defaults.enableALPN = val; + break; + + case SSL_REUSE_SERVER_ECDHE_KEY: + ssl_defaults.reuseServerECDHEKey = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV: + ssl_defaults.enableFallbackSCSV = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SERVER_DHE: + ssl_defaults.enableServerDhe = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + ssl_defaults.enableExtendedMS = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_SIGNED_CERT_TIMESTAMPS: + ssl_defaults.enableSignedCertTimestamps = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_0RTT_DATA: + ssl_defaults.enable0RttData = val; + break; + + case SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + if (val < 64 || val > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 1)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_defaults.recordSizeLimit = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE: + ssl_defaults.enableTls13CompatMode = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_DTLS_SHORT_HEADER: + ssl_defaults.enableDtlsShortHeader = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_HELLO_DOWNGRADE_CHECK: + ssl_defaults.enableHelloDowngradeCheck = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO: + ssl_defaults.enableV2CompatibleHello = val; + break; + + case SSL_ENABLE_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + ssl_defaults.enablePostHandshakeAuth = val; + break; + + case SSL_SUPPRESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ssl_defaults.suppressEndOfEarlyData = val; + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetMaxEarlyDataSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint32 size) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + ss->opt.maxEarlyDataSize = size; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* function tells us if the cipher suite is one that we no longer support. */ +static PRBool +ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(PRInt32 suite) +{ + switch (suite) { + case SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_NULL_SHA: + case SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA: + case SSL_FORTEZZA_DMS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA: + return PR_TRUE; + default: + return PR_FALSE; + } +} + +/* Part of the public NSS API. + * Since this is a global (not per-socket) setting, we cannot use the + * HandshakeLock to protect this. Probably want a global lock. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetPolicy(long which, int policy) +{ + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) + return SECSuccess; + return SSL_CipherPolicySet(which, policy); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 policy) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) { + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_SetPolicy((ssl3CipherSuite)which, policy); + } + return rv; +} +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 policy) +{ + SECStatus rv = ssl_Init(); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + if (NSS_IsPolicyLocked()) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_POLICY_LOCKED); + return SECFailure; + } + return ssl_CipherPolicySet(which, policy); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPolicyGet(PRInt32 which, PRInt32 *oPolicy) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (!oPolicy) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) { + *oPolicy = SSL_NOT_ALLOWED; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_GetPolicy((ssl3CipherSuite)which, oPolicy); + } + return rv; +} + +/* Part of the public NSS API. + * Since this is a global (not per-socket) setting, we cannot use the + * HandshakeLock to protect this. Probably want a global lock. + * These changes have no effect on any sslSockets already created. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_EnableCipher(long which, PRBool enabled) +{ + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) + return SECSuccess; + return SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(which, enabled); +} + +SECStatus +ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled) +{ + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) + return SECSuccess; + return ssl3_CipherPrefSetDefault((ssl3CipherSuite)which, enabled); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled) +{ + SECStatus rv = ssl_Init(); + PRInt32 locks; + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS, &locks); + if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (locks & NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + return ssl_CipherPrefSetDefault(which, enabled); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPrefGetDefault(PRInt32 which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (!enabled) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) { + *enabled = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_CipherPrefGetDefault((ssl3CipherSuite)which, enabled); + } + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PRInt32 locks; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in CipherPrefSet", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS, &locks); + if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (locks & NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) + return SECSuccess; + return ssl3_CipherPrefSet(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)which, enabled); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_CipherPrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 which, PRBool *enabled) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!enabled) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in CipherPrefGet", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + *enabled = PR_FALSE; + return SECFailure; + } + if (ssl_IsRemovedCipherSuite(which)) { + *enabled = PR_FALSE; + rv = SECSuccess; + } else { + rv = ssl3_CipherPrefGet(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)which, enabled); + } + return rv; +} + +/* The client can call this function to be aware of the current + * CipherSuites order. */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_CipherSuiteOrderGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 *cipherOrder, + unsigned int *numCiphers) +{ + if (!fd) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL: file descriptor in CipherSuiteOrderGet is null", + SSL_GETPID())); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!cipherOrder || !numCiphers) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in CipherSuiteOrderGet", SSL_GETPID(), + fd)); + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + unsigned int enabled = 0; + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = &ss->cipherSuites[i]; + if (suiteCfg && suiteCfg->enabled && + suiteCfg->policy != SSL_NOT_ALLOWED) { + cipherOrder[enabled++] = suiteCfg->cipher_suite; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + *numCiphers = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function permits reorder the CipherSuites List for the Handshake + * (Client Hello). */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_CipherSuiteOrderSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint16 *cipherOrder, + unsigned int numCiphers) +{ + if (!fd) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL: file descriptor in CipherSuiteOrderGet is null", + SSL_GETPID())); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!cipherOrder || !numCiphers || numCiphers > ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in CipherSuiteOrderSet", SSL_GETPID(), + fd)); + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + ssl3CipherSuiteCfg tmpSuiteCfg[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED]; + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + /* For each cipherSuite given as input, verify that it is + * known to NSS and only present in the list once. */ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < numCiphers; i++) { + const ssl3CipherSuiteCfg *suiteCfg = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteCfg(cipherOrder[i], ss->cipherSuites); + if (!suiteCfg) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + for (unsigned int j = i + 1; j < numCiphers; j++) { + /* This is a duplicate entry. */ + if (cipherOrder[i] == cipherOrder[j]) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + } + tmpSuiteCfg[i] = *suiteCfg; + tmpSuiteCfg[i].enabled = PR_TRUE; + } + /* Find all defined ciphersuites not present in the input list and append + * them after the preferred. This guarantees that the socket will always + * have a complete list of size ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED */ + unsigned int cfgIdx = numCiphers; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED; i++) { + PRBool received = PR_FALSE; + for (unsigned int j = 0; j < numCiphers; j++) { + if (ss->cipherSuites[i].cipher_suite == + tmpSuiteCfg[j].cipher_suite) { + received = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (!received) { + tmpSuiteCfg[cfgIdx] = ss->cipherSuites[i]; + tmpSuiteCfg[cfgIdx++].enabled = PR_FALSE; + } + } + PORT_Assert(cfgIdx == ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED); + /* now we can rewrite the socket with the desired order */ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, tmpSuiteCfg, sizeof(tmpSuiteCfg)); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(void) +{ + SECStatus status = SECSuccess; + const PRUint16 *cipher; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 policy; + + /* If we've already defined some policy oids, skip changing them */ + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policy); + if ((rv == SECSuccess) && (policy & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { + return ssl_Init(); /* make sure the policies have been loaded */ + } + + for (cipher = SSL_ImplementedCiphers; *cipher != 0; ++cipher) { + status = SSL_SetPolicy(*cipher, SSL_ALLOWED); + if (status != SECSuccess) + break; + } + return status; +} + +SECStatus +NSS_SetExportPolicy(void) +{ + return NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); +} + +SECStatus +NSS_SetFrancePolicy(void) +{ + return NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_NamedGroupConfig(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLNamedGroup *groups, + unsigned int numGroups) +{ + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j = 0; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!groups) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (numGroups > SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + memset((void *)ss->namedGroupPreferences, 0, + sizeof(ss->namedGroupPreferences)); + for (i = 0; i < numGroups; ++i) { + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(groups[i]); + if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, groupDef)) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[j++] = groupDef; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLDHEGroupType *groups, + PRUint16 num_groups) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + const SSLDHEGroupType *list; + unsigned int count; + int i, k, j; + const sslNamedGroupDef *enabled[SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT] = { 0 }; + static const SSLDHEGroupType default_dhe_groups[] = { + ssl_ff_dhe_2048_group + }; + + if ((num_groups && !groups) || (!num_groups && groups) || + num_groups > SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (groups) { + list = groups; + count = num_groups; + } else { + list = default_dhe_groups; + count = PR_ARRAY_SIZE(default_dhe_groups); + } + + /* save enabled ec groups and clear ss->namedGroupPreferences */ + k = 0; + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType != ssl_kea_dh) { + enabled[k++] = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + } + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = NULL; + } + + ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { + PRBool duplicate = PR_FALSE; + SSLNamedGroup name; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + switch (list[i]) { + case ssl_ff_dhe_2048_group: + name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048; + break; + case ssl_ff_dhe_3072_group: + name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072; + break; + case ssl_ff_dhe_4096_group: + name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_4096; + break; + case ssl_ff_dhe_6144_group: + name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_6144; + break; + case ssl_ff_dhe_8192_group: + name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_8192; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(name); + PORT_Assert(groupDef); + if (!ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup) { + ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup = groupDef; + } + PORT_Assert(k < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT); + for (j = 0; j < k; ++j) { + /* skip duplicates */ + if (enabled[j] == groupDef) { + duplicate = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (!duplicate) { + enabled[k++] = groupDef; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < k; ++i) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = enabled[i]; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRCallOnceType gWeakDHParamsRegisterOnce; +int gWeakDHParamsRegisterError; + +PRCallOnceType gWeakDHParamsOnce; +int gWeakDHParamsError; +/* As our code allocates type PQGParams, we'll keep it around, + * even though we only make use of it's parameters through gWeakDHParam. */ +static PQGParams *gWeakParamsPQG; +static ssl3DHParams *gWeakDHParams; +#define WEAK_DHE_SIZE 1024 + +static PRStatus +ssl3_CreateWeakDHParams(void) +{ + PQGVerify *vfy; + SECStatus rv, passed; + + PORT_Assert(!gWeakDHParams && !gWeakParamsPQG); + + rv = PK11_PQG_ParamGenV2(WEAK_DHE_SIZE, 160, 64 /*maximum seed that will work*/, + &gWeakParamsPQG, &vfy); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + gWeakDHParamsError = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + rv = PK11_PQG_VerifyParams(gWeakParamsPQG, vfy, &passed); + if (rv != SECSuccess || passed != SECSuccess) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: PK11_PQG_VerifyParams failed in ssl3_CreateWeakDHParams", + SSL_GETPID())); + gWeakDHParamsError = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + gWeakDHParams = PORT_ArenaNew(gWeakParamsPQG->arena, ssl3DHParams); + if (!gWeakDHParams) { + gWeakDHParamsError = PORT_GetError(); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + gWeakDHParams->name = ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom; + gWeakDHParams->prime.data = gWeakParamsPQG->prime.data; + gWeakDHParams->prime.len = gWeakParamsPQG->prime.len; + gWeakDHParams->base.data = gWeakParamsPQG->base.data; + gWeakDHParams->base.len = gWeakParamsPQG->base.len; + + PK11_PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy); + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_WeakDHParamsShutdown(void *appData, void *nssData) +{ + if (gWeakParamsPQG) { + PK11_PQG_DestroyParams(gWeakParamsPQG); + gWeakParamsPQG = NULL; + gWeakDHParams = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus +ssl3_WeakDHParamsRegisterShutdown(void) +{ + SECStatus rv; + rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_WeakDHParamsShutdown, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + gWeakDHParamsRegisterError = PORT_GetError(); + } + return (PRStatus)rv; +} + +/* global init strategy inspired by ssl3_CreateECDHEphemeralKeys */ +SECStatus +SSL_EnableWeakDHEPrimeGroup(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + PRStatus status; + + if (enabled) { + status = PR_CallOnce(&gWeakDHParamsRegisterOnce, + ssl3_WeakDHParamsRegisterShutdown); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(gWeakDHParamsRegisterError); + return SECFailure; + } + + status = PR_CallOnce(&gWeakDHParamsOnce, ssl3_CreateWeakDHParams); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) { + PORT_SetError(gWeakDHParamsError); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (!fd) + return SECSuccess; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_DHEGroupPrefSet", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +#include "dhe-param.c" + +const ssl3DHParams * +ssl_GetDHEParams(const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + switch (groupDef->name) { + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048: + return &ff_dhe_2048_params; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072: + return &ff_dhe_3072_params; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_4096: + return &ff_dhe_4096_params; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_6144: + return &ff_dhe_6144_params; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_8192: + return &ff_dhe_8192_params; + case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom: + PORT_Assert(gWeakDHParams); + return gWeakDHParams; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return NULL; +} + +/* This validates dh_Ys against the group prime. */ +PRBool +ssl_IsValidDHEShare(const SECItem *dh_p, const SECItem *dh_Ys) +{ + unsigned int size_p = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(dh_p); + unsigned int size_y = SECKEY_BigIntegerBitLength(dh_Ys); + unsigned int commonPart; + int cmp; + + if (dh_p->len == 0 || dh_Ys->len == 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* Check that the prime is at least odd. */ + if ((dh_p->data[dh_p->len - 1] & 0x01) == 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* dh_Ys can't be 1, or bigger than dh_p. */ + if (size_y <= 1 || size_y > size_p) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + /* If dh_Ys is shorter, then it's definitely smaller than p-1. */ + if (size_y < size_p) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + /* Compare the common part of each, minus the final octet. */ + commonPart = (size_p + 7) / 8; + PORT_Assert(commonPart <= dh_Ys->len); + PORT_Assert(commonPart <= dh_p->len); + cmp = PORT_Memcmp(dh_Ys->data + dh_Ys->len - commonPart, + dh_p->data + dh_p->len - commonPart, commonPart - 1); + if (cmp < 0) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (cmp > 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* The last octet of the prime is the only thing that is different and that + * has to be two greater than the share, otherwise we have Ys == p - 1, + * and that means small subgroups. */ + if (dh_Ys->data[dh_Ys->len - 1] >= (dh_p->data[dh_p->len - 1] - 1)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Checks that the provided DH parameters match those in one of the named groups + * that we have enabled. The groups are defined in dhe-param.c and are those + * defined in Appendix A of draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe. + * + * |groupDef| and |dhParams| are optional outparams that identify the group and + * its parameters respectively (if this is successful). */ +SECStatus +ssl_ValidateDHENamedGroup(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *dh_p, + const SECItem *dh_g, + const sslNamedGroupDef **groupDef, + const ssl3DHParams **dhParams) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + const ssl3DHParams *params; + if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]) { + continue; + } + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType != ssl_kea_dh) { + continue; + } + + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]); + PORT_Assert(params); + if (SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(¶ms->prime, dh_p)) { + if (!SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(¶ms->base, dh_g)) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (groupDef) + *groupDef = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + if (dhParams) + *dhParams = params; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Ensure DH parameters have been selected. This just picks the first enabled + * FFDHE group in ssl_named_groups, or the weak one if it was enabled. */ +SECStatus +ssl_SelectDHEGroup(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef **groupDef) +{ + unsigned int i; + static const sslNamedGroupDef weak_group_def = { + ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom, WEAK_DHE_SIZE, ssl_kea_dh, + SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_CUSTOM, PR_TRUE + }; + PRInt32 minDH; + SECStatus rv; + + // make sure we select a group consistent with our + // current policy policy + rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minDH); + if (rv != SECSuccess || minDH <= 0) { + minDH = DH_MIN_P_BITS; + } + + /* Only select weak groups in TLS 1.2 and earlier, but not if the client has + * indicated that it supports an FFDHE named group. */ + if (ss->ssl3.dheWeakGroupEnabled && + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + !ss->xtnData.peerSupportsFfdheGroups && + weak_group_def.bits >= minDH) { + *groupDef = &weak_group_def; + return SECSuccess; + } + if (ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup && + ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup) && + ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup->bits >= minDH) { + *groupDef = ss->ssl3.dhePreferredGroup; + return SECSuccess; + } + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->keaType == ssl_kea_dh && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]->bits >= minDH) { + *groupDef = ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + *groupDef = NULL; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* LOCKS ??? XXX */ +static PRFileDesc * +ssl_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd, SSLProtocolVariant variant) +{ + sslSocket *ns = NULL; + PRStatus rv; + PRNetAddr addr; + SECStatus status = ssl_Init(); + + if (status != SECSuccess) { + return NULL; + } + + if (model == NULL) { + /* Just create a default socket if we're given NULL for the model */ + ns = ssl_NewSocket((PRBool)(!ssl_defaults.noLocks), variant); + } else { + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(model); + if (ss == NULL || ss->protocolVariant != variant) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad model socket in ssl_ImportFD", + SSL_GETPID(), model)); + return NULL; + } + ns = ssl_DupSocket(ss); + } + if (ns == NULL) + return NULL; + + rv = ssl_PushIOLayer(ns, fd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER); + if (rv != PR_SUCCESS) { + ssl_FreeSocket(ns); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } +#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(FORCE_PR_ASSERT) + { + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PORT_Assert(ss == ns); + } +#endif + ns->TCPconnected = (PR_SUCCESS == ssl_DefGetpeername(ns, &addr)); + return fd; +} + +PRFileDesc * +SSL_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + return ssl_ImportFD(model, fd, ssl_variant_stream); +} + +PRFileDesc * +DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + return ssl_ImportFD(model, fd, ssl_variant_datagram); +} + +/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback is used to select an application protocol + * for ALPN. */ +SECStatus +SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLNextProtoCallback callback, + void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetNextProtoCallback", SSL_GETPID(), + fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ss->nextProtoCallback = callback; + ss->nextProtoArg = arg; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback is set as an ALPN callback when + * SSL_SetNextProtoNego is used. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd, + const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len, + unsigned char *protoOut, unsigned int *protoOutLen, + unsigned int protoMaxLen) +{ + unsigned int i, j; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len == 0) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback ALPN disabled", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(protoMaxLen <= 255); + if (protoMaxLen > 255) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* For each protocol in client preference, see if we support it. */ + for (j = 0; j < ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;) { + for (i = 0; i < protos_len;) { + if (protos[i] == ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j] && + PORT_Memcmp(&protos[i + 1], &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j + 1], + protos[i]) == 0) { + /* We found a match. */ + const unsigned char *result = &protos[i]; + memcpy(protoOut, result + 1, result[0]); + *protoOutLen = result[0]; + return SECSuccess; + } + i += 1 + (unsigned int)protos[i]; + } + j += 1 + (unsigned int)ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[j]; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd, const unsigned char *data, + unsigned int length) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetNextProtoNego", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length > 0 && ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol(data, length) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* NPN required that the client's fallback protocol is first in the + * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So move the + * first protocol to the end of the list. */ + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->opt.nextProtoNego, PR_FALSE); + if (length > 0) { + SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego, length); + size_t firstLen = data[0] + 1; + /* firstLen <= length is ensured by ssl3_ValidateAppProtocol. */ + PORT_Memcpy(ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data + (length - firstLen), data, firstLen); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, data + firstLen, length - firstLen); + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + return SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(fd, ssl_NextProtoNegoCallback, NULL); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_GetNextProto(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLNextProtoState *state, unsigned char *buf, + unsigned int *bufLen, unsigned int bufLenMax) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetNextProto", SSL_GETPID(), + fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!state || !buf || !bufLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + *state = ss->xtnData.nextProtoState; + + if (ss->xtnData.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT && + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data) { + if (ss->xtnData.nextProto.len > bufLenMax) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(buf, ss->xtnData.nextProto.data, ss->xtnData.nextProto.len); + *bufLen = ss->xtnData.nextProto.len; + } else { + *bufLen = 0; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetSRTPCiphers(PRFileDesc *fd, + const PRUint16 *ciphers, + unsigned int numCiphers) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + unsigned int i; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss || !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetSRTPCiphers", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (numCiphers > MAX_DTLS_SRTP_CIPHER_SUITES) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount = 0; + for (i = 0; i < numCiphers; i++) { + const PRUint16 *srtpCipher = srtpCiphers; + + while (*srtpCipher) { + if (ciphers[i] == *srtpCipher) + break; + srtpCipher++; + } + if (*srtpCipher) { + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount++] = + ciphers[i]; + } else { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: invalid or unimplemented SRTP cipher " + "suite specified: 0x%04hx", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, + ciphers[i])); + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_GetSRTPCipher(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 *cipher) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_GetSRTPCipher", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->xtnData.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + *cipher = ss->xtnData.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite; + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRFileDesc * +SSL_ReconfigFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *sm = NULL, *ss = NULL; + PRCList *cursor; + SECStatus rv; + + if (model == NULL) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0); + return NULL; + } + sm = ssl_FindSocket(model); + if (sm == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad model socket in ssl_ReconfigFD", + SSL_GETPID(), model)); + return NULL; + } + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + PORT_Assert(ss); + if (ss == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return NULL; + } + + ss->opt = sm->opt; + ss->vrange = sm->vrange; + ss->now = sm->now; + ss->nowArg = sm->nowArg; + PORT_Memcpy(ss->cipherSuites, sm->cipherSuites, sizeof sm->cipherSuites); + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers, sm->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers, + sizeof(PRUint16) * sm->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount); + ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount = sm->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes, sm->ssl3.signatureSchemes, + sizeof(ss->ssl3.signatureSchemes[0]) * + sm->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount); + ss->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount = sm->ssl3.signatureSchemeCount; + ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion = sm->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion; + + if (!ss->opt.useSecurity) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return NULL; + } + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->serverCerts)) { + cursor = PR_LIST_TAIL(&ss->serverCerts); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cursor); + ssl_FreeServerCert((sslServerCert *)cursor); + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&sm->serverCerts); + cursor != &sm->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *sc = ssl_CopyServerCert((sslServerCert *)cursor); + if (!sc) + return NULL; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&sc->link, &ss->serverCerts); + } + + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(ss); + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&sm->ephemeralKeyPairs); + cursor != &sm->ephemeralKeyPairs; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *mkp = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *skp = ssl_CopyEphemeralKeyPair(mkp); + if (!skp) + return NULL; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&skp->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + } + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->extensionHooks)) { + cursor = PR_LIST_TAIL(&ss->extensionHooks); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cursor); + PORT_Free(cursor); + } + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&sm->extensionHooks); + cursor != &sm->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook = (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + rv = SSL_InstallExtensionHooks(ss->fd, hook->type, + hook->writer, hook->writerArg, + hook->handler, hook->handlerArg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return NULL; + } + } + + PORT_Memcpy((void *)ss->namedGroupPreferences, + sm->namedGroupPreferences, + sizeof(ss->namedGroupPreferences)); + ss->additionalShares = sm->additionalShares; + + /* copy trust anchor names */ + if (sm->ssl3.ca_list) { + if (ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + CERT_FreeDistNames(ss->ssl3.ca_list); + } + ss->ssl3.ca_list = CERT_DupDistNames(sm->ssl3.ca_list); + if (!ss->ssl3.ca_list) { + return NULL; + } + } + + /* Copy ECH. */ + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&ss->echConfigs); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->echPrivKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->echPubKey); + rv = tls13_CopyEchConfigs(&sm->echConfigs, &ss->echConfigs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return NULL; + } + if (sm->echPrivKey && sm->echPubKey) { + /* Might be client (no keys). */ + ss->echPrivKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(sm->echPrivKey); + ss->echPubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(sm->echPubKey); + if (!ss->echPrivKey || !ss->echPubKey) { + return NULL; + } + } + + /* Copy anti-replay context. */ + if (ss->antiReplay) { + tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ss->antiReplay); + ss->antiReplay = NULL; + } + if (sm->antiReplay) { + ss->antiReplay = tls13_RefAntiReplayContext(sm->antiReplay); + PORT_Assert(ss->antiReplay); + if (!ss->antiReplay) { + return NULL; + } + } + + tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(sm, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + if (sm->authCertificate) + ss->authCertificate = sm->authCertificate; + if (sm->authCertificateArg) + ss->authCertificateArg = sm->authCertificateArg; + if (sm->getClientAuthData) + ss->getClientAuthData = sm->getClientAuthData; + if (sm->getClientAuthDataArg) + ss->getClientAuthDataArg = sm->getClientAuthDataArg; + if (sm->sniSocketConfig) + ss->sniSocketConfig = sm->sniSocketConfig; + if (sm->sniSocketConfigArg) + ss->sniSocketConfigArg = sm->sniSocketConfigArg; + if (sm->alertReceivedCallback) { + ss->alertReceivedCallback = sm->alertReceivedCallback; + ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg = sm->alertReceivedCallbackArg; + } + if (sm->alertSentCallback) { + ss->alertSentCallback = sm->alertSentCallback; + ss->alertSentCallbackArg = sm->alertSentCallbackArg; + } + if (sm->handleBadCert) + ss->handleBadCert = sm->handleBadCert; + if (sm->badCertArg) + ss->badCertArg = sm->badCertArg; + if (sm->handshakeCallback) + ss->handshakeCallback = sm->handshakeCallback; + if (sm->handshakeCallbackData) + ss->handshakeCallbackData = sm->handshakeCallbackData; + if (sm->pkcs11PinArg) + ss->pkcs11PinArg = sm->pkcs11PinArg; + + return fd; +} + +SECStatus +ssl3_GetEffectiveVersionPolicy(SSLProtocolVariant variant, + SSLVersionRange *effectivePolicy) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 policyFlag; + PRInt32 minPolicy, maxPolicy; + + if (variant == ssl_variant_stream) { + effectivePolicy->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_STREAM; + effectivePolicy->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED; + } else { + effectivePolicy->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_DATAGRAM; + effectivePolicy->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED; + } + + rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, &policyFlag); + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || !(policyFlag & NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL)) { + /* Policy is not active, report library extents. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = NSS_OptionGet(VERSIONS_POLICY_MIN(variant), &minPolicy); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = NSS_OptionGet(VERSIONS_POLICY_MAX(variant), &maxPolicy); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (minPolicy > effectivePolicy->max || + maxPolicy < effectivePolicy->min || + minPolicy > maxPolicy) { + return SECFailure; + } + effectivePolicy->min = PR_MAX(effectivePolicy->min, minPolicy); + effectivePolicy->max = PR_MIN(effectivePolicy->max, maxPolicy); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Assumes that rangeParam values are within the supported boundaries, + * but should contain all potentially allowed versions, even if they contain + * conflicting versions. + * Will return the overlap, or a NONE range if system policy is invalid. + */ +static SECStatus +ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSLVersionRange *input, + SSLVersionRange *overlap) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSLVersionRange effectivePolicyBoundary; + SSLVersionRange vrange; + + PORT_Assert(input != NULL); + + rv = ssl3_GetEffectiveVersionPolicy(protocolVariant, + &effectivePolicyBoundary); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* SECFailure means internal failure or invalid configuration. */ + overlap->min = overlap->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + return SECFailure; + } + + vrange.min = PR_MAX(input->min, effectivePolicyBoundary.min); + vrange.max = PR_MIN(input->max, effectivePolicyBoundary.max); + + if (vrange.max < vrange.min) { + /* there was no overlap, turn off range altogether */ + overlap->min = overlap->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_NONE; + return SECFailure; + } + + *overlap = vrange; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRBool +ssl_VersionIsSupportedByPolicy(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSLVersionRange effectivePolicyBoundary; + + rv = ssl3_GetEffectiveVersionPolicy(protocolVariant, + &effectivePolicyBoundary); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + /* SECFailure means internal failure or invalid configuration. */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + return version >= effectivePolicyBoundary.min && + version <= effectivePolicyBoundary.max; +} + +/* + * This is called at SSL init time to constrain the existing range based + * on user supplied policy. + */ +SECStatus +ssl3_ConstrainRangeByPolicy(void) +{ + /* We ignore failures in ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy. Although an empty + * overlap disables all connectivity, it's an allowed state. + */ + ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(ssl_variant_stream, + VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(ssl_variant_stream), + VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(ssl_variant_stream)); + ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(ssl_variant_datagram, + VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(ssl_variant_datagram), + VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(ssl_variant_datagram)); + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_VersionIsSupportedByCode(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version) +{ + switch (protocolVariant) { + case ssl_variant_stream: + return (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_STREAM && + version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED); + case ssl_variant_datagram: + return (version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_DATAGRAM && + version <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED); + } + + /* Can't get here */ + PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE); + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +ssl3_VersionIsSupported(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSL3ProtocolVersion version) +{ + if (!ssl_VersionIsSupportedByPolicy(protocolVariant, version)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return ssl3_VersionIsSupportedByCode(protocolVariant, version); +} + +const SECItem * +SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_PeerSignedCertTimestamps", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return NULL; + } + + return &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (!vrange) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + switch (protocolVariant) { + case ssl_variant_stream: + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_STREAM; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED; + /* We don't allow SSLv3 and TLSv1.3 together. + * However, don't check yet, apply the policy first. + * Because if the effective supported range doesn't use TLS 1.3, + * then we don't need to increase the minimum. */ + break; + case ssl_variant_datagram: + vrange->min = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MIN_SUPPORTED_DATAGRAM; + vrange->max = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(protocolVariant, vrange, vrange); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Library default and policy don't overlap. */ + return rv; + } + + /* We don't allow SSLv3 and TLSv1.3 together */ + if (vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + vrange->min = PR_MAX(vrange->min, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + if ((protocolVariant != ssl_variant_stream && + protocolVariant != ssl_variant_datagram) || + !vrange) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + *vrange = *VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(protocolVariant); + return ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(protocolVariant, vrange, vrange); +} + +static PRBool +ssl3_HasConflictingSSLVersions(const SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + return (vrange->min <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 && + vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); +} + +static SECStatus +ssl3_CheckRangeValidAndConstrainByPolicy(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (vrange->min > vrange->max || + !ssl3_VersionIsSupportedByCode(protocolVariant, vrange->min) || + !ssl3_VersionIsSupportedByCode(protocolVariant, vrange->max) || + ssl3_HasConflictingSSLVersions(vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION_RANGE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Try to adjust the received range using our policy. + * If there's overlap, we'll use the (possibly reduced) range. + * If there isn't overlap, it's failure. */ + + rv = ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(protocolVariant, vrange, vrange); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + /* We don't allow SSLv3 and TLSv1.3 together */ + if (vrange->max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + vrange->min = PR_MAX(vrange->min, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault(SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, + const SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + SSLVersionRange constrainedRange; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!vrange) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + constrainedRange = *vrange; + rv = ssl3_CheckRangeValidAndConstrainByPolicy(protocolVariant, + &constrainedRange); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + *VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(protocolVariant) = constrainedRange; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_VersionRangeGet(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_VersionRangeGet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!vrange) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + *vrange = ss->vrange; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(ss->protocolVariant, vrange, vrange); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_VersionRangeSet(PRFileDesc *fd, const SSLVersionRange *vrange) +{ + SSLVersionRange constrainedRange; + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!vrange) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_VersionRangeSet", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + constrainedRange = *vrange; + rv = ssl3_CheckRangeValidAndConstrainByPolicy(ss->protocolVariant, + &constrainedRange); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion && + ss->vrange.max > ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION_RANGE); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->vrange = constrainedRange; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint16 version) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetDowngradeCheckVersion", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (version && !ssl3_VersionIsSupported(ss->protocolVariant, version)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (version && version < ss->vrange.max) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + ss->ssl3.downgradeCheckVersion = version; + rv = SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +const SECItemArray * +SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + + if (!ss->sec.ci.sid) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return NULL; + } + + return &ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCertStatus; +} + +/************************************************************************/ +/* The following functions are the TOP LEVEL SSL functions. +** They all get called through the NSPRIOMethods table below. +*/ + +static PRFileDesc *PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Accept(PRFileDesc *fd, PRNetAddr *sockaddr, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + sslSocket *ns = NULL; + PRFileDesc *newfd = NULL; + PRFileDesc *osfd; + PRStatus status; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in accept", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return NULL; + } + + /* IF this is a listen socket, there shouldn't be any I/O going on */ + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ss->cTimeout = timeout; + + osfd = ss->fd->lower; + + /* First accept connection */ + newfd = osfd->methods->accept(osfd, sockaddr, timeout); + if (newfd == NULL) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: accept failed, errno=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError())); + } else { + /* Create ssl module */ + ns = ssl_DupSocket(ss); + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); /* ss isn't used below here. */ + + if (ns == NULL) + goto loser; + + /* push ssl module onto the new socket */ + status = ssl_PushIOLayer(ns, newfd, PR_TOP_IO_LAYER); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) + goto loser; + + /* Now start server connection handshake with client. + ** Don't need locks here because nobody else has a reference to ns yet. + */ + if (ns->opt.useSecurity) { + if (ns->opt.handshakeAsClient) { + ns->handshake = ssl_BeginClientHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsClient; + } else { + ns->handshake = ssl_BeginServerHandshake; + ss->handshaking = sslHandshakingAsServer; + } + } + ns->TCPconnected = 1; + return newfd; + +loser: + if (ns != NULL) + ssl_FreeSocket(ns); + if (newfd != NULL) + PR_Close(newfd); + return NULL; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Connect(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRNetAddr *sockaddr, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + PRStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in connect", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + /* IF this is a listen socket, there shouldn't be any I/O going on */ + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + + ss->cTimeout = timeout; + rv = (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->connect)(ss, sockaddr); + + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Bind(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRNetAddr *addr) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + PRStatus rv; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in bind", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + + rv = (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->bind)(ss, addr); + + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Listen(PRFileDesc *fd, PRIntn backlog) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + PRStatus rv; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in listen", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + + rv = (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->listen)(ss, backlog); + + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Shutdown(PRFileDesc *fd, PRIntn how) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + PRStatus rv; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in shutdown", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + if (how == PR_SHUTDOWN_RCV || how == PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH) { + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + } + if (how == PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND || how == PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH) { + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + } + + rv = (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->shutdown)(ss, how); + + if (how == PR_SHUTDOWN_SEND || how == PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH) { + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + } + if (how == PR_SHUTDOWN_RCV || how == PR_SHUTDOWN_BOTH) { + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + } + return rv; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Close(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + PRStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in close", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + + /* There must not be any I/O going on */ + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + + /* By the time this function returns, + ** ss is an invalid pointer, and the locks to which it points have + ** been unlocked and freed. So, this is the ONE PLACE in all of SSL + ** where the LOCK calls and the corresponding UNLOCK calls are not in + ** the same function scope. The unlock calls are in ssl_FreeSocket(). + */ + rv = (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->close)(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static int PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Recv(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 len, PRIntn flags, + PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + int rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in recv", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + ss->rTimeout = timeout; + if (!ss->opt.fdx) + ss->wTimeout = timeout; + rv = (*ss->ops->recv)(ss, (unsigned char *)buf, len, flags); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static int PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Send(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 len, PRIntn flags, + PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + int rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in send", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + ss->wTimeout = timeout; + if (!ss->opt.fdx) + ss->rTimeout = timeout; + rv = (*ss->ops->send)(ss, (const unsigned char *)buf, len, flags); + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static int PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Read(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 len) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + int rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in read", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_LOCK_READER(ss); + ss->rTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + if (!ss->opt.fdx) + ss->wTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + rv = (*ss->ops->read)(ss, (unsigned char *)buf, len); + SSL_UNLOCK_READER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static int PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Write(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 len) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + int rv; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in write", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_LOCK_WRITER(ss); + ss->wTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + if (!ss->opt.fdx) + ss->rTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + rv = (*ss->ops->write)(ss, (const unsigned char *)buf, len); + SSL_UNLOCK_WRITER(ss); + return rv; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_GetPeerName(PRFileDesc *fd, PRNetAddr *addr) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in getpeername", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->getpeername)(ss, addr); +} + +/* +*/ +SECStatus +ssl_GetPeerInfo(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRFileDesc *osfd; + int rv; + PRNetAddr sin; + + osfd = ss->fd->lower; + + PORT_Memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); + rv = osfd->methods->getpeername(osfd, &sin); + if (rv < 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->TCPconnected = 1; + if (sin.inet.family == PR_AF_INET) { + PR_ConvertIPv4AddrToIPv6(sin.inet.ip, &ss->sec.ci.peer); + ss->sec.ci.port = sin.inet.port; + } else if (sin.ipv6.family == PR_AF_INET6) { + ss->sec.ci.peer = sin.ipv6.ip; + ss->sec.ci.port = sin.ipv6.port; + } else { + PORT_SetError(PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_GetSockName(PRFileDesc *fd, PRNetAddr *name) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in getsockname", SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return PR_FAILURE; + } + return (PRStatus)(*ss->ops->getsockname)(ss, name); +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SetSockPeerID(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *peerID) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetSockPeerID", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->peerID) { + PORT_Free(ss->peerID); + ss->peerID = NULL; + } + if (peerID) + ss->peerID = PORT_Strdup(peerID); + return (ss->peerID || !peerID) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; +} + +#define PR_POLL_RW (PR_POLL_WRITE | PR_POLL_READ) + +static PRInt16 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Poll(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt16 how_flags, PRInt16 *p_out_flags) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + PRInt16 new_flags = how_flags; /* should select on these flags. */ + PRNetAddr addr; + + *p_out_flags = 0; + ss = ssl_GetPrivate(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_Poll", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return 0; /* don't poll on this socket */ + } + + if (ss->opt.useSecurity && + ss->handshaking != sslHandshakingUndetermined && + !ss->firstHsDone && + (how_flags & PR_POLL_RW)) { + if (!ss->TCPconnected) { + ss->TCPconnected = (PR_SUCCESS == ssl_DefGetpeername(ss, &addr)); + } + /* If it's not connected, then presumably the application is polling + ** on read or write appropriately, so don't change it. + */ + if (ss->TCPconnected) { + if (!ss->handshakeBegun) { + /* If the handshake has not begun, poll on read or write + ** based on the local application's role in the handshake, + ** not based on what the application requested. + */ + new_flags &= ~PR_POLL_RW; + if (ss->handshaking == sslHandshakingAsClient) { + new_flags |= PR_POLL_WRITE; + } else { /* handshaking as server */ + new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; + } + } else if (ss->lastWriteBlocked) { + /* First handshake is in progress */ + if (new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) { + /* The caller is waiting for data to be received, + ** but the initial handshake is blocked on write, or the + ** client's first handshake record has not been written. + ** The code should select on write, not read. + */ + new_flags &= ~PR_POLL_READ; /* don't select on read. */ + new_flags |= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* do select on write. */ + } + } else if (new_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) { + /* The caller is trying to write, but the handshake is + ** blocked waiting for data to read, and the first + ** handshake has been sent. So do NOT to poll on write + ** unless we did false start or we are doing 0-RTT. + */ + if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted)) { + new_flags &= ~PR_POLL_WRITE; /* don't select on write. */ + } + new_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; /* do select on read. */ + } + } + } else if ((new_flags & PR_POLL_READ) && (SSL_DataPending(fd) > 0)) { + *p_out_flags = PR_POLL_READ; /* it's ready already. */ + return new_flags; + } else if ((ss->lastWriteBlocked) && (how_flags & PR_POLL_READ) && + (ss->pendingBuf.len != 0)) { /* write data waiting to be sent */ + new_flags |= PR_POLL_WRITE; /* also select on write. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget != NULL) { + /* Read and write will block until the asynchronous callback completes + * (e.g. until SSL_AuthCertificateComplete is called), so don't tell + * the caller to poll the socket unless there is pending write data. + */ + if (ss->lastWriteBlocked && ss->pendingBuf.len != 0) { + /* Ignore any newly-received data on the socket, but do wait for + * the socket to become writable again. Here, it is OK for an error + * to be detected, because our logic for sending pending write data + * will allow us to report the error to the caller without the risk + * of the application spinning. + */ + new_flags &= (PR_POLL_WRITE | PR_POLL_EXCEPT); + } else { + /* Unfortunately, clearing new_flags will make it impossible for + * the application to detect errors that it would otherwise be + * able to detect with PR_POLL_EXCEPT, until the asynchronous + * callback completes. However, we must clear all the flags to + * prevent the application from spinning (alternating between + * calling PR_Poll that would return PR_POLL_EXCEPT, and send/recv + * which won't actually report the I/O error while we are waiting + * for the asynchronous callback to complete). + */ + new_flags = 0; + } + } + + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: SSL[%d]: ssl_Poll flags %x -> %x", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, how_flags, new_flags)); + + if (new_flags && (fd->lower->methods->poll != NULL)) { + PRInt16 lower_out_flags = 0; + PRInt16 lower_new_flags; + lower_new_flags = fd->lower->methods->poll(fd->lower, new_flags, + &lower_out_flags); + if ((lower_new_flags & lower_out_flags) && (how_flags != new_flags)) { + PRInt16 out_flags = lower_out_flags & ~PR_POLL_RW; + if (lower_out_flags & PR_POLL_READ) + out_flags |= PR_POLL_WRITE; + if (lower_out_flags & PR_POLL_WRITE) + out_flags |= PR_POLL_READ; + *p_out_flags = out_flags; + new_flags = how_flags; + } else { + *p_out_flags = lower_out_flags; + new_flags = lower_new_flags; + } + } + + return new_flags; +} + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_TransmitFile(PRFileDesc *sd, PRFileDesc *fd, + const void *headers, PRInt32 hlen, + PRTransmitFileFlags flags, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + PRSendFileData sfd; + + sfd.fd = fd; + sfd.file_offset = 0; + sfd.file_nbytes = 0; + sfd.header = headers; + sfd.hlen = hlen; + sfd.trailer = NULL; + sfd.tlen = 0; + + return sd->methods->sendfile(sd, &sfd, flags, timeout); +} + +PRBool +ssl_FdIsBlocking(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PRSocketOptionData opt; + PRStatus status; + + opt.option = PR_SockOpt_Nonblocking; + opt.value.non_blocking = PR_FALSE; + status = PR_GetSocketOption(fd, &opt); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) + return PR_FALSE; + return (PRBool)!opt.value.non_blocking; +} + +PRBool +ssl_SocketIsBlocking(sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ssl_FdIsBlocking(ss->fd); +} + +PRInt32 sslFirstBufSize = 8 * 1024; +PRInt32 sslCopyLimit = 1024; + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_WriteV(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRIOVec *iov, PRInt32 vectors, + PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + PRInt32 i; + PRInt32 bufLen; + PRInt32 left; + PRInt32 rv; + PRInt32 sent = 0; + const PRInt32 first_len = sslFirstBufSize; + const PRInt32 limit = sslCopyLimit; + PRBool blocking; + PRIOVec myIov; + char buf[MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH]; + + if (vectors < 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return -1; + } + if (vectors > PR_MAX_IOVECTOR_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR); + return -1; + } + for (i = 0; i < vectors; i++) { + if (iov[i].iov_len < 0) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + blocking = ssl_FdIsBlocking(fd); + +#define K16 ((int)sizeof(buf)) +#define KILL_VECTORS \ + while (vectors && !iov->iov_len) { \ + ++iov; \ + --vectors; \ + } +#define GET_VECTOR \ + do { \ + myIov = *iov++; \ + --vectors; \ + KILL_VECTORS \ + } while (0) +#define HANDLE_ERR(rv, len) \ + if (rv != len) { \ + if (rv < 0) { \ + if (!blocking && \ + (PR_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) && \ + (sent > 0)) { \ + return sent; \ + } else { \ + return -1; \ + } \ + } \ + /* Only a nonblocking socket can have partial sends */ \ + PR_ASSERT(!blocking); \ + return sent + rv; \ + } +#define SEND(bfr, len) \ + do { \ + rv = ssl_Send(fd, bfr, len, 0, timeout); \ + HANDLE_ERR(rv, len) \ + sent += len; \ + } while (0) + + /* Make sure the first write is at least 8 KB, if possible. */ + KILL_VECTORS + if (!vectors) + return ssl_Send(fd, 0, 0, 0, timeout); + GET_VECTOR; + if (!vectors) { + return ssl_Send(fd, myIov.iov_base, myIov.iov_len, 0, timeout); + } + if (myIov.iov_len < first_len) { + PORT_Memcpy(buf, myIov.iov_base, myIov.iov_len); + bufLen = myIov.iov_len; + left = first_len - bufLen; + while (vectors && left) { + int toCopy; + GET_VECTOR; + toCopy = PR_MIN(left, myIov.iov_len); + PORT_Memcpy(buf + bufLen, myIov.iov_base, toCopy); + bufLen += toCopy; + left -= toCopy; + myIov.iov_base += toCopy; + myIov.iov_len -= toCopy; + } + SEND(buf, bufLen); + } + + while (vectors || myIov.iov_len) { + PRInt32 addLen; + if (!myIov.iov_len) { + GET_VECTOR; + } + while (myIov.iov_len >= K16) { + SEND(myIov.iov_base, K16); + myIov.iov_base += K16; + myIov.iov_len -= K16; + } + if (!myIov.iov_len) + continue; + + if (!vectors || myIov.iov_len > limit) { + addLen = 0; + } else if ((addLen = iov->iov_len % K16) + myIov.iov_len <= limit) { + /* Addlen is already computed. */; + } else if (vectors > 1 && + iov[1].iov_len % K16 + addLen + myIov.iov_len <= 2 * limit) { + addLen = limit - myIov.iov_len; + } else + addLen = 0; + + if (!addLen) { + SEND(myIov.iov_base, myIov.iov_len); + myIov.iov_len = 0; + continue; + } + PORT_Memcpy(buf, myIov.iov_base, myIov.iov_len); + bufLen = myIov.iov_len; + do { + GET_VECTOR; + PORT_Memcpy(buf + bufLen, myIov.iov_base, addLen); + myIov.iov_base += addLen; + myIov.iov_len -= addLen; + bufLen += addLen; + + left = PR_MIN(limit, K16 - bufLen); + if (!vectors /* no more left */ + || myIov.iov_len > 0 /* we didn't use that one all up */ + || bufLen >= K16 /* it's full. */) { + addLen = 0; + } else if ((addLen = iov->iov_len % K16) <= left) { + /* Addlen is already computed. */; + } else if (vectors > 1 && + iov[1].iov_len % K16 + addLen <= left + limit) { + addLen = left; + } else + addLen = 0; + + } while (addLen); + SEND(buf, bufLen); + } + return sent; +} + +/* + * These functions aren't implemented. + */ + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Available(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRInt64 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Available64(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PRInt64 res; + + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + LL_I2L(res, -1L); + return res; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_FSync(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Seek(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 offset, PRSeekWhence how) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRInt64 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_Seek64(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt64 offset, PRSeekWhence how) +{ + PRInt64 res; + + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + LL_I2L(res, -1L); + return res; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_FileInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, PRFileInfo *info) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +static PRStatus PR_CALLBACK +ssl_FileInfo64(PRFileDesc *fd, PRFileInfo64 *info) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_RecvFrom(PRFileDesc *fd, void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags, + PRNetAddr *addr, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRInt32 PR_CALLBACK +ssl_SendTo(PRFileDesc *fd, const void *buf, PRInt32 amount, PRIntn flags, + const PRNetAddr *addr, PRIntervalTime timeout) +{ + PORT_Assert(0); + PR_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR, 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +static const PRIOMethods ssl_methods = { + PR_DESC_LAYERED, + ssl_Close, /* close */ + ssl_Read, /* read */ + ssl_Write, /* write */ + ssl_Available, /* available */ + ssl_Available64, /* available64 */ + ssl_FSync, /* fsync */ + ssl_Seek, /* seek */ + ssl_Seek64, /* seek64 */ + ssl_FileInfo, /* fileInfo */ + ssl_FileInfo64, /* fileInfo64 */ + ssl_WriteV, /* writev */ + ssl_Connect, /* connect */ + ssl_Accept, /* accept */ + ssl_Bind, /* bind */ + ssl_Listen, /* listen */ + ssl_Shutdown, /* shutdown */ + ssl_Recv, /* recv */ + ssl_Send, /* send */ + ssl_RecvFrom, /* recvfrom */ + ssl_SendTo, /* sendto */ + ssl_Poll, /* poll */ + PR_EmulateAcceptRead, /* acceptread */ + ssl_TransmitFile, /* transmitfile */ + ssl_GetSockName, /* getsockname */ + ssl_GetPeerName, /* getpeername */ + NULL, /* getsockopt OBSOLETE */ + NULL, /* setsockopt OBSOLETE */ + NULL, /* getsocketoption */ + NULL, /* setsocketoption */ + PR_EmulateSendFile, /* Send a (partial) file with header/trailer*/ + NULL, /* reserved for future use */ + NULL, /* reserved for future use */ + NULL, /* reserved for future use */ + NULL, /* reserved for future use */ + NULL /* reserved for future use */ +}; + +static PRIOMethods combined_methods; + +static void +ssl_SetupIOMethods(void) +{ + PRIOMethods *new_methods = &combined_methods; + const PRIOMethods *nspr_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods(); + const PRIOMethods *my_methods = &ssl_methods; + + *new_methods = *nspr_methods; + + new_methods->file_type = my_methods->file_type; + new_methods->close = my_methods->close; + new_methods->read = my_methods->read; + new_methods->write = my_methods->write; + new_methods->available = my_methods->available; + new_methods->available64 = my_methods->available64; + new_methods->fsync = my_methods->fsync; + new_methods->seek = my_methods->seek; + new_methods->seek64 = my_methods->seek64; + new_methods->fileInfo = my_methods->fileInfo; + new_methods->fileInfo64 = my_methods->fileInfo64; + new_methods->writev = my_methods->writev; + new_methods->connect = my_methods->connect; + new_methods->accept = my_methods->accept; + new_methods->bind = my_methods->bind; + new_methods->listen = my_methods->listen; + new_methods->shutdown = my_methods->shutdown; + new_methods->recv = my_methods->recv; + new_methods->send = my_methods->send; + new_methods->recvfrom = my_methods->recvfrom; + new_methods->sendto = my_methods->sendto; + new_methods->poll = my_methods->poll; + new_methods->acceptread = my_methods->acceptread; + new_methods->transmitfile = my_methods->transmitfile; + new_methods->getsockname = my_methods->getsockname; + new_methods->getpeername = my_methods->getpeername; + /* new_methods->getsocketoption = my_methods->getsocketoption; */ + /* new_methods->setsocketoption = my_methods->setsocketoption; */ + new_methods->sendfile = my_methods->sendfile; +} + +static PRCallOnceType initIoLayerOnce; + +static PRStatus +ssl_InitIOLayer(void) +{ + ssl_layer_id = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("SSL"); + ssl_SetupIOMethods(); + return PR_SUCCESS; +} + +static PRStatus +ssl_PushIOLayer(sslSocket *ns, PRFileDesc *stack, PRDescIdentity id) +{ + PRFileDesc *layer = NULL; + PRStatus status; + + status = PR_CallOnce(&initIoLayerOnce, &ssl_InitIOLayer); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) { + goto loser; + } + if (ns == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + layer = PR_CreateIOLayerStub(ssl_layer_id, &combined_methods); + if (layer == NULL) + goto loser; + layer->secret = (PRFilePrivate *)ns; + + /* Here, "stack" points to the PRFileDesc on the top of the stack. + ** "layer" points to a new FD that is to be inserted into the stack. + ** If layer is being pushed onto the top of the stack, then + ** PR_PushIOLayer switches the contents of stack and layer, and then + ** puts stack on top of layer, so that after it is done, the top of + ** stack is the same "stack" as it was before, and layer is now the + ** FD for the former top of stack. + ** After this call, stack always points to the top PRFD on the stack. + ** If this function fails, the contents of stack and layer are as + ** they were before the call. + */ + status = PR_PushIOLayer(stack, id, layer); + if (status != PR_SUCCESS) + goto loser; + + ns->fd = (id == PR_TOP_IO_LAYER) ? stack : layer; + return PR_SUCCESS; + +loser: + if (layer) { + layer->dtor(layer); /* free layer */ + } + return PR_FAILURE; +} + +/* if this fails, caller must destroy socket. */ +static SECStatus +ssl_MakeLocks(sslSocket *ss) +{ + ss->firstHandshakeLock = PZ_NewMonitor(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->firstHandshakeLock) + goto loser; + ss->ssl3HandshakeLock = PZ_NewMonitor(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->ssl3HandshakeLock) + goto loser; + ss->specLock = NSSRWLock_New(SSL_LOCK_RANK_SPEC, NULL); + if (!ss->specLock) + goto loser; + ss->recvBufLock = PZ_NewMonitor(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->recvBufLock) + goto loser; + ss->xmitBufLock = PZ_NewMonitor(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->xmitBufLock) + goto loser; + ss->writerThread = NULL; + if (ssl_lock_readers) { + ss->recvLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->recvLock) + goto loser; + ss->sendLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockSSL); + if (!ss->sendLock) + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; +loser: + ssl_DestroyLocks(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +#if defined(XP_UNIX) || defined(XP_WIN32) +#define NSS_HAVE_GETENV 1 +#endif + +#define LOWER(x) (x | 0x20) /* cheap ToLower function ignores LOCALE */ + +static void +ssl_SetDefaultsFromEnvironment(void) +{ +#if defined(NSS_HAVE_GETENV) + static int firsttime = 1; + + if (firsttime) { + char *ev; + firsttime = 0; +#ifdef DEBUG + ssl_trace_iob = NULL; + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("SSLDEBUGFILE"); + if (ev && ev[0]) { + ssl_trace_iob = fopen(ev, "w"); + } + if (!ssl_trace_iob) { + ssl_trace_iob = stderr; + } +#ifdef TRACE + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("SSLTRACE"); + if (ev && ev[0]) { + ssl_trace = atoi(ev); + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: tracing set to %d", ssl_trace)); + } +#endif /* TRACE */ + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("SSLDEBUG"); + if (ev && ev[0]) { + ssl_debug = atoi(ev); + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: debugging set to %d", ssl_debug)); + } +#endif /* DEBUG */ +#ifdef NSS_ALLOW_SSLKEYLOGFILE + ssl_keylog_iob = NULL; + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("SSLKEYLOGFILE"); + if (ev && ev[0]) { + ssl_keylog_iob = fopen(ev, "a"); + if (!ssl_keylog_iob) { + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: failed to open key log file")); + } else { + if (ftell(ssl_keylog_iob) == 0) { + fputs("# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by NSS\n", + ssl_keylog_iob); + } + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: logging SSL/TLS secrets to %s", ev)); + ssl_keylog_lock = PR_NewLock(); + if (!ssl_keylog_lock) { + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: failed to create key log lock")); + fclose(ssl_keylog_iob); + ssl_keylog_iob = NULL; + } + } + } +#endif + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("SSLFORCELOCKS"); + if (ev && ev[0] == '1') { + ssl_force_locks = PR_TRUE; + ssl_defaults.noLocks = 0; + strcpy(lockStatus + LOCKSTATUS_OFFSET, "FORCED. "); + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: force_locks set to %d", ssl_force_locks)); + } + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION"); + if (ev) { + if (ev[0] == '1' || LOWER(ev[0]) == 'u') + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED; + else if (ev[0] == '0' || LOWER(ev[0]) == 'n') + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER; + else if (ev[0] == '2' || LOWER(ev[0]) == 'r') + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN; + else if (ev[0] == '3' || LOWER(ev[0]) == 't') + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL; + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: enableRenegotiation set to %d", + ssl_defaults.enableRenegotiation)); + } + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION"); + if (ev && ev[0] == '1') { + ssl_defaults.requireSafeNegotiation = PR_TRUE; + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: requireSafeNegotiation set to %d", + PR_TRUE)); + } + ev = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV"); + if (ev && ev[0] == '0') { + ssl_defaults.cbcRandomIV = PR_FALSE; + SSL_TRACE(("SSL: cbcRandomIV set to 0")); + } + } +#endif /* NSS_HAVE_GETENV */ +} + +const sslNamedGroupDef * +ssl_LookupNamedGroup(SSLNamedGroup group) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ssl_named_groups[i].name == group) { + return &ssl_named_groups[i]; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +PRBool +ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(const sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + unsigned int i; + + if (!groupDef) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] && + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] == groupDef) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Returns a reference counted object that contains a key pair. + * Or NULL on failure. Initial ref count is 1. + * Uses the keys in the pair as input. Adopts the keys given. + */ +sslKeyPair * +ssl_NewKeyPair(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + sslKeyPair *pair; + + if (!privKey || !pubKey) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + pair = PORT_ZNew(sslKeyPair); + if (!pair) + return NULL; /* error code is set. */ + pair->privKey = privKey; + pair->pubKey = pubKey; + pair->refCount = 1; + return pair; /* success */ +} + +sslKeyPair * +ssl_GetKeyPairRef(sslKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&keyPair->refCount); + return keyPair; +} + +void +ssl_FreeKeyPair(sslKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + if (!keyPair) { + return; + } + + PRInt32 newCount = PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&keyPair->refCount); + if (!newCount) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(keyPair->privKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(keyPair->pubKey); + PORT_Free(keyPair); + } +} + +/* Ephemeral key handling. */ +sslEphemeralKeyPair * +ssl_NewEphemeralKeyPair(const sslNamedGroupDef *group, + SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + sslKeyPair *keys; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + if (!group) { + PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + keys = ssl_NewKeyPair(privKey, pubKey); + if (!keys) { + return NULL; + } + + pair = PORT_ZNew(sslEphemeralKeyPair); + if (!pair) { + ssl_FreeKeyPair(keys); + return NULL; /* error already set */ + } + + PR_INIT_CLIST(&pair->link); + pair->group = group; + pair->keys = keys; + + return pair; +} + +sslEphemeralKeyPair * +ssl_CopyEphemeralKeyPair(sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + sslEphemeralKeyPair *pair; + + pair = PORT_ZNew(sslEphemeralKeyPair); + if (!pair) { + return NULL; /* error already set */ + } + + PR_INIT_CLIST(&pair->link); + pair->group = keyPair->group; + pair->keys = ssl_GetKeyPairRef(keyPair->keys); + + return pair; +} + +void +ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair(sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair) +{ + if (!keyPair) { + return; + } + + ssl_FreeKeyPair(keyPair->keys); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&keyPair->link); + PORT_Free(keyPair); +} + +PRBool +ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(const sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + return ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair((sslSocket *)ss, groupDef) != NULL; +} + +sslEphemeralKeyPair * +ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + cursor != &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor; + if (keyPair->group == groupDef) { + return keyPair; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +void +ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(sslSocket *ss) +{ + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)) { + PRCList *cursor = PR_LIST_TAIL(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPair((sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor); + } +} + +PRTime +ssl_Time(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!ss->now) { + return PR_Now(); + } + return ss->now(ss->nowArg); +} + +/* +** Create a newsocket structure for a file descriptor. +*/ +static sslSocket * +ssl_NewSocket(PRBool makeLocks, SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss; + int i; + ssl_SetDefaultsFromEnvironment(); + + if (ssl_force_locks) + makeLocks = PR_TRUE; + + /* Make a new socket and get it ready */ + ss = PORT_ZNew(sslSocket); + if (!ss) { + return NULL; + } + ss->opt = ssl_defaults; + if (protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) { + ss->opt.enableRenegotiation = SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER; + } + ss->opt.useSocks = PR_FALSE; + ss->opt.noLocks = !makeLocks; + ss->vrange = *VERSIONS_DEFAULTS(protocolVariant); + ss->protocolVariant = protocolVariant; + /* Ignore overlap failures, because returning NULL would trigger assertion + * failures elsewhere. We don't want this scenario to be fatal, it's just + * a state where no SSL connectivity is possible. */ + ssl3_CreateOverlapWithPolicy(ss->protocolVariant, &ss->vrange, &ss->vrange); + ss->peerID = NULL; + ss->rTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + ss->wTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + ss->cTimeout = PR_INTERVAL_NO_TIMEOUT; + ss->url = NULL; + + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->serverCerts); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->extensionHooks); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->echConfigs); + + ss->dbHandle = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(); + + /* Provide default implementation of hooks */ + ss->authCertificate = SSL_AuthCertificate; + ss->authCertificateArg = (void *)ss->dbHandle; + ss->sniSocketConfig = NULL; + ss->sniSocketConfigArg = NULL; + ss->getClientAuthData = NULL; + ss->alertReceivedCallback = NULL; + ss->alertReceivedCallbackArg = NULL; + ss->alertSentCallback = NULL; + ss->alertSentCallbackArg = NULL; + ss->handleBadCert = NULL; + ss->badCertArg = NULL; + ss->pkcs11PinArg = NULL; + + ssl_ChooseOps(ss); + ssl3_InitSocketPolicy(ss); + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + ss->namedGroupPreferences[i] = &ssl_named_groups[i]; + } + ss->additionalShares = 0; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.lastMessageFlight); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + ssl3_InitExtensionData(&ss->xtnData, ss); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsSentHandshake); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.dtlsRcvdHandshake); + PR_INIT_CLIST(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + dtls_InitTimers(ss); + + ss->echPrivKey = NULL; + ss->echPubKey = NULL; + ss->antiReplay = NULL; + ss->psk = NULL; + + if (makeLocks) { + rv = ssl_MakeLocks(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl_CreateSecurityInfo(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_InitGather(&ss->gs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + rv = ssl3_InitState(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + return ss; + +loser: + ssl_DestroySocketContents(ss); + ssl_DestroyLocks(ss); + PORT_Free(ss); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * DEPRECATED: Will always return false. + */ +SECStatus +SSL_CanBypass(CERTCertificate *cert, SECKEYPrivateKey *srvPrivkey, + PRUint32 protocolmask, PRUint16 *ciphersuites, int nsuites, + PRBool *pcanbypass, void *pwArg) +{ + if (!pcanbypass) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + *pcanbypass = PR_FALSE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Functions that are truly experimental use EXP, functions that are no longer + * experimental use PUB. + * + * When initially defining a new API, add that API here using the EXP() macro + * and name the function with a SSLExp_ prefix. Define the experimental API as + * a macro in sslexp.h using the SSL_EXPERIMENTAL_API() macro defined there. + * + * Once an API is stable and proven, move the macro definition in sslexp.h to a + * proper function declaration in ssl.h. Keeping the function in this list + * ensures that code built against the release that contained the experimental + * API will continue to work; use PUB() to reference the public function. + */ +#define EXP(n) \ + { \ + "SSL_" #n, SSLExp_##n \ + } +#define PUB(n) \ + { \ + "SSL_" #n, SSL_##n \ + } +struct { + const char *const name; + void *function; +} ssl_experimental_functions[] = { +#ifndef SSL_DISABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_API + EXP(AddExternalPsk), + EXP(AddExternalPsk0Rtt), + EXP(AeadDecrypt), + EXP(AeadEncrypt), + EXP(CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner), + EXP(CipherSuiteOrderGet), + EXP(CipherSuiteOrderSet), + EXP(CreateAntiReplayContext), + EXP(CreateMask), + EXP(CreateMaskingContext), + EXP(CreateVariantMaskingContext), + EXP(DelegateCredential), + EXP(DestroyAead), + EXP(DestroyMaskingContext), + EXP(DestroyResumptionTokenInfo), + EXP(EnableTls13BackendEch), + EXP(EnableTls13GreaseEch), + EXP(SetTls13GreaseEchSize), + EXP(EncodeEchConfigId), + EXP(GetCurrentEpoch), + EXP(GetEchRetryConfigs), + EXP(GetExtensionSupport), + EXP(GetResumptionTokenInfo), + EXP(HelloRetryRequestCallback), + EXP(InstallExtensionHooks), + EXP(HkdfExtract), + EXP(HkdfExpandLabel), + EXP(HkdfExpandLabelWithMech), + EXP(HkdfVariantExpandLabel), + EXP(HkdfVariantExpandLabelWithMech), + EXP(KeyUpdate), + EXP(MakeAead), + EXP(MakeVariantAead), + EXP(RecordLayerData), + EXP(RecordLayerWriteCallback), + EXP(ReleaseAntiReplayContext), + EXP(RemoveEchConfigs), + EXP(RemoveExternalPsk), + EXP(SecretCallback), + EXP(SendCertificateRequest), + EXP(SendSessionTicket), + EXP(SetAntiReplayContext), + EXP(SetClientEchConfigs), + EXP(SetDtls13VersionWorkaround), + EXP(SetMaxEarlyDataSize), + EXP(SetResumptionTokenCallback), + EXP(SetResumptionToken), + EXP(SetServerEchConfigs), + EXP(SetTimeFunc), +#endif + { "", NULL } +}; +#undef EXP +#undef PUB + +void * +SSL_GetExperimentalAPI(const char *name) +{ + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_experimental_functions); ++i) { + if (strcmp(name, ssl_experimental_functions[i].name) == 0) { + return ssl_experimental_functions[i].function; + } + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EXPERIMENTAL_API); + return NULL; +} + +void +ssl_ClearPRCList(PRCList *list, void (*f)(void *)) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cursor = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cursor); + if (f) { + f(cursor); + } + PORT_Free(cursor); + } +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_EnableTls13GreaseEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetTls13GreaseEchSize(PRFileDesc *fd, PRUint8 size) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss || size == 0) { + return SECFailure; + } + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize = size; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_EnableTls13BackendEch(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_CallExtensionWriterOnEchInner(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetDtls13VersionWorkaround(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool enabled) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->opt.enableDtls13VersionCompat = enabled; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetTimeFunc(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLTimeFunc f, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetTimeFunc", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->now = f; + ss->nowArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Experimental APIs for session cache handling. */ + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetResumptionTokenCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLResumptionTokenCallback cb, + void *ctx) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetResumptionTokenCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ss->resumptionTokenCallback = cb; + ss->resumptionTokenContext = ctx; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetResumptionToken(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *token, + unsigned int len) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + sslSessionID *sid = NULL; + + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetResumptionToken", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->firstHsDone || ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake || + ss->sec.isServer || len == 0 || !token) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + // We override any previously set session. + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + } + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "incoming resumption token", token, len)); + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Populate NewSessionTicket values */ + SECStatus rv = ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(sid, token, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + // If decoding fails, we assume the token is bad. + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR); + goto loser; + } + + // Make sure that the token is currently usable. + if (!ssl_IsResumptionTokenUsable(ss, sid)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR); + goto loser; + } + + // Generate a new random session ID for this ticket. + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(sid->u.ssl3.sessionID, SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; // Code set by PK11_GenerateRandom. + } + sid->u.ssl3.sessionIDLength = SSL3_SESSIONID_BYTES; + /* Use the sid->cached as marker that this is from an external cache and + * we don't have to look up anything in the NSS internal cache. */ + sid->cached = in_external_cache; + sid->lastAccessTime = ssl_Time(ss); + + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_DestroyResumptionTokenInfo(SSLResumptionTokenInfo *token) +{ + if (!token) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if (token->peerCert) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(token->peerCert); + } + PORT_Free(token->alpnSelection); + PORT_Memset(token, 0, token->length); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_GetResumptionTokenInfo(const PRUint8 *tokenData, unsigned int tokenLen, + SSLResumptionTokenInfo *tokenOut, PRUintn len) +{ + if (!tokenData || !tokenOut || !tokenLen || + len > sizeof(SSLResumptionTokenInfo)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + sslSessionID sid = { 0 }; + SSLResumptionTokenInfo token; + + /* Populate sid values */ + if (ssl_DecodeResumptionToken(&sid, tokenData, tokenLen) != SECSuccess) { + // If decoding fails, we assume the token is bad. + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_RESUMPTION_TOKEN_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + token.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid.peerCert); + + token.alpnSelectionLen = sid.u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len; + token.alpnSelection = PORT_ZAlloc(token.alpnSelectionLen); + if (!token.alpnSelection) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (token.alpnSelectionLen > 0) { + PORT_Assert(sid.u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data); + PORT_Memcpy(token.alpnSelection, sid.u.ssl3.alpnSelection.data, + token.alpnSelectionLen); + } + + if (sid.u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) { + token.maxEarlyDataSize = + sid.u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size; + } else { + token.maxEarlyDataSize = 0; + } + token.expirationTime = sid.expirationTime; + + token.length = PR_MIN(sizeof(SSLResumptionTokenInfo), len); + PORT_Memcpy(tokenOut, &token, token.length); + + ssl_DestroySID(&sid, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c5bedad7a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.c @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * Handling of cipher specs. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +#include "sslimpl.h" + +/* Record protection algorithms, indexed by SSL3BulkCipher. + * + * The |max_records| field (|mr| below) is set to a number that is higher than + * recommended in some literature (esp. TLS 1.3) because we currently abort the + * connection when this limit is reached and we want to ensure that we only + * rarely hit this limit. See bug 1268745 for details. + */ +#define MR_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MAX /* 2^48-1 */ +#define MR_128 (0x5aULL << 28) /* For AES and similar. */ +#define MR_LOW (1ULL << 20) /* For weak ciphers. */ +/* clang-format off */ +static const ssl3BulkCipherDef ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[] = { + /* |--------- Lengths ---------| */ + /* cipher calg : s : */ + /* : e b n */ + /* oid short_name mr : c l o */ + /* k r o t n */ + /* e e i c a c */ + /* y t type v k g e */ + {cipher_null, ssl_calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, "NULL", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_rc4, ssl_calg_rc4, 16,16, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_RC4, "RC4", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_des, ssl_calg_des, 8, 8, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_CBC, "DES-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_3des, ssl_calg_3des, 24,24, type_block, 8, 8, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "3DES-EDE-CBC", MR_LOW}, + {cipher_aes_128, ssl_calg_aes, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, "AES-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256, ssl_calg_aes, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, "AES-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_128, ssl_calg_camellia, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, "Camellia-128", MR_128}, + {cipher_camellia_256, ssl_calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, "Camellia-256", MR_128}, + {cipher_seed, ssl_calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, "SEED-CBC", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_128_gcm, ssl_calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, "AES-128-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_aes_256_gcm, ssl_calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8, + SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, "AES-256-GCM", MR_128}, + {cipher_chacha20, ssl_calg_chacha20, 32,32, type_aead, 12, 0,16, 0, + SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, "ChaCha20-Poly1305", MR_MAX}, + {cipher_missing, ssl_calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0, + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, "missing", 0U}, +}; +/* clang-format on */ + +const ssl3BulkCipherDef * +ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef) +{ + SSL3BulkCipher bulkCipher = suiteDef->bulk_cipher_alg; + PORT_Assert(bulkCipher < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_bulk_cipher_defs)); + PORT_Assert(ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[bulkCipher].cipher == bulkCipher); + return &ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[bulkCipher]; +} + +/* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */ +static const ssl3MACDef ssl_mac_defs[] = { + /* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */ + /* mac mmech pad_size mac_size */ + { ssl_mac_null, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, 0, 0, 0 }, + { ssl_mac_md5, CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC, 48, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 }, + { ssl_mac_sha, CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC, 40, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 }, + { ssl_hmac_md5, CKM_MD5_HMAC, 0, MD5_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5 }, + { ssl_hmac_sha, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, 0, SHA1_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 }, + { ssl_hmac_sha256, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, 0, SHA256_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256 }, + { ssl_mac_aead, CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, 0, 0, 0 }, + { ssl_hmac_sha384, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, 0, SHA384_LENGTH, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384 } +}; + +const ssl3MACDef * +ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(SSL3MACAlgorithm mac) +{ + /* Cast here for clang: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16154 */ + PORT_Assert((size_t)mac < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(ssl_mac_defs)); + PORT_Assert(ssl_mac_defs[mac].mac == mac); + return &ssl_mac_defs[mac]; +} + +const ssl3MACDef * +ssl_GetMacDef(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef) +{ + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac = suiteDef->mac_alg; + if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + switch (mac) { + case ssl_mac_md5: + mac = ssl_hmac_md5; + break; + case ssl_mac_sha: + mac = ssl_hmac_sha; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + return ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(mac); +} + +ssl3CipherSpec * +ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction, + DTLSEpoch epoch) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + for (cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); + cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs; + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) { + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = (ssl3CipherSpec *)cur_p; + + if (spec->epoch != epoch) { + continue; + } + if (direction != spec->direction) { + continue; + } + return spec; + } + return NULL; +} + +ssl3CipherSpec * +ssl_CreateCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = PORT_ZNew(ssl3CipherSpec); + if (!spec) { + return NULL; + } + spec->refCt = 1; + spec->version = ss->version; + spec->direction = direction; + spec->recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: new %s spec %d ct=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, + spec->refCt)); + return spec; +} + +void +ssl_SaveCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + PR_APPEND_LINK(&spec->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.cipherSpecs); +} + +/* Called from ssl3_InitState. */ +/* Caller must hold the SpecWriteLock. */ +SECStatus +ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection dir) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); + + spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, dir); + if (!spec) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Set default versions. This value will be used to generate and send + * alerts if a version is not negotiated. These values are overridden when + * sending a ClientHello and when a version is negotiated. */ + spec->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + spec->recordVersion = IS_DTLS(ss) + ? SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE + : SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0; + spec->cipherDef = &ssl_bulk_cipher_defs[cipher_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->cipherDef->cipher == cipher_null); + spec->macDef = &ssl_mac_defs[ssl_mac_null]; + PORT_Assert(spec->macDef->mac == ssl_mac_null); + spec->cipher = Null_Cipher; + + spec->phase = "cleartext"; + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); + + ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); + if (dir == ssl_secret_read) { + ss->ssl3.crSpec = spec; + } else { + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = spec; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +void +ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + ++spec->refCt; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: Increment ref ct for %s spec %d. new ct = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->refCt)); +} + +void +ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(ssl3KeyMaterial *keyMaterial) +{ + PK11_FreeSymKey(keyMaterial->key); + PK11_FreeSymKey(keyMaterial->macKey); + if (keyMaterial->macContext != NULL) { + PK11_DestroyContext(keyMaterial->macContext, PR_TRUE); + } +} + +static void +ssl_FreeCipherSpec(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: Freeing %s spec %d. epoch=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->epoch)); + + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&spec->link); + + /* PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSpecWriteLock(ss)); Don't have ss! */ + if (spec->cipherContext) { + PK11_DestroyContext(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE); + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(spec->masterSecret); + ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(&spec->keyMaterial); + ssl_DestroyMaskingContextInner(spec->maskContext); + + PORT_ZFree(spec, sizeof(*spec)); +} + +/* This function is never called on a spec which is on the + * cipherSpecs list. */ +void +ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + if (!spec) { + return; + } + + PORT_Assert(spec->refCt > 0); + --spec->refCt; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[-]: decrement refct for %s spec %d. epoch=%d new ct = %d", + SSL_GETPID(), SPEC_DIR(spec), spec, spec->epoch, spec->refCt)); + if (!spec->refCt) { + ssl_FreeCipherSpec(spec); + } +} + +void +ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(PRCList *list) +{ + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = (ssl3CipherSpec *)PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + ssl_FreeCipherSpec(spec); + } +} + +void +ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection dir, + DTLSEpoch epoch) +{ + ssl3CipherSpec *spec; + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: releasing %s cipher spec for epoch %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + (dir == ssl_secret_read) ? "read" : "write", epoch)); + + spec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, dir, epoch); + if (spec) { + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(spec); + } +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..061d888aed --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslspec.h @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslspec_h_ +#define __sslspec_h_ + +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "prclist.h" + +typedef enum { + TrafficKeyClearText = 0, + TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData = 1, + TrafficKeyHandshake = 2, + TrafficKeyApplicationData = 3 +} TrafficKeyType; + +#define SPEC_DIR(spec) \ + ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read) ? "read" : "write") + +typedef struct ssl3CipherSpecStr ssl3CipherSpec; +typedef struct ssl3BulkCipherDefStr ssl3BulkCipherDef; +typedef struct ssl3MACDefStr ssl3MACDef; +typedef struct ssl3CipherSuiteDefStr ssl3CipherSuiteDef; +typedef PRUint64 sslSequenceNumber; +typedef PRUint16 DTLSEpoch; + +/* The SSL bulk cipher definition */ +typedef enum { + cipher_null, + cipher_rc4, + cipher_des, + cipher_3des, + cipher_aes_128, + cipher_aes_256, + cipher_camellia_128, + cipher_camellia_256, + cipher_seed, + cipher_aes_128_gcm, + cipher_aes_256_gcm, + cipher_chacha20, + cipher_missing /* reserved for no such supported cipher */ + /* This enum must match ssl3_cipherName[] in ssl3con.c. */ +} SSL3BulkCipher; + +typedef enum { + type_stream, + type_block, + type_aead +} CipherType; + +/* +** There are tables of these, all const. +*/ +struct ssl3BulkCipherDefStr { + SSL3BulkCipher cipher; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + unsigned int key_size; + unsigned int secret_key_size; + CipherType type; + unsigned int iv_size; + unsigned int block_size; + unsigned int tag_size; /* for AEAD ciphers. */ + unsigned int explicit_nonce_size; /* for AEAD ciphers. */ + SECOidTag oid; + const char *short_name; + /* The maximum number of records that can be sent/received with the same + * symmetric key before the connection will be terminated. */ + PRUint64 max_records; +}; + +/* to make some of these old enums public without namespace pollution, +** it was necessary to prepend ssl_ to the names. +** These #defines preserve compatibility with the old code here in libssl. +*/ +typedef SSLMACAlgorithm SSL3MACAlgorithm; + +/* + * There are tables of these, all const. + */ +struct ssl3MACDefStr { + SSL3MACAlgorithm mac; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mmech; + int pad_size; + int mac_size; + SECOidTag oid; +}; + +#define MAX_IV_LENGTH 24 + +typedef struct { + PK11SymKey *key; + PK11SymKey *macKey; + PK11Context *macContext; + PRUint8 iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; +} ssl3KeyMaterial; + +typedef SECStatus (*SSLCipher)(void *context, + unsigned char *out, + unsigned int *outlen, + unsigned int maxout, + const unsigned char *in, + unsigned int inlen); +typedef SECStatus (*SSLAEADCipher)(PK11Context *context, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivGen, + unsigned int fixedbits, + unsigned char *iv, unsigned int ivlen, + const unsigned char *aad, + unsigned int aadlen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outlen, + unsigned int maxout, unsigned char *tag, + unsigned int taglen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen); + +/* The DTLS anti-replay window in number of packets. Defined here because we + * need it in the cipher spec. Note that this is a ring buffer but left and + * right represent the true window, with modular arithmetic used to map them + * onto the buffer. + */ +#define DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW 1024 +#define RECORD_SEQ_MASK ((1ULL << 48) - 1) +#define RECORD_SEQ_MAX RECORD_SEQ_MASK +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW % 8 == 0); + +typedef struct DTLSRecvdRecordsStr { + unsigned char data[DTLS_RECVD_RECORDS_WINDOW / 8]; + sslSequenceNumber left; + sslSequenceNumber right; +} DTLSRecvdRecords; + +/* + * These are the "specs" used for reading and writing records. Access to the + * pointers to these specs, and all the specs' contents (direct and indirect) is + * protected by the reader/writer lock ss->specLock. + */ +struct ssl3CipherSpecStr { + PRCList link; + PRUint8 refCt; + + SSLSecretDirection direction; + SSL3ProtocolVersion version; + SSL3ProtocolVersion recordVersion; + + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipherDef; + const ssl3MACDef *macDef; + + SSLCipher cipher; + void *cipherContext; + + PK11SymKey *masterSecret; + ssl3KeyMaterial keyMaterial; + + DTLSEpoch epoch; + const char *phase; + + /* The next sequence number to be sent or received. */ + sslSequenceNumber nextSeqNum; + DTLSRecvdRecords recvdRecords; + + /* The number of 0-RTT bytes that can be sent or received in TLS 1.3. This + * will be zero for everything but 0-RTT. */ + PRUint32 earlyDataRemaining; + /* The maximum plaintext length. This differs from the configured or + * negotiated value for TLS 1.3; it is reduced by one to account for the + * content type octet. */ + PRUint16 recordSizeLimit; + + /* DTLS 1.3: Sequence number masking context. */ + SSLMaskingContext *maskContext; + + /* DTLS 1.3: Count of decryption failures for the given key. */ + PRUint64 deprotectionFailures; +}; + +typedef void (*sslCipherSpecChangedFunc)(void *arg, + PRBool sending, + ssl3CipherSpec *newSpec); + +const ssl3BulkCipherDef *ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def); +const ssl3MACDef *ssl_GetMacDefByAlg(SSL3MACAlgorithm mac); +const ssl3MACDef *ssl_GetMacDef(const sslSocket *ss, const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef); + +ssl3CipherSpec *ssl_CreateCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction); +void ssl_SaveCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec); +void ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ssl3CipherSpec *spec); +void ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ssl3CipherSpec *spec); +void ssl_DestroyCipherSpecs(PRCList *list); +SECStatus ssl_SetupNullCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection dir); + +ssl3CipherSpec *ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, + SSLSecretDirection direction, + DTLSEpoch epoch); +void ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction, + DTLSEpoch epoch); + +#endif /* __sslspec_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d12b3c91ff --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h @@ -0,0 +1,583 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file contains prototypes for the public SSL functions. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __sslt_h_ +#define __sslt_h_ + +#include "certt.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "prtypes.h" +#include "secitem.h" + +typedef enum { + ssl_hs_hello_request = 0, + ssl_hs_client_hello = 1, + ssl_hs_server_hello = 2, + ssl_hs_hello_verify_request = 3, + ssl_hs_new_session_ticket = 4, + ssl_hs_end_of_early_data = 5, + ssl_hs_hello_retry_request = 6, + ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions = 8, + ssl_hs_certificate = 11, + ssl_hs_server_key_exchange = 12, + ssl_hs_certificate_request = 13, + ssl_hs_server_hello_done = 14, + ssl_hs_certificate_verify = 15, + ssl_hs_client_key_exchange = 16, + ssl_hs_finished = 20, + ssl_hs_certificate_status = 22, + ssl_hs_key_update = 24, + ssl_hs_next_proto = 67, + ssl_hs_message_hash = 254, /* Not a real message. */ + ssl_hs_ech_outer_client_hello = 257, /* Not a real message. */ +} SSLHandshakeType; + +typedef enum { + ssl_ct_change_cipher_spec = 20, + ssl_ct_alert = 21, + ssl_ct_handshake = 22, + ssl_ct_application_data = 23, + ssl_ct_ack = 26 +} SSLContentType; + +typedef enum { + ssl_secret_read = 1, + ssl_secret_write = 2, +} SSLSecretDirection; + +typedef struct SSL3StatisticsStr { + /* statistics from ssl3_SendClientHello (sch) */ + long sch_sid_cache_hits; + long sch_sid_cache_misses; + long sch_sid_cache_not_ok; + + /* statistics from ssl3_HandleServerHello (hsh) */ + long hsh_sid_cache_hits; + long hsh_sid_cache_misses; + long hsh_sid_cache_not_ok; + + /* statistics from ssl3_HandleClientHello (hch) */ + long hch_sid_cache_hits; + long hch_sid_cache_misses; + long hch_sid_cache_not_ok; + + /* statistics related to stateless resume */ + long sch_sid_stateless_resumes; + long hsh_sid_stateless_resumes; + long hch_sid_stateless_resumes; + long hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures; +} SSL3Statistics; + +/* Key Exchange algorithm values */ +typedef enum { + ssl_kea_null = 0, + ssl_kea_rsa = 1, + ssl_kea_dh = 2, + ssl_kea_fortezza = 3, /* deprecated, now unused */ + ssl_kea_ecdh = 4, + ssl_kea_ecdh_psk = 5, + ssl_kea_dh_psk = 6, + ssl_kea_tls13_any = 7, + ssl_kea_size /* number of ssl_kea_ algorithms */ +} SSLKEAType; + +/* The following defines are for backwards compatibility. +** They will be removed in a forthcoming release to reduce namespace pollution. +** programs that use the kt_ symbols should convert to the ssl_kt_ symbols +** soon. +*/ +#define kt_null ssl_kea_null +#define kt_rsa ssl_kea_rsa +#define kt_dh ssl_kea_dh +#define kt_fortezza ssl_kea_fortezza /* deprecated, now unused */ +#define kt_ecdh ssl_kea_ecdh +#define kt_kea_size ssl_kea_size + +/* Values of this enum match the SignatureAlgorithm enum from + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +typedef enum { + ssl_sign_null = 0, /* "anonymous" in TLS */ + ssl_sign_rsa = 1, + ssl_sign_dsa = 2, + ssl_sign_ecdsa = 3 +} SSLSignType; + +/* Values of this enum match the HashAlgorithm enum from + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ +typedef enum { + /* ssl_hash_none is used internally to mean the pre-1.2 combination of MD5 + * and SHA1. The other values are only used in TLS 1.2. */ + ssl_hash_none = 0, + ssl_hash_md5 = 1, + ssl_hash_sha1 = 2, + ssl_hash_sha224 = 3, + ssl_hash_sha256 = 4, + ssl_hash_sha384 = 5, + ssl_hash_sha512 = 6 +} SSLHashType; + +/* Deprecated */ +typedef struct SSLSignatureAndHashAlgStr { + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSLSignType sigAlg; +} SSLSignatureAndHashAlg; + +typedef enum { + ssl_sig_none = 0, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 = 0x0201, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 = 0x0401, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 = 0x0501, + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512 = 0x0601, + /* For ECDSA, the pairing of the hash with a specific curve is only enforced + * in TLS 1.3; in TLS 1.2 any curve can be used with each of these. */ + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 = 0x0403, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 = 0x0503, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 = 0x0603, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 = 0x0804, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 = 0x0805, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 = 0x0806, + ssl_sig_ed25519 = 0x0807, + ssl_sig_ed448 = 0x0808, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256 = 0x0809, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384 = 0x080a, + ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512 = 0x080b, + + ssl_sig_dsa_sha1 = 0x0202, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha256 = 0x0402, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha384 = 0x0502, + ssl_sig_dsa_sha512 = 0x0602, + ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1 = 0x0203, + + /* The following value (which can't be used in the protocol), represents + * the RSA signature using SHA-1 and MD5 that is used in TLS 1.0 and 1.1. + * This is reported as a signature scheme when TLS 1.0 or 1.1 is used. + * This should not be passed to SSL_SignatureSchemePrefSet(); this + * signature scheme is always used and cannot be disabled. */ + ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5 = 0x10101, +} SSLSignatureScheme; + +/* Deprecated names maintained only for source compatibility. */ +#define ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 +#define ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 +#define ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512 ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 + +/* +** SSLAuthType describes the type of key that is used to authenticate a +** connection. That is, the type of key in the end-entity certificate. +*/ +typedef enum { + ssl_auth_null = 0, + ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt = 1, /* RSA key exchange. */ + ssl_auth_dsa = 2, + ssl_auth_kea = 3, /* unused */ + ssl_auth_ecdsa = 4, + ssl_auth_ecdh_rsa = 5, /* ECDH cert with an RSA signature. */ + ssl_auth_ecdh_ecdsa = 6, /* ECDH cert with an ECDSA signature. */ + ssl_auth_rsa_sign = 7, /* RSA signing with an rsaEncryption key. */ + ssl_auth_rsa_pss = 8, /* RSA signing with a PSS key. */ + ssl_auth_psk = 9, + ssl_auth_tls13_any = 10, + ssl_auth_size /* number of authentication types */ +} SSLAuthType; + +typedef enum { + ssl_psk_none = 0, + ssl_psk_resume = 1, + ssl_psk_external = 2, +} SSLPskType; + +/* This is defined for backward compatibility reasons */ +#define ssl_auth_rsa ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt + +typedef enum { + ssl_calg_null = 0, + ssl_calg_rc4 = 1, + ssl_calg_rc2 = 2, + ssl_calg_des = 3, + ssl_calg_3des = 4, + ssl_calg_idea = 5, + ssl_calg_fortezza = 6, /* deprecated, now unused */ + ssl_calg_aes = 7, + ssl_calg_camellia = 8, + ssl_calg_seed = 9, + ssl_calg_aes_gcm = 10, + ssl_calg_chacha20 = 11 +} SSLCipherAlgorithm; + +typedef enum { + ssl_mac_null = 0, + ssl_mac_md5 = 1, + ssl_mac_sha = 2, + ssl_hmac_md5 = 3, /* TLS HMAC version of mac_md5 */ + ssl_hmac_sha = 4, /* TLS HMAC version of mac_sha */ + ssl_hmac_sha256 = 5, + ssl_mac_aead = 6, + ssl_hmac_sha384 = 7 +} SSLMACAlgorithm; + +typedef enum { + ssl_compression_null = 0, + ssl_compression_deflate = 1 /* RFC 3749 */ +} SSLCompressionMethod; + +typedef enum { + ssl_grp_ec_sect163k1 = 1, + ssl_grp_ec_sect163r1 = 2, + ssl_grp_ec_sect163r2 = 3, + ssl_grp_ec_sect193r1 = 4, + ssl_grp_ec_sect193r2 = 5, + ssl_grp_ec_sect233k1 = 6, + ssl_grp_ec_sect233r1 = 7, + ssl_grp_ec_sect239k1 = 8, + ssl_grp_ec_sect283k1 = 9, + ssl_grp_ec_sect283r1 = 10, + ssl_grp_ec_sect409k1 = 11, + ssl_grp_ec_sect409r1 = 12, + ssl_grp_ec_sect571k1 = 13, + ssl_grp_ec_sect571r1 = 14, + ssl_grp_ec_secp160k1 = 15, + ssl_grp_ec_secp160r1 = 16, + ssl_grp_ec_secp160r2 = 17, + ssl_grp_ec_secp192k1 = 18, + ssl_grp_ec_secp192r1 = 19, + ssl_grp_ec_secp224k1 = 20, + ssl_grp_ec_secp224r1 = 21, + ssl_grp_ec_secp256k1 = 22, + ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1 = 23, + ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1 = 24, + ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1 = 25, + ssl_grp_ec_curve25519 = 29, /* RFC4492 */ + ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048 = 256, /* RFC7919 */ + ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072 = 257, + ssl_grp_ffdhe_4096 = 258, + ssl_grp_ffdhe_6144 = 259, + ssl_grp_ffdhe_8192 = 260, + ssl_grp_none = 65537, /* special value */ + ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom = 65538 /* special value */ +} SSLNamedGroup; + +typedef struct SSLExtraServerCertDataStr { + /* When this struct is passed to SSL_ConfigServerCert, and authType is set + * to a value other than ssl_auth_null, this limits the use of the key to + * the type defined; otherwise, the certificate is configured for all + * compatible types. */ + SSLAuthType authType; + /* The remainder of the certificate chain. */ + const CERTCertificateList* certChain; + /* A set of one or more stapled OCSP responses for the certificate. This is + * used to generate the OCSP stapling answer provided by the server. */ + const SECItemArray* stapledOCSPResponses; + /* A serialized sign_certificate_timestamp extension, used to answer + * requests from clients for this data. */ + const SECItem* signedCertTimestamps; + + /* Delegated credentials. + * + * A serialized delegated credential (DC) to use for authentication to peers + * who indicate support for this extension (ietf-drafts-tls-subcerts). DCs + * are used opportunistically if (1) the client indicates support, (2) TLS + * 1.3 or higher is negotiated, and (3) the selected certificate is + * configured with a DC. + * + * Note that it's the caller's responsibility to ensure that the DC is + * well-formed. + */ + const SECItem* delegCred; + + /* The secret key corresponding to the |delegCred|. + * + * Note that it's the caller's responsibility to ensure that this matches + * the DC public key. + */ + const SECKEYPrivateKey* delegCredPrivKey; +} SSLExtraServerCertData; + +typedef struct SSLChannelInfoStr { + /* On return, SSL_GetChannelInfo sets |length| to the smaller of + * the |len| argument and the length of the struct used by NSS. + * Callers must ensure the application uses a version of NSS that + * isn't older than the version used at compile time. */ + PRUint32 length; + PRUint16 protocolVersion; + PRUint16 cipherSuite; + + /* The strength of the key used to authenticate the peer. Before + * interpreting this value, check authType, signatureScheme, and + * peerDelegCred, to determine the type of the key and how it was used. + * + * Typically, this is the length of the key from the peer's end-entity + * certificate. If delegated credentials are used (i.e., peerDelegCred is + * PR_TRUE), then this is the strength of the delegated credential key. */ + PRUint32 authKeyBits; + + /* key exchange algorithm info */ + PRUint32 keaKeyBits; + + /* session info */ + PRUint32 creationTime; /* seconds since Jan 1, 1970 */ + PRUint32 lastAccessTime; /* seconds since Jan 1, 1970 */ + PRUint32 expirationTime; /* seconds since Jan 1, 1970 */ + PRUint32 sessionIDLength; /* up to 32 */ + PRUint8 sessionID[32]; + + /* The following fields are added in NSS 3.12.5. */ + + /* compression method info */ + const char* compressionMethodName; + SSLCompressionMethod compressionMethod; + + /* The following fields are added in NSS 3.21. + * This field only has meaning in TLS < 1.3 and will be set to + * PR_FALSE in TLS 1.3. + */ + PRBool extendedMasterSecretUsed; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.25. + * This field only has meaning in TLS >= 1.3, and indicates on the + * client side that the server accepted early (0-RTT) data. + */ + PRBool earlyDataAccepted; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.28. */ + /* These fields have the same meaning as in SSLCipherSuiteInfo. */ + SSLKEAType keaType; + SSLNamedGroup keaGroup; + SSLCipherAlgorithm symCipher; + SSLMACAlgorithm macAlgorithm; + SSLAuthType authType; + SSLSignatureScheme signatureScheme; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.34. */ + /* When the session was resumed this holds the key exchange group of the + * original handshake. */ + SSLNamedGroup originalKeaGroup; + /* This field is PR_TRUE when the session is resumed and PR_FALSE + * otherwise. */ + PRBool resumed; + + /* Indicates whether the peer used a delegated credential (DC) for + * authentication. + */ + PRBool peerDelegCred; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.54. */ + /* Indicates what type of PSK, if any, was used in a handshake. */ + SSLPskType pskType; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.60 */ + /* This field is PR_TRUE when the connection is established + * with TLS 1.3 Encrypted Client Hello. */ + PRBool echAccepted; + + /* The following field was added in NSS 3.66 */ + /* This filed is PR_TRUE if the FIPS indicator is true for the + * current connection */ + PRBool isFIPS; + + /* When adding new fields to this structure, please document the + * NSS version in which they were added. */ +} SSLChannelInfo; + +/* Preliminary channel info */ +#define ssl_preinfo_version (1U << 0) +#define ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite (1U << 1) +#define ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite (1U << 2) +/* ssl_preinfo_peer_auth covers peerDelegCred, authKeyBits, + * and scheme. Not included in ssl_preinfo_all as it is client-only. */ +#define ssl_preinfo_peer_auth (1U << 3) +#define ssl_preinfo_ech (1U << 4) +/* ssl_preinfo_all doesn't contain ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite because that + * field is only set if 0-RTT is sent (client) or accepted (server). */ +#define ssl_preinfo_all (ssl_preinfo_version | ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite | ssl_preinfo_ech) + +typedef struct SSLPreliminaryChannelInfoStr { + /* On return, SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo sets |length| to the smaller of + * the |len| argument and the length of the struct used by NSS. + * Callers must ensure the application uses a version of NSS that + * isn't older than the version used at compile time. */ + PRUint32 length; + /* A bitfield over SSLPreliminaryValueSet that describes which + * preliminary values are set (see ssl_preinfo_*). */ + PRUint32 valuesSet; + /* Protocol version: test (valuesSet & ssl_preinfo_version) */ + PRUint16 protocolVersion; + /* Cipher suite: test (valuesSet & ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite) */ + PRUint16 cipherSuite; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.29. */ + /* |canSendEarlyData| is true when a 0-RTT is enabled. This can only be + * true after sending the ClientHello and before the handshake completes. + */ + PRBool canSendEarlyData; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.31. */ + /* The number of early data octets that a client is permitted to send on + * this connection. The value will be zero if the connection was not + * resumed or early data is not permitted. For a client, this value only + * has meaning if |canSendEarlyData| is true. For a server, this indicates + * the value that was advertised in the session ticket that was used to + * resume this session. */ + PRUint32 maxEarlyDataSize; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.43. */ + /* This reports the cipher suite used for 0-RTT if it sent or accepted. For + * a client, this is set earlier than |cipherSuite|, and will match that + * value if 0-RTT is accepted by the server. The server only sets this + * after accepting 0-RTT, so this will contain the same value. */ + PRUint16 zeroRttCipherSuite; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.48. */ + /* These fields contain information about the key that will be used in + * the CertificateVerify message. If Delegated Credentials are being used, + * this is the DC-contained SPKI, else the EE-cert SPKI. These fields are + * valid only after the Certificate message is handled. This can be determined + * by checking the valuesSet field against |ssl_preinfo_peer_auth|. */ + PRBool peerDelegCred; + PRUint32 authKeyBits; + SSLSignatureScheme signatureScheme; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.60. */ + PRBool echAccepted; + /* If the application configured ECH but |!echAccepted|, authCertificate + * should use the following hostname extracted from the ECHConfig. */ + const char* echPublicName; + + /* The following field was added in NSS 3.85. */ + PRBool ticketSupportsEarlyData; + + /* When adding new fields to this structure, please document the + * NSS version in which they were added. */ +} SSLPreliminaryChannelInfo; + +typedef struct SSLCipherSuiteInfoStr { + /* On return, SSL_GetCipherSuitelInfo sets |length| to the smaller of + * the |len| argument and the length of the struct used by NSS. + * Callers must ensure the application uses a version of NSS that + * isn't older than the version used at compile time. */ + PRUint16 length; + PRUint16 cipherSuite; + + /* Cipher Suite Name */ + const char* cipherSuiteName; + + /* server authentication info */ + const char* authAlgorithmName; + SSLAuthType authAlgorithm; /* deprecated, use |authType| */ + + /* key exchange algorithm info */ + const char* keaTypeName; + SSLKEAType keaType; + + /* symmetric encryption info */ + const char* symCipherName; + SSLCipherAlgorithm symCipher; + PRUint16 symKeyBits; + PRUint16 symKeySpace; + PRUint16 effectiveKeyBits; + + /* MAC info */ + /* AEAD ciphers don't have a MAC. For an AEAD cipher, macAlgorithmName + * is "AEAD", macAlgorithm is ssl_mac_aead, and macBits is the length in + * bits of the authentication tag. */ + const char* macAlgorithmName; + SSLMACAlgorithm macAlgorithm; + PRUint16 macBits; + + PRUintn isFIPS : 1; + PRUintn isExportable : 1; /* deprecated, don't use */ + PRUintn nonStandard : 1; + PRUintn reservedBits : 29; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.24. */ + /* This reports the correct authentication type for the cipher suite, use + * this instead of |authAlgorithm|. */ + SSLAuthType authType; + + /* The following fields were added in NSS 3.43. */ + /* This reports the hash function used in the TLS KDF, or HKDF for TLS 1.3. + * For suites defined for versions of TLS earlier than TLS 1.2, this reports + * ssl_hash_none. */ + SSLHashType kdfHash; + + /* When adding new fields to this structure, please document the + * NSS version in which they were added. */ +} SSLCipherSuiteInfo; + +typedef enum { + ssl_variant_stream = 0, + ssl_variant_datagram = 1 +} SSLProtocolVariant; + +typedef struct SSLVersionRangeStr { + PRUint16 min; + PRUint16 max; +} SSLVersionRange; + +typedef enum { + SSL_sni_host_name = 0, + SSL_sni_type_total +} SSLSniNameType; + +/* Supported extensions. */ +/* Update SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS whenever a new extension type is added. */ +typedef enum { + ssl_server_name_xtn = 0, + ssl_cert_status_xtn = 5, + ssl_supported_groups_xtn = 10, + ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn = 11, + ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn = 13, + ssl_use_srtp_xtn = 14, + ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn = 16, + /* signed_certificate_timestamp extension, RFC 6962 */ + ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn = 18, + ssl_padding_xtn = 21, + ssl_extended_master_secret_xtn = 23, + ssl_record_size_limit_xtn = 28, + ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn = 34, + ssl_session_ticket_xtn = 35, + /* 40 was used in draft versions of TLS 1.3; it is now reserved. */ + ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn = 41, + ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn = 42, + ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn = 43, + ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn = 44, + ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn = 45, + ssl_tls13_ticket_early_data_info_xtn = 46, /* Deprecated. */ + ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn = 47, + ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn = 49, + ssl_signature_algorithms_cert_xtn = 50, + ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn = 51, + /* TLS 1.3 GREASE extension dummy type for builders. */ + ssl_tls13_grease_xtn = 0x0a0a, + ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn = 13172, /* Deprecated. */ + ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn = 0xff01, + ssl_tls13_short_header_xtn = 0xff03, /* Deprecated. */ + ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn = 0xfd00, + ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn = 0xfe0d, + ssl_tls13_encrypted_sni_xtn = 0xffce, /* Deprecated. */ +} SSLExtensionType; + +/* This is the old name for the supported_groups extensions. */ +#define ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn ssl_supported_groups_xtn + +/* SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS includes the maximum number of extensions that are + * supported for any single message type. That is, a ClientHello; ServerHello + * and TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket and HelloRetryRequest extensions have fewer. */ +#define SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS 21 + +/* Deprecated */ +typedef enum { + ssl_dhe_group_none = 0, + ssl_ff_dhe_2048_group = 1, + ssl_ff_dhe_3072_group = 2, + ssl_ff_dhe_4096_group = 3, + ssl_ff_dhe_6144_group = 4, + ssl_ff_dhe_8192_group = 5, + ssl_dhe_group_max +} SSLDHEGroupType; + +#endif /* __sslt_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssltrace.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssltrace.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b1fdde7902 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssltrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Functions to trace SSL protocol behavior in DEBUG builds. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +#include <stdarg.h> +#include "cert.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "prprf.h" + +#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(TRACE) +static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; + +static const char printable[257] = { + "................" /* 0x */ + "................" /* 1x */ + " !\"#$%&'()*+,-./" /* 2x */ + "0123456789:;<=>?" /* 3x */ + "@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO" /* 4x */ + "PQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_" /* 5x */ + "`abcdefghijklmno" /* 6x */ + "pqrstuvwxyz{|}~." /* 7x */ + "................" /* 8x */ + "................" /* 9x */ + "................" /* ax */ + "................" /* bx */ + "................" /* cx */ + "................" /* dx */ + "................" /* ex */ + "................" /* fx */ +}; + +void +ssl_PrintBuf(const sslSocket *ss, const char *msg, const void *vp, int len) +{ + const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)vp; + char buf[80]; + char *bp; + char *ap; + + if (ss) { + SSL_TRACE(("%d: SSL[%d]: %s [Len: %d]", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + msg, len)); + } else { + SSL_TRACE(("%d: SSL: %s [Len: %d]", SSL_GETPID(), msg, len)); + } + + if (!cp) { + SSL_TRACE((" <NULL>")); + return; + } + + memset(buf, ' ', sizeof buf); + bp = buf; + ap = buf + 50; + while (--len >= 0) { + unsigned char ch = *cp++; + *bp++ = hex[(ch >> 4) & 0xf]; + *bp++ = hex[ch & 0xf]; + *bp++ = ' '; + *ap++ = printable[ch]; + if (ap - buf >= 66) { + *ap = 0; + SSL_TRACE((" %s", buf)); + memset(buf, ' ', sizeof buf); + bp = buf; + ap = buf + 50; + } + } + if (bp > buf) { + *ap = 0; + SSL_TRACE((" %s", buf)); + } +} + +void +ssl_Trace(const char *format, ...) +{ + char buf[2000]; + va_list args; + + if (ssl_trace_iob) { + va_start(args, format); + PR_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, args); + va_end(args); + + fputs(buf, ssl_trace_iob); + fputs("\n", ssl_trace_iob); + } +} + +void +ssl_PrintKey(const sslSocket *ss, const char *msg, PK11SymKey *key) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *rawkey; + + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_Trace("Could not extract key for %s", msg); + return; + } + rawkey = PK11_GetKeyData(key); + if (!rawkey) { + ssl_Trace("Could not extract key for %s", msg); + return; + } + ssl_PrintBuf(ss, msg, rawkey->data, rawkey->len); +} +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslver.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslver.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..666e259224 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/sslver.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* Library identity and versioning */ + +#include "nss.h" + +#if defined(DEBUG) +#define _DEBUG_STRING " (debug)" +#else +#define _DEBUG_STRING "" +#endif + +/* + * Version information + */ +const char __nss_ssl_version[] = "Version: NSS " NSS_VERSION _DEBUG_STRING; diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fbbc510f15 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.c @@ -0,0 +1,6568 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * TLS 1.3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "stdarg.h" +#include "cert.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "prerr.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "secmod.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13con.h" +#include "tls13err.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13hashstate.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" + +static SECStatus tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch, + SSLSecretDirection install, + PRBool deleteSecret); +static SECStatus tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss); +static void tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, + TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare); +static SECStatus tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest( + sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, + const PRUint8 *token, unsigned int tokenLen); + +static SECStatus tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificate( + sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleCertificateVerify( + sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, + sslSessionID *sid); +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *prefix, + const char *suffix, + const char *keylogLabel, + PK11SymKey **dest); +SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PK11SymKey **dest, + SSLHashType hash); +static SECStatus tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, size_t length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, SSLHashType type); +static SECStatus tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType message, + PK11SymKey *secret, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes); +static SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, + const PRUint8 *appToken, + unsigned int appTokenLen); +static SECStatus tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_ComputeFinished( + sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, SSLHashType hashType, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, + unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen); +static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(sslSocket *ss); +static SECStatus tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss); + +const char kHkdfLabelClient[] = "c"; +const char kHkdfLabelServer[] = "s"; +const char kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret[] = "derived"; +const char kHkdfLabelResPskBinderKey[] = "res binder"; +const char kHkdfLabelExtPskBinderKey[] = "ext binder"; +const char kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "e traffic"; +const char kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "e exp master"; +const char kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret[] = "hs traffic"; +const char kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret[] = "ap traffic"; +const char kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret[] = "finished"; +const char kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret[] = "res master"; +const char kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret[] = "exp master"; +const char kHkdfLabelResumption[] = "resumption"; +const char kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate[] = "traffic upd"; +const char kHkdfPurposeKey[] = "key"; +const char kHkdfPurposeSn[] = "sn"; +const char kHkdfPurposeIv[] = "iv"; + +const char keylogLabelClientEarlyTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +const char keylogLabelClientHsTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +const char keylogLabelServerHsTrafficSecret[] = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +const char keylogLabelClientTrafficSecret[] = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; +const char keylogLabelServerTrafficSecret[] = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0"; +const char keylogLabelEarlyExporterSecret[] = "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"; +const char keylogLabelExporterSecret[] = "EXPORTER_SECRET"; + +/* Belt and suspenders in case we ever add a TLS 1.4. */ +PR_STATIC_ASSERT(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAX_SUPPORTED <= + SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + +void +tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc) +{ + PORT_Assert(desc != internal_error); /* These should never happen */ + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, desc); + PORT_SetError(prError); +} + +#ifdef TRACE +#define STATE_CASE(a) \ + case a: \ + return #a +static char * +tls13_HandshakeState(SSL3WaitState st) +{ + switch (st) { + STATE_CASE(idle_handshake); + STATE_CASE(wait_client_hello); + STATE_CASE(wait_end_of_early_data); + STATE_CASE(wait_client_cert); + STATE_CASE(wait_client_key); + STATE_CASE(wait_cert_verify); + STATE_CASE(wait_change_cipher); + STATE_CASE(wait_finished); + STATE_CASE(wait_server_hello); + STATE_CASE(wait_certificate_status); + STATE_CASE(wait_server_cert); + STATE_CASE(wait_server_key); + STATE_CASE(wait_cert_request); + STATE_CASE(wait_hello_done); + STATE_CASE(wait_new_session_ticket); + STATE_CASE(wait_encrypted_extensions); + default: + break; + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return "unknown"; +} +#endif + +#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK 0x80 + +#define TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ws) (ws & ~TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK) +/* We don't mask idle_handshake because other parts of the code use it*/ +#define TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) (((ws == idle_handshake) || (ws == wait_server_hello)) ? ws : ws | TLS13_WAIT_STATE_MASK) +#define TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, err, ...) \ + tls13_CheckHsState(ss, err, #err, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + __VA_ARGS__, \ + wait_invalid) +void +tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws, + const char *func, const char *file, int line) +{ +#ifdef TRACE + const char *new_state_name = + tls13_HandshakeState(ws); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s state change from %s->%s in %s (%s:%d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)), + new_state_name, + func, file, line)); +#endif + + ss->ssl3.hs.ws = TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws); +} + +static PRBool +tls13_InHsStateV(sslSocket *ss, va_list ap) +{ + SSL3WaitState ws; + + while ((ws = va_arg(ap, SSL3WaitState)) != wait_invalid) { + if (TLS13_WAIT_STATE(ws) == ss->ssl3.hs.ws) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + } + return PR_FALSE; +} + +PRBool +tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...) +{ + PRBool found; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, ss); + found = tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return found; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_CheckHsState(sslSocket *ss, int err, const char *error_name, + const char *func, const char *file, int line, + ...) +{ + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, line); + if (tls13_InHsStateV(ss, ap)) { + va_end(ap); + return SECSuccess; + } + va_end(ap); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: error %s state is (%s) at %s (%s:%d)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + error_name, + tls13_HandshakeState(TLS13_BASE_WAIT_STATE(ss->ssl3.hs.ws)), + func, file, line)); + tls13_FatalError(ss, err, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; +} + +PRBool +tls13_IsPostHandshake(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && ss->firstHsDone; +} + +SSLHashType +tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ssl3CipherSuite suite) +{ + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipherDef = + ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite); + PORT_Assert(cipherDef); + if (!cipherDef) { + return ssl_hash_none; + } + return cipherDef->prf_hash; +} + +SSLHashType +tls13_GetHash(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* suite_def may not be set yet when doing EPSK 0-Rtt. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) { + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + return ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash; + } + /* This should never happen. */ + PORT_Assert(0); + return ssl_hash_none; + } + + /* All TLS 1.3 cipher suites must have an explict PRF hash. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash != ssl_hash_none); + return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_GetHashAndCipher(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLHashType *hash, const ssl3BulkCipherDef **cipher) +{ + if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + // Lookup and check the suite. + SSLVersionRange vrange = { version, version }; + if (!ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(cipherSuite, &vrange)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(cipherSuite); + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef); + if (cipherDef->type != type_aead) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + *hash = suiteDef->prf_hash; + if (cipher != NULL) { + *cipher = cipherDef; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +unsigned int +tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(SSLHashType hash) +{ + switch (hash) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return 32; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return 48; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return 32; +} + +unsigned int +tls13_GetHashSize(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(SSLHashType hashType) +{ + switch (hashType) { + case ssl_hash_sha256: + return CKM_SHA256_HMAC; + case ssl_hash_sha384: + return CKM_SHA384_HMAC; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return CKM_SHA256_HMAC; +} + +static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE +tls13_GetHmacMechanism(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + return tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(tls13_GetHash(ss)); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHash(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes, + const PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int len, + SSLHashType hash) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash), hashes->u.raw, buf, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + hashes->len = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hash); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_CreateKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair) +{ + SECStatus rv; + const ssl3DHParams *params; + + PORT_Assert(groupDef); + switch (groupDef->keaType) { + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl_CreateECDHEphemeralKeyPair(ss, groupDef, keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + params = ssl_GetDHEParams(groupDef); + PORT_Assert(params->name != ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom); + rv = ssl_CreateDHEKeyPair(groupDef, params, keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_AddKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef) +{ + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_CreateKeyShare(ss, groupDef, &keyPair); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&keyPair->link, &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSL_SendAdditionalKeyShares(PRFileDesc *fd, unsigned int count) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->additionalShares = count; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Generate shares for ECDHE and FFDHE. This picks the first enabled group of + * the requisite type and creates a share for that. + * + * Called from ssl3_SendClientHello. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType chType) +{ + unsigned int i; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + unsigned int numShares = 0; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = tls13_ClientSetupEch(ss, chType); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Everything below here is only run on the first CH. */ + if (chType != client_hello_initial) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = tls13_ClientGreaseSetup(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Select the first enabled group. + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): be smarter about offering the group + * that the other side negotiated if we are resuming. */ + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + for (i = 0; i < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++i) { + if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]) { + continue; + } + rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[i]); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (++numShares > ss->additionalShares) { + break; + } + } + + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHERS_SUPPORTED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Try to do stateless resumption, if we can. */ + if (sid->cached != never_cached && + sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. */ + session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + PORT_Assert(session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data); + + if (ssl_TicketTimeValid(ss, session_ticket)) { + ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid); + rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->sch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; + rv = ssl3_SetupCipherSuite(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)); + } + } + + /* Derive the binder keys if any PSKs. */ + if (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)) { + /* If an External PSK specified a suite, use that. */ + sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + if (!ss->statelessResume && + psk->type == ssl_psk_external && + psk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = psk->zeroRttSuite; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem publicValue = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + publicValue.data = b; + publicValue.len = length; + if (!ssl_IsValidDHEShare(&pubKey->u.dh.prime, &publicValue)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_DHE_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + peerKey->keyType = dhKey; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.prime, + &pubKey->u.dh.prime); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.base, + &pubKey->u.dh.base); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(peerKey->arena, &peerKey->u.dh.publicValue, + &publicValue); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, + sslKeyPair *keyPair, + SSLHashType hash, + PK11SymKey **out) +{ + PORTCheapArenaPool arena; + SECKEYPublicKey *peerKey; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + PRErrorCode errorCode; + PK11SymKey *key; + SECStatus rv; + int keySize = 0; + + PORT_InitCheapArena(&arena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + peerKey = PORT_ArenaZNew(&arena.arena, SECKEYPublicKey); + if (peerKey == NULL) { + goto loser; + } + peerKey->arena = &arena.arena; + peerKey->pkcs11Slot = NULL; + peerKey->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + switch (entry->group->keaType) { + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + rv = ssl_ImportECDHKeyShare(peerKey, + entry->key_exchange.data, + entry->key_exchange.len, + entry->group); + mechanism = CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE; + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + rv = tls13_ImportDHEKeyShare(peerKey, + entry->key_exchange.data, + entry->key_exchange.len, + keyPair->pubKey); + mechanism = CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE; + keySize = peerKey->u.dh.publicValue.len; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + key = PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF( + keyPair->privKey, peerKey, PR_FALSE, NULL, NULL, mechanism, + CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, keySize, CKD_NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (!key) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + *out = key; + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&arena); + errorCode = PORT_GetError(); /* don't overwrite the error code */ + tls13_FatalError(ss, errorCode, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; +} + +static PRBool +tls13_UseServerSecret(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) +{ + return ss->sec.isServer == (direction == ssl_secret_write); +} + +static PK11SymKey ** +tls13_TrafficSecretRef(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) +{ + if (tls13_UseServerSecret(ss, direction)) { + return &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret; + } + return &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, SSLSecretDirection direction) +{ + PK11SymKey **secret; + PK11SymKey *updatedSecret; + PRUint16 epoch; + SECStatus rv; + + secret = tls13_TrafficSecretRef(ss, direction); + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(*secret, tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate, + strlen(kHkdfLabelTrafficUpdate), + tls13_GetHmacMechanism(ss), + tls13_GetHashSize(ss), + ss->protocolVariant, + &updatedSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(*secret); + *secret = updatedSecret; + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + if (direction == ssl_secret_read) { + epoch = ss->ssl3.crSpec->epoch; + } else { + epoch = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch; + } + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + + if (epoch == PR_UINT16_MAX) { + /* Good chance that this is an overflow from too many updates. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + ++epoch; + + if (ss->secretCallback) { + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, epoch, direction, updatedSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, epoch, direction, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, tls13KeyUpdateRequest request, PRBool buffer) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s send key update, response %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), + (request == update_requested) ? "requested" + : "not requested")); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer || !ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested); + + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Not supported. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_key_update, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, request, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* If we have been asked to buffer, then do so. This allows us to coalesce + * a KeyUpdate with a pending write. */ + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, buffer ? ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER : 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + rv = tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(ss, ssl_secret_write); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code set by tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys */ + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_KeyUpdate(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool requestUpdate) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, requestUpdate ? update_requested : update_not_requested, + PR_FALSE /* don't buffer */); + + /* Remember that we are the ones that initiated this KeyUpdate. */ + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate = PR_FALSE; + } + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +/* + * enum { + * update_not_requested(0), update_requested(1), (255) + * } KeyUpdateRequest; + * + * struct { + * KeyUpdateRequest request_update; + * } KeyUpdate; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, unsigned int length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 update; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s handle key update", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_KEY_UPDATE, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* We should never be idle_handshake prior to firstHsDone. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &update, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + if (length != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!(update == update_requested || + update == update_not_requested)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_UPDATE, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys(ss, ssl_secret_read); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set by tls13_UpdateTrafficKeys. */ + } + + if (update == update_requested) { + PRBool sendUpdate; + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + /* Post-handshake auth is in progress; defer sending a key update. */ + ss->ssl3.keyUpdateDeferred = PR_TRUE; + ss->ssl3.deferredKeyUpdateRequest = update_not_requested; + sendUpdate = PR_FALSE; + } else if (ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate) { + /* Only send an update if we have sent with the current spec. This + * prevents us from being forced to crank forward pointlessly. */ + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + sendUpdate = ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum > 0; + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + } else { + sendUpdate = PR_TRUE; + } + if (sendUpdate) { + /* Respond immediately (don't buffer). */ + rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, update_not_requested, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error already set. */ + } + } + ss->ssl3.peerRequestedKeyUpdate = PR_TRUE; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SendCertificateRequest(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Not supported. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Disallow a CertificateRequest if this connection uses an external PSK. */ + if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MISSING_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested = PR_TRUE; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore != ssl_0rtt_ignore_none) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: successfully decrypted handshake after " + "failed 0-RTT", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Would it be better to check all the states here? */ + switch (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type) { + case ssl_hs_certificate: + return tls13_HandleCertificate(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_certificate_request: + return tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_certificate_verify: + return tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions: + return tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_new_session_ticket: + return tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_finished: + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + return tls13_ServerHandleFinished(ss, b, length); + } else { + return tls13_ClientHandleFinished(ss, b, length); + } + + case ssl_hs_end_of_early_data: + return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss, b, length); + + case ssl_hs_key_update: + return tls13_HandleKeyUpdate(ss, b, length); + + default: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNKNOWN_HANDSHAKE, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(0); /* Unreached */ + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PK11SymKey *wrapKey; /* wrapping key */ + SECItem wrappedMS = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSLHashType hashType; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: recovering static secret (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* Now find the hash used as the PRF for the previous handshake. */ + hashType = tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite); + + /* If we are the server, we compute the wrapping key, but if we + * are the client, its coordinates are stored with the ticket. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + wrapKey = ssl3_GetWrappingKey(ss, NULL, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + } else { + PK11SlotInfo *slot = SECMOD_LookupSlot(sid->u.ssl3.masterModuleID, + sid->u.ssl3.masterSlotID); + if (!slot) + return SECFailure; + + wrapKey = PK11_GetWrapKey(slot, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapIndex, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapSeries, + ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (!wrapKey) { + return SECFailure; + } + + wrappedMS.data = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret; + wrappedMS.len = sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; + + PK11SymKey *unwrappedPsk = ssl_unwrapSymKey(wrapKey, sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech, + NULL, &wrappedMS, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType), + CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY, ss->pkcs11PinArg); + PK11_FreeSymKey(wrapKey); + if (!unwrappedPsk) { + return SECFailure; + } + sslPsk *rpsk = tls13_MakePsk(unwrappedPsk, ssl_psk_resume, hashType, NULL); + if (!rpsk) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(unwrappedPsk); + return SECFailure; + } + if (sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) { + rpsk->maxEarlyData = sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.max_early_data_size; + rpsk->zeroRttSuite = sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite; + } + PRINT_KEY(50, (ss, "Recovered RMS", rpsk->key)); + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) || + ((sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks))->type != ssl_psk_resume); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* In server, we couldn't select the RPSK in the extension handler + * since it was not unwrapped yet. We're committed now, so select + * it and add it to the list (to ensure it is freed). */ + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = rpsk; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&rpsk->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Key Derivation Functions. + * + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") + * | = binder_key + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", + * | ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", + * | ClientHello) + * | = early_exporter_secret + * v + * Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") + * | + * v + *(EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * v + * Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished) + * | = client_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished) + * | = server_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "exp master", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished) + * | = exporter_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "res master", + * ClientHello...Client Finished) + * = resumption_master_secret + * + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute early secrets (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + sslPsk *psk = NULL; + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + psk = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk; + } else { + /* Client to use the first PSK for early secrets. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)); + psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + } + PORT_Assert(psk && psk->key); + PORT_Assert(psk->hash != ssl_hash_none); + + PK11SymKey *earlySecret = NULL; + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, psk->key, psk->hash, &earlySecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* No longer need the raw input key */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(psk->key); + psk->key = NULL; + const char *label = (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) ? kHkdfLabelResPskBinderKey : kHkdfLabelExtPskBinderKey; + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, earlySecret, + label, strlen(label), + &psk->binderKey, psk->hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(earlySecret); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = earlySecret; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This derives the early traffic and early exporter secrets. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelEarlyTrafficSecret, + keylogLabelClientEarlyTrafficSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->secretCallback) { + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelEarlyExporterSecret, + keylogLabelEarlyExporterSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.earlyExporterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *derivedSecret = NULL; + PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL; + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secret (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* If no PSK, generate the default early secret. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, NULL, + tls13_GetHash(ss), &ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + + /* Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") */ + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret, + strlen(kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret), + &derivedSecret, tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + /* HKDF-Extract(ECDHE, .) = Handshake Secret */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(derivedSecret, ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret, + tls13_GetHash(ss), &newSecret); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SymKey *derivedSecret = NULL; + PK11SymKey *newSecret = NULL; + + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute handshake secrets (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* Now compute |*HsTrafficSecret| */ + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, + keylogLabelClientHsTrafficSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelServer, + kHkdfLabelHandshakeTrafficSecret, + keylogLabelServerHsTrafficSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + + if (ss->secretCallback) { + SSLSecretDirection dir = + ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write; + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyHandshake, dir, + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + dir = ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_write : ssl_secret_read; + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyHandshake, dir, + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + } + + SSL_TRC(5, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: compute master secret (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + + /* Crank HKDF forward to make master secret, which we + * stuff in current secret. */ + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret, + strlen(kHkdfLabelDerivedSecret), + &derivedSecret, tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return rv; + } + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(derivedSecret, + NULL, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + &newSecret); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = newSecret; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelClient, + kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, + keylogLabelClientTrafficSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + kHkdfLabelServer, + kHkdfLabelApplicationTrafficSecret, + keylogLabelServerTrafficSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->secretCallback) { + SSLSecretDirection dir = + ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_read : ssl_secret_write; + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyApplicationData, + dir, ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + dir = ss->sec.isServer ? ssl_secret_write : ssl_secret_read; + ss->secretCallback(ss->fd, (PRUint16)TrafficKeyApplicationData, + dir, ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret, + ss->secretCallbackArg); + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelExporterMasterSecret, + keylogLabelExporterSecret, + &ss->ssl3.hs.exporterSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.crSpec->masterSecret); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.cwSpec->masterSecret); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + rv = tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret, + NULL, kHkdfLabelResumptionMasterSecret, + NULL, + &ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void +tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(sslSocket *ss, sslSessionID *sid) +{ + /* Set these to match the cached value. + * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Make a version with the "true" values. + * Bug 1256137. + */ + ss->sec.authType = sid->authType; + ss->sec.authKeyBits = sid->authKeyBits; + ss->sec.originalKeaGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(sid->keaGroup); + ss->sec.signatureScheme = sid->sigScheme; +} + +/* Check whether resumption-PSK is allowed. */ +static PRBool +tls13_CanResume(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + const sslServerCert *sc; + + if (!sid) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sid->version != ss->version) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + +#ifdef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + /* When fuzzing, sid could contain garbage that will crash tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite. + * Do a direct comparison of cipher suites. This makes us refuse to resume when the + * protocol allows it, but resumption is discretionary anyway. */ + if (sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite != ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite) { +#else + if (tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite) != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) { +#endif + return PR_FALSE; + } + + /* Server sids don't remember the server cert we previously sent, but they + * do remember the type of certificate we originally used, so we can locate + * it again, provided that the current ssl socket has had its server certs + * configured the same as the previous one. */ + sc = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, sid->namedCurve); + if (!sc || !sc->serverCert) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +static PRBool +tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent); + sslPsk *psk = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk; + + if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!psk) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (psk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!psk->maxEarlyData) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != psk->zeroRttSuite) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { + if (!sid) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + PORT_Assert(sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data); + PORT_Assert(ss->statelessResume); + if (!ss->statelessResume) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&ss->xtnData.nextProto, + &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection) != 0) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + } else if (psk->type != ssl_psk_external) { + PORT_Assert(0); + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (tls13_IsReplay(ss, sid)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Called from tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2 to update the state of 0-RTT handling. + * + * 0-RTT is only permitted if: + * 1. The early data extension was present. + * 2. We are resuming a session. + * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. + * 4. The ticket allowed 0-RTT. + * 5. We negotiated the same ALPN value as in the ticket. + */ +static void +tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: negotiate 0-RTT %p", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, sid)); + + /* tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn sets this to ssl_0rtt_sent, so this will + * be ssl_0rtt_none unless early_data is present. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) { + return; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored) { + /* HelloRetryRequest causes 0-RTT to be ignored. On the second + * ClientHello, reset the ignore state so that decryption failure is + * handled normally. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore == ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; + } else { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: application ignored 0-RTT", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + return; + } + + if (!tls13_CanNegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore 0-RTT", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; + return; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: enable 0-RTT", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite; +} + +/* Check if the offered group is acceptable. */ +static PRBool +tls13_isGroupAcceptable(const sslNamedGroupDef *offered, + const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup) +{ + /* We accept epsilon (e) bits around the offered group size. */ + const unsigned int e = 2; + + PORT_Assert(offered); + PORT_Assert(preferredGroup); + + if (offered->bits >= preferredGroup->bits - e && + offered->bits <= preferredGroup->bits + e) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Find remote key share for given group and return it. + * Returns NULL if no key share is found. */ +static TLS13KeyShareEntry * +tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) +{ + PRCList *cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + while (cur_p != &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares) { + TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p; + if (offer->group == group) { + return offer; + } + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p); + } + return NULL; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef **requestedGroup, + TLS13KeyShareEntry **clientShare) +{ + unsigned int index; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry = NULL; + const sslNamedGroupDef *preferredGroup = NULL; + + /* We insist on DHE. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Since the server insists on DHE to provide forward secracy, for + * every other PskKem value but DHE stateless resumption is disabled, + * this includes other specified and GREASE values. */ + if (!memchr(ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.data, tls13_psk_dh_ke, + ss->xtnData.psk_ke_modes.len)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client offered PSK without DH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + /* Now figure out which key share we like the best out of the + * mutually supported groups, regardless of what the client offered + * for key shares. + */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_supported_groups_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected KE = %s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ss->statelessResume || ss->xtnData.selectedPsk ? "PSK + (EC)DHE" : "(EC)DHE")); + + /* Find the preferred group and an according client key share available. */ + for (index = 0; index < SSL_NAMED_GROUP_COUNT; ++index) { + /* Continue to the next group if this one is not enabled. */ + if (!ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]) { + /* There's a gap in the preferred groups list. Assume this is a group + * that's not supported by the client but preferred by the server. */ + if (preferredGroup) { + entry = NULL; + break; + } + continue; + } + + /* Check if the client sent a key share for this group. */ + entry = tls13_FindKeyShareEntry(ss, ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]); + + if (preferredGroup) { + /* We already found our preferred group but the group didn't have a share. */ + if (entry) { + /* The client sent a key share with group ss->namedGroupPreferences[index] */ + if (tls13_isGroupAcceptable(ss->namedGroupPreferences[index], + preferredGroup)) { + /* This is not the preferred group, but it's acceptable */ + preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; + } else { + /* The proposed group is not acceptable. */ + entry = NULL; + } + } + break; + } else { + /* The first enabled group is the preferred group. */ + preferredGroup = ss->namedGroupPreferences[index]; + if (entry) { + break; + } + } + } + + if (!preferredGroup) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: group = %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, + preferredGroup->name)); + + /* Either provide a share, or provide a group that should be requested in a + * HelloRetryRequest, but not both. */ + if (entry) { + PORT_Assert(preferredGroup == entry->group); + *clientShare = entry; + *requestedGroup = NULL; + } else { + *clientShare = NULL; + *requestedGroup = preferredGroup; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SelectServerCert(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRCList *cursor; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* This picks the first certificate that has: + * a) the right authentication method, and + * b) the right named curve (EC only) + * + * We might want to do some sort of ranking here later. For now, it's all + * based on what order they are configured in. */ + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->serverCerts); + cursor != &ss->serverCerts; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslServerCert *cert = (sslServerCert *)cursor; + + if (SSL_CERT_IS_ONLY(cert, ssl_auth_rsa_decrypt)) { + continue; + } + + rv = ssl_PickSignatureScheme(ss, + cert->serverCert, + cert->serverKeyPair->pubKey, + cert->serverKeyPair->privKey, + ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, + PR_FALSE, + &ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + /* Found one. */ + ss->sec.serverCert = cert; + + /* If we can use a delegated credential (DC) for authentication in + * the current handshake, then commit to using it now. We'll send a + * DC as an extension and use the DC private key to sign the + * handshake. + * + * This sets the signature scheme to be the signature scheme + * indicated by the DC. + */ + rv = tls13_MaybeSetDelegatedCredential(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Failure indicates an internal error. */ + } + + ss->sec.authType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = + ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + ss->sec.authKeyBits = cert->serverKeyBits; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, + handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Note: |requestedGroup| is non-NULL when we send a key_share extension. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_MaybeSendHelloRetry(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup, + PRBool *hrrSent) +{ + SSLHelloRetryRequestAction action = ssl_hello_retry_accept; + PRUint8 token[256] = { 0 }; + unsigned int tokenLen = 0; + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->hrrCallback) { + action = ss->hrrCallback(!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry, + ss->xtnData.applicationToken.data, + ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len, + token, &tokenLen, sizeof(token), + ss->hrrCallbackArg); + } + + /* These use SSL3_SendAlert directly to avoid an assertion in + * tls13_FatalError(), which is ordinarily OK. */ + if (action == ssl_hello_retry_request && ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (action != ssl_hello_retry_request && tokenLen) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (tokenLen > sizeof(token)) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_APP_CALLBACK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (action == ssl_hello_retry_fail) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_APPLICATION_ABORT, handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (action == ssl_hello_retry_reject_0rtt) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; + } + + if (!requestedGroup && action != ssl_hello_retry_request) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(ss, requestedGroup, token, tokenLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + /* We may have received ECH, but have to start over with CH2. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE; + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL; + + *hrrSent = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected resumption PSK authentication", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; + /* Overwritten by tls13_RestoreCipherInfo. */ + ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; + return SECSuccess; + } else if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + /* If the EPSK doesn't specify a suite, use what was negotiated. + * Else, only use the EPSK if we negotiated that suite. */ + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL || + ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite == ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected external PSK authentication", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = ssl_sig_none; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; + ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + /* If there were PSKs, they are no longer needed. */ + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: selected certificate authentication", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + SECStatus rv = tls13_SelectServerCert(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} +/* Called from ssl3_HandleClientHello after we have parsed the + * ClientHello and are sure that we are going to do TLS 1.3 + * or fail. */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *suites, + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup = NULL; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *clientShare = NULL; + ssl3CipherSuite previousCipherSuite = 0; + const sslNamedGroupDef *previousGroup = NULL; + PRBool hrr = PR_FALSE; + PRBool previousOfferedEch; + + /* If the legacy_version field is set to 0x300 or smaller, + * reject the connection with protocol_version alert. */ + if (ss->clientHelloVersion <= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, protocol_version); + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight = PR_TRUE; + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; + } + + /* Negotiate cipher suite. */ + rv = ssl3_NegotiateCipherSuite(ss, suites, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure); + goto loser; + } + + /* If we are going around again, then we should make sure that the cipher + * suite selection doesn't change. That's a sign of client shennanigans. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + + /* Update sequence numbers before checking the cookie so that any alerts + * we generate are sent with the right sequence numbers. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Count the first ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq = 1; + ss->ssl3.hs.recvMessageSeq = 1; + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + /* Increase the write sequence number. The read sequence number + * will be reset after this to early data or handshake. */ + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum = 1; + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } + + if (!ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn) || + !ss->xtnData.cookie.len) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_COOKIE_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Client sent cookie", + ss->xtnData.cookie.data, ss->xtnData.cookie.len)); + + rv = tls13_HandleHrrCookie(ss, ss->xtnData.cookie.data, + ss->xtnData.cookie.len, + &previousCipherSuite, + &previousGroup, + &previousOfferedEch, NULL, PR_TRUE); + + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Now merge the ClientHello into the hash state. */ + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, msg, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; + + /* Note: We call this quite a bit earlier than with TLS 1.2 and + * before. */ + rv = ssl3_ServerCallSNICallback(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* An alert has already been sent. */ + } + + /* Check if we could in principle resume. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(sid); + if (!sid) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!tls13_CanResume(ss, sid)) { + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } + + /* Select key exchange. */ + rv = tls13_NegotiateKeyExchange(ss, &requestedGroup, &clientShare); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* We should get either one of these, but not both. */ + PORT_Assert((requestedGroup && !clientShare) || + (!requestedGroup && clientShare)); + + /* After HelloRetryRequest, check consistency of cipher and group. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(previousCipherSuite); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != previousCipherSuite) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + if (!clientShare) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + /* CH1/CH2 must either both include ECH, or both exclude it. */ + if (previousOfferedEch != (ss->xtnData.ech != NULL)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + previousOfferedEch ? missing_extension : illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + /* If we requested a new key share, check that the client provided just + * one of the right type. */ + if (previousGroup) { + if (PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares) != + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + if (clientShare->group != previousGroup) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + } + } + + rv = tls13_MaybeSendHelloRetry(ss, requestedGroup, &hrr); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (hrr) { + if (sid) { /* Free the sid. */ + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Select the authentication (this is also handshake shape). */ + rv = tls13_NegotiateAuthentication(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { + if (ss->statelessResume) { + /* We are now committed to trying to resume. */ + PORT_Assert(sid); + /* Check that the negotiated SNI and the cached SNI match. */ + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&sid->u.ssl3.srvName, + &ss->ssl3.hs.srvVirtName) != SECEqual) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, + handshake_failure); + goto loser; + } + + ss->sec.serverCert = ssl_FindServerCert(ss, sid->authType, + sid->namedCurve); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + rv = tls13_RecoverWrappedSharedSecret(ss, sid); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); + + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + if (sid->peerCert != NULL) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + } else if (sid) { + /* We should never have a SID in the non-resumption case. */ + PORT_Assert(0); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender( + ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn); + tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, sid); + + rv = tls13_ComputeEarlySecretsWithPsk(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + if (sid) { /* we had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + sid = NULL; + } + tls13_NegotiateZeroRtt(ss, NULL); + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk); + } + + /* Now that we have the binder key, check the binder. */ + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + SSL3Hashes hashes; + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len > ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen); + rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash( + ss, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len - ss->xtnData.pskBindersLen, + &hashes, tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->hash == tls13_GetHash(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def); + rv = tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, ssl_hs_client_hello, + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->binderKey, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.data, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.len, + &hashes); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* This needs to go after we verify the psk binder. */ + rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* If this is TLS 1.3 we are expecting a ClientKeyShare + * extension. Missing/absent extension cause failure + * below. */ + rv = tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(ss, clientShare); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* An alert was sent already. */ + } + + /* From this point we are either committed to resumption, or not. */ + if (ss->statelessResume) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_hits); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_stateless_resumes); + } else { + if (sid) { + /* We had a sid, but it's no longer valid, free it. */ + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_not_ok); + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } else if (!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hch_sid_cache_misses); + } + + sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); + if (!sid) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + /* Take ownership of the session. */ + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + sid = NULL; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), handshake_failure); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We're done with PSKs */ + tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (sid) { + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_HelloRetryRequestCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback cb, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + ss->hrrCallback = cb; + ss->hrrCallbackArg = arg; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } HelloRetryRequest; + * + * Note: this function takes an empty buffer and returns + * a non-empty one on success, in which case the caller must + * eventually clean up. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, + const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, + PRUint8 *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen, + const PRUint8 *cookieGreaseEchSignal, + sslBuffer *buffer) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer extensionsBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + PORT_Assert(buffer->len == 0); + + /* Note: cookie is pointing to a stack variable, so is only valid + * now. */ + ss->xtnData.selectedGroup = selectedGroup; + ss->xtnData.cookie.data = cookie; + ss->xtnData.cookie.len = cookieLen; + + /* Set restored ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf value for ECH HRR extension + * reconstruction. */ + if (cookieGreaseEchSignal) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.len); + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf, + cookieGreaseEchSignal, + TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionsBuf, + ssl_hs_hello_retry_request); + /* Reset ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf if it was changed. */ + if (cookieGreaseEchSignal) { + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* These extensions can't be empty. */ + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionsBuf) > 0); + + /* Clean up cookie so we're not pointing at random memory. */ + ss->xtnData.cookie.data = NULL; + ss->xtnData.cookie.len = 0; + + rv = ssl_ConstructServerHello(ss, PR_TRUE, &extensionsBuf, buffer); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionsBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionsBuf); + sslBuffer_Clear(buffer); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, + const sslNamedGroupDef *requestedGroup, + const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int cookieLen; + PRUint8 cookie[1024]; + sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send hello retry request handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* If an ECH backend or shared-mode server accepted ECH when offered, + * the HRR extension's payload must be set to 8 zero bytes, these are + * overwritten with the accept_confirmation value after the handshake + * transcript calculation. + * If a client-facing or shared-mode server did not accept ECH when offered + * OR if ECH GREASE is enabled on the server and a ECH extension was + * received, a 8 byte random value is set as the extension's payload + * [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7]. + * + * The (temporary) payload is written to the extension in tls13exthandle.c/ + * tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(). */ + if (ss->xtnData.ech) { + PRUint8 echGreaseRaw[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN] = { 0 }; + if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || + (ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && + ss->xtnData.ech && + ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn))) { + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(echGreaseRaw, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(100, ("Generated random value for ECH HRR GREASE.")); + } + sslBuffer echGreaseBuffer = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&echGreaseBuffer, echGreaseRaw, sizeof(echGreaseRaw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* HRR GREASE/accept_confirmation zero bytes placeholder buffer. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf = echGreaseBuffer; + } + + /* Compute the cookie we are going to need. */ + rv = tls13_MakeHrrCookie(ss, requestedGroup, + appToken, appTokenLen, + cookie, &cookieLen, sizeof(cookie)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now build the body of the message. */ + rv = tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, + requestedGroup, + cookie, cookieLen, + NULL, &messageBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* And send it. */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshake(ss, &messageBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); /* Done with messageBuf */ + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len) { + PRInt32 sent; + + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt() only flushes to the output buffer, so we + * have to force a send. */ + sent = ssl_SendSavedWriteData(ss); + if (sent < 0 && PORT_GetError() != PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SOCKET_WRITE_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } else { + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* error code set by ssl3_FlushHandshake */ + } + } + + /* We depend on this being exactly one record and one message. */ + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss) || (ss->ssl3.hs.sendMessageSeq == 1 && + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->nextSeqNum == 1)); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + + /* We received early data but have to ignore it because we sent a retry. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_hrr; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Called from tls13_HandleClientHello. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, TLS13KeyShareEntry *peerShare) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; /* ours */ + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle client_key_share handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(peerShare); + + tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, peerShare->group); + + /* Generate our key */ + rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(ss, peerShare->group); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + /* We should have exactly one key share. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + + keyPair = ((sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); + + /* Register the sender */ + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + + rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, peerShare, keyPair->keys, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + &ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + return rv; /* Error code set already. */ +} + +/* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.3.2 + * + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_extension_oid<1..2^8-1>; + * opaque certificate_extension_values<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateExtension; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * CertificateExtension certificate_extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + unsigned int offset = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send certificate_request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_certificate_request); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + /* We should always have at least one of these. */ + PORT_Assert(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf) > 0); + + /* Create a new request context for post-handshake authentication */ + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + PRUint8 context[16]; + SECItem contextItem = { siBuffer, context, sizeof(context) }; + + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(context, sizeof(context)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.certReqContext, &contextItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf); + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, + 1 + /* request context length */ + ss->xtnData.certReqContext.len + + 2 + /* extension length */ + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + /* Context. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data, + ss->xtnData.certReqContext.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + /* Extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionBuf, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) + offset, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) - offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; S 4.4.1] says: + * + * Transcript-Hash(ClientHello1, HelloRetryRequest, ... MN) = + * Hash(message_hash || // Handshake type + * 00 00 Hash.length || // Handshake message length + * Hash(ClientHello1) || // Hash of ClientHello1 + * HelloRetryRequest ... MN) + * + * For an ECH handshake, the process occurs for the outer + * transcript in |ss->ssl3.hs.messages| and the inner + * transcript in |ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages|. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SSL3Hashes echInnerHashes; + SECStatus rv; + + /* First compute the hash. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.messages.len, + tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &echInnerHashes, + ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages.len, + tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + ssl3_RestartHandshakeHashes(ss); + + /* Reinject the message. The Default context variant updates + * the default hash state. Use it for both non-ECH and ECH Outer. */ + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageDefault(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, + hashes.u.raw, hashes.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageEchInner(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, + echInnerHashes.u.raw, + echInnerHashes.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} +static unsigned int +ssl_ListCount(PRCList *list) +{ + unsigned int c = 0; + PRCList *cur; + for (cur = PR_NEXT_LINK(list); cur != list; cur = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur)) { + ++c; + } + return c; +} + +/* + * savedMsg contains the HelloRetryRequest message. When its extensions are parsed + * in ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions, the handler for ECH HRR extensions (tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn) + * will take a reference into the message buffer. + * + * This reference is then used in tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal in order to compute + * the transcript for the ECH signal calculation. This was felt to be preferable + * to re-parsing the HelloRetryRequest message in order to create the transcript. + * + * Consequently, savedMsg should not be moved or mutated between these + * function calls. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, + PRUint32 savedLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle hello retry request", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_server_hello); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + /* Restore the null cipher spec for writing. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ss->ssl3.cwSpec = ssl_FindCipherSpecByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_write, + TrafficKeyClearText); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none); + } + /* Set the spec version, because we want to send CH now with 0303 */ + tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + + /* Extensions must contain more than just supported_versions. This will + * ensure that a HelloRetryRequest isn't a no-op: we must have at least two + * extensions, supported_versions plus one other. That other must be one + * that we understand and recognize as being valid for HelloRetryRequest, + * and should alter our next Client Hello. */ + unsigned int requiredExtensions = 1; + /* The ECH HRR extension is a no-op from the client's perspective. */ + if (ss->xtnData.ech) { + requiredExtensions++; + } + if (ssl_ListCount(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions) <= requiredExtensions) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_hello_retry_request); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ + } + rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(ss, savedMsg, savedLength, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry = PR_TRUE; + rv = tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, + savedMsg, savedLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss) && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none) { + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_SendClientHello(ss, client_hello_retry); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondFlight because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate; + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL); + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateRequest(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem extensionsData = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_request sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Client */ + if (ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth) { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, + wait_cert_request, idle_handshake); + } else { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, + wait_cert_request); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* MUST NOT combine external PSKs with certificate authentication. */ + if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_REQUEST, unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_request, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* clean up anything left from previous handshake. */ + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificateList(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain); + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertificate != NULL) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + ss->ssl3.clientCertificate = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL) { + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes != NULL) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen = 0; + } + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE); + ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data = NULL; + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertChain == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemes == NULL); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientAuthSignatureSchemesLen == 0); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.certReqContext.data == NULL); + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Unless it is a post-handshake client auth, the certificate + * request context must be empty. */ + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) && context.len > 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionsData, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Process all the extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensionsData.data, &extensionsData.len, + ssl_hs_certificate_request); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_EXTENSION, + missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.certReqContext, &context); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested = PR_TRUE; + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + + /* Request a client certificate. */ + rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest( + ss, ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, + &ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return rv; + } + rv = tls13_SendPostHandshakeCertificate(ss); + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_cert); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRBool +tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* Even if we are configured to request a certificate, we can't + * if this handshake used a PSK, even when we are resuming. */ + return ss->opt.requestCertificate && + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType != ssl_auth_psk; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, + ssl_SendEmptyExtension); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set already. */ + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { + rv = tls13_SendCertificateRequest(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none) { + SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey; + + rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + if (tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Signing with delegated credential", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + svrPrivKey = ss->sec.serverCert->delegCredKeyPair->privKey; + } else { + svrPrivKey = ss->sec.serverCert->serverKeyPair->privKey; + } + + rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, svrPrivKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err code is set. */ + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from: ssl3_HandleClientHello */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendServerHelloSequence(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRErrorCode err = 0; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: begin send server_hello sequence", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_SendServerHello(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err code is set. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid.len) { + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.hs.fakeSid, PR_FALSE); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendEncryptedServerSequence(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + err = PORT_GetError(); + } + /* Even if we get an error, since the ServerHello was successfully + * serialized, we should give it a chance to reach the network. This gives + * the client a chance to perform the key exchange and decrypt the alert + * we're about to send. */ + rv |= ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (err) { + PORT_SetError(err); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Compute the rest of the secrets except for the resumption + * and exporter secret. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError()); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* We need this for reading ACKs. */ + ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.crSpec); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_read, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_end_of_early_data); + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored); + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, + TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_client_cert); + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } + } + + /* Here we set a baseline value for our RTT estimation. + * This value is updated when we get a response from the client. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); + + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type != ssl_psk_resume) { + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + } + } else { + /* We may have offered a PSK. If the server didn't negotiate + * it, clear this state to re-extract the Early Secret. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret) { + /* We might have dropped incompatible PSKs on HRR + * (see RFC8466, Section 4.1.4). */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || + ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)); + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.currentSecret = NULL; + } + ss->statelessResume = PR_FALSE; + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + } + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + if (tls13_GetHash(ss) != + tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Now create a synthetic kea_def that we can tweak. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable = *ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def; + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable; + + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.authKeyType = ssl_auth_psk; + if (ss->statelessResume) { + tls13_RestoreCipherInfo(ss, sid); + if (sid->peerCert) { + ss->sec.peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(sid->peerCert); + } + + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_hits); + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_stateless_resumes); + } else { + ss->sec.authType = ssl_auth_psk; + } + } else { + if (ss->statelessResume && + ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)) { + SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(&ssl3stats->hsh_sid_cache_misses); + } + if (sid->cached == in_client_cache) { + /* If we tried to resume and failed, let's not try again. */ + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + } + } + + /* Discard current SID and make a new one, though it may eventually + * end up looking a lot like the old one. + */ + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (sid == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.peerCert); + } + sid->version = ss->version; + + rv = tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecret(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(ss, savedMsg, savedLength, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code is set. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + /* When we send 0-RTT, we saved the null spec in case we needed it to + * send another ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest. Now + * that we won't be receiving a HelloRetryRequest, release the spec. */ + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_write, TrafficKeyClearText); + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_encrypted_extensions); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void +tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *group) +{ + ss->sec.keaGroup = group; + switch (group->keaType) { + /* Note: These overwrite on resumption.... so if you start with ECDH + * and resume with DH, we report DH. That's fine, since no answer + * is really right. */ + case ssl_kea_ecdh: + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = + ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_ecdh_psk : ssl_kea_ecdh; + ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_ecdh; + break; + case ssl_kea_dh: + ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def_mutable.exchKeyType = + ss->statelessResume ? ssl_kea_dh_psk : ssl_kea_dh; + ss->sec.keaType = ssl_kea_dh; + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } +} + +/* + * Called from ssl3_HandleServerHello. + * + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle server_key_share handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* This list should have one entry. */ + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_KEY_SHARE, missing_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + entry = (TLS13KeyShareEntry *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + PORT_Assert(PR_NEXT_LINK(&entry->link) == &ss->xtnData.remoteKeyShares); + + /* Now get our matching key. */ + keyPair = ssl_LookupEphemeralKeyPair(ss, entry->group); + if (!keyPair) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, entry->group)); + + rv = tls13_HandleKeyShare(ss, entry, keyPair->keys, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + &ss->ssl3.hs.dheSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; /* Error code set by caller. */ + + tls13_SetKeyExchangeType(ss, entry->group); + ss->sec.keaKeyBits = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrengthInBits(keyPair->keys->pubKey); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * opaque ASN1Cert<1..2^24-1>; + * + * struct { + * ASN1Cert cert_data; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificate(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificateList *certChain; + int certChainLen = 0; + int i; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + sslBuffer extensionBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS1.3[%d]: send certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.localCert); + /* A server certificate is selected in tls13_SelectServerCert(). */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + + certChain = ss->sec.serverCert->serverCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.serverCert->serverCert); + } else { + if (ss->sec.localCert) + CERT_DestroyCertificate(ss->sec.localCert); + + certChain = ss->ssl3.clientCertChain; + ss->sec.localCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->ssl3.clientCertificate); + } + + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested); + context = ss->xtnData.certReqContext; + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + /* Each cert is 3 octet length, cert, and extensions */ + certChainLen += 3 + certChain->certs[i].len + 2; + } + + /* Build the extensions. This only applies to the leaf cert, because we + * don't yet send extensions for non-leaf certs. */ + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensionBuf, ssl_hs_certificate); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* code already set */ + } + /* extensionBuf.len is only added once, for the leaf cert. */ + certChainLen += SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensionBuf); + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, + 1 + context.len + 3 + certChainLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, context.data, + context.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, certChainLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + if (certChain) { + for (i = 0; i < certChain->len; i++) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, certChain->certs[i].data, + certChain->certs[i].len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + + if (i) { + /* Not end-entity. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + continue; + } + + /* End-entity, send extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionBuf, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensionBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, PRBool first, + CERTCertificate **certp) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem certData; + SECItem extensionsData; + CERTCertificate *cert = NULL; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certData, + 3, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensionsData, + 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse all the extensions. */ + if (first && !ss->sec.isServer) { + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &extensionsData.data, + &extensionsData.len, + ssl_hs_certificate); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Copy out SCTs. Bug 1315727. */ + } + + cert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &certData, NULL, + PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); + + if (!cert) { + PRErrorCode errCode = PORT_GetError(); + switch (errCode) { + case PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR: + case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATABASE: + case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, errCode, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + default: + ssl3_SendAlertForCertError(ss, errCode); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + *certp = cert; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * tls13 Certificate message. + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificate(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem context = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem certList; + PRBool first = PR_TRUE; + ssl3CertNode *lastCert = NULL; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Receiving this message might be the first sign we have that + * early data is over, so pretend we received EOED. */ + rv = tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, + idle_handshake); + } else { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, + wait_client_cert); + } + } else { + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERTIFICATE, + wait_cert_request, wait_server_cert); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We can ignore any other cleartext from the client. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer && IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, TrafficKeyClearText); + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } else if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Our first shot an getting an RTT estimate. If the client took extra + * time to fetch a certificate, this will be bad, but we can't do much + * about that. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss) - ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate; + } + + /* Process the context string */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &context, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + if (ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested) { + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&context, &ss->xtnData.certReqContext) != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &certList, 3, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!certList.len) { + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Servers always need to send some cert. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERTIFICATE, bad_certificate); + return SECFailure; + } else { + /* This is TLS's version of a no_certificate alert. */ + /* I'm a server. I've requested a client cert. He hasn't got one. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleNoCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + /* Now clean up. */ + ssl3_CleanupPeerCerts(ss); + ss->ssl3.peerCertArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (ss->ssl3.peerCertArena == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + while (certList.len) { + CERTCertificate *cert; + + rv = tls13_HandleCertificateEntry(ss, &certList, first, + &cert); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + return SECFailure; + } + + if (first) { + ss->sec.peerCert = cert; + + if (ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len) { + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &sid->u.ssl3.signedCertTimestamps, + &ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps); + ss->xtnData.signedCertTimestamps.len = 0; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } else { + ssl3CertNode *c = PORT_ArenaNew(ss->ssl3.peerCertArena, + ssl3CertNode); + if (!c) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + c->cert = cert; + c->next = NULL; + + if (lastCert) { + lastCert->next = c; + } else { + ss->ssl3.peerCertChain = c; + } + lastCert = c; + } + + first = PR_FALSE; + } + SECKEY_UpdateCertPQG(ss->sec.peerCert); + + return ssl3_AuthCertificate(ss); /* sets ss->ssl3.hs.ws */ +} + +/* Add context to the hash functions as described in + [draft-ietf-tls-tls13; Section 4.9.1] */ +SECStatus +tls13_AddContextToHashes(sslSocket *ss, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + SSLHashType algorithm, PRBool sending, + SSL3Hashes *tbsHash) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + PK11Context *ctx; + const unsigned char context_padding[] = { + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 + }; + + const char *client_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + const char *server_cert_verify_string = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + const char *context_string = (sending ^ ss->sec.isServer) ? client_cert_verify_string + : server_cert_verify_string; + unsigned int hashlength; + + /* Double check that we are doing the same hash.*/ + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(algorithm)); + if (!ctx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto loser; + } + + PORT_Assert(SECFailure); + PORT_Assert(!SECSuccess); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash without context", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Context string", context_string, strlen(context_string))); + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, context_padding, sizeof(context_padding)); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, (unsigned char *)context_string, + strlen(context_string) + 1); /* +1 includes the terminating 0 */ + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + /* Update the hash in-place */ + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, tbsHash->u.raw, &hashlength, sizeof(tbsHash->u.raw)); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "TLS 1.3 hash with context", tbsHash->u.raw, hashlength)); + + tbsHash->len = hashlength; + tbsHash->hashAlg = algorithm; + + if (rv) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, + * Hash(Messages) + Hash(resumption_context), L)) + */ +SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PK11SymKey **dest, + SSLHashType hash) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(key, hash, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len, + label, labelLen, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hash), + ss->protocolVariant, dest); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Convenience wrapper for the empty hash. */ +SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + PK11SymKey **dest, + SSLHashType hash) +{ + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 buf[] = { 0 }; + + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, buf, 0, hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, key, label, labelLen, &hashes, dest, hash); +} + +/* Convenience wrapper that lets us supply a separate prefix and suffix. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecretWrap(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *prefix, + const char *suffix, + const char *keylogLabel, + PK11SymKey **dest) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + char buf[100]; + const char *label; + + if (prefix) { + if ((strlen(prefix) + strlen(suffix) + 2) > sizeof(buf)) { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + (void)PR_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %s", + prefix, suffix); + label = buf; + } else { + label = suffix; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving secret '%s'", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, label)); + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Assert(0); /* Should never fail */ + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_DeriveSecret(ss, key, label, strlen(label), + &hashes, dest, tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (keylogLabel) { + ssl3_RecordKeyLog(ss, keylogLabel, *dest); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SecretCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLSecretCallback cb, void *arg) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SecretCallback", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ss->secretCallback = cb; + ss->secretCallbackArg = arg; + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Derive traffic keys for the next cipher spec in the queue. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + TrafficKeyType type, + PRBool deleteSecret) +{ + size_t keySize = spec->cipherDef->key_size; + size_t ivSize = spec->cipherDef->iv_size + + spec->cipherDef->explicit_nonce_size; /* This isn't always going to + * work, but it does for + * AES-GCM */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkAlgorithm = ssl3_Alg2Mech(spec->cipherDef->calg); + PK11SymKey **prkp = NULL; + PK11SymKey *prk = NULL; + PRBool clientSecret; + SECStatus rv; + /* These labels are just used for debugging. */ + static const char kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys[] = "early application data"; + static const char kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys[] = "handshake data"; + static const char kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys[] = "application data"; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + clientSecret = !tls13_UseServerSecret(ss, spec->direction); + switch (type) { + case TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData: + PORT_Assert(clientSecret); + prkp = &ss->ssl3.hs.clientEarlyTrafficSecret; + spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseEarlyApplicationDataKeys; + break; + case TrafficKeyHandshake: + prkp = clientSecret ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret + : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret; + spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseHandshakeKeys; + break; + case TrafficKeyApplicationData: + prkp = clientSecret ? &ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret + : &ss->ssl3.hs.serverTrafficSecret; + spec->phase = kHkdfPhaseApplicationDataKeys; + break; + default: + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(prkp != NULL); + prk = *prkp; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deriving %s traffic keys epoch=%d (%s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SPEC_DIR(spec), + spec->epoch, spec->phase)); + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + kHkdfPurposeKey, strlen(kHkdfPurposeKey), + bulkAlgorithm, keySize, + ss->protocolVariant, + &spec->keyMaterial.key); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && spec->epoch > 0) { + rv = ssl_CreateMaskingContextInner(spec->version, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, + ss->protocolVariant, prk, kHkdfPurposeSn, + strlen(kHkdfPurposeSn), &spec->maskContext); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(prk, tls13_GetHash(ss), + NULL, 0, + kHkdfPurposeIv, strlen(kHkdfPurposeIv), + ss->protocolVariant, + spec->keyMaterial.iv, ivSize); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + + if (deleteSecret) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(prk); + *prkp = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + return SECFailure; +} + +void +tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + /* Set the record version to pretend to be (D)TLS 1.2. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE; + } else { + spec->recordVersion = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2; + } + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: set spec=%d record version to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->recordVersion)); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + ssl3CipherSuite suite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(spec->epoch); + + /* Version isn't set when we send 0-RTT data. */ + spec->version = PR_MAX(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, ss->version); + + ssl_SaveCipherSpec(ss, spec); + /* We want to keep read cipher specs around longer because + * there are cases where we might get either epoch N or + * epoch N+1. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && spec->direction == ssl_secret_read) { + ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(spec); + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Set Pending Cipher Suite to 0x%04x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, suite)); + + spec->cipherDef = ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(suite)); + + if (spec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) { + if (ss->xtnData.selectedPsk && + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->zeroRttSuite != TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { + spec->earlyDataRemaining = ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->maxEarlyData; + } + } + + tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, spec); + + /* The record size limit is reduced by one so that the remainder of the + * record handling code can use the same checks for all versions. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_record_size_limit_xtn)) { + spec->recordSizeLimit = ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_read) + ? ss->opt.recordSizeLimit + : ss->xtnData.recordSizeLimit) - + 1; + } else { + spec->recordSizeLimit = MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Initialize the cipher context. All TLS 1.3 operations are AEAD, + * so they are all message contexts. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_InitPendingContext(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec) +{ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE encMechanism; + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE encMode; + SECItem iv; + SSLCipherAlgorithm calg; + + calg = spec->cipherDef->calg; + + encMechanism = ssl3_Alg2Mech(calg); + encMode = CKA_NSS_MESSAGE | ((spec->direction == ssl_secret_write) ? CKA_ENCRYPT : CKA_DECRYPT); + iv.data = NULL; + iv.len = 0; + + /* + * build the context + */ + spec->cipherContext = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(encMechanism, encMode, + spec->keyMaterial.key, + &iv); + if (!spec->cipherContext) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * Called before sending alerts to set up the right key on the client. + * We might encounter errors during the handshake where the current + * key is ClearText or EarlyApplicationData. This + * function switches to the Handshake key if possible. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if (TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, wait_server_hello)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + if ((ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyClearText) && + (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Install a new cipher spec for this direction. + * + * During the handshake, the values for |epoch| take values from the + * TrafficKeyType enum. Afterwards, key update increments them. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SetCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 epoch, + SSLSecretDirection direction, PRBool deleteSecret) +{ + TrafficKeyType type; + SECStatus rv; + ssl3CipherSpec *spec = NULL; + ssl3CipherSpec **specp; + + /* Flush out old handshake data. */ + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, ssl_SEND_FLAG_FORCE_INTO_BUFFER); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Create the new spec. */ + spec = ssl_CreateCipherSpec(ss, direction); + if (!spec) { + return SECFailure; + } + spec->epoch = epoch; + spec->nextSeqNum = 0; + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + dtls_InitRecvdRecords(&spec->recvdRecords); + } + + /* This depends on spec having a valid direction and epoch. */ + rv = tls13_SetupPendingCipherSpec(ss, spec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + type = (TrafficKeyType)PR_MIN(TrafficKeyApplicationData, epoch); + rv = tls13_DeriveTrafficKeys(ss, spec, type, deleteSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = tls13_InitPendingContext(ss, spec); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Now that we've set almost everything up, finally cut over. */ + specp = (direction == ssl_secret_read) ? &ss->ssl3.crSpec : &ss->ssl3.cwSpec; + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(*specp); /* May delete old cipher. */ + *specp = spec; /* Overwrite. */ + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s installed key for epoch=%d (%s) dir=%s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), spec->epoch, + spec->phase, SPEC_DIR(spec))); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_CipherSpecRelease(spec); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *ctx = NULL; + PRBool useEchInner; + sslBuffer *transcript; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown) { + /* Backup: if we haven't done any hashing, then hash now. + * This happens when we are doing 0-RTT on the client. */ + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(tls13_GetHash(ss))); + if (!ctx) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (PK11_DigestBegin(ctx) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + /* One might expect this to use ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted, + * but with 0-RTT we don't know that yet. */ + useEchInner = ss->sec.isServer ? PR_FALSE : !!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx; + transcript = useEchInner ? &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages : &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; + + PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "Handshake hash computed over saved messages", + transcript->buf, + transcript->len)); + + if (PK11_DigestOp(ctx, + transcript->buf, + transcript->len) != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } else { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + ctx = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake); + } else { + ctx = PK11_CloneContext(ss->ssl3.hs.sha); + } + if (!ctx) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, + &hashes->len, + sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(10, (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss)); + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; +} + +TLS13KeyShareEntry * +tls13_CopyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *o) +{ + TLS13KeyShareEntry *n; + + PORT_Assert(o); + n = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry); + if (!n) { + return NULL; + } + + if (SECSuccess != SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &n->key_exchange, &o->key_exchange)) { + PORT_Free(n); + return NULL; + } + n->group = o->group; + return n; +} + +void +tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *offer) +{ + if (!offer) { + return; + } + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&offer->key_exchange, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(offer, sizeof(*offer)); +} + +void +tls13_DestroyKeyShares(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + /* The list must be initialized. */ + PORT_Assert(PR_LIST_HEAD(list)); + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry((TLS13KeyShareEntry *)cur_p); + } +} + +void +tls13_DestroyEarlyData(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + TLS13EarlyData *msg; + + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + msg = (TLS13EarlyData *)cur_p; + + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&msg->data, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(msg, sizeof(*msg)); + } +} + +/* draft-ietf-tls-tls13 Section 5.2.2 specifies the following + * nonce algorithm: + * + * The length of the per-record nonce (iv_length) is set to max(8 bytes, + * N_MIN) for the AEAD algorithm (see [RFC5116] Section 4). An AEAD + * algorithm where N_MAX is less than 8 bytes MUST NOT be used with TLS. + * The per-record nonce for the AEAD construction is formed as follows: + * + * 1. The 64-bit record sequence number is padded to the left with + * zeroes to iv_length. + * + * 2. The padded sequence number is XORed with the static + * client_write_iv or server_write_iv, depending on the role. + * + * The resulting quantity (of length iv_length) is used as the per- + * record nonce. + * + * Existing suites have the same nonce size: N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 bytes + * + * See RFC 5288 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-chacha20-poly1305-04#section-2 + */ +static void +tls13_WriteNonce(const unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned int ivInLen, + const unsigned char *nonce, unsigned int nonceLen, + unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned int ivOutLen) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned int offset = ivOutLen - nonceLen; + + PORT_Assert(ivInLen <= ivOutLen); + PORT_Assert(nonceLen <= ivOutLen); + PORT_Memset(ivOut, 0, ivOutLen); + PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivInLen); + + /* XOR the last n bytes of the IV with the nonce (should be a counter). */ + for (i = 0; i < nonceLen; ++i) { + ivOut[offset + i] ^= nonce[i]; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Nonce", ivOut, ivOutLen)); +} + +/* Setup the IV for AEAD encrypt. The PKCS #11 module will add the + * counter, but it doesn't know about the DTLS epic, so we add it here. + */ +unsigned int +tls13_SetupAeadIv(PRBool isDTLS, unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned char *ivIn, + unsigned int offset, unsigned int ivLen, DTLSEpoch epoch) +{ + PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivLen); + if (isDTLS) { + /* handle the tls 1.2 counter mode case, the epoc is copied + * instead of xored. We accomplish this by clearing ivOut + * before running xor. */ + if (offset >= ivLen) { + ivOut[offset] = ivOut[offset + 1] = 0; + } + ivOut[offset] ^= (unsigned char)(epoch >> BPB) & 0xff; + ivOut[offset + 1] ^= (unsigned char)(epoch)&0xff; + offset += 2; + } + return offset; +} + +/* + * Do a single AEAD for TLS. This differs from PK11_AEADOp in the following + * ways. + * 1) If context is not supplied, it treats the operation as a single shot + * and creates a context from symKey and mech. + * 2) It always assumes the tag will be at the end of the buffer + * (in on decrypt, out on encrypt) just like the old single shot. + * 3) If we aren't generating an IV, it uses tls13_WriteNonce to create the + * nonce. + * NOTE is context is supplied, symKey and mech are ignored + */ +SECStatus +tls13_AEAD(PK11Context *context, PRBool decrypt, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivGen, unsigned int fixedbits, + const unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned char *ivOut, unsigned int ivLen, + const unsigned char *nonceIn, unsigned int nonceLen, + const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int maxout, + unsigned int tagLen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inLen) +{ + unsigned char *tag; + unsigned char iv[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tagbuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX]; + SECStatus rv; + + /* must have either context or the symKey set */ + if (!context) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(ivLen <= MAX_IV_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(tagLen <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX); + if (!ivOut) { + ivOut = iv; /* caller doesn't need a returned, iv */ + } + + if (ivGen == CKG_NO_GENERATE) { + tls13_WriteNonce(ivIn, ivLen, nonceIn, nonceLen, ivOut, ivLen); + } else if (ivIn != ivOut) { + PORT_Memcpy(ivOut, ivIn, ivLen); + } + if (decrypt) { + inLen = inLen - tagLen; + tag = (unsigned char *)in + inLen; + /* tag is const on decrypt, but returned on encrypt */ + } else { + /* tag is written to a separate buffer, then added to the end + * of the actual output buffer. This allows output buffer to be larger + * than the input buffer and everything still work */ + tag = tagbuf; + } + rv = PK11_AEADOp(context, ivGen, fixedbits, ivOut, ivLen, aad, aadLen, + out, (int *)outLen, maxout, tag, tagLen, in, inLen); + /* on encrypt SSL always puts the tag at the end of the buffer */ + if ((rv == SECSuccess) && !(decrypt)) { + unsigned int len = *outLen; + /* make sure there is still space */ + if (len + tagLen > maxout) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(out + len, tag, tagLen); + *outLen += tagLen; + } + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 innerLength; + SECItem oldAlpn = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle encrypted extensions", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + wait_encrypted_extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &innerLength, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Alert already sent. */ + } + if (innerLength != length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If we are doing 0-RTT, then we already have an ALPN value. Stash + * it for comparison. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent && + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE) { + oldAlpn = ss->xtnData.nextProto; + ss->xtnData.nextProto.data = NULL; + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ + } + + /* Handle the rest of the extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_HandleParsedExtensions(ss, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code set below */ + } + + /* We can only get here if we offered 0-RTT. */ + if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent); + if (!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk) { + /* Illegal to accept 0-RTT without also accepting PSK. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + } + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_accepted; + + /* Check that the server negotiated the same ALPN (if any). */ + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&oldAlpn, &ss->xtnData.nextProto)) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check that the server negotiated the same cipher suite. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite != ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } else if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_sent) { + /* Though we sent 0-RTT, the early_data extension wasn't present so the + * state is unmodified; the server must have rejected 0-RTT. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_ignored; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttIgnore = ssl_0rtt_ignore_trial; + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none || + (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_ignored)); + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&oldAlpn, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->authKeyType == ssl_auth_psk) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_cert_request); + } + + /* Client is done with any PSKs */ + tls13_DestroyPskList(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEncryptedExtensions(sslSocket *ss) +{ + sslBuffer extensions = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send encrypted extensions handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + rv = ssl_ConstructExtensions(ss, &extensions, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&extensions) + 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_AppendBufferToHandshakeVariable(ss, &extensions, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensions); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&extensions); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + SECItem buf = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int len; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes hash; + SSL3Hashes tbsHash; /* The hash "to be signed". */ + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_single); + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We should have picked a signature scheme when we received a + * CertificateRequest, or when we picked a server certificate. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme != ssl_sig_none); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme == ssl_sig_none) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme); + rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, &hash, hashAlg, + PR_TRUE, &tbsHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_SignHashes(ss, &tbsHash, privKey, &buf); + if (rv == SECSuccess && !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* Remember the info about the slot that did the signing. + * Later, when doing an SSL restart handshake, verify this. + * These calls are mere accessors, and can't fail. + */ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; + + slot = PK11_GetSlotFromPrivateKey(privKey); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSeries = PK11_GetSlotSeries(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthSlotID = PK11_GetSlotID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthModuleID = PK11_GetModuleID(slot); + sid->u.ssl3.clAuthValid = PR_TRUE; + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err code was set by ssl3_SignHashes */ + } + + len = buf.len + 2 + 2; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* err set by AppendHandshakeNumber */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, buf.data, buf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto done; /* error code set by AppendHandshake */ + } + +done: + /* For parity with the allocation functions, which don't use + * SECITEM_AllocItem(). */ + if (buf.data) + PORT_Free(buf.data); + return rv; +} + +/* Called from tls13_CompleteHandleHandshakeMessage() when it has deciphered a complete + * tls13 CertificateVerify message + * Caller must hold Handshake and RecvBuf locks. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleCertificateVerify(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred; + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; + SECItem signed_hash = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + SSLSignatureScheme sigScheme; + SSLHashType hashAlg; + SSL3Hashes tbsHash; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle certificate_verify handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_CERT_VERIFY, + wait_cert_verify); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, b, length); + } else { + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_certificate_verify, b, length); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_ConsumeSignatureScheme(ss, &b, &length, &sigScheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Set the |spki| used to verify the handshake. When verifying with a + * delegated credential (DC), this corresponds to the DC public key; + * otherwise it correspond to the public key of the peer's end-entity + * certificate. + */ + if (tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { + /* DelegatedCredential.cred.expected_cert_verify_algorithm is expected + * to match CertificateVerify.scheme. + * DelegatedCredential.cred.expected_cert_verify_algorithm must also be + * the same as was reported in ssl3_AuthCertificate. + */ + if (sigScheme != dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg || sigScheme != ss->sec.signatureScheme) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Verify the DC has three steps: (1) use the peer's end-entity + * certificate to verify DelegatedCredential.signature, (2) check that + * the certificate has the correct key usage, and (3) check that the DC + * hasn't expired. + */ + rv = tls13_VerifyDelegatedCredential(ss, dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* Calls FATAL_ERROR() */ + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Verifying with delegated credential", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + spki = dc->spki; + } else { + spki = &ss->sec.peerCert->subjectPublicKeyInfo; + } + + rv = ssl_CheckSignatureSchemeConsistency(ss, sigScheme, spki); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Error set already */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(sigScheme); + + rv = tls13_AddContextToHashes(ss, &hashes, hashAlg, PR_FALSE, &tbsHash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &signed_hash, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length != 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_VERIFY, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, sigScheme, + &tbsHash, &signed_hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), decrypt_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* Set the auth type and verify it is what we captured in ssl3_AuthCertificate */ + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + ss->sec.authType = ssl_SignatureSchemeToAuthType(sigScheme); + + uint32_t prelimAuthKeyBits = ss->sec.authKeyBits; + rv = ssl_SetAuthKeyBits(ss, pubKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Alert sent and code set. */ + } + + if (prelimAuthKeyBits != ss->sec.authKeyBits) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_CERT_VERIFY_ALG_MISMATCH, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Request a client certificate now if one was requested. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + rv = ssl3_BeginHandleCertificateRequest( + ss, ss->xtnData.sigSchemes, ss->xtnData.numSigSchemes, + &ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Compute the PSK binder hash over: + * Client HRR prefix, if present in ss->ssl3.hs.messages or ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages, + * |len| bytes of |buf| */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, size_t length, + SSL3Hashes *hashes, SSLHashType hashType) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *ctx = NULL; + sslBuffer *clientResidual = NULL; + if (!ss->sec.isServer) { + /* On the server, HRR residual is already buffered. */ + clientResidual = ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx ? &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages : &ss->ssl3.hs.messages; + } + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.hashType == handshake_hash_unknown); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "Binder computed over ClientHello", + b, length)); + + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hashType)); + if (!ctx) { + goto loser; + } + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + if (clientResidual && clientResidual->len) { + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, " with HRR prefix", clientResidual->buf, + clientResidual->len)); + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, clientResidual->buf, clientResidual->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + } + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(ctx, b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hashes->u.raw, &hashes->len, sizeof(hashes->u.raw)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + PRINT_BUF(10, (NULL, "PSK Binder hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ctx) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Compute and inject the PSK Binder for sending. + * + * When sending a ClientHello, we construct all the extensions with a dummy + * value for the binder. To construct the binder, we commit the entire message + * up to the point where the binders start. Then we calculate the hash using + * the saved message (in ss->ssl3.hs.messages). This is written over the dummy + * binder, after which we write the remainder of the binder extension. */ +SECStatus +tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *extensions, sslBuffer *chBuf) +{ + SSL3Hashes hashes; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)); + sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + unsigned int size = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(psk->hash); + unsigned int prefixLen = extensions->len - size - 3; + unsigned int finishedLen; + + PORT_Assert(extensions->len >= size + 3); + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chBuf, extensions->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Only write the extension up to the point before the binders. Assume that + * the pre_shared_key extension is at the end of the buffer. Don't write + * the binder, or the lengths that precede it (a 2 octet length for the list + * of all binders, plus a 1 octet length for the binder length). */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(chBuf, extensions->buf, prefixLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Calculate the binder based on what has been written out. */ + rv = tls13_ComputePskBinderHash(ss, chBuf->buf, chBuf->len, &hashes, psk->hash); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Write the binder into the extensions buffer, over the zeros we reserved + * previously. This avoids an allocation and means that we don't need a + * separate write for the extra bits that precede the binder. */ + PORT_Assert(psk->binderKey); + rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, psk->binderKey, + psk->hash, &hashes, PR_TRUE, + extensions->buf + extensions->len - size, + &finishedLen, size); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(finishedLen == size); + + /* Write out the remainder of the extension. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(chBuf, extensions->buf + prefixLen, + extensions->len - prefixLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey, + SSLHashType hashType, const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PRBool sending, PRUint8 *output, unsigned int *outputLen, + unsigned int maxOutputLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *hmacCtx = NULL; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg = tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(hashType); + SECItem param = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + unsigned int outputLenUint; + const char *label = kHkdfLabelFinishedSecret; + PK11SymKey *secret = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(baseKey); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s calculate finished", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handshake hash", hashes->u.raw, hashes->len)); + + /* Now derive the appropriate finished secret from the base secret. */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(baseKey, hashType, + NULL, 0, label, strlen(label), + tls13_GetHmacMechanismFromHash(hashType), + tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType), + ss->protocolVariant, &secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto abort; + } + + PORT_Assert(hashes->len == tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType)); + hmacCtx = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macAlg, CKA_SIGN, + secret, ¶m); + if (!hmacCtx) { + goto abort; + } + + rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmacCtx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + + rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmacCtx, hashes->u.raw, hashes->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + + PORT_Assert(maxOutputLen >= tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(hashType)); + rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmacCtx, output, &outputLenUint, maxOutputLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto abort; + *outputLen = outputLenUint; + + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "finished value", output, outputLenUint)); + return SECSuccess; + +abort: + if (secret) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + } + + if (hmacCtx) { + PK11_DestroyContext(hmacCtx, PR_TRUE); + } + + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *baseKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE]; + unsigned int finishedLen; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send finished handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSpecReadLock(ss); + rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, baseKey, tls13_GetHash(ss), &hashes, PR_TRUE, + finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); + ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_finished, finishedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, finishedBuf, finishedLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + + /* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Record key log */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_VerifyFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSLHandshakeType message, + PK11SymKey *secret, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 finishedBuf[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE]; + unsigned int finishedLen; + + if (!hashes) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeFinished(ss, secret, tls13_GetHash(ss), hashes, PR_FALSE, + finishedBuf, &finishedLen, sizeof(finishedBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (length != finishedLen) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + FATAL_ERROR(ss, message == ssl_hs_finished ? SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED : SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + + if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(b, finishedBuf, finishedLen) != 0) { +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE, + decrypt_error); + return SECFailure; +#endif + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_CommonHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_FINISHED, + wait_finished); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.endOfFlight = PR_TRUE; + + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + LOG_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl_HashPostHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); + } else { + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessage(ss, ssl_hs_finished, b, length); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + return tls13_VerifyFinished(ss, ssl_hs_finished, + key, b, length, &hashes); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = tls13_CommonHandleFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret, + b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return tls13_SendClientSecondRound(ss); +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server handle finished handshake", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (!tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { + /* Receiving this message might be the first sign we have that + * early data is over, so pretend we received EOED. */ + rv = tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss)) { + /* Finalize the RTT estimate. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate = ssl_Time(ss) - ss->ssl3.hs.rttEstimate; + } + } + + rv = tls13_CommonHandleFinished(ss, + ss->firstHsDone ? ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret : ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret, + b, length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake); + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake != NULL); + PK11_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.shaPostHandshake = NULL; + + ss->ssl3.clientCertRequested = PR_FALSE; + + if (ss->ssl3.keyUpdateDeferred) { + rv = tls13_SendKeyUpdate(ss, ss->ssl3.deferredKeyUpdateRequest, + PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error is set. */ + } + ss->ssl3.keyUpdateDeferred = PR_FALSE; + } + + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (!tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss) && + (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_done)) { + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, TrafficKeyClearText); + /* We need to keep the handshake cipher spec so we can + * read re-transmitted client Finished. */ + rv = dtls_StartTimer(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.hdTimer, + DTLS_RETRANSMIT_FINISHED_MS, + dtls13_HolddownTimerCb); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + /* If resumption, authType is the original value and not ssl_auth_psk. */ + if (ss->opt.enableSessionTickets && ss->sec.authType != ssl_auth_psk) { + rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss, NULL, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_FinishHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget == NULL); + + /* The first handshake is now completed. */ + ss->handshake = NULL; + + /* Don't need this. */ + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + PK11_FreeSymKey(ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret); + ss->ssl3.hs.serverHsTrafficSecret = NULL; + + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, idle_handshake); + + return ssl_FinishHandshake(ss); +} + +/* Do the parts of sending the client's second round that require + * the XmitBuf lock. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int offset = 0; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending); + + PRBool sendClientCert = !ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert && + ss->ssl3.clientCertChain != NULL && + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey != NULL; + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf); + } + + if (ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert) { + ss->ssl3.sendEmptyCert = PR_FALSE; + rv = ssl3_SendEmptyCertificate(ss); + /* Don't send verify */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* error code is set. */ + } + } else if (sendClientCert) { + rv = tls13_SendCertificate(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) + offset, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) - offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->xtnData.certReqContext, PR_FALSE); + if (ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena) { + PORT_FreeArena(ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena, PR_FALSE); + ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL; + } + PORT_Memset(&ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities, 0, + sizeof(ss->xtnData.certReqAuthorities)); + ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertRequested = PR_FALSE; + } + + if (sendClientCert) { + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + offset = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf); + } + + rv = tls13_SendCertificateVerify(ss, ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey); + ss->ssl3.clientPrivateKey = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ + } + + if (ss->firstHsDone) { + rv = ssl3_UpdatePostHandshakeHashes(ss, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) + offset, + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->sec.ci.sendBuf) - offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ + } + } + } + + rv = tls13_SendFinished(ss, ss->firstHsDone ? ss->ssl3.hs.clientTrafficSecret : ss->ssl3.hs.clientHsTrafficSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_error; /* err code was set. */ + } + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* No point in sending an alert here because we're not going to + * be able to send it if we couldn't flush the handshake. */ + goto error; + } + + return SECSuccess; + +alert_error: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; +error: + LOG_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError()); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendClientSecondRound(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss)); + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); + + /* Defer client authentication sending if we are still waiting for server + * authentication. This avoids unnecessary disclosure of client credentials + * to an unauthenticated server. + */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) { + PR_NOT_REACHED("unexpected ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget"); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.authCertificatePending || ss->ssl3.hs.clientCertificatePending) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: deferring tls13_SendClientSecondRound because" + " certificate authentication is still pending.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget = tls13_SendClientSecondRound; + PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeApplicationSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + rv = tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error code already set. */ + } + } else if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss) && + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_none && + !ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; + } + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INIT_CIPHER_SUITE_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + /* This call can't block, as clientAuthCertificatePending is checked above */ + rv = tls13_SendClientSecondFlight(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); /*******************************/ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_write, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_ComputeFinalSecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The handshake is now finished */ + return tls13_FinishHandshake(ss); +} + +/* + * enum { (65535) } TicketExtensionType; + * + * struct { + * TicketExtensionType extension_type; + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } TicketExtension; + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<1..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * TicketExtension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + */ + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *appToken, + unsigned int appTokenLen) +{ + PRUint16 message_length; + PK11SymKey *secret; + SECItem ticket_data = { 0, NULL, 0 }; + SECStatus rv; + NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; + PRUint32 max_early_data_size_len = 0; + PRUint32 greaseLen = 0; + PRUint8 ticketNonce[sizeof(ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce)]; + sslBuffer ticketNonceBuf = SSL_BUFFER(ticketNonce); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send new session ticket message %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce)); + + ticket.flags = 0; + if (ss->opt.enable0RttData) { + ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; + max_early_data_size_len = 8; /* type + len + value. */ + } + ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = ssl_ticket_lifetime; + + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + greaseLen = 4; /* type + len + 0 (empty) */ + } + + /* The ticket age obfuscator. */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom((PRUint8 *)&ticket.ticket_age_add, + sizeof(ticket.ticket_age_add)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&ticketNonceBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce, + sizeof(ticketNonce)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + ++ss->ssl3.hs.ticketNonce; + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + ticketNonce, sizeof(ticketNonce), + kHkdfLabelResumption, + strlen(kHkdfLabelResumption), + CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + tls13_GetHashSize(ss), + ss->protocolVariant, &secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket(ss, &ticket, appToken, appTokenLen, + secret, &ticket_data); + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + message_length = + 4 + /* lifetime */ + 4 + /* ticket_age_add */ + 1 + sizeof(ticketNonce) + /* ticket_nonce */ + 2 + /* extensions lentgh */ + max_early_data_size_len + /* max_early_data_size extension length */ + greaseLen + /* GREASE extension length */ + 2 + /* ticket length */ + ticket_data.len; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket, + message_length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* This is a fixed value. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_ticket_lifetime, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_age_add, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* The ticket nonce. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ticketNonce, sizeof(ticketNonce), 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Encode the ticket. */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable( + ss, ticket_data.data, ticket_data.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Extensions */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, max_early_data_size_len + greaseLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* GREASE NewSessionTicket: + * When sending a NewSessionTicket message in TLS 1.3, a server MAY select + * one or more GREASE extension values and advertise them as extensions + * with varying length and contents [RFC8701, SEction 4.1]. */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + PR_ASSERT(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + PRUint16 grease; + rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(&grease); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + /* Extension type */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, grease, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + /* Extension length */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + /* Max early data size extension. */ + if (max_early_data_size_len) { + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber( + ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + /* Length */ + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->opt.maxEarlyDataSize, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ticket_data.data) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ticket_data, PR_FALSE); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SendSessionTicket(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *token, + unsigned int tokenLen) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv; + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->sec.isServer || !tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) || + tokenLen > 0xffff) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Disable tickets if we can trace this connection back to a PSK. + * We aren't able to issue tickets (currently) without a certificate. + * As PSK =~ resumption, there is no reason to do this. */ + if (ss->sec.authType == ssl_auth_psk) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_FEATURE_DISABLED); + return SECFailure; + } + + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = tls13_SendNewSessionTicket(ss, token, tokenLen); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + rv = ssl3_FlushHandshake(ss, 0); + } + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 utmp; + NewSessionTicket ticket = { 0 }; + SECItem data; + SECItem ticket_nonce; + SECItem ticket_data; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle new session ticket message", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + idle_handshake); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!tls13_IsPostHandshake(ss) || ss->sec.isServer) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + unexpected_message); + return SECFailure; + } + + ticket.received_timestamp = ssl_Time(ss); + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint, 4, &b, + &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + ticket.ticket.type = siBuffer; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp), + &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + ticket.ticket_age_add = PR_ntohl(utmp); + + /* The nonce. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticket_nonce, 1, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Get the ticket value. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ticket_data, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !ticket_data.len) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse extensions. */ + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &data, 2, &b, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess || length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_HandleExtensions(ss, &data.data, + &data.len, ssl_hs_new_session_ticket); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + if (ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size) { + ticket.flags |= ticket_allow_early_data; + ticket.max_early_data_size = ss->xtnData.max_early_data_size; + } + + if (!ss->opt.noCache) { + PK11SymKey *secret; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid); + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ticket.ticket, &ticket_data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Caching session ticket", + ticket.ticket.data, + ticket.ticket.len)); + + /* Replace a previous session ticket when + * we receive a second NewSessionTicket message. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_client_cache || + ss->sec.ci.sid->cached == in_external_cache) { + /* Create a new session ID. */ + sslSessionID *sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_FALSE); + if (!sid) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Copy over the peerCert. */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); + sid->peerCert = CERT_DupCertificate(ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert); + if (!sid->peerCert) { + ssl_FreeSID(sid); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Destroy the old SID. */ + ssl_UncacheSessionID(ss); + ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); + ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; + } + + ssl3_SetSIDSessionTicket(ss->sec.ci.sid, &ticket); + PORT_Assert(!ticket.ticket.data); + + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(ss->ssl3.hs.resumptionMasterSecret, + tls13_GetHash(ss), + ticket_nonce.data, ticket_nonce.len, + kHkdfLabelResumption, + strlen(kHkdfLabelResumption), + CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + tls13_GetHashSize(ss), + ss->protocolVariant, &secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_FillInCachedSID(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid, secret); + PK11_FreeSymKey(secret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Cache the session. */ + ssl_CacheSessionID(ss); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +#define _M_NONE 0 +#define _M(a) (1 << PR_MIN(a, 31)) +#define _M1(a) (_M(ssl_hs_##a)) +#define _M2(a, b) (_M1(a) | _M1(b)) +#define _M3(a, b, c) (_M1(a) | _M2(b, c)) + +static const struct { + PRUint16 ex_value; + PRUint32 messages; +} KnownExtensions[] = { + { ssl_server_name_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, + { ssl_supported_groups_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate_request) }, + { ssl_signature_algorithms_cert_xtn, _M2(client_hello, + certificate_request) }, + { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, + { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, + { ssl_padding_xtn, _M1(client_hello) }, + { ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn, _M3(client_hello, server_hello, + hello_retry_request) }, + { ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn, _M2(client_hello, server_hello) }, + { ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn, _M1(client_hello) }, + { ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn, _M3(client_hello, encrypted_extensions, + new_session_ticket) }, + { ssl_signed_cert_timestamp_xtn, _M3(client_hello, certificate_request, + certificate) }, + { ssl_cert_status_xtn, _M3(client_hello, certificate_request, + certificate) }, + { ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate) }, + { ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn, _M2(client_hello, hello_retry_request) }, + { ssl_tls13_certificate_authorities_xtn, _M2(client_hello, certificate_request) }, + { ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn, _M3(client_hello, server_hello, + hello_retry_request) }, + { ssl_record_size_limit_xtn, _M2(client_hello, encrypted_extensions) }, + { ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, _M3(client_hello, encrypted_extensions, hello_retry_request) }, + { ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn, _M_NONE /* Encoding/decoding only */ }, + { ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn, _M1(client_hello) } +}; + +tls13ExtensionStatus +tls13_ExtensionStatus(PRUint16 extension, SSLHandshakeType message) +{ + unsigned int i; + + PORT_Assert((message == ssl_hs_client_hello) || + (message == ssl_hs_server_hello) || + (message == ssl_hs_hello_retry_request) || + (message == ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) || + (message == ssl_hs_new_session_ticket) || + (message == ssl_hs_certificate) || + (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request)); + + for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions); i++) { + /* Hacky check for message numbers > 30. */ + PORT_Assert(!(KnownExtensions[i].messages & (1U << 31))); + if (KnownExtensions[i].ex_value == extension) { + break; + } + } + if (i >= PR_ARRAY_SIZE(KnownExtensions)) { + return tls13_extension_unknown; + } + + /* Return "disallowed" if the message mask bit isn't set. */ + if (!(_M(message) & KnownExtensions[i].messages)) { + return tls13_extension_disallowed; + } + + return tls13_extension_allowed; +} + +#undef _M +#undef _M1 +#undef _M2 +#undef _M3 + +/* We cheat a bit on additional data because the AEAD interface + * which doesn't have room for the record number. The AAD we + * format is serialized record number followed by the true AD + * (i.e., the record header) plus the serialized record number. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_FormatAdditionalData( + sslSocket *ss, + const PRUint8 *header, unsigned int headerLen, + DTLSEpoch epoch, sslSequenceNumber seqNum, + PRUint8 *aad, unsigned int *aadLength, unsigned int maxLength) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(aad, maxLength); + + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, epoch, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, seqNum, IS_DTLS(ss) ? 6 : 8); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&buf, header, headerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *aadLength = buf.len; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRInt32 +tls13_LimitEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType type, PRInt32 toSend) +{ + PRInt32 reduced; + + PORT_Assert(type == ssl_ct_application_data); + PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); + if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->epoch != TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData) { + return toSend; + } + + if (IS_DTLS(ss) && toSend > ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining) { + /* Don't split application data records in DTLS. */ + return 0; + } + + reduced = PR_MIN(toSend, ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining); + ss->ssl3.cwSpec->earlyDataRemaining -= reduced; + return reduced; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSLContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = cwSpec->cipherDef; + const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(cwSpec->direction == ssl_secret_write); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) protect 0x%0llx len=%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cwSpec, cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->phase, + cwSpec->nextSeqNum, contentLen)); + + if (contentLen + 1 + tagLen > SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Copy the data into the wrBuf. We're going to encrypt in-place + * in the AEAD branch anyway */ + PORT_Memcpy(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), pIn, contentLen); + + if (cipher_def->calg == ssl_calg_null) { + /* Shortcut for plaintext */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, contentLen, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + } else { + PRUint8 hdr[13]; + sslBuffer buf = SSL_BUFFER_FIXED(hdr, sizeof(hdr)); + PRBool needsLength; + PRUint8 aad[21]; + const int ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size + cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; + unsigned int ivOffset = ivLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber); + unsigned char ivOut[MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + unsigned int aadLen; + unsigned int len; + + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead); + + /* If the following condition holds, we can skip the padding logic for + * DTLS 1.3 (4.2.3). This will be the case until we support a cipher + * with tag length < 15B. */ + PORT_Assert(tagLen + 1 /* cType */ >= 16); + + /* Add the content type at the end. */ + *(SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf) + contentLen) = type; + + /* Create the header (ugly that we have to do it twice). */ + rv = ssl_InsertRecordHeader(ss, cwSpec, ssl_ct_application_data, + &buf, &needsLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (needsLength) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&buf, contentLen + 1 + tagLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&buf), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&buf), + cwSpec->epoch, cwSpec->nextSeqNum, + aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* set up initial IV value */ + ivOffset = tls13_SetupAeadIv(IS_DTLS(ss), ivOut, cwSpec->keyMaterial.iv, + ivOffset, ivLen, cwSpec->epoch); + + rv = tls13_AEAD(cwSpec->cipherContext, PR_FALSE, + CKG_GENERATE_COUNTER_XOR, ivOffset * BPB, + ivOut, ivOut, ivLen, /* iv */ + NULL, 0, /* nonce */ + aad + sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* aad */ + aadLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* output */ + &len, /* out len */ + SSL_BUFFER_SPACE(wrBuf), /* max out */ + tagLen, + SSL_BUFFER_NEXT(wrBuf), /* input */ + contentLen + 1); /* input len */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_ENCRYPTION_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(wrBuf, len, NULL); + PORT_Assert(rv == SECSuccess); + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Unprotect a TLS 1.3 record and leave the result in plaintext. + * + * Called by ssl3_HandleRecord. Caller must hold the spec read lock. + * Therefore, we MUST not call SSL3_SendAlert(). + * + * If SECFailure is returned, we: + * 1. Set |*alert| to the alert to be sent. + * 2. Call PORT_SetError() with an appropriate code. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_UnprotectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSL3Ciphertext *cText, + sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSLContentType *innerType, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert) +{ + const ssl3BulkCipherDef *cipher_def = spec->cipherDef; + const int ivLen = cipher_def->iv_size + cipher_def->explicit_nonce_size; + const int tagLen = cipher_def->tag_size; + const int innerTypeLen = 1; + + PRUint8 aad[21]; + unsigned int aadLen; + SECStatus rv; + + *alert = bad_record_mac; /* Default alert for most issues. */ + + PORT_Assert(spec->direction == ssl_secret_read); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: spec=%d epoch=%d (%s) unprotect 0x%0llx len=%u", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, spec, spec->epoch, spec->phase, + cText->seqNum, cText->buf->len)); + + /* Verify that the outer content type is right. + * + * For the inner content type as well as lower TLS versions this is checked + * in ssl3con.c/ssl3_HandleNonApllicationData(). + * + * For DTLS 1.3 this is checked in ssl3gthr.c/dtls_GatherData(). DTLS drops + * invalid records silently [RFC6347, Section 4.1.2.7]. + * + * Also allow the DTLS short header in TLS 1.3. */ + if (!(cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data || + (IS_DTLS(ss) && + ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (cText->hdr[0] & 0xe0) == 0x20))) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has invalid exterior type=%2.2x", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, cText->hdr[0])); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_RECORD_TYPE); + *alert = unexpected_message; + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We can perform this test in variable time because the record's total + * length and the ciphersuite are both public knowledge. */ + if (cText->buf->len < tagLen) { + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record too short to contain valid AEAD data", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Check if the ciphertext can be valid if we assume maximum plaintext and + * add the specific ciphersuite expansion. + * This way we detect overlong plaintexts/padding before decryption. + * This check enforces size limitations more strict than the RFC. + * (see RFC8446, Section 5.2) */ + if (cText->buf->len > (spec->recordSizeLimit + innerTypeLen + tagLen)) { + *alert = record_overflow; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Check the version number in the record. Stream only. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL3ProtocolVersion version = + ((SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[1] << 8) | + (SSL3ProtocolVersion)cText->hdr[2]; + if (version != spec->recordVersion) { + /* Do we need a better error here? */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus version", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Decrypt */ + PORT_Assert(cipher_def->type == type_aead); + rv = tls13_FormatAdditionalData(ss, cText->hdr, cText->hdrLen, + spec->epoch, cText->seqNum, + aad, &aadLen, sizeof(aad)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_AEAD(spec->cipherContext, PR_TRUE, + CKG_NO_GENERATE, 0, /* ignored for decrypt */ + spec->keyMaterial.iv, NULL, ivLen, /* iv */ + aad, sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* nonce */ + aad + sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), /* aad */ + aadLen - sizeof(sslSequenceNumber), + plaintext->buf, /* output */ + &plaintext->len, /* outlen */ + plaintext->space, /* maxout */ + tagLen, + cText->buf->buf, /* in */ + cText->buf->len); /* inlen */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + spec->deprotectionFailures++; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: record has bogus MAC", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* There is a similar test in ssl3_HandleRecord, but this test is needed to + * account for padding. */ + if (plaintext->len > spec->recordSizeLimit + innerTypeLen) { + *alert = record_overflow; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The record is right-padded with 0s, followed by the true + * content type, so read from the right until we receive a + * nonzero byte. */ + while (plaintext->len > 0 && !(plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1])) { + --plaintext->len; + } + + /* Bogus padding. */ + if (plaintext->len < 1) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: empty record", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + /* It's safe to report this specifically because it happened + * after the MAC has been verified. */ + *alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_BLOCK_PADDING); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Record the type. */ + *innerType = (SSLContentType)plaintext->buf[plaintext->len - 1]; + --plaintext->len; + + /* Check for zero-length encrypted Alert and Handshake fragments + * (zero-length + inner content type byte). + * + * Implementations MUST NOT send Handshake and Alert records that have a + * zero-length TLSInnerPlaintext.content; if such a message is received, + * the receiving implementation MUST terminate the connection with an + * "unexpected_message" alert [RFC8446, Section 5.4]. */ + if (!plaintext->len && ((!IS_DTLS(ss) && cText->hdr[0] == ssl_ct_application_data) || + (IS_DTLS(ss) && dtls_IsDtls13Ciphertext(spec->version, cText->hdr[0])))) { + switch (*innerType) { + case ssl_ct_alert: + *alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ALERT); + return SECFailure; + case ssl_ct_handshake: + *alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HANDSHAKE); + return SECFailure; + default: + break; + } + } + + /* Check that we haven't received too much 0-RTT data. */ + if (spec->epoch == TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData && + *innerType == ssl_ct_application_data) { + if (plaintext->len > spec->earlyDataRemaining) { + *alert = unexpected_message; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + spec->earlyDataRemaining -= plaintext->len; + } + + SSL_TRC(10, + ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s received record of length=%d, type=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss), plaintext->len, *innerType)); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* 0-RTT is only permitted if: + * + * 1. We are doing TLS 1.3 + * 2. This isn't a second ClientHello (in response to HelloRetryRequest) + * 3. The 0-RTT option is set. + * 4. We have a valid ticket or an External PSK. + * 5. If resuming: + * 5a. The server is willing to accept 0-RTT. + * 5b. We have not changed our ALPN settings to disallow the ALPN tag + * in the ticket. + * + * Called from tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(). + */ +PRBool +tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + /* We checked that the cipher suite was still allowed back in + * ssl3_SendClientHello. */ + if (sid->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!ss->opt.enable0RttData) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + if (psk->zeroRttSuite == TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (!psk->maxEarlyData) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_external) { + return psk->hash == tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(psk->zeroRttSuite); + } + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { + if (!ss->statelessResume) + return PR_FALSE; + if ((sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket.flags & ticket_allow_early_data) == 0) + return PR_FALSE; + return ssl_AlpnTagAllowed(ss, &sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); + } + PORT_Assert(0); + return PR_FALSE; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* Don't do anything if there is no early_data xtn, which means we're + * not doing early data. */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_sent; + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttSuite = ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite; + /* Note: Reset the preliminary info here rather than just add 0-RTT. We are + * only guessing what might happen at this point.*/ + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo = ssl_preinfo_0rtt_cipher_suite; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: in 0-RTT mode", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Set the ALPN data as if it was negotiated. We check in the ServerHello + * handler that the server negotiates the same value. */ + if (ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection.len) { + ss->xtnData.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_EARLY_VALUE; + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.nextProto, + &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.alpnSelection); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (ss->opt.enableTls13CompatMode && !IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Pretend that this is a proper ChangeCipherSpec even though it is sent + * before receiving the ServerHello. */ + ssl_GetSpecWriteLock(ss); + tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(ss, ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + ssl_ReleaseSpecWriteLock(ss); + ssl_GetXmitBufLock(ss); + rv = ssl3_SendChangeCipherSpecsInt(ss); + ssl_ReleaseXmitBufLock(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* If we're trying 0-RTT, derive from the first PSK */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) && !ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + rv = tls13_DeriveEarlySecrets(ss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Save cwSpec in case we get a HelloRetryRequest and have to send another + * ClientHello. */ + ssl_CipherSpecAddRef(ss->ssl3.cwSpec); + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData, + ssl_secret_write, PR_TRUE); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRInt32 +tls13_Read0RttData(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, PRInt32 len) +{ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)); + PRInt32 offset = 0; + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData)) { + TLS13EarlyData *msg = + (TLS13EarlyData *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + unsigned int tocpy = msg->data.len - msg->consumed; + + if (tocpy > (len - offset)) { + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* In DTLS, we only return entire records. + * So offset and consumed are always zero. */ + PORT_Assert(offset == 0); + PORT_Assert(msg->consumed == 0); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_SHORT_DTLS_READ); + return -1; + } + + tocpy = len - offset; + } + + PORT_Memcpy(buf + offset, msg->data.data + msg->consumed, tocpy); + offset += tocpy; + msg->consumed += tocpy; + + if (msg->consumed == msg->data.len) { + PR_REMOVE_LINK(&msg->link); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&msg->data, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(msg, sizeof(*msg)); + } + + /* We are done after one record for DTLS; otherwise, when the buffer fills up. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss) || offset == len) { + break; + } + } + + return offset; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_SendEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); + + if (!ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send EndOfEarlyData", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, ssl_hs_end_of_early_data, 0); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return rv; /* err set by AppendHandshake. */ + } + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + rv = TLS13_CHECK_HS_STATE(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + wait_end_of_early_data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We shouldn't be getting any more early data, and if we do, + * it is because of reordering and we drop it. */ + if (IS_DTLS(ss)) { + ssl_CipherSpecReleaseByEpoch(ss, ssl_secret_read, + TrafficKeyEarlyApplicationData); + dtls_ReceivedFirstMessageInFlight(ss); + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted); + + if (length) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, decode_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_SetCipherSpec(ss, TrafficKeyHandshake, + ssl_secret_read, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState = ssl_0rtt_done; + if (tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(ss)) { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_client_cert); + } else { + TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, wait_finished); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_MaybeHandleSuppressedEndOfEarlyData(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + if (!ss->opt.suppressEndOfEarlyData || + ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + return tls13_HandleEndOfEarlyData(ss, NULL, 0); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf) +{ + TLS13EarlyData *ed; + SECItem it = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState == ssl_0rtt_accepted); + if (ss->ssl3.hs.zeroRttState != ssl_0rtt_accepted) { + /* Belt and suspenders. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_BUF(3, (NULL, "Received early application data", + origBuf->buf, origBuf->len)); + ed = PORT_ZNew(TLS13EarlyData); + if (!ed) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + it.data = origBuf->buf; + it.len = origBuf->len; + if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ed->data, &it) != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&ed->link, &ss->ssl3.hs.bufferedEarlyData); + + origBuf->len = 0; /* So ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord will keep looping. */ + + return SECSuccess; +} + +PRUint16 +tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, SSLProtocolVariant variant) +{ + if (variant == ssl_variant_datagram) { +#ifdef DTLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION + switch (version) { + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3: + return 0x7f00 | DTLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION; + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2_WIRE; + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: + /* TLS_1_1 maps to DTLS_1_0, see sslproto.h. */ + return SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_DTLS_1_0_WIRE; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } +#else + return dtls_TLSVersionToDTLSVersion(); +#endif + } + /* Stream-variant encodings do not change. */ + return (PRUint16)version; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(sslSocket *ss) +{ + PRUint32 temp; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + SECItem it; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Update the version based on the extension, as necessary. */ + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (!versionExtension) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Struct copy so we don't damage the extension. */ + it = versionExtension->data; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &temp, 2, &it.data, &it.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (it.len) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (temp != tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, + ss->protocolVariant)) { + /* You cannot negotiate < TLS 1.3 with supported_versions. */ + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with...ServerHello.legacy_version + * set to 0x0300 (SSL3) MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" + * alert. [RFC8446, Section D.5] + * + * The ServerHello.legacy_version is read into the ss->version field by + * ssl_ClientReadVersion(). */ + if (ss->version == SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, protocol_version); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Pick the highest version we support that is also advertised. */ +SECStatus +tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, const TLSExtension *supportedVersions) +{ + PRUint16 version; + /* Make a copy so we're nondestructive. */ + SECItem data = supportedVersions->data; + SECItem versions; + SECStatus rv; + + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &versions, 1, + &data.data, &data.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (data.len || !versions.len || (versions.len & 1)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) { + if (version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 && + (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted)) { + /* Prevent negotiating to a lower version after 1.3 HRR or ECH + * When accepting ECH, a different alert is generated. + */ + SSL3AlertDescription alert = ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? illegal_parameter : protocol_version; + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, alert); + return SECFailure; + } + + PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeVersion(version, ss->protocolVariant); + unsigned long offset; + + for (offset = 0; offset < versions.len; offset += 2) { + PRUint16 supported = + (versions.data[offset] << 8) | versions.data[offset + 1]; + if (supported == wire) { + ss->version = version; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + } + + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, protocol_version); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This is TLS 1.3 or might negotiate to it. */ +PRBool +tls13_MaybeTls13(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + if (!(ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo & ssl_preinfo_version)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + return PR_FALSE; +} + +/* Setup random client GREASE values according to RFC8701. State must be kept + * so an equal ClientHello might be send on HelloRetryRequest. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientGreaseSetup(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!ss->opt.enableGrease) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.grease = PORT_Alloc(sizeof(tls13ClientGrease)); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { + return SECFailure; + } + + tls13ClientGrease *grease = ss->ssl3.hs.grease; + /* We require eight GREASE values and randoms. */ + PRUint8 random[8]; + + /* Generate random GREASE values. */ + if (PK11_GenerateRandom(random, sizeof(random)) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + for (size_t i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(grease->idx); i++) { + random[i] = ((random[i] & 0xf0) | 0x0a); + grease->idx[i] = ((random[i] << 8) | random[i]); + } + /* Specific PskKeyExchangeMode GREASE value. */ + grease->pskKem = 0x0b + ((random[8 - 1] >> 5) * 0x1f); + + /* Duplicate extensions are not allowed. */ + if (grease->idx[grease_extension1] == grease->idx[grease_extension2]) { + grease->idx[grease_extension2] ^= 0x1010; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Destroy client GREASE state. */ +void +tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.grease) { + PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.grease); + ss->ssl3.hs.grease = NULL; + } +} + +/* Generate a random GREASE value according to RFC8701. + * This function does not provide valid PskKeyExchangeMode GREASE values! */ +SECStatus +tls13_RandomGreaseValue(PRUint16 *out) +{ + PRUint8 random; + + if (PK11_GenerateRandom(&random, sizeof(random)) != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + random = ((random & 0xf0) | 0x0a); + *out = ((random << 8) | random); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Set TLS 1.3 GREASE Extension random GREASE type. */ +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeGreaseExtensionType(const sslSocket *ss, + const SSLHandshakeType message, + PRUint16 *exType) +{ + if (*exType != ssl_tls13_grease_xtn) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + PR_ASSERT(ss->opt.enableGrease); + PR_ASSERT(message == ssl_hs_client_hello || + message == ssl_hs_certificate_request); + + /* GREASE ClientHello: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and + * advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents + * [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ + if (message == ssl_hs_client_hello) { + PR_ASSERT(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + /* Check if the first GREASE extension was already added. */ + if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension1])) { + *exType = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension1]; + } else { + *exType = ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_extension2]; + } + } + /* GREASE CertificateRequest: + * When sending a CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3, a server MAY behave as + * follows: A server MAY select one or more GREASE extension values and + * advertise them as extensions with varying length and contents + * [RFC8701, Section 4.1]. */ + else if (message == ssl_hs_certificate_request) { + PR_ASSERT(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + /* Get random grease extension type. */ + SECStatus rv = tls13_RandomGreaseValue(exType); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e082d639a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13con.h @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13con_h_ +#define __tls13con_h_ + +#include "sslexp.h" +#include "sslspec.h" + +typedef enum { + tls13_extension_allowed, + tls13_extension_disallowed, + tls13_extension_unknown +} tls13ExtensionStatus; + +#define TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_COOKIE_SENTINEL 0xff + +SECStatus tls13_UnprotectRecord( + sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec, + SSL3Ciphertext *cText, sslBuffer *plaintext, + SSLContentType *innerType, + SSL3AlertDescription *alert); + +#if defined(WIN32) +#define __func__ __FUNCTION__ +#endif + +void tls13_SetHsState(sslSocket *ss, SSL3WaitState ws, + const char *func, const char *file, int line); +#define TLS13_SET_HS_STATE(ss, ws) \ + tls13_SetHsState(ss, ws, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__) + +/* Return PR_TRUE if the socket is in one of the given states, else return + * PR_FALSE. Only call the macro not the function, because the trailing + * wait_invalid is needed to terminate the argument list. */ +PRBool tls13_InHsState(sslSocket *ss, ...); +#define TLS13_IN_HS_STATE(ss, ...) \ + tls13_InHsState(ss, __VA_ARGS__, wait_invalid) + +PRBool tls13_IsPostHandshake(const sslSocket *ss); + +SSLHashType tls13_GetHash(const sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_GetHashAndCipher(PRUint16 version, PRUint16 cipherSuite, + SSLHashType *hash, const ssl3BulkCipherDef **cipher); +SSLHashType tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ssl3CipherSuite suite); +unsigned int tls13_GetHashSize(const sslSocket *ss); +unsigned int tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(SSLHashType hash); +SECStatus tls13_ComputeHash(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Hashes *hashes, + const PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int len, + SSLHashType hash); +SECStatus tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss, + SSL3Hashes *hashes); +SECStatus tls13_DeriveSecretNullHash(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + PK11SymKey **dest, + SSLHashType hash); +void tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, + SSL3AlertDescription desc); +SECStatus tls13_SetupClientHello(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType chType); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeDo0RTTHandshake(sslSocket *ss); +PRInt32 tls13_LimitEarlyData(sslSocket *ss, SSLContentType type, PRInt32 toSend); +PRBool tls13_AllowPskCipher(const sslSocket *ss, + const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *cipher_def); +PRBool tls13_PskSuiteEnabled(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *extensions, + sslBuffer *chBuf); +SECStatus tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, + const SECItem *suites, + sslSessionID *sid, + const PRUint8 *msg, + unsigned int len); +SECStatus tls13_HandleServerHelloPart2(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength); +SECStatus tls13_HandlePostHelloHandshakeMessage(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +SECStatus tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSuite cipherSuite, + const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, + PRUint8 *cookie, + unsigned int cookieLen, + const PRUint8 *cookieGreaseEchSignal, + sslBuffer *buffer); +SECStatus tls13_HandleHelloRetryRequest(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length); +SECStatus tls13_HandleKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, + TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry, + sslKeyPair *keyPair, + SSLHashType hash, + PK11SymKey **out); +TLS13KeyShareEntry *tls13_CopyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *o); +void tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(TLS13KeyShareEntry *entry); +void tls13_DestroyKeyShares(PRCList *list); +SECStatus tls13_CreateKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef, + sslEphemeralKeyPair **keyPair); +SECStatus tls13_AddKeyShare(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef); +void tls13_DestroyEarlyData(PRCList *list); +SECStatus tls13_SetAlertCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss); +tls13ExtensionStatus tls13_ExtensionStatus(PRUint16 extension, + SSLHandshakeType message); +SECStatus tls13_ProtectRecord(sslSocket *ss, + ssl3CipherSpec *cwSpec, + SSLContentType type, + const PRUint8 *pIn, + PRUint32 contentLen, + sslBuffer *wrBuf); +PRInt32 tls13_Read0RttData(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf, PRInt32 len); +SECStatus tls13_HandleEarlyApplicationData(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *origBuf); +PRBool tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid); +PRUint16 tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL3ProtocolVersion version, + SSLProtocolVariant variant); +SECStatus tls13_ClientReadSupportedVersion(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_NegotiateVersion(sslSocket *ss, + const TLSExtension *supported_versions); +PRBool tls13_ShouldRequestClientAuth(sslSocket *ss); + +PRBool tls13_IsReplay(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid); +void tls13_AntiReplayRollover(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx, PRTime now); +SSLAntiReplayContext *tls13_RefAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx); +void tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_CreateAntiReplayContext( + PRTime now, PRTime window, unsigned int k, unsigned int bits, + SSLAntiReplayContext **ctx); +SECStatus SSLExp_SetAntiReplayContext(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx); +SECStatus SSLExp_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx); + +SECStatus SSLExp_HelloRetryRequestCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, + SSLHelloRetryRequestCallback cb, + void *arg); +SECStatus tls13_SendKeyUpdate(sslSocket *ss, tls13KeyUpdateRequest request, + PRBool buffer); +SECStatus SSLExp_KeyUpdate(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool requestUpdate); +PRBool tls13_MaybeTls13(sslSocket *ss); +unsigned int tls13_SetupAeadIv(PRBool isDTLS, unsigned char *ivOut, + unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned int offset, + unsigned int ivLen, DTLSEpoch epoch); +SECStatus tls13_AEAD(PK11Context *context, PRBool decrypt, + CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION ivGen, unsigned int fixedbits, + const unsigned char *ivIn, unsigned char *ivOut, + unsigned int ivLen, + const unsigned char *nonceIn, unsigned int nonceLen, + const unsigned char *aad, unsigned int aadLen, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int *outLen, + unsigned int maxout, unsigned int tagLen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inLen); +void tls13_SetSpecRecordVersion(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec); +SECStatus SSLExp_SendCertificateRequest(PRFileDesc *fd); +SECStatus tls13_ClientGreaseSetup(sslSocket *ss); +void tls13_ClientGreaseDestroy(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_RandomGreaseValue(PRUint16 *out); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeGreaseExtensionType(const sslSocket *ss, + const SSLHandshakeType message, + PRUint16 *exType); + +/* Use this instead of FATAL_ERROR when no alert shall be sent. */ +#define LOG_ERROR(ss, prError) \ + do { \ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)", \ + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, prError, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \ + PORT_SetError(prError); \ + } while (0) + +/* Log an error and generate an alert because something is irreparably wrong. */ +#define FATAL_ERROR(ss, prError, desc) \ + do { \ + LOG_ERROR(ss, prError); \ + tls13_FatalError(ss, prError, desc); \ + } while (0) + +#endif /* __tls13con_h_ */ diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9808a9fe2d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.c @@ -0,0 +1,2818 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "pk11hpke.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "selfencrypt.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13hashstate.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" + +extern SECStatus +ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(sslSocket *ss, const unsigned char *b, + unsigned int l, sslBuffer *transcriptBuf); +extern SECStatus +ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 **b, PRUint32 *length, SECItem *sidBytes, + SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem *comps); +extern SECStatus +tls13_DeriveSecret(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *key, + const char *label, + unsigned int labelLen, + const SSL3Hashes *hashes, + PK11SymKey **dest, + SSLHashType hash); + +PRBool +tls13_Debug_CheckXtnBegins(const PRUint8 *start, const PRUint16 xtnType) +{ +#ifdef DEBUG + SECStatus rv; + sslReader ext_reader = SSL_READER(start, 2); + PRUint64 extension_number; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&ext_reader, 2, &extension_number); + return ((rv == SECSuccess) && (extension_number == xtnType)); +#else + return PR_TRUE; +#endif +} + +void +tls13_DestroyEchConfig(sslEchConfig *config) +{ + if (!config) { + return; + } + SECITEM_FreeItem(&config->contents.publicKey, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&config->contents.suites, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&config->raw, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Free(config->contents.publicName); + config->contents.publicName = NULL; + PORT_ZFree(config, sizeof(*config)); +} + +void +tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + tls13_DestroyEchConfig((sslEchConfig *)cur_p); + } +} + +void +tls13_DestroyEchXtnState(sslEchXtnState *state) +{ + if (!state) { + return; + } + SECITEM_FreeItem(&state->innerCh, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&state->senderPubKey, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&state->retryConfigs, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(state, sizeof(*state)); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_CopyEchConfigs(PRCList *oConfigs, PRCList *configs) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEchConfig *config; + sslEchConfig *newConfig = NULL; + + for (PRCList *cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(oConfigs); + cur_p != oConfigs; + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) { + config = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_TAIL(oConfigs); + newConfig = PORT_ZNew(sslEchConfig); + if (!newConfig) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &newConfig->raw, &config->raw); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + newConfig->contents.publicName = PORT_Strdup(config->contents.publicName); + if (!newConfig->contents.publicName) { + goto loser; + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &newConfig->contents.publicKey, + &config->contents.publicKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &newConfig->contents.suites, + &config->contents.suites); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + newConfig->contents.configId = config->contents.configId; + newConfig->contents.kemId = config->contents.kemId; + newConfig->contents.kdfId = config->contents.kdfId; + newConfig->contents.aeadId = config->contents.aeadId; + newConfig->contents.maxNameLen = config->contents.maxNameLen; + newConfig->version = config->version; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&newConfig->link, configs); + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyEchConfig(newConfig); + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(configs); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * struct { + * HpkeKdfId kdf_id; + * HpkeAeadId aead_id; + * } HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite; + * + * struct { + * uint8 config_id; + * HpkeKemId kem_id; + * HpkePublicKey public_key; + * HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4>; + * } HpkeKeyConfig; + * + * struct { + * HpkeKeyConfig key_config; + * uint16 maximum_name_length; + * opaque public_name<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } ECHConfigContents; + * + * struct { + * uint16 version; + * uint16 length; + * select (ECHConfig.version) { + * case 0xfe0d: ECHConfigContents contents; + * } + * } ECHConfig; + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_DecodeEchConfigContents(const sslReadBuffer *rawConfig, + sslEchConfig **outConfig) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEchConfigContents contents = { 0 }; + sslEchConfig *decodedConfig; + PRUint64 tmpn; + PRUint64 tmpn2; + sslReadBuffer tmpBuf; + PRUint16 *extensionTypes = NULL; + unsigned int extensionIndex = 0; + sslReader configReader = SSL_READER(rawConfig->buf, rawConfig->len); + sslReader suiteReader; + sslReader extensionReader; + PRBool hasValidSuite = PR_FALSE; + PRBool unsupportedMandatoryXtn = PR_FALSE; + + /* HpkeKeyConfig key_config */ + /* uint8 config_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&configReader, 1, &tmpn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + contents.configId = tmpn; + + /* HpkeKemId kem_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&configReader, 2, &tmpn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + contents.kemId = tmpn; + + /* HpkePublicKey public_key */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&configReader, 2, &tmpBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &contents.publicKey, (PRUint8 *)tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4> */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&configReader, 2, &tmpBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (tmpBuf.len & 1) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG); + goto loser; + } + suiteReader = (sslReader)SSL_READER(tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len); + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&suiteReader)) { + /* HpkeKdfId kdf_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&suiteReader, 2, &tmpn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* HpkeAeadId aead_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&suiteReader, 2, &tmpn2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (!hasValidSuite) { + /* Use the first compatible ciphersuite. */ + rv = PK11_HPKE_ValidateParameters(contents.kemId, tmpn, tmpn2); + if (rv == SECSuccess) { + hasValidSuite = PR_TRUE; + contents.kdfId = tmpn; + contents.aeadId = tmpn2; + break; + } + } + } + + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &contents.suites, (PRUint8 *)tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* uint8 maximum_name_length */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&configReader, 1, &tmpn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + contents.maxNameLen = (PRUint8)tmpn; + + /* opaque public_name<1..2^16-1> */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&configReader, 1, &tmpBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (tmpBuf.len == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG); + goto loser; + } + if (!tls13_IsLDH(tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len) || + tls13_IsIp(tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG); + goto loser; + } + + contents.publicName = PORT_ZAlloc(tmpBuf.len + 1); + if (!contents.publicName) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(contents.publicName, (PRUint8 *)tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len); + + /* Extensions. We don't support any, but must + * check for any that are marked critical. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&configReader, 2, &tmpBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + extensionReader = (sslReader)SSL_READER(tmpBuf.buf, tmpBuf.len); + extensionTypes = PORT_NewArray(PRUint16, tmpBuf.len / 2 * sizeof(PRUint16)); + if (!extensionTypes) { + goto loser; + } + + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&extensionReader)) { + /* Get the extension's type field */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&extensionReader, 2, &tmpn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < extensionIndex; i++) { + if (extensionTypes[i] == tmpn) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_VALUE_INVALID); + goto loser; + } + } + extensionTypes[extensionIndex++] = (PRUint16)tmpn; + + /* Clients MUST parse the extension list and check for unsupported + * mandatory extensions. If an unsupported mandatory extension is + * present, clients MUST ignore the ECHConfig + * [draft-ietf-tls-esni, Section 4.2]. */ + if (tmpn & (1 << 15)) { + unsupportedMandatoryXtn = PR_TRUE; + } + + /* Skip. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&extensionReader, 2, &tmpBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* Check that we consumed the entire ECHConfig */ + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&configReader)) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG); + goto loser; + } + + /* If the ciphersuites were compatible AND if NO unsupported mandatory + * extensions were found set the outparam. Return success either way if the + * config was well-formed. */ + if (hasValidSuite && !unsupportedMandatoryXtn) { + decodedConfig = PORT_ZNew(sslEchConfig); + if (!decodedConfig) { + goto loser; + } + decodedConfig->contents = contents; + *outConfig = decodedConfig; + } else { + PORT_Free(contents.publicName); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&contents.publicKey, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&contents.suites, PR_FALSE); + } + PORT_Free(extensionTypes); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_Free(extensionTypes); + PORT_Free(contents.publicName); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&contents.publicKey, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&contents.suites, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Decode an ECHConfigList struct and store each ECHConfig + * into |configs|. */ +SECStatus +tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(const SECItem *data, PRCList *configs) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEchConfig *decodedConfig = NULL; + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len); + sslReadBuffer tmp; + sslReadBuffer singleConfig; + PRUint64 version; + PRUint64 length; + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(configs)); + + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&rdr, 2, &tmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(100, ("Read EchConfig list of size %u", SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr))); + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + sslReader configsReader = SSL_READER(tmp.buf, tmp.len); + + if (!SSL_READER_REMAINING(&configsReader)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Handle each ECHConfig. */ + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&configsReader)) { + singleConfig.buf = SSL_READER_CURRENT(&configsReader); + /* uint16 version */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&configsReader, 2, &version); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* uint16 length */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&configsReader, 2, &length); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + singleConfig.len = 4 + length; + + rv = sslRead_Read(&configsReader, length, &tmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (version == TLS13_ECH_VERSION) { + rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigContents(&tmp, &decodedConfig); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + if (decodedConfig) { + decodedConfig->version = version; + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &decodedConfig->raw, singleConfig.buf, + singleConfig.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PR_APPEND_LINK(&decodedConfig->link, configs); + decodedConfig = NULL; + } + } + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(configs); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Encode an ECHConfigList structure. We only create one config, and as the + * primary use for this function is to generate test inputs, we don't + * validate against what HPKE and libssl can actually support. */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_EncodeEchConfigId(PRUint8 configId, const char *publicName, unsigned int maxNameLen, + HpkeKemId kemId, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + const HpkeSymmetricSuite *hpkeSuites, unsigned int hpkeSuiteCount, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxlen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int savedOffset; + unsigned int len; + sslBuffer b = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + PRUint8 tmpBuf[66]; // Large enough for an EC public key, currently only X25519. + unsigned int tmpLen; + + if (!publicName || !hpkeSuites || hpkeSuiteCount == 0 || + !pubKey || maxNameLen == 0 || !out || !outlen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* ECHConfig ECHConfigList<1..2^16-1>; */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&b, 2, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* + * struct { + * uint16 version; + * uint16 length; + * select (ECHConfig.version) { + * case 0xfe0d: ECHConfigContents contents; + * } + * } ECHConfig; + */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, TLS13_ECH_VERSION, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&b, 2, &savedOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* + * struct { + * uint8 config_id; + * HpkeKemId kem_id; + * HpkePublicKey public_key; + * HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4>; + * } HpkeKeyConfig; + */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, configId, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, kemId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = PK11_HPKE_Serialize(pubKey, tmpBuf, &tmpLen, sizeof(tmpBuf)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&b, tmpBuf, tmpLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, hpkeSuiteCount * 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < hpkeSuiteCount; i++) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, hpkeSuites[i].kdfId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, hpkeSuites[i].aeadId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + /* + * struct { + * HpkeKeyConfig key_config; + * uint8 maximum_name_length; + * opaque public_name<1..255>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } ECHConfigContents; + */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, maxNameLen, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + len = PORT_Strlen(publicName); + if (len > 0xff) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&b, (const PRUint8 *)publicName, len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* extensions */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&b, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Write the length now that we know it. */ + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(&b, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(&b, savedOffset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&b) > maxlen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(out, SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&b), SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&b)); + *outlen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&b); + sslBuffer_Clear(&b); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&b); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_GetEchRetryConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *retryConfigs) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss; + SECItem out = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + if (!fd || !retryConfigs) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in %s", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, __FUNCTION__)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We don't distinguish between "handshake completed + * without retry configs", and "handshake not completed". + * An application should only call this after receiving a + * RETRY_WITH_ECH error code, which implies retry_configs. */ + if (!ss->xtnData.ech || !ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigsValid) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_NOT_COMPLETED); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* May be empty. */ + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &out, &ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigs); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + return SECFailure; + } + *retryConfigs = out; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_RemoveEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + + if (!fd) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in %s", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, __FUNCTION__)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->echPrivKey); + ss->echPrivKey = NULL; + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->echPubKey); + ss->echPubKey = NULL; + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&ss->echConfigs); + + /* Also remove any retry_configs and handshake context. */ + if (ss->xtnData.ech && ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigs.len) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->xtnData.ech->retryConfigs, PR_FALSE); + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = NULL; + } + PORT_Free(CONST_CAST(char, ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName)); + ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName = NULL; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Import one or more ECHConfigs for the given keypair. The AEAD/KDF + * may differ , but only X25519 is supported for the KEM.*/ +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetServerEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const PRUint8 *echConfigs, unsigned int echConfigsLen) +{ + sslSocket *ss; + SECStatus rv; + SECItem data = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, echConfigs), echConfigsLen }; + + if (!fd || !pubKey || !privKey || !echConfigs || echConfigsLen == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in %s", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, __FUNCTION__)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Overwrite if we're already configured. */ + rv = SSLExp_RemoveEchConfigs(fd); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(&data, &ss->echConfigs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + goto loser; + } + + ss->echPubKey = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(pubKey); + if (!ss->echPubKey) { + goto loser; + } + ss->echPrivKey = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(privKey); + if (!ss->echPrivKey) { + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&ss->echConfigs); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ss->echPrivKey); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ss->echPubKey); + ss->echPubKey = NULL; + ss->echPrivKey = NULL; + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Client enable. For now, we'll use the first + * compatible config (server preference). */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetClientEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, + const PRUint8 *echConfigs, + unsigned int echConfigsLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslSocket *ss; + SECItem data = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, echConfigs), echConfigsLen }; + + if (!fd || !echConfigs || echConfigsLen == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in %s", + SSL_GETPID(), fd, __FUNCTION__)); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Overwrite if we're already configured. */ + rv = SSLExp_RemoveEchConfigs(fd); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(&data, &ss->echConfigs); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Set up ECH. This generates an ephemeral sender + * keypair and the HPKE context */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSetupEch(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type) +{ + SECStatus rv; + HpkeContext *cx = NULL; + SECKEYPublicKey *pkR = NULL; + SECItem hpkeInfo = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + sslEchConfig *cfg = NULL; + + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs) || + !ssl_ShouldSendSNIExtension(ss, ss->url) || + IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Maybe apply our own priority if >1. For now, we only support + * one version and one KEM. Each ECHConfig can specify multiple + * KDF/AEADs, so just use the first. */ + cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs); + + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Setup client ECH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + switch (type) { + case client_hello_initial: + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName); + cx = PK11_HPKE_NewContext(cfg->contents.kemId, cfg->contents.kdfId, + cfg->contents.aeadId, NULL, NULL); + break; + case client_hello_retry: + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx || !ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Nothing else to do. */ + return SECSuccess; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + goto loser; + } + if (!cx) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = PK11_HPKE_Deserialize(cx, cfg->contents.publicKey.data, cfg->contents.publicKey.len, &pkR); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &hpkeInfo, strlen(kHpkeInfoEch) + 1 + cfg->raw.len)) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(&hpkeInfo.data[0], kHpkeInfoEch, strlen(kHpkeInfoEch)); + PORT_Memset(&hpkeInfo.data[strlen(kHpkeInfoEch)], 0, 1); + PORT_Memcpy(&hpkeInfo.data[strlen(kHpkeInfoEch) + 1], cfg->raw.data, cfg->raw.len); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Info", hpkeInfo.data, hpkeInfo.len)); + + /* Setup with an ephemeral sender keypair. */ + rv = PK11_HPKE_SetupS(cx, NULL, NULL, pkR, &hpkeInfo); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_GetNewRandom(ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + /* If ECH is rejected, the application will use SSLChannelInfo + * to fetch this field and perform cert chain verification. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName = PORT_Strdup(cfg->contents.publicName); + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echPublicName) { + goto loser; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = cx; + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pkR); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&hpkeInfo, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pkR); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&hpkeInfo, PR_FALSE); + PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* + * outerAAD - The associated data for the AEAD (the entire client hello with the ECH payload zeroed) + * chInner - The plaintext which will be encrypted (the ClientHelloInner plus padding) + * echPayload - Output location. A buffer containing all-zeroes of at least chInner->len + TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN bytes. + * + * echPayload may point into outerAAD to avoid the need to duplicate the ClientHelloOuter buffer. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_EncryptClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *aadItem, const sslBuffer *chInner, PRUint8 *echPayload) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem chPt = { siBuffer, chInner->buf, chInner->len }; + SECItem *chCt = NULL; + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "aad for ECH Encrypt", aadItem->data, aadItem->len)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "plaintext for ECH Encrypt", chInner->buf, chInner->len)); + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = PK11_HPKE_Seal(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, aadItem, &chPt, &chCt); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "ciphertext from ECH Encrypt", chCt->data, chCt->len)); +#else + /* Fake a tag. */ + SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, chCt, chPt.len + TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN); + if (!chCt) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(chCt->data, chPt.data, chPt.len); +#endif + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* When encrypting in-place, the payload is part of the AAD and must be zeroed. */ + PRUint8 val = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < chCt->len; i++) { + val |= *(echPayload + i); + } + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "Empty Placeholder for output of ECH Encryption", echPayload, chCt->len)); + PR_ASSERT(val == 0); +#endif + + PORT_Memcpy(echPayload, chCt->data, chCt->len); + SECITEM_FreeItem(chCt, PR_TRUE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECITEM_FreeItem(chCt, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_GetMatchingEchConfigs(const sslSocket *ss, HpkeKdfId kdf, HpkeAeadId aead, + const PRUint8 configId, const sslEchConfig *cur, sslEchConfig **next) +{ + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: GetMatchingEchConfig %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, configId)); + + /* If |cur|, resume the search at that node, else the list head. */ + for (PRCList *cur_p = cur ? ((PRCList *)cur)->next : PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs); + cur_p != &ss->echConfigs; + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) { + sslEchConfig *echConfig = (sslEchConfig *)cur_p; + if (echConfig->contents.configId == configId && + echConfig->contents.aeadId == aead && + echConfig->contents.kdfId == kdf) { + *next = echConfig; + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + *next = NULL; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Given a CH with extensions, copy from the start up to the extensions + * into |writer| and return the extensions themselves in |extensions|. + * If |explicitSid|, place this value into |writer| as the SID. Else, + * the sid is copied from |reader| to |writer|. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_CopyChPreamble(sslSocket *ss, sslReader *reader, const SECItem *explicitSid, sslBuffer *writer, sslReadBuffer *extensions) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslReadBuffer tmpReadBuf; + + /* Locate the extensions. */ + rv = sslRead_Read(reader, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(writer, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* legacy_session_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, 1, &tmpReadBuf); + if (explicitSid) { + /* Encoded SID should be empty when copying from CHOuter. */ + if (tmpReadBuf.len > 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(writer, explicitSid->data, explicitSid->len, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(writer, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* cipher suites */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, 2, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(writer, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* compression */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, 1, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(writer, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* extensions */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(reader, 2, extensions); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* padding (optional) */ + sslReadBuffer padding; + rv = sslRead_Read(reader, SSL_READER_REMAINING(reader), &padding); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRUint8 result = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < padding.len; i++) { + result |= padding.buf[i]; + } + if (result) { + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13: Invalid ECH ClientHelloInner padding decoded", SSL_GETPID())); + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * The ClientHelloOuterAAD is a serialized ClientHello structure, defined in + * Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446], which matches the ClientHelloOuter except the + * payload field of the "encrypted_client_hello" is replaced with a byte + * string of the same length but whose contents are zeros. This value does + * not include the four-byte header from the Handshake structure. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ServerMakeChOuterAAD(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *outerCh, unsigned int outerChLen, SECItem *outerAAD) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer aad = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + const unsigned int echPayloadLen = ss->xtnData.ech->innerCh.len; /* Length of incoming payload */ + const unsigned int echPayloadOffset = ss->xtnData.ech->payloadStart - outerCh; /* Offset from start of CHO */ + + PORT_Assert(outerChLen > echPayloadLen); + PORT_Assert(echPayloadOffset + echPayloadLen <= outerChLen); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.ech); + +#ifdef DEBUG + /* Safety check that payload length pointed to by offset matches expected length */ + sslReader echXtnReader = SSL_READER(outerCh + echPayloadOffset - 2, 2); + PRUint64 parsedXtnSize; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&echXtnReader, 2, &parsedXtnSize); + PR_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess); + PR_ASSERT(parsedXtnSize == echPayloadLen); +#endif + + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&aad, outerCh, outerChLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memset(aad.buf + echPayloadOffset, 0, echPayloadLen); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "AAD for ECH Decryption", aad.buf, aad.len)); + + outerAAD->data = aad.buf; + outerAAD->len = aad.len; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&aad); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_OpenClientHelloInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *outer, const SECItem *outerAAD, sslEchConfig *cfg, SECItem **chInner) +{ + SECStatus rv; + HpkeContext *cx = NULL; + SECItem *decryptedChInner = NULL; + SECItem hpkeInfo = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Server opening ECH Inner%s", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry ? " after HRR" : "")); + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx); + cx = PK11_HPKE_NewContext(cfg->contents.kemId, cfg->contents.kdfId, + cfg->contents.aeadId, NULL, NULL); + if (!cx) { + goto loser; + } + + if (!SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &hpkeInfo, strlen(kHpkeInfoEch) + 1 + cfg->raw.len)) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Memcpy(&hpkeInfo.data[0], kHpkeInfoEch, strlen(kHpkeInfoEch)); + PORT_Memset(&hpkeInfo.data[strlen(kHpkeInfoEch)], 0, 1); + PORT_Memcpy(&hpkeInfo.data[strlen(kHpkeInfoEch) + 1], cfg->raw.data, cfg->raw.len); + + rv = PK11_HPKE_SetupR(cx, ss->echPubKey, ss->echPrivKey, + &ss->xtnData.ech->senderPubKey, &hpkeInfo); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + } else { + PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx); + cx = ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx; + } + +#ifndef UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE + rv = PK11_HPKE_Open(cx, outerAAD, &ss->xtnData.ech->innerCh, &decryptedChInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Failed to decrypt inner CH with this candidate", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto loser; /* code set */ + } +#else + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, decryptedChInner, &ss->xtnData.ech->innerCh); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + decryptedChInner->len -= TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN; /* Fake tag */ +#endif + + /* Stash the context, we may need it for HRR. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = cx; + *chInner = decryptedChInner; + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "Decrypted ECH Inner", decryptedChInner->data, decryptedChInner->len)); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&hpkeInfo, PR_FALSE); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECITEM_FreeItem(decryptedChInner, PR_TRUE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&hpkeInfo, PR_FALSE); + if (cx != ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + /* Don't double-free if it's already global. */ + PK11_HPKE_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* This is the maximum number of extension hooks that the following functions can handle. */ +#define MAX_EXTENSION_WRITERS 32 + +static SECStatus +tls13_WriteDupXtnsToChInner(PRBool compressing, sslBuffer *dupXtns, sslBuffer *chInnerXtns) +{ + SECStatus rv; + if (compressing && SSL_BUFFER_LEN(dupXtns) > 0) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, dupXtns->len + 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(chInnerXtns, dupXtns, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + /* dupXtns carries whole extensions with lengths on each. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(chInnerXtns, dupXtns); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + sslBuffer_Clear(dupXtns); + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Add ordinary extensions to CHInner. + * The value of the extension from CHOuter is in |extensionData|. + * + * If the value is to be compressed, it is written to |dupXtns|. + * Otherwise, a full extension is written to |chInnerXtns|. + * + * This function is always called twice: + * once without compression and once with compression if possible. + * + * Because we want to allow extensions that did not appear in CHOuter + * to be included in CHInner, we also need to track which extensions + * have been included. This is what |called| and |nCalled| track. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ChInnerAppendExtension(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 extensionType, + const sslReadBuffer *extensionData, + sslBuffer *dupXtns, sslBuffer *chInnerXtns, + PRBool compressing, + PRUint16 *called, unsigned int *nCalled) +{ + PRUint8 buf[1024] = { 0 }; + const PRUint8 *p; + unsigned int len = 0; + PRBool willCompress; + + PORT_Assert(extensionType != ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn); + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook = ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner + ? ssl_FindCustomExtensionHooks(ss, extensionType) + : NULL; + if (hook && hook->writer) { + if (*nCalled >= MAX_EXTENSION_WRITERS) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); /* TODO new code? */ + return SECFailure; + } + + PRBool append = (*hook->writer)(ss->fd, ssl_hs_client_hello, + buf, &len, sizeof(buf), hook->writerArg); + called[(*nCalled)++] = extensionType; + if (!append) { + /* This extension is not going to appear in CHInner. */ + /* TODO: consider removing this extension from ss->xtnData.advertised. + * The consequence of not removing it is that we won't complain + * if the server accepts ECH and then includes this extension. + * The cost is a complete reworking of ss->xtnData.advertised. + */ + return SECSuccess; + } + /* It can be compressed if it is the same as the outer value. */ + willCompress = (len == extensionData->len && + NSS_SecureMemcmp(buf, extensionData->buf, len) == 0); + p = buf; + } else { + /* Non-custom extensions are duplicated when compressing. */ + willCompress = PR_TRUE; + p = extensionData->buf; + len = extensionData->len; + } + + /* Duplicated extensions all need to go together. */ + sslBuffer *dst = willCompress ? dupXtns : chInnerXtns; + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(dst, extensionType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + if (!willCompress || !compressing) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(dst, p, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + /* As this function is called twice, we only want to update our state the second time. */ + if (compressing) { + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = extensionType; + SSL_TRC(50, ("Appending extension=%d to the Client Hello Inner. Compressed?=%d", extensionType, willCompress)); + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Call any custom extension handlers that didn't want to be added to CHOuter. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ChInnerAdditionalExtensionWriters(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint16 *called, + unsigned int nCalled, sslBuffer *chInnerXtns) +{ + if (!ss->opt.callExtensionWriterOnEchInner) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + for (PRCList *cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->extensionHooks); + cursor != &ss->extensionHooks; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslCustomExtensionHooks *hook = (sslCustomExtensionHooks *)cursor; + + /* Skip if this hook was already called. */ + PRBool hookCalled = PR_FALSE; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nCalled; ++i) { + if (called[i] == hook->type) { + hookCalled = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (hookCalled) { + continue; + } + + /* This is a cut-down version of ssl_CallCustomExtensionSenders(). */ + PRUint8 buf[1024]; + unsigned int len = 0; + PRBool append = (*hook->writer)(ss->fd, ssl_hs_client_hello, + buf, &len, sizeof(buf), hook->writerArg); + if (!append) { + continue; + } + + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, hook->type, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(chInnerXtns, buf, len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = hook->type; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Take the PSK extension CHOuter and fill it with junk. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_RandomizePsk(PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int len) +{ + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(buf, len); + + /* Read the length of identities. */ + PRUint64 outerLen = 0; + SECStatus rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &outerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(outerLen < len + 2); + + /* Read the length of PskIdentity.identity */ + PRUint64 innerLen = 0; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &innerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* identities should contain just one identity. */ + PORT_Assert(outerLen == innerLen + 6); + + /* Randomize PskIdentity.{identity,obfuscated_ticket_age}. */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf + rdr.offset, innerLen + 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rdr.offset += innerLen + 4; + + /* Read the length of binders. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &outerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(outerLen + rdr.offset == len); + + /* Read the length of the binder. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 1, &innerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* binders should contain just one binder. */ + PORT_Assert(outerLen == innerLen + 1); + + /* Randomize the binder. */ + rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(buf + rdr.offset, innerLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Given a buffer of extensions prepared for CHOuter, translate those extensions to a + * buffer suitable for CHInner. This is intended to be called twice: once without + * compression for the transcript hash and binders, and once with compression for + * encoding the actual CHInner value. + * + * Compressed extensions are moved in both runs. When compressing, they are moved + * to a single outer_extensions extension, which lists extensions from CHOuter. + * When not compressing, this produces the ClientHello that will be reconstructed + * from the compressed ClientHello (that is, what goes into the handshake transcript), + * so all the compressed extensions need to appear in the same place that the + * outer_extensions extension appears. + * + * On the first run, if |inOutPskXtn| and OuterXtnsBuf contains a PSK extension, + * remove it and return in the outparam.he caller will compute the binder value + * based on the uncompressed output. Next, if |compress|, consolidate duplicated + * extensions (that would otherwise be copied) into a single outer_extensions + * extension. If |inOutPskXtn|, the extension contains a binder, it is appended + * after the deduplicated outer_extensions. In the case of GREASE ECH, one call + * is made to estimate size (wiith compression, null inOutPskXtn). + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ConstructInnerExtensionsFromOuter(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *chOuterXtnsBuf, + sslBuffer *chInnerXtns, sslBuffer *inOutPskXtn, + PRBool shouldCompress) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint64 extensionType; + sslReadBuffer extensionData; + sslBuffer pskXtn = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer dupXtns = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; /* Duplicated extensions, types-only if |compress|. */ + unsigned int tmpOffset; + unsigned int tmpLen; + unsigned int srcXtnBase; /* To truncate CHOuter and remove the PSK extension. */ + + PRUint16 called[MAX_EXTENSION_WRITERS] = { 0 }; /* For tracking which has been called. */ + unsigned int nCalled = 0; + + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Constructing ECH inner extensions %s compression", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, shouldCompress ? "with" : "without")); + + /* When offering the "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its + * ClientHelloOuter, the client MUST also offer an empty + * "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its ClientHelloInner. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, ech_xtn_type_inner, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(chOuterXtnsBuf->buf, chOuterXtnsBuf->len); + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) { + srcXtnBase = rdr.offset; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &extensionType); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Get the extension data. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&rdr, 2, &extensionData); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Skip extensions that are TLS < 1.3 only, since CHInner MUST + * negotiate TLS 1.3 or above. + * If the extension is supported by default (sslSupported) but unknown + * to TLS 1.3 it must be a TLS < 1.3 only extension. */ + SSLExtensionSupport sslSupported; + (void)SSLExp_GetExtensionSupport(extensionType, &sslSupported); + if (sslSupported != ssl_ext_none && + tls13_ExtensionStatus(extensionType, ssl_hs_client_hello) == tls13_extension_unknown) { + continue; + } + + switch (extensionType) { + case ssl_server_name_xtn: + /* Write the real (private) SNI value. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, extensionType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(chInnerXtns, 2, &tmpOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + tmpLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(chInnerXtns); + rv = ssl3_ClientFormatServerNameXtn(ss, ss->url, + strlen(ss->url), + NULL, chInnerXtns); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + tmpLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(chInnerXtns) - tmpLen; + rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(chInnerXtns, tmpOffset, tmpLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Only update state on second invocation of this function */ + if (shouldCompress) { + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = extensionType; + } + break; + case ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn: + /* Only TLS 1.3 and GREASE on CHInner. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, extensionType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Extension length. */ + tmpLen = (ss->opt.enableGrease) ? 5 : 3; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, tmpLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* ProtocolVersion length */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, tmpLen - 1, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* ProtocolVersion TLS 1.3 */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* ProtocolVersion GREASE */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_version], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + /* Only update state on second invocation of this function */ + if (shouldCompress) { + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = extensionType; + } + break; + case ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn: + if (inOutPskXtn && !shouldCompress) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&pskXtn, extensionType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&pskXtn, extensionData.buf, + extensionData.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* This should be the last extension. */ + PORT_Assert(srcXtnBase == ss->xtnData.lastXtnOffset); + PORT_Assert(chOuterXtnsBuf->len - srcXtnBase == extensionData.len + 4); + rv = tls13_RandomizePsk(chOuterXtnsBuf->buf + srcXtnBase + 4, + chOuterXtnsBuf->len - srcXtnBase - 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else if (!inOutPskXtn) { + /* When GREASEing, only the length is used. + * Order doesn't matter, so just copy the extension. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(chInnerXtns, extensionType, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(chInnerXtns, extensionData.buf, + extensionData.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + /* Only update state on second invocation of this function */ + if (shouldCompress) { + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = extensionType; + } + break; + default: { + /* This is a regular extension. We can maybe compress these. */ + rv = tls13_ChInnerAppendExtension(ss, extensionType, + &extensionData, + &dupXtns, chInnerXtns, + shouldCompress, + called, &nCalled); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + break; + } + } + } + + rv = tls13_WriteDupXtnsToChInner(shouldCompress, &dupXtns, chInnerXtns); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Now call custom extension handlers that didn't choose to append anything to + * the outer ClientHello. */ + rv = tls13_ChInnerAdditionalExtensionWriters(ss, called, nCalled, chInnerXtns); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (inOutPskXtn) { + /* On the first, non-compress run, append the (bad) PSK binder. + * On the second compression run, the caller is responsible for + * providing an extension with a valid binder, so append that. */ + if (shouldCompress) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(chInnerXtns, inOutPskXtn); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(chInnerXtns, &pskXtn); + *inOutPskXtn = pskXtn; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&pskXtn); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dupXtns); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_EncodeClientHelloInner(sslSocket *ss, const sslBuffer *chInner, const sslBuffer *chInnerXtns, sslBuffer *out) +{ + PORT_Assert(ss && chInner && chInnerXtns && out); + SECStatus rv; + sslReadBuffer tmpReadBuf; + sslReader chReader = SSL_READER(chInner->buf, chInner->len); + + rv = sslRead_Read(&chReader, 4, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslRead_Read(&chReader, 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Skip the legacy_session_id */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&chReader, 1, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, 0, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* cipher suites */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&chReader, 2, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(out, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* compression methods */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&chReader, 1, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(out, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Append the extensions. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(out, chInnerXtns, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(out); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_PadChInner(sslBuffer *chInner, uint8_t maxNameLen, uint8_t serverNameLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(chInner); + PORT_Assert(serverNameLen > 0); + static unsigned char padding[256 + 32] = { 0 }; + int16_t name_padding = (int16_t)maxNameLen - (int16_t)serverNameLen; + if (name_padding < 0) { + name_padding = 0; + } + unsigned int rounding_padding = 31 - ((SSL_BUFFER_LEN(chInner) + name_padding) % 32); + unsigned int total_padding = name_padding + rounding_padding; + PORT_Assert(total_padding < sizeof(padding)); + SSL_TRC(100, ("computed ECH Inner Client Hello padding of size %u", total_padding)); + rv = sslBuffer_Append(chInner, padding, total_padding); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + sslBuffer_Clear(chInner); + return SECFailure; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Build an ECH Xtn body with a zeroed payload for the client hello inner + * + * enum { outer(0), inner(1) } ECHClientHelloType; + * + * struct { + * ECHClientHelloType type; + * select (ECHClientHello.type) { + * case outer: + * HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 config_id; + * opaque enc<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque payload<1..2^16-1>; + * case inner: + * Empty; + * }; + * } ECHClientHello; + * + * payloadLen = Size of zeroed placeholder field for payload. + * payloadOffset = Out parameter, start of payload field + * echXtn = Out parameter, constructed ECH Xtn with zeroed placeholder field. +*/ +SECStatus +tls13_BuildEchXtn(sslEchConfig *cfg, const SECItem *hpkeEnc, unsigned int payloadLen, PRUint16 *payloadOffset, sslBuffer *echXtn) +{ + SECStatus rv; + /* Format the encrypted_client_hello extension. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, ech_xtn_type_outer, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, cfg->contents.kdfId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, cfg->contents.aeadId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, cfg->contents.configId, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (hpkeEnc) { + /* Public Key */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(echXtn, hpkeEnc->data, hpkeEnc->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + /* |enc| is empty. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + payloadLen += TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(echXtn, payloadLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + *payloadOffset = echXtn->len; + rv = sslBuffer_Fill(echXtn, 0, payloadLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(100, (NULL, "ECH Xtn with Placeholder:", echXtn->buf, echXtn->len)); + return SECSuccess; +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(echXtn); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ConstructClientHelloWithEch(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid, PRBool freshSid, + sslBuffer *chOuter, sslBuffer *chOuterXtnsBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer chInner = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer encodedChInner = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer paddingChInner = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer chInnerXtns = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer pskXtn = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + unsigned int preambleLen; + + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Constructing ECH inner", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Create the full (uncompressed) inner extensions and steal any PSK extension. + * NB: Neither chOuterXtnsBuf nor chInnerXtns are length-prefixed. */ + rv = tls13_ConstructInnerExtensionsFromOuter(ss, chOuterXtnsBuf, &chInnerXtns, + &pskXtn, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + rv = ssl3_CreateClientHelloPreamble(ss, sid, PR_FALSE, SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, + PR_TRUE, &chInnerXtns, &chInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + preambleLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&chInner); + + /* Write handshake header length. tls13_EncryptClientHello will + * remove this upon encoding, but the transcript needs it. This assumes + * the 4B stream-variant header. */ + PORT_Assert(!IS_DTLS(ss)); + rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(&chInner, 1, + chInner.len + 2 + chInnerXtns.len - 4, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (pskXtn.len) { + PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn)); + rv = tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder(ss, &chInnerXtns, &chInner); + /* Update the stolen PSK extension with the binder value. */ + PORT_Memcpy(pskXtn.buf, &chInnerXtns.buf[chInnerXtns.len - pskXtn.len], pskXtn.len); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(&chInner, &chInnerXtns, 2); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Uncompressed CHInner", chInner.buf, chInner.len)); + rv = ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashesInt(ss, chInner.buf, chInner.len, + &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + /* Un-append the extensions, then append compressed via Encoded. */ + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&chInner) = preambleLen; + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInnerXtns); + rv = tls13_ConstructInnerExtensionsFromOuter(ss, chOuterXtnsBuf, + &chInnerXtns, &pskXtn, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = tls13_EncodeClientHelloInner(ss, &chInner, &chInnerXtns, &encodedChInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Compressed CHInner", encodedChInner.buf, encodedChInner.len)); + + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)); + sslEchConfig *cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs); + + /* We are using ECH so SNI must have been included */ + rv = tls13_PadChInner(&encodedChInner, cfg->contents.maxNameLen, strlen(ss->url)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Build the ECH Xtn with placeholder and put it in chOuterXtnsBuf */ + sslBuffer echXtn = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + const SECItem *hpkeEnc = NULL; + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + hpkeEnc = PK11_HPKE_GetEncapPubKey(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx); + if (!hpkeEnc) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + } + PRUint16 echXtnPayloadOffset; /* Offset from start of ECH Xtn to ECH Payload */ + rv = tls13_BuildEchXtn(cfg, hpkeEnc, encodedChInner.len, &echXtnPayloadOffset, &echXtn); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised[ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised++] = ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn; + rv = ssl3_EmplaceExtension(ss, chOuterXtnsBuf, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, + echXtn.buf, echXtn.len, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Add the padding */ + rv = ssl_InsertPaddingExtension(ss, chOuter->len, chOuterXtnsBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Finish the CHO with the ECH Xtn payload zeroed */ + rv = ssl3_InsertChHeaderSize(ss, chOuter, chOuterXtnsBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + unsigned int chOuterXtnsOffset = chOuter->len + 2; /* From Start of CHO to Extensions list */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBufferVariable(chOuter, chOuterXtnsBuf, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* AAD consists of entire CHO, minus the 4 byte handshake header */ + SECItem aadItem = { siBuffer, chOuter->buf + 4, chOuter->len - 4 }; + /* ECH Payload begins after CHO Header, after ECH Xtn start, after ECH Xtn header */ + PRUint8 *echPayload = chOuter->buf + chOuterXtnsOffset + ss->xtnData.echXtnOffset + 4 + echXtnPayloadOffset; + /* Insert the encrypted_client_hello xtn and coalesce. */ + rv = tls13_EncryptClientHello(ss, &aadItem, &encodedChInner, echPayload); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + sslBuffer_Clear(&echXtn); + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedChInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&paddingChInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInnerXtns); + sslBuffer_Clear(&pskXtn); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedChInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&paddingChInner); + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInnerXtns); + sslBuffer_Clear(&pskXtn); + PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeEchHelloRetryTranscript(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen, sslBuffer *out) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 zeroedEchSignal[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN] = { 0 }; + sslBuffer *previousTranscript; + + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + previousTranscript = &(ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + } else { + previousTranscript = &(ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + } + /* + * This segment calculates the hash of the Client Hello + * TODO(djackson@mozilla.com) - Replace with existing function? + * e.g. tls13_ReinjectHandshakeTranscript + * TODO(djackson@mozilla.com) - Replace with streaming version + */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry || !ss->sec.isServer) { + /* + * This function can be called in three situations: + * - By the server, prior to sending the HRR, when ECH was accepted + * - By the client, after receiving the HRR, but before it knows whether ECH was accepted + * - By the server, after accepting ECH and receiving CH2 when it needs to reconstruct the HRR + * In the first two situations, we need to include the message hash of inner ClientHello1 but don't + * want to alter the buffer containing the current transcript. + * In the last, the buffer already contains the message hash of inner ClientHello1. + */ + SSL3Hashes hashes; + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, previousTranscript->buf, previousTranscript->len, tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, ssl_hs_message_hash, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, hashes.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, hashes.u.raw, hashes.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(out, previousTranscript); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + } + /* Ensure the first ClientHello has been hashed. */ + PR_ASSERT(out->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss) + 4); + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "ECH Client Hello Message Hash", out->buf, out->len)); + /* Message Header */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, ssl_hs_server_hello, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Message Size */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, shLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Calculate where the HRR ECH Xtn Signal begins */ + unsigned int absEchOffset; + if (ss->sec.isServer) { + /* We know the ECH HRR Xtn is last */ + PORT_Assert(shLen >= TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + absEchOffset = shLen - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN; + } else { + /* We parsed the offset earlier */ + /* The result of pointer comparision is unspecified + * (and pointer arithemtic is undefined) if the pointers + * do not point to the same array or struct. That means these + * asserts cannot be relied on for correctness in compiled code, + * but may help the reader understand the requirements. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.ech->hrrConfirmation > sh); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.ech->hrrConfirmation < sh + shLen); + absEchOffset = ss->xtnData.ech->hrrConfirmation - sh; + } + PR_ASSERT(tls13_Debug_CheckXtnBegins(sh + absEchOffset - 4, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); + /* The HRR up to the ECH Xtn signal */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, sh, absEchOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, zeroedEchSignal, sizeof(zeroedEchSignal)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PR_ASSERT(absEchOffset + TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN <= shLen); + /* The remainder of the HRR */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, sh + absEchOffset + TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN, shLen - absEchOffset - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PR_ASSERT(out->len == tls13_GetHashSize(ss) + 4 + shLen + 4); + return SECSuccess; +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(out); + return SECFailure; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_ComputeEchServerHelloTranscript(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen, sslBuffer *out) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer *chSource = ss->sec.isServer ? &ss->ssl3.hs.messages : &ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages; + unsigned int offset = sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN; + PORT_Assert(sh && shLen > offset); + PORT_Assert(TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN <= SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + + /* TODO(djackson@mozilla.com) - Replace with streaming version */ + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(out, chSource); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Re-create the message header. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, ssl_hs_server_hello, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, shLen, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Copy the version and 24B of server_random. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, sh, offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Zero the signal placeholder. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(out, 0, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + offset += TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN; + + /* Use the remainder of SH. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(out, &sh[offset], shLen - offset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + return SECSuccess; +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.messages); + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages); + sslBuffer_Clear(out); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Compute the ECH signal using the transcript (up to, including) + * ServerHello. The server sources this transcript prefix from + * ss->ssl3.hs.messages, as it never uses ss->ssl3.hs.echInnerMessages. + * The client uses the inner transcript, echInnerMessages. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ComputeEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRBool isHrr, const PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen, PRUint8 *out) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer confMsgs = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + PK11SymKey *echSecret = NULL; + + const char *hkdfInfo = isHrr ? kHkdfInfoEchHrrConfirm : kHkdfInfoEchConfirm; + const size_t hkdfInfoLen = strlen(hkdfInfo); + + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "ECH Server Hello", sh, shLen)); + + if (isHrr) { + rv = tls13_ComputeEchHelloRetryTranscript(ss, sh, shLen, &confMsgs); + } else { + rv = tls13_ComputeEchServerHelloTranscript(ss, sh, shLen, &confMsgs); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "ECH Transcript", confMsgs.buf, confMsgs.len)); + rv = tls13_ComputeHash(ss, &hashes, confMsgs.buf, confMsgs.len, + tls13_GetHash(ss)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "ECH Transcript Hash", &hashes.u, hashes.len)); + rv = tls13_DeriveEchSecret(ss, &echSecret); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(echSecret, tls13_GetHash(ss), hashes.u.raw, + hashes.len, hkdfInfo, hkdfInfoLen, ss->protocolVariant, + out, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s computed ECH signal", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss))); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Computed ECH Signal", out, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN)); + PK11_FreeSymKey(echSecret); + sslBuffer_Clear(&confMsgs); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_FreeSymKey(echSecret); + sslBuffer_Clear(&confMsgs); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Ech Secret is HKDF-Extract(0, ClientHelloInner.random) where + "0" is a string of Hash.len bytes of value 0. */ +SECStatus +tls13_DeriveEchSecret(const sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **output) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *crKey = NULL; + SECItem rawKey; + const unsigned char *client_random = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.client_random : ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Client Random for ECH", client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH)); + /* We need a SECItem */ + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &rawKey, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto cleanup; + } + /* We need a slot*/ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto cleanup; + } + /* We import the key */ + crKey = PK11_ImportDataKey(slot, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, PK11_OriginUnwrap, + CKA_DERIVE, &rawKey, NULL); + if (crKey == NULL) { + rv = SECFailure; + goto cleanup; + } + /* NULL will be expanded to 0s of hash length */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExtract(NULL, crKey, tls13_GetHash(ss), output); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto cleanup; + } + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ECH Confirmation Key Derived.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "ECH Confirmation Key", *output)); +cleanup: + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&rawKey, PR_FALSE); + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + if (crKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(crKey); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess && *output) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(*output); + *output = NULL; + } + return rv; +} + +/* Called just prior to padding the CH. Use the size of the CH to estimate + * the size of a corresponding ECH extension, then add it to the buffer. */ +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(sslSocket *ss, const sslBuffer *preamble, sslBuffer *buf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslBuffer chInnerXtns = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer encodedCh = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslBuffer greaseBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + unsigned int payloadLen; + HpkeAeadId aead; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *hmacPrk = NULL; + PK11SymKey *derivedData = NULL; + SECItem *rawData; + CK_HKDF_PARAMS params; + SECItem paramsi; + /* 1B aead determinant (don't send), 1B config_id, 32B enc, payload */ + PR_ASSERT(!ss->sec.isServer); + const int kNonPayloadLen = 34; + + if (!ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch || ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + IS_DTLS(ss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* In draft-09, CH2 sends exactly the same GREASE ECH extension. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + return ssl3_EmplaceExtension(ss, buf, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf, + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.len, PR_TRUE); + } + + /* Compress the extensions for payload length. */ + rv = tls13_ConstructInnerExtensionsFromOuter(ss, buf, &chInnerXtns, + NULL, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code set */ + } + rv = tls13_EncodeClientHelloInner(ss, preamble, &chInnerXtns, &encodedCh); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code set */ + } + rv = tls13_PadChInner(&encodedCh, ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchSize, strlen(ss->url)); + + payloadLen = encodedCh.len; + payloadLen += TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN; /* Aead tag */ + + /* HMAC-Expand to get something that will pass for ciphertext. */ + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + goto loser; + } + + hmacPrk = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_HKDF_DATA, NULL, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL); + if (!hmacPrk) { + goto loser; + } + + params.bExtract = CK_FALSE; + params.bExpand = CK_TRUE; + params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256; + params.pInfo = NULL; + params.ulInfoLen = 0; + paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; + paramsi.len = sizeof(params); + derivedData = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(hmacPrk, CKM_HKDF_DATA, + ¶msi, CKM_HKDF_DATA, + CKA_DERIVE, kNonPayloadLen + payloadLen, + CKF_VERIFY); + if (!derivedData) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(derivedData); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rawData = PK11_GetKeyData(derivedData); + if (!rawData) { + goto loser; + } + PORT_Assert(rawData->len == kNonPayloadLen + payloadLen); + + /* struct { + HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suite; // kdf_id, aead_id + PRUint8 config_id; + opaque enc<1..2^16-1>; + opaque payload<1..2^16-1>; + } ClientECH; */ + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&greaseBuf, ech_xtn_type_outer, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + /* Only support SHA256. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&greaseBuf, HpkeKdfHkdfSha256, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* HpkeAeadAes128Gcm = 1, HpkeAeadChaCha20Poly1305 = 3, */ + aead = (rawData->data[0] & 1) ? HpkeAeadAes128Gcm : HpkeAeadChaCha20Poly1305; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&greaseBuf, aead, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* config_id */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&greaseBuf, rawData->data[1], 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* enc len is fixed 32B for X25519. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&greaseBuf, &rawData->data[2], 32, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&greaseBuf, &rawData->data[kNonPayloadLen], payloadLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Mark ECH as advertised so that we can validate any response. + * We'll use echHpkeCtx to determine if we sent real or GREASE ECH. */ + rv = ssl3_EmplaceExtension(ss, buf, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, + greaseBuf.buf, greaseBuf.len, PR_TRUE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Stash the GREASE ECH extension - in the case of HRR, CH2 must echo it. */ + ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf = greaseBuf; + + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInnerXtns); + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedCh); + PK11_FreeSymKey(hmacPrk); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedData); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&chInnerXtns); + sslBuffer_Clear(&encodedCh); + PK11_FreeSymKey(hmacPrk); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derivedData); + if (slot) { + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeHandleEch(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *msg, PRUint32 msgLen, SECItem *sidBytes, + SECItem *comps, SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem **echInner) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem *tmpEchInner = NULL; + PRUint8 *b; + PRUint32 length; + TLSExtension *echExtension; + TLSExtension *versionExtension; + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted); + SECItem tmpSid = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem tmpCookie = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem tmpSuites = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem tmpComps = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + + echExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn); + if (echExtension) { + rv = tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(ss, &ss->xtnData, &echExtension->data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + rv = tls13_MaybeAcceptEch(ss, sidBytes, msg, msgLen, &tmpEchInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + } + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + PORT_Assert(tmpEchInner); + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions)); + + /* Start over on ECHInner */ + b = tmpEchInner->data; + length = tmpEchInner->len; + rv = ssl3_HandleClientHelloPreamble(ss, &b, &length, &tmpSid, + &tmpCookie, &tmpSuites, &tmpComps); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + + versionExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_supported_versions_xtn); + if (!versionExtension) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + rv = tls13_NegotiateVersion(ss, versionExtension); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* code and alert set by tls13_NegotiateVersion */ + goto loser; + } + + *comps = tmpComps; + *cookieBytes = tmpCookie; + *sidBytes = tmpSid; + *suites = tmpSuites; + *echInner = tmpEchInner; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECITEM_FreeItem(tmpEchInner, PR_TRUE); + PORT_Assert(PORT_GetError() != 0); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *sh, PRUint32 shLen, PRBool isHrr) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 computed[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; + const PRUint8 *signal; + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + + /* If !echHpkeCtx, we either didn't advertise or sent GREASE ECH. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client only sent GREASE ECH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (isHrr) { + if (ss->xtnData.ech) { + signal = ss->xtnData.ech->hrrConfirmation; + } else { + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client did not receive ECH Xtn from Server HRR", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + signal = NULL; + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_FALSE; + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_TRUE; + } + } else { + signal = &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; + } + + PORT_Assert(ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); + + /* Check ECH Confirmation for HRR ECH Xtn or ServerHello Random */ + if (signal) { + rv = tls13_ComputeEchSignal(ss, isHrr, sh, shLen, computed); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "Server Signal", signal, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN)); + PRBool new_decision = !NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed, signal, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + /* Server can't change its mind on whether to accept ECH */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided && new_decision != ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = new_decision; + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_TRUE; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_ech; + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_SERVER_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Server accepted, but sent an extension which was only advertised in the ClientHelloOuter */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echInvalidExtension) { + (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Swap the advertised lists as we've accepted ECH. */ + PRUint16 *tempArray = ss->xtnData.advertised; + PRUint16 tempNum = ss->xtnData.numAdvertised; + + ss->xtnData.advertised = ss->xtnData.echAdvertised; + ss->xtnData.numAdvertised = ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised; + + ss->xtnData.echAdvertised = tempArray; + ss->xtnData.echNumAdvertised = tempNum; + + /* |enc| must not be included in CH2.ClientECH. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && ss->sec.isServer && + ss->xtnData.ech->senderPubKey.len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn; + + /* Only overwrite client_random with client_inner_random if CHInner was + * succesfully used for handshake (NOT if HRR is received). */ + if (!isHrr) { + PORT_Memcpy(ss->ssl3.hs.client_random, ss->ssl3.hs.client_inner_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + } + } + /* If rejected, leave echHpkeCtx and echPublicName for rejection paths. */ + ssl3_CoalesceEchHandshakeHashes(ss); + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ECH %s accepted by server", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted ? "is" : "is not")); + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_UnencodeChInner(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, SECItem **echInner) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslReadBuffer outerExtensionsList; + sslReadBuffer tmpReadBuf; + sslBuffer unencodedChInner = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + PRCList *outerCursor; + PRCList *innerCursor; + PRBool outerFound; + PRUint32 xtnsOffset; + PRUint64 tmp; + PRUint8 *tmpB; + PRUint32 tmpLength; + sslReader chReader = SSL_READER((*echInner)->data, (*echInner)->len); + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions)); + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions)); + TLSExtension *echExtension; + int error = SSL_ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR_ALERT; + int errDesc = internal_error; + + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "ECH Inner", chReader.buf.buf, chReader.buf.len)); + + /* unencodedChInner := preamble, tmpReadBuf := encoded extensions. */ + rv = tls13_CopyChPreamble(ss, &chReader, sidBytes, &unencodedChInner, &tmpReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set */ + } + + /* Parse inner extensions into ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions. */ + tmpB = CONST_CAST(PRUint8, tmpReadBuf.buf); + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &tmpB, &tmpReadBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* malformed, alert sent. */ + } + + echExtension = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn); + if (!echExtension) { + error = SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; /* Must have an inner Extension */ + } + rv = tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(ss, &ss->xtnData, &echExtension->data); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code set, alert sent. */ + } + + /* Exit early if there are no outer_extensions to decompress. */ + if (!ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn)) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&unencodedChInner, tmpReadBuf.buf, tmpReadBuf.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + sslBuffer_Clear(&unencodedChInner); + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Save room for uncompressed length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(&unencodedChInner, 2, &xtnsOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* For each inner extension: If not outer_extensions, copy it to the output. + * Else if outer_extensions, iterate the compressed extension list and append + * each full extension as contained in CHOuter. Compressed extensions must be + * contiguous, so decompress at the point at which outer_extensions appears. */ + for (innerCursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + innerCursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions; + innerCursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(innerCursor)) { + TLSExtension *innerExtension = (TLSExtension *)innerCursor; + if (innerExtension->type != ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: copying inner extension of type %d and size %d directly", SSL_GETPID(), + ss->fd, innerExtension->type, innerExtension->data.len)); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&unencodedChInner, + innerExtension->type, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&unencodedChInner, + innerExtension->data.data, + innerExtension->data.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + continue; + } + + /* Decompress */ + sslReader extensionRdr = SSL_READER(innerExtension->data.data, + innerExtension->data.len); + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&extensionRdr, 1, &outerExtensionsList); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ECH Outer Extensions has invalid size.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&extensionRdr) || (outerExtensionsList.len % 2) != 0 || !outerExtensionsList.len) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ECH Outer Extensions has invalid size.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + + outerCursor = &ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions; + sslReader compressedTypes = SSL_READER(outerExtensionsList.buf, outerExtensionsList.len); + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&compressedTypes)) { + outerFound = PR_FALSE; + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&compressedTypes, 2, &tmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ECH Outer Extensions has invalid contents.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + if (tmp == ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn || + tmp == ssl_tls13_outer_extensions_xtn) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ECH Outer Extensions contains an invalid reference.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + do { + const TLSExtension *candidate = (TLSExtension *)outerCursor; + /* Advance the outerCursor, we never consider the same xtn twice. */ + outerCursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(outerCursor); + if (candidate->type == tmp) { + outerFound = PR_TRUE; + SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Decompressing ECH Inner Extension of type %d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, tmp)); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&unencodedChInner, + candidate->type, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&unencodedChInner, + candidate->data.data, + candidate->data.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + break; + } + } while (outerCursor != &ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); + if (!outerFound) { + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: ECH Outer Extensions has missing," + " out of order or duplicate references.", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION; + errDesc = illegal_parameter; + goto alert_loser; + } + } + } + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions); + ssl3_DestroyRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + + /* Correct the message and extensions sizes. */ + rv = sslBuffer_InsertNumber(&unencodedChInner, xtnsOffset, + unencodedChInner.len - xtnsOffset - 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + tmpB = &unencodedChInner.buf[xtnsOffset]; + tmpLength = unencodedChInner.len - xtnsOffset; + rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber64(ss, &tmp, 2, &tmpB, &tmpLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess || tmpLength != tmp) { + error = SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO; + errDesc = internal_error; + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ParseExtensions(ss, &tmpB, &tmpLength); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Error set and alert already sent */ + } + + SECITEM_FreeItem(*echInner, PR_FALSE); + (*echInner)->data = unencodedChInner.buf; + (*echInner)->len = unencodedChInner.len; + return SECSuccess; +alert_loser: + FATAL_ERROR(ss, error, errDesc); +loser: + sslBuffer_Clear(&unencodedChInner); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeAcceptEch(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const PRUint8 *chOuter, + unsigned int chOuterLen, SECItem **chInner) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SECItem outer = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, chOuter), chOuterLen }; + SECItem *decryptedChInner = NULL; + SECItem outerAAD = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + SECItem cookieData = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + sslEchCookieData echData; + sslEchConfig *candidate = NULL; /* non-owning */ + TLSExtension *hrrXtn; + PRBool previouslyOfferedEch; + + if (!ss->xtnData.ech || ss->xtnData.ech->receivedInnerXtn) { + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.ech->innerCh.data); + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_TRUE; + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx); + hrrXtn = ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn); + if (!hrrXtn) { + /* If the client doesn't echo cookie, we can't decrypt. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx); + + PRUint8 *tmp = hrrXtn->data.data; + PRUint32 len = hrrXtn->data.len; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cookieData, 2, + &tmp, &len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Extract ECH info without restoring hash state. If there's + * something wrong with the cookie, continue without ECH + * and let HRR code handle the problem. */ + rv = tls13_HandleHrrCookie(ss, cookieData.data, cookieData.len, + NULL, NULL, &previouslyOfferedEch, &echData, PR_FALSE); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx = echData.hpkeCtx; + + const PRUint8 greaseConstant[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN] = { 0 }; + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = previouslyOfferedEch && + !NSS_SecureMemcmp(greaseConstant, echData.signal, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + + if (echData.configId != ss->xtnData.ech->configId || + echData.kdfId != ss->xtnData.ech->kdfId || + echData.aeadId != ss->xtnData.ech->aeadId) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_BAD_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + return SECSuccess; + } + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided && !ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + /* We don't change our mind */ + return SECSuccess; + } + /* Regardless of where we return, the outcome is decided */ + ss->ssl3.hs.echDecided = PR_TRUE; + + /* Cookie data was good, proceed with ECH. */ + rv = tls13_GetMatchingEchConfigs(ss, ss->xtnData.ech->kdfId, ss->xtnData.ech->aeadId, + ss->xtnData.ech->configId, candidate, &candidate); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (candidate) { + rv = tls13_ServerMakeChOuterAAD(ss, chOuter, chOuterLen, &outerAAD); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + while (candidate) { + rv = tls13_OpenClientHelloInner(ss, &outer, &outerAAD, candidate, &decryptedChInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + /* Get the next matching config */ + rv = tls13_GetMatchingEchConfigs(ss, ss->xtnData.ech->kdfId, ss->xtnData.ech->aeadId, + ss->xtnData.ech->configId, candidate, &candidate); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE, internal_error); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&outerAAD, PR_FALSE); + return SECFailure; + } + continue; + } + break; + } + SECITEM_FreeItem(&outerAAD, PR_FALSE); + + if (rv != SECSuccess || !decryptedChInner) { + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION, decrypt_error); + return SECFailure; + } else { + /* Send retry_configs (if we have any) when we fail to decrypt or + * found no candidates. This does *not* count as negotiating ECH. */ + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, &ss->xtnData, + ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendEchXtn); + } + } + + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Successfully opened ECH inner CH", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Compressed CHInner", decryptedChInner->data, + decryptedChInner->len)); + + ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted = PR_TRUE; + + /* Stash the CHOuter extensions. They're not yet handled (only parsed). If + * the CHInner contains outer_extensions_xtn, we'll need to reference them. */ + ssl3_MoveRemoteExtensions(&ss->ssl3.hs.echOuterExtensions, &ss->ssl3.hs.remoteExtensions); + + rv = tls13_UnencodeChInner(ss, sidBytes, &decryptedChInner); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SECITEM_FreeItem(decryptedChInner, PR_TRUE); + return SECFailure; /* code set */ + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Uncompressed CHInner", decryptedChInner->data, + decryptedChInner->len)); + *chInner = decryptedChInner; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint8 signal[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; + PRUint8 *msg_random = &sh[sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion)]; + + PORT_Assert(shLen > sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + rv = tls13_ComputeEchSignal(ss, PR_FALSE, sh, shLen, signal); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRUint8 *dest = &msg_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; + PORT_Memcpy(dest, signal, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + + /* Keep the socket copy consistent. */ + PORT_Assert(0 == memcmp(msg_random, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN)); + dest = &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; + PORT_Memcpy(dest, signal, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PR_ASSERT(shLen >= 4 + TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + /* We put the HRR ECH extension last. */ + PRUint8 *placeholder_location = sh + shLen - TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN; + /* Defensive check that we are overwriting the contents of the right extension */ + PR_ASSERT(tls13_Debug_CheckXtnBegins(placeholder_location - 4, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)); + /* Calculate signal and overwrite */ + rv = tls13_ComputeEchSignal(ss, PR_TRUE, sh, shLen, placeholder_location); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* Free HRR GREASE/accept_confirmation value, it MUST be restored from + * cookie when handling CH2 after HRR. */ + sslBuffer_Clear(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + return SECSuccess; +}
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..90b674e40d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13ech.h @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13ech_h_ +#define __tls13ech_h_ + +#include "pk11hpke.h" + +/* draft-09, supporting shared-mode and split-mode as a backend server only. + * Notes on the implementation status: + * - Padding (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-08#section-6.2), + * is not implemented (see bug 1677181). + * - When multiple ECHConfigs are provided by the server, the first compatible + * config is selected by the client. Ciphersuite choices are limited and only + * the AEAD may vary (AES-128-GCM or ChaCha20Poly1305). + * - Some of the buffering (construction/compression/decompression) could likely + * be optimized, but the spec is still evolving so that work is deferred. + */ +#define TLS13_ECH_VERSION 0xfe0d +#define TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN 8 +#define TLS13_ECH_AEAD_TAG_LEN 16 + +static const char kHpkeInfoEch[] = "tls ech"; +static const char hHkdfInfoEchConfigID[] = "tls ech config id"; +static const char kHkdfInfoEchConfirm[] = "ech accept confirmation"; +static const char kHkdfInfoEchHrrConfirm[] = "hrr ech accept confirmation"; + +typedef enum { + ech_xtn_type_outer = 0, + ech_xtn_type_inner = 1, +} EchXtnType; + +struct sslEchConfigContentsStr { + PRUint8 configId; + HpkeKemId kemId; + SECItem publicKey; /* NULL on server. Use the keypair in sslEchConfig instead. */ + HpkeKdfId kdfId; + HpkeAeadId aeadId; + SECItem suites; /* One or more HpkeCipherSuites. The selected s + * suite is placed in kdfId and aeadId. */ + PRUint8 maxNameLen; + char *publicName; + /* No supported extensions. */ +}; + +/* ECH Information needed by a server to process a second CH after a + * HelloRetryRequest is sent. This data is stored in the cookie. + */ +struct sslEchCookieDataStr { + PRBool previouslyOffered; + PRUint8 configId; + HpkeKdfId kdfId; + HpkeAeadId aeadId; + HpkeContext *hpkeCtx; + PRUint8 signal[TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN]; +}; + +struct sslEchConfigStr { + PRCList link; + SECItem raw; + PRUint16 version; + sslEchConfigContents contents; +}; + +struct sslEchXtnStateStr { + SECItem innerCh; /* Server: ClientECH.payload */ + SECItem senderPubKey; /* Server: ClientECH.enc */ + PRUint8 configId; /* Server: ClientECH.config_id */ + HpkeKdfId kdfId; /* Server: ClientECH.cipher_suite.kdf */ + HpkeAeadId aeadId; /* Server: ClientECH.cipher_suite.aead */ + SECItem retryConfigs; /* Client: ServerECH.retry_configs*/ + PRBool retryConfigsValid; /* Client: Extraction of retry_configss is allowed. + * This is set once the handshake completes (having + * verified to the ECHConfig public name). */ + PRUint8 *hrrConfirmation; /* Client/Server: HRR Confirmation Location */ + PRBool receivedInnerXtn; /* Server: Handled ECH Xtn with Inner Enum */ + PRUint8 *payloadStart; /* Server: Start of ECH Payload*/ +}; + +SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS + +SECStatus SSLExp_EncodeEchConfigId(PRUint8 configId, const char *publicName, unsigned int maxNameLen, + HpkeKemId kemId, const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, + const HpkeSymmetricSuite *hpkeSuites, unsigned int hpkeSuiteCount, + PRUint8 *out, unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxlen); +SECStatus SSLExp_GetEchRetryConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, SECItem *retryConfigs); +SECStatus SSLExp_SetClientEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *echConfigs, + unsigned int echConfigsLen); +SECStatus SSLExp_SetServerEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd, + const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, const SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, + const PRUint8 *echConfigs, unsigned int numEchConfigs); +SECStatus SSLExp_RemoveEchConfigs(PRFileDesc *fd); + +SEC_END_PROTOS + +SECStatus tls13_ClientSetupEch(sslSocket *ss, sslClientHelloType type); +SECStatus tls13_ConstructClientHelloWithEch(sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid, + PRBool freshSid, sslBuffer *chOuterBuf, + sslBuffer *chInnerXtnsBuf); +SECStatus tls13_CopyEchConfigs(PRCList *oconfigs, PRCList *configs); +SECStatus tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(const SECItem *data, PRCList *configs); +void tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(PRCList *list); +void tls13_DestroyEchXtnState(sslEchXtnState *state); +SECStatus tls13_GetMatchingEchConfig(const sslSocket *ss, HpkeKdfId kdf, HpkeAeadId aead, + const SECItem *configId, sslEchConfig **cfg); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleEch(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *msg, PRUint32 msgLen, SECItem *sidBytes, + SECItem *comps, SECItem *cookieBytes, SECItem *suites, SECItem **echInner); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeHandleEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, const PRUint8 *savedMsg, PRUint32 savedLength, PRBool isHrr); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeAcceptEch(sslSocket *ss, const SECItem *sidBytes, const PRUint8 *chOuter, + unsigned int chOuterLen, SECItem **chInner); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeGreaseEch(sslSocket *ss, const sslBuffer *preamble, sslBuffer *buf); +SECStatus tls13_WriteServerEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen); +SECStatus tls13_WriteServerEchHrrSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen); +SECStatus tls13_DeriveEchSecret(const sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **output); +SECStatus tls13_ComputeEchSignal(sslSocket *ss, PRBool isHrr, const PRUint8 *sh, unsigned int shLen, PRUint8 *out); + +PRBool tls13_IsIp(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len); +PRBool tls13_IsLDH(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13echv.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13echv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae9792a910 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13echv.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* Validation functions for ECH public names. */ + +#include "seccomon.h" + +/* Convert a single character `c` into a number `*d` with the given radix. + * Fails if the character isn't valid for the radix. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_IpDigit(PRUint8 c, PRUint8 radix, PRUint8 *d) +{ + PRUint8 v = 0xff; + if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { + v = c - '0'; + } else if (radix > 10) { + if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { + v = c - 'a'; + } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { + v = c - 'A'; + } + } + if (v >= radix) { + return SECFailure; + } + *d = v; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This function takes the first couple of characters from `str`, starting at offset + * `*i` and calculates a radix. If it starts with "0x" or "0X", then `*i` is moved up + * by two and `*radix` is set to 16 (hexadecimal). If it starts with "0", then `*i` is + * moved up by one and `*radix` is set to 8 (octal). Otherwise, `*i` is left alone and + * `*radix` is set to 10 (decimal). + * Fails if there are no characters remaining or the next character is '.', either at + * the start or after "0x". + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_IpRadix(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len, unsigned int *i, PRUint8 *radix) +{ + if (*i == len || str[*i] == '.') { + return SECFailure; + } + if (str[*i] == '0') { + (*i)++; + if (*i < len && (str[*i] == 'x' || str[*i] == 'X')) { + (*i)++; + if (*i == len || str[*i] == '.') { + return SECFailure; + } + *radix = 16; + } else { + *radix = 8; + } + } else { + *radix = 10; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Take a number from `str` from offset `*i` and put the value in `*v`. + * This calculates the radix and returns a value between 0 and 2^32-1, using all + * of the digits up to the end of the string (determined by `len`) or a period ('.'). + * Fails if there is no value, if there a non-digit characters, or if the value is + * too large. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_IpValue(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len, unsigned int *i, PRUint32 *v) +{ + PRUint8 radix; + SECStatus rv = tls13_IpRadix(str, len, i, &radix); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + PRUint64 part = 0; + while (*i < len) { + PRUint8 d; + rv = tls13_IpDigit(str[*i], radix, &d); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + if (str[*i] != '.') { + return SECFailure; + } + break; + } + part = part * radix + d; + if (part > PR_UINT32_MAX) { + return SECFailure; + } + (*i)++; + } + *v = part; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Returns true if `end` is true and `v` is within the `limit`. Used to validate the + * last part of an IPv4 address, which can hold larger numbers if there are fewer then + * four parts. */ +static PRBool +tls13_IpLastPart(PRBool end, PRUint32 v, PRUint32 limit) +{ + if (!end) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + return v <= limit; +} + +/* Returns true if `str` contains an IPv4 address. */ +PRBool +tls13_IsIp(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len) +{ + PRUint32 part; + PRUint32 v; + unsigned int i = 0; + for (part = 0; part < 4; part++) { + SECStatus rv = tls13_IpValue(str, len, &i, &v); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (v > 0xff || i == len) { + return tls13_IpLastPart(i == len, v, PR_UINT32_MAX >> (part * 8)); + } + PORT_Assert(str[i] == '.'); + i++; + } + + return tls13_IpLastPart(i == len, v, 0xff); +} + +static PRBool +tls13_IsLD(PRUint8 c) +{ + return (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || + (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || + (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || + c == '_'; /* not in spec, but in the world; bug 1136616 */ +} + +/* Is this a valid dotted LDH string (that is, an A-Label domain name)? + * This does not tolerate a trailing '.', where the DNS generally does. + */ +PRBool +tls13_IsLDH(const PRUint8 *str, unsigned int len) +{ + unsigned int i = 0; + while (i < len && tls13_IsLD(str[i])) { + unsigned int labelEnd = PR_MIN(len, i + 63); + i++; + while (i < labelEnd && (tls13_IsLD(str[i]) || str[i] == '-')) { + i++; + } + if (str[i - 1] == '-') { + /* labels cannot end in a hyphen */ + return PR_FALSE; + } + if (i == len) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + if (str[i] != '.') { + return PR_FALSE; + } + i++; + } + return PR_FALSE; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13err.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8cdeb12eb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13err.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13err_h_ +#define __tls13err_h_ + +/* Use this instead of FATAL_ERROR when an alert isn't possible. */ +#define LOG_ERROR(ss, prError) \ + do { \ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: fatal error %d in %s (%s:%d)", \ + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, prError, __func__, __FILE__, __LINE__)); \ + PORT_SetError(prError); \ + } while (0) + +/* Log an error and generate an alert because something is irreparably wrong. */ +#define FATAL_ERROR(ss, prError, desc) \ + do { \ + LOG_ERROR(ss, prError); \ + tls13_FatalError(ss, prError, desc); \ + } while (0) + +void tls13_FatalError(sslSocket *ss, PRErrorCode prError, SSL3AlertDescription desc); +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4d8c711bd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c @@ -0,0 +1,1802 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nssrenam.h" +#include "nss.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "ssl3ext.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert; + const SECItem *item; + SECStatus rv; + + if (!serverCert->certStatusArray || + !serverCert->certStatusArray->len) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + item = &serverCert->certStatusArray->items[0]; + + /* Only send the first entry. */ + /* status_type == ocsp */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1> */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, item->data, item->len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.2.3. + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * + * struct { + * select (role) { + * case client: + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<4..2^16-1>; + * + * case server: + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } + * } KeyShare; + * + * DH is Section 6.3.2.3.1. + * + * opaque dh_Y<1..2^16-1>; + * + * ECDH is Section 6.3.2.3.2. + * + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + */ +PRUint32 +tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + /* Size = NamedGroup(2) + length(2) + opaque<?> share */ + switch (pubKey->keyType) { + case ecKey: + return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len; + case dhKey: + return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + } + return 0; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, SSLNamedGroup group, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int size = tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(pubKey); + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, group, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, size - 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + switch (pubKey->keyType) { + case ecKey: + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data, + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len); + break; + case dhKey: + rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(buf, pubKey, PR_FALSE); + break; + default: + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + break; + } + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRCList *cursor; + unsigned int lengthOffset; + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Optimistically try to send an ECDHE key using the + * preexisting key (in future will be keys) */ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send client key share xtn", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Save the offset to the length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + cursor != &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs; + cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) { + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor; + rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, + keyPair->group->name, + keyPair->keys->pubKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* GREASE KeyShareEntry: + * [The client] MAY also send KeyShareEntry values for a subset of those + * selected in the "key_share" extension. For each of these, the + * "key_exchange" field MAY be any value [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. + * + * By default we do not send KeyShares for every NamedGroup so the + * ServerKeyShare handshake message / additional round-trip is not + * triggered by sending GREASE KeyShareEntries. */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_group], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + /* Entry length */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + /* Entry value */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0xCD, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(sslReader *rdr, TLS13KeyShareEntry **ksp) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint64 group; + const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef; + TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL; + sslReadBuffer share; + + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(rdr, 2, &group); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group); + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(rdr, 2, &share); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* This has to happen here because we want to consume + * the entire entry even if the group is unknown + * or disabled. */ + /* If the group is disabled, continue. */ + if (!groupDef) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + ks = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry); + if (!ks) { + goto loser; + } + ks->group = groupDef; + + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &ks->key_exchange, + share.buf, share.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + *ksp = ks; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks); + + return SECFailure; +} +/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the client and copy to + * |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key + * share is processed in tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(). */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares)); + TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + + /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len); + rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks); + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || !ks) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) { + tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE); + return SECFailure; + } + PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 tmp; + const sslNamedGroupDef *group; + + PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension in HRR", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* error code already set */ + } + if (data->len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + + group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)tmp); + /* If the group is not enabled, or we already have a share for the + * requested group, abort. */ + if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, group) || + ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(ss, group)) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now delete all the key shares per [draft-ietf-tls-tls13 S 4.1.2] */ + ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)); + + /* And replace with our new share. */ + rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), group); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the server and copy to + * |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key + * share is processed in tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(). */ +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint32 length; + + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares)); + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* Redundant length because of TLS encoding (this vector consumes + * the entire extension.) */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &data->data, + &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + goto loser; + if (length != data->len) { + /* Check for consistency */ + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE); + goto loser; + } + + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len); + while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) { + TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL; + rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE); + goto loser; + } + if (ks) { + /* |ks| == NULL if this is an unknown group. */ + PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares); + } + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = + ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyKeyShares(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair; + + /* There should be exactly one key share. */ + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) == + PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs)); + + keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs); + + rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, keyPair->group->name, + keyPair->keys->pubKey); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Called by clients. + * + * struct { + * opaque identity<0..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: + * PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * + * case server_hello: + * uint16 selected_identity; + * }; + * + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + const static PRUint8 binder[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned int binderLen; + unsigned int identityLen = 0; + const PRUint8 *identity = NULL; + PRTime age; + SECStatus rv; + + /* Exit early if no PSKs or max version < 1.3. */ + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) || + ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* ...or if PSK type is resumption, but we're not resuming. */ + sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume && !ss->statelessResume) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* ...or if PSKs are incompatible with negotiated ciphersuites + * (different hash algorithms) on HRR. + * + * In addition, in its updated ClientHello, the client SHOULD NOT offer any + * pre-shared keys associated with a hash other than that of the selected + * cipher suite. This allows the client to avoid having to compute partial + * hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second ClientHello + * [RFC8446, Section 4.1.4]. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry && + (psk->hash != ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Save where this extension starts so that if we have to add padding, it + * can be inserted before this extension. */ + PORT_Assert(buf->len >= 4); + xtnData->lastXtnOffset = buf->len - 4; + PORT_Assert(psk->type == ssl_psk_resume || psk->type == ssl_psk_external); + binderLen = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(psk->hash); + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { + /* Send a single ticket identity. */ + NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; + identityLen = session_ticket->ticket.len; + identity = session_ticket->ticket.data; + + /* Obfuscated age. */ + age = ssl_Time(ss) - session_ticket->received_timestamp; + age /= PR_USEC_PER_MSEC; + age += session_ticket->ticket_age_add; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending Resumption PSK with identity", identity, identityLen)); + } else if (psk->type == ssl_psk_external) { + identityLen = psk->label.len; + identity = psk->label.data; + age = 0; + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending External PSK with label", identity, identityLen)); + } else { + PORT_Assert(0); + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Length is len(identityLen) + identityLen + len(age) */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2 + identityLen + 4, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, identity, + identityLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, age, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Write out the binder list length. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, binderLen + 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Write zeroes for the binder for the moment. These + * are overwritten in tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, binder, binderLen, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) { + xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECItem inner; + SECStatus rv; + unsigned int numIdentities = 0; + unsigned int numBinders = 0; + SECItem *appToken; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* The application token is set via the cookie extension if this is the + * second ClientHello. Don't set it twice. The cookie extension handler + * sets |helloRetry| and that will have been called already because this + * extension always comes last. */ + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + appToken = &xtnData->applicationToken; + } else { + appToken = NULL; + } + + /* Parse the identities list. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &inner, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + while (inner.len) { + SECItem label; + PRUint32 obfuscatedAge; + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &label, 2, + &inner.data, &inner.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + if (!label.len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &obfuscatedAge, 4, + &inner.data, &inner.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + + if (!numIdentities) { + /* Check any configured external PSK for a matching label. + * If none exists, try to parse it as a ticket. */ + PORT_Assert(!xtnData->selectedPsk); + for (PRCList *cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.psks; + cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) { + sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)cur_p; + if (psk->type != ssl_psk_external || + SECITEM_CompareItem(&psk->label, &label) != SECEqual) { + continue; + } + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Using External PSK with label", + psk->label.data, psk->label.len)); + xtnData->selectedPsk = psk; + } + + if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) { + PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handling PreSharedKey value", + label.data, label.len)); + rv = ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon( + CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), &label, appToken); + /* This only happens if we have an internal error, not + * a malformed ticket. Bogus tickets just don't resume + * and return SECSuccess. */ + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->sec.ci.sid) { + /* xtnData->ticketAge contains the baseline we use for + * calculating the ticket age (i.e., our RTT estimate less the + * value of ticket_age_add). + * + * Add that to the obfuscated ticket age to recover the client's + * view of the ticket age plus the estimated RTT. + * + * See ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket() for details. */ + xtnData->ticketAge += obfuscatedAge; + + /* We are not committed to resumption until after unwrapping the + * RMS in tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2. The RPSK will be stored + * in ss->xtnData.selectedPsk at that point, so continue. */ + } + } + } + + ++numIdentities; + } + + xtnData->pskBindersLen = data->len; + + /* Parse the binders list. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, + &inner, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + if (data->len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + while (inner.len) { + SECItem binder; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &binder, 1, + &inner.data, &inner.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + if (binder.len < 32) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (!numBinders) { + xtnData->pskBinder = binder; + } + ++numBinders; + } + + if (numBinders != numIdentities) + goto alert_loser; + + if (ss->statelessResume) { + PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + } else if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) { + /* No matching EPSK. */ + return SECSuccess; + } + + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* We only process the first session ticket the client sends, + * so the index is always 0. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PRUint32 index; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &index, 2, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return SECFailure; + + /* This should be the end of the extension. */ + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* We only sent one PSK label so index must be equal to 0 */ + if (index) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks)); + sslPsk *candidate = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + + /* Check that the server-selected ciphersuite hash and PSK hash match. */ + if (candidate->hash != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn; + xtnData->selectedPsk = candidate; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * struct { } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (!tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* This will only be called if we also offered the extension. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PRUint32 utmp; + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle ticket early_data extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp), + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->max_early_data_size = PR_ntohl(utmp); + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * case server_hello: + * ProtocolVersion version; + * }; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + PRUint16 version; + unsigned int lengthOffset; + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client send supported_versions extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 1, &lengthOffset); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx || ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) { + PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeVersion(version, + ss->protocolVariant); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, wire, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->opt.enableDtls13VersionCompat && + ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) { + switch (version) { + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2: + case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1: + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, (PRUint16)version, 2); + break; + default: + continue; + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + /* GREASE SupportedVersions: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE version values and advertise them + * in the "supported_versions" extension, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_version], 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server send supported_versions extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PRUint16 ver = tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, + ss->protocolVariant); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ver, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; + * } Cookie; + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + /* IMPORTANT: this is only valid while the HelloRetryRequest is still valid. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable( + ss, &CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)->ssl3.hs.cookie, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len || data->len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + !ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send cookie extension", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data, + ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &xtnData->cookie, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (xtnData->cookie.len == 0) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + /* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single + * NST immediately following the client Finished. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send post_handshake_auth extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + *added = ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandlePostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle post_handshake_auth extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + if (data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single + * NST immediately following the client Finished. */ + if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) { + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* + * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + ss->opt.noCache) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send psk key exchange modes extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode: + * A client MAY select one or more GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode values and + * advertise them in the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension, if sent + * [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */ + if (ss->opt.enableGrease) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->pskKem }, 2, 1); + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke }, 1, 1); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle PSK key exchange modes extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + /* IMPORTANT: We aren't copying these values, just setting pointers. + * They will only be valid as long as the ClientHello is in memory. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, + &xtnData->psk_ke_modes, 1, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + if (!xtnData->psk_ke_modes.len || data->len) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = + ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + unsigned int calen; + const SECItem *name; + unsigned int nnames; + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &name, &nnames); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!calen) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, calen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + while (nnames) { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, name->data, name->len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + ++name; + --nnames; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PLArenaPool *arena; + + if (!data->len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + return SECFailure; + } + + arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (!arena) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = arena; + rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs((sslSocket *)ss, + &data->data, &data->len, + &xtnData->certReqAuthorities); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + if (data->len) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST); + goto loser; + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL; + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, SECItem *data) +{ + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore certificate_authorities extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + /* NSS ignores certificate_authorities in the ClientHello */ + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + + if (!xtnData->selectedGroup) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->selectedGroup->name, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + PORT_Assert(xtnData->cookie.len > 0); + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, + xtnData->cookie.data, xtnData->cookie.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + if (data->len != TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received GREASEd ECH confirmation", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECSuccess; + } + SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received HRR ECH confirmation", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech); + xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState); + if (!xtnData->ech) { + return SECFailure; + } + xtnData->ech->hrrConfirmation = data->data; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRCList parsedConfigs; + PR_INIT_CLIST(&parsedConfigs); + + /* The [retry config] response is valid only when the server used the + * ClientHelloOuter. If the server sent this extension in response to the + * inner variant [ECH was accepted], then the client MUST abort with an + * "unsupported_extension" alert [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 5]. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the + * "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the + * "retry_configs" field set to one or more ECHConfig structures with + * up-to-date keys [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.1]. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + /* For TLS < 1.3 the extension is unkown/unsupported. */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension); + } else { + /* For TLS 1.3 the extension is known but prohibited outside EE + * (see RFC8446, Section 4.2 for alert rationale). */ + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + } + return SECFailure; + } + + PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech); + xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState); + if (!xtnData->ech) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse the list to determine 1) That the configs are valid + * and properly encoded, and 2) If any are compatible. */ + rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(data, &parsedConfigs); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Don't mark ECH negotiated on rejection with retry_config. + * Save the the raw configs so the application can retry. If + * we sent GREASE ECH (no echHpkeCtx), don't apply retry_configs. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&parsedConfigs)) { + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->retryConfigs, data); + } + tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&parsedConfigs); + + return rv; +} + +/* Indicates support for the delegated credentials extension. This should be + * hooked while processing the ClientHello. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + /* Only send the extension if support is enabled and the client can + * negotiate TLS 1.3. */ + if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + !ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Filter the schemes that are enabled and acceptable. Save these in + * the "advertised" list, then encode them to be sent. If we receive + * a DC in response, validate that it matches one of the advertised + * schemes. */ + SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 }; + unsigned int filteredCount = 0; + SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, ss->vrange.max, + PR_TRUE /* disableRsae */, + PR_FALSE /* forCert */, + MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES, + filtered, + &filteredCount); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* If no schemes available for the DC extension, don't send it. */ + if (!filteredCount) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + rv = ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount, + PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, buf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLSignatureScheme *dcSchemesAdvertised = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme, + filteredCount); + if (!dcSchemesAdvertised) { + return SECFailure; + } + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < filteredCount; i++) { + dcSchemesAdvertised[i] = filtered[i]; + } + + if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised) { + PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised); + } + xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = dcSchemesAdvertised; + xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = filteredCount; + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Parses the delegated credential (DC) offered by the server. This should be + * hooked while processing the server's CertificateVerify. + * + * Only the DC sent with the end-entity certificate is to be parsed. This is + * ensured by |tls13_HandleCertificateEntry|, which only processes extensions + * for the first certificate in the chain. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ClientHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + if (!ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials || + ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL; + SECStatus rv = tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(data->data, data->len, &dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* code already set */ + } + + /* When using RSA, the public key MUST NOT use the rsaEncryption OID. */ + if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 || + dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 || + dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* The algorithm and expected_cert_verify_algorithm fields MUST be of a + * type advertised by the client in the SignatureSchemeList and are + * considered invalid otherwise. Clients that receive invalid delegated + * credentials MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" + * alert. */ + PRBool found = PR_FALSE; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) { + if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (found == PR_FALSE) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + // Check the dc->alg, if necessary. + if (dc->alg != dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg) { + found = PR_FALSE; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) { + if (dc->alg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + if (found == PR_FALSE) { + goto alert_loser; + } + } + + xtnData->peerDelegCred = dc; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = + ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn; + return SECSuccess; +alert_loser: + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); +loser: + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Adds the DC extension if we're committed to authenticating with a DC. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) { + const SECItem *dc = &ss->sec.serverCert->delegCred; + SECStatus rv; + rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, dc->data, dc->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *added = PR_TRUE; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* The client has indicated support of DCs. We can't act on this information + * until we've committed to signing with a DC, so just set a callback for + * sending the DC extension later. */ +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes) { + PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes); + xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes = NULL; + xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes = 0; + } + SECStatus rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, NULL, + &xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes, + &xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + if (xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes == 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return SECFailure; + } + /* Check for trailing data. */ + if (data->len != 0) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ + xtnData->peerRequestedDelegCred = PR_TRUE; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = + ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn; + + return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender( + ss, xtnData, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn, + tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn); +} + +/* Adds the ECH extension containing server retry_configs */ +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + const sslEchConfig *cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, cfg->raw.data, cfg->raw.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* If an ECH server sends the HRR ECH extension after it accepted ECH, the + * extension's payload must be set to 8 zero bytes, these are overwritten with + * the accept_confirmation value after the required transcript calculation. + * If a client-facing/shared-mode server did not accept ECH when offered in CH + * or if ECH GREASE is enabled on the server and a ECH extension was received, + * a 8 byte random value is set as the extension's payload + * [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7]. + * + * Depending on the acceptance of ECH, zero or random bytes are written to + * ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf in tls13con.c/tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(). */ +SECStatus +tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + SECStatus rv; + /* Do not send HRR ECH extension if TLS < 1.3 was negotiated OR no ECH + * extension was received OR the server is NOT in any ECH server mode AND + * ECH GREASE is NOT enabled. */ + if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 || + !xtnData->ech || + (!ss->echPubKey && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && !ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch)) { + SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server not sending HRR ECH Xtn", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + return SECSuccess; + } + SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server sending HRR ECH Xtn", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + PR_ASSERT(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf) == TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "grease_ech_confirmation", ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN)); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(buf, &ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + PRUint64 xtn_type; + sslReader xtnReader = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len); + + PR_ASSERT(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch); + PR_ASSERT(!xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn); + + SECStatus rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&xtnReader, 1, &xtn_type); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&xtnReader)) { + /* Inner ECH Extension must contain only type enum */ + goto alert_loser; + } + + xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn = PR_TRUE; + xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn; + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data) +{ + SECStatus rv; + HpkeKdfId kdf; + HpkeAeadId aead; + PRUint32 tmp; + PRUint8 configId; + SECItem senderPubKey; + SECItem encryptedCh; + + PRUint32 xtn_type; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &xtn_type, 1, &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_outer && xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) { + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: unexpected ECH extension type in client hello outer, alert", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + goto alert_loser; + } + /* If we are operating in shared mode, we can accept an inner xtn in the ClientHelloOuter */ + if (xtn_type == ech_xtn_type_inner) { + if (!ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech); + xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState); + if (!xtnData->ech) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* We have to rewind the buffer advanced by ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber */ + data->data--; + data->len++; + return tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(ss, xtnData, data); + } + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) { + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle outer ECH extension", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + + PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech); + xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState); + if (!xtnData->ech) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Parse the KDF and AEAD. */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + kdf = (HpkeKdfId)tmp; + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + aead = (HpkeAeadId)tmp; + + /* config_id */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 1, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + configId = tmp; + + /* enc */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &senderPubKey, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + /* payload, which must be final and non-empty. */ + xtnData->ech->payloadStart = data->data + 2; /* Move past length */ + rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &encryptedCh, 2, + &data->data, &data->len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto alert_loser; + } + if (data->len || !encryptedCh.len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) { + /* In the real ECH HRR case, config_id and enc should be empty. This + * is checked after acceptance, because it might be GREASE ECH. */ + if (!senderPubKey.len) { + goto alert_loser; + } + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->senderPubKey, &senderPubKey); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->innerCh, &encryptedCh); + PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "CT for ECH Decryption", encryptedCh.data, encryptedCh.len)); + if (rv == SECFailure) { + return SECFailure; + } + xtnData->ech->configId = configId; + xtnData->ech->kdfId = kdf; + xtnData->ech->aeadId = aead; + + /* Not negotiated until tls13_MaybeAcceptEch. */ + return SECSuccess; + +alert_loser: + ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error); + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (!ss->opt.enableGrease || + (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) || + (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_SendGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added) +{ + if (!ss->opt.enableGrease || + (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) || + (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ 0x00 }, 1, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *added = PR_TRUE; + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e4247e295d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.h @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13exthandle_h_ +#define __tls13exthandle_h_ + +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *append); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, SECItem *data); + +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(sslReader *rdr, TLS13KeyShareEntry **ksp); +PRUint32 tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); +SECStatus tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, SSLNamedGroup group, + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandlePostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_ClientSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_ServerHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + SECItem *data); +SECStatus tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); +SECStatus tls13_SendGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss, + TLSExtensionData *xtnData, + sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d14e325580 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.c @@ -0,0 +1,332 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslt.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "selfencrypt.h" +#include "tls13con.h" +#include "tls13ech.h" +#include "tls13err.h" +#include "tls13hashstate.h" + +/* + * The cookie is structured as a self-encrypted structure with the + * inner value being. + * + * struct { + * uint8 indicator = 0xff; // To disambiguate from tickets. + * uint16 cipherSuite; // Selected cipher suite. + * uint16 keyShare; // Requested key share group (0=none) + * PRUint8 echConfigId; // ECH config_id + * HpkeKdfId kdfId; // ECH KDF (uint16) + * HpkeAeadId aeadId; // ECH AEAD (uint16) + * opaque echHpkeCtx<0..65535>; // ECH serialized HPKE context + * opaque applicationToken<0..65535>; // Application token + * opaque ch_hash[rest_of_buffer]; // H(ClientHello) + * } CookieInner; + * + * An empty echConfigId means that ECH was not offered in the first ClientHello. + * An empty echHrrPsk means that ECH was not accepted in CH1. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_MakeHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, + const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen, + PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxlen) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Hashes hashes; + PRUint8 cookie[1024]; + sslBuffer cookieBuf = SSL_BUFFER(cookie); + static const PRUint8 indicator = 0xff; + SECItem *echHpkeCtx = NULL; + + /* Encode header. */ + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&cookieBuf, &indicator, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, + selectedGroup ? selectedGroup->name : 0, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (ss->xtnData.ech) { + /* Record that we received ECH. See sslEchCookieData */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, PR_TRUE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->configId, + 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->kdfId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, ss->xtnData.ech->aeadId, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + /* We need to send a ECH HRR Extension containing a signal for the client, + * we must store the signal in the cookie so we can reconstruct the transcript + * later. To avoid leaking whether ECH was accepted in the length of the cookie + * we include the empty signal in the cookie regardless. + */ + PR_ASSERT(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf) == TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(&cookieBuf, &ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* There might be no HPKE Context, e.g. when we lack a matching ECHConfig. */ + if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) { + rv = PK11_HPKE_ExportContext(ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx, NULL, &echHpkeCtx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&cookieBuf, echHpkeCtx->data, echHpkeCtx->len, 2); + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(echHpkeCtx, PR_TRUE); + } else { + /* Zero length HPKE context. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, 0, 2); + } + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } else { + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&cookieBuf, PR_FALSE, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + /* Application token. */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&cookieBuf, appToken, appTokenLen, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Compute and encode hashes. */ + rv = tls13_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, &hashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&cookieBuf, hashes.u.raw, hashes.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Encrypt right into the buffer. */ + rv = ssl_SelfEncryptProtect(ss, cookieBuf.buf, cookieBuf.len, + buf, len, maxlen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Given a cookie and cookieLen, decrypt and parse, returning + * any values that were requested via the "previous_" params. If + * recoverState is true, the transcript state and application + * token are restored. Note that previousEchKdfId, previousEchAeadId, + * previousEchConfigId, and previousEchHpkeCtx are not modified if ECH was not + * previously negotiated (i.e., previousEchOffered is PR_FALSE). */ +SECStatus +tls13_HandleHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss, + unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen, + ssl3CipherSuite *previousCipherSuite, + const sslNamedGroupDef **previousGroup, + PRBool *previousOfferedEch, + sslEchCookieData *echData, + PRBool recoverState) +{ + SECStatus rv; + unsigned char plaintext[1024]; + unsigned int plaintextLen = 0; + sslBuffer messageBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + sslReadBuffer echHpkeBuf = { 0 }; + PRBool receivedEch; + PRUint64 sentinel; + PRUint64 cipherSuite; + sslEchCookieData parsedEchData = { 0 }; + sslReadBuffer greaseReadBuf = { 0 }; + PRUint64 group; + PRUint64 tmp64; + const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup; + PRUint64 appTokenLen; + + rv = ssl_SelfEncryptUnprotect(ss, cookie, cookieLen, + plaintext, &plaintextLen, sizeof(plaintext)); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SSL_TRC(100, ("Error decrypting cookie.")); + return SECFailure; + } + + sslReader reader = SSL_READER(plaintext, plaintextLen); + + /* Should start with the sentinel value. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &sentinel); + if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (sentinel != TLS13_COOKIE_SENTINEL)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + /* The cipher suite should be the same or there are some shenanigans. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &cipherSuite); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* The named group, if any. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &group); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + selectedGroup = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group); + + /* Was ECH received. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmp64); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + receivedEch = tmp64 == PR_TRUE; + *previousOfferedEch = receivedEch; + if (receivedEch) { + /* ECH config ID */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 1, &tmp64); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedEchData.configId = (PRUint8)tmp64; + + /* ECH Ciphersuite */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmp64); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedEchData.kdfId = (HpkeKdfId)tmp64; + + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &tmp64); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + parsedEchData.aeadId = (HpkeAeadId)tmp64; + + /* ECH accept_confirmation signal. */ + rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN, &greaseReadBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(parsedEchData.signal, greaseReadBuf.buf, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN); + + /* ECH HPKE context may be empty. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&reader, 2, &echHpkeBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + if (echData && echHpkeBuf.len) { + const SECItem hpkeItem = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(unsigned char, echHpkeBuf.buf), + echHpkeBuf.len }; + parsedEchData.hpkeCtx = PK11_HPKE_ImportContext(&hpkeItem, NULL); + if (!parsedEchData.hpkeCtx) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } + + /* Application token. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&reader, 2, &appTokenLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + sslReadBuffer appTokenReader = { 0 }; + rv = sslRead_Read(&reader, appTokenLen, &appTokenReader); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Assert(appTokenReader.len == appTokenLen); + + if (recoverState) { + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len == 0); + if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ss->xtnData.applicationToken, + appTokenLen) == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + PORT_Memcpy(ss->xtnData.applicationToken.data, appTokenReader.buf, appTokenLen); + ss->xtnData.applicationToken.len = appTokenLen; + + /* The remainder is the hash. */ + unsigned int hashLen = SSL_READER_REMAINING(&reader); + if (hashLen != tls13_GetHashSize(ss)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Now reinject the message. */ + SSL_ASSERT_HASHES_EMPTY(ss); + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ssl_hs_message_hash, 0, + SSL_READER_CURRENT(&reader), hashLen, + ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + /* And finally reinject the HRR. */ + rv = tls13_ConstructHelloRetryRequest(ss, cipherSuite, + selectedGroup, + cookie, cookieLen, + parsedEchData.signal, + &messageBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = ssl_HashHandshakeMessageInt(ss, ssl_hs_server_hello, 0, + SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&messageBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&messageBuf), + ssl3_UpdateHandshakeHashes); + sslBuffer_Clear(&messageBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + } + + if (previousCipherSuite) { + *previousCipherSuite = cipherSuite; + } + if (previousGroup) { + *previousGroup = selectedGroup; + } + if (echData) { + PORT_Memcpy(echData, &parsedEchData, sizeof(parsedEchData)); + } + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6780f4994d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hashstate.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13hashstate_h_ +#define __tls13hashstate_h_ + +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslt.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +SECStatus tls13_MakeHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss, const sslNamedGroupDef *selectedGroup, + const PRUint8 *appToken, unsigned int appTokenLen, + PRUint8 *buf, unsigned int *len, unsigned int maxlen); +SECStatus tls13_GetHrrCookieLength(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int *length); +SECStatus tls13_HandleHrrCookie(sslSocket *ss, + unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookieLen, + ssl3CipherSuite *previousCipherSuite, + const sslNamedGroupDef **previousGroup, + PRBool *previousOfferedEch, + sslEchCookieData *echData, + PRBool recoverState); +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed6cdd559f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * TLS 1.3 Protocol + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secitem.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslt.h" +#include "sslerr.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" + +/* This table contains the mapping between TLS hash identifiers and the + * PKCS#11 identifiers */ +static const struct { + SSLHashType hash; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE pkcs11Mech; + unsigned int hashSize; +} kTlsHkdfInfo[] = { + { ssl_hash_none, 0, 0 }, + { ssl_hash_md5, 0, 0 }, + { ssl_hash_sha1, 0, 0 }, + { ssl_hash_sha224, 0 }, + { ssl_hash_sha256, CKM_SHA256, 32 }, + { ssl_hash_sha384, CKM_SHA384, 48 }, + { ssl_hash_sha512, CKM_SHA512, 64 } +}; + +SECStatus +tls13_HkdfExtract(PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2, SSLHashType baseHash, + PK11SymKey **prkp) +{ + CK_HKDF_PARAMS params; + SECItem paramsi; + PK11SymKey *prk; + static const PRUint8 zeroKeyBuf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX]; + SECItem zeroKeyItem = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(PRUint8, zeroKeyBuf), kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize }; + PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL; + PK11SymKey *newIkm2 = NULL; + PK11SymKey *newIkm1 = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + + params.bExtract = CK_TRUE; + params.bExpand = CK_FALSE; + params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech; + params.pInfo = NULL; + params.ulInfoLen = 0UL; + params.pSalt = NULL; + params.ulSaltLen = 0UL; + params.hSaltKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + if (!ikm1) { + /* PKCS #11 v3.0 has and explict NULL value, which equates to + * a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC. */ + params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_NULL; + } else { + /* PKCS #11 v3.0 can take the salt as a key handle */ + params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(ikm1); + params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_KEY; + + /* if we have both keys, make sure they are in the same slot */ + if (ikm2) { + rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, + ikm2, ikm1, &newIkm2, &newIkm1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + SECItem *salt; + /* couldn't move the keys, try extracting the salt */ + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(ikm1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) + return rv; + salt = PK11_GetKeyData(ikm1); + if (!salt) + return SECFailure; + PORT_Assert(salt->len > 0); + /* Set up for Salt as Data instead of Salt as key */ + params.pSalt = salt->data; + params.ulSaltLen = salt->len; + params.ulSaltType = CKF_HKDF_SALT_DATA; + } + /* use the new keys */ + if (newIkm1) { + /* we've moved the key, get the handle for the new key */ + params.hSaltKey = PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(newIkm1); + /* we don't use ikm1 after this, so don't bother setting it */ + } + if (newIkm2) { + /* new ikm2 key, use the new key */ + ikm2 = newIkm2; + } + } + } + paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; + paramsi.len = sizeof(params); + + PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech); + PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hashSize); + PORT_Assert(kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].hash == baseHash); + + /* A zero ikm2 is a key of hash-length 0s. */ + if (!ikm2) { + /* if we have ikm1, put the zero key in the same slot */ + slot = ikm1 ? PK11_GetSlotFromKey(ikm1) : PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + return SECFailure; + } + + newIkm2 = PK11_ImportDataKey(slot, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, PK11_OriginUnwrap, + CKA_DERIVE, &zeroKeyItem, NULL); + if (!newIkm2) { + return SECFailure; + } + ikm2 = newIkm2; + } + PORT_Assert(ikm2); + + PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM1/Salt", params.pSalt, params.ulSaltLen)); + PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract: IKM2", ikm2)); + + prk = PK11_Derive(ikm2, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, ¶msi, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, + CKA_DERIVE, 0); + PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm2); + PK11_FreeSymKey(newIkm1); + if (slot) + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + if (!prk) { + return SECFailure; + } + + PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "HKDF Extract", prk)); + *prkp = prk; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE deriveMech, PK11SymKey *prk, + SSLHashType baseHash, + const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + CK_HKDF_PARAMS params; + SECItem paramsi = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + /* Size of info array needs to be big enough to hold the maximum Prefix, + * Label, plus HandshakeHash. If it's ever to small, the code will abort. + */ + PRUint8 info[256]; + sslBuffer infoBuf = SSL_BUFFER(info); + PK11SymKey *derived; + SECStatus rv; + const char *kLabelPrefixTls = "tls13 "; + const char *kLabelPrefixDtls = "dtls13"; + const unsigned int kLabelPrefixLen = + (variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? strlen(kLabelPrefixTls) : strlen(kLabelPrefixDtls); + const char *kLabelPrefix = + (variant == ssl_variant_stream) ? kLabelPrefixTls : kLabelPrefixDtls; + + PORT_Assert(prk); + PORT_Assert(keyp); + if ((handshakeHashLen > 255) || + (handshakeHash == NULL && handshakeHashLen > 0) || + (labelLen + kLabelPrefixLen > 255)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* + * [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 7.1: + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, HashValue, Length) = + * HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length) + * + * Where HkdfLabel is specified as: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; + * opaque label<9..255>; + * opaque hash_value<0..255>; + * }; + * + * Where: + * - HkdfLabel.length is Length + * - HkdfLabel.hash_value is HashValue. + * - HkdfLabel.label is "TLS 1.3, " + Label + * + */ + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&infoBuf, keySize, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&infoBuf, labelLen + kLabelPrefixLen, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&infoBuf, kLabelPrefix, kLabelPrefixLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_Append(&infoBuf, label, labelLen); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(&infoBuf, handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen, 1); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + params.bExtract = CK_FALSE; + params.bExpand = CK_TRUE; + params.prfHashMechanism = kTlsHkdfInfo[baseHash].pkcs11Mech; + params.pInfo = SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&infoBuf); + params.ulInfoLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&infoBuf); + paramsi.data = (unsigned char *)¶ms; + paramsi.len = sizeof(params); + derived = PK11_DeriveWithFlags(prk, deriveMech, + ¶msi, algorithm, + CKA_DERIVE, keySize, + CKF_SIGN | CKF_VERIFY); + if (!derived) { + return SECFailure; + } + + *keyp = derived; + +#ifdef TRACE + if (ssl_trace >= 50) { + /* Make sure the label is null terminated. */ + char labelStr[100]; + PORT_Memcpy(labelStr, label, labelLen); + labelStr[labelLen] = 0; + SSL_TRC(50, ("HKDF Expand: label='tls13 %s',requested length=%d", + labelStr, keySize)); + } + PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "PRK", prk)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Hash", handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen)); + PRINT_BUF(50, (NULL, "Info", SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&infoBuf), + SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&infoBuf))); + PRINT_KEY(50, (NULL, "Derived key", derived)); +#endif + + return SECSuccess; +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HkdfExpandLabel(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash, + const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp) +{ + return tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, prk, baseHash, + handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen, + label, labelLen, algorithm, keySize, + variant, keyp); +} + +SECStatus +tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash, + const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, unsigned char *output, + unsigned int outputLen) +{ + PK11SymKey *derived = NULL; + SECItem *rawkey; + SECStatus rv; + + /* the result is not really a key, it's a data object */ + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelGeneral(CKM_HKDF_DATA, prk, baseHash, + handshakeHash, handshakeHashLen, + label, labelLen, CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, outputLen, + variant, &derived); + if (rv != SECSuccess || !derived) { + goto abort; + } + + rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(derived); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto abort; + } + + rawkey = PK11_GetKeyData(derived); + if (!rawkey) { + goto abort; + } + + PORT_Assert(rawkey->len == outputLen); + memcpy(output, rawkey->data, outputLen); + PK11_FreeSymKey(derived); + + return SECSuccess; + +abort: + if (derived) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(derived); + } + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SYM_KEY_CONTEXT_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..00e5ff1dd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13hkdf.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13hkdf_h_ +#define __tls13hkdf_h_ + +#include "keyhi.h" +#include "sslt.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +SECStatus tls13_HkdfExtract( + PK11SymKey *ikm1, PK11SymKey *ikm2, SSLHashType baseHash, + PK11SymKey **prkp); +SECStatus tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw( + PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash, + const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, unsigned char *output, + unsigned int outputLen); +SECStatus tls13_HkdfExpandLabel( + PK11SymKey *prk, SSLHashType baseHash, + const PRUint8 *handshakeHash, unsigned int handshakeHashLen, + const char *label, unsigned int labelLen, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE algorithm, unsigned int keySize, + SSLProtocolVariant variant, PK11SymKey **keyp); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7343c5a6f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" + +SECStatus +SSLExp_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(PRFileDesc *fd, PK11SymKey *key, const PRUint8 *identity, + unsigned int identityLen, SSLHashType hash, + PRUint16 zeroRttSuite, PRUint32 maxEarlyData) +{ + + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSLExp_SetExternalPsk", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!key || !identity || !identityLen || identityLen > 0xFFFF || + (hash != ssl_hash_sha256 && hash != ssl_hash_sha384)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECItem label = { siBuffer, CONST_CAST(unsigned char, identity), identityLen }; + sslPsk *psk = tls13_MakePsk(PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key), ssl_psk_external, + hash, &label); + if (!psk) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return SECFailure; + } + psk->zeroRttSuite = zeroRttSuite; + psk->maxEarlyData = maxEarlyData; + SECStatus rv = SECFailure; + + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (ss->psk) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + tls13_DestroyPsk(psk); + } else { + ss->psk = psk; + rv = SECSuccess; + tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_AddExternalPsk(PRFileDesc *fd, PK11SymKey *key, const PRUint8 *identity, + unsigned int identityLen, SSLHashType hash) +{ + return SSLExp_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(fd, key, identity, identityLen, + hash, TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, 0); +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_RemoveExternalPsk(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *identity, unsigned int identityLen) +{ + if (!identity || !identityLen) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: bad socket in SSL_SetPSK", + SSL_GETPID(), fd)); + return SECFailure; + } + + SECItem removeIdentity = { siBuffer, + (unsigned char *)identity, + identityLen }; + + SECStatus rv; + ssl_Get1stHandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + + if (!ss->psk || SECITEM_CompareItem(&ss->psk->label, &removeIdentity) != SECEqual) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_KEY); + rv = SECFailure; + } else { + tls13_DestroyPsk(ss->psk); + ss->psk = NULL; + tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.psks); + rv = SECSuccess; + } + + ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss); + ssl_Release1stHandshakeLock(ss); + + return rv; +} + +sslPsk * +tls13_CopyPsk(sslPsk *opsk) +{ + if (!opsk || !opsk->key) { + return NULL; + } + + sslPsk *psk = PORT_ZNew(sslPsk); + if (!psk) { + return NULL; + } + + SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &psk->label, &opsk->label); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_Free(psk); + return NULL; + } + /* We should only have the initial key. Binder keys + * are derived during the handshake. */ + PORT_Assert(opsk->type == ssl_psk_external); + PORT_Assert(opsk->key); + PORT_Assert(!opsk->binderKey); + psk->hash = opsk->hash; + psk->type = opsk->type; + psk->key = opsk->key ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(opsk->key) : NULL; + psk->binderKey = opsk->binderKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(opsk->binderKey) : NULL; + return psk; +} + +void +tls13_DestroyPsk(sslPsk *psk) +{ + if (!psk) { + return; + } + if (psk->key) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(psk->key); + psk->key = NULL; + } + if (psk->binderKey) { + PK11_FreeSymKey(psk->binderKey); + psk->binderKey = NULL; + } + SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&psk->label, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(psk, sizeof(*psk)); +} + +void +tls13_DestroyPskList(PRCList *list) +{ + PRCList *cur_p; + while (!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(list)) { + cur_p = PR_LIST_TAIL(list); + PR_REMOVE_LINK(cur_p); + tls13_DestroyPsk((sslPsk *)cur_p); + } +} + +sslPsk * +tls13_MakePsk(PK11SymKey *key, SSLPskType pskType, SSLHashType hashType, const SECItem *label) +{ + sslPsk *psk = PORT_ZNew(sslPsk); + if (!psk) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + return NULL; + } + psk->type = pskType; + psk->hash = hashType; + psk->key = key; + + /* Label is NULL in the resumption case. */ + if (label) { + PORT_Assert(psk->type != ssl_psk_resume); + SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &psk->label, label); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + tls13_DestroyPsk(psk); + return NULL; + } + } + + return psk; +} + +/* Destroy any existing PSKs in |list| then copy + * in the configured |ss->psk|, if any.*/ +SECStatus +tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(sslSocket *ss, PRCList *list) +{ + tls13_DestroyPskList(list); + PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk); + ss->xtnData.selectedPsk = NULL; + if (ss->psk) { + PORT_Assert(ss->psk->type == ssl_psk_external); + PORT_Assert(ss->psk->key); + PORT_Assert(!ss->psk->binderKey); + + sslPsk *epsk = tls13_MakePsk(PK11_ReferenceSymKey(ss->psk->key), + ss->psk->type, ss->psk->hash, &ss->psk->label); + if (!epsk) { + return SECFailure; + } + epsk->zeroRttSuite = ss->psk->zeroRttSuite; + epsk->maxEarlyData = ss->psk->maxEarlyData; + PR_APPEND_LINK(&epsk->link, list); + } + return SECSuccess; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..73013fb9bc --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13psk.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13psk_h_ +#define __tls13psk_h_ + +/* + * Internally, we have track sslPsk pointers in three locations: + * 1) An external PSK can be configured to the socket, in which case ss->psk will hold an owned reference. + * For now, this only holds one external PSK. The value will persist across handshake restarts. + * 2) When a handshake begins, the ss->psk value is deep-copied into ss->ssl3.hs.psks, which may also hold + * a resumption PSK. This is essentially a priority-sorted list (where a resumption PSK has higher + * priority than external), and we currently only send one PskIdentity and binder. + * 3) During negotiation, ss->xtnData.selectedPsk will either be NULL or it will hold a non-owning refernce + * to the PSK that has been (or is being) negotiated. + */ + +/* Note: When holding a resumption PSK: + * 1. |hash| comes from the original connection. + * 2. |label| is ignored: The identity sent in the pre_shared_key_xtn + * comes from ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket. + */ +struct sslPskStr { + PRCList link; + PK11SymKey *key; /* A raw PSK. */ + PK11SymKey *binderKey; /* The binder key derived from |key|. |key| is NULL after derivation. */ + SSLPskType type; /* none, resumption, or external. */ + SECItem label; /* Label (identity) for an external PSK. */ + SSLHashType hash; /* A hash algorithm associated with a PSK. */ + ssl3CipherSuite zeroRttSuite; /* For EPSKs, an explicitly-configured ciphersuite for 0-Rtt. */ + PRUint32 maxEarlyData; /* For EPSKs, a limit on early data. Must be > 0 for 0-Rtt. */ +}; + +SECStatus SSLExp_AddExternalPsk(PRFileDesc *fd, PK11SymKey *psk, const PRUint8 *identity, + unsigned int identitylen, SSLHashType hash); + +SECStatus SSLExp_AddExternalPsk0Rtt(PRFileDesc *fd, PK11SymKey *psk, const PRUint8 *identity, + unsigned int identitylen, SSLHashType hash, + PRUint16 zeroRttSuite, PRUint32 maxEarlyData); + +SECStatus SSLExp_RemoveExternalPsk(PRFileDesc *fd, const PRUint8 *identity, unsigned int identitylen); + +sslPsk *tls13_CopyPsk(sslPsk *opsk); + +void tls13_DestroyPsk(sslPsk *psk); + +void tls13_DestroyPskList(PRCList *list); + +sslPsk *tls13_MakePsk(PK11SymKey *key, SSLPskType pskType, SSLHashType hashType, const SECItem *label); + +SECStatus tls13_ResetHandshakePsks(sslSocket *ss, PRCList *list); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13replay.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13replay.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7e00785e08 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13replay.c @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * Anti-replay measures for TLS 1.3. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" /* for NSS_RegisterShutdown */ +#include "nssilock.h" /* for PZMonitor */ +#include "pk11pub.h" +#include "prmon.h" +#include "prtime.h" +#include "secerr.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslbloom.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13psk.h" + +struct SSLAntiReplayContextStr { + /* The number of outstanding references to this context. */ + PRInt32 refCount; + /* Used to serialize access. */ + PZMonitor *lock; + /* The filters, use of which alternates. */ + sslBloomFilter filters[2]; + /* Which of the two filters is active (0 or 1). */ + PRUint8 current; + /* The time that we will next update. */ + PRTime nextUpdate; + /* The width of the window; i.e., the period of updates. */ + PRTime window; + /* This key ensures that the bloom filter index is unpredictable. */ + PK11SymKey *key; +}; + +void +tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx) +{ + if (!ctx) { + return; + } + if (PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&ctx->refCount) >= 1) { + return; + } + + if (ctx->lock) { + PZ_DestroyMonitor(ctx->lock); + ctx->lock = NULL; + } + PK11_FreeSymKey(ctx->key); + ctx->key = NULL; + sslBloom_Destroy(&ctx->filters[0]); + sslBloom_Destroy(&ctx->filters[1]); + PORT_Free(ctx); +} + +/* Clear the current state and free any resources we allocated. */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx) +{ + tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ctx); + return SECSuccess; +} + +SSLAntiReplayContext * +tls13_RefAntiReplayContext(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx) +{ + PORT_Assert(ctx); + PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&ctx->refCount); + return ctx; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_AntiReplayKeyGen(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx) +{ + PK11SlotInfo *slot; + + PORT_Assert(ctx); + + slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(CKM_HKDF_DERIVE, NULL); + if (!slot) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + return SECFailure; + } + + ctx->key = PK11_KeyGen(slot, CKM_HKDF_KEY_GEN, NULL, 32, NULL); + if (!ctx->key) { + goto loser; + } + + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Set a limit on the combination of number of hashes and bits in each hash. */ +#define SSL_MAX_BLOOM_FILTER_SIZE 64 + +/* + * The context created by this function can be called concurrently on multiple + * threads if the server is multi-threaded. A monitor is used to ensure that + * only one thread can access the structures that change over time, but no such + * guarantee is provided for configuration data. + */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_CreateAntiReplayContext(PRTime now, PRTime window, unsigned int k, + unsigned int bits, SSLAntiReplayContext **pctx) +{ + SECStatus rv; + + if (window <= 0 || k == 0 || bits == 0 || pctx == NULL) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + if ((k * (bits + 7) / 8) > SSL_MAX_BLOOM_FILTER_SIZE) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx = PORT_ZNew(SSLAntiReplayContext); + if (!ctx) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + + ctx->refCount = 1; + ctx->lock = PZ_NewMonitor(nssILockSSL); + if (!ctx->lock) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + rv = tls13_AntiReplayKeyGen(ctx); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + rv = sslBloom_Init(&ctx->filters[0], k, bits); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + rv = sslBloom_Init(&ctx->filters[1], k, bits); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + /* When starting out, ensure that 0-RTT is not accepted until the window is + * updated. A ClientHello might have been accepted prior to a restart. */ + sslBloom_Fill(&ctx->filters[1]); + + ctx->current = 0; + ctx->nextUpdate = now + window; + ctx->window = window; + *pctx = ctx; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ctx); + return SECFailure; +} + +SECStatus +SSLExp_SetAntiReplayContext(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx) +{ + sslSocket *ss = ssl_FindSocket(fd); + if (!ss) { + return SECFailure; /* Code already set. */ + } + tls13_ReleaseAntiReplayContext(ss->antiReplay); + if (ctx != NULL) { + ss->antiReplay = tls13_RefAntiReplayContext(ctx); + } else { + ss->antiReplay = NULL; + } + return SECSuccess; +} + +static void +tls13_AntiReplayUpdate(SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx, PRTime now) +{ + PR_ASSERT_CURRENT_THREAD_IN_MONITOR(ctx->lock); + if (now >= ctx->nextUpdate) { + ctx->current ^= 1; + ctx->nextUpdate = now + ctx->window; + sslBloom_Zero(ctx->filters + ctx->current); + } +} + +PRBool +tls13_InWindow(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PRInt32 timeDelta; + + /* Calculate the difference between the client's view of the age of the + * ticket (in |ss->xtnData.ticketAge|) and the server's view, which we now + * calculate. The result should be close to zero. timeDelta is signed to + * make the comparisons below easier. */ + timeDelta = ss->xtnData.ticketAge - + ((ssl_Time(ss) - sid->creationTime) / PR_USEC_PER_MSEC); + + /* Only allow the time delta to be at most half of our window. This is + * symmetrical, though it doesn't need to be; this assumes that clock errors + * on server and client will tend to cancel each other out. + * + * There are two anti-replay filters that roll over each window. In the + * worst case, immediately after a rollover of the filters, we only have a + * single window worth of recorded 0-RTT attempts. Thus, the period in + * which we can accept 0-RTT is at most one window wide. This uses PR_ABS() + * and half the window so that the first attempt can be up to half a window + * early and then replays will be caught until the attempts are half a + * window late. + * + * For example, a 0-RTT attempt arrives early, but near the end of window 1. + * The attempt is then recorded in window 1. Rollover to window 2 could + * occur immediately afterwards. Window 1 is still checked for new 0-RTT + * attempts for the remainder of window 2. Therefore, attempts to replay + * are detected because the value is recorded in window 1. When rollover + * occurs again, window 1 is erased and window 3 instated. If we allowed an + * attempt to be late by more than half a window, then this check would not + * prevent the same 0-RTT attempt from being accepted during window 1 and + * later window 3. + */ + PRInt32 allowance = ss->antiReplay->window / (PR_USEC_PER_MSEC * 2); + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: replay check time delta=%d, allow=%d", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, timeDelta, allowance)); + return PR_ABS(timeDelta) < allowance; +} + +/* Checks for a duplicate in the two filters we have. Performs maintenance on + * the filters as a side-effect. This only detects a probable replay, it's + * possible that this will return true when the 0-RTT attempt is not genuinely a + * replay. In that case, we reject 0-RTT unnecessarily, but that's OK because + * no client expects 0-RTT to work every time. */ +PRBool +tls13_IsReplay(const sslSocket *ss, const sslSessionID *sid) +{ + PRBool replay; + unsigned int size; + PRUint8 index; + SECStatus rv; + static const char *label = "anti-replay"; + PRUint8 buf[SSL_MAX_BLOOM_FILTER_SIZE]; + SSLAntiReplayContext *ctx = ss->antiReplay; + + /* If SSL_SetAntiReplayContext hasn't been called with a valid context, then + * treat all attempts at 0-RTT as a replay. */ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + if (!sid) { + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.selectedPsk->type == ssl_psk_external); + } else if (!tls13_InWindow(ss, sid)) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + size = ctx->filters[0].k * (ctx->filters[0].bits + 7) / 8; + PORT_Assert(size <= SSL_MAX_BLOOM_FILTER_SIZE); + rv = tls13_HkdfExpandLabelRaw(ctx->key, ssl_hash_sha256, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.data, + ss->xtnData.pskBinder.len, + label, strlen(label), + ss->protocolVariant, buf, size); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return PR_TRUE; + } + + PZ_EnterMonitor(ctx->lock); + tls13_AntiReplayUpdate(ctx, ssl_Time(ss)); + + index = ctx->current; + replay = sslBloom_Add(&ctx->filters[index], buf); + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: replay check current window: %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, replay ? "replay" : "ok")); + if (!replay) { + replay = sslBloom_Check(&ctx->filters[index ^ 1], buf); + SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: replay check previous window: %s", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, replay ? "replay" : "ok")); + } + + PZ_ExitMonitor(ctx->lock); + return replay; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ecc0a5816 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.c @@ -0,0 +1,801 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nss.h" +#include "pk11func.h" +#include "secder.h" +#include "sechash.h" +#include "ssl.h" +#include "sslproto.h" +#include "sslimpl.h" +#include "ssl3exthandle.h" +#include "tls13exthandle.h" +#include "tls13hkdf.h" +#include "tls13subcerts.h" + +/* Parses the delegated credential (DC) from the raw extension |b| of length + * |length|. Memory for the DC is allocated and set to |*dcp|. + * + * It's the caller's responsibility to invoke |tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential| + * when this data is no longer needed. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(PRUint8 *b, PRUint32 length, + sslDelegatedCredential **dcp) +{ + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL; + SECStatus rv; + PRUint64 n; + sslReadBuffer tmp; + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(b, length); + + PORT_Assert(!*dcp); + + dc = PORT_ZNew(sslDelegatedCredential); + if (!dc) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto loser; + } + + /* Read the valid_time field of DelegatedCredential.cred. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 4, &n); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + dc->validTime = n; + + /* Read the expected_cert_verify_algorithm field of + * DelegatedCredential.cred. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &n); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg = n; + + /* Read the ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo field of DelegatedCredential.cred. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&rdr, 3, &tmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &dc->derSpki, tmp.buf, tmp.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Parse the DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo. */ + dc->spki = SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&dc->derSpki); + if (!dc->spki) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Read the algorithm field of the DelegatedCredential. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &n); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + dc->alg = n; + + /* Read the signature field of the DelegatedCredential. */ + rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&rdr, 2, &tmp); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &dc->signature, tmp.buf, tmp.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* There should be nothing left to read. */ + if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr) > 0) { + goto loser; + } + + *dcp = dc; + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + *dcp = NULL; + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Frees |dc| from the heap. */ +void +tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + if (!dc) { + return; + } + + SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(dc->spki); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&dc->derSpki, PR_FALSE); + SECITEM_FreeItem(&dc->signature, PR_FALSE); + PORT_ZFree(dc, sizeof(sslDelegatedCredential)); +} + +/* Sets |*certVerifyAlg| to the expected_cert_verify_algorithm field from the + * serialized DC |in|. Returns SECSuccess upon success; SECFailure indicates a + * decoding failure or the input wasn't long enough. + */ +static SECStatus +tls13_GetExpectedCertVerifyAlg(SECItem in, SSLSignatureScheme *certVerifyAlg) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRUint64 n; + sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(in.data, in.len); + + if (in.len < 6) { /* Buffer too short to contain the first two params. */ + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 4, &n); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&rdr, 2, &n); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + *certVerifyAlg = n; + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Returns PR_TRUE if the host is verifying the handshake with a DC. */ +PRBool +tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + /* We currently do not support client-delegated credentials. */ + if (ss->sec.isServer || + !ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials || + !ss->xtnData.peerDelegCred) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Returns PR_TRUE if the host is signing the handshake with a DC. */ +PRBool +tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(const sslSocket *ss) +{ + if (!ss->sec.isServer || + !ss->xtnData.sendingDelegCredToPeer || + !ss->xtnData.peerRequestedDelegCred) { + return PR_FALSE; + } + + return PR_TRUE; +} + +/* Commits to authenticating with a DC if all of the following conditions hold: + * - the negotiated protocol is TLS 1.3 or newer; + * - the selected certificate has a DC configured; + * - the peer has indicated support for this extension; + * - the peer has indicated support for the DC signature scheme; and + * - the host supports the DC signature scheme. + * + * It's the caller's responsibility to ensure that the version has been + * negotiated and the certificate has been selected. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_MaybeSetDelegatedCredential(sslSocket *ss) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRBool doesRsaPss; + SECKEYPrivateKey *priv; + SSLSignatureScheme scheme; + + /* Assert that the host is the server (we do not currently support + * client-delegated credentials), the certificate has been + * chosen, TLS 1.3 or higher has been negotiated, and that the set of + * signature schemes supported by the client is known. + */ + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); + PORT_Assert(ss->sec.serverCert); + PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3); + PORT_Assert(ss->xtnData.peerRequestedDelegCred == !!ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemes); + + /* Check that the peer has indicated support and that a DC has been + * configured for the selected certificate. + */ + if (!ss->xtnData.peerRequestedDelegCred || + !ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemes || + !ss->sec.serverCert->delegCred.len || + !ss->sec.serverCert->delegCredKeyPair) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Check that the host and peer both support the signing algorithm used with + * the DC. + */ + rv = tls13_GetExpectedCertVerifyAlg(ss->sec.serverCert->delegCred, + &scheme); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + priv = ss->sec.serverCert->delegCredKeyPair->privKey; + rv = ssl_PrivateKeySupportsRsaPss(priv, NULL, NULL, &doesRsaPss); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + if (!ssl_SignatureSchemeEnabled(ss, scheme) || + !ssl_CanUseSignatureScheme(scheme, + ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemes, + ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemes, + PR_FALSE /* requireSha1 */, + doesRsaPss)) { + return SECSuccess; + } + + /* Commit to sending a DC and set the handshake signature scheme to the + * indicated algorithm. + */ + ss->xtnData.sendingDelegCredToPeer = PR_TRUE; + ss->ssl3.hs.signatureScheme = scheme; + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Serializes the DC up to the signature. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_AppendCredentialParams(sslBuffer *buf, sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + SECStatus rv; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, dc->validTime, 4); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; /* Error set by caller. */ + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, dc->derSpki.data, dc->derSpki.len, 3); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, dc->alg, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Serializes the DC signature. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_AppendCredentialSignature(sslBuffer *buf, sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + SECStatus rv; + rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, dc->signature.data, + dc->signature.len, 2); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Hashes the message used to sign/verify the DC. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_HashCredentialSignatureMessage(SSL3Hashes *hash, + SSLSignatureScheme scheme, + const CERTCertificate *cert, + const sslBuffer *dcBuf) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PK11Context *ctx = NULL; + unsigned int hashLen; + + /* Set up hash context. */ + hash->hashAlg = ssl_SignatureSchemeToHashType(scheme); + ctx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(hash->hashAlg)); + if (!ctx) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto loser; + } + + static const PRUint8 kCtxStrPadding[64] = { + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, + 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20, 0x20 + }; + + static const PRUint8 kCtxStr[] = "TLS, server delegated credentials"; + + /* Hash the message signed by the peer. */ + rv = SECSuccess; + rv |= PK11_DigestBegin(ctx); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, kCtxStrPadding, sizeof kCtxStrPadding); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, kCtxStr, 1 /* 0-byte */ + strlen((const char *)kCtxStr)); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len); + rv |= PK11_DigestOp(ctx, dcBuf->buf, dcBuf->len); + rv |= PK11_DigestFinal(ctx, hash->u.raw, &hashLen, sizeof hash->u.raw); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + hash->len = hashLen; + if (ctx) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + } + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + if (ctx) { + PK11_DestroyContext(ctx, PR_TRUE); + } + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Verifies the DC signature. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_VerifyCredentialSignature(sslSocket *ss, sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; + SSL3Hashes hash; + sslBuffer dcBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = NULL; + + /* Serialize the DC parameters. */ + rv = tls13_AppendCredentialParams(&dcBuf, dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Error set by caller. */ + } + + /* Hash the message that was signed by the delegator. */ + rv = tls13_HashCredentialSignatureMessage(&hash, dc->alg, cert, &dcBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (pubKey == NULL) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY_FAILURE, internal_error); + goto loser; + } + + /* Verify the signature of the message. */ + rv = ssl_VerifySignedHashesWithPubKey(ss, pubKey, dc->alg, + &hash, &dc->signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_BAD_SIGNATURE, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + SECOidTag spkiAlg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(dc->spki->algorithm)); + if (spkiAlg == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, illegal_parameter); + goto loser; + } + + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dcBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dcBuf); + return SECFailure; +} + +/* Checks that the peer's end-entity certificate has the correct key usage. */ +static SECStatus +tls13_CheckCertDelegationUsage(sslSocket *ss) +{ + int i; + PRBool found; + CERTCertExtension *ext; + SECItem delegUsageOid = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; + const CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + + /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.44363.44, as defined in draft-ietf-tls-subcerts. */ + static unsigned char kDelegationUsageOid[] = { + 0x2b, + 0x06, + 0x01, + 0x04, + 0x01, + 0x82, + 0xda, + 0x4b, + 0x2c + }; + + delegUsageOid.data = kDelegationUsageOid; + delegUsageOid.len = sizeof kDelegationUsageOid; + + /* The certificate must have the delegationUsage extension that authorizes + * it to negotiate delegated credentials. + */ + found = PR_FALSE; + for (i = 0; cert->extensions[i] != NULL; i++) { + ext = cert->extensions[i]; + if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&ext->id, &delegUsageOid) == SECEqual) { + found = PR_TRUE; + break; + } + } + + /* The certificate must also have the digitalSignature keyUsage set. */ + if (!found || + !cert->keyUsagePresent || + !(cert->keyUsage & KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_INVALID_KEY_USAGE, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +static SECStatus +tls13_CheckCredentialExpiration(sslSocket *ss, sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + SECStatus rv; + CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + /* 7 days in microseconds */ + static const PRTime kMaxDcValidity = ((PRTime)7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + PRTime start, now, end; /* microseconds */ + + rv = DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&start, &cert->validity.notBefore); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + end = start + ((PRTime)dc->validTime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC); + now = ssl_Time(ss); + if (now > end || end < 0) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_EXPIRED, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + /* Not more than 7 days remaining in the validity period. */ + if (end - now > kMaxDcValidity) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_DC_INAPPROPRIATE_VALIDITY_PERIOD, illegal_parameter); + return SECFailure; + } + + return SECSuccess; +} + +/* Returns SECSucces if |dc| is a DC for the current handshake; otherwise it + * returns SECFailure. A valid DC meets three requirements: (1) the signature + * was produced by the peer's end-entity certificate, (2) the end-entity + * certificate must have the correct key usage, and (3) the DC must not be + * expired and its remaining TTL must be <= the maximum validity period (fixed + * as 7 days). + * + * This function calls FATAL_ERROR() when an error occurs. + */ +SECStatus +tls13_VerifyDelegatedCredential(sslSocket *ss, + sslDelegatedCredential *dc) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PRTime start; + PRExplodedTime end; + CERTCertificate *cert = ss->sec.peerCert; + char endStr[256]; + + rv = DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&start, &cert->validity.notBefore); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + FATAL_ERROR(ss, PORT_GetError(), internal_error); + return SECFailure; + } + + PR_ExplodeTime(start + (dc->validTime * PR_USEC_PER_SEC), + PR_GMTParameters, &end); + if (PR_FormatTime(endStr, sizeof(endStr), "%a %b %d %H:%M:%S %Y", &end)) { + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Received delegated credential (expires %s)", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, endStr)); + } else { + SSL_TRC(20, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: Received delegated credential", + SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); + } + + rv = SECSuccess; + rv |= tls13_VerifyCredentialSignature(ss, dc); + rv |= tls13_CheckCertDelegationUsage(ss); + rv |= tls13_CheckCredentialExpiration(ss, dc); + return rv; +} + +static CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo * +tls13_MakePssSpki(const SECKEYPublicKey *pub, SECOidTag hashOid) +{ + SECStatus rv; + PLArenaPool *arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); + if (!arena) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo); + if (!spki) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + spki->arena = arena; + + SECKEYRSAPSSParams params = { 0 }; + params.hashAlg = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECAlgorithmID); + rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, params.hashAlg, hashOid, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + /* Set the mask hash algorithm too, which is an argument to + * a SEC_OID_PKCS1_MGF1 value. */ + SECAlgorithmID maskHashAlg; + memset(&maskHashAlg, 0, sizeof(maskHashAlg)); + rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &maskHashAlg, hashOid, NULL); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + SECItem *maskHashAlgItem = + SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &maskHashAlg, + SEC_ASN1_GET(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)); + if (!maskHashAlgItem) { + /* Probably OOM, but not certain. */ + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + + params.maskAlg = PORT_ArenaZNew(arena, SECAlgorithmID); + rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, params.maskAlg, SEC_OID_PKCS1_MGF1, + maskHashAlgItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + /* Always include saltLength: all hashes are larger than 20. */ + unsigned int saltLength = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashOid); + PORT_Assert(saltLength > 20); + if (!SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, ¶ms.saltLength, saltLength)) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + /* Omit the trailerField always. */ + + SECItem *algorithmItem = + SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, ¶ms, + SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_RSAPSSParamsTemplate)); + if (!algorithmItem) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &spki->algorithm, + SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE, algorithmItem); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; /* Code already set. */ + } + + SECItem *pubItem = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &spki->subjectPublicKey, pub, + SEC_ASN1_GET(SECKEY_RSAPublicKeyTemplate)); + if (!pubItem) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); + goto loser; + } + spki->subjectPublicKey.len *= 8; /* Key length is in bits. */ + return spki; + +loser: + PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); + return NULL; +} + +static CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo * +tls13_MakeDcSpki(const SECKEYPublicKey *dcPub, SSLSignatureScheme dcCertVerifyAlg) +{ + switch (SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(dcPub)) { + case rsaKey: { + SECOidTag hashOid; + switch (dcCertVerifyAlg) { + /* Note: RSAE schemes are NOT permitted within DC SPKIs. However, + * support for their issuance remains so as to enable negative + * testing of client behavior. */ + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384: + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512: + return SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(dcPub); + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha256: + hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA256; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha384: + hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA384; + break; + case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_sha512: + hashOid = SEC_OID_SHA512; + break; + + default: + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return NULL; + } + return tls13_MakePssSpki(dcPub, hashOid); + } + + case ecKey: { + const sslNamedGroupDef *group = ssl_ECPubKey2NamedGroup(dcPub); + if (!group) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return NULL; + } + SSLSignatureScheme keyScheme; + switch (group->name) { + case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1: + keyScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256; + break; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1: + keyScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384; + break; + case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1: + keyScheme = ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512; + break; + default: + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return NULL; + } + if (keyScheme != dcCertVerifyAlg) { + PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); + return NULL; + } + return SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(dcPub); + } + + default: + break; + } + + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); + return NULL; +} + +/* Returns a serialized DC with the given parameters. + * + * Note that this function is meant primarily for testing. In particular, it + * DOES NOT verify any of the following: + * - |certPriv| is the private key corresponding to |cert|; + * - that |checkCertKeyUsage(cert) == SECSuccess|; + * - |dcValidFor| is less than 7 days (the maximum permitted by the spec); or + * - validTime doesn't overflow a PRUint32. + * + * These conditions are things we want to test for, which is why we allow them + * here. A real API for creating DCs would want to explicitly check ALL of these + * conditions are met. + */ +SECStatus +SSLExp_DelegateCredential(const CERTCertificate *cert, + const SECKEYPrivateKey *certPriv, + const SECKEYPublicKey *dcPub, + SSLSignatureScheme dcCertVerifyAlg, + PRUint32 dcValidFor, + PRTime now, + SECItem *out) +{ + SECStatus rv; + SSL3Hashes hash; + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki = NULL; + SECKEYPrivateKey *tmpPriv = NULL; + sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL; + sslBuffer dcBuf = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY; + + if (!cert || !certPriv || !dcPub || !out) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS); + return SECFailure; + } + + dc = PORT_ZNew(sslDelegatedCredential); + if (!dc) { + PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); + goto loser; + } + + /* Serialize the DC parameters. */ + PRTime start; + rv = DER_DecodeTimeChoice(&start, &cert->validity.notBefore); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + dc->validTime = ((now - start) / PR_USEC_PER_SEC) + dcValidFor; + + /* Building the SPKI also validates |dcCertVerifyAlg|. */ + spki = tls13_MakeDcSpki(dcPub, dcCertVerifyAlg); + if (!spki) { + goto loser; + } + dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg = dcCertVerifyAlg; + + SECItem *spkiDer = + SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL /*arena*/, &dc->derSpki, spki, + SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate)); + if (!spkiDer) { + goto loser; + } + + rv = ssl_SignatureSchemeFromSpki(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo, + PR_TRUE /* isTls13 */, &dc->alg); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + if (dc->alg == ssl_sig_none) { + SECOidTag spkiOid = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm); + /* If the Cert SPKI contained an AlgorithmIdentifier of "rsaEncryption", set a + * default rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 scheme. NOTE: RSAE SPKIs are not permitted within + * "real" Delegated Credentials. However, since this function is primarily used for + * testing, we retain this support in order to verify that these DCs are rejected + * by tls13_VerifyDelegatedCredential. */ + if (spkiOid == SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) { + SSLSignatureScheme scheme = ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256; + if (ssl_SignatureSchemeValid(scheme, spkiOid, PR_TRUE /* isTls13 */)) { + dc->alg = scheme; + } + } + } + PORT_Assert(dc->alg != ssl_sig_none); + + rv = tls13_AppendCredentialParams(&dcBuf, dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Hash signature message. */ + rv = tls13_HashCredentialSignatureMessage(&hash, dc->alg, cert, &dcBuf); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Sign the hash with the delegation key. + * + * The PK11 API discards const qualifiers, so we have to make a copy of + * |certPriv| and pass the copy to |ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey|. + */ + tmpPriv = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(certPriv); + rv = ssl3_SignHashesWithPrivKey(&hash, tmpPriv, dc->alg, + PR_TRUE /* isTls */, &dc->signature); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Serialize the DC signature. */ + rv = tls13_AppendCredentialSignature(&dcBuf, dc); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + /* Copy the serialized DC to |out|. */ + rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, out, dcBuf.buf, dcBuf.len); + if (rv != SECSuccess) { + goto loser; + } + + PRINT_BUF(20, (NULL, "delegated credential", dcBuf.buf, dcBuf.len)); + + SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(tmpPriv); + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dcBuf); + return SECSuccess; + +loser: + SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); + SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(tmpPriv); + tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc); + sslBuffer_Clear(&dcBuf); + return SECFailure; +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce9996bb80 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13subcerts.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ +/* + * This file is PRIVATE to SSL. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#ifndef __tls13subcerts_h_ +#define __tls13subcerts_h_ + +struct sslDelegatedCredentialStr { + /* The number of seconds for which the delegated credential (DC) is valid + * following the notBefore parameter of the delegation certificate. + */ + PRUint32 validTime; + + /* The signature algorithm of the DC public key. This expected to the same + * as CertificateVerify.scheme. + */ + SSLSignatureScheme expectedCertVerifyAlg; + + /* The DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo, the DC public key. + */ + SECItem derSpki; + + /* The decoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo parsed from |derSpki|. */ + CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki; + + /* The signature algorithm used to verify the DC signature. */ + SSLSignatureScheme alg; + + /* The DC signature. */ + SECItem signature; +}; + +SECStatus tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(PRUint8 *b, + PRUint32 length, + sslDelegatedCredential **dcp); +void tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(sslDelegatedCredential *dc); + +PRBool tls13_IsVerifyingWithDelegatedCredential(const sslSocket *ss); +PRBool tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(const sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_MaybeSetDelegatedCredential(sslSocket *ss); +SECStatus tls13_VerifyDelegatedCredential(sslSocket *ss, + sslDelegatedCredential *dc); + +SECStatus SSLExp_DelegateCredential(const CERTCertificate *cert, + const SECKEYPrivateKey *certPriv, + const SECKEYPublicKey *dcPub, + SSLSignatureScheme dcCertVerifyAlg, + PRUint32 dcValidFor, + PRTime now, + SECItem *out); + +#endif diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6cd450f699 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.c @@ -0,0 +1,837 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * this code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#if 0 +#include "primpl.h" +#else +#define _PR_POLL_AVAILABLE 1 +#include "prerror.h" +#endif + +#if defined(__bsdi__) || defined(NTO) || defined(DARWIN) +#undef _PR_POLL_AVAILABLE +#endif + +#if defined(_PR_POLL_AVAILABLE) +#include <poll.h> +#endif +#include <errno.h> + +/* forward declarations. */ +void nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(int err); + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_opendir_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_closedir_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_readdir_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { + case ENOENT: + prError = PR_NO_MORE_FILES_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EOVERFLOW + case EOVERFLOW: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_unlink_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EPERM: + prError = PR_IS_DIRECTORY_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_stat_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_fstat_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_rename_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EEXIST: + prError = PR_DIRECTORY_NOT_EMPTY_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_access_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_mkdir_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_rmdir_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { + case EEXIST: + prError = PR_DIRECTORY_NOT_EMPTY_ERROR; + break; + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_DIRECTORY_NOT_EMPTY_ERROR; + break; + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_read_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_write_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_lseek_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_fsync_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_close_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_socket_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_socketavailable_error(int err) +{ + PR_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_recv_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_recvfrom_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_send_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_sendto_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_writev_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_accept_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ENODEV: + prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_connect_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EACCES: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; +#if defined(UNIXWARE) || defined(SNI) || defined(NEC) + /* + * On some platforms, if we connect to a port on the local host + * (the loopback address) that no process is listening on, we get + * EIO instead of ECONNREFUSED. + */ + case EIO: + prError = PR_CONNECT_REFUSED_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ELOOP: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENOENT: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_bind_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_SOCKET_ADDRESS_IS_BOUND_ERROR; + break; + /* + * UNIX domain sockets are not supported in NSPR + */ + case EIO: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case EISDIR: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ELOOP: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENOENT: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENOTDIR: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case EROFS: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_listen_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_shutdown_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_socketpair_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_getsockname_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_getpeername_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_getsockopt_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR; + break; + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_setsockopt_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR; + break; + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_open_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EAGAIN: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case EBUSY: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ENODEV: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_mmap_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EAGAIN: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case EMFILE: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case ENODEV: + prError = PR_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_gethostname_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_select_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} + +#ifdef _PR_POLL_AVAILABLE +void +nss_MD_unix_map_poll_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { + case EAGAIN: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_poll_revents_error(int err) +{ + if (err & POLLNVAL) + PR_SetError(PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR, EBADF); + else if (err & POLLHUP) + PR_SetError(PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR, EPIPE); + else if (err & POLLERR) + PR_SetError(PR_IO_ERROR, EIO); + else + PR_SetError(PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR, err); +} +#endif /* _PR_POLL_AVAILABLE */ + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_flock_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; + case EWOULDBLOCK: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_lockf_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EACCES: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; + break; + case EDEADLK: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +#ifdef HPUX11 +void +nss_MD_hpux_map_sendfile_error(int err) +{ + nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(err); +} +#endif /* HPUX11 */ + +void +nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(int err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case EACCES: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case EADDRINUSE: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_IN_USE_ERROR; + break; + case EADDRNOTAVAIL: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_AVAILABLE_ERROR; + break; + case EAFNOSUPPORT: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case EAGAIN: + prError = PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR; + break; +/* + * On QNX and Neutrino, EALREADY is defined as EBUSY. + */ +#if EALREADY != EBUSY + case EALREADY: + prError = PR_ALREADY_INITIATED_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EBADF: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EBADMSG + case EBADMSG: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EBUSY: + prError = PR_FILESYSTEM_MOUNTED_ERROR; + break; + case ECONNREFUSED: + prError = PR_CONNECT_REFUSED_ERROR; + break; + case ECONNRESET: + prError = PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR; + break; + case EDEADLK: + prError = PR_DEADLOCK_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EDIRCORRUPTED + case EDIRCORRUPTED: + prError = PR_DIRECTORY_CORRUPTED_ERROR; + break; +#endif +#ifdef EDQUOT + case EDQUOT: + prError = PR_NO_DEVICE_SPACE_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EEXIST: + prError = PR_FILE_EXISTS_ERROR; + break; + case EFAULT: + prError = PR_ACCESS_FAULT_ERROR; + break; + case EFBIG: + prError = PR_FILE_TOO_BIG_ERROR; + break; + case EINPROGRESS: + prError = PR_IN_PROGRESS_ERROR; + break; + case EINTR: + prError = PR_PENDING_INTERRUPT_ERROR; + break; + case EINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case EIO: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case EISCONN: + prError = PR_IS_CONNECTED_ERROR; + break; + case EISDIR: + prError = PR_IS_DIRECTORY_ERROR; + break; + case ELOOP: + prError = PR_LOOP_ERROR; + break; + case EMFILE: + prError = PR_PROC_DESC_TABLE_FULL_ERROR; + break; + case EMLINK: + prError = PR_MAX_DIRECTORY_ENTRIES_ERROR; + break; + case EMSGSIZE: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EMULTIHOP + case EMULTIHOP: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ENAMETOOLONG: + prError = PR_NAME_TOO_LONG_ERROR; + break; + case ENETUNREACH: + prError = PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR; + break; + case ENFILE: + prError = PR_SYS_DESC_TABLE_FULL_ERROR; + break; +#if !defined(SCO) + case ENOBUFS: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ENODEV: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case ENOENT: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case ENOLCK: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef ENOLINK + case ENOLINK: + prError = PR_REMOTE_FILE_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ENOMEM: + prError = PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR; + break; + case ENOPROTOOPT: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case ENOSPC: + prError = PR_NO_DEVICE_SPACE_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef ENOSR + case ENOSR: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ENOTCONN: + prError = PR_NOT_CONNECTED_ERROR; + break; + case ENOTDIR: + prError = PR_NOT_DIRECTORY_ERROR; + break; + case ENOTSOCK: + prError = PR_NOT_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; + case ENXIO: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case EOPNOTSUPP: + prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EOVERFLOW + case EOVERFLOW: + prError = PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EPERM: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case EPIPE: + prError = PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR; + break; +#ifdef EPROTO + case EPROTO: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EPROTONOSUPPORT: + prError = PR_PROTOCOL_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case EPROTOTYPE: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case ERANGE: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + case EROFS: + prError = PR_READ_ONLY_FILESYSTEM_ERROR; + break; + case ESPIPE: + prError = PR_INVALID_METHOD_ERROR; + break; + case ETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR; + break; +#if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN + case EWOULDBLOCK: + prError = PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case EXDEV: + prError = PR_NOT_SAME_DEVICE_ERROR; + break; + + default: + prError = PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; + break; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5d7d547bfb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/unix_err.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * this code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* NSPR doesn't make these functions public, so we have to duplicate +** them in NSS. +*/ +extern void nss_MD_hpux_map_sendfile_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_accept_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_access_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_bind_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_close_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_closedir_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_connect_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_default_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_flock_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_fstat_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_fsync_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_gethostname_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_getpeername_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_getsockname_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_getsockopt_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_listen_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_lockf_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_lseek_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_mkdir_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_mmap_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_open_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_opendir_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_poll_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_poll_revents_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_read_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_readdir_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_recv_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_recvfrom_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_rename_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_rmdir_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_select_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_send_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_sendto_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_setsockopt_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_shutdown_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_socket_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_socketavailable_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_socketpair_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_stat_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_unlink_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_write_error(int err); +extern void nss_MD_unix_map_writev_error(int err); diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..caa12b956e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.c @@ -0,0 +1,550 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * this code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "prerror.h" +#include "prlog.h" +#include <errno.h> +#include <windows.h> + +/* + * On Win32, we map three kinds of error codes: + * - GetLastError(): for Win32 functions + * - WSAGetLastError(): for Winsock functions + * - errno: for standard C library functions + * + * We do not check for WSAEINPROGRESS and WSAEINTR because we do not + * use blocking Winsock 1.1 calls. + * + * Except for the 'socket' call, we do not check for WSAEINITIALISED. + * It is assumed that if Winsock is not initialized, that fact will + * be detected at the time we create new sockets. + */ + +/* forward declaration. */ +void nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(PRInt32 err); + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_opendir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_closedir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_readdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_delete_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* The error code for stat() is in errno. */ +void +nss_MD_win32_map_stat_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_fstat_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_rename_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* The error code for access() is in errno. */ +void +nss_MD_win32_map_access_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_mkdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_rmdir_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_read_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_transmitfile_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_write_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_lseek_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_fsync_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* + * For both CloseHandle() and closesocket(). + */ +void +nss_MD_win32_map_close_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_socket_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PR_ASSERT(err != WSANOTINITIALISED); + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_recv_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_recvfrom_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_send_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEMSGSIZE: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_sendto_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEMSGSIZE: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_accept_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: + prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_acceptex_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_connect_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: + prError = PR_IN_PROGRESS_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_ALREADY_INITIATED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_IO_TIMEOUT_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_bind_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_SOCKET_ADDRESS_IS_BOUND_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_listen_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: + prError = PR_NOT_TCP_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_shutdown_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_getsockname_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_getpeername_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_getsockopt_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_setsockopt_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_open_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_gethostname_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +/* Win32 select() only works on sockets. So in this +** context, WSAENOTSOCK is equivalent to EBADF on Unix. +*/ +void +nss_MD_win32_map_select_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + switch (err) { + case WSAENOTSOCK: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; + default: + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); + return; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_lockf_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(err); +} + +void +nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(PRInt32 err) +{ + PRErrorCode prError; + + switch (err) { + case EACCES: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case ENOENT: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS: + prError = PR_FILE_EXISTS_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_DISK_CORRUPT: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_DISK_FULL: + prError = PR_NO_DEVICE_SPACE_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_DISK_OPERATION_FAILED: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_DRIVE_LOCKED: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_FILENAME_EXCED_RANGE: + prError = PR_NAME_TOO_LONG_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_FILE_CORRUPT: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_FILE_EXISTS: + prError = PR_FILE_EXISTS_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_FILE_INVALID: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; +#if ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND != ENOENT + case ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; +#endif + case ERROR_HANDLE_DISK_FULL: + prError = PR_NO_DEVICE_SPACE_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_INVALID_ADDRESS: + prError = PR_ACCESS_FAULT_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_INVALID_NAME: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_INVALID_USER_BUFFER: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_LOCKED: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_LOCKED_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NETNAME_DELETED: + prError = PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NOACCESS: + prError = PR_ACCESS_FAULT_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_MEMORY: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NOT_ENOUGH_QUOTA: + prError = PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NOT_READY: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES: + prError = PR_NO_MORE_FILES_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_OPEN_FAILED: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_OPEN_FILES: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_PATH_BUSY: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND: + prError = PR_FILE_NOT_FOUND_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_SEEK_ON_DEVICE: + prError = PR_IO_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION: + prError = PR_FILE_IS_BUSY_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_STACK_OVERFLOW: + prError = PR_ACCESS_FAULT_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPEN_FILES: + prError = PR_SYS_DESC_TABLE_FULL_ERROR; + break; + case ERROR_WRITE_PROTECT: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEACCES: + prError = PR_NO_ACCESS_RIGHTS_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEADDRINUSE: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_IN_USE_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_AVAILABLE_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEAFNOSUPPORT: + prError = PR_ADDRESS_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEALREADY: + prError = PR_ALREADY_INITIATED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEBADF: + prError = PR_BAD_DESCRIPTOR_ERROR; + break; + case WSAECONNABORTED: + prError = PR_CONNECT_ABORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAECONNREFUSED: + prError = PR_CONNECT_REFUSED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAECONNRESET: + prError = PR_CONNECT_RESET_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEDESTADDRREQ: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEFAULT: + prError = PR_ACCESS_FAULT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEHOSTUNREACH: + prError = PR_HOST_UNREACHABLE_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEINVAL: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEISCONN: + prError = PR_IS_CONNECTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEMFILE: + prError = PR_PROC_DESC_TABLE_FULL_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEMSGSIZE: + prError = PR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENETDOWN: + prError = PR_NETWORK_DOWN_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENETRESET: + prError = PR_CONNECT_ABORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENETUNREACH: + prError = PR_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENOBUFS: + prError = PR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENOPROTOOPT: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENOTCONN: + prError = PR_NOT_CONNECTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAENOTSOCK: + prError = PR_NOT_SOCKET_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEOPNOTSUPP: + prError = PR_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEPROTONOSUPPORT: + prError = PR_PROTOCOL_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEPROTOTYPE: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAESHUTDOWN: + prError = PR_SOCKET_SHUTDOWN_ERROR; + break; + case WSAESOCKTNOSUPPORT: + prError = PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR; + break; + case WSAETIMEDOUT: + prError = PR_CONNECT_ABORTED_ERROR; + break; + case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: + prError = PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR; + break; + default: + prError = PR_UNKNOWN_ERROR; + break; + } + PR_SetError(prError, err); +} diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.h b/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a698849061 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/win32err.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * This file essentially replicates NSPR's source for the functions that + * map system-specific error codes to NSPR error codes. We would use + * NSPR's functions, instead of duplicating them, but they're private. + * As long as SSL's server session cache code must do platform native I/O + * to accomplish its job, and NSPR's error mapping functions remain private, + * This code will continue to need to be replicated. + * + * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +/* NSPR doesn't make these functions public, so we have to duplicate +** them in NSS. +*/ +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_accept_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_acceptex_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_access_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_bind_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_close_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_closedir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_connect_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_default_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_delete_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_fstat_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_fsync_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_gethostname_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_getpeername_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_getsockname_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_getsockopt_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_listen_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_lockf_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_lseek_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_mkdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_open_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_opendir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_read_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_readdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_recv_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_recvfrom_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_rename_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_rmdir_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_select_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_send_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_sendto_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_setsockopt_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_shutdown_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_socket_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_stat_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_transmitfile_error(PRInt32 err); +extern void nss_MD_win32_map_write_error(PRInt32 err); |