Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esr

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1130 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92269e1ac0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/toolkit/components/url-classifier/nsUrlClassifierUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1130 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "chromium/safebrowsing.pb.h"
+#include "nsEscape.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
+#include "nsIURL.h"
+#include "nsIXULRuntime.h"
+#include "nsUrlClassifierUtils.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "plbase64.h"
+#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
+#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
+#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/Mutex.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
+#include "nsIDocShell.h"
+#include "mozilla/TextUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/Services.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIObserverService.h"
+#include "nsIPrefBranch.h"
+#include "nsIPrefService.h"
+#include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsThreadManager.h"
+#include "nsTHashSet.h"
+#include "Classifier.h"
+#include "Entries.h"
+#include "prprf.h"
+#include "prtime.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION "2.2"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::safebrowsing;
+
+static mozilla::StaticRefPtr<nsUrlClassifierUtils> gUrlClassifierUtils;
+
+static char int_to_hex_digit(int32_t i) {
+  NS_ASSERTION((i >= 0) && (i <= 15), "int too big in int_to_hex_digit");
+  return static_cast<char>(((i < 10) ? (i + '0') : ((i - 10) + 'A')));
+}
+
+static bool IsDecimal(const nsACString& num) {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mozilla::IsAsciiDigit(num[i])) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool IsHex(const nsACString& num) {
+  if (num.Length() < 3) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (num[0] != '0' || !(num[1] == 'x' || num[1] == 'X')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 2; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mozilla::IsAsciiHexDigit(num[i])) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+static bool IsOctal(const nsACString& num) {
+  if (num.Length() < 2) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (num[0] != '0') {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 1; i < num.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mozilla::IsAsciiDigit(num[i]) || num[i] == '8' || num[i] == '9') {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// SafeBrowsing V4 related utits.
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace safebrowsing {
+
+static PlatformType GetPlatformType() {
+#if defined(ANDROID)
+  return ANDROID_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_MACOSX)
+  return OSX_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_LINUX)
+  return LINUX_PLATFORM;
+#elif defined(XP_WIN)
+  return WINDOWS_PLATFORM;
+#else
+  // Default to Linux for other platforms (see bug 1362501).
+  return LINUX_PLATFORM;
+#endif
+}
+
+typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest ListUpdateRequest;
+typedef FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest_ListUpdateRequest_Constraints Constraints;
+
+static void InitListUpdateRequest(ThreatType aThreatType,
+                                  const nsCString& aStateBase64,
+                                  ListUpdateRequest* aListUpdateRequest) {
+  aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_type(aThreatType);
+  PlatformType platform = GetPlatformType();
+#if defined(ANDROID)
+  // Temporary hack to fix bug 1441345.
+  if ((aThreatType == SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC) ||
+      (aThreatType == SOCIAL_ENGINEERING)) {
+    platform = LINUX_PLATFORM;
+  }
+#endif
+  aListUpdateRequest->set_platform_type(platform);
+  aListUpdateRequest->set_threat_entry_type(URL);
+
+  Constraints* contraints = new Constraints();
+  contraints->add_supported_compressions(RICE);
+  aListUpdateRequest->set_allocated_constraints(contraints);
+
+  // Only set non-empty state.
+  if (!aStateBase64.IsEmpty()) {
+    nsCString stateBinary;
+    nsresult rv = Base64Decode(aStateBase64, stateBinary);
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+      aListUpdateRequest->set_state(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length());
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static ClientInfo* CreateClientInfo() {
+  ClientInfo* c = new ClientInfo();
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+
+  nsAutoCString clientId;
+  nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref("browser.safebrowsing.id", clientId);
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    clientId = "Firefox";  // Use "Firefox" as fallback.
+  }
+
+  c->set_client_id(clientId.get());
+
+  return c;
+}
+
+static bool IsAllowedOnCurrentPlatform(uint32_t aThreatType) {
+  PlatformType platform = GetPlatformType();
+
+  switch (aThreatType) {
+    case POTENTIALLY_HARMFUL_APPLICATION:
+      // Bug 1388582 - Google server would respond 404 error if the request
+      // contains PHA on non-mobile platform.
+      return ANDROID_PLATFORM == platform;
+    case MALICIOUS_BINARY:
+    case CSD_DOWNLOAD_WHITELIST:
+      // Bug 1392204 - 'goog-downloadwhite-proto' and 'goog-badbinurl-proto'
+      // are not available on android.
+      return ANDROID_PLATFORM != platform;
+  }
+  // We allow every threat type not listed in the switch cases.
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // end of namespace safebrowsing.
+}  // end of namespace mozilla.
+
+// static
+already_AddRefed<nsUrlClassifierUtils>
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetXPCOMSingleton() {
+  if (gUrlClassifierUtils) {
+    return do_AddRef(gUrlClassifierUtils);
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<nsUrlClassifierUtils> utils = new nsUrlClassifierUtils();
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(utils->Init()))) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Note: This is cleared in the nsUrlClassifierUtils destructor.
+  gUrlClassifierUtils = utils.get();
+  ClearOnShutdown(&gUrlClassifierUtils);
+  return utils.forget();
+}
+
+// static
+nsUrlClassifierUtils* nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetInstance() {
+  if (!gUrlClassifierUtils) {
+    RefPtr<nsUrlClassifierUtils> utils = GetXPCOMSingleton();
+  }
+
+  return gUrlClassifierUtils;
+}
+
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::nsUrlClassifierUtils()
+    : mProviderDictLock("nsUrlClassifierUtils.mProviderDictLock") {}
+
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::~nsUrlClassifierUtils() {
+  if (gUrlClassifierUtils) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(gUrlClassifierUtils == this);
+    gUrlClassifierUtils = nullptr;
+  }
+}
+
+nsresult nsUrlClassifierUtils::Init() {
+  // nsIUrlClassifierUtils is a thread-safe service so it's
+  // allowed to use on non-main threads. However, building
+  // the provider dictionary must be on the main thread.
+  // We forcefully load nsUrlClassifierUtils in
+  // nsUrlClassifierDBService::Init() to ensure we must
+  // now be on the main thread.
+  nsresult rv = ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Add an observer for shutdown
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
+      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+  if (!observerService) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+
+  observerService->AddObserver(this, "xpcom-shutdown-threads", false);
+  mozilla::Preferences::AddStrongObserver(this, "browser.safebrowsing");
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsUrlClassifierUtils, nsIUrlClassifierUtils, nsIObserver)
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// nsIUrlClassifierUtils
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetKeyForURI(nsIURI* uri, nsACString& _retval) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(uri);
+  if (!innerURI) innerURI = uri;
+
+  nsAutoCString host;
+  innerURI->GetAsciiHost(host);
+
+  if (host.IsEmpty()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = CanonicalizeHostname(host, _retval);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsAutoCString path;
+  rv = innerURI->GetPathQueryRef(path);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Strip fragment and query because canonicalization only applies to path
+  int32_t ref = path.FindChar('#');
+  if (ref != kNotFound) {
+    path.SetLength(ref);
+  }
+
+  int32_t query = path.FindChar('?');
+  if (query != kNotFound) {
+    path.SetLength(query);
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString temp;
+  rv = CanonicalizePath(path, temp);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  _retval.Append(temp);
+
+  if (query != kNotFound) {
+    nsAutoCString query;
+    rv = innerURI->GetQuery(query);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    _retval.AppendPrintf("?%s", query.get());
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// We use "goog-*-proto" as the list name for v4, where "proto" indicates
+// it's updated (as well as hash completion) via protobuf.
+//
+// In the mozilla official build, we are allowed to use the
+// private phishing list (goog-phish-proto). See Bug 1288840.
+static const struct {
+  const char* mListName;
+  uint32_t mThreatType;
+} THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[] = {
+    {"goog-malware-proto", MALWARE_THREAT},                   // 1
+    {"googpub-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC},       // 2
+    {"goog-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE},               // 3
+    {"goog-harmful-proto", POTENTIALLY_HARMFUL_APPLICATION},  // 4
+    {"goog-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING},                 // 5
+
+    // For application reputation
+    {"goog-badbinurl-proto", MALICIOUS_BINARY},            // 7
+    {"goog-downloadwhite-proto", CSD_DOWNLOAD_WHITELIST},  // 9
+
+    // For login reputation
+    {"goog-passwordwhite-proto", CSD_WHITELIST},  // 8
+
+    // For testing purpose.
+    {"moztest-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC},  // 2
+    {"test-phish-proto", SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC},     // 2
+    {"moztest-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE},       // 3
+    {"test-unwanted-proto", UNWANTED_SOFTWARE},          // 3
+    {"moztest-passwordwhite-proto", CSD_WHITELIST},      // 8
+    {"test-passwordwhite-proto", CSD_WHITELIST},         // 8
+};
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(uint32_t aThreatType,
+                                                   nsACString& aListNames) {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
+    if (aThreatType == THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType) {
+      if (!aListNames.IsEmpty()) {
+        aListNames.AppendLiteral(",");
+      }
+      aListNames += THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return aListNames.IsEmpty() ? NS_ERROR_FAILURE : NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ConvertListNameToThreatType(const nsACString& aListName,
+                                                  uint32_t* aThreatType) {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE); i++) {
+    if (aListName.EqualsASCII(THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mListName)) {
+      *aThreatType = THREAT_TYPE_CONV_TABLE[i].mThreatType;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProvider(const nsACString& aTableName,
+                                  nsACString& aProvider) {
+  MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
+  nsCString* provider = nullptr;
+
+  if (IsTestTable(aTableName)) {
+    aProvider = nsLiteralCString(TESTING_TABLE_PROVIDER_NAME);
+  } else if (mProviderDict.Get(aTableName, &provider)) {
+    aProvider = provider ? *provider : ""_ns;
+  } else {
+    aProvider.Truncate();
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetTelemetryProvider(const nsACString& aTableName,
+                                           nsACString& aProvider) {
+  GetProvider(aTableName, aProvider);
+  // Exceptionlist known providers to avoid reporting on private ones.
+  // An empty provider is treated as "other"
+  if (!"mozilla"_ns.Equals(aProvider) && !"google"_ns.Equals(aProvider) &&
+      !"google4"_ns.Equals(aProvider) && !"baidu"_ns.Equals(aProvider) &&
+      !"mozcn"_ns.Equals(aProvider) && !"yandex"_ns.Equals(aProvider) &&
+      !nsLiteralCString(TESTING_TABLE_PROVIDER_NAME).Equals(aProvider)) {
+    aProvider.AssignLiteral("other");
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::GetProtocolVersion(const nsACString& aProvider,
+                                         nsACString& aVersion) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+  if (prefBranch) {
+    nsPrintfCString prefName("browser.safebrowsing.provider.%s.pver",
+                             nsCString(aProvider).get());
+    nsAutoCString version;
+    nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(prefName.get(), version);
+
+    aVersion = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) ? version.get() : DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+  } else {
+    aVersion = DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeUpdateRequestV4(
+    const nsTArray<nsCString>& aListNames,
+    const nsTArray<nsCString>& aStatesBase64, nsACString& aRequest) {
+  using namespace mozilla::safebrowsing;
+
+  if (aListNames.Length() != aStatesBase64.Length()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  FetchThreatListUpdatesRequest r;
+  r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo());
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aListNames.Length(); i++) {
+    uint32_t threatType;
+    nsresult rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(aListNames[i], &threatType);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      continue;  // Unknown list name.
+    }
+    if (!IsAllowedOnCurrentPlatform(threatType)) {
+      NS_WARNING(
+          nsPrintfCString(
+              "Threat type %d (%s) is unsupported on current platform: %d",
+              threatType, aListNames[i].get(), GetPlatformType())
+              .get());
+      continue;  // Some threat types are not available on some platforms.
+    }
+    auto lur = r.mutable_list_update_requests()->Add();
+    InitListUpdateRequest(static_cast<ThreatType>(threatType), aStatesBase64[i],
+                          lur);
+  }
+
+  // Then serialize.
+  std::string s;
+  r.SerializeToString(&s);
+
+  nsCString out;
+  nsresult rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(), (const uint8_t*)s.c_str(),
+                                Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include, out);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  aRequest = out;
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeFindFullHashRequestV4(
+    const nsTArray<nsCString>& aListNames,
+    const nsTArray<nsCString>& aListStatesBase64,
+    const nsTArray<nsCString>& aPrefixesBase64, nsACString& aRequest) {
+  if (aListNames.Length() != aListStatesBase64.Length()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  FindFullHashesRequest r;
+  r.set_allocated_client(CreateClientInfo());
+
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  //-------------------------------------------------------------------
+  // Set up FindFullHashesRequest.threat_info.
+  auto threatInfo = r.mutable_threat_info();
+
+  PlatformType platform = GetPlatformType();
+
+  // 1) Set threat types.
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aListNames.Length(); i++) {
+    // Add threat types.
+    uint32_t threatType;
+    rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(aListNames[i], &threatType);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    if (!IsAllowedOnCurrentPlatform(threatType)) {
+      NS_WARNING(
+          nsPrintfCString(
+              "Threat type %d (%s) is unsupported on current platform: %d",
+              threatType, aListNames[i].get(), GetPlatformType())
+              .get());
+      continue;
+    }
+    threatInfo->add_threat_types((ThreatType)threatType);
+
+#if defined(ANDROID)
+    // Temporary hack to fix bug 1441345.
+    if (((ThreatType)threatType == SOCIAL_ENGINEERING_PUBLIC) ||
+        ((ThreatType)threatType == SOCIAL_ENGINEERING)) {
+      platform = LINUX_PLATFORM;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    // Add client states for index 'i' only when the threat type is available
+    // on current platform.
+    nsCString stateBinary;
+    rv = Base64Decode(aListStatesBase64[i], stateBinary);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    r.add_client_states(stateBinary.get(), stateBinary.Length());
+  }
+
+  // 2) Set platform type.
+  threatInfo->add_platform_types(platform);
+
+  // 3) Set threat entry type.
+  threatInfo->add_threat_entry_types(URL);
+
+  // 4) Set threat entries.
+  for (const nsCString& prefix : aPrefixesBase64) {
+    nsCString prefixBinary;
+    rv = Base64Decode(prefix, prefixBinary);
+    threatInfo->add_threat_entries()->set_hash(prefixBinary.get(),
+                                               prefixBinary.Length());
+  }
+  //-------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+  // Then serialize.
+  std::string s;
+  r.SerializeToString(&s);
+
+  nsCString out;
+  rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(), (const uint8_t*)s.c_str(),
+                       Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include, out);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  aRequest = out;
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Remove ref, query, userpass, anypart which may contain sensitive data
+static nsresult GetSpecWithoutSensitiveData(nsIURI* aUri, nsACString& aSpec) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aUri)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url(do_QueryInterface(aUri));
+  if (url) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> clone;
+    rv = NS_MutateURI(url)
+             .SetQuery(""_ns)
+             .SetRef(""_ns)
+             .SetUserPass(""_ns)
+             .Finalize(clone);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    rv = clone->GetAsciiSpec(aSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult AddThreatSourceFromChannel(ThreatHit& aHit,
+                                           nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                           ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType aType) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aChannel)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  auto matchingSource = aHit.add_resources();
+  matchingSource->set_type(aType);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCString spec;
+  rv = GetSpecWithoutSensitiveData(uri, spec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  matchingSource->set_url(spec.get());
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (httpChannel) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = httpChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
+    if (referrerInfo) {
+      nsAutoCString referrerSpec;
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> referrer = referrerInfo->GetComputedReferrer();
+      if (referrer) {
+        rv = GetSpecWithoutSensitiveData(referrer, referrerSpec);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+        matchingSource->set_referrer(referrerSpec.get());
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal =
+      do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (httpChannelInternal) {
+    nsCString remoteIp;
+    rv = httpChannelInternal->GetRemoteAddress(remoteIp);
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !remoteIp.IsEmpty()) {
+      matchingSource->set_remote_ip(remoteIp.get());
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+static nsresult AddThreatSourceFromRedirectEntry(
+    ThreatHit& aHit, nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* aRedirectEntry,
+    ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType aType) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aRedirectEntry)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+  rv = aRedirectEntry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsCString spec;
+  rv = principal->GetExposableSpec(spec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  auto source = aHit.add_resources();
+  source->set_url(spec.get());
+  source->set_type(aType);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> referrer;
+  rv = aRedirectEntry->GetReferrerURI(getter_AddRefs(referrer));
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && referrer) {
+    nsCString referrerSpec;
+    rv = GetSpecWithoutSensitiveData(referrer, referrerSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    source->set_referrer(referrerSpec.get());
+  }
+
+  nsCString remoteIp;
+  rv = aRedirectEntry->GetRemoteAddress(remoteIp);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !remoteIp.IsEmpty()) {
+    source->set_remote_ip(remoteIp.get());
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Add top level tab url and redirect threatsources to threatHit message
+static nsresult AddTabThreatSources(ThreatHit& aHit, nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!aChannel)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<mozIDOMWindowProxy> win;
+  nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
+      do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = thirdPartyUtil->GetTopWindowForChannel(aChannel, nullptr,
+                                              getter_AddRefs(win));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  auto* pwin = nsPIDOMWindowOuter::From(win);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = pwin->GetDocShell();
+  if (!docShell) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> topChannel;
+  docShell->GetCurrentDocumentChannel(getter_AddRefs(topChannel));
+  if (!topChannel) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> topUri;
+  rv = topChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(topUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  bool isTopUri = false;
+  rv = topUri->Equals(uri, &isTopUri);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !isTopUri) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+    if (loadInfo->RedirectChain().Length()) {
+      AddThreatSourceFromRedirectEntry(aHit, loadInfo->RedirectChain()[0],
+                                       ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType_TAB_RESOURCE);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Set top level tab_url threat source
+  rv = AddThreatSourceFromChannel(aHit, topChannel,
+                                  ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType_TAB_URL);
+  Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  // Set tab_redirect threat sources if there's any
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> topLoadInfo = topChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* redirectEntry;
+  size_t length = topLoadInfo->RedirectChain().Length();
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+    redirectEntry = topLoadInfo->RedirectChain()[i];
+    AddThreatSourceFromRedirectEntry(aHit, redirectEntry,
+                                     ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType_TAB_REDIRECT);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::MakeThreatHitReport(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                          const nsACString& aListName,
+                                          const nsACString& aHashBase64,
+                                          nsACString& aRequest) {
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(aListName.IsEmpty()) || NS_WARN_IF(aHashBase64.IsEmpty()) ||
+      NS_WARN_IF(!aChannel)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  ThreatHit hit;
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  uint32_t threatType;
+  rv = ConvertListNameToThreatType(aListName, &threatType);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  hit.set_threat_type(static_cast<ThreatType>(threatType));
+
+  hit.set_platform_type(GetPlatformType());
+
+  nsCString hash;
+  rv = Base64Decode(aHashBase64, hash);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || hash.Length() != COMPLETE_SIZE) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  auto threatEntry = hit.mutable_entry();
+  threatEntry->set_hash(hash.get(), hash.Length());
+
+  // Set matching source
+  rv = AddThreatSourceFromChannel(hit, aChannel,
+                                  ThreatHit_ThreatSourceType_MATCHING_URL);
+  Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+  // Set tab url, tab resource url and redirect sources
+  rv = AddTabThreatSources(hit, aChannel);
+  Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  hit.set_allocated_client_info(CreateClientInfo());
+
+  std::string s;
+  hit.SerializeToString(&s);
+
+  nsCString out;
+  rv = Base64URLEncode(s.size(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(s.c_str()),
+                       Base64URLEncodePaddingPolicy::Include, out);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  aRequest = out;
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static uint32_t DurationToMs(const Duration& aDuration) {
+  // Seconds precision is good enough. Ignore nanoseconds like Chrome does.
+  return aDuration.seconds() * 1000;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseFindFullHashResponseV4(
+    const nsACString& aResponse,
+    nsIUrlClassifierParseFindFullHashCallback* aCallback) {
+  enum CompletionErrorType {
+    SUCCESS = 0,
+    PARSING_FAILURE = 1,
+    UNKNOWN_THREAT_TYPE = 2,
+  };
+
+  FindFullHashesResponse r;
+  if (!r.ParseFromArray(aResponse.BeginReading(), aResponse.Length())) {
+    NS_WARNING("Invalid response");
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_COMPLETION_ERROR,
+                          PARSING_FAILURE);
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  bool hasUnknownThreatType = false;
+
+  for (auto& m : r.matches()) {
+    nsCString tableNames;
+    nsresult rv = ConvertThreatTypeToListNames(m.threat_type(), tableNames);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      hasUnknownThreatType = true;
+      continue;  // Ignore un-convertable threat type.
+    }
+    auto& hash = m.threat().hash();
+    auto cacheDurationSec = m.cache_duration().seconds();
+    aCallback->OnCompleteHashFound(
+        nsDependentCString(hash.c_str(), hash.length()), tableNames,
+        cacheDurationSec);
+  }
+
+  auto minWaitDuration = DurationToMs(r.minimum_wait_duration());
+  auto negCacheDurationSec = r.negative_cache_duration().seconds();
+
+  aCallback->OnResponseParsed(minWaitDuration, negCacheDurationSec);
+
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::URLCLASSIFIER_COMPLETION_ERROR,
+                        hasUnknownThreatType ? UNKNOWN_THREAT_TYPE : SUCCESS);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// nsIObserver
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsUrlClassifierUtils::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic,
+                              const char16_t* aData) {
+  if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID)) {
+    MutexAutoLock lock(mProviderDictLock);
+    return ReadProvidersFromPrefs(mProviderDict);
+  }
+
+  if (0 == strcmp(aTopic, "xpcom-shutdown-threads")) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+    NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+    return prefs->RemoveObserver("browser.safebrowsing", this);
+  }
+
+  return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+}
+
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// non-interface methods
+
+nsresult nsUrlClassifierUtils::ReadProvidersFromPrefs(ProviderDictType& aDict) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(),
+             "ReadProvidersFromPrefs must be on main thread");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(prefs, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranch;
+  nsresult rv = prefs->GetBranch("browser.safebrowsing.provider.",
+                                 getter_AddRefs(prefBranch));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // We've got a pref branch for "browser.safebrowsing.provider.".
+  // Enumerate all children prefs and parse providers.
+  nsTArray<nsCString> childArray;
+  rv = prefBranch->GetChildList("", childArray);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Collect providers from childArray.
+  nsTHashSet<nsCString> providers;
+  for (auto& child : childArray) {
+    auto dotPos = child.FindChar('.');
+    if (dotPos < 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    nsDependentCSubstring provider = Substring(child, 0, dotPos);
+
+    providers.Insert(provider);
+  }
+
+  // Now we have all providers. Check which one owns |aTableName|.
+  // e.g. The owning lists of provider "google" is defined in
+  // "browser.safebrowsing.provider.google.lists".
+  for (const auto& provider : providers) {
+    nsPrintfCString owninListsPref("%s.lists",
+                                   nsPromiseFlatCString{provider}.get());
+
+    nsAutoCString owningLists;
+    nsresult rv = prefBranch->GetCharPref(owninListsPref.get(), owningLists);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // We've got the owning lists (represented as string) of |provider|.
+    // Build the dictionary for the owning list and the current provider.
+    nsTArray<nsCString> tables;
+    Classifier::SplitTables(owningLists, tables);
+    for (auto tableName : tables) {
+      aDict.InsertOrUpdate(tableName, MakeUnique<nsCString>(provider));
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizeHostname(const nsACString& hostname,
+                                                    nsACString& _retval) {
+  nsAutoCString unescaped;
+  if (!NS_UnescapeURL(PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(),
+                      PromiseFlatCString(hostname).Length(), 0, unescaped)) {
+    unescaped.Assign(hostname);
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString cleaned;
+  CleanupHostname(unescaped, cleaned);
+
+  nsAutoCString temp;
+  ParseIPAddress(cleaned, temp);
+  if (!temp.IsEmpty()) {
+    cleaned.Assign(temp);
+  }
+
+  ToLowerCase(cleaned);
+  SpecialEncode(cleaned, false, _retval);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalizePath(const nsACString& path,
+                                                nsACString& _retval) {
+  _retval.Truncate();
+
+  nsAutoCString decodedPath(path);
+  nsAutoCString temp;
+  while (NS_UnescapeURL(decodedPath.get(), decodedPath.Length(), 0, temp)) {
+    decodedPath.Assign(temp);
+    temp.Truncate();
+  }
+
+  SpecialEncode(decodedPath, true, _retval);
+  // XXX: lowercase the path?
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void nsUrlClassifierUtils::CleanupHostname(const nsACString& hostname,
+                                           nsACString& _retval) {
+  _retval.Truncate();
+
+  const char* curChar = hostname.BeginReading();
+  const char* end = hostname.EndReading();
+  char lastChar = '\0';
+  while (curChar != end) {
+    unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
+    if (c == '.' && (lastChar == '\0' || lastChar == '.')) {
+      // skip
+    } else {
+      _retval.Append(*curChar);
+    }
+    lastChar = c;
+    ++curChar;
+  }
+
+  // cut off trailing dots
+  while (_retval.Length() > 0 && _retval[_retval.Length() - 1] == '.') {
+    _retval.SetLength(_retval.Length() - 1);
+  }
+}
+
+void nsUrlClassifierUtils::ParseIPAddress(const nsACString& host,
+                                          nsACString& _retval) {
+  _retval.Truncate();
+  nsACString::const_iterator iter, end;
+  host.BeginReading(iter);
+  host.EndReading(end);
+
+  if (host.Length() <= 15) {
+    // The Windows resolver allows a 4-part dotted decimal IP address to
+    // have a space followed by any old rubbish, so long as the total length
+    // of the string doesn't get above 15 characters. So, "10.192.95.89 xy"
+    // is resolved to 10.192.95.89.
+    // If the string length is greater than 15 characters, e.g.
+    // "10.192.95.89 xy.wildcard.example.com", it will be resolved through
+    // DNS.
+
+    if (FindCharInReadable(' ', iter, end)) {
+      end = iter;
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (host.BeginReading(iter); iter != end; iter++) {
+    if (!(mozilla::IsAsciiHexDigit(*iter) || *iter == 'x' || *iter == 'X' ||
+          *iter == '.')) {
+      // not an IP
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  host.BeginReading(iter);
+  nsTArray<nsCString> parts;
+  ParseString(PromiseFlatCString(Substring(iter, end)), '.', parts);
+  if (parts.Length() > 4) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If any potentially-octal numbers (start with 0 but not hex) have
+  // non-octal digits, no part of the ip can be in octal
+  // XXX: this came from the old javascript implementation, is it really
+  // supposed to be like this?
+  bool allowOctal = true;
+  uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
+    const nsCString& part = parts[i];
+    if (part[0] == '0') {
+      for (uint32_t j = 1; j < part.Length(); j++) {
+        if (part[j] == 'x') {
+          break;
+        }
+        if (part[j] == '8' || part[j] == '9') {
+          allowOctal = false;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < parts.Length(); i++) {
+    nsAutoCString canonical;
+
+    if (i == parts.Length() - 1) {
+      CanonicalNum(parts[i], 5 - parts.Length(), allowOctal, canonical);
+    } else {
+      CanonicalNum(parts[i], 1, allowOctal, canonical);
+    }
+
+    if (canonical.IsEmpty()) {
+      _retval.Truncate();
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
+      _retval.Assign(canonical);
+    } else {
+      _retval.Append('.');
+      _retval.Append(canonical);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void nsUrlClassifierUtils::CanonicalNum(const nsACString& num, uint32_t bytes,
+                                        bool allowOctal, nsACString& _retval) {
+  _retval.Truncate();
+
+  if (num.Length() < 1) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t val;
+  if (allowOctal && IsOctal(num)) {
+    if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%o", &val) != 1) {
+      return;
+    }
+  } else if (IsDecimal(num)) {
+    if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(), "%u", &val) != 1) {
+      return;
+    }
+  } else if (IsHex(num)) {
+    if (PR_sscanf(PromiseFlatCString(num).get(),
+                  num[1] == 'X' ? "0X%x" : "0x%x", &val) != 1) {
+      return;
+    }
+  } else {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  while (bytes--) {
+    char buf[20];
+    SprintfLiteral(buf, "%u", val & 0xff);
+    if (_retval.IsEmpty()) {
+      _retval.Assign(buf);
+    } else {
+      _retval = nsDependentCString(buf) + "."_ns + _retval;
+    }
+    val >>= 8;
+  }
+}
+
+// This function will encode all "special" characters in typical url
+// encoding, that is %hh where h is a valid hex digit.  It will also fold
+// any duplicated slashes.
+bool nsUrlClassifierUtils::SpecialEncode(const nsACString& url,
+                                         bool foldSlashes,
+                                         nsACString& _retval) {
+  bool changed = false;
+  const char* curChar = url.BeginReading();
+  const char* end = url.EndReading();
+
+  unsigned char lastChar = '\0';
+  while (curChar != end) {
+    unsigned char c = static_cast<unsigned char>(*curChar);
+    if (ShouldURLEscape(c)) {
+      _retval.Append('%');
+      _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c / 16));
+      _retval.Append(int_to_hex_digit(c % 16));
+
+      changed = true;
+    } else if (foldSlashes && (c == '/' && lastChar == '/')) {
+      // skip
+    } else {
+      _retval.Append(*curChar);
+    }
+    lastChar = c;
+    curChar++;
+  }
+  return changed;
+}
+
+bool nsUrlClassifierUtils::ShouldURLEscape(const unsigned char c) const {
+  return c <= 32 || c == '%' || c == '#' || c >= 127;
+}
+
+// moztest- tables are built-in created in LookupCache, they contain hardcoded
+// url entries in it. moztest tables don't support updates.
+// static
+bool nsUrlClassifierUtils::IsMozTestTable(const nsACString& aTableName) {
+  return StringBeginsWith(aTableName, "moztest-"_ns);
+}
+
+// test- tables are used by testcases and can add custom test entries
+// through update API.
+// static
+bool nsUrlClassifierUtils::IsTestTable(const nsACString& aTableName) {
+  return IsMozTestTable(aTableName) || StringBeginsWith(aTableName, "test"_ns);
+}
+
+bool nsUrlClassifierUtils::IsInSafeMode() {
+  static Maybe<bool> sIsInSafeMode;
+
+  if (!sIsInSafeMode.isSome()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIXULRuntime> appInfo =
+        do_GetService("@mozilla.org/xre/runtime;1");
+    if (appInfo) {
+      bool inSafeMode = false;
+      appInfo->GetInSafeMode(&inSafeMode);
+      sIsInSafeMode.emplace(inSafeMode);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return sIsInSafeMode.value();
+}