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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 15:26:00 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 15:26:00 +0000 |
commit | 830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a (patch) | |
tree | d6a0ece6feea91f3c656166dbaa884ef8a29740e /lib/dnssec.h | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | knot-resolver-830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a.tar.xz knot-resolver-830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a.zip |
Adding upstream version 5.6.0.upstream/5.6.0upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/dnssec.h')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/dnssec.h | 191 |
1 files changed, 191 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/dnssec.h b/lib/dnssec.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fbd47c --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/dnssec.h @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +/* Copyright (C) CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-resolver@labs.nic.cz> + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later + */ + +#pragma once + +#include "lib/defines.h" +#include "lib/utils.h" +#include <libknot/packet/pkt.h> + +/** + * Initialise cryptographic back-end. + */ +KR_EXPORT +void kr_crypto_init(void); + +/** + * De-initialise cryptographic back-end. + */ +KR_EXPORT +void kr_crypto_cleanup(void); + +/** + * Re-initialise cryptographic back-end. + * @note Must be called after fork() in the child. + */ +KR_EXPORT +void kr_crypto_reinit(void); + +#define KR_DNSSEC_VFLG_WEXPAND 0x01 +#define KR_DNSSEC_VFLG_OPTOUT 0x02 + +/** DNSSEC validation context. */ +struct kr_rrset_validation_ctx { + const knot_pkt_t *pkt; /*!< Packet to be validated. */ + ranked_rr_array_t *rrs; /*!< List of preselected RRs to be validated. */ + knot_section_t section_id; /*!< Section to work with. */ + knot_rrset_t *keys; /*!< DNSKEY RRSet; TTLs may get lowered when validating this set. */ + const knot_dname_t *zone_name; /*!< Name of the zone containing the RRSIG RRSet. */ + uint32_t timestamp; /*!< Validation time. */ + uint32_t ttl_min; /*!< See trim_ttl() for details. */ + bool has_nsec3; /*!< Whether to use NSEC3 validation. */ + uint32_t qry_uid; /*!< Current query uid. */ + uint32_t flags; /*!< Output - Flags. */ + uint32_t err_cnt; /*!< Output - Number of validation failures. */ + uint32_t cname_norrsig_cnt; /*!< Output - Number of CNAMEs missing RRSIGs. */ + + /** Validation result: kr_error() code. + * + * ENOENT: the usual, no suitable signature found + * EAGAIN: encountered a different signer name + * +others + */ + int result; + const struct kr_query *log_qry; /*!< The query; just for logging purposes. */ + struct { + unsigned int matching_name_type; /*!< Name + type matches */ + unsigned int expired; + unsigned int notyet; + unsigned int signer_invalid; /*!< Signer is not zone apex */ + unsigned int labels_invalid; /*!< Number of labels in RRSIG */ + unsigned int key_invalid; /*!< Algorithm/keytag/key owner */ + unsigned int crypto_invalid; + unsigned int nsec_invalid; + } rrs_counters; /*!< Error counters for single RRset validation. */ +}; + +typedef struct kr_rrset_validation_ctx kr_rrset_validation_ctx_t; + +/** + * Validate RRSet. + * @param vctx Pointer to validation context. + * @param covered RRSet covered by a signature. It must be in canonical format. + * Its TTL may get lowered. + * @return 0 or kr_error() code, same as vctx->result (see its docs). + */ +int kr_rrset_validate(kr_rrset_validation_ctx_t *vctx, knot_rrset_t *covered); + +/** + * Return true iff the RRset contains at least one usable DS. See RFC6840 5.2. + */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +bool kr_ds_algo_support(const knot_rrset_t *ta); + +/** + * Check whether the DNSKEY rrset matches the supplied trust anchor RRSet. + * + * @param vctx Pointer to validation context. Note that TTL of vctx->keys may get lowered. + * @param sigs RRSIGs for this DNSKEY set + * @param ta Trusted DS RRSet against which to validate the DNSKEY RRSet. + * @return 0 or error code, same as vctx->result. + */ +int kr_dnskeys_trusted(kr_rrset_validation_ctx_t *vctx, const knot_rdataset_t *sigs, + const knot_rrset_t *ta); + +/** Return true if the DNSKEY can be used as a ZSK. */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +bool kr_dnssec_key_zsk(const uint8_t *dnskey_rdata); + +/** Return true if the DNSKEY indicates being KSK (=> has SEP). */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +bool kr_dnssec_key_ksk(const uint8_t *dnskey_rdata); + +/** Return true if the DNSKEY is revoked. */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +bool kr_dnssec_key_revoked(const uint8_t *dnskey_rdata); + +/** Return DNSKEY tag. + * @param rrtype RR type (either DS or DNSKEY are supported) + * @param rdata Key/digest RDATA. + * @param rdlen RDATA length. + * @return Key tag (positive number), or an error code + */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +int kr_dnssec_key_tag(uint16_t rrtype, const uint8_t *rdata, size_t rdlen); + +/** Return 0 if the two keys are identical. + * @note This compares RDATA only, algorithm and public key must match. + * @param key_a_rdata First key RDATA + * @param key_a_rdlen First key RDATA length + * @param key_b_rdata Second key RDATA + * @param key_b_rdlen Second key RDATA length + * @return 0 if they match or an error code + */ +KR_EXPORT KR_PURE +int kr_dnssec_key_match(const uint8_t *key_a_rdata, size_t key_a_rdlen, + const uint8_t *key_b_rdata, size_t key_b_rdlen); + +/* Opaque DNSSEC key struct; forward declaration from libdnssec. */ +struct dnssec_key; + +/** + * Construct a DNSSEC key. + * @param key Pointer to be set to newly created DNSSEC key. + * @param kown DNSKEY owner name. + * @param rdata DNSKEY RDATA + * @param rdlen DNSKEY RDATA length + * @return 0 or error code; in particular: DNSSEC_INVALID_KEY_ALGORITHM + */ +int kr_dnssec_key_from_rdata(struct dnssec_key **key, const knot_dname_t *kown, const uint8_t *rdata, size_t rdlen); + +/** + * Frees the DNSSEC key. + * @param key Pointer to freed key. + */ +void kr_dnssec_key_free(struct dnssec_key **key); + +/** + * Checks whether NSEC/NSEC3 RR selected by iterator matches the supplied name and type. + * @param rrs Records selected by iterator. + * @param qry_uid Query unique identifier where NSEC/NSEC3 belongs to. + * @param name Name to be checked. + * @param type Type to be checked. + * @return 0 or error code. + */ +int kr_dnssec_matches_name_and_type(const ranked_rr_array_t *rrs, uint32_t qry_uid, + const knot_dname_t *name, uint16_t type); + + +/* Simple validator API. Main use case: prefill module, i.e. RRs from a zone file. */ + +/** Opaque context for simple validator. */ +struct kr_svldr_ctx; +/** + * Create new context for validating within a given zone. + * + * - `ds` is assumed to be trusted, and it's used to validate `dnskey+dnskey_sigs`. + * - The TTL of `dnskey` may get trimmed. + * - The insides are placed on malloc heap (use _free_ctx). + * - `err_ctx` is optional, for use when error happens (but avoid the inside pointers) + */ +KR_EXPORT +struct kr_svldr_ctx * kr_svldr_new_ctx(const knot_rrset_t *ds, knot_rrset_t *dnskey, + const knot_rdataset_t *dnskey_sigs, uint32_t timestamp, + kr_rrset_validation_ctx_t *err_ctx); +/** Free the context. Passing NULL is OK. */ +KR_EXPORT +void kr_svldr_free_ctx(struct kr_svldr_ctx *ctx); +/** + * Validate an RRset with the associated signatures; assume no wildcard expansions. + * + * - It's caller's responsibility that rrsigs have matching owner, class and type. + * - The TTL of `rrs` may get trimmed. + * - If it's a wildcard other than in its simple `*.` form, it may fail to validate. + * - More generally, non-existence proofs are not supported. + * @return 0 or kr_error() code, same as kr_rrset_validation_ctx::result (see its docs). + */ +KR_EXPORT +int kr_svldr_rrset(knot_rrset_t *rrs, const knot_rdataset_t *rrsigs, + struct kr_svldr_ctx *ctx); + |