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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
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Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+==============================================================
+Authorizing (or not) your USB devices to connect to the system
+==============================================================
+
+Copyright (C) 2007 Inaky Perez-Gonzalez <inaky@linux.intel.com> Intel Corporation
+
+This feature allows you to control if a USB device can be used (or
+not) in a system. This feature will allow you to implement a lock-down
+of USB devices, fully controlled by user space.
+
+As of now, when a USB device is connected it is configured and
+its interfaces are immediately made available to the users. With this
+modification, only if root authorizes the device to be configured will
+then it be possible to use it.
+
+Usage
+=====
+
+Authorize a device to connect::
+
+ $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized
+
+De-authorize a device::
+
+ $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/DEVICE/authorized
+
+Set new devices connected to hostX to be deauthorized by default (ie:
+lock down)::
+
+ $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default
+
+Remove the lock down::
+
+ $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/authorized_default
+
+By default, Wired USB devices are authorized by default to
+connect. Wireless USB hosts deauthorize by default all new connected
+devices (this is so because we need to do an authentication phase
+before authorizing). Writing "2" to the authorized_default attribute
+causes kernel to only authorize by default devices connected to internal
+USB ports.
+
+
+Example system lockdown (lame)
+------------------------------
+
+Imagine you want to implement a lockdown so only devices of type XYZ
+can be connected (for example, it is a kiosk machine with a visible
+USB port)::
+
+ boot up
+ rc.local ->
+
+ for host in /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb*
+ do
+ echo 0 > $host/authorized_default
+ done
+
+Hookup an script to udev, for new USB devices::
+
+ if device_is_my_type $DEV
+ then
+ echo 1 > $device_path/authorized
+ done
+
+
+Now, device_is_my_type() is where the juice for a lockdown is. Just
+checking if the class, type and protocol match something is the worse
+security verification you can make (or the best, for someone willing
+to break it). If you need something secure, use crypto and Certificate
+Authentication or stuff like that. Something simple for an storage key
+could be::
+
+ function device_is_my_type()
+ {
+ echo 1 > authorized # temporarily authorize it
+ # FIXME: make sure none can mount it
+ mount DEVICENODE /mntpoint
+ sum=$(md5sum /mntpoint/.signature)
+ if [ $sum = $(cat /etc/lockdown/keysum) ]
+ then
+ echo "We are good, connected"
+ umount /mntpoint
+ # Other stuff so others can use it
+ else
+ echo 0 > authorized
+ fi
+ }
+
+
+Of course, this is lame, you'd want to do a real certificate
+verification stuff with PKI, so you don't depend on a shared secret,
+etc, but you get the idea. Anybody with access to a device gadget kit
+can fake descriptors and device info. Don't trust that. You are
+welcome.
+
+
+Interface authorization
+-----------------------
+
+There is a similar approach to allow or deny specific USB interfaces.
+That allows to block only a subset of an USB device.
+
+Authorize an interface::
+
+ $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized
+
+Deauthorize an interface::
+
+ $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/INTERFACE/authorized
+
+The default value for new interfaces
+on a particular USB bus can be changed, too.
+
+Allow interfaces per default::
+
+ $ echo 1 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default
+
+Deny interfaces per default::
+
+ $ echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/devices/usbX/interface_authorized_default
+
+Per default the interface_authorized_default bit is 1.
+So all interfaces would authorized per default.
+
+Note:
+ If a deauthorized interface will be authorized so the driver probing must
+ be triggered manually by writing INTERFACE to /sys/bus/usb/drivers_probe
+
+For drivers that need multiple interfaces all needed interfaces should be
+authorized first. After that the drivers should be probed.
+This avoids side effects.