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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
commit2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch)
tree848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz
linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h478
1 files changed, 478 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c7b2f9d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Based on arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd.
+ */
+#ifndef __ASM_UACCESS_H
+#define __ASM_UACCESS_H
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/sysreg.h>
+
+/*
+ * User space memory access functions
+ */
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/mmu.h>
+#include <asm/mte.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
+#include <asm/extable.h>
+
+static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size);
+
+/*
+ * Test whether a block of memory is a valid user space address.
+ * Returns 1 if the range is valid, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to the following test:
+ * (u65)addr + (u65)size <= (u65)TASK_SIZE_MAX
+ */
+static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ /*
+ * Asynchronous I/O running in a kernel thread does not have the
+ * TIF_TAGGED_ADDR flag of the process owning the mm, so always untag
+ * the user address before checking.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI) &&
+ (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD || test_thread_flag(TIF_TAGGED_ADDR)))
+ addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+
+ return likely(__access_ok(addr, size));
+}
+#define access_ok access_ok
+
+#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
+
+/*
+ * User access enabling/disabling.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+static inline void __uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags, ttbr;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ ttbr = read_sysreg(ttbr1_el1);
+ ttbr &= ~TTBR_ASID_MASK;
+ /* reserved_pg_dir placed before swapper_pg_dir */
+ write_sysreg(ttbr - RESERVED_SWAPPER_OFFSET, ttbr0_el1);
+ isb();
+ /* Set reserved ASID */
+ write_sysreg(ttbr, ttbr1_el1);
+ isb();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static inline void __uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags, ttbr0, ttbr1;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable interrupts to avoid preemption between reading the 'ttbr0'
+ * variable and the MSR. A context switch could trigger an ASID
+ * roll-over and an update of 'ttbr0'.
+ */
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ ttbr0 = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->ttbr0);
+
+ /* Restore active ASID */
+ ttbr1 = read_sysreg(ttbr1_el1);
+ ttbr1 &= ~TTBR_ASID_MASK; /* safety measure */
+ ttbr1 |= ttbr0 & TTBR_ASID_MASK;
+ write_sysreg(ttbr1, ttbr1_el1);
+ isb();
+
+ /* Restore user page table */
+ write_sysreg(ttbr0, ttbr0_el1);
+ isb();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void)
+{
+ if (!system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
+ return false;
+ __uaccess_ttbr0_disable();
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void)
+{
+ if (!system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
+ return false;
+ __uaccess_ttbr0_enable();
+ return true;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_disable(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool uaccess_ttbr0_enable(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(void)
+{
+ asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), ARM64_HAS_PAN,
+ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));
+}
+
+static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void)
+{
+ asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), ARM64_HAS_PAN,
+ CONFIG_ARM64_PAN));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The Tag Check Flag (TCF) mode for MTE is per EL, hence TCF0
+ * affects EL0 and TCF affects EL1 irrespective of which TTBR is
+ * used.
+ * The kernel accesses TTBR0 usually with LDTR/STTR instructions
+ * when UAO is available, so these would act as EL0 accesses using
+ * TCF0.
+ * However futex.h code uses exclusives which would be executed as
+ * EL1, this can potentially cause a tag check fault even if the
+ * user disables TCF0.
+ *
+ * To address the problem we set the PSTATE.TCO bit in uaccess_enable()
+ * and reset it in uaccess_disable().
+ *
+ * The Tag check override (TCO) bit disables temporarily the tag checking
+ * preventing the issue.
+ */
+static inline void __uaccess_disable_tco(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(0),
+ ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS));
+}
+
+static inline void __uaccess_enable_tco(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_TCO(1),
+ ARM64_MTE, CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS));
+}
+
+/*
+ * These functions disable tag checking only if in MTE async mode
+ * since the sync mode generates exceptions synchronously and the
+ * nofault or load_unaligned_zeropad can handle them.
+ */
+static inline void __uaccess_disable_tco_async(void)
+{
+ if (system_uses_mte_async_or_asymm_mode())
+ __uaccess_disable_tco();
+}
+
+static inline void __uaccess_enable_tco_async(void)
+{
+ if (system_uses_mte_async_or_asymm_mode())
+ __uaccess_enable_tco();
+}
+
+static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void)
+{
+ __uaccess_disable_tco();
+
+ if (uaccess_ttbr0_disable())
+ return;
+
+ __uaccess_enable_hw_pan();
+}
+
+static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void)
+{
+ __uaccess_enable_tco();
+
+ if (uaccess_ttbr0_enable())
+ return;
+
+ __uaccess_disable_hw_pan();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanitize a uaccess pointer such that it cannot reach any kernel address.
+ *
+ * Clearing bit 55 ensures the pointer cannot address any portion of the TTBR1
+ * address range (i.e. any kernel address), and either the pointer falls within
+ * the TTBR0 address range or must cause a fault.
+ */
+#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr)
+static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
+{
+ void __user *safe_ptr;
+
+ asm volatile(
+ " bic %0, %1, %2\n"
+ : "=r" (safe_ptr)
+ : "r" (ptr),
+ "i" (BIT(55))
+ );
+
+ return safe_ptr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
+ * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
+ * call.
+ *
+ * The "__xxx_error" versions set the third argument to -EFAULT if an error
+ * occurs, and leave it unchanged on success.
+ */
+#define __get_mem_asm(load, reg, x, addr, err, type) \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: " load " " reg "1, [%2]\n" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_##type##ACCESS_ERR_ZERO(1b, 2b, %w0, %w1) \
+ : "+r" (err), "=&r" (x) \
+ : "r" (addr))
+
+#define __raw_get_mem(ldr, x, ptr, err, type) \
+do { \
+ unsigned long __gu_val; \
+ switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \
+ case 1: \
+ __get_mem_asm(ldr "b", "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 2: \
+ __get_mem_asm(ldr "h", "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 4: \
+ __get_mem_asm(ldr, "%w", __gu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 8: \
+ __get_mem_asm(ldr, "%x", __gu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ default: \
+ BUILD_BUG(); \
+ } \
+ (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * We must not call into the scheduler between uaccess_ttbr0_enable() and
+ * uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). As `x` and `ptr` could contain blocking functions,
+ * we must evaluate these outside of the critical section.
+ */
+#define __raw_get_user(x, ptr, err) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__rgu_ptr = (ptr); \
+ __typeof__(x) __rgu_val; \
+ __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \
+ \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \
+ __raw_get_mem("ldtr", __rgu_val, __rgu_ptr, err, U); \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \
+ \
+ (x) = __rgu_val; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \
+ might_fault(); \
+ if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \
+ __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \
+ __raw_get_user((x), __p, (err)); \
+ } else { \
+ (x) = (__force __typeof__(x))0; (err) = -EFAULT; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define __get_user(x, ptr) \
+({ \
+ int __gu_err = 0; \
+ __get_user_error((x), (ptr), __gu_err); \
+ __gu_err; \
+})
+
+#define get_user __get_user
+
+/*
+ * We must not call into the scheduler between __uaccess_enable_tco_async() and
+ * __uaccess_disable_tco_async(). As `dst` and `src` may contain blocking
+ * functions, we must evaluate these outside of the critical section.
+ */
+#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(dst) __gkn_dst = (dst); \
+ __typeof__(src) __gkn_src = (src); \
+ int __gkn_err = 0; \
+ \
+ __uaccess_enable_tco_async(); \
+ __raw_get_mem("ldr", *((type *)(__gkn_dst)), \
+ (__force type *)(__gkn_src), __gkn_err, K); \
+ __uaccess_disable_tco_async(); \
+ \
+ if (unlikely(__gkn_err)) \
+ goto err_label; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define __put_mem_asm(store, reg, x, addr, err, type) \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: " store " " reg "1, [%2]\n" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_##type##ACCESS_ERR(1b, 2b, %w0) \
+ : "+r" (err) \
+ : "r" (x), "r" (addr))
+
+#define __raw_put_mem(str, x, ptr, err, type) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val = (x); \
+ switch (sizeof(*(ptr))) { \
+ case 1: \
+ __put_mem_asm(str "b", "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 2: \
+ __put_mem_asm(str "h", "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 4: \
+ __put_mem_asm(str, "%w", __pu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ case 8: \
+ __put_mem_asm(str, "%x", __pu_val, (ptr), (err), type); \
+ break; \
+ default: \
+ BUILD_BUG(); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * We must not call into the scheduler between uaccess_ttbr0_enable() and
+ * uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). As `x` and `ptr` could contain blocking functions,
+ * we must evaluate these outside of the critical section.
+ */
+#define __raw_put_user(x, ptr, err) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__rpu_ptr = (ptr); \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __rpu_val = (x); \
+ __chk_user_ptr(__rpu_ptr); \
+ \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \
+ __raw_put_mem("sttr", __rpu_val, __rpu_ptr, err, U); \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__p = (ptr); \
+ might_fault(); \
+ if (access_ok(__p, sizeof(*__p))) { \
+ __p = uaccess_mask_ptr(__p); \
+ __raw_put_user((x), __p, (err)); \
+ } else { \
+ (err) = -EFAULT; \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+#define __put_user(x, ptr) \
+({ \
+ int __pu_err = 0; \
+ __put_user_error((x), (ptr), __pu_err); \
+ __pu_err; \
+})
+
+#define put_user __put_user
+
+/*
+ * We must not call into the scheduler between __uaccess_enable_tco_async() and
+ * __uaccess_disable_tco_async(). As `dst` and `src` may contain blocking
+ * functions, we must evaluate these outside of the critical section.
+ */
+#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \
+do { \
+ __typeof__(dst) __pkn_dst = (dst); \
+ __typeof__(src) __pkn_src = (src); \
+ int __pkn_err = 0; \
+ \
+ __uaccess_enable_tco_async(); \
+ __raw_put_mem("str", *((type *)(__pkn_src)), \
+ (__force type *)(__pkn_dst), __pkn_err, K); \
+ __uaccess_disable_tco_async(); \
+ \
+ if (unlikely(__pkn_err)) \
+ goto err_label; \
+} while(0)
+
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
+#define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \
+({ \
+ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \
+ __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), \
+ __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \
+ __acfu_ret; \
+})
+
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
+#define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \
+({ \
+ unsigned long __actu_ret; \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \
+ __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \
+ (from), (n)); \
+ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \
+ __actu_ret; \
+})
+
+#define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
+#define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER
+
+extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
+static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
+{
+ if (access_ok(to, n)) {
+ uaccess_ttbr0_enable();
+ n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
+ uaccess_ttbr0_disable();
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+#define clear_user __clear_user
+
+extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
+
+extern __must_check long strnlen_user(const char __user *str, long n);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE
+struct page;
+void memcpy_page_flushcache(char *to, struct page *page, size_t offset, size_t len);
+extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_user_flushcache(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
+
+static inline int __copy_from_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
+{
+ kasan_check_write(dst, size);
+ return __copy_user_flushcache(dst, __uaccess_mask_ptr(src), size);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 on success, the number of bytes not probed otherwise.
+ */
+static inline size_t probe_subpage_writeable(const char __user *uaddr,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ if (!system_supports_mte())
+ return 0;
+ return mte_probe_user_range(uaddr, size);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SUBPAGE_FAULTS */
+
+#endif /* __ASM_UACCESS_H */