Adding upstream version 6.1.82.upstream/6.1.82

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

3 files changed, 13 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index e737dc8cd..fa3171f56 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
+	select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
 	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE	if ACPI
 	select ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
 	select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ config LOONGARCH
 	select GPIOLIB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
+	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
@@ -461,23 +463,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START
 	  specified in the "crashkernel=YM@XM" command line boot parameter
 	  passed to the panic-ed kernel).
 
-config SECCOMP
-	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
-	depends on PROC_FS
-	default y
-	help
-	  This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
-	  that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
-	  execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
-	  the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
-	  syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
-	  their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
-	  enabled via /proc/<pid>/seccomp, it cannot be disabled
-	  and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
-	  defined by each seccomp mode.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here.
-
 endmenu
 
 config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
@@ -495,10 +480,6 @@ config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
 	  or have huge holes in the physical address space for other reasons.
 	  See <file:Documentation/mm/numa.rst> for more.
 
-config ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
-	def_bool y
-	depends on TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
-
 config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE
 	def_bool y
 	depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c
index 434bfc1cd..18a2b37f4 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ void play_dead(void)
 		addr = iocsr_read64(LOONGARCH_IOCSR_MBUF0);
 	} while (addr == 0);
 
+	local_irq_disable();
 	init_fn = (void *)TO_CACHE(addr);
 	iocsr_write32(0xffffffff, LOONGARCH_IOCSR_IPI_CLEAR);
 
@@ -473,7 +474,6 @@ asmlinkage void start_secondary(void)
 	sync_counter();
 	cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
 	set_my_cpu_offset(per_cpu_offset(cpu));
-	rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);
 
 	cpu_probe();
 	constant_clockevent_init();
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/tlb.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/tlb.c
index da3681f13..eeb2d815c 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/tlb.c
@@ -271,12 +271,16 @@ void setup_tlb_handler(int cpu)
 		set_handler(EXCCODE_TLBNR * VECSIZE, handle_tlb_protect, VECSIZE);
 		set_handler(EXCCODE_TLBNX * VECSIZE, handle_tlb_protect, VECSIZE);
 		set_handler(EXCCODE_TLBPE * VECSIZE, handle_tlb_protect, VECSIZE);
-	}
+	} else {
+		int vec_sz __maybe_unused;
+		void *addr __maybe_unused;
+		struct page *page __maybe_unused;
+
+		/* Avoid lockdep warning */
+		rcu_cpu_starting(cpu);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-	else {
-		void *addr;
-		struct page *page;
-		const int vec_sz = sizeof(exception_handlers);
+		vec_sz = sizeof(exception_handlers);
 
 		if (pcpu_handlers[cpu])
 			return;
@@ -292,8 +296,8 @@ void setup_tlb_handler(int cpu)
 		csr_write64(pcpu_handlers[cpu], LOONGARCH_CSR_EENTRY);
 		csr_write64(pcpu_handlers[cpu], LOONGARCH_CSR_MERRENTRY);
 		csr_write64(pcpu_handlers[cpu] + 80*VECSIZE, LOONGARCH_CSR_TLBRENTRY);
-	}
 #endif
+	}
 }
 
 void tlb_init(int cpu)